anātman

From Buddha-Nature

< Key Terms

Glossaryanātman

Sanskrit Noun

anātman

selflessness
अनात्मन्
བདག་མེད་པ་
无我

Basic Meaning

The nonexistence of the self as a permanent, unchanging entity.

Has the Sense of

A key feature of the Buddha's teachings that stood in direct contrast to main stream Indian religious-philosophical notion of an eternal self.

On this topic
PhD Diss
A Study of Yogācāric Influence on Tathāgatagarbha Doctrine as Found in Laṅkāvatārasūtra
Abstract

Through a close examination on three Sanskrit compounds — i.e., tathāgatanairātmyagarbha, tathāgatagarbhālayavijñāna and pariniṣpannasvabhāvas tathāgatagarbhahṛdayam — in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, this thesis will demonstrate how the tathāgatagarbha thought in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra is significantly enriched by Yogācāric influence.
      First, in regard to tathāgata-nairātmya-garbha, a doctrinal review of the term "nairātmya" is necessary, because its definition differs according to different traditions. In primitive Buddhism, the term "nairātmya" is a synonym of the term "anātman" (non-existence of a substantial self), which indicates that in the realm of suffering and the impermanence of life phenomena that arise according to the principle of co-dependent origination/ pratītyasamutpāda, no eternal and dependent ātman can be found. According to the Madhyamaka School, the term "nairātmya" is a synonym of the term "niḥsvabhāva" (no

intrinsic-nature) which implies that all beings, whether conditioned or unconditioned, are all devoid of an ever-abiding intrinsic nature. For the Yogācāra School, the reality of nairātmya is said to be grasped under the principle of mind-only. That is to say, the imagined self /kalpitātman that is the presentation of mind is unreal, while the indescribable self/ anabhilāpyātman that is the genuine mind itself is real. Finally, it can be said that the tathāgata-nairātmya-garbha in Laṅkāvatārasūtra accords well with the Yogācāra teaching. In other words, it is the Yogācāric sense of nairātmya that sheds an influence upon the tathāgatagarbha doctrine.
      Secondly, in regard to tathāgatagarbhālayavijñāna, a doctrinal development is promoted owing to the identification of tathāgatagarbha with ālayavijñāna, which according to the Yogācāra School is also named "sarvabīljavijñāna" (cognition as the seed of everything). This latter synonym references its function of bringing forth all beings just as a giant tree originates from a seed. As a result of its identification with the ālayavijñāna, the tathāgatagarbha is said to be endowed with the function of bringing forth all forms of existence and thus becomes the "producing cause" of all. This interpretation is not seen in earlier scriptures wherein the tathāgatagarbha is described simply as a static substance supporting all beings.
      Thirdly, in regard to pariniṣpannasvabhāvastathāgata-garbhahṛdayam, the implication of the tathāgatagarbha was expanded substantially by declaring that pariniṣpannasvabhāva is the very essence of tathāgatagarbha. The term "pariniṣpannasvabhāva" according to some important Yogācāra texts is defined as tathatā (ultimate realm of suchness). The combining of pariniṣpannasvabhāva with tathāgatagarbha that had formerly focused on the subjective potential of realizing wisdom, shifts the doctrinal emphasis toward the objective realm of realized perfection.
      This thesis reveals that, having assimilated the Yogācāric doctrine of dharmanairātmya, ālayavijñāna and pariniṣpannasvabhāva, the tathāgatagarbha thinking in Laṅkāvatārasūtra presents the comprehensive and distinctive features in comparison to the scriptures that preceded it.
Hsiao, Mei. "A Study of Yogācāric Influence on Tathāgatagarbha Doctrine as Found in Laṅkāvatārasūtra." PhD diss., University of Calgary, 2008.
PhD Diss
Affirmation in Negation: A Study of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory in the Light of the Bodhisattva Practices
The Tathāgatagarbha theory, also known as the Buddha-nature theory, is one of the most influential Mahāyāna doctrines in the East Asian Buddhism. In 1989, it was severely criticized by some Japanese scholars, namely, Shiro Matsumoto and Noriaki Hakamaya, for being contradictory to the Buddha's teaching of non-self (anātman) and accused of being a non-Buddhist theory in disguise. The purpose of this study is to refute such an accusation and to demonstrate the relationship between this theory and the Bodhisattva practices which are the very core of the Mahāyāna Buddhism.

