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The first edition of this Buddhist Bible was published in 1932. When the need of a new edition became evident, it was decided to enlarge it so as to include other Scriptures of like importance so as to make it more comprehensive. This involved making a number of new translations for which we are indebted to Bhikshu Wai-tao. We are also indebted and are very grateful to a number of other Buddhist Scholars for permission to use their translations, as noted in the Appendix.
The compiling of a Buddhist Bible is a very different matter from compiling the Christian Bible. In the first place, there is no Hierarchy or Ecclesiastic Council to pass upon the authenticity of different scriptures, and as to their canonicity. In the second place, Christian Scriptures are a closed system of doctrines and dogmas that have been inspired by the Holy Spirit and are to be accepted in faith. Buddhism, on the contrary, is looked upon as a growing organism whose scriptures are of many kinds as the organism has developed under different racial, temporal and cultural conditions. As disciples follow the Buddha's Noble Path and practice dhyana concentration and intuitive meditation they have an unfolding experience of spiritual insight and grace which any one of them may describe and elucidate. Some of these expediences are of highest value, some of less value. Some are concerned with
the Dharma, some have to do with the rules of the Brotherhoods, some are philosophical, some psychological, some are commentaries and some are commentaries on commentaries. In the third place, there is the difference of quantity. In the Christian Bible there are sixty-six titles; Buddhist scriptures number over ten thousand, only a fraction of which have thus far been translated. In the Sung Dynasty about 972 AD a Chinese version of these scriptures was published consisting of 1521 works, in more than 5000 volumes, covering 130,000 pages.
The nearest approach to canonicity is the Pali Tripitika. That was the earliest collection and was supposed to be limited to the words of Buddha. Southern Buddhists are passionately devoted to these Pali Scriptures and are inclined to disparage and dispute the more philosophical scriptures of the Northern School that developed later after Buddhism had come in contact with other world religions in Persia, Palestine, Egypt and Greece. Under these conditions there developed in Northern India, and Kashgar, a succession of very able minds,
Ashvaghosha, Nargajuna, Vasobandhu and his brother Asangha from whose writings and teachings there developed various important schools of philosophical thought that profoundly changed the understanding of Buddha's Dharma.
Later on as Buddhism spread into China and came under the influence of its immemorial culture and practical good sense, it took on forms of Taoist naturalism and kindly humanism, and there developed forms of "salvation by faith in Amitabha's mercy" and rebirth in his Pure Land. While in Tibet, coming in contact with its ancient Bon religion, and
under the climatic conditions of its high altitudes, it took on forms of strenuousness and magic and tantric conceptions. Later on in Japan owing to political and social conditions incident to the presence of a limited but powerful noble class dominating a suppressed peasantry, which had developed extremes of loyalty and obedience and self-control, it took on forms of concentrative meditation known as Zen, and a still more widely divergent type of the True Pure Land Sect.
Naturally among these diverse conditions Buddhist scriptures vary widely, and the quantity of them being so enormous, they have become segregated into different groups as they are favored by different schools of thought and practice. The Tien-tai favor the more philosophical scriptures, the Shingon, the more esoteric, the Ch’an (Zen), the more intellectual, and the Pure Land, the more emotional. The present editor has been guided in his selection of scriptures for this Buddhist Bible by a sincere purpose to make the selection as comprehensive as possible within its limits and to represent as truly as possible the original teachings of the Blessed One both as understood by the Southern and more primitive school and by the Northern and more philosophical interpreters. He has also humbly tried to have the choice vouched for by his own spiritual experience in his practice of the Noble Path and especially during its Eighth Stage of intuitive Dhyana.
