Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka
Basic Meaning
Along with Yogācāra, it is one of the two major philosophical schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Founded by Nāgārjuna around the second century CE, it is rooted in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras, though its initial exposition was presented in Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.
This dissertation begins with definitions of the term "tathāgatagarbha" and some of its synonyms which are followed by a brief review of the historical development of the Tathāgatagarbha theory from India to China. With these as the background knowledge, it is easier to point out the fallacies of the two Japanese scholars' criticism on this theory. A key issue in their criticism is that they viewed the Tathāgatagarbha theory as the ātman of the Upaniṣads in disguise. It is therefore necessary to discuss not only the distinction between the ātman mentioned in the Tathāgatagarbha theory and that in the Upaniṣads but also the controversy over the issue of ātman versus anātman among the Buddhist scholars.
In the discussion to clarify the issue of ātman in the Tathāgatagarbha theory, it is demonstrated that the ātman in the Tathāgatagarbha theory is not only uncontradictory to the doctrine of anātman in Buddhism but very important to the Bodhisattva practices in the Mahāyāna Buddhism. It functions as a unity for the Bodhisattvas to voluntarily return to the world of saṃsāra again and again. Furthermore, the purport of the entire theory, that all sentient beings are endowed with the essence of the Buddha, supports various Bodhisattva practices such as the aspiration to save all beings in the world, the six perfections, etc. In a word, the Tathāgatagarbha theory is an excellent representative of the soteriology of the Mahāyāna Buddhism. Included in the end of this dissertation is an annotated translation of the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra. (Source Accessed May 26, 2020)
In this chapter I will look into interpretations of buddha-nature starting with the Sublime Continuum (Uttaratantra, ca. fourth century), the first commentarial treatise focused on this subject. I will then present its role(s) in Mahāyāna Buddhism in general, and in the interpretations of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka in particular. Next I will discuss the role of buddha-nature as a key element in the theory and practice of Buddhist tantra, which will lead into a discussion of this doctrine in light of pantheism ("all is God"). Thinking of buddha-nature in terms of pantheism can help bring to light significant dimensions of this strand of Buddhist thought. (Duckworth, introduction, 235)
Gorampa's text is polemical, and his targets are two of Tibet's greatest thinkers: Tsongkhapa, founder of the Gelug school, and Dolpopa, a founding figure of the Jonang school. Distinguishing the Views argues that Dolpopa has fallen into an eternalistic extreme, whereas Tsongkhapa has fallen into nihilism, and that only the mainstream Sakya view—what Gorampa calls "freedom from extremes"—represents the true middle way, the correct view of emptiness. Suppressed for years in Tibet, this seminal work today is widely regarded and is studied in some of Tibet's greatest academic institutions.
Gorampa's treatise has been translated and annotated here by two leading scholars of Tibetan Buddhist philosophy, and a critical edition of the Tibetan text on facing pages gives students and scholars direct access to Gorampa's own words. José Cabezón's extended introduction provides a thorough overview of Tibetan polemical literature and contextualizes the life and work of Gorampa both historically and intellectually. Freedom from Extremes will be indispensable for serious students of Madhyamaka thought. (Source: Wisdom Publications)The Fundamental Potential for Enlightenment sets forth an analysis of the natural and developed potential within all of us from the perspectives of the two main schools of mahayana thought–the Mind-Only school and the Middle Way school. It explains how this potential is transformed into the state of enlightenment and gives comprehensive definitions and explanations clearly establishing the existence and nature of the various facets of enlightenment.
(Source: back cover)Buddha-nature comes to shape a Madhyamaka interpretation of emptiness in a positive light in a way that parallels its place in a Yogācāra interpretation (as a positive foundation of mind and reality). Buddha-nature supplements a Yogācāra theory of mind and reality by offering a positive alternative to a theory of consciousness that otherwise functions simply as the distorted cognitive structure of suffering. It thus is not only the potential for an awakened mind, but the cognitive content of awakening, too.