This dissertation begins with definitions of the term "tathāgatagarbha" and some of its synonyms which are followed by a brief review of the historical development of the Tathāgatagarbha theory from India to China. With these as the background knowledge, it is easier to point out the fallacies of the two Japanese scholars' criticism on this theory. A key issue in their criticism is that they viewed the Tathāgatagarbha theory as the ātman of the Upaniṣads in disguise. It is therefore necessary to discuss not only the distinction between the ātman mentioned in the Tathāgatagarbha theory and that in the Upaniṣads but also the controversy over the issue of ātman versus anātman among the Buddhist scholars.

In the discussion to clarify the issue of ātman in the Tathāgatagarbha theory, it is demonstrated that the ātman in the Tathāgatagarbha theory is not only uncontradictory to the doctrine of anātman in Buddhism but very important to the Bodhisattva practices in the Mahāyāna Buddhism. It functions as a unity for the Bodhisattvas to voluntarily return to the world of saṃsāra again and again. Furthermore, the purport of the entire theory, that all sentient beings are endowed with the essence of the Buddha, supports various Bodhisattva practices such as the aspiration to save all beings in the world, the six perfections, etc. In a word, the Tathāgatagarbha theory is an excellent representative of the soteriology of the Mahāyāna Buddhism. Included in the end of this dissertation is an annotated translation of the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra (Taisho nos. 666 and 667). (Source accessed May 26, 2020)
Chen, Shu-hui. “Affirmation in Negation: A Study of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory in the Light of the Bodhisattva Practices.” PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1998.
Book
An Introduction to Buddhism (Takasaki)
This book is based upon notes prepared by the author for general lectures on Buddhism which he has been giving to students at a number of universities in Tokyo since around 1960. The initial version of the present work first saw the light of day as part of a textbook for university students entitled Bukkyo ippan 仏教一般 (Buddhism in General) which was compiled in concert with professors specializing in Chinese and Japanese Buddhism and published by the Department of Buddhist Studies at Komazawa University in Tokyo. Then, at a later date, the author was approached by the Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai (University of Tokyo Press) to write an introductory work on Buddhism for the edification of the general reading public. By permission of the Department of Buddhist Studies at Komazawa University, he accordingly extracted those sections of the above textbook which he had himself written ("Outline of Buddhism" and "Indian Buddhism"), to which he then made some additions and corrections and also appended a brief history of Buddhism covering not only India but also China and Japan. This was then published in 1983 under the title of Bukkyo nyümon 仏教入門 (An Introduction to Buddhism), of which the present work is an English translation. (Takasaki, preface to the English version, iii)
Takasaki, Jikidō. An Introduction to Buddhism. Translated by Rolf W. Giebel. Tokyo: Tōhō Gakkai, 1987. https://nirc.nanzan-u.ac.jp/en/files/2018/06/Takasaki-Jikido_An-Introduction-to-Buddhism.pdf
Video
David Higgins at the 2019 Tathāgatagarbha Symposium
David Higgins explores the Eighth Karmapa Mikyö Dorje’s (1507–1554) prolific writings on tathāgatagarbha, which contain several extended discussions on the topic of how buddha-nature relates to different conceptions of selfhood.
Higgins, David. "Buddha-Nature and Selfhood." Paper presented at the University of Vienna Symposium, Tathāgatagarbha Across Asia, Vienna, Austria, July 2019. Video, 41:28. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LHzI1PxptpI.
Book
Mahāyāna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations
Originating in India, Mahayana Buddhism spread across Asia, becoming the prevalent form of Buddhism in Tibet and East Asia. Over the last twenty-five years Western interest in Mahayana has increased considerably, reflected both in the quantity of scholarly material produced and in the attraction of Westerners towards Tibetan Buddhism and Zen. Paul Williams’ Mahayana Buddhism is widely regarded as the standard introduction to the field, used internationally for teaching and research and has been translated into several European and Asian languages. This new edition has been fully revised throughout in the light of the wealth of new studies and focuses on the religion’s diversity and richness. It includes much more material on China and Japan, with appropriate reference to Nepal, and for students who wish to carry their study further there is a much-expanded bibliography and extensive footnotes and cross-referencing. Everyone studying this important tradition will find Williams’ book the ideal companion to their studies. (Source: Routledge)
Williams, Paul. Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations. 2nd ed. The Library of Religious Beliefs and Practices. New York: Routledge, 2009. https://archive.org/details/mahayanabuddhismthedoctrinalfoundationspaulwilliamsroutledgeseealtruismandreality_202003_445_W/mode/2up.
Article
On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism
Schmithausen, Lambert. "On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism." In Vol. 2, German Scholars on India: Contributions to Indian Studies, edited by the Cultural Department of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, New Delhi, 235–50. Bombay: Nachiketa Publications, 1976. https://archive.org/details/germanscholarsonindiavolume2nachiketapublications_20200306_38/page/n307/mode/2up.
Schmithausen, Lambert. "On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism." In Vol. 2, German Scholars on India: Contributions to Indian Studies, edited by the Cultural Department of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, New Delhi, 235–50. Bombay: Nachiketa Publications, 1976. https://archive.org/details/germanscholarsonindiavolume2nachiketapublications_20200306_38/page/n307/mode/2up.
Book
Progressive Stages of Meditation on Emptiness (2016)
The text presents a series of meditation practices on a particular aspect of the Buddha's teachings. They begin with one's rather coarse understanding and progresses through increasingly subtle stages until one arrives at complete and perfect understanding. (Source: back cover)
Gyamtso, Khenpo Tsultrim. Progressive Stages of Meditation on Emptiness. Translated by Shenpen Hookham. San Bernardino, CA: Shrimala Trust, 2016.
Book
Selfless Persons
This book seeks to explain carefully and sypathetically the Buddhist doctrine of anatta ('not-self'), which denies the existence of any self, soul or enduring essence in human beings. The author relates this doctrine to its cultural and historical context, particularly to its Brahmanical background, and shows how the Theravāda Buddhist tradition has constructed a philosophical and psychological account of personal identity and continuity on the apparently impossible basis of the denial of self. (Source: Cambridge University Press) For relevance to the concept of buddha-nature, see chapter 8, "Momentariness and the bhavaṅga-mind."
Collins, Steven. Selfless Persons: Imagery and Thought in Theravāda Buddhism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982. https://archive.org/details/thervadaselflesspersonsimagerythoughtintheravadabuddhismstevencollinsoup_564_z/mode/2up.
Article
Tathāgatagarbha and Ātman: Self Where There Is No-Self
Laughlin, Aaron Alexander. "Tathāgatagarbha and Ātman: Self Where There Is No-Self." IdeaFest: Interdisciplinary Journal of Creative Works and Research from Humboldt State University 3 (2019): 57–61. https://digitalcommons.humboldt.edu/ideafest/vol3/iss1/11
Laughlin, Aaron Alexander. "Tathāgatagarbha and Ātman: Self Where There Is No-Self." IdeaFest: Interdisciplinary Journal of Creative Works and Research from Humboldt State University 3 (2019): 57–61. https://digitalcommons.humboldt.edu/ideafest/vol3/iss1/11
PhD Diss
The Active Self: A Philosophical Study of the "Buddha Nature Treatise" and Other Chinese Buddhist Texts
        Buddha nature is the Thusness revealed by the twin
        emptiness of man and things. . . . If one does not
        speak of Buddha nature, one does not understand
        emptiness.[1]