It follows, therefore, that the scriptures thus selected are the generally accepted scriptures of the Dhyana Sects—Ch’an in China, Zen in Japan and Kargyupta in Tibet. Of course among so enormous a collection of scriptures there are others that are favorites also, notably the Saddharma-pundarika (Lotus of the Perfect Law), and the Avatamsaka, said to be the grandest religious document ever written, but these are very large books in themselves. The late W. E. Soothil of London left a very careful translation of the Lotus that still waits a publisher. Dr. Suzuki of Kyoto has made a translation of the Gandhavyuha sections of the Avatamsaka that is now in process of being published. The inclusion of Laotzu’s Tao-teh-king is open to question as it is not strictly a Buddhist
text, but its teaching has such a close affinity to Buddhist teaching and nearly all early Chinese Masters of Buddhism were Taoist scholars who, upon becoming Buddhists, did not give up their Taoist conceptions and terms, and because the Laotzuan teaching in the Tao-teh-king has had such a wholesome
influence on the development of Chinese Buddhism, and, in later years, wherever the Tao-teh-king is held in reverence, it has tended to restrain individual pride of egoism, religious ceremonial, ecclesiasticism, priestcraft and insincerity generally, we make no apology for including it. In fact, it is our earnest wish that the Tao-teh-king may become one of the foundation stones of American and European Buddhism.
Further introductory notes are reserved for the Appendix
under the heads of the individual Scriptures, as are also -grateful appreciation to those who have contributed to the preparation and publication of this Bible, especially to those Buddhist scholars who have courteously granted the Editor permission to use their translations for this purpose
Just a closing word as to the rules that have guided the
Editor in his choice and handling of textual material. He has always kept in mind the spiritual needs of his readers. This Buddhist Bible is not intended to be a source book for critical literary and historical study. It is only intended to be a source of spiritual inspiration designed to awaken faith and to develop faith into aspiration and full realization. The original texts having for centuries been carried in memory and transcribed by hand by scribes who were often more loyal to their Master than to historical exactness, are often overloaded with interpolations and extensions, and in places are confused and obscure. To carry out the design of the Editor, he has omitted a great deal of matter not bearing directly upon the theme of
the particular Scripture, and has interpreted occasionally where it seemed necessary and advisable, in order to provide an easier and more inspiring reading. The need for this course will become apparent to every earnest minded disciple.
In these days when Western civilization and culture is buffeted as never before by foreboding waves of materialism and selfish aggrandisement both individual and national, Buddhism seems to hold out teachings of highest promise. For two thousand years Dhyana Buddhism has powerfully conditioned the cultural, ethical and spiritual life of the great Oriental nations. It well may be the salvation of Western civilization. Its rationality, its discipline, its emphasis on simplicity and sincerity, its thoughtfulness, its cheerful industry not for profit but for service, its love for all animate life, its restraint of desire in all its subtle forms, its actual foretastes of enlightenment and blissful peace, its patient acceptance of karma and rebirth, all mark it out as being competent to meet the problems of this excitement loving, materialistic, acquisitive and thoughtless age.
Its basic principle of an eternal process based on unchanging law and operating in eternal recurrence, leading to mind-control, to highest cognition, to purest conceptions of love and compassion, to ever clearing insight, to highest perfect wisdom, to the self-giving of Bodhisattvas, and Buddhas, to blissful peace, is worthy of confidence; and its Noble Path worthy of
The theme of this Buddhist Bible is designed to show the unreality of all conceptions of a personal ego. Its purpose is to awaken faith in Buddhahood as being one’s true self-nature; to kindle aspiration to realize one’s true Buddha-nature; to energize effort to follow the Noble Path, to become Buddha. The true response to the appeal of this Buddhist Bible is not in outward activities, but in self-yielding, becoming a clear channel for Buddhahood's indrawing compassion, that all sentient beings may become emancipated, enlightened and brought to Buddhahood. (Goddard, preface, v–viii)
Consolidating the intent of Buddha Shakyamuni’s teachings into a unified body of text books, it is the philosophical backbone of the living tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. This rich source book embodies the basics of Prajnaparamita and Madhyamika as well as the Abhidharma from both the Mahayana and Hinayana perspective. Every volume in this series includes the Tibetan text and the English translation on facing pages.
