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The ''Treatise on the Awakening of Faith according to the Mahāyāna'' (''Dasheng qixin lun'' 大乗起信論) is an immensely important treatise popular in all traditions of Buddhism in East Asia. It was written in China in the middle of the sixth century, heavily influenced by Indian Yogācāra and ''tathāgatagarbha'' teachings, providing a scriptural foundation for both buddha-nature theory and the doctrine of original enlightenment. The text synthesized tathāgatagarbha and ''ālayavijñāna'' theories to explain how the mind is the source for both enlightenment and ignorance. A relatively short text at just nine pages, it lucidly, if densely, explains important topics such as the nature of mind and consciousness and the threefold bodies of the Buddha, concluding with elegant meditation instructions. +
Articles/On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
Everyone who has had at least some glimpses at Buddhism knows that it contains various philosophical theories as well as various spiritual practices. The term ' ''philosophical theory'' ' should be understood here in a general sense comprising any attempt to make rational statements about the true nature or the fundamental principles of the totality or some part of the existent, or about those aspects of it of which everyday experience is not aware. In this sense, philosophical theories in Buddhism are, e.g., the doctrine that there is no substantial Self, no ''ātman''; or the doctrine that the whole universe consists of momentary factors, of factors each of which lasts only for the time of an extremely short moment. ' ''Spiritual practice'' ', in the case of Buddhism, consists essentially of moral or ethical exercises, and of practices of meditation, deep concentration, or trance. As an example, we may adduce the so-called four 'infinitudes', or 'unlimited ones' (''apramāṇa''), i.e. the meditative practice of the attitudes of friendliness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and impartiality or equanimity with regard to all living beings. Another example is the 'contemplation of the impure' (''aśubhabhāvanā''). Here the Yogin, in order to subdue excessive covetousness, contemplates dead bodies in their different stages of decomposition. In this exercise, it is not necessary that the Yogin actually stays at a cemetery for the whole time. He may well continue the exercise at any other place, making use of a special meditative practice in which he is able to ''visualize'' those dead bodies he saw previously. <br> In this article I want to contribute to the solution of the problem of the ''historical relation'' of these two elements — philosophical theory and spiritual practice — in Buddhism. Did Buddhism usually start from philosophical theories and afterwards develop corresponding spiritual practices? Or is it more typical for Buddhism that first there are spiritual practices and that philosophical theories are only the result of a subsequent reflection which leads to a theoretical consolidation and generalization of those spiritual practices? (Schmithausen, "On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism," 235)
The Indian treatise that this website identifies as the ''Ratnagotravibhāga Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra'' is also known by a handful of other titles in multiple languages. It is fairly common for ancient works of literature to be known by many names, especially if, like the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' (to give it its abbreviated name), it has been translated into many languages. This essay will explain the multiple names, discuss what is known of its authorship, and briefly survey the existing recensions and translations. +
Articles/On the Ālayavijñāna in the Awakening of Faith: Comparing and Contrasting Wŏnhyo and Fazang’s Views on Tathāgatagarbha and Ālayavijñāna +
The ''Awakening of Faith'', one of the most seminal treatises in East Asian Buddhism, is well-known for its synthesis of the two Mahāyāna concepts of ''tathāgatagarbha'' and ''ālayavijñāna''. Unlike early Yogācāra texts, such as the ''Yogācārabhūmi'', in which ''ālayavijñāna'' is described as a defiled consciousness, the ''Awakening of Faith'' explains it as a "synthetic" consciousness, in which ''tathāgatagarbha'' and the defiled mind are unified in a neither-identical-nor-different condition. East Asian Buddhist exegetes noted the innovative explanation of the ''Awakening of Faith'' and compiled the commentaries, among which Huayan master Fazang’s (643–712) commentary had a profound effect on the process of the establishment of the treatise as one of the most representative ''tathāgatagarbha'' texts in East Asia. However, as scholarly perceptions that the commentators’ interpretations do not always represent the ''Awakening of Faith''’s tenets themselves have grown, the propriety of relying on Fazang’s commentary for understanding the treatise has also been questioned. What attracts our attention in this regard is that the Silla scholar-monk Wǒnhyo’s (617–686) commentaries, which are known to have significantly influenced Fazang’s, present very different views. This article demonstrates that two distinct interpretations existed in Wǒnhyo’s days for ''tathāgatagarbha'' and ''ālayavijñāna'' of the ''Awakening of Faith'' by comparing Wǒnhyo and Fazang’s commentaries, and further considers the possibility that the ''Awakening of Faith''’s doctrine of ''ālayavijñāna'' is not doctrinally incompatible with that of early Yogācāra on the basis of Wǒnhyo’s view on ''ālayavijñāna''. +
