anātman
anātman
Basic Meaning
The nonexistence of the self as a permanent, unchanging entity.
Has the Sense of
A key feature of the Buddha's teachings that stood in direct contrast to the mainstream Indian religious-philosophical notion of an eternal self, or ātman.
Through a close examination on three Sanskrit compounds — i.e., tathāgatanairātmyagarbha, tathāgatagarbhālayavijñāna and pariniṣpannasvabhāvas tathāgatagarbhahṛdayam — in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, this thesis will demonstrate how the tathāgatagarbha thought in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra is significantly enriched by Yogācāric influence.
First, in regard to tathāgata-nairātmya-garbha, a doctrinal review of the term "nairātmya" is necessary, because its definition differs according to different traditions. In primitive Buddhism, the term "nairātmya" is a synonym of the term "anātman" (non-existence of a substantial self), which indicates that in the realm of suffering and the impermanence of life phenomena that arise according to the principle of co-dependent
origination/ pratītyasamutpāda, no eternal and dependent ātman can be found. According to
the Madhyamaka School, the term "nairātmya" is a synonym of the term "niḥsvabhāva" (no
Secondly, in regard to tathāgatagarbhālayavijñāna, a doctrinal development is promoted owing to the identification of tathāgatagarbha with ālayavijñāna, which according to the Yogācāra School is also named "sarvabīljavijñāna" (cognition as the seed of everything). This latter synonym references its function of bringing forth all beings just as a giant tree originates from a seed. As a result of its identification with the ālayavijñāna, the tathāgatagarbha is said to be endowed with the function of bringing forth all forms of existence and thus becomes the "producing cause" of all. This interpretation is not seen in earlier scriptures wherein the tathāgatagarbha is described simply as a static substance supporting all beings.
Thirdly, in regard to pariniṣpannasvabhāvastathāgata-garbhahṛdayam, the implication of the tathāgatagarbha was expanded substantially by declaring that pariniṣpannasvabhāva is the very essence of tathāgatagarbha. The term "pariniṣpannasvabhāva" according to some important Yogācāra texts is defined as tathatā (ultimate realm of suchness). The combining of pariniṣpannasvabhāva with tathāgatagarbha that had formerly focused on the subjective potential of realizing wisdom, shifts the doctrinal emphasis toward the objective realm of realized perfection.
This thesis reveals that, having assimilated the Yogācāric doctrine of dharmanairātmya, ālayavijñāna and pariniṣpannasvabhāva, the tathāgatagarbha thinking in Laṅkāvatārasūtra presents the comprehensive and distinctive features in comparison to the scriptures that preceded it.
This dissertation begins with definitions of the term "tathāgatagarbha" and some of its synonyms which are followed by a brief review of the historical development of the Tathāgatagarbha theory from India to China. With these as the background knowledge, it is easier to point out the fallacies of the two Japanese scholars' criticism on this theory. A key issue in their criticism is that they viewed the Tathāgatagarbha theory as the ātman of the Upaniṣads in disguise. It is therefore necessary to discuss not only the distinction between the ātman mentioned in the Tathāgatagarbha theory and that in the Upaniṣads but also the controversy over the issue of ātman versus anātman among the Buddhist scholars.
In the discussion to clarify the issue of ātman in the Tathāgatagarbha theory, it is demonstrated that the ātman in the Tathāgatagarbha theory is not only uncontradictory to the doctrine of anātman in Buddhism but very important to the Bodhisattva practices in the Mahāyāna Buddhism. It functions as a unity for the Bodhisattvas to voluntarily return to the world of saṃsāra again and again. Furthermore, the purport of the entire theory, that all sentient beings are endowed with the essence of the Buddha, supports various Bodhisattva practices such as the aspiration to save all beings in the world, the six perfections, etc. In a word, the Tathāgatagarbha theory is an excellent representative of the soteriology of the Mahāyāna Buddhism. Included in the end of this dissertation is an annotated translation of the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra. (Source Accessed May 26, 2020)
The Buddhist Self: On Tathāgatagarbha and Ātman (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2020) by Christopher Jones
It has long been recognized that Indian Buddhist writings concerned with buddha-nature, or more narrowly the enigmatic expression tathāgatagarbha, have a complex relationship with foundational Buddhist teachings about 'not-self' (anātman). Drawing upon and developing recent scholarship concerning the relative ages of Indian Buddhist works that deal with buddha-nature, The Buddhist Self explores the likely trajectory of this complex relationship. Constituent chapters deal with all Indian texts, across Indic, Chinese and Tibetan sources, that deal with buddha-nature and the matter of how far it should be conceptualized in terms of selfhood. I argue that it is likely that our earliest sources for teaching about tathāgatagarbha, perhaps beginning with the Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra, are those which understood this term to refer to what could also be called the self (ātman). It is only later in the development of tathāgatagarbha literature that teachings about buddha-nature were elaborated to stress that this is not, after all, something of a caveat to teachings about absence of self. As such, teaching about tathāgatagarbha was perhaps originally presented as the Buddha's revelation of what is enduring and precious in the constitution of all sentient beings, and was in part a dynamic move to enter wider Indian discourse about the nature and value of the self. In 2021 The Buddhist Self was awarded the Toshihide Numata Book Award.
