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Discovering the Buddha Within is an experiential learning program of the Buddha Dharma created as part of the vast vision of Guru Vajradhara His Holiness the 12th Chamgon Kenting Tai Situpa. The aim of this curriculum is to explain the essence of the Buddha's teachings in an easy and understandable yet comprehensive way. This three-year curriculum follows the Buddha's teachings on the Three Turnings of the Wheel of Dharma, followed by the sacred transmission of four tantras that correspond to three gradual levels of discovering the ultimate nature of the mind and phenomena. For each level, the teacher will explain the view (intellectual understanding), meditation (experiential understanding), and application (applying this understanding to change one's daily habits) of the topics according to Shravakayana, Mahayana, and Vajrayana.
Meditations that form the core part of each level are divided into two sections: Shamatha (calm abiding) and Vipashyana (advanced insight).
The main masters who will teach the Discovering the Buddha Within curriculum are His Eminence Yongey Mingyur Rinpoche and other masters including His Eminence Gyalton Rinpoche and senior khenpos of Palpung Sherabling Monastic Seat.
This program is open to everyone, long term Buddhist as well as non-Buddhists willing to learn the foundation of meditation and Buddhist' universal wisdom.
《開啟內在之佛》 是一個體驗式的佛法學習課程，是作為上師金剛持尊勝的第十二世慈尊廣定大司徒巴的宏大願景之一而設置。課程目的是以簡明易懂而又全面綜合的方式來講解佛陀教法的精要。課程為期三年，依於佛陀三轉法輪的教法，而後依據四部密續之神聖傳承，其對應於開啟心與現象究竟本性的三次第。每個次第，導師將依聲聞乘、大乘和金剛乘來講解該主題的見（智識上的領悟）、修（體驗式的領悟）和行（以此領悟來改變其日常習慣）。
禪修將作為每個次第的核心，其可以分為兩個部分：奢摩他（寂止）與 毗婆舍那（勝觀）。
此課程面向所有人士，包括長期的佛教徒以及意樂學習禪修基礎與佛教普遍智慧的非佛教徒們。
《開啟內在之佛》 課程的教授師主要有尊貴的詠給明就仁波切、尊貴的賈敦仁波切及八蚌智慧林的資深堪布等。([https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yYVpA4GgmCg Source Accessed June 8, 2023]) +
''Ostensen, Morten. "Introduction to Dzogchen and Buddha-Nature." ''Buddha-Nature: A Tsadra Foundation Initiative'', July 11, 2019. https://buddhanature.tsadra.org/index.php/Articles/Introduction_to_Dzogchen_and_Buddha-nature.'' +
''Ostensen, Morten. "Introduction to Mahāmudrā and Buddha-Nature." ''Buddha-Nature: A Tsadra Foundation Initiative'', August 23, 2019. https://buddhanature.tsadra.org/index.php/Articles/Introduction_to_Mah%C4%81mudr%C4%81_and_Buddha-Nature.'' +
''Ostensen, Mort. "Introduction to Other-Emptiness and the Great Middle Way." ''Buddha-Nature: A Tsadra Foundation Initiative'', August 23rd, 2019. https://buddhanature.tsadra.org/index.php/Articles/Introduction_to_Other-Emptiness_and_the_Great_Middle_Way.'' +
I have been told that many lamas have come here and given extensive instructions on the preliminary practices. It seems that at this time there is a great interest in receiving teachings on the nature of the mind. I have been requested . to give such a teaching so, although I don't really know how to give these teachings, because you have requested them, I will speak in brief.<br>
First of all, I would like you to consider all sentient beings who are equal to limitless space and generate a sense of loving kindness towards all of them. Generate the wish that each and every one of them may know happiness in this life and never return to the lower realms in future lifetimes, and that gradually they may all establish the status of buddhahood. Consider that it is for this purpose that you wish to receive the teachings on the. nature of the mind. Please give rise to the purest motivation of which you are capable.<br>
In the past it was always traditional for the teacher to examine disciples and for disciples to examine the teacher. From the standpoint of the spiritual teacher, this process of examination was necessary to determine whether or not the disciples were suitable vessels to receive teachings on the nature of the mind. From the standpoint of the disciples, it was necessary to determine whether or not the teacher was qualified to truly bring benefit to the disciples. In this way, much care would be taken by both teacher and disciples to examine one another, after which a relationship would be established and the teachings would be transmitted.<br>
These days both teacher and disciple are unable to do this. If you ask whether or not I am a truly qualified teacher of dzogchen, I am not. If I were, I would be able to see into the minds of all the disciples and know exactly whether they are ready· for the teachings or not. It is only a realized being, only a buddha, who has the power to really understand the minds of others. Therefore we should consider that the teacher of dzogchen must truly be an enlightened one. In our present circumstances we can also consider, first, that the mind of all sentient beings is buddha, that all~entient beings possess the buddha nature, which is their very essence, and second, that we have all obtained the precious human rebirth. With these two things together the teachings are allowed to be transmitted and received. (Yangthang Rinpoche, ''Introduction to the Nature of Mind'', Section One: The Prerequisites, 1–2)