In Tibet we see the interpretation of buddha-nature converge with Mahāyāna doctrines in structurally parallel ways. Paired with buddha-nature, the doctrine of emptiness in Madhyamaka pivots from a “self-empty” lack of intrinsic nature to an “other-empty,” pure ground that remains. In narratives of disclosure characteristic of the doctrine of buddha-nature, we also see parallel shifts in the foundations of Yogācāra, as grounds of distortion like the basic consciousness, the dependent nature, and self-awareness are reinscribed into a causal story that takes place within a pure, gnostic ground.Lion of Speech: The Life of Mipham Rinpoche offers a translation of Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche’s biography of Mipham Rinpoche, left behind in Tibet when Khyentse Rinpoche went into exile in 1959 and lost for eighty years before its discovery by an extraordinary stroke of good fortune. The biography is written as a traditional namthar, an account of the “life and liberation” of a man who is widely considered to be among the greatest scholars and accomplished masters in the history of Tibetan Buddhism. One of the striking features of Khyentse Rinpoche’s account is that it downplays the “miraculous” aspects of Mipham’s life and activities—perhaps as a means of bringing into sharper focus the effect that Mipham had on his contemporaries as a spiritual master, scholar, and teacher.
On Understanding and Practice of Buddha-Nature in Drukpa Kagyu Tradition
Explaining the concept of spiritual gene, or gotra, in the Madhyamaka tradition in general through citations from sūtras and commentarial literature, Lopen Damcho Dorji presents Buddha-Nature in the Drukpa Kagyu school, particularly as found in the writings of Pema Karpo, as the sphere of reality which is the emptiness free from all elaborations, specifically the emptiness of the mental consciousness. Pema Karpo, he explains, considers an emptiness transcending all extremes of existence, nonexistence, both, and neither to be buddha-nature and not a mere negation of true existence.
Mipam ( 'ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846–1912) is one of the most prolific thinkers in the history of Tibet and is a key figure in the Nyingma tradition of Buddhism. His works continue to be widely studied in the Tibetan cultural region and beyond. This book provides an in-depth account of Mipam’s view, drawing on a wide range of his works and offering several new translations. Douglas S. Duckworth shows how a dialectic of presence and absence permeates Mipam’s writings on the Middle Way and Buddha-nature.
Among the distinctive aspects of Shakya Chokden s oeuvre are his several contributions to the history of Buddhist thought. Historical writing in Tibet (chapter 11) was interested above all in important political or religious events, and the lives of the major actors. Doctrinal or intellectual history was generally ignored, no doubt in part be- cause the outlook fostered in the monastic colleges was one of perennialism: the truths revealed in the Buddha s teaching were eternal, and thus exempt from the process of historical change. Knowledgeable scholars were, of course, aware that commentarial and interpretive traditions did have a history of sorts, but this awareness tended to be expressed in their own commentarial notes, not in dedicated doctrinal histories. In Shakya Chokden's writings, however, we find sustained historical essays on Indian and Tibetan traditions of logic and epistemology, and of the Madhyamaka philosophy inspired by Nāgārjuna. The selections given here are drawn from his work on the latter, and may serve as an introductory guide to the philosophical writings included in the remainder of this chapter.
Shakya Chokden's discussion turns on the distinction made by Tibetan thinkers between two types of argument, termed in the present translation "autonomous reason” and "consequence.” The first refers to the method of using positive proof to demonstrate the truth or falsehood of a given proposition. The second, by contrast, only seeks to undermine the propositions advanced by a (real or presumed) opponent by drawing out their untenable consequences, and so is similar to reductio ad absurdum, or “indirect Proof,” in Western systems of logic. This distinction was often considered by Tibetans to he the basis for designating two distinct schools of Madhyamaka philosophy, Svātantrika (Autonomous Reasoning) and Prāsańgika (Consequentialist). MTK (Komarovski, Sources of Tibetan Tradition, 373)
Section II investigates the complex, and controversial, problem of whether a (Prāsaṅgika) Mādhyamika may, within the frame of his school's philosophy, assert a thesis (pratijñā) and maintain a philosophical position (pakṣa, mata). It is a reworked and expanded version of an earlier study: 'On the thesis and assertion in the Madhyamaka/dBu ma' in E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher (ed.), Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist religion and philosophy (Proceedings of the Csoma de Korös Symposium held at Velm-Vienna, 13-19 September 1981 (Vienna, 1983), pp. 205-241).
