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In order to overcome the five main obstacles facing a bodhisattva, says Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche, we must realize that all beings are primordially pure. He presents the essential teachings on buddhanature from Maitreya’s ''Uttaratantra Shastra''. +
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Articles/T'ien-t'ai Chih'i's Concept of Threefold Buddha Nature-A Synergy of Reality, Wisdom, and Practice +
Paul L. Swanson's contribution, on Chih-i's threefold concept of Buddha Nature, places T'ien-t'ai thought on this matter in a broader conceptual context. He presents it as one more application of the fundamental T'ien-t' ai idea of synergy—that there is a deeply symbiotic relationship between the way things really are (reality), the awareness of the way things really are (wisdom), and the religious practice that produces such an awareness (practice). Swanson bases his exposition on the ''Fa-hua hsüan-i'', in which Buddha Nature, along with nine other Buddhist concepts, is interpreted through the threefold pattern already adverted to. Swanson shows how Chih-i, drawing upon both the ''Nirvāṇa Sūtra'' and the ''Lotus Sūtra'', accommodates Buddha Nature terminology and concepts into the structure of his own thought. (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to ''Buddha Nature'', 6) +
Articles/Tathāgatagarbaḥ Sarvasattvānāṃ: A Hypothetical Interpretation of a Declarative Formula in the Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra +
In this paper, I shall propose a hypothetical interpretation of the phrase ''tathāgatagarbhaḥ sarvasattvānāṃ'', which is a declarative formula of the ''Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra'' (abbr. MPMS) and is preserved as original Sanskrit. This phrase confirms that the word ''tathāgatagarbha''—if this is a ''bahuvrīhi'' compound—cannot grammatically go with the word ''sattvānāṃ'' unlike the case of the ''Tathāgatagarbhasūtra'', in which ''tathāgatagarbha'', being a ''bahuvrīhi'', qualifies the noun ''sattva'' (''sarvasattvās tathāgatagarbhāḥ''). Previous studies have mostly interpreted ''tathāgatagarbhaḥ'' of the MPMS, as a ''tatpuruṣa'', whereas I shall keep this as a ''bahuvrīhi'' and take it to be an adjective which qualifies some undescribed noun—that is, ''stūpa'', omitted in the phrase, based on the following reasons: (1) The word ''tathāgatagarbha'' in the formula is probably premising such expressions like ''tathāgatadhātugarbhān stūpān, dhātugarbhe caitye'' (which is paraphrased by the expression ''sadhātuke caitye'' "a ''caitya'' that contains relics"), etc., as found in other Mahāyāna scriptures, where ''tathāgatadhātugarbha'', as a ''bahuvrīhi'', qualifies the noun ''stūpa'' "a ''stūpa'' that contains ''tathāgata'' 's relics”; (2) the omission of the noun ''stūpa'' in the formula might reflect the same omission found in expressions, such as ''dhātudhṛk'' or ''dhātudharaḥ'' (both omitting ''stūpaḥ''), as found in Buddhist inscriptions; (3) The declarative formula of the MPMS should naturally be relevant to the main topic of the MPMS, which deals with ''tathāgata'''s ''nirvāṇa'' and his relics that were found in ''stūpas'' (which, in turn, are reinterpreted in the MPMS from the viewpoint of the ''dharmakāya'' and ''tathāgatagarbha''); (4) The MPMS precisely declares that all beings are real ''stūpa''/''caitya'', and this declaration fits well with the phrase ''tathāgatagarbhaḥ sarvasattvānāṃ'' “all beings have ''tathāgatagarbha'' (i.e. ''stūpa'')”; (5) We find yet another expression (''asmākam upari tathāgatagarbho 'sti'' "there is ''tathāgatagarbha'' above us") in the Sanskrit fragment of the MPMS; however, the word ''tathāgatagarbha'', in this expression, does not disturb the abovementioned interpretation. Instead, this reminds us of the famous scene taught in the ''Saddharmapuṇḍarīka''—the stūpa arising in the sky above the audience: ''saptaratnamayaḥ stūpo ’bhyudgataḥ ... parṣanmaṇḍalasyopari vaihāyasaṃ tiṣṭhet''. Accordingly, I shall tentatively propose to interpret the word ''tathāgatagarbhaḥ'' in the formula as a ''bahuvrīhi'' which qualifies the noun ''stūpa''. I think, however, it is possible to apprehend ''tathāgatagarbha'' as a ''tatpuruṣa'', to be the secondary meaning of the word because the MPMS most probably utilizes the word with double or triple meaning in order to preserve the semantic richness of the word ''garbha'', which has already been pointed out by Masahiro Shimoda and Michael Radich.
