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Articles/Presenting a Controversial Doctrine in a Conciliatory Way: Mkhan chen Gang shar dbang po's (1925–1958-59?) Inclusion of Gzhan stong ("Emptiness of Other") within Prāsaṅgika +
In . . . "Presenting a Controversial Doctrine in a Conciliatory Way: Mkhan-chen Gang-shar dbang-po’s (1925-1958/59?) Inclusion of ''Gzhan-stong'' ('Emptiness of Other') within Prāsaṅgika," I investigate the ''gzhan stong'' position of an influential rNying-ma-pa thinker, a learned master from Zhe-chen Monastery, who was among other things, a highly esteemed teacher of Thrangu Rinpoche, and thus influential in the latter's own understanding of ''gzhan stong''. Unlike Dol-po-pa or Shākya-mchog-ldan, mKhan-po Gang-shar does not present his ''gzhan stong'' against the backdrop of the three natures theory, but rather elucidates the distinction he makes between ''rang stong'' and ''gzhan stong'' within a Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka framework. In a way similar to Klong-chen-pa, Gang-shar insists that everything from material form up to omniscience is ''rang stong'' only. This is when the two truths are presented as
appearance and emptiness in terms of valid cognition that analyzes for the ultimate abiding nature. In the context of a conventional valid cognition, however, which analyzes for the mode of appearances (i.e., perception), the two truths are defined in terms of the way things appear versus the way they truly are. When the abiding nature is perceived as it truly is, there is still awareness, albeit in a form beyond the duality of ordinary perception. For Gang shar it is only in this phenomenological sense that the ''rang stong'' of samsara and ''gzhan stong'' of ''nirvāṇa'' need to be distinguished. [https://buddhanature.tsadra.org/index.php/Articles/Introduction:_The_History_of_the_Rang_stong-Gzhan_stong_Distinction_from_Its_Beginning_through_the_Ris-med_Movement (Mathes, "Introduction: The History of the ''Rang stong/Gzhan stong'' Distinction," 7)] +
One of the particularly significant points implicitly made by the volume as a whole and explicitly developed in the chapter by Luis O. Gómez is that the sudden-gradual polarity is “soft” at its edges. As we have noted, the polarity enfolds a host of complexly interrelated issues. With insight and erudition, Gómez demonstrates that, when the specific historical instances of the sudden-gradual controversy are examined, it is clear that there is no necessary or even predictable way in which the positions taken by the actual participants can be correlated with the complex of issues contained within the sudden-gradual rubric. Hence the subitist on one occasion may well espouse a number of doctrinal positions held by the gradualist on another. Subitists and gradualists, moreover, often appealed to the same doctrine in support of their position. For example, in the most famous instance of the controversy, the exchange of poems that the Platform Sutra alleges were composed by Shen-hsiu and Hui-neng, both parties based their positions on the notion of an intrinsically enlightened Buddha-nature. (Gregory, introduction, 6) +
A central concept within Mahāyāna Buddhism is the doctrine of ''tathāgatagarbha'', or buddha-nature (''deshin shekpai nyingpo'', ''deshek nyingpo''), the element inherent to every sentient being. Presenting this buddha nature as the absolute in positive terms, as a state of wisdom with inconceivable qualities, is the essence of the so-called shentong view. Mind as such is understood to be ''shentong'' or "empty of other," meaning that it is empty of adventitious stains, which are not minds true nature. But mind is not empty of its enlightened qualities. Still, as long as sentient beings' perceptions are obscured by the temporary stains, they are incapable of directly relating to wisdoms inherent enlightened qualities. According to the relevant texts,'"`UNIQ--ref-00000001-QINU`"' these stains constitute the only difference between normal beings and the awakened ones who have removed the stains and actualized their inherent buddha nature. From the perspective of both the doctrine of tathāgatagarbha in general and shentong in particular, proper Buddhist philosophy and spiritual training in ethics, view, and meditation have as their goal the removal of the stains of karma and afflictive emotions and their subtle tendencies of ignorance so that the mind's inherent qualities can manifest.<br> This chapter deals with the corresponding approach in view and meditation taught by the cleric-scholar Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Thayé (1813–99). As one of the leading figures in the rimé movement in eastern Tibet, he worked to preserve practice traditions from the various Buddhist lineages of Tibet—in particular, practices from the Nyingma, Kadam, Jonang, Kagyü, and Sakya schools. His work exemplifies the idea that implementing philosophical understanding in meditative training is an essential part of all Tibetan Buddhist traditions. His ''Immaculate Vajra Moonrays: An Instruction for the View of Shentong, the Great Madhyamaka'' (abbreviated here as ''Instruction for the View of Shentong'') is but one instance of the integral relationship between philosophical understanding and meditative training. The text guides meditators in a gradual practice that aims to achieve a direct realization of the true nature of mind—buddha nature with all of its inherent qualities. (Draszczyk, "Putting Buddha Nature into Practice," 251–52)
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Articles/RNgog blo ldan shes rab's Topical Outline of the Ratnagotravibhāga Discovered at Khara Khoto +