Section III concerns the very significant place occupied in Tsoṅ kha pa's Madhyamaka philosophy by the ideas and methods of epistemological and logical system (pramāṇavidyā) of Dharmakīrti. It is an expanded version of a study first published in 1991: 'On pramāṇa theory in Tsoṅ khap pa's Madhyamaka philosophy' in E. Steinkellner (ed.), Studies in the Buddhist epistemological tradition (Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference, Vienna, 11-16 June, 1989, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophische-Historische Klasse, Denkschriften, 222. Band (Vienna, 1991), pp. 281-310).
Part II of these Studies will contain annotated translations of Candrakīrti's Sanskrit commentary on Madhyamakakārikā i.1 taken from his renowned Prasannapadā madhyamakavṛttiḥ and of rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen's Tibetan Summary-Memorandum on the Eight Crucial Points in Madhyamaka philosophy (dKya' gnad/gnas brgyad kyi zin bris). (Source: foreword in Part I)
More specifically, my objective has been to make a contribution to the ongoing investigations into the history of Buddhist philosophy by focussing on one Buddhist author's interpretation of a specific topic— the doctrine of anātma— and providing an analysis of it in relation to the views of several other Buddhist schools. I have attempted to demonstrate how Acarya Candrakirti's theory of self is significantly different from the generally accepted Buddhist explanation of this topic. In doing so, several relevant areas of Candrakirti's overall system are also examined. With regard to his Prasangika views on logic, I have introduced new material from the writings of Svatantrika scholars for the purpose of further clarifying the nature of the differences between these two Madhyamika schools of thought.
Part Two consists of a translation of Candrakirti's most comprehensive discussion of his views on the self. This text was not previously available in English. In several instances my translation also corrects misinterpretations that occur in the incomplete French translation of Professor Louis de la Vallée Poussin. The text consists of a section of the sixth chapter from Acarya Candrakirti's Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya. Since the original Sanskrit is not extant, my translation is based on the Tibetan translation. For a manuscript I have used the 1912 edition prepared by Professor Poussin and published by the Russian Imperial Academy of Sciences as Volume IX of the Bibliotheca Buddhica series. In preparing the English translation, Professor Poussin's French translation as well as a partial Sanskrit reconstruction by N. Aiyaswami Sastri were consulted; however the most useful aid proved to be the Tibetan translation of a 12th century Indian commentary to Candrakirti's text composed by a certain Jayānanda and entitled Madhyamakāvatāratīka. This work provides a literal explanation for almost every word of Candrakirti's text and was extremely helpful for understanding numerous obscure passages.
Although several of the texts cited in Part One of the dissertation can be found in translations prepared by other scholars, I have presented my own version for all these quotations in order to maintain a consistency of style and terminology. The one exception occurs in the chapter on Prasangika logic, for which ample explanation is given there. (Engle, preface, iii–v)
The book follows the original Indian sources as well as the standard commentaries on Madhyamaka in the Kagyü School of Tibetan Buddhism. At the same time, these materials are adapted for a contemporary audience, combining the familiar sharpness of Madhyamaka reasonings (launching a massive assault on our cherished belief systems) with exploring the practical relevance of the Madhyamaka way of mind training.
Part One of the book, "The General Presentation of Madhyamaka in the Kagyü Tradition," provides an overview of the transmission of Madhyamaka from India to Tibet and its relation to Vajrayāna and Mahāmudrā, followed by a general presentation of Madhyamaka in terms of ground, path, and fruition. Further chapters are devoted to the Autonomist-Consequentialist distinction, the controversial issue of "Shentong-Madhyamaka," the distinction between expedient and definitive meaning, and a penetrating presentation of the major differences between the Eight Karmapa's and Tsongkhapa's interpretations of Madhyamaka.
Part Two consists of a brief introduction to the Bodhicaryāvatāra and a translation of the Second Pawo Rinpoche's commentary on its ninth chapter (on knowledge).
(Source: book jacket) By down-playing the late commentorial traditions, the author attempts a general reappraisal of the epistemological and ontological writings of Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. He concludes that the overlap in all areas of doctrine is significant, but particularly with respect to the teachings on the levels of truth, the enlightened and unenlightened states, the status of language and the nature of reality
Frauwallner's way of translating was straightforward: to remain as close as possible to the original text while presenting it in a clear and readable way in order to convey an accurate impression of its meaning. For technical terms in the source materials he maintained a single translation even when various meanings were suggested. For clarity regarding such variations of meaning he relied on the context and his explanation.