Articles/Tathāgatagarbha Influences in the Three Nature (Trisvabhāva) Theory of the Maitreya Works +
Retaining the Abhidharma distinction between the "real" (''dravyasat'') factors of existence (''dharma'') and the mere nominal existence (''prajñaptisat'') of false projections, the Yogācāras restricted the emptiness of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras to the imagined nature (''parikalpitasvabhāva''). The latter is taken to be a product of dependently arising dharmas, i.e., the dependent nature, which is admitted a higher degree of reality than the one of the imagined nature. Together with the perfect nature (''pariniṣpannasvabhāva''), defined as the absence of the fictive from the real, the imagined and dependent natures constitute the Yogācāra model of reality. Besides this Yogācāra type of ontological distinction between real and nominal existence there are also, throughout the Maitreya Works, influences of the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' model of an ultimate ''tathāgatagarbha'' (once even referred to as such in one of the Yogācāra texts of the Maitreya Works, namely in MSABh on IX.37) that is devoid of adventitious stains. In the present paper it is argued that the integration of the ''tathāgatagarbha'' model of reality contributes to remedying the flaws Yogācāra has in the eyes of Mādhyamikas, namely that a considerable group of sentient beings is completely cut off from liberation or that a dependently arising mind exists on the level of ultimate truth. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
There is no traditional rubric of ''tathāgatagarbha'' scriptures, though modem scholars (e.g. Takasaki, 1974) have treated several scriptures as belonging to a thematic class, namely the ;;Tathāgatagarbhasūtra'', the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta'', the ''Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanādasūtra'', the (Mahāyāna) ''Mahaaparinirvāṇamahāsūtra'', the ''Mahāmeghasūtra'', the *''Mahābherīhārakasūtra'', and the Mahāyāna ''Aṅgulimālīya'' (or ''Aṅgulimālīyasūtra''). This classification is based in the first instance on the use of
these and related works as proof texts in the Indian treatise ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' (''Mahāyānottaratantra''). The category is thus in some sense conceptually coherent even in an Indian context. Moreover, many of these texts take on a very significant role in East Asia where, again, they are often appealed to in various groupings.
The notion of ''tathāgatagarbha'' (embryo of the tathāgatas), a Mahāyāna innovation, signifies the presence in every sentient being of the innate capacity for buddhahood. Although different traditions interpret it variously, the basic idea is either that all beings are already awakened, but simply do not recognize it, or that all beings possess the capacity, and for some the certainty, of attaining buddhahood, but adventitious defilements (''āgantukakleśa'') for the moment prevent the realization of this potential. (Radich, "Tathāgatagarbha Sūtras," 261) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
The historical approach to Zen in Heinrich Dumoulin's major work, ''A History of Zen'', published over twenty years ago, broke new ground in Western Zen studies. Up to that time Zen publication in the West dealt primarily with interpretive accounts of Zen and translations of Zen or Zen-related texts. I follow here an alternate approach to Zen and seek to place it in the context of one or another aspect of Mahāyāna tradition. One might read Zen in the perspective of Indian Mādhyamika or Yogācāra, or in terms of the Chinese ''prajñic'' or Hua-yen doctrinal development. But I would like to place it within the perspective of Tathāgatagarbha thought. (Kiyota, "Tathāgatagarbha Thought," 207)<br><br>
[https://nirc.nanzan-u.ac.jp/nfile/2311 Read more here . . .] +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
Humans have long grappled with the question of the nature of our Self, defined here as the ultimate reality inherent to our individual being. Religious traditions can be a great place to look when attempting to understand this aspect of our humanity. Broadly speaking, when contemplating ideas of Self in Buddhism and Hinduism, the relationship between the Buddhist notion of Buddha-nature (''tathāgatagarbha'') and the Hindu notion of Self (''ātman''), is an intriguing one: How can we understand them to be similar or different? How do the Buddhist concepts of emptiness (''śūnyatā'') and mind-only (''cittamātra'') relate to the concepts of ''tathāgatagarbha'' and ''ātman''? Is emptiness contrary to these ideas? Are ''tathāgatagarbha'' and the Hindu teaching that ''ātman'' is equal to brahman (ultimate reality), both expressions of a non-dualistic state of mind? Although it is commonly taught that Hinduism and Buddhism differ in their understanding of Self, one thing that becomes apparent is that these are not simple questions, perhaps mainly because