Property:Gloss-def

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T
ee Skt. ''itaretaraśūnyatā'', Tib. ''gcig gis gcig stong pa nyid''  +
Often rendered relative "truth" or conventional "truth," even though this is not a truth in the strict sense of the property of a proposition, etc.; but the translation of ''satya = bden pa'' by Reality is itself somewhat conventional and does not resolve all the philosophical issues involved. In Madhyamaka thought, ''saṃvṛtisatya'' is reality in a limited way only; see Candrakīrti, MABh vi.23, 28 and PPMVxxiv. 11. Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, ''Two prolegomena'', pp. 187n52 and 194n65. It is, then, only in a restricted, and even problematic, sense that it is possible to speak of a ''two''-truth—or even of a ''two''-reality—theory in Madhyamaka (as distinct from a two-level theory). In the purified cognitive sight of ''āryas'', ''saṃvṛtisatya'' is presented, i.e., apprehended, as ''saṃvṛti[mātra] = kun rdzob [tsam]'', mere Surface. Cf. ''Two prolegomena'', pp. 194ff. In Madhyamaka, the theory of Surface-level Reality has the effect of "saving appearances/the phenomena" (sôzein ta phainomena, ''salvare phaenomena''). Cf. transactional-pragmatic. See Skt. ''saṃvṛtisatya'', Tib. ''kun rdzob kyi bden pa''; compare Tib. ''snang stong''  +
See Skt. ''pratiṣedhya'', ''niṣedhya''\ Tib. ''dgag bya''  +
(of an argument or method). See Skt. ''prasańga'', Tib. ''thal ba(r'gyur ba'')  +
(also deep meaning, the opposite of provisional or surface meaning). See Skt. ''nītārtha'', Tib. ''nges pa'i don''  +
the correlative opposite of transactional-pragmatic, and of Surface (level). See Skt. ''paramārtha'', Tib. ''don dam pa''. Cf. Reality of Absolute/ultimate Meaning/Sense, Skt. ''paramārthasatya'', Tib. ''don dam pa'i bden pa''. (The frequently used translation of Skt. ''satya'' = Tib. ''bden pa'', and of Pali ''sacca'', by "truth" is in this case etymological and hence simply conventional. Here the word ''satya'' does not denote truth as the property of either a proposition, statement or sentence, or of a belief. But even the rendering Reality does not entirely resolve all the philosophical issues involved, and recourse to multiple renderings and definitions can only pardy compensate for these difficulties of translation. For the use of conventional terminological equivalents in the translation of Indian and Tibetan philosophical terminology see D. Seyfort Ruegg, "La traduction de la terminologie technique de la pensee indienne et bouddhique depuis Sylvain Lévi" [1007]. In the present work, markedly conventional and technical English renderings are shown by capitalized initial letters, for example "Absolute" and "Emptiness")  +
For Tsong kha pas positing of a self-characteristic (''rang gi mtshan nyid'') in his exegesis and interpretative reading of Bhavivekas philosophy, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, ''Three studies'', section III. See Skt. ''svalakṣaṇa'', Tib. ''rang gi mtshan nyid = rang mtshan''  +
(a provisional, intentional, meaning requiring hermeneutical interpretation in a further sense; the opposite of definitive/deep meaning). See Skt. ''neyārtha'', Tib. ''drang ba'i don''. Cf. intentional (''ābhiprāyika'')  +
Skt. ''madhyamaka'', Tib. ''dbu ma''. The word ''madhyamaka''—derived from Skt. ''madhyama'' "placed in the middle, central," itself related to ''madhya'' "id."—means middle, middlemost. In the sūtra for Kātyāyana cited in ''MMK'' xv. 7 (the Pali version of which is in the Saṃyuttanikāya II 17), the Buddha is shown explaining that to say "all exists" is one extreme (''anta'') and to say "all does not exist" is a second extreme; hence he, the Tathāgata, without resorting to either binary extreme, teaches the Dharma "by the middle" {''majjhena''). This sūtra then mentions members of the chain of origination in dependence that accounts for the arising (''samudaya'') of the entire aggregate of Pain (''dukkhakkhandha''), and whose reversal leads to the cessation (''nirodha'') of this