The same approach was taken by the translator of the present book. Although his translation attempts to be faithful to the 1994 edition of Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, he inserted helpful additional headlines into the text and considerably enlarged the index. All other additions by the translator are given within square brackets. Besides this, he created an Appendix, which contains one of Frauwallner's more important articles "Amalavijnana and Alayavijnana" (1951) to complement the long Yogacara section of the book, a bibliography of selective publications after 1969. The URLs for many of the source materials were also conveniently provided. (Source: Motilal Banarsidass)Paul Williams places this controversy in its Indian and Tibetan context. He traces in detail Mi pham's position in his commentary on the Bodhicaryaāvatāra, the attack of one of his opponents, and his response, as well as indicating ways in which this controversy over the nature of awareness may be important within the context of Mi pham's rNyingma heritage of rDzogs chen thought and practice.
This book is the first book length study of its subject, and also includes a reprint of a previous paper by Williams on the reflexive nature of awareness, as well as the relevant Tibetan texts from Mi pham. The book will be of interest to all students of Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka, as well as associated areas of Buddhist thought such as Yogācāra and the philosophy of Dharmakīrti. It will also be of value to those concerned with the intelectual foundations of rDzogs chen. (Source: Back cover of Routledge 2013 edition)
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Nevertheless, given their very different theoretical upbringings and doctrinal affiliations, it is inevitable that they would carry to their explanations of the Buddha-nature concept some of the basic principles and assumptions of their respective philosophical traditions. In examining and comparing the Buddha-nature teachings of Hui-yüan and Chi-tsang our present study attempts to show how the Buddha-nature concept has come to assume divergent significances when read in the context of the two main streams of thought in Mahāyāna Buddhism: Yogācāra and Mādhyamika. (Liu, "The Yogācāra and Mādhyamika Interpretations of the Buddha-nature Concept in Chinese Buddhism," 171)Buddhism, as a religion arose in ancient India and developed in various parts of the world, aims at the unique goal that is providing welfare and happiness for human beings. The real happiness brought to mankind by Buddhism is not a satisfaction of self-requirement, but a spiritual benefit
coming from enlightenment of the absolute truth, emancipation of the ego of things and persons, and free from the hindrances of passion and ignorance. Buddhism that is mainly based on teachings of the Buddha delivered at different places on different occasions continues to develop and adapt to the new challenges in the form of thought, different cultures, religions, customs and tradition of the people wherever it went. However, all the Buddha’s teachings originate in the enlightenment of the Buddha.
All traditions of Buddhism accept that the Buddha attained enlightenment through stages of meditation that led to the Buddhahood endowed with transcendent wisdom and compassion. According to some Mahāyāna scriptures, the Buddhahood is nothing other than the Buddhanature which is the inherent essence within all beings. The doctrine of the Buddha-nature presented in several Mahāyāna scriptures of the so-called Tathāgatagarbha literature was formed in about the third century CE. There is no evidence that the doctrine of Buddha-nature formed a school in India like the Śūnyatā (Emptiness) of the Mādhyamika or the Vijñaptimātratā (Consciousness-only) of the Yogācāra School, but the Buddha-nature plays an important role in the religious life of Mahāyāna Buddhism in the East and Southeast Asian countries because it provides a faith of the permanence and immortality due to a declaration that all sentient beings possess the innate Buddha-nature and have a potentiality of becoming the Buddhas.
Although most of the followers of Mahāyāna Buddhism believe the doctrine of the Buddha-nature and constantly try their best endeavor to attain the goal of Buddhahood, there were a lot of opinions that criticize the doctrine of the Buddha-nature by asserting that it is not Buddhist because this idea of the Buddha-nature seems to be akin to the permanent Self
(ātman/brahman) presented in the Vedānta of Brahmanism. Conversely, according to some other scholars, the Buddha nature or Tathāgatagarbha referred in some Mahāyāna Sūtras does not represent a substantial self or ego; it is rather a positive language to express the thought of śūnyatā and to represent the potentiality of realizing the Buddhahood through Buddhist
practices. Modern scholars today fall into an unending discussion about the similarity or difference between the Buddha-nature and Brahman but no one compares the date of these doctrines. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is an attempt to clarify the Buddhist orthodoxy of the doctrine of the Buddha-nature through chronological comparison of the date of Buddha-nature with that of Brahman. Based on the Laṅkāvatārasūtra and other scriptures, the work attempt to elucidate that the Buddhist thought of the Buddha-nature had existed prior the Vedāntic thought of Brahman. Indeed, the thesis shows that while the doctrine of the Buddha-nature had come into existence in the third century CE in the Tathāgatagarbha literature, the
Vedāntic doctrine of Brahman appeared for the first time in the sixth century CE. Consequently, although the Buddha-nature is closely akin to Brahman/ātman of the Vedānta, the doctrine of the Buddha-nature is originally a thought of Buddhism. For this reason, the writer chose the topic
entitled “Thought of Buddha-nature as Depicted in the LaṅkāvatāraSūtra” for the Ph.D. thesis.