Kukyō ichijō hōshōron to higashiajia bukkyō: Go—nana seiki no nyoraizō, shinnyo, shushō no kenkyū『究竟一乗宝性論』と東アジア仏教 ── 五—七世紀の如来蔵・真如・種姓説の研究 [The Ratnagotravibhāga and East Asian Buddhism: A Study on the Tathāgatagarbha, Tathatā and Gotra between the 5th and 7th Centuries] (Tokyo: Kokusho kankōkai, 2020) by Li Zijie
Everyone who has had at least some glimpses at Buddhism knows that it contains various philosophical theories as well as various spiritual practices. The term ' philosophical theory ' should be understood here in a general sense comprising any attempt to make rational statements about the true nature or the fundamental principles of the totality or some part of the existent, or about those aspects of it of which everyday experience is not aware. In this sense, philosophical theories in Buddhism are, e.g., the doctrine that there is no substantial Self, no ātman; or the doctrine that the whole universe consists of momentary factors, of factors each of which lasts only for the time of an extremely short moment. ' Spiritual practice ', in the case of Buddhism, consists essentially of moral or ethical exercises, and of practices of meditation, deep concentration, or trance. As an example, we may adduce the so-called four 'infinitudes', or 'unlimited ones' (apramāṇa), i.e. the meditative practice of the attitudes of friendliness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and impartiality or equanimity with regard to all living beings. Another example is the 'contemplation of the impure' (aśubhabhāvanā). Here the Yogin, in order to subdue excessive covetousness, contemplates dead bodies in their different stages of decomposition. In this exercise, it is not necessary that the Yogin actually stays at a cemetery for the whole time. He may well continue the exercise at any other place, making use of a special meditative practice in which he is able to visualize those dead bodies he saw previously.
In this article I want to contribute to the solution of the problem of the historical relation of these two elements — philosophical theory and spiritual practice — in Buddhism. Did Buddhism usually start from philosophical theories and afterwards develop corresponding spiritual practices? Or is it more typical for Buddhism that first there are spiritual practices and that philosophical theories are only the result of a subsequent reflection which leads to a theoretical consolidation and generalization of those spiritual practices? (Schmithausen, "On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism," 235)
Potprecha Cholvijarn is the author of Nibbāna as True Reality beyond the Debate, a book about the recent debate in Thailand over the nature of nibbāna (nirvāṇa), the unconditioned, whether it is attā (self) or anattā (not-self). Western Buddhist studies, especially of recent years, have assumed that Theravāda Buddhism straightforwardly teaches the doctrine of anattā: that Theravāda Buddhism rejects attā in all respects, including in the ultimate sense. However, as the well-known debate in Thailand, which reached its zenith in 1999, has shown, there appears to be a significant minority of Theravāda monks, respected by significant numbers of Theravāda laity, arguing that nibbāna is attā.
In the book, Dr. Cholvijarn compares the Thai debate to the Tibetan Rang Stong and Gzhan Stong dispute and concludes that "they reveal two similar trends found in the history of Buddhist thought, one positing a substantial absolute beyond all conceptualization, and the other rejecting all kinds of substantial absolute. Both trends are found at various points in the history of Buddhism in different traditions."
Potprecha Cholvijarn holds a PhD in Buddhist Studies from the University of Bristol, in the UK. He is currently a special lecturer at the Thai Studies Centre, Faculty of Arts, Chulalongkorn University.Pérez-Remón's book is analytical in nature, and its immediate aim is to provide an interpretative study of the anattā doctrine as it appears in the earlier parts of the Pali canon, namely the Nikaya literature. He describes the religious views elaborated in these contexts as a soteriology, that is to say a system of moral training which considers salvation to be its prime goal. Buddhist writings on the self, he argues, are not as clear and unambiguous as is often supposed. He does not, in particular, believe that one could regard them in a purely negative light, after the manner of certain Theravada exponents. The use and the import of "self" (attā) and "non-self" (anattā) are of course central to this study. In order to facilitate his inquiry into these key terms, he introduces some important distinctions which appear for the most part to be philosophical in nature. First, there is the distinction between the self in its existential and metaphysical signification; and second, between two senses of the term non-self, one qualified and the other absolute. Previous interpretations of the anattā doctrine have not revolved around distinctions of this kind. Perez-Remon, however, is of the view that it is necessary to focus on them in order to gain a true insight into early Buddhist thinking on the nature and existence of the self.
