Kadam
Kadam
Basic Meaning
The Kadam tradition, which traces its origin to the teachings of Atiśa, was the first of the so-called New Schools of Tibetan Buddhism, traditions which arose during or after the Second Propagation of Buddhism (phyi dar) in the tenth century.
distinctive view of ultimate truth (don dam bden pa; paramārthasatya) and propagated this view widely and earned much scorn for it, leading to one of the most controversial doctrinal-sectarian disputes in Tibetan Buddhist history. His explication of other-emptiness, which he equates with the ultimate truth, is deemed radical and wholly unacceptable by many of his contemporaries and later Tibetan scholars because it stands in sharp contrast to the mainstream fourteenth-century and early-fifteenth-century Tibetan interpretations of self-emptiness, the notion that all phenomena including ultimate truth do not exist inherently. The
self-emptiness interpretations are based primarily on Indie sources such as the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, Nāgārjuna's (c. 200) Madhyamakakārikā, and Candrakīrti's (c. 570-640) Madhyamakāvatāra. In contrast, Dolpopa generally does not claim that middle wheel treatises (’khor lo bar pa’i gzhung) such as the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras are the fundamental sources for his presentation of an other-emptiness view. Rather, he bases his formulation of other-emptiness on tantric sources such as the Kālacakra,2 last wheel suūtras {'khor lo tha ma’i mdo) such as Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra,3 and Indic commentarial sources4 traditionally credited to figures such as Maitreya, Asaṅga (c. 300), and Vasubandhu (c. 300).
As a prominent fourteenth-century Tibetan doxographer, Dolpopa, however, does not repudiate self-emptiness per se; rather, he speaks of two types of emptiness5 that have separate referent points. For him, self-emptiness refers only to conventional phenomena such as tables, chairs,
and negative defilements that do not inherently exist6 or that are empty of their own entities. Dolpopa argues that since conventional phenomena cannot withstand analysis, in that their individual entities are essentially empty or deconstructed, as the existence of their nature is thoroughly investigated, they are empty of inherent existence. Therefore, he claims
that self-emptiness is not ultimate truth.7
On the other hand, he passionately demonstrates that other-emptiness exists inherently and ultimately. Furthermore, it is identified with the tathâgata-essence (de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po, tathdgatagarbha or buddha-nature (sangs rgyas kyi rigs; buddhagotra) endowed with enlightened qualities that exists in all beings. Dolpopa argues that this form of emptiness is not empty of its own entity, since it ultimately and permanently exists. Also, ultimate truth is empty of all conventional phenomena that are antithetical to ultimately existent other-emptiness. So, while self-emptiness, which he refers to as "empty-emptiness" (stong pa’i stong pa), is primarily taught in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras of the middle wheel teachings, it is not ultimate truth, as it is empty of its own entity and it is not free from conceptual thought. On the other hand, other-emptiness, which he dubs "non-empty-emptiness" (mi stong pa’i stong pa), while not primarily taught in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, is delineated in last wheel teachings of the Buddha, such as Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, Śrīmālādevīsūtra, and others to refer to the naturally enlightened buddha-nature that is empty of all conventional phenomena. This is Dolpopa’s position on the two types of emptiness and the hierarchy of Mahāyāna literature in a nutshell and much of the discourse that follows on other-emptiness in the history of Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism has its roots in Dolpopa’s doctrinal formulation of other-emptiness vis-à-vis self-emptiness.
While Dolpopa certainly gets the well-deserved credit for making other-emptiness "a place of fundamental importance in the expression of
his philosophy"8 in Tibet, his controversial interpretation of Mahāyāna texts and the relative early availability of his writings to international scholars has perhaps led some to assume that Dolpopa’s thought is more original than it really was. Fortunately, the recent release of dozens of Kadam (bka’ gdams) volumes of previously unknown philosophical texts that predate Dolpopa allows us to reconsider this issue. Among the new texts that might be pertinent to a reconstruction of the early history of other-emptiness discourse in Tibet is the writing of Rinchen (rin chen ye shes, 13th-14th c.) in conjunction with the previously available Buton’s (bu ston rin chen grub, 1290-1364) Precious Garland of Rebuttals (’phrin yig gi lan rin po che’i phreng ba).9 I argue that Dolpopa’s unique doctrinal views with respect to ultimate truth and their related Indie sources are found in Rinchen’s doctrinal formulation of Mahāyāna literature. Furthermore, there is a good reason to argue that Dolpopa’s unique views were directly influenced by the Kadam scholar.10 Therefore, in this article, I analyze their points of convergence and divergence on the issues of buddha-nature,
Interpretation of Buddha-Nature by Ngok Loden Sherab and Chapa Chökyi Senge
The old Kadam masters have written many works on Buddha-Nature and their teachings have influenced many other scholars in all Tibetan Buddhist traditions. However, today their teachings have declined, most of it being neglected. It is even difficult to find Kadam writings, and it is therefore pertinent that a special opportunity to make a presentation on the early Kadam tradition is given. Atiśa received the Mahāyāna tradition of both the profound view tradition from Nāgārjuna and vast praxis tradition from Asaṅga, and his followers included both those following the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika and Svātantrika Mādhyamika tradition.
Among the most prominent early Kadam masters on Buddha-Nature is Ngok Lotsāwa Loden Sherab, who was not only the main transmitter of the Ultimate Continuum, the main book on Buddha-Nature, but also a first and major commentator. After explaining the etymology of tathāgatagarbha, gotra, dhatu, etc., Khenpo Tenkyong explains Ngok's understanding of tathāgarbha as emptiness of own being or self-existence and as a reality which cannot be found if investigated by ultimate analysis. Thus, emptiness is not an object of cognition and not a knowable thing. Such ultimate truth qua emptiness is the nature of the illusory conventional phenomena, and the two truths, i.e. emptiness of own being and illusory appearance, coalesce to form the union of two truths. Such emptiness and conventional appearance exist from primordial existence and are not newly contrived and created.
Discussing Chapa, whose understanding is from his trilogy on the Middle Way, he argues that Chapa asserts the absence of phenomena when investigated by ultimate analysis is ultimate truth. The presence of phenomena when not investigated by analysis is conventional truth. They are one by nature but different in aspects. Unlike Ngok, Chapa argued that the ultimate qua emptiness can be found when investigated through ultimate analysis. This led to a heated discussion on whether there is something truly existent or hypostatically existent in the Madhyamaka tradition.| Term Variations | |
|---|---|
| Key Term | Kadam |
| Topic Variation | Kadam |
| Tibetan | བཀའ་གདམས་ ( ka dam) |
| Wylie Tibetan Transliteration | bka' gdams ( ka dam) |
| Buddha-nature Site Standard English | Kadam |
| Term Information | |
| Source Language | Tibetan |
| Basic Meaning | The Kadam tradition, which traces its origin to the teachings of Atiśa, was the first of the so-called New Schools of Tibetan Buddhism, traditions which arose during or after the Second Propagation of Buddhism (phyi dar) in the tenth century. |
| Term Type | School |
| Definitions | |