In this article, I chart a trajectory from deconstruction to embodiment in the intellectual history of Buddhist traditions in Tibet. I focus on embodiment as a participatory approach to radically deconstructed and unthematized meaning, in contrast to an interpretation of truth as purely an analytic category or an approach to meaning that deals with values, such as emptiness, as simply truth claims or representations. I show how certain Buddhists in Tibet have represented the meaning of emptiness as a uniquely participatory encounter in such a way that its meaning is necessarily embodied. To speak of it otherwise, I argue, is to misrepresent its meaning fundamentally. An important way that the embodiment of emptiness is formulated is through the discourses of buddha-nature (''tathāgatagarbha''). I show how Tibetan interpretations of Buddha-nature reflect postmodern concerns about metaphysics and onto-theology. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The varying answers given to the single question of whether the mind is pure by nature or defiled by nature form a convenient lenses through which to view the development of Yogācāra thought. If the mind is pure, then where do the defilements originate? If it is defiled, where does purity originate? Though the classical formulation of Asaṇga and Vasubandhu sees consciousness as ''paratantric'', the source of defilement yet only the ''support'' of purity (an important distinction that necessitates an external source of purity), another view which was taken up by Yogācāran thinkers is that of the originally pure mind (''viśuddhi cittaprakṛiti''); a third schema brings the structure of consciousness together with that purity as seen, for example, within the *''Mahāyāna śraddhotpādaśāstra'' (''The Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith''). (Hubbard, introductory remarks, 1) +
In understanding the ongoing process of the development of any doctrinal system, isolated insights into particular texts or particular doctrinal themes are not sufficient. No number of monographs on ''ālayavijñāna'' or ''trisvabhāva'' suffices, for, although such studies do clarify particular themes, no understanding is gained of the overall purpose for which these themes were developed. What is desired is an overall insight into what the system is trying to achieve. In the case of the Yogācāra system, the question of its basic intent and overall purpose is not easily determined. There are, it would appear, two reasons for this situation. The first is that the complex of questions regarding the dating, authorship, and compilation of the various textual data have not yet received definite answers in many instances, and yet each of these questions bears directly upon the understanding of the lines of doctrinal development. A second reason is that the doctrinal focuses of some of the basic Yogācāra texts appear to differ.<br> The intent of this paper is to treat this latter concern. It will attempt to describe the basic doctrinal focus of four early Yogācāra texts, suggest the intent of their authors, and draw a hypothesis concerning the lines of development of early Yogācāra as seen in these texts. The texts selected are the ''[[Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārakārikā|Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra]]'', the ''[[Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra]]'', the ''[[Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra]]'', and the ''[[Madhyāntavibhāga|Madyāntavibhāgaśāstra]]''. All four texts were composed before the time of the classical formulation of Yogācāra by [[Asaṅga]] and [[Vasubandhu]]. Although it is not possible to determine with any degree of certitude the temporal relationship among these texts, insight into their doctrinal emphases would help to identify the overall problematic that led the early, pre-Asaṅgan Yogācārins to develop their thinking. ([https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jiabs/article/view/8560/2467 Source Accessed Jan 28, 2020])
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
In this essay I aim to clarify the meaning of other-emptiness in the Jonang (''jo nang'')
tradition of Buddhism of Tibet. I will focus on the writings of Dölpopa (''dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan'') (1292–1361), the renowned forefather of this tradition. Dölpopa famously differentiated two types of emptiness, or two ways of being empty—self-emptiness (''rang stong'') and other-emptiness (''gzhan stong'')—and proclaimed the
superiority of the latter.
In contrast to the meaning of self-emptiness, other-emptiness is not a phenomenon’s emptiness of its own essence. It refers to ultimate reality’s emptiness of all that it is not. Also, it does not just refer to a (relative) phenomenon being empty of another phenomenon (like an ox lacking the quality of a sheep), but rather refers to the ultimate ground that is empty of all relative phenomena. Other-emptiness also is a way of articulating that the qualities of nirvāṇa lack the qualities of saṃsāra (i.e., nirvāṇa is empty of its other). By endorsing the superiority of other-emptiness, Dölpopa laid out a distinctive claim that became the hallmark of his Jonang tradition’s interpretation of emptiness:
:All that is said about emptiness is not exclusively self-emptiness; there is a division between the emptiness that is the profound other-emptiness and the emptiness that is selfemptiness, which is not profound. Moreover, there are two: the emptiness that is ultimate and the emptiness that is relative. And there are two: the emptiness that is thoroughly established and the emptiness that is imputed. Furthermore, there are two: the emptiness that is natural and innate and the emptiness that is artificial and contingent.[1]
While it is not controversial for a Buddhist to claim that the ultimate truth is not the
relative truth or that nirvāṇa lacks the qualities of saṃsāra, it is controversial to claim
that other-emptiness is a more profound form of emptiness than self-emptiness, or
that it is the most profound meaning of emptiness. This is just what Dölpopa claims.
