Post-28

Bötrul Dongak Tenpai Nyima and His Elucidation of Mipam's Thought

[[ |300px|thumb| ]] If Ju Mipam Gyatso, who composed commentaries on many classical texts and articulated specific Nyingma philosophical positions on critical and popular topics in the Tibetan scholarly world, can be considered the father of Nyingma scholasticism, it was his disciples and followers who carried on this legacy and gave a sustained and strong philosophical voice for the Nyingma school. This can be seen in hermeneutics pertaining to buddha-nature, which was initiated by Mipam and later on reinforced by his followers, such as Bötrul Dongak Tenpai Nyima.

Bötrul, in his Notes on the Essential Points of Exegesis (སྟོང་ཐུན་གནད་ཀྱི་ཟིན་ཐུན་), captures the gist of interpretations, analyses, and arguments which Mipam has presented in his writings, particularly in Lion's Roar: Exposition of Buddha-Nature. This concise and clear synopsis was initially written at the behest of Choying Rangdrol in Kham and later extended at Drigung Nyima Changra, when Bötrul taught there for a year. The crux of Mipam and Bötrul's exposition of buddha-nature and related literature and formulation of buddha-nature as a union of emptiness and luminosity is the two sets of two truths and the fourfold scheme of correct cognition. Mipam endorses the importance of distinguishing the two different sets of two truths in order to understand the intent of the many sūtras and their commentaries. The first set of two truths, which is well known particularly in the Mādhyamika literature, is two truths comprising emptiness and appearance (སྣང་སྟོང་བདེན་གཉིས་). In this context, emptiness is the ultimate truth and all knowable phenomena or appearances fall under the category of conventional truth. Buddha-nature, in this case, is a conventional truth just as the wisdom and qualities of the fully enlightened Buddha are. Emptiness, which is free from all extremes or elaborations, is the only real ultimate truth. The Buddha's middle turning of the wheel and the scholastic writings of Nāgārjuna, according to Mipam and Bötrul, focus on this set of two truths.

Mipam calls the second set the two truths of abiding/ontic and appearing/phenomenal modes (གནས་་སྣང་བདེན་གཉིས་). In this context, a thing for which its ontic existence and phenomenal appearance are consistent (གནས་ཚུལ་དང་སྣང་ཚུལ་མཐུན་པ་), such as the Buddha's wisdom, is the ultimate truth, while a thing for which its appearance does not conform with its ontic reality, such as the illusory experience of hell through misconception, is a worldly or conventional truth. Thus, buddha-nature, which is the innate nature of all beings, falls under the ultimate truth because it exists ontologically as it appears, whereas suffering, for instance, is a part of the conventional truth because it is an illusory experience triggered by adventitious afflictions and does not exist objectively.

In tandem with this distinction of two sets of two truths, Mipam and his followers also underscored the theory of fourfold correct cognition. Firstly, correct cognition is divided, as is popularly done, into two categories of the cognition examining the ultimate (དོན་དམ་དཔྱོད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་ཚད་མ་) and the cognition examining the conventional (ཐ་སྙད་དཔྱོད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་ཚད་མ་). The correct cognition discerning the ultimate is then divided into the correct cognition discerning the notational ultimate (རྣམ་གྲངས་པའི་དོན་དམ་) and the one discerning the non-notational ultimate (རྣམ་གྲངས་མ་ཡིན་པའི་དོན་དམ་). The first one apprehends merely the emptiness or absence of real existence, while the second is the awareness of emptiness free from all extremes or elaborations. The understanding of the lack of self-existence or hypostatic existence is considered only a partial emptiness and the notational ultimate. The real ultimate is said to transcend all points of fixation, mental constructions, and conceptual elaborations.

The correct cognition perceiving the conventional is also divided into two categories of the limited mundane cognition (ཚུར་མཐོང་ཚད་མ་) and cognition of pure discernment (དག་གཟིགས་ཚད་མ་). Ordinary phenomena such as the things of saṃsāra are objects of limited mundane cognition which does not have ontic reality. Thus, they fall within the conventional truth, while things associated with nirvāṇa, such as buddha-nature, which exist as the true nature of things, are objects of the latter. Because they are confirmed by the higher cognition of pure discernment or the pristine wisdom of the enlightened beings, these things are ultimately existent (དོན་དམ་པར་ཡོད་པ་).

The rejection of buddha-nature as the ultimate truth in the sūtras of the middle turning of the wheel and works of masters such as Candrakīrti is in the context of the first set of two truths. Buddha-nature is negated when examined by the cognition examining the ultimate truth in this context. Thus, buddha-nature is considered a provisional teaching. However, buddha-nature is part of the ultimate truth in the context of the second set of two truths as it is ascertained by the enlightened wisdom or cognition of pure discernment. Therefore, it is considered as a definitive teaching in the sūtras of the third turning of the wheel and in texts such as Maitreya's Ultimate Continuum. In this manner, Mipam and his followers adopt a hermeneutic approach to reconcile the divergent positions of the sūtras and classical Mādhyamika authors and claim them to be noncontradictory.

Weekly quote

Mahāmati, Buddha-nature is the basis of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, and happiness and suffering. 

~ Laṅkāvatārasūtra