their answers are contextual. There are many answers that come from many different types of Hindus and Buddhists in various places. For this paper, I will be looking at commentary on the Buddhist text the ''Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra'' and its use of the concept of a permanent Self and how this relates to emptiness (''śūnyatā'') and skillful means (''upāya''). This paper seeks to support my claim that, through skillful means, ''ātman'' and ''anātman'' (no-Self) are both saying something quite similar—despite the apparent paradoxical nature of this statement—and will look at Buddha-nature in the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra'' as a way to understand and help articulate this thought. (Laughlin, "''Tathāgatagarbha'' and ''Ātman''," 57) +
La traduction anglaise, par T. Suzuki, du ''Mahāyānaçraddhotpāda'' (Chicago, Open Court, 1900), ainsi que la version française, par S. Lévi, du ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' (Paris, Champion, 1911), ont attiré l'attention sur duex notions mahayaniques—Tathāgathagarbha et Ālayavijñāna—qui parurent abstruses, faute de termes correspondants en la philosophie européenne. Leur valeur exacte, distincte déjà dans ces deux textes, apparaìtra peu-être sous un jour autre quand nous aurons accès a un plus grand nombre de documents, après explorartion du canon bouddhique dans les diverses langues où il s'est exprimé. Dès à présent toutefois il semble possible de redresser certaines erreurs et d'entrevoir la portée des deux notions. (Masson-Oursel, "Tathāgatagarbha et Ālayavijñāna," 295)<br><br>
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Articles/Textual and Philosophical Problems in the Translation and Transmission of Tathāgatagarbha Texts +
This article examines philological problems relating to descriptions defining the ''tathāgatagarbha'', or "buddha-nature," in Sanskrit sūtras and exegetical literature, together with the variant Tibetan translations of these descriptions in the bKa’ ’gyur and bsTan ’gyur. Attention is called also to some possible philosophical implications of these variant descriptions. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
Buddhism, and especially early Buddhism, is known for the ''anātman'' (no self) teaching. By any account, this teaching is central to both doctrine and practice from the beginning. Zen Buddhism (Chinese Ch'an), in contrast, is known for its teaching that the single most important thing in life is to discover the 'true self'. Is there a real, or only an apparent, conflict between these two versions of Buddhism? Certainly there is at the least a radical change in the linguistic formulation of the teaching. Examining the two teachings on the linguistic level, we note that the use of the term 'true' in the phrase 'true self' may indicate that we have here a conscious reformation of the place of the term 'self' in the tradition, or perhaps that the use of this phrase in Zen is the product of such a conscious formulation. Thus we may expect, upon investigation, to find an evolution from one teaching to the other, rather than a true doctrinal disparity. The apparent, or linguistic, conflict between the two, however, remains; hence we must also expect to find a doctrinal formulation at some point in this evolution in which the apparent conflict is consciously apprehended and resolved.<br> That is, Buddhism embraces both the teaching that there is no self and the teaching that the goal of life is to discover the true self. Not only does Buddhism embrace these two formulations, but each in its own context is the central pivot of the teachings of the school or community concerned. Two questions arise here. (1) How can a single tradition affirm both no self and true self? How can the two ideas be reconciled? (This is the philosophical question.) (2) In linking early Buddhism and Zen we are discussing two religious movements separated by approximately 12 centuries and by their development in two vastly different cultures, the Indian and the Chinese. What is there in the course of this development that could account for the transition from talk of no self to talk of true self? (This is the question of intellectual history.) In the present essay I will attempt to show that it is by examining the Buddha nature (''fo hsing'' 佛性) concept and understanding it as a term representing certain actions that these questions may be answered. (King, "The Buddha Nature," 255)
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