The student of The Gateway to Knowledge can begin to comprehend the meaning of the major works on Buddhist philosophy and of the traditional sciences. When you want to extract their meaning you need an “expert system,” a key. The Gateway to Knowledge is like that key, a magical key – it opens up the treasury of precious gemstones in the expansive collection of Buddhist scriptures. (Source: Rangjung Yeshe Publications)Une religion comme le bouddhisme est un tout infiniment complexe. Quelque place qu'y tiennent les idées théosophiques, soyons sûrs qu'elles ne la constituent pas tout entière. Elles s'y trouvent amalgamées à des éléments de toute provenance. Est-ce en les isolant artificiellement qu'on les étudiera le mieux dans leur nature et dans leur action ? Ce ne serait ni avantageux, ni même possible. Les contacts qu'elles subissent entraînent pour elles des déterminations dont il faut bien tenir compte : tel le cristal transparent qui se colore par le voisinage d'une fleur d'hibiscus. D'autre part, il serait excessif sous prétexte de théosophie, d'embrasser ici le bouddhisme dans toute son étendue. D'excellents ouvrages, aisément accessibles au public, me permettent de limiter ma tâche sans inconvénient.
Ce que je me propose, c'est d'étudier dans quelles conditions, externes et internes, les idées maîtresses du bouddhisme ont agi sur les esprits ; de quelle manière elles se lient les unes aux autres ; quelle influence elles ont exercée sur la conduite des individus et sur la communauté ; comment elles se sont transformées par le travail même de la pensée ; comment elles ont dévié au contact de doctrines hétérogènes ; à quels excès de théorie et de pratique elles ont parfois abouti. Je ne m'occuperai donc du Bouddha et du Sangha que dans la mesure où la personnalité du maître et l'organisation de l'église sont pour quelque chose dans la direction prise par le travail des âmes religieuses. Quant aux doctrines, je laisserai de côté celles qui n'intéressent pas du tout l'élaboration du salut, et passerai rapidement sur celles qui peuvent être considérées comme la simple application des principes essentiels. Si je ne craignais d'exposer mon livre à de redoutables comparaisons, je dirais que j'ai tenté de mettre en lumière !'« esprit » du bouddhisme, un esprit remarquable à la fois par sa continuité et par ses variations.
Malgré les restrictions que je viens d'indiquer, ce programme, je le crains, paraîtra trop ambitieux. Peutêtre même le trouvera-t-on irréalisable dans les conditions actuelles de la science. Que d'incertitudes, en effet, et que de lacunes dans l'histoire de la pensée bouddhique! Pouvons-nous seulement dater avec quelque approximation les écrits dits canoniques ? N'est-il pas puéril de vouloir expliquer les aspects successifs du bouddhisme sans tenir le plus grand compte de facteurs qui ne sont ni théosophiques, ni même hindous ? On a cherché du côté de la gnose et du manichéisme l'origine de quelques-unes des nouveautés par lesquelles se distinguent les écoles du Grand Véhicule. Si l'on a eu raison l'évolution de la doctrine cesse d'être exclusivement autochtone. Comme, d'ailleurs, l'influence des religions sectaires s'est fait sentir très vite, qu'elle s'est accentuée avec le temps, qu'elle a fini par devenir presque prépondérante, on trouvera l'explication des dernières déviations, non pas sans doute hors de l'Inde, mais hors du bouddhisme, et dans des formations religieuses dont nous savons fort mal l'histoire ancienne. Ces écueils,et d'autres encore, je savais qu'ils étaient semés sur ma route, et j'espère n'avoir jamais oublié leur présence pendant que je travaillais à cet ouvrage. Mais je n'ai pas eu non plus la prétention de résoudre tous les problèmes. Je me tiendrai pour satisfait, si j'ai quelque peu contribué à une plus entière connaissance du bouddhisme. (Oltramare, preface, xiii–xv)
Tathāgatagarbha and Buddha nature are technical terms that indicate the existence of the true nature of the Buddha or Tathāgata who has attained enlightenment through totally unclouded insight (prajñā), within all living things, though these living things may be covered with the impurity of worldly desire and be seemingly incapable of attaining enlightenment. In essence, these terms refer to the fact that the Buddha or Tathāgata resides within the nature of all living things. The notions of Tathāgatagarbha and Buddha nature make assertions about the nature of enlightenment or salvation for living things still trapped in an unenlightened condition of suffering. They do so from the ideological position of those Tathāgatas or Buddhas who have already realized truth and been released from suffering and unenlightenment. These ideas are expressed as a kind of theodicy and soteriology, as they deal with the challenge of how super-temporal, absolute truth appears at a historical or personal level. Ideas that originate in the mature period of the history of an ideology produce higher-level notions that allow concepts born in various contexts in the previous history of the ideology to coexist. The ideas of Tathāgatagarbha and Buddha nature, which point to the Tathāgata or Buddha that dwells within all living things, encompass both all living things and Tathāgata, and so exist at a higher conceptual level than either.