For the complete review, click hereHumans have long grappled with the question of the nature of our Self, defined here as the ultimate reality inherent to our individual being. Religious traditions can be a great place to look when attempting to understand this aspect of our humanity. Broadly speaking, when contemplating ideas of Self in Buddhism and Hinduism, the relationship between the Buddhist notion of Buddha-nature (tathāgatagarbha) and the Hindu notion of Self (ātman), is an intriguing one: How can we understand them to be similar or different? How do the Buddhist concepts of emptiness (śūnyatā) and mind-only (cittamātra) relate to the concepts of tathāgatagarbha and ātman? Is emptiness contrary to these ideas? Are tathāgatagarbha and the Hindu teaching that ātman is equal to brahman (ultimate reality), both expressions of a non-dualistic state of mind? Although it is commonly taught that Hinduism and Buddhism differ in their understanding of Self, one thing that becomes apparent is that these are not simple questions, perhaps mainly because their answers are contextual. There are many answers that come from many different types of Hindus and Buddhists in various places. For this paper, I will be looking at commentary on the Buddhist text the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra and its use of the concept of a permanent Self and how this relates to emptiness (śūnyatā) and skillful means (upāya). This paper seeks to support my claim that, through skillful means, ātman and anātman (no-Self) are both saying something quite similar—despite the apparent paradoxical nature of this statement—and will look at Buddha-nature in the Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra as a way to understand and help articulate this thought. (Laughlin, "Tathāgatagarbha and Ātman," 57)
emptiness of man and things. . . . If one does not
speak of Buddha nature, one does not understand
emptiness.[1]
The Buddhist notion of anātman, no self, has been a source of fascination and bewilderment to Western thinkers ever since the introduction of Buddhism to the West. Yet once we accept this notion and its centrality in Buddhist thought and practice, our bewilderment is redoubled when we learn that certain texts of the tathāgatagarbha/Buddha nature lineage speak in the most positive language of such things as a Buddha nature, a pure mind and even the perfection of selfhood. How can such language be used within a tradition which places so much importance on the anātman teaching? Similarly, we are at first puzzled by the Mādhyamika teaching that everything is empty (śūnya) and that the supreme truth is emptiness. This language is the product of a man, Nāgārjuna, who is regarded as second only to the Buddha by Mahāyāna Buddhists and whose thinking forms the core of Mahāyāna philosophy. How, then, do the Buddha nature theorists intend their remarks that the Buddha nature is revealed by emptiness and that the perfections of purity, self, bliss and eternity characteristic of the dharmakāya, with which the Buddha nature is identified, are not empty (aśūnya)? Such doctrines are astonishing in the context of Mādhyamika emptiness teachings.
This study addresses these philosophical issues. What is the Buddha-nature? What is its ontological status? Why do certain texts speak of a Buddha nature? What is the place of a Buddha nature concept in the context of the history of Buddhist thought? In particular, can it be reconciled with the central teachings of anātman and śūnyatā? If so, how? In short, what does the term "Buddha nature" represent and how does it function?
I shall approach these issues through an examination of the Buddha nature concept within the context of Chinese Buddhism. The Buddha nature idea achieved a popularity and an importance in China which greatly exceeded its importance in India. China was the site of the heated and sustained "Buddha nature controversy" which revolved around the issue of whether or not all beings possess a Buddha nature. Virtually all important Buddhist schools and thinkers were obliged to commit themselves to positions on this crucial issue of the time and these positions became one of the primary criteria by which they judged each other. As a result of its being made an object of such scrutiny, the importance of the Buddha nature concept for subsequent developments of Chinese Buddhism was assured. I shall therefore be concerned toward the end of the study to consider the influences the Buddha nature concept may have had on some of these subsequent developments. (King, introduction, 1–3)
Notes
1. Fo Hsing Lun, (Buddha Nature Treatise, BNT), attributed to Vasubandhu, translated by Paramārtha. T. 31, #1610, p. 787b.America—but also, and no less importantly, in the course of its development
within historical India itself.