So far, no lifeless universe has been discovered. That is, the occurrence of matter without the occurrence of life is, judging by the available empirical evidence viewed globally, something that does not happen. In every case that matter has been there in any universe, life has occurred—eventually.<br> I do not mean that there has never been a time, a single snapshot moment or a billion such moments, during which there was only matter but no life. Nor do I mean that there is no part of the universe in which, considered in isolation from all other parts, there is only lifelessness. "In every case that matter has been there in any universe, life has occurred" is true even if there are immense periods of time, considered in isolation, and immense swaths of space, considered in isolation, where there is no life.<br> The crux of the problem, however, lies in those three words, "considered in isolation." Everything depends on how we divide things up, where our definition of "one thing" begins and ends.<br> For what I mean when I say that "matter without life has never existed" is that, scientifically speaking, there has never appeared even one particle of any kind of matter found in any non-life-producing universe, considering that universe as a whole. For no non-life-producing universe has yet been discovered. Likewise, there is no lifeless matter in any period of time that is not part of at least one sequence of time that produces life.<br> All matter that has ever been discovered has existed only in a universe that also contains life, and all lifeless times were part of this sequence of time we are now in, the total sequence of time that produced this life.<br> No lifeless universe has ever been discovered. Among all the universes that have been discovered so far, there is not even one that is devoid of life. I challenge you or anyone to show me even one particle of matter, or even one moment of time, from a universe without life.<br> At this point we have merely been speaking empirically about what has so far been discovered. There are very few things that we can know with absolute certainty without relying on empirical contingency. But in fact this is one thing we can know with absolute certainty: no universe ''will ever be discovered'' devoid of life.<br> We can know this for two reasons. The first is perhaps relatively trivial, although some philosophers attach great significance to it. It is that the act of "discovering" itself requires a living being. Ipso facto, wherever any discovering is done, life is also present. Therefore no universe devoid of life can ever be discovered.<br> The second reason has to do with how we define universe. Th is is the hidden premise of the claims I am making here: it is because we understand the idea of "universe" in a certain way that we can claim, with absolute certainty, that there is no lifeless universe. If the universe is taken in its broadest meaning, which is also its most commonsensical meaning, it means "all that exists." All that exists certainly includes this planet, this solar system, this period of time. The universe in this broadest sense is what includes any more-narrowly construed universes—for example, all alternate universes. If we call the sum total of all possible universes "the universe," then it is obvious that there is no universe but this one, and since this one contains life, no universe can be discovered that is devoid of life. Whatever might be discovered is by definition part of this totality that includes our lives.<br> All of the above is true even if life exists only once, for a few million years, on one small planet. Even if there was no life for billions of years—and in most of the universe there never has been and never will be life—even if the phenomenon "life" is a peculiar flash that occurs only on planet Earth between the Hadean Eon 4,500 million years ago until 2018 CE, and never arises anywhere ever again, it is still true that there is no universe devoid of life and that there can never be any universe devoid of life.<br> And yet people often contemplate those vast billions of years and expanses of space and speak of "lifeless matter." This makes sense only if we divide the world in a certain way. That is, it is only because we are in the habit of dividing self and other, or mind and its objects, or—to put it most generally—inside and outside, that it is possible to speak of lifeless matter. Only if any one part of the universe is thought of as an entity truly separate from all other parts can anything be lifeless. The key question is how much of the universe do we consider to be "one thing." Where do we draw the line that divides inside from outside? If "me and that rock" are one thing, that one thing has life, just as "my skin and my fingernails" has life. If me and that rock are separate, then my body has life and the rock has no life.<br> Mahāyāna Buddhism, particularly that developed in the Madhyamaka school and further elaborated in Tiantai Buddhism, holds that the separation of "inside and outside" is impossible to sustain in any nonambiguous way. These schools generally develop this idea logically by use of reductio ad absurdum arguments that try to demonstrate that any way of drawing common-sense dividing lines to define one object in distinction to another end up being self-contradictory. (Read the entire article [https://rk-world.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/DW18_7-12.pdf here]).