''Ostensen, Morten. "Introduction to the Traditions of Ngok and Tsen." ''Buddha-Nature: A Tsadra Foundation Initiative'', February 28, 2020. https://buddhanature.tsadra.org/index.php/Articles/Introduction_to_the_Traditions_of_Ngok_and_Tsen.'' +
Articles/Introduction: The History of the Rang stong-Gzhan stong Distinction from Its Beginning through the Ris-med Movement +
By the time Tibetans inherited Indian Buddhism, it had already witnessed two major doctrinal developments, namely, the notion elucidated in the "Discourses on the Perfection of Insight" (''Prajñāpāramitāsūtras'') that all factors of existence (''dharmas'') lack an own-being (emptiness), and the Yogācāra interpretation of this emptiness based on the imagined (''parikalpita''-), dependent (''paratantra''-) and perfect natures (''pariniṣpannasvabhāva''). Closely related to this threefold distinction was the Tathāgatagarbha restriction of emptiness to adventitious stains that cover an ultimate nature, that of buddha-qualities. Throughout Tibetan intellectual history it has been a controversial issue whether these teachings require a distinction between two modes of emptiness: being "empty of an own-being" (''rang stong''), and "empty of other" (''gzhan stong''). While a follower of the ''rang-stong'' view insists that everything (and that includes the Buddha and his qualities) shares the same mode of emptiness (i.e., the absence of an independent existence), some followers of ''gzhan stong'' claim that the ultimate nature of mind and its inherent buddha qualities do have an independent existence, since they are only empty of everything else ("the other") that does not belong to them. This must be distinguished from a more moderate form of ''gzhan stong'', which admits the ''rang stong'' mode of emptiness for both the adventitious stains of relative truth as well as the ultimate nature of mind, but insists that for a practitioner with an immediate experience of the ultimate nature, it is essential to distinguish the latter from the adventitious states of mind that do not reflect how the nature of mind truly is. While forerunners of ''rang stong/gzhan stong'' distinctions can be already identified in a variety of Indian texts and early bKa'-gdams-pa manuscripts,'"`UNIQ--ref-00000001-QINU`"' their most influential proponents doubtlessly were Dol-po-pa Shes-rab rgyal-mtshan (1292–1361) and Gser-mdog paṇ-chen Shākya mchog-ldan (1427–1507). At the other end of our time frame, new insights into the development of ''gzhan stong'' at the very end of the ''ris-med'' movement can now be gained from the collected works of Zhe-chen Mkhan-chen Gang-shar dbang-po (1925–1958/59?).<br> The contributions to this volume were presented at the ''gzhan stong'' panel organized by Klaus-Dieter Mathes (University of Vienna) at the Twelfth Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies in Vancouver, Canada, in August 2010. Its full name was "The History of the ''Rang stong''/''Gzhan stong'' Distinction from its Beginning through the ''Ris-med'' Movement." The contributors were, besides the organizer, Karl Brunnhölzl (Tsadra Foundation), Anne Burchardi (The University of Copenhagen and The Royal Library of Denmark), Douglas Duckworth (Temple University), David Higgins (University of Vienna), Yaroslav Komarovski (University of Nebraska-Lincoln), and Tsering Wangchuk (University of San Francisco). It is regretted that Karl Brunnhölzl and Douglas Duckworth were unable to include their work in the present publication. (Mathes, introduction, 4–5)
Articles/Is "Buddha-Nature" Buddhist? Doctrinal Tensions in the Srimala Sutra: An Early Tathagatagarbha Text +
Recent controversies in Japanese Buddhist scholarship have focused upon the Mahayana notion of a "Buddha nature" within all sentient beings and whether or not the concept is compatible with traditional Buddhist teachings such as ''anātman'' (no-abiding-self). This controversy is not only relevant to Far Eastern Buddhism, for which the notion of a Buddha-nature is a central doctrinal theme, but also for the roots of this tradition in those Indian Mahāyāna ''sūtras'' which utilised the notion of ''tathāgatagarbha'' (Buddha-embryo or Buddha womb). One of the earliest Buddhist texts to discuss this notion is the ''Queen Śrīmālā Sūtra'' (''Śrīmālādevīsūtra''), which appears to display a transitional and revisionist attitude towards traditional Mahāyāna doctrines such as emptiness (''śūnyatā'') and no-abiding-self (''anātman''). These and related issues are examined as they occur in the ''Śrīmālā Sūtra'' and as they might relate to the issue of the place of Buddha-nature thought within the Buddhist tradition. Finally some concluding remarks are made about the quest for "true" Buddhism. +
