Property:Gloss-def
From Buddha-Nature
This is a property of type Text.
T
See Skt. ''jñāna'', Tib. ''ye shes'' +
(L. Wittgenstein's ''Familienähnlichkeit''; a polythetic relation, as opposed to the monothetic) +
See Tib. ''bden par grub pa'' = ''bden grub'' +
a representative of the line of Madhyamaka thought going back to Bhā(va)-viveka/Bhavya. See Skt. ''svātantrika'', Tib. ''rang rgyud pa'' +
A mode of thinking and expression linked in particular with certain sūtras teaching the ''tathāgatagarbha'', with the ''Ratnagotravibhāga-Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra'', and with Nāgārjuna's "Hymnic Corpus" (Tib. ''bstod tshogs''). +
The set of four positions in terms of which a reified entity might conceivably be postulated and defined. All of these positions and their corresponding statements have been negated by Nāgārjuna and his followers, who did not posit any such substantial entity (without the interpretation of this ''prasajya''-type negation having to depend on an intuitionist or paraconsistent logic); see the entry "negation" above. Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, ''Three studies'', pp. 109-12 (note 5), 139-47. See Skt. ''catuṣkoṭi'', Tib. ''mu bzhi'' +
In Madhyamaka thought the vexed question of the exact role and status of a thesis has been the object of much reflection and discussion; see D. Seyfort Ruegg, ''Three studies'', sections II and III. See Skt. ''pratijñā'', Tib. ''dam bca'' +
(the "relative" or "conventional," said of discursive linguistic usage). See Skt. ''vyāvahārika'', Tib. ''tha snyad pa''. Cf. Surface, Surface Reality, ''saṃvṛti(satya)'' +
See Reality of Absolute/ultimate Meaning/Sense; Absolute/ultimate Meaning/Sense; and Skt. ''paramārthasatya'', Tib. ''don dam pa'i bden pa''. Compare Surface Reality, ''saṃvṛtisatya'', often rendered as "Surface Truth," "conventional truth" or "relative truth." (As noted above, since here there is no truth in the current philosophical usage of the word, the rendering of ''satya'' by "truth" is conventional.) +
(the fact of being) without self-existence (''svabhāva'') (said of all things, Skt. ''dharma''). See Skt. ''niḥsvabhāva'', ''anātman'', ''nirātman'', ''nairātmyā'' Tib. ''bdag med pa (nyid'') (literally "Selfless [ness]") +
Two main types of negation are recognized in Madhyamaka: 1. non-implicative and non-presuppositional —, also known as exclusion, external or propositional negation ("it is not the case that..."), and even as one form of illocutionary negation ("I do not assert, etc., that..."). Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, ''Three studies'', pp. 224ff. See Skt. ''prasajyapratiṣedha'', Tib. ''med (par) dgag (pa''); 2. implicative and presuppositional —, also known as choice, internal or predicate negation. See Skt. ''paryudāsa'', Tib. ''ma yin (par) dgag (pa)''. See D. Seyfort Ruegg, ''Two prolegomena'', pp. 19-24 (note 6). +
See Tib. ''c(h)ig c(h)ar (ba)'' +
See definitive meaning +
(of a speaker, especially the Buddha). See Skt. ''abhiprāya'', Tib. ''dgongs pa'' +
a mode of thinking and expression linked with many sūtras of the Mahāyāna (such as the Prajñāpāramitā collection) and with Nāgārjuna's "Scholastic Corpus" (Tib. ''rigs tshogs''). +
See tetralemma, in which a form of binegation is the (negated) fourth position. (Distinguish binegation that is ''not'' the fourth position of a tetralemma and which is used to describe ultimate Reality.) +
(of a meaning or teaching, especially of the Buddha). See Skt. ''ābhiprāyika'', Tib. ''dgongs pa can''. Cf. provisional/surface meaning +
There are two sides to the very fundamental Madhyamaka concept of origination in dependence: 1. ''pratītyasamutpāda'', closely linked with ''śūnyatā'' "Emptiness" (for which in reasoning it supplies the hetu or evidence) and often in effect an expression for ultimate reality; and 2. the originating/being produced in dependence {''pratītyasamutpanna'') on causes and conditions (''hetu-pratyaya''), i.e., in conditionship, thus belonging to the level of the conditioned (''saṁskṛta'') and the Surface level of the relative or conventional (''saṃvṛti''), and having the quality of being empty (''śūnyatva''). Although closely linked with Emptiness (''śūnyatā''), origination in dependence is, nevertheless, not exactly co-extensive, and coterminous, with ''śūnyatā'' inasmuch as the latter term pertains to all entities (''bhāva'') and things (''dharma'') without exception—i.e., to unconditioned (''asaṃskṛta'') as well as to conditioned (''saṃskṛta'') things—, whereas to have originated in dependence {''pratītyasamutpanna'') applies to the conditioned, and the ''sāṃvṛta'', only; the two terms are therefore not strictly synonyms substitutable for each other in philosophical usage. Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, ''The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India''(19 81), pp. 44n110 and 45n113; ''Two prolegomena to Madhyamaka philosophy (Studies in Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka thought, Part 2, [2002])'',pp. 27iff. See Skt. ''pratītyasamutpāda'', Tib. ''rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba, rten 'byung'', and Skt. ''pratītyasamutpanna'' +
See Skt. ''avācya'', ''avaktavya''. Cf. inexpressible; D. Seyfort Ruegg, ''Three studies in the history of Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Philosophy {Studies in Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Thought, Part I'' [2.000]), pp. 109ff. +