1) Among the fifty or so compositions of Rngog lo, most are still unavailable and only nine works have so far been published. To these works we can add our topical outline of the ''RGV'' (''rgyud bla ma’i bsdus don'') preserved in a folio discovered at Khara Khoto, which originally consisted of two folios. Its authorship could be confirmed from its colophon as well as by comparing its contents to another lengthy ''RGV'' commentary (the ''Essential Meaning'') ascribed to Rngog lo. Our manuscript is thus the earliest Tibetan text that systematically outlines the ''RGV'', and it has made a fundamental contribution to the development of the Tibetan exegetical tradition of the ''RGV''.<br><br>
2) Rngog lo seems to have used the term ''bsdus don'' (or its equivalents) to refer to two kinds of works, namely “topical outline” and “essential meaning,” for he composed two works on the ''RGV''―a brief topical outline and a lengthy essential meaning―which bear titles containing the term ''bsdus don'' and its equivalent ''don bsdus pa'', respectively. Among Rngog lo’s available writings, our Khara Khoto manuscript and the ''Byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa la ’jug pa’i don bsdus pa'' offer the only testimony that ''bsdus don'' (and its equivalent ''don bsdus pa'') refers to a “topical outline,” as he often uses the term ''bsdus don'' to indicate a lengthy "essential meaning" in his other commentarial works. The first usage was common among Tibetan masters during the early and middle ''phyi dar'' period, whereas the latter was generally rare. This rare usage is most likely influenced by the ''piṇḍārtha'' sub-genre of Indian commentaries.<br><br>
3) Our manuscript has some serious textual problems, such as missing words, illegible words, syntactic ambiguity, and a missing folio. However, we can solve many of those problems by referring to corresponding sentences in the other two works on the ''RGV'', namely, Rngog lo’s ''Essential Meaning'' and Phywa pa’s ''Topical Outline''.<br><br>
4) The colophon of our manuscript does not tell us when the work was composed or copied. We can only deduce an approximate date of the manuscript to be some time between ca. 1092 (a possible ''terminus post quem'' of the composition of the work) and 1374 (the year of the destruction of Khara Khoto). The contents of our manuscript and other relevant works discovered at Khara Khoto show that the Tibetan scholastic tradition of the Bka’ gdams pa had spread there. (Kano, conclusion, 170)
Articles/RNgog lo-tsā-ba's Commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga: An Early-20th-Century Lhasa Printed Edition +
rNgog Io-tsa-ba Blo-ldan-shcs-rab (1059-1109) was more than anyone else responsible for the establishment of Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000001-QINU`"' He founded in Tibet not only the main enduring lineages of logic and epistemology (''Tshad-ma'': ''Pramāṇa'') studies but also of two other major branches of Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy and doctrine—those of the Five Dharmas of Maitreya (''Byams chos sde Inga'') and of the Svātantrika Yogācāra-Madhyamaka.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000002-QINU`"' rNgog-lo furthermore trained virtually the entire next generation of important Tibetan scholastics, his "four chief spiritual sons" being: (1) Zhang Tshe-spong-ba, (2) Gro-lung-pa Blo-gros-'byung gnas, (3) Khyung Rin-chen-grags, and (4) 'Bre Shes-rab-'bar.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000003-QINU`"' Yet in spite of rNgog's central position in the history of Tibetan philosophical and doctrinal studies, until recently only a very small number of his works were known to survive, and of these the two most extensive and important have remained for decades largely inaccessible outside of Tibet, existing only as isolated xylographs in private collections.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000004-QINU`"' Now, however, with the reprinting of two of his major works by the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, including his very important commentary on the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' described here, some of the seminal contributions of rNgog-lo can at last be easily assessed in the original.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000005-QINU`"'<br>
Both of these major works of rNgog-lo were commentaries on fundamental works of the Maitreyanātha tradition within the Yogācāra branch of Mahāyana Buddhism,'"`UNIQ--ref-00000006-QINU`"' namely on the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' and ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra''.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000007-QINU`"' The works thus reflected another aspect of his illustrious career, for in addition to—and indeed in tandem with—his importance as a great teacher, he was also of crucial significance as a composer of commentaries on the works he expounded. (Jackson, "rNgog lo-tsa-ba's Commentary of the Ratnagotravibhāga," 339–340)
Although much has been said about deconstruction in Madhyamika Buddhism, very little has been done in the study of deconstructive strategy in Chan Buddhism. In his study of deconstruction in Nāgārjuna's thought, Robert Magliola adds several passages that discuss the same topic in Chan/Zen Buddhism. Magliola's major contribution is his distinction between logocentric and differential trends in Chan/Zen Buddhism (Magliola: 96-7). This distinction allows us to take a fresh look at, and to re-examine, those inner struggles in the evolution of Chan Buddhist thought. However, Magliola's study of deconstruction in Chan is not systematic, despite its insights. He uses only a few cases to show the deconstructive tendency in Chan, without applying his distinction to a closer examination of the different schools of Chan thought. Thus, his study leaves only the impression that the deconstructive or differential trend is connected with the Southern School of Chan. He does not justify this thesis through a closer doctrinal and textual-contextual investigation.