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Dölpopa, ''Elucidation of Emptiness'', pp. 294–295.
Scholars of Buddhism writing in European languages have celebrated, derided, and frequently misinterpreted the doctrine of ''tathāgatagarbha'' for well over a hundred years. While some have seen it as a crucial theoretical step to explain how deluded, impure sentient beings can become buddhas, others have dismissed the entire idea as non-Buddhist. Following Chinese and Tibetan scholiasts, Western scholars have labeled tathāgatagarbha as either Yogācāra or Madhyamaka, although most now understand that the doctrine arose independently of either of these main Mahāyāna schools. The philosophical question of whether ultimate reality can or should be described in positive terms, and the ethical matters of faith and practice all come to the fore in discussions of tathāgatagarbha, and scholars have for the most part spent the last century explicating the scripture and commentary that have sought to make sense of it all. To the degree that academics have assumed the role of interpreting Buddhist doctrine to Western audiences, tathāgatagarbha—“buddha-nature” to the popular reader—seems now to be the foremost shared interest of the academic and the practitioner. This essay attempts to be exhaustive, referencing all books, articles, and chapters that take buddha-nature as the primary focus. It discusses only scholarship published in European languages. +
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Articles/Paramārtha's Doctrine of a Ninth Consciousness, as Transmitted in Tibetan Texts: Tsong kha pa's Kun gzhi dka' gter and Its Context +
This study aims to elucidate a portion of the reception and evaluation of Paramārtha's doctrines in Tibet, taking as its entry point controversy about Paramārtha's theory of a ninth consciousness as seen in Tsong kha pa's (Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa, 1357-1419) Kun gzhi dka' gter, while simultaneously investigating the background to that text. The development of our argument will incorporate new insights gained through investigation of the texts upon which Tsong kha pa based himself: Wǒnch'ŭk's commentary on the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, and commentaries on the Abhidharmasamuccaya by gZad ring (gZad ring Dar ma tshul khrims, latter half of the 12th century), bCom ldan rig ral (1227-1305), Bu ston (Bu ston Rin chen grub, 1290-1364) and Blo gros brtan pa (dPang Blo gros brtan pa, 1276-1342).<br> Wǒnch'ŭk, bCom ldan rig ral and Bu ston understood that ninth consciousness is ultimately the seeds of the eighth consciousness, or else the pure part thereof. In terms of the content of the controversy, gZad ring, bCom ldan rig ral and Bu ston largely follow a common archetype. They introduce the ninth consciousness without mentioning Paramārtha; they refer to tathāgatagarbha doctrine, relying upon a passage from the Samādhirāja-sūtra as their proof-text; and in rejecting the doctrine of ninth consciousness, they propose that ninth consciousness must exist either actually or potentially, and then reject both alternatives. Since these two points cannot be identified in Wǒnch'ŭk's commentary, we can postulate that the controversy between these scholars was an innovative creation and development from within Tibetan Buddhism. Furthermore, it also seems that in the transmission of ninth consciousness doctrine in Tibet, there arose certain distortions (or deviations from Wǒnch'ŭk's theories), such as when gZad ring ascribes the doctrine of ninth consciousness not to Paramārtha, but to Bhavya.<br> We also must not neglect the fact that the doctrine of ninth consciousness affirmed in these commentaries to the Abhidharmasamuccaya is not completely identical to that described by Tsong kha pa. Comparison with these texts, which constitute the immediate context for his discussion, highlights the fact that in discussing Paramārtha's doctrine of ninth consciousness as it appears in Wonchuk, Tsong kha pa cites Wonchuk's work directly, rather than second-hand (i.e. rather than relying upon predecessors who utilize Wonchuk's exposition); and in refuting the doctrine of ninth consciousness, he attempts to construct proofs on the basis of his own original viewpoint, rather than recycling the arguments of his predecessors. We are surely justified in judging that it was Tsong kha pa's achievement to absorb Wonchuk's commentary for himself, and to attempt to correct the distortions incidental to the transmission of ninth consciousness doctrine in Tibet. ([https://koyasan-u.academia.edu/Departments/Esoteric_Buddhist_Studies/Documents?page=2 Source Accessed June 16, 2020])