There are two foundations of the ideas of Tathāgatagarbha and Buddha nature, which simultaneously problematize both unenlightenment and enlightenment: the features of soteriology in general religious thought, and the view of truth that is unique to Buddhism. Soteriology, as conceived of in general religious thought, considers the world in a dualistic fashion, as being split into the world of humanity and the world of gods, the world of suffering and the world of liberation, the endless cycle of life and death (samsara) and supreme enlightenment (nirvana). On the one hand is a relative, limited, and impermanent world, and on the other an absolute, infinite, and eternal world. The movement from the former aspect to the latter is not ceaseless but, rather, requires a change in the dimension of our existence, such as religious conversion or enlightenment. The experience of the individual transforms the aspect of the world, which formerly appeared as a single layer, thus exposing its mysterious and unseen facets. In contrast to many religions, which end their exposition at this point, Mahayana Buddhism takes the appearance of this duality itself as a subjective experience and seeks to reach the point at which both aspects ultimately become indistinguishable. The scenery of this world as seen from the world of libreration, worldly desire purified by enlightenment, Samsara illuminated by nirvana are all accepted as they are, without the necessity of any negation or denial. The duality of the world is therefore overcome, and a higher-level equality emerges that still acknowledges individual differences. (Source Accessed June 29, 2020)
The earliest extant translation of part of the text into Chinese was by Guṇabhadra between A.D. 435 and 443. But, as the text was a source for Asaṅga whose works are known in Chinese in 413–421, a date second to third centuries A.D. is reasonably proposed (p. 24–5)
In his preface M. Lamotte has discussed the texts and commentaries, the title, the importance of the text by reason of its early date and position between the Prajñāpāramitā texts and those of the Vijñānavāda, and has given a detailed analysis of the contents. The author has p. 7 himself rightly recognized how little satisfactory literal renderings of Buddhish technical terms are. (H. W. Bailey, Review of Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra. L'Explication des Mystères. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 8 , no. 4 (1937): 1157.)Pérez-Remón's book is analytical in nature, and its immediate aim is to provide an interpretative study of the anattā doctrine as it appears in the earlier parts of the Pali canon, namely the Nikaya literature. He describes the religious views elaborated in these contexts as a soteriology, that is to say a system of moral training which considers salvation to be its prime goal. Buddhist writings on the self, he argues, are not as clear and unambiguous as is often supposed. He does not, in particular, believe that one could regard them in a purely negative light, after the manner of certain Theravada exponents. The use and the import of "self" (attā) and "non-self" (anattā) are of course central to this study. In order to facilitate his inquiry into these key terms, he introduces some important distinctions which appear for the most part to be philosophical in nature. First, there is the distinction between the self in its existential and metaphysical signification; and second, between two senses of the term non-self, one qualified and the other absolute. Previous interpretations of the anattā doctrine have not revolved around distinctions of this kind. Perez-Remon, however, is of the view that it is necessary to focus on them in order to gain a true insight into early Buddhist thinking on the nature and existence of the self.