<br> Bernard Faure, on the other hand, touches upon the same issue of logocentric and differential trends in Chan in his comprehensive critique of the Chan tradition. Faure's study of this issue has two main problems. First, since his study is a criticism, he shows only what he thinks is the logocentric side of Chan, without providing a constructive study of deconstruction in Chan. Second, he criticizes Magliola for relating his logocentric/differential distinction to the historically well-defined distinction between Northern and Southern Chan. Faure believes that this hasty connection is "counterproductive" (Faure 1993: 225). His own approach, as opposed to Magliola's, is to suggest that it is impossible to identify one school or one figure in the Chan tradition as either logocentric or deconstructive. He asserts that there are "only combinations" of these two types in the Chan tradition (Faure 1993: 225). It appears that this position of "combination only" avoids a one-sided view and the error of jumping to a conclusion. However, by concluding that there are only combinations, Faure turns away from the necessity and possibility of analyzing and identifying individual deconstructive trends in Chan Buddhism, and from the necessity and even the possibility of a coherent reinterpretation and reconstruction of Chan thought. The coherent reinterpretation and reconstruction of Chan thought obviously demands more than a mere criticism. It is true that the thought of one school or one figure may involve elements of two trends; but this fact does not preclude the possibility of its being coherently interpreted as representative of one trend.<br> This paper, therefore, will attempt to investigate a major deconstructive trend in Chan Buddhism, namely, that of the Huineng 惠能 and the Hongzhou 洪州 Chan, and its target—certain reifying tendencies in Chan. (Wang, preliminary remarks, 63–64)
The tantric path of Buddhism is complex and arduous, but its surprising culmination is the practice of spaciousness, ease, and simplicity known as Dzogchen, the Great Perfection. +
With an intention to contribute a little to gaining a fuller and more accurate picture of the intellectual agenda and philosophical edifice of Rong-zom Chos-kyi-bzang-po (henceforth: Rong-zom-pa), an eleventh-century Tibetan scholar, I wish to address in this article merely one question, namely, how Rong-zom-pa interprets what we shall call the positivistic ontology of the Tathāgatagarbha school'"`UNIQ--ref-00000002-QINU`"' while he himself undoubtedly proposes a radically negativistic ontology of a Madhyamaka sub-school called Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda. To be sure, the word ontology is used here in the sense of the philosophical theory about the true or ultimate reality of phenomena (according to any given Buddhist system).'"`UNIQ--ref-00000003-QINU`"' In particular, the idea that the "root-less-ness" of the mind (or, the rootless mind) is the "root" of all phenomena, or ideas similar to it, is explicit in a number of textual sources that are ''de-facto'' considered the literature of the Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda by Rong-zom-pa.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000004-QINU`"' (Wangchuk, prologue, 87–89) +
Articles/RṄog Blo ldan śes rab's Position on the Buddha-nature Doctrine and its Influence on the Early gSaṅ phu Tradition +
The teaching that all sentient beings have Buddha-nature (''tathāgatagarbha'') was first proclaimed in the ''Tathāgatagarbhasūtra''. Developed in a series of Mahāyāna sūtras, such as the ''Śrīmālādevīsūtra'' and ''Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśasūtra'', it was then systematized in the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' (abbr. ''RGV''), alias ''Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra''. The core idea of the ''RGV''’s teaching is that everyone possesses Buddha-nature. The latter does not change throughout the progression from the level of ordinary beings to that of a Buddha, it is merely purified through the separation from adventitious defilements. Once this purification is complete, awakening is accomplished.<br> Both Indian and Tibetan traditions struggled with the question of the ontological status of Buddha-nature. One finds indeed in some sūtras descriptions of Buddha-nature as permanent and pervading every sentient being, which are also characteristics ascribed by non-Buddhists to the Self (''ātman''). But if Buddha-nature were to be understood as a permanent entity akin to a Self, how could this teaching be compatible with the standard Buddhist doctrine that everything is impermanent and selfless?<br> Some Mahāyāna sūtras, such as the ''Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra'', would offer support for the assimilation of Buddha-nature with a Self. The ''Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra'' is quite explicit in associating the two notions, characterizing in particular the ''dharmakāya'' in terms of “perfection of Self” (''ātmapāramitā''), but warns about the confusion of the “correct” ''ātman'', which is Buddha-nature, with ''ātman'' taken in its ordinary sense.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000001-QINU`"'<br> ''RGV'' I.37 and ''RGVV'' also speak of the “perfection of Self” as an epithet of the ''dharmakāya'', interpreting however this notion of “Self” (''ātman'') in the sense of selflessness (''nairātmya'') or quiescence of conceptual proliferations (''prapañca''), thus distinguishing Buddha-nature from the notion of a personal, permanent Self (''ātman'').'"`UNIQ--ref-00000002-QINU`"'<br> Nevertheless, the ''RGV'' does not promote the doctrine of emptiness in the sense that everything is ultimately empty of intrinsic nature. Quite on the contrary, the ''RGV'' stresses the real existence of Buddha-nature, and proclaims the superiority of the Buddha-nature doctrine to the emptiness doctrine of the ''Prajñāpāramitāsūtras''.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000003-QINU`"'<br>