The present paper [in German] consists of two sections. The first section is concerned with the structure of the Ratnagotravibhāgaḥ (RGV). The starting point is the analysis given by J. Takasaki in his book "A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga" (Rome 1966). Takasaki's distinction between basic verses, commentary verses and prose commentary certainly has to be accepted. His attempt however to recover an original RGV of only 27 verses by declaring most of the basic verses to be later enlargements of the basic text seems open to doubt, because even this pretended original RGV admits of being split up again. Therefore, to my opinion the original RGV is constituted by the totality of basic verses. But this original RGV seems to have made use of several (perhaps only partly remodelIed) older materials. — The second section of the present paper is dedicated to suggesting corrections of the Sanskrit text and — in some cases — of the translation of single RGV-passages. +
Is Dōgen a philosopher? Or even an example of what he scolds a "word-counting scholar"? Despite the difficulties of classifying Dōgen, many would still agree, at least with regard to his ''magnum opus'', the ''Shōbōgenzō'', that his writings are philosophical. This, however, requires some clarification, since there is not much left of this work if one were to exclude all the fascicles that are not explicitly cited for philosophical interpretation. The philosophic scope becomes even smaller if one were to consider the respective passages of the few fascicles pertinent for explicit philosophical reading. At the risk of oversimplifying, the philosophical reception of Dōgen's works is almost entirely grounded in the fascicle "Uji", which is distinguished for its thought–provoking discourse on time. Furthermore the philosophical reading of other fascicles, including "Genjōkōan" and "Zenki" revolves around a related interpretation of "Uji."<br> Nevertheless, we can still ask if there might be yet another accessible vantage point from which one could regard Dōgen's ''Shōbōgenzō'' as philosophical? This paper will argue that the answer is "yes," there is such a vantage point, so long as one distinguishes ''what'' Dōgen writes from ''how'' Dōgen writes. For the claim of the paper is that while it remains ambiguous to maintain that his writings exhibit a philosophical system based on content, their form realizes what philosophy is at its core, i.e. reflexivity or philosophy’s inherent self reference. (Müller, "Philosophy and the Practice of Reflexivity," 545–46)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#English quoted from W/A 16; jap. DZZ 2: 467−68: ｢文字をかぞふる学者｣. Note: The original text references quote from ''Dōgen zenji zenshū'', ["DZZ"]. The English translations of the three main writings (''Bendōwa'' [辦道話], "Busshō" [仏性], and ''Hōkyōki'' [宝慶記]) are based on Norman Waddell and Masao Abe (2002) ["W/A"]; and, respectively, Takashi James Kodera (1980), ["K"].
#As has already been pointed out, most philosophical readers only consider Dōgen's ''Shōbōgenzō'' (正法眼蔵). In fact, there is probably no reader of Dōgen who would blatantly disregard the religious practitioner's interpretation of Dōgen in favor of that of a strictly theoretical interpretation of a philosopher. Since, to my understanding, most existing philosophical readings of Dōgen are not radically different, it seems worth reevaluating these readings by dismantling both the historical and rhetorical layers of the respective author's prose to relate the effective ambitions and the factual interpretations. — In the case of Tanabe Hajime's 1939 reading of Dōgen (see Tanabe 2011 and Müller 2006 for translation and commentary), Masunaga Reihō (1939) presents the earliest and most comprehensive critique of Tanabe's philosophical reading including a set of six objections (pp. 627–630) building on Tanabe's own question of the systematic relation of religion and philosophy. Taking Tanabe's reading seriously would require a similar critique from his own vantage point. — A more recent outline of Western readers of Dōgen by Hee-Jin Kim (2004: xv-xxii) subsumes his own approach in contradistinction to the "textual-historical" and "comparative philosophical" method as "methodological-hermeneutical" (p. xviii) to show "how Dōgen does his religion, especially his way of appropriating language and symbols soteriologically" (ibid.). The present article evolves Kim's reasoning with regards to the way Dōgen does philosophy in a similar vein.
#See Elberfeld 2006 for a recent interpretation of the fascicle "Uji" in the horizon of the Indian and Chinese Buddhist tradition. Still worth reading is Heine 1985.
#有時.
#現成公案 and 全機.
Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche presents the essential teachings of Mahamudra and its three main approaches to practice, each offering effective methods for directly pointing out mind’s true nature. +
Articles/Presenting a Controversial Doctrine in a Conciliatory Way: Mkhan chen Gang shar dbang po's (1925–1958-59?) Inclusion of Gzhan stong ("Emptiness of Other") within Prāsaṅgika +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Positive descriptions of the ultimate, which are based on direct access to the luminous nature of one’s mind, as taught in the various traditions of Mahāmudrā or Great Perfection, look back upon a long history. Such systems found doctrinal support in the teachings of the third turning of the wheel of the ''dharma'' (''dharmacakra''), which is not only based on the doctrine of emptiness, but also distinguishes between the imputed and the real (i.e., phenomena and their true nature, or adventitious stains and
buddha-nature).[1] Some took this third ''dharmacakra'' as a teaching of definitive meaning and went so far as to stress the need to define its distinction between the imputed and the real in terms of two modes of emptiness: being "empty of an own-being" (''rang stong'') and being "empty of other" (''gzhan stong''). The most prominent proponent of ''gzhan stong'', Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan (1292-1561), takes relative truth as being empty of a true own-being, but the ultimate as not being empty of such an own-being.[2] In terms of the theory of three natures, Dol po pa equates this ultimate with the perfect nature. It alone is ''gzhan stong'', that is, empty of the imagined and dependent natures.[3] Such an interpretation mainly follows the Extensive Commentary (''Bṛhaṭṭīkā'')[4] on the Discourses of the Perfection of Wisdom
(while also drawing support from the teaching of a buddha-nature, if one equates the latter with the perfect nature and the adventitious stains with the imagined and dependent natures) and requires one to reinterpret the traditional Yogācāra formula according to which the perfect is the dependent empty of the imagined. In the final analysis, the Jo nang pas go so far as to restrict the perfect to its unchangeable nature, with the perfect in terms of its unmistaken aspect (i.e., as nonconceptual wisdom) being taken as the "pure dependent."[5] The basis of emptiness thus is the ultimate or the unchangeable aspect of the perfect nature, everything dependent being part of the negandum which includes the entire relative truth. It should be noted that the Jo nang pa variety of ''gzhan stong'' is based on a particular understanding of the relation between the two truths, which requires a clear-cut distinction between an existing transcendent ultimate and a relative that does not exist in this fundamental state.[6]
<h5>Notes</h5>
#According to ''Discourse Revealing the True Intention'' (''Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra'') VII.30, the Buddha taught the Four Noble Truths in the first ''dharmacakra''. Both the second and the third ''dharmacakras'' he taught beginning with the lack of an own-being in phenomena, and going on to the fact that these latter neither arise nor pass out of existence, that they are quiescent from the beginning, and that they are naturally in a state of ''nirvāṇa''—in other words, emptiness as taught in the Discourses on the Perfection of Wisdom (Prajñāpāramitāsūtras) and the analytical Madhyamaka works of Nāgārjuna. The third ''dharmacakra'' stands out, though, for the fine distinctions it offers, and for this reason alone it has—contrary to the first two—definitive meaning (''nitārtha''), and so outshines the second ''dharmacakra'' by an uncountable factor (SNS, 85; and Powers, ''Wisdom of the Buddha; The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra'', 138-41).
#Dol po pa: ''Bden gnyis gsal ba’i nyi ma'', 4<sub>1–3</sub>: "Any object of consciousness, that which is, from its own side, empty of a true own-being, this is the defining characteristic of relative truth. . . . Any object of the genuine wisdom of the noble ones, that which is, from its own side, not empty of its respective own-being, this is the defining characteristic of the ultimate." (''rnam shes kyi yul gang zhig'' / ''gshis la rang gi ngo bo bden pas stong pa ni'' / ''kun rdzob bden pa'i mtshan nyid . . . ’phags pa’i ye shes dam pa’i yul gang zhig'' / ''gzhis la rang rang gi ngo bo bden pas mi stong pa ni'' / ''don dam pa’i mtshan nyid de'' /). See Mathes, "Vordergründige und höchste Wahrheit im ''gZan stoṅ''-Madhyamaka," 459.
#Dol po pa: ''Jo nang ri chos nges don rgya mtsho'', 150<sub>4–6</sub>: "Since it has been said that the ''dharmatā'' [or] perfect [nature], which is empty of the imagined and dependent [natures], ultimately exists, the ultimate is well established as being ''gzhan stong'' alone." (''kun btags dang gzhan dbang gis stongpa’i chos nyid yongs grub don dam du yod par gsungs pa’i phyir don dam gzhan stong nyid du legs par grub po'' /).