One way in which Buddhism has responded to these intellectual and cultural encounters can be related to hermeneutics: that is, the modes by which a tradition explains its sources and thereby interprets (or reinterprets) itself
in a continuing process of reactivation and renewal of its heritage.[1]
In the case of Buddhism this process—perhaps comparable in part to what in another context is now frequently referred to as aggiornamento—had both endogenous and exogenous causes. It was, in other words, set in train both by internal, systemically generated requirements and tensions within the
Buddhist tradition as it evolved in geographical space and historical time, and by external impulses received from its intellectual and social environment, which could be, according to the case, either positive or negative in character.
The purpose of this paper is to explore this process with respect to the Buddhist hermeneutics of the ideas of non-self (anatman) and of a spiritual matrix or germ (gotra, tathagatagarbha or Buddha-nature) and the relationship of this pair of ideas to Vedantic notions and Brahmanical social groups in classical India. Reference will be made also to certain exegetical developments that either originated in Tibet or were at least fully realized there for the first time. Our analysis will revolve around the fact that, however historically antithetical and structurally contrasting these two ideas are in Buddhism, they in fact have not invariably been treated by Buddhist hermeneuticians as contradictory or even as systematically exclusive of each other.
Because of its philosophical and religious significance in the fields of soteriology and gnoseology, the Mahāyānist theory of the tathāgatagarbha—the Germ of Buddhahood latent in all sentient beings—occupies a crucial position in Buddhist thought, and indeed in Indian thought as a whole. In virtue of both their extent and their contents, the sūtras treating the tathāgatagarbha—and the systematically related doctrines of the natural luminosity (prakṛtiprabhāsvaratā) of mind (citta) and the spiritual germ existent by nature (prakṛtistha-gotra)[2]—are amongst the most important in the Mahāyāna. The idea that the doctrine of the tathāgatagarbha and Buddha-nature is one of the supreme teachings of the Mahāyāna is explicitly stated in
the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sutra.[3]
More specifically, my objective has been to make a contribution to the ongoing investigations into the history of Buddhist philosophy by focussing on one Buddhist author's interpretation of a specific topic— the doctrine of anātma— and providing an analysis of it in relation to the views of several other Buddhist schools. I have attempted to demonstrate how Acarya Candrakirti's theory of self is significantly different from the generally accepted Buddhist explanation of this topic. In doing so, several relevant areas of Candrakirti's overall system are also examined. With regard to his Prasangika views on logic, I have introduced new material from the writings of Svatantrika scholars for the purpose of further clarifying the nature of the differences between these two Madhyamika schools of thought.
Part Two consists of a translation of Candrakirti's most comprehensive discussion of his views on the self. This text was not previously available in English. In several instances my translation also corrects misinterpretations that occur in the incomplete French translation of Professor Louis de la Vallée Poussin. The text consists of a section of the sixth chapter from Acarya Candrakirti's Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya. Since the original Sanskrit is not extant, my translation is based on the Tibetan translation. For a manuscript I have used the 1912 edition prepared by Professor Poussin and published by the Russian Imperial Academy of Sciences as Volume IX of the Bibliotheca Buddhica series. In preparing the English translation, Professor Poussin's French translation as well as a partial Sanskrit reconstruction by N. Aiyaswami Sastri were consulted; however the most useful aid proved to be the Tibetan translation of a 12th century Indian commentary to Candrakirti's text composed by a certain Jayānanda and entitled Madhyamakāvatāratīka. This work provides a literal explanation for almost every word of Candrakirti's text and was extremely helpful for understanding numerous obscure passages.
Although several of the texts cited in Part One of the dissertation can be found in translations prepared by other scholars, I have presented my own version for all these quotations in order to maintain a consistency of style and terminology. The one exception occurs in the chapter on Prasangika logic, for which ample explanation is given there. (Engle, preface, iii–v)
Frauwallner's way of translating was straightforward: to remain as close as possible to the original text while presenting it in a clear and readable way in order to convey an accurate impression of its meaning. For technical terms in the source materials he maintained a single translation even when various meanings were suggested. For clarity regarding such variations of meaning he relied on the context and his explanation.
The same approach was taken by the translator of the present book. Although his translation attempts to be faithful to the 1994 edition of Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, he inserted helpful additional headlines into the text and considerably enlarged the index. All other additions by the translator are given within square brackets. Besides this, he created an Appendix, which contains one of Frauwallner's more important articles "Amalavijnana and Alayavijnana" (1951) to complement the long Yogacara section of the book, a bibliography of selective publications after 1969. The URLs for many of the source materials were also conveniently provided. (Source: Motilal Banarsidass)See especially chapter 10, Bhavaṅga and the Brightly Shining Mind.