The ''RGV'' thus on the one hand distinguishes Buddha-nature from the disapproved view of a Self, while on the other hand it admits Buddha-nature as ultimately existent'"`UNIQ--ref-00000004-QINU`"'—an ambiguous viewpoint, and a challenging one for its interpreters. . . .<br> The present paper deals with a selection of rṄog’s most significant views on the doctrine of Buddha-nature and considers some reactions to his interpretations in the works of his followers. Since the ''RGV'' commentaries attributed to two of rṄog’s "four main [spiritual] sons" (''sras kyi thu bo bźi''), Źaṅ Tshes spoṅ ba Chos kyi bla ma and Gro luṅ pa Blo gros byuṅ gnas,'"`UNIQ--ref-00000005-QINU`"' as yet remain to be found'"`UNIQ--ref-00000006-QINU`"' we will concentrate on the next-earliest available work, a commentary by Phywa pa Chos kyi seṅ ge (1109–1169) '"`UNIQ--ref-00000007-QINU`"' (Kano, introduction, 249–55)
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The present paper provides newly available Sanskrit fragments (11½ verses) from the ''Triśaraṇasaptati'' attributed to Candrakīrti '"`UNIQ--ref-00000002-QINU`"' These verses are found in the Sanskrit manuscript of Abhayākaraguptaʼs ''Munimatālaṃkāra''.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000003-QINU`"'<br> The ''Triśaraṇasaptati'' is a small versified work consisting 68 ''ślokas'', the full text of which is preserved only in Tibetan translation. We find two versions (i.e. recensions) of the ''Triśaraṇasaptati'' in all the Tanjurs. The two versions are almost the same, having been translated by the same translation team (Atiśa and Rin chen bzang po).<br> Sorensen translated the Tibetan text into English and added to them six verses (12, 13, 33, 45, 46, and 47) in Sanskrit traced in the form of quotations in other works. Sorensenʼs English translation is for the most part faithful to the Tibetan text. The Tibetan translation itself, when compared with the Sanskrit original, is seen on occasion to be imprecise (see below, "Philological Remarks").<br> Other quotations from the ''Triśaraṇasaptati'' have been found in two passages in the ''Munimatālaṃkāra'': Passage A (Skt. Ms. 7v1-4; Tib. D 82a7-b3; verses 1, 34, 51, 54, 55, 67) in ''Munimatālaṃkāra'' chapter 1 (the Bodhicittāloka chapter)'"`UNIQ--ref-00000004-QINU`"' and Passage B (Skt. 132r1-3; Tib. D 219a5-b1; 7-9ab, 22-23) in chapter 3 (the Aṣṭābhisamayāloka chapter). When we collate these 11½ verses with the 6 verses independently collected by Sorensen, the total number becomes 17½, which is about 26% of the whole text of the ''Triśaraṇasaptati''. (Kano and Xuezhu, introductory remarks, 4) +
Serdok Paṇchen Shakya Chokden (1428-1507) stands out as one of the most remarkable thinkers of Tibet. The enormous body of his collected works is notable for the diversity and originality of the writings it contains, and for their exceptional rigor. One of the few Tibetan intellectuals affiliated with both the Sakyapa and Kagyüpa orders, which were often doctrinal and political rivals (see chapters 7 and 11), he was also among the sharpest critics of Jé Tsongkhapa (chapter 16), the founder of the Gelukpa order that would come to dominate Tibet under the Dalai Lamas. For this reason Shakya Chok- dens works were eventually banned by the Central Tibetan government. They are known to us today primarily thanks to a beautifully produced eighteenth-century man- uscript from Bhutan, where the Central Tibetan ban did not extend and the religious leadership was congenial to the blend of Sakyapa and Kagyüpa perspectives that lent Shakya Chokden s texts much of their unique flavor.<br> Among the distinctive aspects of Shakya Chokden s oeuvre are his several contributions to the history of Buddhist thought. Historical writing in Tibet (chapter 11) was interested above all in important political or religious events, and the lives of the major actors. Doctrinal or intellectual history was generally ignored, no doubt in part be- cause the outlook fostered in the monastic colleges was one of perennialism: the truths revealed in the Buddha s teaching were eternal, and thus exempt from the process of historical change. Knowledgeable scholars were, of course, aware that commentarial and interpretive traditions did have a history of sorts, but this awareness tended to be expressed in their own commentarial notes, not in dedicated doctrinal histories. In Shakya Chokden's writings, however, we find sustained historical essays on Indian and Tibetan traditions of logic and epistemology, and of the Madhyamaka philosophy inspired by Nāgārjuna. The selections given here are drawn from his work on the latter, and may serve as an introductory guide to the philosophical writings included in the remainder of this chapter.<br> Shakya Chokden's discussion turns on the distinction made by Tibetan thinkers between two types of argument, termed in the present translation "autonomous reason” and "consequence.” The first refers to the method of using positive proof to demonstrate the truth or falsehood of a given proposition. The second, by contrast, only seeks to undermine the propositions advanced by a (real or presumed) opponent by drawing out their untenable consequences, and so is similar to ''reductio ad absurdum'', or “indirect Proof,” in Western systems of logic. This distinction was often considered by Tibetans to he the basis for designating two distinct schools of Madhyamaka philosophy, Svātantrika (Autonomous Reasoning) and Prāsańgika (Consequentialist). MTK (Komarovski, ''Sources of Tibetan Tradition'', 373)