For the complete review, click hereEchoing the Sutra of the Ten Lands, the Sutra of the Unveiling of Deep Meaning is part of the logic of a collection which aims to introduce lovers of wisdom to the jewels of Buddhist thought and mysticism.
The translation presented in this volume was made from the Tibetan version of the eighth century. (Source: Fayard)Showing how it is absolutely essential for—and goes hand in hand with—the achievement of insight into reality, he gives practical tips for countering sleepiness, agitation, and their more subtle counterparts. Leading us step by step toward deeper levels of concentration, volume 4 of the Steps on the Path to Enlightenment series brings readers closer to the ultimate goal of śamatha: unlimited and effortless focus. (Source: Wisdom Publications)
This book by Giuseppe Tucci, the internationally renowned Tibetologist, is a scholarly study of the religions of Tibet: Buddhism, the nameless "folk religion," and the system called Bon. The history of the spread of Buddhism in Tibet is divided in the indigenous tradition into the "early" and "later" stages. The first chapter of the book surveys the significant events of the early spread, which ended with the persecution of Buddhism in the ninth century, and the second reviews those of the later spread, beginning with the revival of Buddhism and the founding of great monasteries in the eleventh century. Chapter 3 deals with the general characteristics of "Lamaism" and the emergence of the major schools of Tibetan Buddhism, particularly the rNying ma pa, Sa skya pa, bKa' brgyud pa, and dGe lugs pa. Chapter 4 examines the doctrines held, both in common and in particular, by these schools, as well as the substantialism of the Jo nang pa and the quietism of the Zhi byed pa. The fifth chapter deals with the organization of the monastic community, the administration of the monastery and its property, and the religious calendar with its various festivals. Chapter 6 is devoted to the "folk religion," replete with its beliefs in benevolent and malevolent numina. Various apotropaic rituals intended to protect the individual, the family, the house, and other property are discussed in detail. This chapter shows clearly the contradiction between the intellectual preoccupation with Buddhist epistemology and ontology on the monastic level and the emotional concern with the existence of demonic powers and the vulnerability of the "soul" (bla) on the lay level. The final chapter deals with the Bon religion that predated Buddhism in Tibet. This chapter explores the religious milieu of the ancient monarchy and then examines the way in which Bon evolved over the centuries in competition with, and later in imitation of, Buddhism. An eight-page chronological table listing significant dates and events in Tibetan history is given at the end of the book.
considered the starting point of Buddhism. According to both Mahāyāna ('Greater Vehicle')
and Hīnayāna ('Lesser Vehicle') or non-Mahāyāna, the historical Buddha had sometime in
the distant past resolved to become a buddha, thereby launching out on the career of a
bodhisattva, that is, a sentient being who strives to attain the highest state of awakening. A
major distinction between non-Mahāyāna and Mahāyāna, however, is that for the former the
status of being a bodhisattva or buddha is confined to the historical Buddha (or a few others like him), while the ultimate soteriological goal of a disciple is Arhatship (that is, the final
state of a saint who has attained release from the cycle of birth and death) primarily for
oneself. For the latter, by contrast, even an ordinary sentient being is capable of undertaking
the long and arduous career of a bodhisattva by generating bodhicitta and finally becoming a buddha (just like the historical Buddha himself), primarily for the sake of many other sentient
beings. In sum, a person who possesses or has generated bodhicitta is considered to be a
bodhisattva, and the form of Buddhism concerned with the theory and practice of a bodhisattva is known as Mahāyāna. The idea of bodhicitta in the sense of the resolve to
become a buddha is hence the bedrock of Mahāyāna, and is what distinguishes a bodhisattva from a śrāvaka, Mahāyāna from non-Mahāyāna. It is presupposed by all forms of Mahāyāna Buddhism including Vajrayāna ('Diamond Vehicle'), or tantric Mahāyāna.