Pain. See also ''Kāśyapaparivarta'' § 56 ff. It is of the highest importance that the ''Samādhirājasūtra'' (ix.27) has pointed out that the Middle is no third position in which one might install oneself, having once eschewed the twin extremes of existence and non-existence (''madhye 'pi na sthānaṃ karoti paṇḍitaḥ''). The word ''madhyamaka'' denotes, then, a philosophical Middle free from the twin extreme views of the eternal (''śāśvata'') and destruction (''uccheda''), and indeed from any hypostatized position on which one might fixate. (Compare also Śāntideva's ''Bodhicaryāvatāra'' ix.35: ''yadā na bhāvo nâbhāvo mateḥ saṃtiṣṭhate puraḥ/ tadânyagatyabhāvena nirālambā praśaāmyati''//)) Madhyamaka thought is thus neither substantialism (metaphysical essentialism) nor nihilism. Later (see ''The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India'', p. 1) the word ''madhyamaka'' came to designate the system or school of thought that goes back to Nāgārjuna (ca. second century C.E.) and was continued by his disciple Āryadeva and, subsequently, by Buddhapālita (ca. 500, a source for the Apagogist branch of the Madhyamaka school), by Bhāviveka (sixth century, the initiator of the Autonomist branch of the school), and by Candrakīrti (the seventh-century master of its Apagogist branch). Madhyamaka theory (and the school) may be designated also by the appellation ''madhyamakadarśana''. The term ''madhyamakaśāstra'' denotes either a major text belonging to the Madhyamaka school or the body of this schools texts and doctrines. A Mādhyamika (Tib. ''dbu ma pa'') is a person who follows this school of thought. (Wackernagel-Debrunner, ''Altindische Grammatik II'', 2 [Göttingen, 1954], § 37b [p. 124], is misleading when declaring: "Auf Prākritismus beruhen buddh. [...] ''madhyamika''- neben ''mā''- als Name einer Schule") Over many centuries Mādhyamikas have drawn out and explicated the philosophical implications of the Middle Way.  
a term expressing the ultimate nature (''dharmatā'', Tib. ''chos nyid'') of all things (Skt. ''dharma'', Tib. ''chos''), conditioned (Skt. ''saṃskṛta''. Tib. '' 'dus byas'') and unconditioned (Skt. ''asamskṛta'', Tib. '' 'dus ma byas''), as being Empty of self-existence (Skt. ''svabhāva'', Tib. ''rang bzhin, rang gi ngo bo nyid'', i.e., aseity, hypostatized/reified existence, substantial existence). The term is an equivalent of absence of self-existence (Skt. ''niḥsvabhāvatā'') and non-substantiality (Skt. ''nairātmya'', literally "Selflessness"), and (in some degree) of other terms for the ultimately real. Emptiness is closely linked with origination/production in dependence (Skt. ''pratītyasamutpāda'') and the fact that things are produced in dependence (Skt. ''pratītyasamutpanna'') on causes and conditions (Skt. ''hetu-pratyaya''), such conditionship being in fact stated to be the ground or reason for their being Empty of self-existence. It is important to note that ''śūnyatā'' is itself stated to be Empty of self-existence. —''Śūnyatā'' is so to speak a dynamic enabling principle rather than a static and hypostatized (or reified) thing. See W 70: "All things obtain for him for whom this ''śūnyatā'' obtains; nothing at all obtains for him for whom ''śūnyatā'' does not obtain" (''prabhavati ca Sunyateyam yasya prabhavanti tasya sarvārthāḥ/prabhavati na tasya kiṃcin na prabhavati Sunyatdyasya''//) (Skt. ''pra-bhū-'' is here rendered by Tib. ''srid pa'')-, MMK xxiv.14: "All fits for him for whom ''śūnyatā'' fits; all does not fit for him for whom the Empty does not fit" (''sarvaṃ ca yujyate tasya śūnyatā yasyayujyate/ sarvarṃ na yujyate tasya iunyamyasya na yujyate//)'' (Skt. ''yujyate'' is here translated by Tib. ''rung ba'', and Skt. ''śūnyaṃ'' by Tib. ''stong pa nyid'' "Emptiness"); and MMK xxiv. 3 6: "In rejecting ''śūnyatā'' that is production in dependence you reject all worldly practices" (''sarvavyavahārāṃś ca laukikān pratibādhase/yat pratītyasamutpādaśaunyatāṃ pratibādhase''//). N.B. The term ''śūnyatā'' is usually to be distinguished from the word ''śūnyatā'', the state or quality of being Empty; cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, ''The literature of the Madhyamaka school'', pp. 3n8 and 45n113. (In certain textual passages, e.g., ''MMK'' xxiv. 14d, ''śūnya'' appears to stand for ''śūnyatā'', and Tib. renders by ''stong pa nyid'') See Skt. ''śūnyatā''., Tib. ''stong pa nyid''  