The universality of Buddha-nature is a doctrine accepted by all Chinese schools of Buddhism. The Wei-shih (Fa-hsiang, Vijñaptimātratā) school of Hsüan-tsang, for reviving the notion that the ''icchantika'' is ''agotra'', devoid of this seed of enlightenment, had been summarily dismissed as "Hīnayānist" for that reason. The idea of "the enlightenability of the ''icchantika''" is associated with the later-named
"Nirvāṇa School," a group of scholars in the Southern Dynasties (420–589) that chose to specialize on the ''Nirvāṇa Sūtra'', the Mahāyāna scripture narrating the last day and teaching of Śākyamuni on earth. The person credited with discovering this doctrine, before even the full ''sūtra'' was available to vindicate his stand, is Chu Tao-sheng (375?–434), perhaps better known for his stand on "sudden enlightenment." The school as such flourished best in the Liang dynasty (502–557); but because it was then aligned with scholarship focusing on the ''Ch'eng-shih-lun'' (Satyasiddhi?) by Harivarman, it came under criticism when the latter was denounced as Hīnayānist in the Sui dynasty. It is usually said that the T'ien-t'ai school, based on the Lotus Sūtra, superseded the Nirvāṇa school by incorporating many of its ideas, while the Ch'eng-shih school suffered irredeemably under the attack of Chi-tsang of the San-lun (Three Treatise or Mādhyamika) school at the same time. Henceforth, the Nirvāṇa school faded away while its old association with the Ch'eng-shih tradition was judged an unnecessary mistake.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000002-QINU`"' This article will introduce three moments from the history of this Nirvana school, showing the main trends of development and, somewhat contrary to traditional opinion, justifying the necessity for the detour into Harivarman's scholarship. Emphasis will also be put on the interaction between Buddhist reflections and the native traditions. (Lai, "Sinitic Speculations," 135) +
This electronic resource contains various translations from Stephen Hodge of diverse parts of the ''Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra''. It is presented on Dr. Tony Page's website Nirvana Sutra: Appreciation of the "Mahayana Mahaparinirvana Sutra." According to Page, the passages translated by Hodge were taken from various parts of the Dharmakṣema ''Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra'' and constitute words spoken by the Buddha within the sūtra. Hodge's translations are presented in four parts (on four separate pages) within Page's website. They include: [https://www.nirvanasutra.net/stephenhodgetranslates.htm Stephen Hodge Translates], [https://www.nirvanasutra.net/stephenhodgetrans2.htm Stephen Hodge Translates 2], [https://www.nirvanasutra.net/shodgetranslates3.htm Stephen Hodge Translates 3], and [https://www.nirvanasutra.net/stephenhodgetrans4.htm Stephen Hodge Translates 4]. +
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Articles/T'ien-T'ai Chih-I's Theory of Buddha Nature—A Realistic and Humanistic Understanding of the Buddha +
Heng-ching Shih, in her contribution, explores in some detail the T'ien-t'ai view of Buddha Nature, with a special focus on the question of evil. This is clearly a difficult issue for any philosophical school whose basic affirmation is that all living beings are naturally and originally pure and radiant: how, if this is true, can one account for the apparent existence of evil, the opposite or absence of this purity and radiance? Shih's chronological review of the development of the theory of "inherent evil" in T'ien-t'ai begins with the ''Ta ch'eng chih-kuan fa men'' which, in accord with the tradition, she judges to predate Chih-i himself, and then proceeds to an analysis of the ''Kuan-yin hsüan-i'', a work that, again following tradition, she
attributes to Chih-i. It is probably fair to say that the weight of contemporary historical-critical scholarship in both Japan and the West is against both this chronology and this attribution; Shih is, of course, aware of this, but judges the arguments against the traditional position to be inconclusive. The matter is complex, and the importance of Shih's paper lies not in this but rather in the substantive doctrinal analysis she provides of "inherent evil". (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to ''Buddha Nature'', 6) +
Articles/Tathāgatagarbha from the Perspective of Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje as Presented in His Lamp that Eloquently Highlights the Tradition of the Gzhan stong Madhyamaka Proponents +
In his ''Lamp'', Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje equates ''tathāgatagarbha'' with the ''dharmadhātu'' which is realized through self-aware, self-luminous wisdom. He maintains that there is no dependency on extraneous factors; buddha nature, so to speak, is self-sufficient, bringing about its perfect awakening by means of personally experienced wisdom. ''Tathāgatagarbha'' is spontaneously endowed with qualities and activities and is permanent in the specific sense that it remains unchanging throughout the three phases and thus its beneficial activities never come to an end. Therefore, the absolute, ''tathāgatagarbha'', being effective, i.e. of benefit, for itself and for others, is empty of afflictions, but not empty of qualities. lt is from this point of view that the text—despite the fact that the term ''gzhan stong'' is nowhere to be found—can well be understood as a way of highlighting the intent of the proponents of ''gzhan stong'' Madhyamaka. Mi bskyod rdo rje, following the lead of Maitreya-Asaṅga with their cataphatic appraisal of the absolute, equates ''tathāgatagarbha'' with the ''dharmakāya'', with the expanse of ''nirvāṇa'', and with perfect awakening replete with qualities. To him this is the essential meaning of Madhyamaka, and it is for this reason that he frequently refers to Asaṅga as the Great Madhyamika. It is against this background that Mi bskyod rdo rje criticizes those Madhyamaka representatives who do not comprehend the meaning of the third dharma cycle and who therefore view ''tathāgatagarbha'' and its associated buddha qualities and activities exclusively from the perspective of a non-affirming negation. (Draszczyk, conclusion, 157) +