The Buddhist notion of anātman, no self, has been a source of fascination and bewilderment to Western thinkers ever since the introduction of Buddhism to the West. Yet once we accept this notion and its centrality in Buddhist thought and practice, our bewilderment is redoubled when we learn that certain texts of the tathāgatagarbha/Buddha nature lineage speak in the most positive language of such things as a Buddha nature, a pure mind and even the perfection of selfhood. How can such language be used within a tradition which places so much importance on the anātman teaching? Similarly, we are at first puzzled by the Mādhyamika teaching that everything is empty (śūnya) and that the supreme truth is emptiness. This language is the product of a man, Nāgārjuna, who is regarded as second only to the Buddha by Mahāyāna Buddhists and whose thinking forms the core of Mahāyāna philosophy. How, then, do the Buddha nature theorists intend their remarks that the Buddha nature is revealed by emptiness and that the perfections of purity, self, bliss and eternity characteristic of the dharmakāya, with which the Buddha nature is identified, are not empty (aśūnya)? Such doctrines are astonishing in the context of Mādhyamika emptiness teachings.
      This study addresses these philosophical issues. What is the Buddha-nature? What is its ontological status? Why do certain texts speak of a Buddha nature? What is the place of a Buddha nature concept in the context of the history of Buddhist thought? In particular, can it be reconciled with the central teachings of anātman and śūnyatā? If so, how? In short, what does the term "Buddha nature" represent and how does it function?
      I shall approach these issues through an examination of the Buddha nature concept within the context of Chinese Buddhism. The Buddha nature idea achieved a popularity and an importance in China which greatly exceeded its importance in India. China was the site of the heated and sustained "Buddha nature controversy" which revolved around the issue of whether or not all beings possess a Buddha nature. Virtually all important Buddhist schools and thinkers were obliged to commit themselves to positions on this crucial issue of the time and these positions became one of the primary criteria by which they judged each other. As a result of its being made an object of such scrutiny, the importance of the Buddha nature concept for subsequent developments of Chinese Buddhism was assured. I shall therefore be concerned toward the end of the study to consider the influences the Buddha nature concept may have had on some of these subsequent developments. (King, introduction, 1–3)

Notes

1. Fo Hsing Lun, (Buddha Nature Treatise, BNT), attributed to Vasubandhu, translated by Paramārtha. T. 31, #1610, p. 787b.
King, Sallie B. "The Active Self: A Philosophical Study of the 'Buddha Nature Treatise' and Other Chinese Buddhist Texts." PhD diss., Temple University, 1981.
Article
The Buddhist Notion of an 'Immanent Absolute' (tathāgatagarbha) as a Problem in Hermeneutics
As a religious and philosophical tradition works out its own stock of ideas and encounters fresh ones among its neighbours, it must very often generate responses to developing tensions and oppositions unless it is simply to turn in on itself, both ossifying and isolating itself from its intellectual and human environment. Buddhism has not ossified and isolated itself in this way, and it has met such challenges not only in its spread outside the Indian subcontinent—in Central, East and Southeast Asia, and now also in Europe and