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
Buddhist doctrine refers to entities possessing mind (Skt., ''citta'') as sentient beings (Skt., ''sattva'') and considers them to undergo rebirth through the six realms of existence (hells, hungry spirits, animals, asuras, human beings, heavenly beings). It is because they possess mind that they give rise to the defilements, accumulating the negative karma that is the cause of rebirth. The purpose of Buddhism therefore is to release beings from the suffering associated with rebirth, a condition called liberation (Skt., ''vimokśa'') and nirvana. Mahayana calls it the attainment of buddhahood (Jpn., ''jōbutsu''). There also exist nonsentient beings (Skt., ''asattva''). Since they do not possess mind, they do not undergo the cycle of rebirth and so cannot attain liberation, nirvana, or buddhahood. In principle, therefore, plants, like inorganic substances not possessing "mind," are not understood to undergo rebirth. It is therefore impossible to discuss their attainment of buddhahood. However, when Buddhism entered China, the potential for buddhahood of nonsentient beings became an important subject for debate. Since China had not previously had any concept of sentient beings, no strict distinction was made between sentient and nonsentient, which was why the question of nonsentient buddhahood was taken up. The ''Jingangbi lun'' (Diamond Scalpel Treatise) of the sixth Tiantai patriarch, Zhanran (711–82), confronted the issue directly and asserted that nonsentient beings could attain buddhahood. This did not, however, mean that they could aspire to enlightenment, practice, and achieve buddhahood of themselves. Rather, when a sentient being attains buddhahood, the whole environment becomes the Buddha's realm. A sentient being's subjective existence (Jpn., ''shōhō'') arises from past karmic effects and this causes the realm of the environment (Jpn., ''ehō'') to arise. Environment is thus dependent on subjective existence, and therefore, when a sentient being attains enlightenment, so do nonsentient beings. What is important here is that sentient beings attain enlightenment through their own practice, whereas nonsentient beings can only do so as the environment of sentient beings. This was a solution consonant with Chinese ideas that placed significance on a person's own actions, seen typically in Confucianism. The Japanese did not view human beings in any special way as did the Chinese. Furthermore, they tended to look on nature in terms of plants. The land of Japan was called the "middle land of the reed beds" (''ashihara no nakatsu kuni''), its landscape being described as a swamp where reeds grew. The fecundity of plants symbolized the evolution of the world. According to the ''Nihon shoki'' (Chronicle of Japan, eighth century), before Ninigi, grandson of the sun goddess Amaterasu, descended from the heavenly plain, the land of Japan was where "the standing trees, and even the single blade of grass, uttered words." This is thought to represent the disordered state of nature that existed before the land was civilized. Humankind was referred to as people grass (''hitogusa''); in other words, the mass of people was understood through the model of grasses and trees.<br> In Japan, therefore, nature was thought of in terms of plants, and people were thought to be close to them. Japan's view of nature is often described as animism, but this is not necessarily appropriate. Not all natural phenomena were regarded as spiritual entities, nor were they objects of veneration. Deities (''kami'') resided in the depths of nature, manifesting themselves in natural objects serving as receptacles (''yorishiro''). For example, at Ōmiwa Shrine in Nara Prefecture, Mount Miwa is described as the body (''shintai'') of its ''kami''. Originally, though, the mountain was regarded as sacred because it was the place to which the kami descended: it was not itself the ''kami''. The buddhahood of grasses and trees came to be a concern precisely because human beings and plants were thought of as being of the same quality. Whereas in China tiles and stones were presented as representative of nonsentient existence, in Japan it was grasses and trees. (Read the entire article [https://rk-world.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/DW18_7-12.pdf here])