#Derge Bstan ’gyur 3808, fol. 287a<sub>4–5</sub>: "The imagined nature [of phenomena] is that aspect [of them that leads to] form and the other [modes of] phenomena being called "form" and so forth. The dependent nature is that aspect [of them which], under the sway of ignorance and so forth, appears to consciousness as phenomena in a mistaken way. [Their] ultimate—perfect—nature is that ineffable aspect beyond characteristic signs, which is free from the [said] aspects of names and mistaken appearances." (''de la gzugs la sogs pa chos rnams la gzugs zhes bya ba la sogs par mngon par brjod pa’i rnam pa gang yin pa de ni kun brtags pa’i ngo bo nyid do'' / ''ma rig pa la sogs pa’i dbang gis rnam par shes pa la chos rnams su phyin ci log tu snang ba’i mam pa gang yin pa de ni gzhan dbang gi ngo bo nyid do'' / ''gang ming dang'' /''phyin ci log tu snang ba’i rnam pa de dang bred ba brjod du med pa'' / ''mtshan ma med pa’i rnam pa gang yin pa de ni don dam pa yongs su grub pa’i ngo bo nyid de /). See also my first discussion of this passage in Mathes, "Tāranātha's 'Twenty-One Differences with Regard to the Profound Meaning'—Comparing the Views of the Two ''gŹan stoṅ'' Masters Dol po pa and Śākya mchog Idan," 317.
#Mathes, "Tāranātha's Presentation of ''trisvabhāva'' in the ''gŹan stoṅ sñiṅ po''," 218-20.
#Mathes, ''A Direct Path to the Buddha Within: Go Lotsāwa's Mahāmudrā Interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhāga'', 79-80.
East Asian Yogācāra Buddhism has been explained through traditional bifurcations, such as “Old” and “New” Yogācāra Buddhism, Tathāgatagarbha and Yogācāra, One Vehicle (一乘, S. ''eka-yana'') and Three Vehicles (三乘, S. ''tri-yana''), or Dharma Nature School (法性宗) and Dharma Characteristics School (法相宗). These conceptual pairs have served as useful tools in explaining the historical development and doctrinal evolvement of East Asian Yogācāra tradition. These simplistic binary frames, however, contain historical and/or doctrinal problems in understanding the complicated aspects of the development of the Yogācāra tradition in East Asia. In this regards, this paper critically reflects on theoretical implications of the traditional bifurcations by analyzing previous studies related to this subject, thereby disclosing fundamental problems of the binary frame. The paper finally discusses the prospect of studies on East Asian Yogācāra Buddhism. +
R
Ratnākaraśānti (ca. 11th cent.) is one of the most influential figures in the final phase of Indian Buddhism, and more than thirty works are available in Tibetan translations (some of them are also available in Sanskrit originals). However, previous studies have pointed out that some works are of another person with the same namesake, because, among the works attributed to him, we find some serious diversity in their doctrinal systems. The present paper focuses on the diversity in interpretation of the Buddha-nature doctrine.<br> We can find two types of interpretation, i.e., (1) that in accord with the ''yānatraya'' doctrine (in the ''Prajñāpāramitopadeśa'', ''Muktāvalī'', and ''Kusumāñjali''), and (2) that in accord with the ''ekayāna'' doctrine (in the ''Sūtrasamuccayabhāṣya'' and ''Triyānavyavasthāna''). The two positions are clearly contradicting each other. The first interpretation (1) is based on traditional Yogācāra doctrine that admits the ''gotrabheda'' doctrine ("differences of spiritual potentials"), while the second (2) premises the Madhyamaka doctrine that does not accept the ''gotrabheda'' doctrine on the ultimate level and claims all beings equally have the same potential to become a buddha.<br> Furthermore, the existence of the diversity between the two interpretations is supported by other doctrinal issues, for instance, two different attitudes toward the understanding of ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' I.39.<br> As a conclusion, the doctrinal position in the ''Sūtrasamuccayabhāṣya'' and ''Triyānavyavasthāna'' is different from that of the ''Prajñāpāramitopadeśa'' etc. The aim of the present paper is to show the clear diversity attested in the works attributed to Ratnākaraśānti, which will, hopefully, contribute to solving the question of the authorship of the works, i.e., whether they are composed by one person or not. (Source: [https://www.academia.edu/5418196/_Two_Different_Positions_toward_the_Buddha-nature_Doctrine_found_in_Ratn%C4%81kara%C5%9B%C4%81ntis_Compositions_Ratn%C4%81kara%C5%9B%C4%81nti_no_shochosaku_ni_okeru_nyoraiz%C5%8D_rikai_no_niruikei_Mikkyo_bunka._225._2011._pp._7-35_publ._2013_in_Japanese_%E3%83%A9%E3%83%88%E3%83%8A%E3%83%BC%E3%82%AB%E3%83%A9%E3%82%B7%E3%83%A3%E3%83%BC%E3%83%B3%E3%83%86%E3%82%A3%E3%81%AE%E8%AB%B8%E8%91%97%E4%BD%9C%E3%81%AB%E3%81%8A%E3%81%91%E3%82%8B%E5%A6%82%E6%9D%A5%E8%94%B5%E7%90%86%E8%A7%A3%E3%81%AE%E4%BA%8C%E9%A1%9E%E5%9E%8B_%E5%AF%86%E6%95%99%E6%96%87%E5%8C%96_225_2011%E5%B9%B4_2013%E5%B9%B47%E6%9C%88%E5%87%BA%E7%89%88_7-35%E9%A0%81 Academia.edu])