Karl Brunnhölzl discusses whether the teachings on buddha-nature can be considered a radical teaching. He suggests that it is indeed radical, as it fundamentally raises questions about who we are and what it means to be on the path. +
Peter Gregory’s essay, "Is Critical Buddhism Really Critical?," takes the thought of Tsung-mi as a
case study in order to ask whether the pursuit of "true Buddhism" is not in turn positing some sort of ''dhātu-vāda''-like essence of Buddhism, hence mirroring the object of its own criticism. Preferring to see Buddhism as a "product of a complex set of interdependent and ever-changing conditions (''pratītyasamutpāda''),” he looks at Tsung-mi's thought not to determine whether or not it is "truly Buddhist" but in order to discover the causes and conditions that brought it into existence. In a manner similar to Sallie King's argument that Buddha-nature can be understood as a catalyst for positive social change, Gregory argues that for Tsung-mi the doctrine of original enlightenment was tied not to a linguistic transcendentalism but rather to an affirmation of language in response to the more radical critiques of the ''prajñā-pāramitā'' tradition. (Hubbard, introduction to ''Pruning the Bodhi Tree'', xvii) +
Modern exponents of mindfulness meditation promote the therapeutic effects of “bare attention”—a sort of non-judgmental, non-discursive attending to the moment-to-moment flow of consciousness. This approach to Buddhist meditation can be traced to Burmese Buddhist reform movements of the first half of the 20th century, and is arguably at odds with more traditional Theravāda Buddhist doctrine and meditative practices. But the cultivation of present-centered awareness is not without precedent in Buddhist history; similar innovations arose in medieval Chinese Zen (Chan) and Tibetan Dzogchen. These movements have several things in common. In each case the reforms were, in part, attempts to render Buddhist practice and insight accessible to laypersons unfamiliar with Buddhist philosophy and/or unwilling to adopt a renunciatory lifestyle. In addition, these movements all promised astonishingly quick results. And finally, the innovations in practice were met with suspicion and criticism from traditional Buddhist quarters. Those interested in the therapeutic effects of mindfulness and bare attention are often not aware of the existence, much less the content, of the controversies surrounding these practices in Asian Buddhist history. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>In this chapter I examine some medieval Buddhist doctrines that, at least on the surface, seem similarly strange and implausible. Indeed, some of the Buddhist notions to be examined below were perplexing to audiences in their own day, much as discussions of brain transplants are perplexing to us today. On the Indian side, I will begin with the notion of ''nirodha-samāpatti'', a meditative state akin to a vegetative coma in which all consciousness has ceased. I will then turn to a class of beings known as “beings without conception” (''asaṃjñika-sattvāḥ''), denizens of a celestial realm who are devoid of sentience, thought, and consciousness. In both cases, an insentient state seems to be followed by (or gives rise to) a sentient state, which poses serious challenges to the classical Buddhist understanding of karma. On the Chinese side, we will consider the debate over the buddha-nature of insentient objects—can an insentient thing such as a wall or roof tile attain buddhahood and preach the dharma? This doctrine too could be (and was) seen as a threat to the coherence of Buddhist teachings.<br> Modern scholars tend to approach such doctrines as the products of intelligent but misguided scholastics struggling to make sense of the universe, all the while hobbled by the dictates of tradition, scripture, and a prescientific understanding of the cosmos. They are the proverbial schoolmen calculating how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. But I would suggest another perspective. Such theories, I argue, serve as frames of reference for pondering issues of personal identity, ethical responsibility, sentience, and death. Given that we ourselves are still far from clarity on these issues, and given that we too devise fanciful thought experiments to help gain a conceptual toehold, perhaps it is time to look afresh at what the Buddhists might have been up to.[11] (Sharf, preamble, 144–45)
<h5>Notes</h5>
11. For an articulate defense of Buddhist scholasticism, along different lines, see Paul John Griffiths, “Scholasticism: The Possible Recovery of an Intellectual Practice,” in ''Scholasticism: Cross-Cultural and Comparative Perspectives'', ed. José Ignacio Cabezón (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 201–35.