Study on the Buddha-nature is a task which cannot be carried out without the important texts, teachings, practices and historical movements of Buddhism. This study is mainly based upon the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, a Buddhist text of the later period of the Tathāgatagarbha literature, in which
the thought of the Buddha-nature is depicted in relationship with most of the Mahāyāna concepts such as the Buddhatā, Tathāgatagarbha, Ālayavijñāna, Dharmakāya, Mind-only, etc. Especially, the Laṅkāvatārasūtra emphasizes the practice of self-realization and sudden enlightenment of the Buddha-nature. It is also said that the Sūtra was handed down by Bodhidharma to his heir disciple Hui-ke 慧可 as the proof of enlightenment in Chan (Zen) Buddhism.
This thesis is an attempt to investigate and criticize the philosophical and religious thought of the Buddha-nature as depicted in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra. In so doing, we have taken into consideration the following principle themes:
1. Evolution of the Buddha-nature Concept
2. The Buddha-nature in the Tathāgatagarbha Literature
3. The Laṅkāvatārasūtra and Hindu Philosophy
4. The Thought of Buddha-nature in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra
5. The Practice of Buddha-Nature in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra
6. Further Development of the Concept of Buddha-nature in
China
i. The Wish-fulfilling Meru: A Discourse Explaining the Origination of Madhyamaka (dBu-ma'i byung-tshul rnam-par bshad-pa'i gtam yid-bzhin lhun-po),
ii. Drop of Nectar of Definitive Meaning: Entering the Gate to the Essential Points of the Two Truth[s] (bDen-pa gnyis-kyi gnas-la 'jug-pa nges-don bdud-rtsi thigs-pa), and
iii. Great Ship of Discrimination that Sails into the Ocean of Definitive Meaning: A Treatise Differentiating the Tenets of Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika Madhyamaka (sBu-ma thal-rang gi grub-mtha'i rnam-par dbye-ba'i bstan-bcos nges-don gyi rgya-mtshor 'jug-pa'i rnam-dpyod kyi gru-chen).
The Wish-fulfilling Meru attempts in presenting in a lucid and concise way the Madhyamaka view including the Tantrik-madhyamaka, and its spread in India and Tibet. Drop of Definitive Meaning, through its brief yet succinct explanation guides us in entering the spheres of definitive meaning by means of understanding the two truth[s]—the conventional truth and the ultimate truth. Great Ship of Discrimination that sails into the Ocean of Definitive Meaning extensively explains the divergence of Madhyamaka into Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka, their philosophical views, and their interpretation of various concepts. In all, this anthology gives a general presentation of Madhyamaka schools and their views according to the great Sakyapa master. (Source: back cover)Indian literature of Madhyamaka philosophical positions. In it, Candrakīrti provides a detailed discussion of the two truths—ultimate truth (paramārthasatya) and conventional truth (saṃvṛtisatya)—arguing that all things that have these two natures and that conventional truths (which he glosses as "concealing truths") are not in fact true because they appear falsely to the ignorant consciousness. He also discusses the crucial question of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) among the unenlightened, relating it to worldly consensus (lokaprasiddha). The sixth chapter also contains one of the most detailed refutations of Yogācāra in Madhyamaka literature, treating such topics as the three natures (trisvabhāva), the foundational consciousness (ālayavijñāna), and the statements in the sūtras that the three realms of existence are "mind-only" (cittamātra). This chapter also contains Candrakīrti's most famous contribution to Madhyamaka reasoning, the sevenfold reasoning designed to demonstrate the absence of a personal self (pudgalanairātmya). Adding to and elaborating upon a fivefold reasoning found in Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Candrakīrti argues that the person does not intrinsically exist because of it: (1) not being the aggregates (skandha), (2) not being other than the aggregates, (3) not being the basis of the aggregates, (4) not depending on the aggregates, (5) not possessing the aggregates, (6) not being the shape of the aggregates, and (7) not being the composite of the aggregates. He illustrates this reasoning by applying it to the example of a chariot, which, he argues, is not to be found among its constituent parts. The sixth chapter concludes with a discussion of
