A proponent of the Cittamātra view. Even though this term is not attested in Indian literature, we use it as a convenient convention instead of the lengthy ‘proponent of the Cittamātra view.’ +
In terms of the doctrine and tenets, this refers to the teachings of the ‘higher vehicles,’ or the upper two of the four Indian Buddhist tenets. In terms of causes and results, it refers to the paths and results of bodhisattvas +
This is the mode of perceiving by non-conceptual subjective perception, through any one of the six sense consciousnesses. It perceives whatever appears to it without any process of elimination, in contrast to conceptual subjective mind, which produces a generic image of the object by a process of elimination and is thus known as “eliminative engager.” +
According to Gorampa, this refers to conceptual thoughts apprehending phenomena in any of the four conceptually possible ways (i.e. as existent, as nonexistent, as both existent and nonexistent, or as neither existent nor nonexistent). +
The ''āyatanas'' are ‘doors’ through which consciousness arises. They consist of the six inner sense powers (i.e. the five sense faculties plus the mind) and their six corresponding objects (i.e. form, sound, odour, taste, tangible objects and phenomena or objects of mental consciousness). +
This refers to the conceptual thought which conceives the individual or phenomena as truly existent. It is an abbreviation of “conceiving 'I' or phenomena as truly existent.” +
Also known as “gzhan stong” or “emptiness of other.” With regard to the Tibetan Gzhan stong school, among the three characteristics: the ‘perfect’ [pariniṣpanna] is devoid ofthe ‘imputed’ [parikalpita] and ‘dependent’ [paratantra]. This is their definition of actual ultimate reality. +
In the context of philosophical debate, this refers to the reasoning accepted by the realists. This is one ofthe four unique ultimate analyses of Prāsaṅgika. +
The generic image is the mental image object, which is superimposed by conceptual thought and which is its direct object. For instance, when we think of emptiness, the concept of emptiness is arrived at by eliminating non-emptiness. That emptiness is the generic imge of emptiness, not the actual emptiness. +
One ofthe two main branches of the Madhyamaka. It differs from the other main branch, Prāsaṅgika, because it employs autonomous or autonomous syllogisms to establish ultimate reality. +
The extremes of eternalism and annihilationism. This sometimes refers to “inherent existence” and “inherent nonexistence.” It is the brief exposition of the extremes; the broader exposition being the “four extremes.” +