America—but also, and no less importantly, in the course of its development within historical India itself.
      One way in which Buddhism has responded to these intellectual and cultural encounters can be related to hermeneutics: that is, the modes by which a tradition explains its sources and thereby interprets (or reinterprets) itself in a continuing process of reactivation and renewal of its heritage.[1]
      In the case of Buddhism this process—perhaps comparable in part to what in another context is now frequently referred to as aggiornamento—had both endogenous and exogenous causes. It was, in other words, set in train both by internal, systemically generated requirements and tensions within the Buddhist tradition as it evolved in geographical space and historical time, and by external impulses received from its intellectual and social environment, which could be, according to the case, either positive or negative in character.
      The purpose of this paper is to explore this process with respect to the Buddhist hermeneutics of the ideas of non-self (anatman) and of a spiritual matrix or germ (gotra, tathagatagarbha or Buddha-nature) and the relationship of this pair of ideas to Vedantic notions and Brahmanical social groups in classical India. Reference will be made also to certain exegetical developments that either originated in Tibet or were at least fully realized there for the first time. Our analysis will revolve around the fact that, however historically antithetical and structurally contrasting these two ideas are in Buddhism, they in fact have not invariably been treated by Buddhist hermeneuticians as contradictory or even as systematically exclusive of each other.
      Because of its philosophical and religious significance in the fields of soteriology and gnoseology, the Mahāyānist theory of the tathāgatagarbha—the Germ of Buddhahood latent in all sentient beings—occupies a crucial position in Buddhist thought, and indeed in Indian thought as a whole. In virtue of both their extent and their contents, the sūtras treating the tathāgatagarbha—and the systematically related doctrines of the natural luminosity (prakṛtiprabhāsvaratā) of mind (citta) and the spiritual germ existent by nature (prakṛtistha-gotra)[2]—are amongst the most important in the Mahāyāna. The idea that the doctrine of the tathāgatagarbha and Buddha-nature is one of the supreme teachings of the Mahāyāna is explicitly stated in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sutra.[3]

      Mahāyānist doctrine is in large part concerned with the path (marga) of the Bodhisattva and supreme and perfect awakening (bodhi), that is, the state of a Buddha. The terms tathāgatagarbha and gotra are used to denote the base or support for practice of the path, and hence the 'cause' (hetu: dhatu) for attainment of the fruit (phala) of buddhahood. Even when the texts do not employ the term tathāgatagarbha to designate this factor as the one which makes it possible for all living beings ultimately to attain liberation and Buddhahood, the importance of the theme of the tathāgatagarbha is basic to the soteriology and gnoseology of the Mahāyāna. (Ruegg, "The Buddhist Notion of an 'Immanent Absolute'," 229–30)
Ruegg, David Seyfort. "The Buddhist Notion of an 'Immanent Absolute' (tathāgatagarbha) as a Problem in Hermeneutics." In The Buddhist Heritage, edited by Tadeusz Skorupski, 229–45. Tring, UK: The Institute of Buddhist Studies, 1989.
Book
The Buddhist Self
The assertion that there is nothing in the constitution of any person that deserves to be considered the self (ātman)—a permanent, unchanging kernel of personal identity in this life and those to come—has been a cornerstone of Buddhist teaching from its inception. Whereas other Indian religious systems celebrated the search for and potential discovery of one’s “true self,” Buddhism taught about the futility of searching for anything in our experience that is not transient and ephemeral. But a small yet influential set of Mahāyāna Buddhist texts, composed in India in the early centuries CE, taught that all sentient beings possess at all times, and across their successive lives, the enduring and superlatively precious nature of a Buddha. This was taught with reference to the enigmatic expression tathāgatagarbha—the “womb” or “chamber” for a Buddha—which some texts refer to as a person’s true self.