The purpose of this paper is to explore how the ''tathāgatagarbha'' tradition might shed light on the current political and economic impasse between the dominant voices in U.S. politics, conservative libertarians and reform liberals. I will begin by describing the two opposing sides and highlighting their implicit anthropologies, their views of human being. I will then lay out the nondual anthropology suggested by a key text in the ''tathāgatagarbha'' tradition, the fifth-century CE ''Ratnagotravibhāga''. Finally, I will discuss what guidance this ''tathāgatagarbha'' perspective might offer in moving us past the current political and economic impasse. +
"''Tathāgatagarbha''" refers to a theory in Mahāyāna Buddhism which interprets the nature of the mind as intrinsically pure (unconditioned) yet defiled (conditioned). The objective of this theory is to link living beings with the Buddha, encouraging them to attain enlightenment. In the ''Śrīmālādevī-sūtra'', a major scriptural authority on Tathāgatagarbha, a correlation between the nature of Emptiness and the nature of mind is explicated. The devlopment of ideas first presented in the ''Śrīmālādevī-sūtra'' greatly influenced the evolution of the notion of ''ālayavijñāna'', the key concept in the second major Mahāyāna school known as ''Vijn̄ãnavāda''. It will be demonstrated that Tathāgatagarbha accounts for the possibility of change from a defiled to an enlightened state due to the two dimensions of the inherently pure nature of mind as "embryo" and "womb." +
The concept of the "innate purity of the mind" (cittaprakṛtiprabhasvara) is a very important notion in the Mahayana Buddhism and has a great influence on the Chinese Buddhism. It is often used synonymously with "tathāgatagarbha" in many Mahayana texts. However, the origin of the concept can be traced back to the ''Āgamas'' and the ''Nikāyas''. It is quite interesting to find such a concept in these sutras which vey much emphasize the concepts of impermanence and non-ego. The purpose of this study is to clarify the true meaning of this concept of the innately pure mind in the ''Āgamas'' and the ''Nikāyas''. This paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, the original statements concerning this concept are discussed within the context of the entire collection of the Buddha's discourses. Since the formula of this concept involves the defilements of the mind, the second part of this study focuses on the types of the defilements which contaminate the mind. The analogies found in the texts discussing the defilements also help to further clarify the meaning and functions of the concept discussed in part one. As there is a lot of debate on this concept in the Abhidharma literature, the third part presents some of the debate to illuminate the issues concerning whether the mind can be truly polluted and the relationship between the mind and the defilements. In the conclusion, in addition to summing up the discussion on the true meaning of the concept of the innately pure mind in the ''Āgamas'' and the ''Nikāyas'', the difference between its use in these sutras and that in the Tathāgatagarbha sutras is also briefly mentioned. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The debate over the role of the ''Awakening of Faith'' in the theory and practice of Chinese Buddhism is one of the central ongoing debates among both Chinese Buddhists and scholars of Buddhism in the modern period. To understand this debate, and the views contained within it, it is necessary to contextualize it within the history of modern East Asian Buddhism. The following review focuses both on a critical assessment of the ''Awakening of Faith''<i>’</i>s authenticity, as well as the role Ouyang played in shifting the course of this debate. This disputation was at the heart of Ouyang’s quest for authenticity. The chapter will not be a comprehensive treatment of all the thinkers involved in these debates; I will deal here only with dimensions of the text that became contentious for Ouyang and with the contribution of other participants who carried forward the debate at that time. (Aviv, introduction, 69)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#The ''Awakening of Faith'' exists in two purported “translations.” One is attributed to Paramārtha, T.32.1666.0575a03–0583b17, in 554 ce; the other, later version is attributed to Śikṣānanda, T.32.1667.0583b21–0591c22, in 695–700 ce. While the title includes the term Mahāyāna, and the text is often translated as the ''Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna'' or ''according to the Mahāyāna'', I take the term Mahāyāna as part of the customary classificatory term in the canon rather than as part of the actual title, as is common with other texts with the same classificatory term and other texts marked with terms such as Abhidharma (阿毘達磨) or the mothers of the Buddha (佛母). +