Skt. ''upādāya prajñaptiḥ'', Tib. ''brten nas gdags pa'' (cf. Pali ''upādāya paññatti'' and ''upādāpaññatti'' attested in the language of the commentaries); relatively conceptualized/designated, Skt. ''upādāya prajñaptaḥ'', Tib. ''brten nas btags pa'' (v.l. ''brtags pa''). A concept/designation that is relative to—i.e., conditioned by and deriving its employment from—its base or ground, whence it is so to say metonymical. (Cf. ''The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India'', pp. 16-17, where the rendering "conditional (pragmatic) designation" was offered.) A classical example is a self (''ātman''), or a ''pudgala'', which in Buddhist thought is only a postulated entity constructed on the base of the five Groups (''skandha = phung po'') of philosophical and psychological analysis. The term ''upādāya'' (Tib. ''brten nas'') is similar in meaning to ''pratītya'' (Tib. ''brten nas'', e.g., in ''pratītyasamutpāda'', origination/production in dependence). At ''MMK'' xxiv. 18, the demonstrative pronoun ''sā'' in ''pāda'' c may refer to ''pratītyasamutpāda'' in ''pāda'' a, it being in the feminine gender by attraction to its predicate ''prajñaptiḥ'' (cf. Apte, ''Student's guide to Sanskrit composition'' § 24; this is compatible with the commentaries, and with Candrakīrti s remark that ''upādāya prajñaptiḥ'' is a ''viśeṣasamjñā'' for ''pratītyasamutpāda''); or the pronoun may refer to ''śūnyatā'' in ''pāda'' b (as indicated in ''PPMV'' p. 504.8). See under Middle Way; and ''Literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India'', p. 17n39. —The substantive that corresponds to the absolutive form ''upādāya'' is ''upādāna'', denoting a base, ground, or cause, as well as appropriation, attachment. Bhāviveka explains ''MMK'' xxiv.18c as follows (.''Prajñāpradīpa'', D, tsha, 230b): ''rten cing 'brel par byung ba zhes bya ba/stong pa nyid gang yin pa de ni brten nas gdags pa ste/ jig rten pa dang jig rten las 'das pa'i tha snyad 'dod pas he bar len pa la brten nas gdags pa yin no'', "so-called origination in dependence, which is Emptiness, is a relative concept/designation; and since worldly and transmundane transactional-pragmatic usage (''vyavahāra'') is maintained, there exists a concept/designation (''prajñaptir'') relative to (''upādāya'') an appropriated base (''upādāna'')." Candrakīrti uses the formula ''upādānena prajñapyate'' in ''PPMVx''.16. See also under Middle Way  
(in linguistic and conceptual discursivity, ineffable). See Skt. ''anabhilāpya'', ''nirabhilāpya''; D. Seyfort Ruegg, ''Théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra'', part 3, chapter v with chapter viii. 3 (pp. 362ff. on the positive determination of the ''tathāgatagarbha'' and the Absolute). Cf. indeterminacy, indeterminate  +
In the Nyingma tradition (and occasionally in others), a special teaching that was “buried” in an earlier era then discovered centuries later by a treasurer revcalcr (''gter ston''). Treasures may be found in the earth, through pure visions, or in the mind of the revealer. Their status as “word of the Buddha ’ has been controversial at times, with some Gelukpas, in particular, questioning their validity.  +
The most common term for the ''summum bonum'' of Buddhism. Nirvana is a state of transcendent peace in which all ''delusions'' have been uprooted, ''karma'' is no longer created, and rebirth need no longer be taken. In ''Mahayana'', nirvana sometimes is regarded as a mere way-station en route to full ''buddhahood'', but it may also be considered synonymous with a ''buddha's'' complete ''enlightenment''.  +
Sachen Künga Nyingpo, Sönam Tsemo, Drakpa Gyaltsen, Sakya Pandita, Phakpa.  +