The Buddhist Self is a methodical examination of Indian teaching about the tathāgatagarbha (otherwise the presence of one's “Buddha-nature”) and the extent to which different Buddhist texts and authors articulated this in terms of the self. C. V. Jones attends to each of the Indian Buddhist works responsible for explaining what is meant by the expression tathāgatagarbha, and how far this should be understood or promoted using the language of selfhood. With close attention to these sources, Jones argues that the trajectory of Buddha-nature thought in India is also the history and legacy of a Buddhist account of what deserves to be called the self: an innovative attempt to equip Mahāyāna Buddhism with an affirmative response to wider Indian interest in the discovery of something precious or even divine in one's own constitution. This argument is supplemented by critical consideration of other themes that run through this distinctive body of Mahāyānist literature: the relationship between Buddhist and non-Buddhist teachings about the self, the overlap between the tathāgatagarbha and the nature of the mind, and the originally radical position that the only means of becoming liberated from rebirth is to achieve the same exalted status as the Buddha. (Source: University of Hawai'i Press)
Jones, Christopher V. The Buddhist Self: On Tathāgatagarbha and Ātman. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, forthcoming.
PhD Diss
The Buddhist Theory of Self according to Acarya Candrakirti
Whether one approaches the Buddhist tradition from a historical, cultural, or philosophical perspective, scholarship in this area of study has largely been the province of individuals possessing some degree of proficiency in one, or a number of, various Asian languages. Obviously, the first challenge facing the scholar is simply that of determining exactly what Buddhism was and, to some extent, continues to be. However, the intellectual tradition of Western civilization has developed virtually in total isolation from this religion. Thus, the ultimate, and perhaps most difficult, challenge is that of pointing out the merits of Buddhism to a largely unfamiliar Western audience. The person who is unversed in any of the canonical languages of Buddhism only has access to Buddhist literature through the writings that are available in a Western language. And, at present, this body of writings does not provide anything like a complete and thorough representation of Buddhist literature. Consequently, in addition to those who are well-versed in Buddhist ideology, this dissertation is also intended for individuals who have little familiarity with this subject.
      More specifically, my objective has been to make a contribution to the ongoing investigations into the history of Buddhist philosophy by focussing on one Buddhist author's interpretation of a specific topic— the doctrine of anātma— and providing an analysis of it in relation to the views of several other Buddhist schools. I have attempted to demonstrate how Acarya Candrakirti's theory of self is significantly different from the generally accepted Buddhist explanation of this topic. In doing so, several relevant areas of Candrakirti's overall system are also examined. With regard to his Prasangika views on logic, I have introduced new material from the writings of Svatantrika scholars for the purpose of further clarifying the nature of the differences between these two Madhyamika schools of thought.
      Part Two consists of a translation of Candrakirti's most comprehensive discussion of his views on the self. This text was not previously available in English. In several instances my translation also corrects misinterpretations that occur in the incomplete French translation of Professor Louis de la Vallée Poussin. The text consists of a section of the sixth chapter from Acarya Candrakirti's Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya. Since the original Sanskrit is not extant, my translation is based on the Tibetan translation. For a manuscript I have used the 1912 edition prepared by Professor Poussin and published by the Russian Imperial Academy of Sciences as Volume IX of the Bibliotheca Buddhica series. In preparing the English translation, Professor Poussin's French translation as well as a partial Sanskrit reconstruction by N. Aiyaswami Sastri were consulted; however the most useful aid proved to be the Tibetan translation of a 12th century Indian commentary to Candrakirti's text composed by a certain Jayānanda and entitled Madhyamakāvatāratīka. This work provides a literal explanation for almost every word of Candrakirti's text and was extremely helpful for understanding numerous obscure passages.
      Although several of the texts cited in Part One of the dissertation can be found in translations prepared by other scholars, I have presented my own version for all these quotations in order to maintain a consistency of style and terminology. The one exception occurs in the chapter on Prasangika logic, for which ample explanation is given there. (Engle, preface, iii–v)
Engle, Artemus Bertine. "The Buddhist Theory of Self According to Acarya Candrakirti." PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1983.
Book
The Philosophy of Buddhism
The translation of Erich Frauwallner's Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, first published in 1956, opens up a classic introduction to Buddhist thought to a broader English language readership. The book covers the period of early canonical literature with examples of its philosophically relevant ideas, followed by the principal philosophical concepts of systematic Sravakayana Buddhism. In the main part of the book, Frauwallner presents the first survey of the development of the philosophical systems of Mahayana Buddhism. He was well aware of the limitations in presenting only the Buddhist philosophy of the "classical", i.e., the systematic period, and does not seem to have been ready to add the philosophically creative new postsystematic tradition of Buddhist epistemology and logic, a major subject of his subsequent years of research.

