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Articles/'Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal's Commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā (Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos kyi 'grel bshad de kho na nyid rab tu gsal ba'i me long)-Review by Hugon +
This book contains a critical edition of a Tibetan commentary composed by 'Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal (1392-1481) on the ''Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā''. The ''Ratnagotravibhāga'', attributed to Maitreya, and its ''vyākhyā'', attributed to Asaṅga, are of special significance in Buddhism for the discussion of the 'buddha-nature' (''tathāgatagarbha''), i.e. the idea that the nature of a buddha is inherent in every human being. gZhon nu dpal's commentary (hereafter: ZhP), which has never been published before, provides an account on this issue which is imposing both in view of its size as well as its historical and philosophical importance. Mathes' edition thus provides an important and valuable contribution to future studies on the subject.<br> The edition proper (pp. 1-576) is preceded by a brief introduction (pp. ix–xvii) which, besides editorial remarks, deals with gZhon nu dpal's life and education on the basis of an unpublished biography by his disciple Zhwa dmar Chos kyi grags pa (1453-1524), and of the ''bKa' gdams chos 'byung'' of Las chen Kun dga' rgyal mtshan (b. 1440), another of his disciples.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000003-QINU`"' This information adds to the preliminary observations by Mathes in an article entitled '"Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal's Extensive Commentary on and Study of the ''Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā'' (Mathes 2002)'"`UNIQ--ref-00000004-QINU`"', which gives a more detailed biographical account and discusses the position that gZhon nu dpal holds in ZhP.<br> 'Gos Lo tsā ba Yid bzang rtse ba gZhon nu dpal is well known to Tibetologists for his work entitled ''The Blue Annals'' (''Deb ther sngon po''), composed a few years earlier than ZhP.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000005-QINU`"' This mine of biographical, bibliographical and historical information already gives us an idea of the mastery that this remarkable scholar had of all fields of Buddhist studies. Mathes' introduction informs us of the key elements of gZhon nu dpal's thorough education in all the major religious traditions with the most important masters of the time, such as Tsong kha pa (1357-1419), the Fifth Karmapa De bzhin gshegs pa (1384-1415), the rNying ma pa teacher sGrol ma ba Sangs rgyas rin chen (1350-1430), or the Sa skya master Rong ston Shes bya kun rig (1367-1449). gZhon nu dpal distinguishes himself by his open-minded and non-sectarian approach, which is reflected in his ZhP, where he combines the commentarial tradition of rNgog Blo ldan shes rab (1059-1109) with sGam po pa's (1079- 1153) "Great Seal" (''mahāmudrā'') interpretation. The introduction also deals with the circumstances of the redaction of ZhP — composed in 1473 as gZhon nu dpal was nearly blind and had to dictate his work from memory over a period of four months — and of the carving of the printing blocks as described in the colophon. Mathes notes that gZhon nu dpal obviously had access to the Sanskrit original of the ''Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā'' as he frequently discusses Sanskrit words from this text and occasionally mentions or (politely) criticizes the existing translation by rNgog Lo tsä ba Bio ldan shes rab, which is the one found in the canon (sDe dge ''bsTan 'gyur'' 4024–4025).'"`UNIQ--ref-00000006-QINU`"' Mathes (p.xv) also mentions a translation by Nag tsho Lo tsā ba which gZhon nu dpal occasionally discusses, but gives no specifics about this translator.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000007-QINU`"' By comparing the quotations of the ''Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā'' in ZhP with the Sanskrit text (edited by E.H. Johnston)'"`UNIQ--ref-00000008-QINU`"' and the Tibetan translation found in the canon (edited by Z. Nakamura on the basis of Sde dge, Narthang and Peking ''bsTan 'gyur'')'"`UNIQ--ref-00000009-QINU`"', Mathes establishes that gZhon nu dpal's version, in several cases, better fits the original (p. xiv).<br><br>
[https://www.e-periodica.ch/digbib/voltoc?rid=ast-002:2006:60::1132&id=browse&id2=browse1&id3=#251 Read more here . . .]