There have been several attempts of late to read Yogācāra through the lens of Western phenomenology. I approach the issue through a reading of the ''Cheng weishi lun'' (''Treatise on the Perfection of Consciousness Only''), a seventh-century Chinese compilation that preserves the voices of multiple Indian commentators on Vasubandhu’s ''Triṃśikāvijñaptikārikā'' (''Thirty Verses on Consciousness''). Specifically, I focus on the "five omnipresent mental factors" (''pañcasarvatraga'', Chin. ''wu bianxing xinsuo'') and the “four aspects” (Chin. ''sifen'') of cognition. These two topics seem ripe, at least on the surface, for phenomenological analysis, particularly as the latter topic includes a discussion of “self-awareness” (''svasaṃvedana'', ''svasaṃvitti'', Chin. ''zizheng''). Yet we find that the ''Cheng weishi lun'' account has little in common with the tradition associated with Husserl and his heirs. The categories and modes of analysis in the ''Cheng weishi lun'' do not emerge from or aver to a systematic reflection on the nature of “lived experience” so much as they are focused on subliminal processes and metaphysical entities that belong to the domain of the noumenal. In my conclusion I suggest that the later ''pramāṇa'' tradition associated with Dignāga and Dharmakīrti—a tradition that profoundly influenced later Yogācāra exegesis in Tibet—did indeed take a “phenomenological turn.” But my comparison shows that both traditions falter when it comes to relating conceptual content to non-conceptual experience, and thus there is reason to be skeptical about claims that phenomenology is epistemologically grounded in how the world presents itself first-personally. +
The Trikāya doctrine of Buddhism, i.e., the doctrine that the Buddha has three "bodies," is notorious for its complexities. Attributed to the Yogācāra, but regarded as typical of the Mahāyāna in general, it is customarily cited in books on Buddhism in terms of the triad ''dharma-kāya'', ''saṃbhoga-kāya'' (or ''saṃbhogika-kāya'') and ''nirmāṇa-kāya'' (or ''nairmāṇika-kāya''). Taking these in ascending order of abstraction, the ''nirmāṇa-kāya'', usually translated "apparitional body," "phantom body," "transformation body," etc., is the physical manifestation of Buddhahood, the ordinary perishable human form, as exemplified by the "historical Buddha," Siddhartha Gautama. The ''saṃbhoga-kāya'' ("body of bliss," "reward body," "enjoyment body," etc.) is a more exalted and splendid manifestation of the enlightened personality, still in the realm of form, but visible only to bodhisattvas, those of advanced spiritual capabilities. By contrast, the ''dharma-kāya'' ("''Dharma''-body," "Body of Truth," "Cosmic Body," "Absolute Body," etc.) is both formless and imperishable, representing the identification of the Buddha with the truth which he revealed, or with reality itself. As such the ''dharma-kāya'' is often linked with various terms for reality, such as ''dharmatā'', ''dharma-dhātu'', and so on, and has even been regarded as a kind of Buddhist absolute, or at least at one with it.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000002-QINU`"' In this light the ''dharma-kāya'' is understood as the primal "source" or "ground" from which the other two types of bodies emanate.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000003-QINU`"' While many scholars are content to describe this in purely abstract terms, others impute personal characteristics to it;'"`UNIQ--ref-00000004-QINU`"' and at least one writer has gone so far as to compare it to the Christian idea of Godhead.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000005-QINU`"'<br> As a summary of the Trikāya doctrine this is, of course, oversimplified. We are dealing here with a complex theory which underwent many accretions and refinements, as Buddhists continued down through the centuries to speculate on the nature of Buddhahood, on the nature of reality, and on the relationship
between them.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000006-QINU`"' It is hardly surprising, then, that attempts to plot the course of such arcane speculations have not always been entirely successful in reaching a clear consensus, although the arguments advanced, even in recent writing on the subject, do tend to follow similar lines. A good example of this is the authoritative treatment by Nagao, "On the Theory of Buddha-body (''Buddha-kāya'')," first published in English in 1973.