Property:Gloss-def
From Buddha-Nature
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Two main types of negation are recognized in Madhyamaka: 1. non-implicative and non-presuppositional —, also known as exclusion, external or propositional negation ("it is not the case that..."), and even as one form of illocutionary negation ("I do not assert, etc., that..."). Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, ''Three studies'', pp. 224ff. See Skt. ''prasajyapratiṣedha'', Tib. ''med (par) dgag (pa''); 2. implicative and presuppositional —, also known as choice, internal or predicate negation. See Skt. ''paryudāsa'', Tib. ''ma yin (par) dgag (pa)''. See D. Seyfort Ruegg, ''Two prolegomena'', pp. 19-24 (note 6). +
See Tib. ''c(h)ig c(h)ar (ba)'' +
See definitive meaning +
(of a speaker, especially the Buddha). See Skt. ''abhiprāya'', Tib. ''dgongs pa'' +
a mode of thinking and expression linked with many sūtras of the Mahāyāna (such as the Prajñāpāramitā collection) and with Nāgārjuna's "Scholastic Corpus" (Tib. ''rigs tshogs''). +
See tetralemma, in which a form of binegation is the (negated) fourth position. (Distinguish binegation that is ''not'' the fourth position of a tetralemma and which is used to describe ultimate Reality.) +
(of a meaning or teaching, especially of the Buddha). See Skt. ''ābhiprāyika'', Tib. ''dgongs pa can''. Cf. provisional/surface meaning +
There are two sides to the very fundamental Madhyamaka concept of origination in dependence: 1. ''pratītyasamutpāda'', closely linked with ''śūnyatā'' "Emptiness" (for which in reasoning it supplies the hetu or evidence) and often in effect an expression for ultimate reality; and 2. the originating/being produced in dependence {''pratītyasamutpanna'') on causes and conditions (''hetu-pratyaya''), i.e., in conditionship, thus belonging to the level of the conditioned (''saṁskṛta'') and the Surface level of the relative or conventional (''saṃvṛti''), and having the quality of being empty (''śūnyatva''). Although closely linked with Emptiness (''śūnyatā''), origination in dependence is, nevertheless, not exactly co-extensive, and coterminous, with ''śūnyatā'' inasmuch as the latter term pertains to all entities (''bhāva'') and things (''dharma'') without exception—i.e., to unconditioned (''asaṃskṛta'') as well as to conditioned (''saṃskṛta'') things—, whereas to have originated in dependence {''pratītyasamutpanna'') applies to the conditioned, and the ''sāṃvṛta'', only; the two terms are therefore not strictly synonyms substitutable for each other in philosophical usage. Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, ''The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India''(19 81), pp. 44n110 and 45n113; ''Two prolegomena to Madhyamaka philosophy (Studies in Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka thought, Part 2, [2002])'',pp. 27iff. See Skt. ''pratītyasamutpāda'', Tib. ''rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba, rten 'byung'', and Skt. ''pratītyasamutpanna'' +
See Skt. ''avācya'', ''avaktavya''. Cf. inexpressible; D. Seyfort Ruegg, ''Three studies in the history of Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Philosophy {Studies in Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Thought, Part I'' [2.000]), pp. 109ff. +
See simultaneism +
See Skt. ''jñāna'', Tib. ''ye shes'' +
ee Skt. ''itaretaraśūnyatā'', Tib. ''gcig gis gcig stong pa nyid'' +
Often rendered relative "truth" or conventional "truth," even though this is not a truth in the strict sense of the property of a proposition, etc.; but the translation of ''satya = bden pa'' by Reality is itself somewhat conventional and does not resolve all the philosophical issues involved. In Madhyamaka thought, ''saṃvṛtisatya'' is reality in a limited way only; see Candrakīrti, MABh vi.23, 28 and PPMVxxiv. 11. Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, ''Two prolegomena'', pp. 187n52 and 194n65. It is, then, only in a restricted, and even problematic, sense that it is possible to speak of a ''two''-truth—or even of a ''two''-reality—theory in Madhyamaka (as distinct from a two-level theory). In the purified cognitive sight of ''āryas'', ''saṃvṛtisatya'' is presented, i.e., apprehended, as ''saṃvṛti[mātra] = kun rdzob [tsam]'', mere Surface. Cf. ''Two prolegomena'', pp. 194ff. In Madhyamaka, the theory of Surface-level Reality has the effect of "saving appearances/the phenomena" (sôzein ta phainomena, ''salvare phaenomena''). Cf. transactional-pragmatic. See Skt. ''saṃvṛtisatya'', Tib. ''kun rdzob kyi bden pa''; compare Tib. ''snang stong'' +
See Skt. ''pratiṣedhya'', ''niṣedhya''\ Tib. ''dgag bya'' +
(of an argument or method). See Skt. ''prasańga'', Tib. ''thal ba(r'gyur ba'') +
(also deep meaning, the opposite of provisional or surface meaning). See Skt. ''nītārtha'', Tib. ''nges pa'i don'' +
See dependence, origination/production in-- Emptiness +
the correlative opposite of transactional-pragmatic, and of Surface (level). See Skt. ''paramārtha'', Tib. ''don dam pa''. Cf. Reality of Absolute/ultimate Meaning/Sense, Skt. ''paramārthasatya'', Tib. ''don dam pa'i bden pa''. (The frequently used translation of Skt. ''satya'' = Tib. ''bden pa'', and of Pali ''sacca'', by "truth" is in this case etymological and hence simply conventional. Here the word ''satya'' does not denote truth as the property of either a proposition, statement or sentence, or of a belief. But even the rendering Reality does not entirely resolve all the philosophical issues involved, and recourse to multiple renderings and definitions can only pardy compensate for these difficulties of translation. For the use of conventional terminological equivalents in the translation of Indian and Tibetan philosophical terminology see D. Seyfort Ruegg, "La traduction de la terminologie technique de la pensee indienne et bouddhique depuis Sylvain Lévi" [1007]. In the present work, markedly conventional and technical English renderings are shown by capitalized initial letters, for example "Absolute" and "Emptiness") +
For Tsong kha pas positing of a self-characteristic (''rang gi mtshan nyid'') in his exegesis and interpretative reading of Bhavivekas philosophy, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, ''Three studies'', section III. See Skt. ''svalakṣaṇa'', Tib. ''rang gi mtshan nyid = rang mtshan'' +
(a provisional, intentional, meaning requiring hermeneutical interpretation in a further sense; the opposite of definitive/deep meaning). See Skt. ''neyārtha'', Tib. ''drang ba'i don''. Cf. intentional (''ābhiprāyika'') +