Ratnākaraśānti (ca. 11th cent.) is one of the most influential figures in the final phase of Indian Buddhism, and more than thirty works are available in Tibetan translations (some of them are also available in Sanskrit originals). However, previous studies have pointed out that some works are of another person with the same namesake, because, among the works attributed to him, we find some serious diversity in their doctrinal systems. The present paper focuses on the diversity in interpretation of the Buddha-nature doctrine. We can find two types of interpretation, i.e., (1) that in accord with the ''yānatraya'' doctrine (in the ''Prajñāpāramitopadeśa'', ''Muktāvalī'', and ''Kusumāñjali''), and (2) that in accord with the ''ekayāna'' doctrine (in the ''Sūtrasamuccayabhāṣya'' and ''Triyānavyavasthāna''). The two positions are clearly contradicting each other. The first interpretation (1) is based on traditional Yogācāra doctrine that admits the ''gotrabheda'' doctrine (“differences of spiritual potentials”), while the second (2) premises the Madhyamaka doctrine that does not accept the ''gotrabheda'' doctrine on the ultimate level and claims all beings equally have the same potential to become a buddha. Furthermore, the existence of the diversity between the two interpretations is supported by other doctrinal issues, for instance, two different attitudes toward the understanding of ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' I.39. As a conclusion, the doctrinal position in the ''Sūtrasamuccayabhāṣya'' and ''Triyānavyavasthāna'' is different from that of the ''Prajñāpāramitopadeśa'' etc. The aim of the present paper is to show the clear diversity attested in the works attributed to Ratnākaraśānti, which will, hopefully, contribute to solving the question of the authorship of the works, i.e., whether they are composed by one person or not. (Source: [https://www.academia.edu/28610706/Ratn%C4%81kara%C5%9B%C4%81nti_s_Understanding_of_Buddha-nature._China_Tibetology_25_2015._pp._52_77 Academia.edu])
Articles/Reading the Writing on the Wall: "Sengchou's" Cave at Xiaonanhai, Early Chinese Buddhist Meditation, and Unique Portions of *Dharmakṣema's Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra +
The ''Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra'' (particularly in the version entitled ''Da banniepan jing'' 大般涅槃經 T374, translated by *Dharmakṣema ca. 421-432) features centrally in the textual and iconographic programme of a remarkable cave at Xiaonanhai 小南海 in northern Henan 河南, which was rediscovered in the 1980s. The cave has close connections with Sengchou 僧稠 (480-560), a famous meditator, and one of the leading clerics in Northern China in the sixth century. This paper argues for a new interpretation of the programme of the cave, and considers what it allows us to see about religious life and practice in Sengchou's time. An appendix examines implications of the textual material featured at the cave for the nature and provenance of the bulky portions of Dharmakṣema's version of the ''Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra'' that are unparalleled in our other three main independent witnesses. (Source: [https://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&id=3287487&journal_code=JIABS Peeters Online Journals]) +
Articles/Reburying the Treasure—Maintaining the Continuity: Two Texts by Śākya Mchog Ldan on the Buddha-Essence +
The rich and interconnected universe of Śākya Mchog Ldan’s views, including those on the buddha-essence, cannot be limited to or summarized in a few neat categories. Nevertheless, the following two interrelated ideas are crucial for understanding Śākya Mchog Ldan’s interpretation of the buddha-essence: 1) only Mahāyāna āryas ('' ’phags pa'') have the buddha-essence characterized by the purity from adventitious stains (''glo bur rnam dag''); 2) the buddha-essence is inseparable from the positive qualities (''yon tan'', ''guṇa'') of a buddha; In his writings, Śākya Mchog Ldan argues against identifying the buddha-essence as a mere natural purity (''rang bzhin rnam dag''), i.e., the state of natural freedom from obscurations as it is taught in the Middle or Second Wheel of Doctrine (''chos ’khor'', ''dharmacakra'') and its commentaries. The buddha-essence has to be posited as inseparability from positive qualities of a buddha.<br>