the sixteen and the twenty forms of emptiness (śūnyatā), which include the emptiness of emptiness (śūnyatāśūnyatā). The work was the most widely studied and commented upon Madhyamaka text in Tibet among all sects, serving, for example, as one of the "five texts" (zhung lnga) that formed the Dge lugs scholastic curriculum. The work is preserved only in Tibetan, although a Sanskrit manuscript of verses has been discovered in Tibet. (Source: "Madhyamakāvatāra." In The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism, 489. Princeton University Press, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46n41q.27.)Term Variations | |
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Key Term | Madhyamaka |
Topic Variation | Madhyamaka |
Tibetan | དབུ་མ་ ( uma) |
Wylie Tibetan Transliteration | dbu ma ( uma) |
Devanagari Sanskrit | मध्यमक |
Romanized Sanskrit | Madhyamaka |
Chinese | 中觀見 |
Chinese Pinyin | Zhōngguān Jìan |
Buddha-nature Site Standard English | Middle Way school |
Jeffrey Hopkin's English Term | Middle Way School |
Term Information | |
Source Language | Sanskrit |
Basic Meaning | Along with Yogācāra, it is one of the two major philosophical schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Founded by Nāgārjuna around the second century CE, it is rooted in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras, though its initial exposition was presented in Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. |
Did you know? | A proponent of the Madhyamaka philosophy is known as a Mādhyamika. |
Related Terms | rangtong, zhentong |
Term Type | School |
Definitions | |
Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism | See p. 487: In Sanskrit, “Middle Way (school)”; a proponent or follower of the middle way” (madhyamapratipad); Buddhism is renowned as the middle way between extremes, a term that appears in the Buddha’s first sermon (see P. Dhammacakkappavattanasutta) in which he prescribed a middle path between the extremes of self-indulgence and self-mortification. Thus, all proponents of Buddhism are in a sense proponents of the middle way, for each school of Buddhist philosophy identifies different versions of the two extremes and charts a middle way between them. The term Madhyamaka has however come to refer more specifically to the school of Buddhist philosophy that sets forth a middle way between the extreme of eternalism (śāśvataḍṛṣṭi) and the extreme of annihilationism (ucchedaḍṛṣṭi)- The Madhyamaka school derives from the works of Nāgārjuna, the c. second century CE philosopher who is traditionally regarded as its founder. His major philosophical works, especially his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (a.k.a. Madhyamakaśāstra), as well as the writings of his disciple Āryadeva, provide the locus classicus for the school (which only seems to have been designated the Madhyamaka school after Āryadeva’s time). Commentaries on their works (by such figures as Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, and Candrakīrti) provide the primary medium for philosophical expression in the school. Madhyamaka was highly influential in Tibet, where it was traditionally considered the highest of the four schools of Indian Buddhist philosophy (Madhyamaka, Yogācāra, Sautrāntika, and Vaibhāṣika). Tibetan exegetes discerned two branches in the Madhyamaka, the Prāsaṅgika (associated with Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti) and the Svātantrika (associated with Bhāvaviveka and Śāntarakṣita). The works of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva were also widely studied in East Asia, forming the basis of the “Three Treatises” school (C. San lun zong ; K. Sam non chong; J. Sanronshū), where the three treatises are the Zhong lun (the “Middle Treatise,” or Madhyamakaśāstra), the Shi’ermen lun (“Twelve Gate Treatise,” or *Dvādaśamukhaśāstra), and the Bai Lun (“Hundred Verses Treatise,” *Śataśāstra), the latter two attributed to Āryadeva. The Madhyamaka school is most renowned for its exposition of the nature of reality, especially its deployment of the doctrines of emptiness (śūnyatā) and the two truths (satyadvaya). |
Tshig mdzod Chen mo | rtag chad kyi mtha' gnyis dang bral ba bden gnyis zung du 'jug pa'i lta ba rtsal du 'don mkhan grub mtha' smra ba bzhi'i ya gyal zhig ... |