This paper has three aims. First, to demonstrate the irreducible ambiguity of what we may very generally call the Buddha's real or essential nature (as we find it in certain Mahāyāna texts). Secondly, to give an explanation of how this ambiguity arose within the Mahāyāna. Thirdly, to see how the Chinese handled this ambiguity. Since my argument takes some time to unfold, I give a summary straightaway without supporting evidence <br> The concept of the Buddha's real or essential nature is referred to by (or better: rests upon) many different Sanskrit terms - e.g. (''tathāgata''-)''dhātu'', (''buddha''-)''gotra'', (''tathāgata''-)''garbha'', ''dharmatā'', ''dharma-kāya'', ''buddhatā''. Other terms that are closely related are ''Tathatā'', ''āśraya'', ''prakṛti'', ''prabhāsvara-citta'', ''dharma-dhātu'', ''buddha-jñāna''.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000001-QINU`"' So when we speak of the Buddha-nature (which is how I will abbreviate the more cumbersome 'the Buddha's real or essential nature' from now on), we are tacitly drawing upon some or all of these terms, which have their own ramifications and interrelations, of course. This is a very complex situation and I want to try and clarify it by approaching it from two angles. First, ''historically'', I want to propose that Buddhism in India always had within it three strands which tended to view and understand the Dharma from their own standpoint; these strands are those of ''śīla'', ''samādhi'' and ''prajñā'' (see p. 262 for details). Secondly, ''conceptually'', I propose a number of what may be called conceptual nets or images (e.g. withinness, foundation, nature/being—see p. 263 for details) that can be applied to the concept of the Buddha-nature, and which (a) tend to hang together as a group, but in addition (b) ''each'' of the conceptual nets to a large extent determines the sort of terminology that is used when speaking of the Buddha-nature. Part of my argument is that works like the ''RGV'' (and to a lesser degree, the ''ŚMS'') represent a systematization of the different terms (and hence, tacitly, the conceptual nets that give rise to these terms) that were available at the time that the Mahāyāna was growing to maturity.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000002-QINU`"' This period of the Mahāyāna is usually referred to as the third turning of the Dharma-cakra; it involved a fundamental shift in the axis of Buddhism which led to a ''bhedābheda'' philosophy (i.e. the Absolute is both distinct and non-distinct from its attributes). Finally, we look at what the Chinese made of all this. They settled on the term ''fo hsing'' to mean 'Buddha-nature', but we find that ''hsing'' is used to translate different Sanskrit terms (e.g. ''prakṛti'', ''gotra'', ''bhāva''—see p. 267 for details), and that these Sanskrit terms are themselves translated by other words than ''hsing'' (e.g. ''t'i'', ''shen'', ''chen'', ''shih''). In other words, the inherent ambiguities in the Sanskrit terminology are replaced by inherent ambiguities in the Chinese terminology. In addition, because ''garbha'' (which nearly always means 'embryo' in Sanskrit) is translated by ''ts'ang'', ( = 'womb'; lit. 'storehouse'), a certain vacuum was created in the Chinese vocabulary which the terms ''fo hsing'' and ''fo hsin'' ( = ''buddha-citta'') neatly filled. (Rawlinson, introductory remarks, 259–60)
Articles/The Buddha Within: Tathagatagarbha Doctrine according to the Shentong Interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhaga-Review by Griffiths +
This book aims to expound, for both scholars and practitioners of Buddhism, the doctrine of the "emptiness-of-the-other" (''shentong'', to adopt the author's more-or-less phonetic method of rendering terms in Tibetan; a more formally accurate transcription would be ''gzhan-stong''), a Buddhist tradition of metaphysical reasoning that has its roots in Indian ''tathāgatagarbha'' thought and is associated especially with the Kagyu and Nyingma lineages in Tibet. This tradition of reasoning, as the author claims, has been given little attention by Western scholars working on Indo-Tibetan Buddhism; they have focused on the Madhyamaka schools in India and on their Gelug and Sakya inheritors in Tibet, and to a somewhat lesser extent upon Indian Yogācāra. In so far as they have said anything about the Shentong tradition or its Indian precursors, they have tended to dismiss it as heretical or not really Buddhist-often following in this the rhetoric of Gelug polemics. Dr. Hookham's book is therefore a welcome corrective, being, as she claims, "the first book in a Western language to discuss at length the views of Tibetan Shentong writers on the basis of their own works" (p. 5). (Griffiths, Review of ''The Buddha Within'', 317-18)<br><br>
[https://www.jstor.org/stable/603064?Search=yes&resultItemClick=true&searchText=Review&searchText=of&searchText=The&searchText=Buddha&searchText=within&searchText=Tathagatagarbha&searchText=Doctrine&searchText=According&searchText=to&searchText=the&searchText=Shentong&searchText=Interpretation&searchText=of&searchText=the&searchText=Ratnagotravibhaga&searchText=by&searchText=S.&searchText=K.&searchText=Hookham&searchText=%28Griffiths%29&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3DReview%2Bof%2BThe%2BBuddha%2Bwithin%253A%2BTathagatagarbha%2BDoctrine%2BAccording%2Bto%2Bthe%2BShentong%2BInterpretation%2Bof%2Bthe%2BRatnagotravibhaga%2Bby%2BS.%2BK.%2BHookham%2B%2528Griffiths%2529%26amp%3Bacc%3Doff%26amp%3Bwc%3Don%26amp%3Bfc%3Doff%26amp%3Bgroup%3Dnone&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_SYC-5152%2Fcontrol&refreqid=search%3A7a0bb245a797898c5e5d056546e1b060&seq=1 Read more here . . .]