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000007-QINU`"' Generally Nagao distinguishes three phases: an initial one-body theory, a two-body theory, and the three-body theory elaborated by the Yogācāras. According to him (p. 104), the two-body theory (i.e., ''rūpa-kāya'' and ''dharma-kāya'') "became stabilized in a variety of earlier sūtras,'"`UNIQ--ref-00000008-QINU`"' and in early Mahāyāna sūtras, the ''Prajñāpāramitā'', the ''Saddharmapuṇḍarīka'', and so forth. The rūpa-kāya is the Buddha seen in a human body, while the dharma-kāya is the Buddha's personality seen in the dharma or dharma-nature." Elsewhere (pp. 106–7) Nagao states that the two-body theory was the one held "until the time of the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra and the time of Nāgārjuna," even though the raw materials for the third body, the ''saṃbhoga-kāya'', were also to hand before the time of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, as a consequence of the ''bodhisattva''-conccpt and the idea that a ''bodhisattva'''s performance of meritorious actions produced a body which was their manifest "reward." Nagao's article contains many valuable observations, but, as we shall see, some of its assertions are rather too imprecise, both chronologically and philosophically, to be of much use in unravelling the early development of the doctrine at issue. Another recent treatment of the subject by Makransky (1989) also describes certain features of the putative earlier two-body theory before the Yogācāras remodelled it (see esp. pp. 51–53), and distinguishes it sharply from the previous Mainstream'"`UNIQ--ref-00000009-QINU`"' (in this case, Sarvāstivādin) formulations. This analysis, too, is open to question in certain respects, as I shall show. In these and other articles on the subject'"`UNIQ--ref-0000000A-QINU`"' there is a general tendency to postulate a one-body/two-body/three-body progression, in terms of which a single personality is divided into a physical and a "spiritual" body, and then the physical body is further split in two, yielding the final complement of three. Some writers, however, point to the existence of three bodies even in the Pali sources, what one scholar has called the "primitive triad," i.e., ''pūti-'' or ''cātur-mahābhūtika-kāya'', ''mano-maya-kāya'', and ''dhamma-kāya''.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000000B-QINU`"' The first is the corruptible physical body formed out of the four elements, while the second is the mind-made body with which the Buddha visits the celestial realms (believed by some to be a forerunner of the ''saṃbhoga-kāya''); the third is the so-called "''Dhamma-body''." Now, although both these ways of approaching the subject—the assumption of a linear process, and the belief that the Pāli Canon contains an embryonic Trikāya schema—raise certain difficulties, I do not propose in this paper to discuss the evolution of the Trikāya theory in its entirety, since that would be a mammoth undertaking. What I wish to do is address one aspect of it only, viz., the early development of the idea of ''dharma-kāya'', in the hope that clarifying this will open the way to a better understanding of Mahāyāna buddhology as a whole. (Harrison, introduction, 44–46)<br><br>[https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jiabs/article/view/8792/2699 Read more here . . .]
In this Dharma teaching, Daehaeng Kun Sunim (1927–2012), a Seon (Zen) master and Buddhist nun from Korea, responds to questions about the concept of Juingong (the underlying mind) from an audience member. +
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Jacqueline Stone discusses the doctrine of original enlightenment (''hongaku hōmon'') and the debate over whether such a concept negates the need for practice and legitimates sinful acts. She explores the notion of original enlightenment as it is portrayed in the twelfth-century text known as ''Shinnyo kan'' (''Contemplation of Suchness). +
Jamgön Mipam (1846-1912) is one of the most extraordinary figures in the history of Tibet. Monk, mystic, and brilliant philosopher, he shaped the trajectory of Tibetan Buddhism's Nyingma school. This introduction provides a most concise entrée to this great luminary's life and work. The first section gives a general context for understanding Mipam's life. Part Two gives an overview of Mipam's interpretation of Buddhism, examining his major themes, and devoting particular attention to his articulation of the Buddhist conception of emptiness. Part Three presents a representative sampling of Mipam's writings. (Source: [https://www.shambhala.com/jamgon-mipam-838.html Shambhala Publications]) +
''Palmo, Jetsunma Tenzin. "Advice on Daily Practice." Conversations on Buddha-Nature with Lopen Dr. Karma Phuntsho. Produced by the Tsadra Foundation Research Department, September 25, 2021. Video, 3:11. https://youtu.be/8FqhpNRPsrI.'' +
''Palmo, Jetsunma Tenzin. "How Can Women and Girls Formulate a Buddhist-Inspired Feminism?" Conversations on Buddha-Nature with Lopen Dr. Karma Phuntsho. Produced by the Tsadra Foundation Research Department, September 25, 2021. Video, 3:43. https://youtu.be/77k0SKcjQ_E.'' +
Media/Jetsunma Tenzin Palmo: How Do We Transform Difficult Circumstances into a Catalyst for Spiritual Transformation and Human Flourishing? +
''Palmo, Jetsunma Tenzin. "How Do We Transform Difficult Circumstances into a Catalyst for Spiritual Transformation and Human Flourishing?" Conversations on Buddha-Nature with Lopen Dr. Karma Phuntsho. Produced by the Tsadra Foundation Research Department, September 25, 2021. Video, 4:38. https://youtu.be/D6_-IrFljok.'' +