Multiple internal and external factors must have contributed to the formation and further development of the concept of bodhicitta. The psychological need of the Buddhists to make up in one way or another for the demise of the historical Buddha may have been one of the principal internal factors that contributed to the formation of the idea of the resolve to become a buddha. Such an idea would not have lacked the doctrinal justification or legitimisation that it needed, for the non-Mahāyāna sources seem to abound in doctrinal elements that could easily be used to underpin the concept of bodhicitta. In its early phase of development, the idea of generating bodhicitta probably meant only the initial resolve to become a buddha, a momentous decision made by an aspirant seeking Buddhahood (buddhatva). This was seen as an indispensable but not necessarily a sufficient condition for the attainment of Buddhahood. However, gradually the idea came to encompass the entire theory and practice of a bodhisattva and to be considered not only a necessary but in fact a sufficient condition for such an attainment. In the course of time, even the true reality that a bodhisattva or buddha experiences as a spiritual event, the meditative insight or gnosis by means of which the true reality is experienced, and all conceivable resources or means—be they psycho-physiological, visual, verbal, or visional impulses that could be employed for becoming a buddha—came to be regarded as bodhicitta. It is this idea as found explicated in Indian and Tibetan Mahāyāna Buddhism that the present study seeks to examine. (Wangchuk, introductory remarks, 21–22)
Articles
There is, however, one subject relating to the spread of Buddhism in Ṭhi-sroṅ-deu-tsen's reign, to which the Tibetan historian devotes his special attention and on which he dwells in detail. This is the strife between two parties into which the Buddhists of Tibet were at that time split. One of these parties consisted of the pupils and followers of Ācārya Śāntirakṣita who professed that form of Mahāyāna Buddhism which was generally acknowledged in India and Nepal, viz. the teaching of the Path to Enlightenment through the practice of meditation connected with the dialectical analysis peculiar to the Mādhyamika school of the Buddhists and with the practice of the six Transcendental Virtues (pāramitā).
The leader of the other party was a Chinese teacher (hwa-śaṅ or ho-shang) known by the Sanskrit name Mahāyānadeva, who preached a doctrine of complete quietism and inactivity. According to him every kind of religious practice, the meditative exercises and all virtuous deeds as well were completely useless and even undesirable: the liberation from the bonds of phenomenal existence was to be attained merely through the complete cessation of every kind of thought and mental activity,—by abiding perpetually in a state analogous to sleep. Bu-ston'"`UNIQ--ref-000002A8-QINU`"' relates how this party grew very powerful and found numerous adherents among the Tibetans, how the followers of Śāntirakṣita suffered oppression from it, and how the king who was an adherent of Śāntirakṣita's system, invited Śāntirakṣita's pupil, the teacher Kamalaśīla in order to refute the incorrect teachings of the Chinese party. The dispute between Kamalaśīla and the Chinese Ho-shang in which the latter was defeated is described by Bu-ston'"`UNIQ--ref-000002A9-QINU`"' in detail. We read that the leading men of the two parties'"`UNIQ--ref-000002AA-QINU`"' assembled in the presence of the king, that the Ho-shang was the first to speak in favour of his theory of quietism and inactivity and was answered by Kamalaśīla who demonstrated all the absurdity of the theses maintained by the Ho-shang and showed that the teachings of such a kind were in conflict with the main principles of Buddhism and were conducive to the depreciation and rejection of the most essential features of the Buddhist Path to Enlightenment. We read further on how the chief adherents of Kamalaśīla'"`UNIQ--ref-000002AB-QINU`"' likewise refuted the theories of the Ho-shang, how the latter and his party acknowledged themselves vanquished and were expelled from Tibet by order of the king who prescribed to follow henceforth the Buddhist doctrines that were generally admitted,—the teaching of the six Virtues as regards religious practice and the Mādhvamika system of Nāgārjuna as regards the theory.'"`UNIQ--ref-000002AC-QINU`"'