Articles/The Buddha Within: Tathagatagarbha Doctrine according to the Shentong Interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhāga-Review by Need +
In ''The Buddha Within'', Dr. S. K. Hookham reworks her dissertation (Oxford, 1986) outlining the Shentong'"`UNIQ--ref-00000001-QINU`"' tradition in Tibet and its view of ultimate reality. "Shentong" (''gzhan stong'', other-empty) is a term used in Tibet to refer to a view of ultimate reality as a wisdom consciousness empty or free of the illusory phenomena of conditioned existence. Such a view owes heavily to the description of ultimate reality in the Tathāgatagarbha Sūtras and in the tantras. One of the earliest proponents of this view was the Jo-nang-pa scholar, Dolpopa Sherab Gyaltsen (''dol-po-pa shes-rab rgyal-mtshan'', 1292-1361), whose massive study titled ''The Mountain Dharma: An Ocean of Definitive Meaning'' (''ri chos nges don rgya mtsho'') outlined this doctrine, extensively citing from sūtra and tantra in support of his position. The Shentong position advanced by Dolpopa and later by such figures as the seventh Karmapa (1454-1506), the Sakya scholar, Sakya Chogden (''gser-mdog paṇ-chen Śākya mchog-ldan'', 1428-1507), and most recently by one of the founders of the Rimay (''ris med'', nonsectarian) movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,'"`UNIQ--ref-00000002-QINU`"' Jamgon Kontrol Lodro Thayay ('''jam-mgon kong-sprul blo-gros mtha'-yas'', 1813-1899), was the object of sustained critique by scholars of other schools-notably those of the Geluk-pa tradition-who advanced what is called a "rangtong" (''rang stong'', self-empty) view of ultimate reality. These scholars held the ultimate truth to be an existent object of knowledge cognized by a wisdom consciousness. Such an object of a wisdom consciousness is held to be a nonaffirming negative—the absence of the inherent existence of any given phenomena, most importantly the self. Shentong advocates argue that this view of ultimate reality fails to account adequately for the qualities associated with a Buddha's wisdom, although it does account for the nature of illusory phenomena. (Need, "Review of ''The Buddha Within''," 585)
It has come to be acknowledged in the present century that Dōgen is one of the most seminal thinkers of Japanese Buddhism. For nearly seven centuries, however, he has been buried in oblivion, except within the Sōtō School of Zen that reveres Dōgen as its founder. Even the Sōtō School contributed to the obscurity of their founder by prohibiting the publication of Dōgen’s major work, ''Shōbōgenzō'' until the end of the eighteenth century.<br> Watsuji Tetsurō (1889-1960) brought Dōgen out of this long period of obscurity with his treatise ''Shamon Dōgen'' written between 1919 and 1921.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000001-QINU`"' Watsuji's contribution, however, is not limited to his introduction of Dōgen to public attention. Instead of treating Dōgen as the founder of the Sōtō School, he presents him as a human being, a person, a man (''hito''):<br>
: ...it may be justifiable to assert that I opened a gate to a new interpretation of Dōgen. He thereby becomes not the Dōgen of a sect but of mankind; not the founder Dōgen but rather our Dōgen. The reason why I claim it so daringly is due to my realization that his truth was killed by sheer sectarian treatments (Watsuji 1925，p. 160).<br>
This realization grew out of Watsuji’s effort to solve the problem of how a layman like himself could attempt to understand Dōgen's "truth" without engaging in the rigorous training prescribed by the Zen tradition (Watsuji 1925, p , 156). A sectarian would claim that the "truth" must be experienced immediately and that any attempt to verbalize or conceptualize it constitutes falsification. If the immediate experience is the only gateway to the "truth," as the sectarian would claim, why did Dōgen himself write so much? Dōgen believed that it was through writing that his truth was to be transmitted to others. For his own religious training, he singlemindedly concentrated on sitting in meditation; yet he saw no intrinsic conflict between sitting and writing. This is why Dōgen started writing ''Shōbōgenzō'' in 1231: so that he might be able to "transmit the
Buddha’s authentic Dharma to those who are misguided by false teachers" (Watsuji 1925, p. 157). Watsuji further quotes from Dogen: "Although it (''Shōbōgenzō'') might appear to be a mere 'theory,' it still bears indispensable importance for the sake of Dharma" (1925，p. 157). Thus Watsuji claims that his approach, which relies on words and concepts, is a valid alternative to the monk’s subjective pursuit.<br> According to Dōgen, enlightenment is possible only through rigorous sitting in meditation (''kufū zazen'') and through the study of Dharma under a master (''sanshi monpō''). One can encounter Dōgen as a master through his writings, for he answers one’s questions in his works. But one still must practice sitting in meditation. Watsuji insists that meditation can be done in an office or a study as well as in a meditation hall; he even goes so far as to say that perhaps a study may be a more congenial place for this purpose than a meditation hall when many monasteries are no longer concerned with the transmission of the truth but are immersed in secular concerns (1925，p. 158). Therefore, for Watsuji, meditation does not necessarily require the act of entering a monastery.<br> Of the two prerequisites for the realization of the truth, sitting in meditation is left to the individual. But the other, the pursuit of Dharma under a master, is Watsuji's principle concern. ''Shamon Dogen'' is an account of Watsuji's personal encounter with the person of Dōgen as he speaks in his writings, primarily ''Shōbōgenzō'' and ''Shōbōgenzō zuimonki'', the latter of which was compiled by Ejō, Dōgen's closest disciple. In Watsuji's treatise, we encounter not only Watsuji as he faced Dōgen but Dōgen himself.<br> Watsuji’s new methodology considers it central to discover and encounter the person (''hito'') of Dōgen in his works.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000002-QINU`"' Many people have followed Watsuji’s methodology. Professor Tamaki Kōshirō of the University of Tokyo, for instance, remarks that not only was he first exposed to Dōgen through Watsuji, but also that he encountered the living Dōgen in Watsuji’s treatise.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000003-QINU`"'<br> This writer finds Watsuji's methodology to be particularly applicable to the study of Dōgen. Dōgen himself saw the truth fully embodied in the personhood of his Chinese master, Juching. Dōgen's encounter with this individual was the single