"Whatever anybody does is a manifestation of their Buddha-nature, but still we are capable of ethical infringement." +
Articles/The Doctrinal Transformation of Twentieth-Century Chinese Buddhism: Master Yinshun's Interpretation of the Tathāgatagarbha Doctrine +
In this paper, I examine Yinshun’s interpretation of the ''tathāgatagarbha'' (''rulaizang'') and its relationship to the following concepts: the Buddha’s epithet ‘the thus come one’ (Skt. ''tathāgata''; Chn. ''rulai'') and the theory of ‘the selfhood of the ''tathāgatagarbha''’ (''rulaizangwo''). Yinshun regards these two ideas as playing substantial roles in the evolution of the ''tathāgatagarbha'' theory. His conception of their connection to the theory clarifies what I contend has been and continues to be Yinshun’s doctrinal agenda; namely, re-asserting the doctrine of emptiness (Skt. ''śūnyatā''; Chn. ''kong'') as the definitive expression of Buddhist truth and relegating the ''tathāgatagarbha'' teaching to the category of expedient means. I base the following discussion primarily on Yinshun’s text ''A Study of the Tathāgatagarbha'' (''Rulaizang Zhi Yanjiu''), for it serves as his most exhaustive statement about the ''tathāgatagarbha'' and related doctrines. Finally, the interpretation of the relationship between the ''tathāgatagarbha'' and the doctrine of emptiness has been and continues to be a contested issue in the Buddhist tradition. Therefore, before turning to Yinshun’s explanation of its connection to the aforementioned concepts, I first place his interpretation of the ''tathāgatagarbha'' within the context of this on-going dispute. (Hurley, "The Doctrinal Transformation of Twentieth-Century Chinese Buddhism," 30) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
One of the most important arguments made by the exponents of Critical Buddhism is, as Matsumoto Shirõ asserts in the title of one of his papers, that "The Doctrine of ''Tathāgata-garbha'' Is Not Buddhist." In brief, the claim made by Matsumoto and Hakamaya Noriaki is that ''tathāgata-garbha'' or Buddha-nature thought is ''dhātu-vāda'', an essentialist philosophy closely akin to the monism of the Upaniṣads. In Matsumoto and Hakamaya’s view, only thought that strictly adheres to the anti-essentialist principle of ''pratītyasamutpāda'' taught by Śākyamuni should be recognized as Buddhist. Buddha-nature thought, being a ''dhātu-vāda'' or essentialist philosophy, is in fundamental violation of this requirement and consequently should not be regarded as Buddhist. On the basis of this reading of Buddha-nature thought, Matsumoto and Hakamaya proceed to make the several subsequent claims documented in this volume. Since the assertion that Buddha-nature thought is ''dhātu-vāda'' is such a foundational claim, I will focus my remarks upon this one point in their corpus, though at the end of this chapter I will have a few words to say regarding their charge that Buddha-nature thought is to blame for the weakness of Japanese Buddhist social ethics.
I propose in this paper to challenge Matsumoto and Hakamaya’s reading of Buddha-nature thought. In my understanding, while Buddha-nature thought uses some of the terminology of essentialist and monistic philosophy, and thus may give the reader the impression that it is essentialist or monistic, a careful study of how those terms are used—how they actually function in the text—leads the reader to a very different conclusion. I will attempt to demonstrate that Buddha-nature thought is by no means ''dhātu-vāda'' as charged, but is instead an impeccably Buddhist variety of thought, based firmly on the idea of emptiness, which in turn is a development of the principle of ''pratītyasamutpāda''. (King, preliminary remarks, 174–75)
The doctrine of Buddha-Nature (Buddhadhātu) is one of the most important doctrines in Mahayana Buddhism. This doctrine can be found in a number of Mahayana texts that were composed at least by the 3rd to the 5th century C. E., and traces of this doctrine can be found in the development of Chinese, Korean and Japanese Buddhism. The doctrine of Buddha-nature basically teaches that all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature and that they can all attain Buddhahood. The Buddha-nature is described as pure and immaculate, free from emotional and conceptual defilements that plague sentient beings. +