Frauwallner's way of translating was straightforward: to remain as close as possible to the original text while presenting it in a clear and readable way in order to convey an accurate impression of its meaning. For technical terms in the source materials he maintained a single translation even when various meanings were suggested. For clarity regarding such variations of meaning he relied on the context and his explanation.

The same approach was taken by the translator of the present book. Although his translation attempts to be faithful to the 1994 edition of Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, he inserted helpful additional headlines into the text and considerably enlarged the index. All other additions by the translator are given within square brackets. Besides this, he created an Appendix, which contains one of Frauwallner's more important articles "Amalavijnana and Alayavijnana" (1951) to complement the long Yogacara section of the book, a bibliography of selective publications after 1969. The URLs for many of the source materials were also conveniently provided. (Source: Motilal Banarsidass)
Frauwallner, Erich. The Philosophy of Buddhism (Die Philosophie des Buddhismus). Translated by Gelong Lodrö Sangpo with the assistance of Jigme Sheldrön, under the supervision of Ernst Steinkellner. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2010. Originally published 1994 by Akademie-Verlag as Die Philosophie des Buddhismus (Berlin).
Book
The Selfless Mind
This careful analysis of early Buddhist thought opens out a perspective in which no permanent Self is accepted, but a rich analysis of changing and potent mental processes is developed. It explores issues relating to the not-Self teaching: self-development, moral responsibility, the between-lives period, and the 'undetermined questions' on the world, on the 'life principle' and on the liberated one after death. It examines the 'person' as a flowing continuity centered on consciousness or discernment (vinnana) configured in changing minds-sets (cittas). The resting state of this is seen as 'brightly shining' - like the 'Buddha nature' of Mahayana thought - so as to represent the potential for Nirvana. Nirvana is then shown to be a state in which consciousness transcends all objects, and thus participates in a timeless, unconditioned realm. (Source: Routledge)

See especially chapter 10, Bhavaṅga and the Brightly Shining Mind.
Harvey, Peter. The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and Nirvāṇa in Early Buddhism. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004. First published 1995 by Curzon Press. http://www.ahandfulofleaves.org/documents/The%20Selfless%20Mind_Personality_Consciousness%20and%20Nirvana%20in%20Early%20Buddhism_Harvey_1995-2004r.pdf.
Term Variations
Key Term anātman
Topic Variation anātman
Tibetan བདག་མེད་པ་  ( dakmépa)
Wylie Tibetan Transliteration bdag med pa  ( dakmépa)
Devanagari Sanskrit अनात्मन्
Chinese 无我
Chinese Pinyin wúwǒ
Japanese Transliteration muga
Korean Transliteration mua
Buddha-nature Site Standard English selflessness
Karl Brunnhölzl's English Term identitylessness
Richard Barron's English Term nonexistence of identity, lack/absence of identity
Jeffrey Hopkin's English Term selflessness
Ives Waldo's English Term egoless[ness]
Alternate Spellings nairātmya
Term Information
Source Language Sanskrit
Basic Meaning The nonexistence of the self as a permanent, unchanging entity.
Has the Sense of A key feature of the Buddha's teachings that stood in direct contrast to main stream Indian religious-philosophical notion of an eternal self.
Did you know? The teaching that there is no personal self was a crucial precursor to the Buddhist concept of emptiness.
Related Terms Ātman, Svabhāva, Śūnyatā
Term Type Noun
Definitions
Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism See page 42: In Sanskrit, “no self” or “nonself” or more broadly “insubstantiality”; the third of the “three marks” (trilakṣaṇa) of existence, along with impermanence (anitya) and suffering (duḥkha). The concept is one of the key insights of the Buddha, and it is foundational to the Buddhist analysis of the compounded quality (samskrta) of existence: since all compounded things are the fruition (phala) of a specific set of causes (hetu) and conditions (pratyaya), they are therefore absent of any perduring substratum of being.
Rangjung Yeshe Dictionary Nonexistence of the self of the individual personality and/ or self-nature of phenomena.
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