4.1.1 The Nirvāṇa Sūtras. Like many other ancient cultures, the Chinese, too, have a concept of a soul or abiding entity that survives the person‘s death. The Chinese word for such an abiding entity is línghún 靈魂. One of ancient China‘s largest and wealthiest temple, built in 328 (Eastern Jin dynasty) by the Indian monk, Huìlǐ 慧理,[1] is called Língyǐn Sì 靈隐寺, the "Temple of the Soul‘s Retreat," belonging to the Chán school, located north-west of Hangzhou, Zhejiang province. In its heyday, during the kingdom of Wúyuè guó 吳越國 (907-978) [5.1.2.1], the temple boasted of 9 multi-storey buildings, 18 pavilions, 72 halls, more than 1300 dormitory rooms, inhabited by more than 3000 monks. Many of the rich Buddhist carvings in the Fēilái fēng 飛來峰 grottos and surrounding mountains also date from this era.
The Chinese word for anattā (P) or anātman (Skt) (non-self) is wúwǒ 無我, literally meaning "not-I." There is no Chinese word for not-linghun. As such, although a Chinese Buddhist would intellectually or verbally accept the notion that there is no I (that is, an agent in an action), he would probably unconsciously hold on to the idea of some sort of independent abiding entity or eternal identity, that is, the linghun, which is in effect the equivalent of the brahmanical ātman. The situation becomes more complicated with Mahāyāna discourses, such as the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, that speak of a transcendent Buddhanature as the true self.[2]
Notes
1. Not to be confused with Huìlì 慧立/惠立 (615 -?), a Táng monk, who respected the works of Xuánzàng Sānzàng 玄奘三藏, and wrote a biography on him entitled Dàcíēnsì sānzàng fǎshī zhuàn 大慈恩寺三藏法師傳. When Huìlǐ 慧理 came to Hángzhōu in 326, he was drawn to the mountainous ambience as a place of "the soul‘s retreat," and founded Língyŭn monastery there. In the Liáng 梁 dynasty, Wǔdì (武帝, emperor 502-550) who generally had a positive attitude toward Buddhism endowed Língyǐn Temple with rich land properties. Emperor Jiǎnwén (簡文, r 550-552) wrote a report on this donation, one which is titled Cì língyǐnsì tián jì (賜靈隱寺田記 Report Concerning the Donation of Land to Língyǐn Temple). See http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?97.xml+id(‗b9748-96b1-5bfa‘).
2. See Dictionary of Buddhism, sv ātman| Term Variations | |
|---|---|
| Key Term | anātman |
| Topic Variation | anātman |
| Tibetan | བདག་མེད་པ་ ( dakmépa) |
| Wylie Tibetan Transliteration | bdag med pa ( dakmépa) |
| Devanagari Sanskrit | अनात्मन् |
| Chinese | 无我 |
| Chinese Pinyin | wúwǒ |
| Japanese Transliteration | muga |
| Korean Transliteration | mua |
| Buddha-nature Site Standard English | selflessness |
| Karl Brunnhölzl's English Term | identitylessness |
| Richard Barron's English Term | nonexistence of identity, lack/absence of identity |
| Jeffrey Hopkin's English Term | selflessness |
| Ives Waldo's English Term | egoless[ness] |
| Alternate Spellings | nairātmya |
| Term Information | |
| Source Language | Sanskrit |
| Basic Meaning | The nonexistence of the self as a permanent, unchanging entity. |
| Has the Sense of | A key feature of the Buddha's teachings that stood in direct contrast to the mainstream Indian religious-philosophical notion of an eternal self, or ātman. |
| Did you know? | The teaching that there is no personal self was a crucial precursor to the Buddhist concept of emptiness. |
| Related Terms | Ātman, Svabhāva, Śūnyatā |
| Term Type | Noun |
| Definitions | |
| Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism | See page 42: In Sanskrit, “no self” or “nonself” or more broadly “insubstantiality”; the third of the “three marks” (trilakṣaṇa) of existence, along with impermanence (anitya) and suffering (duḥkha). The concept is one of the key insights of the Buddha, and it is foundational to the Buddhist analysis of the compounded quality (samskrta) of existence: since all compounded things are the fruition (phala) of a specific set of causes (hetu) and conditions (pratyaya), they are therefore absent of any perduring substratum of being. |
| Rangjung Yeshe Dictionary | Nonexistence of the self of the individual personality and/ or self-nature of phenomena. |