Śākya Mchog Ldan approaches the buddha-essence inseparable from positive qualities of a buddha in two ways. In some texts, such as the ''Essence of Sūtras and Tantras'', he argues that it has to be identified only as purity from adventitious stains, i.e., the removal of all or some negative qualities that prevent one from directly seeing the buddha-essence. In other texts, such as ''The Sun Unseen Before'', he interprets it as the purity from adventitious stains and the natural purity as it is taught in some sūtras of the Third Wheel of Doctrine and their commentaries. That type of natural purity is understood as the state of natural freedom from all obscurations ''inseparable from'' positive qualities of a buddha. Thereby, in this second type of texts, Śākya Mchog Ldan arrives at positing two types of the buddha-essence: relative (''kun rdzob'', ''saṃvṛti'') and ultimate (''don dam'', ''paramārtha''). Despite different interpretations of the natural purity, the identification of the buddha-essence as the purity from adventitious stains is present in both.<br>
In his interpretation of the buddha-essence, Śākya Mchog Ldan utilizes the categories of the three levels found in the ''Sublime Continuum'': the impure (''ma dag'', ''aśuddha''), impure-pure (''ma dag dag pa'', ''aśuddhaśuddha'', i.e. partially pure) and very pure (''shin tu rnam dag'', ''suviśuddha'') levels that correspond respectively to the categories of sentient beings, bodhisattvas (understood as ārya bodhisattvas in this context), and tathāgatas.<br>
Śākya Mchog Ldan argues that one becomes a possessor of the buddha-essence free from adventitious stains only on the impure-pure level. In other words, when bodhisattvas enter the Mahāyāna Path of Seeing (''mthong lam'', ''darśanamārga'') simultaneously with the attainment of the first boddhisattva [''sic''] ground (''byang chub sems pa’i sa'', ''bodhisattavabhūmi'') of Utmost Joy (''rab tu dga’ ba'', ''pramuditā''), they become āryas, i.e. ‘exalted’ or ‘superior’, bodhisattvas, directly realize the ultimate truth (''don dam bden pa'', ''paramārthasatya''), and thereby for the first time generate an antidote to obscurations of knowables (''shes bya’i sgrib pa'', ''jñeyāvaraṇa''). They start gradually removing them, and thereby actually see at least a partial purification of stains ‘covering’ the buddha-essence, and its inseparability from at least some positive qualities. Such is not possible for anyone below that level, even for the non-Mahāyāna arhats (i.e., śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas). Thus, only Mahāyāna āryas have the buddha-essence characterized by the purity from adventitious stains; ārya bodhisattvas have only a part of it, while buddhas have it completely.<br>
This article contains the complete text (in English translation) of ''The Essence of Sūtras and Tantras: Explanation of the Buddha-essence'' and ''The Sun Unseen Before: Definitive Meaning of the “Sublime Continuum” Treatise''. (Source: [https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/classicsfacpub/79/ DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln])
This paper is published in ''Acta Asiatica'' no.118, which concerns recent scholarship on ''tathāgatagarbha'', or Buddha-nature thought, in Indian literature. In light of recent reassessments of the development of ''tathāgatagarbha'' thought in India, this paper considers instances in which ''tathāgatagarbha'' is unpacked to refer to some "essence" (''dhātu'') of a Buddha present in all sentient beings. My observation is that this articulation of Buddha-nature teaching is found throughout Indian ''tathāgatagarbha'' literature, from the ''Nirvāṇa Sūtra'' through to supposedly "basic" materials of the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'', but is conspicuously absent where Buddhist authors are invested in (re)interpreting Buddha-nature in terms of the basic nature of the mind: an influential innovation that I believe is first evident in the ''Śrīmālā Sūtra''. ([https://www.academia.edu/42138584/Reconsidering_the_Essence_of_Indian_Buddha-Nature_Literature Source Accessed April 3, 2020]) +
