Basic Meaning
A negation that denies one thing in such a way that it clearly implies another.
Has the sense of
This is the type of negation most commonly used by proponents of other-emptiness. For instance, by denying the existence of adventitious stains, they imply the presence of enlightened qualities.
dgag pa'i nang gses/ rang dngos su rtogs pa'i blo'am rang brjod pa'i sgras rang gi dgag bya bkag pa'i shul du chos gzhan 'phen pa/ lhas sbyin tshon po nyin par zas mi za/ zhes pa lta bu/ tshon po yin pas zas za bar bstan cing/ nyin par zas za ba bkag pa'i shul du chos gzhan te mtshan mor zas za ba don gyis 'phangs pa'o
In contrast to a nonimplicative negation—the linguistically-bound negation of deconstruction—an implicative negation (Sanskrit paryudāsa-pratiṣedha; Tibetan ma yin dgag) is the type of negation preferred by the proponents of “other-emptiness,” like the Jonang tradition, in the way they approach the ultimate truth. An implicative negation is a negation that points beyond its constructed identity to something other. In this case, the system of linguistic representation does not merely deconstruct itself and succumb to the absence of its self-referential self-destruction. Rather, it is understood to imply, or presume, something else. The classic example of an implicative negation is: “The fat Devadatta does not eat during the day.” While this statement is explicitly a negation, the connotative force of the statement implies something else: that he eats at night. This leaves the interpreter with an unstated, yet implied, state of affairs. In contrast, when we consider the classic example of a nonimplicative negation, “Brahmins should not drink alcohol,” we can see how the connotative force of this negation is simple denial devoid of implication. (Douglas Duckworth, "Onto-theology and Emptiness: The Nature of Buddha-Nature" [Journal of the American Academy of Religion 82, no. 4, 2014], 1076).
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