Thus the influence of the Chinese Ho-shang’s teachings over the minds of the Tibetans suffered a complete defeat and with it perhaps some political influence of China.'"`UNIQ--ref-000002AD-QINU`"' This is certainly a most important event in the history of Tibetan Buddhism which has been duly appreciated by Bu-ston. It is therefore quite natural that we should be interested in finding out the sources of Bu-ston's historical record. But the text of Bu-ston's History which, as a rule, contains references to the works on the foundation of which it has been compiled, does not give us any information here. At the first glance the account of the controversy looks like the reproduction of an oral tradition and there is nothing that could make us conjecture the presence of a literary work upon which the record could have been founded- The following will show that it has now become possible to trace out this work, to compare with it the account given by Bu-ston and to ascertain its historical importance. (Obermiller, "A Sanskrit MS. from Tibet," 1–3)
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In this chapter I examine some medieval Buddhist doctrines that, at least on the surface, seem similarly strange and implausible. Indeed, some of the Buddhist notions to be examined below were perplexing to audiences in their own day, much as discussions of brain transplants are perplexing to us today. On the Indian side, I will begin with the notion of nirodha-samāpatti, a meditative state akin to a vegetative coma in which all consciousness has ceased. I will then turn to a class of beings known as “beings without conception” (asaṃjñika-sattvāḥ), denizens of a celestial realm who are devoid of sentience, thought, and consciousness. In both cases, an insentient state seems to be followed by (or gives rise to) a sentient state, which poses serious challenges to the classical Buddhist understanding of karma. On the Chinese side, we will consider the debate over the buddha-nature of insentient objects—can an insentient thing such as a wall or roof tile attain buddhahood and preach the dharma? This doctrine too could be (and was) seen as a threat to the coherence of Buddhist teachings.
Modern scholars tend to approach such doctrines as the products of intelligent but misguided scholastics struggling to make sense of the universe, all the while hobbled by the dictates of tradition, scripture, and a prescientific understanding of the cosmos. They are the proverbial schoolmen calculating how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. But I would suggest another perspective. Such theories, I argue, serve as frames of reference for pondering issues of personal identity, ethical responsibility, sentience, and death. Given that we ourselves are still far from clarity on these issues, and given that we too devise fanciful thought experiments to help gain a conceptual toehold, perhaps it is time to look afresh at what the Buddhists might have been up to.[11] (Sharf, preamble, 144–45)
Notes
11. For an articulate defense of Buddhist scholasticism, along different lines, see Paul John Griffiths, “Scholasticism: The Possible Recovery of an Intellectual Practice,” in Scholasticism: Cross-Cultural and Comparative Perspectives, ed. José Ignacio Cabezón (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 201–35.Du III au VII siècle de notre ère, selon la chronologie la plus souvent admise, la pensée bouddhique en Inde a trouvé une expression particulièrement brillante dans l'école dite du Vijñānavāda «doctrine de la connaissance». Les premiers ouvrages ressortissant à cette école en tant que telle peuvent être datés du début du Ill siècle. Au cours de ce siècle et du suivant, elle constitue peu à peu ses thèses, notamment à travers les ouvrages de Maitreya-nātha, d'Asaṅga et de Vasubandhu l'ancien. Je désignerai les développements de cette période sous le nom de Vijñānavāda ancien. Au V siècle, Vasubandhu le jeune cherche à fixer et à synthétiser la doctrine; ses travaux ouvrent la période de ce que j'ai appelé le Vijñānavāda classique, caractérisée par une abondante littérature de commentaires qu'illustrent en particulier les noms de Sthiramati, Dharmapāla et Hiuan-tsang. Le present exposé s'attachera à retracer brièvement l'histoire du Vijñānavāda, puis à exposer la doctrine classique. (May, "La philosophie bouddhique idéaliste," 265)
English Translation:
The MPNS-G declares or suggests the non-emptiness of the tathāgata. This is reinterpretation of the pratītyasamutpāda and the śūnyatā idea, and follows the rule of the historical Buddhist hermeneutics. It is especially worthwhile to note that the MBhS, like the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra in the Vijñāptimātra idea, devaluates the śūnyatā idea as imperfect. This quite negative attitude toward the śūnyatā idea does not appear in any other Indian texts on the tathāgatagarbha idea including the MPNS and the AMS. Aiming at establishing the theory that every sentient being is able to perform religious efforts and become buddha on account of the nonemptiness and the eternalness of the tathāgata, the MBhS must reject any sūtra concerning the śūnyatā idea as imperfect. Though the MPNS is a pioneer in reinterpretation of the the śúnyatā idea, the MPNS cannot devaluate it perfectly because the śūnyatā idea is one of the main backgrounds to the MPNS. The MBhS's decisive attitude toward the śūnyatā idea devaluation becomes possible by having the MPNS as its basis. (Source: UTokyo Repository)