most decisive experience in his life, as is abundantly attested in his writings. Furthermore, Dōgen repeatedly discouraged his disciples from associating with institutionalized Zen. This paper, therefore, is the result of the writer’s attempt to encounter the personhood of Dōgen.<br> While this writer uses Watsuji’s methodology, the main body of literature that is examined in this paper is the chapter of Dōgen’s ''Shōbōgenzō'' devoted to the ''busshō'' or Buddha-nature. The reasons for this choice are three. The question that tormented the young monk Dōgen concerned the Buddha-nature. Dōgen's search for the answer to this question took him to the eminent monks of his time: Kōen of Mt. Hiei; Kōin of Miidera temple;
Yōsai of Kenninji temple; Myōzen, who succeeded Yōsai at this first Rinzai Zen monastery in Japan; Wu-chi Liao-pai and finally T'ien-t'ung Ju-ching in Southern Sung China. This pilgrimage spanned a period of over ten years ending in 1225 when he attained enlightenment under Ju-ching’s instruction and solved his question. Thus it is possible to look at Dōgen's formative years as a continuing struggle with the fundamental question he first raised on Mt. Hiei. Secondly, the Buddha-nature chapter is one of the longest of the ninety-two chapters, in the ''Shōbōgenzō'' which may suggest Dōgen's particular concern for the subject matter. Lastly, the original manuscript of this chapter, now preserved in Eiheiji temple, bears witness to the fact that Dōgen laboriously revised the chapter a number of times. Study of the Buddha-nature chapter, therefore, can
reasonably be taken as central to understanding Dōgen's life and thought. (Kodera, "The Buddha-nature in Dogen's
''Shōbōgenzō''," 267–70)<br><br>
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Articles/The Buddhist Notion of an 'Immanent Absolute' (tathāgatagarbha) as a Problem in Hermeneutics +
As a religious and philosophical tradition works out its own stock of ideas and encounters fresh ones among its neighbours, it must very often generate responses to developing tensions and oppositions unless it is simply to turn in on itself, both ossifying and isolating itself from its intellectual and human environment. Buddhism has not ossified and isolated itself in this way, and it has met such challenges not only in its spread outside the Indian subcontinent—in Central, East and Southeast Asia, and now also in Europe and America—but also, and no less importantly, in the course of its development within historical India itself.<br> One way in which Buddhism has responded to these intellectual and cultural encounters can be related to hermeneutics: that is, the modes by which a tradition explains its sources and thereby interprets (or reinterprets) itself in a continuing process of reactivation and renewal of its heritage.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000001-QINU`"'<br> In the case of Buddhism this process—perhaps comparable in part to what in another context is now frequently referred to as ''aggiornamento''—had both endogenous and exogenous causes. It was, in other words, set in train both by internal, systemically generated requirements and tensions within the Buddhist tradition as it evolved in geographical space and historical time, and by external impulses received from its intellectual and social environment, which could be, according to the case, either positive or negative in character.<br> The purpose of this paper is to explore this process with respect to the Buddhist hermeneutics of the ideas of non-self (''anatman'') and of a spiritual matrix or germ (''gotra'', ''tathagatagarbha'' or Buddha-nature) and the relationship of this pair of ideas to Vedantic notions and Brahmanical social groups in classical India. Reference will be made also to certain exegetical developments that either originated in Tibet or were at least fully realized there for the first time. Our analysis will revolve around the fact that, however historically antithetical and structurally contrasting these two ideas are in Buddhism, they in fact have not invariably been treated by Buddhist hermeneuticians as contradictory or even as systematically exclusive of each other.<br> Because of its philosophical and religious significance in the fields of soteriology and gnoseology, the Mahāyānist theory of the ''tathāgatagarbha''—the Germ of Buddhahood latent in all sentient beings—occupies a crucial position in Buddhist thought, and indeed in Indian thought as a whole. In virtue of both their extent and their contents, the sūtras treating the ''tathāgatagarbha''—and the systematically related doctrines of the natural luminosity (''prakṛtiprabhāsvaratā'') of mind (''citta'') and the spiritual germ existent by nature (''prakṛtistha-gotra'')'"`UNIQ--ref-00000002-QINU`"'—are amongst the most important in the Mahāyāna. The idea that the doctrine of the ''tathāgatagarbha'' and Buddha-nature is one of the supreme teachings of the Mahāyāna is explicitly stated in the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-sutra''.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000003-QINU`"'<br> Mahāyānist doctrine is in large part concerned with the path (''marga'') of the Bodhisattva and supreme and perfect awakening (''bodhi''), that is, the state of a Buddha. The terms ''tathāgatagarbha'' and ''gotra'' are used to denote the base or support for practice of the path, and hence the 'cause' (''hetu'': ''dhatu'') for attainment of the fruit (''phala'') of buddhahood. Even when the texts do not employ the term ''tathāgatagarbha'' to designate this factor as the one which makes it possible for all living beings ultimately to attain liberation and Buddhahood, the importance of the theme of the ''tathāgatagarbha'' is basic to the soteriology and gnoseology of the Mahāyāna. (Ruegg, "The Buddhist Notion of an 'Immanent Absolute'," 229–30)