Everyone who has had at least some glimpses at Buddhism knows that it contains various philosophical theories as well as various spiritual practices. The term ' philosophical theory ' should be understood here in a general sense comprising any attempt to make rational statements about the true nature or the fundamental principles of the totality or some part of the existent, or about those aspects of it of which everyday experience is not aware. In this sense, philosophical theories in Buddhism are, e.g., the doctrine that there is no substantial Self, no ātman; or the doctrine that the whole universe consists of momentary factors, of factors each of which lasts only for the time of an extremely short moment. ' Spiritual practice ', in the case of Buddhism, consists essentially of moral or ethical exercises, and of practices of meditation, deep concentration, or trance. As an example, we may adduce the so-called four 'infinitudes', or 'unlimited ones' (apramāṇa), i.e. the meditative practice of the attitudes of friendliness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and impartiality or equanimity with regard to all living beings. Another example is the 'contemplation of the impure' (aśubhabhāvanā). Here the Yogin, in order to subdue excessive covetousness, contemplates dead bodies in their different stages of decomposition. In this exercise, it is not necessary that the Yogin actually stays at a cemetery for the whole time. He may well continue the exercise at any other place, making use of a special meditative practice in which he is able to visualize those dead bodies he saw previously.
In this article I want to contribute to the solution of the problem of the historical relation of these two elements — philosophical theory and spiritual practice — in Buddhism. Did Buddhism usually start from philosophical theories and afterwards develop corresponding spiritual practices? Or is it more typical for Buddhism that first there are spiritual practices and that philosophical theories are only the result of a subsequent reflection which leads to a theoretical consolidation and generalization of those spiritual practices? (Schmithausen, "On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism," 235)
The systematic question underlying my comments upon these verses throughout will be: what is the relation between the ground of awakening, that which makes it possible, and the fact of awakening, its essential properties?
In what follows I shall provide ftrst a brief introduction to the of the MSA-corpus; I shall then place MSA IX.22-37 in its context within the text as a whole, and shall translate the verses in full and offer expository comments on them, drawing in so doing upon the surviving Indic commentaries. (Griffiths, "Painting Space with Colors", 41–42)
There is no traditional rubric of tathāgatagarbha scriptures, though modem scholars (e.g. Takasaki, 1974) have treated several scriptures as belonging to a thematic class, namely the ;;Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta, the Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanādasūtra, the (Mahāyāna) Mahaaparinirvāṇamahāsūtra, the Mahāmeghasūtra, the *Mahābherīhārakasūtra, and the Mahāyāna Aṅgulimālīya (or Aṅgulimālīyasūtra). This classification is based in the first instance on the use of these and related works as proof texts in the Indian treatise Ratnagotravibhāga (Mahāyānottaratantra). The category is thus in some sense conceptually coherent even in an Indian context. Moreover, many of these texts take on a very significant role in East Asia where, again, they are often appealed to in various groupings.
The notion of tathāgatagarbha (embryo of the tathāgatas), a Mahāyāna innovation, signifies the presence in every sentient being of the innate capacity for buddhahood. Although different traditions interpret it variously, the basic idea is either that all beings are already awakened, but simply do not recognize it, or that all beings possess the capacity, and for some the certainty, of attaining buddhahood, but adventitious defilements (āgantukakleśa) for the moment prevent the realization of this potential. (Radich, "Tathāgatagarbha Sūtras," 261)