Articles/'Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal's Extensive Commentary on and Study of the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā +
In this paper I present some preliminary observations on 'Gos Lo tsā ba Gzhon nu dpal's (1392-1481) commentary on the ''Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā'', which I am editing and evaluating as a part of my habilitation project. Three years ago I gained access to a photocopy of a 698-folio-long handwritten ''dbu med'' version of this text.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000F7E-QINU`"' Like the Indian ''vyākhyā'', the commentary is divided into five chapters. Their headings are listed together with the folio numbers on a cover page, which bears the seal of the Zhva dmar pa and assigns the letter ''ha'' to the volume containing Gzhon nu dpal's commentary. It is thus reasonable to assume that the original was kept in the library of the Shamarpas in Yangpacan, probably already from the time of the famous Fourth Shamarpa Chos kyi grags pa (1453-1524), who was a disciple of Gzhon nu dpal. After the war with Prithivi Narayan Shah in 1792, Yangpacan was seized by the Gelug government and the text found its way to Drepung, where many other Kagyu texts were kept. Recently I received a photocopy of a Yangpacan block-print from Tibet with the same text on 463 folios. This could be the text described by A khu ching Shes rab rgya mtsho as having 461 folios.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000F7F-QINU`"' The numbering starts anew with each chapter; thus a small calculation mistake could explain the difference of two folios. (Mathes, introductory remarks, 79) +
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Articles/A Clue to the Authorship of the Awakening of Faith: "Śikṣānanda's" Redaction of the Word "Nien" +
The text, ''Ta-ch'eng ch'i-hsin lun''<sup>f</sup> (The Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna, henceforth abbreviated as AFM), has been the center of a long controversy in the field of Buddhist studies. It has been suspected by Mochizuki Shinkō<sup>g</sup>'"`UNIQ--ref-00000DD2-QINU`"' and others to be a Chinese fabrication, while Tokiwa Daijō and others defend its alleged Indian origin. The present short article will not review the past and present scholarship on the AFM or bring in my own studies on the matter.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000DD3-QINU`"' It will be devoted to one tiny but crucial issue: the fate of a key concept in the two "translations"—Paramārtha's original (AFM) and Śikṣānanda's version (AFMS for short). The concept is ''nien'' and ''wu-nien''. To state the conclusion here so as to simplify our discussion: the ''nien'' complex, in my opinion, cannot be understood without reference to a pre-Buddhist (Han Chinese) usage of the term. It is foreign or jarring enough to the person responsible for the AFMS that it has been systematically modified or outright substituted so as to bring the AFM in line with the Yogācāra (Wei-shih,<sup>i</sup> Vijñaptimātratā) philosophy. By showing the sinitic character of the ''nien'' ideology, its centrality in the AFM, and the redaction of it by the AFMS, we can come one step closer to resolving the long controversy over the authorship of the AFM. From the limited evidence in this one short study, it would appear that the AFM was authored in China and the AFMS was a conscious redaction of the AFM in China (or Korea?'"`UNIQ--ref-00000DD4-QINU`"') to bring this work into line with the demands of Hsüan-tsang's<sup>j</sup> Wei-shih philosophy.<br> We will begin with a survey of modern Sanskritists' attempts at identifying ''nien'' and why such attempts have ultimately failed. Then we will look at a similar attempt by the AFMS to edit off the ''nien'' ideology and how by so doing it violated the integrity of the original AFM message. The sinitic meaning of the term ''nien'' and ''wu-nien'' will be demonstrated with precedents in Han thought, usages in the Six Dynasties and in Ch'an.<sup>k</sup> I will conclude with a word on why AFMS was produced. (Lai, "A Clue to the Authorship of the ''Awakening of Faith''," 34–35)
Articles/A Eulogy of Mind’s Connate Qualities, Zhwa dmar Chos grags ye shes on the Hidden Meaning of Luminosity +
The Fourth Zhwa dmar pa Chos grags ye shes (1453–1524) as well as being a prominent student and biographer of the famous ’Gos Lo tsā ba, also established himself as a scholar, a central Tibetan ruler, and a monk. His collected works discuss among much else the topic of luminosity as it is developed in the Bka’ brgyud pa Mahāmudrā tradition.<br>
This paper focuses on his writings on the “hidden meaning of luminosity”. According to Chos grags ye shes the nonaffirming negation in the second cycle of the Buddha’s teaching is of not fully perfected definitive meaning while the affirming negation of the third wheel, the inseparability of mind’s emptiness and luminosity, in other words ''mahāmudrā'', constitutes the fully perfected definitive meaning. (Draszczyk, introduction, 1) +
Articles/A Preliminary Report on Newly Identified Text Fragments in Śāradā Script from Źwa lu Monastery in the Tucci Collection +
In the summer of 2007 I had the opportunity to participate in Francesco Sferra’s course on Kamalaśīla’s First ''Bhāvanākrama'' at the University of Hamburg. For his lectures Sferra kindly provided us with digital images of Tucci’s photographs of the Sanskrit manuscript of this text. The 27 extant folios of the ''Bhāvanākrama'' (fols. 2–28), which were used by Tucci for the ''editio princeps'' of the text,'"`UNIQ--ref-00000C6A-QINU`"' have been photographed in three successive multi-folio images together with nine extra folios that appear in two photos only, namely those labelled MT 41 II/01 and MT 42 II/02. My attention was caught by these folios since while the ''Bhāvanākrama'' manuscript is written in Magadhi script, these nine folios are written in Śāradā script — a rather rare phenomenon among the corpus of Sanskrit manuscripts preserved in Tibet. They and the rest of the ''Bhāvanākrama'' manuscript were originally preserved at Zwa lu Ri phug.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000C6B-QINU`"' The manuscripts preserved there were probably taken to Beijing (The Cultural Palace of Nationalities) in the 1960s, but were returned to Lhasa sometime after 1990 (first to Nor bu gliṅ ka and then to the Tibetan Museum).'"`UNIQ--ref-00000C6C-QINU`"'<br> Of the nine folios, Tucci photographed both sides of seven of them, while he photographed only one side of the remaining two (here labelled 7.2 and 9.2). The two sides not filmed were probably blank or contained title pages (unfortunately, Tucci did not photograph title pages). Some images are out of focus and barely legible, and thus a complete diplomatic transcription is almost impossible. If Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana photographed the same folios, this would be very helpful in deciphering them; however, I have yet to find evidence that he did. Therefore, I have only been able to go through the folios haltingly, and so identify a limited number of them. (Kano, introductory remarks, 381–82)<br><br> +
This article introduces 45 Tibetan commentaries on the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' (RGV), better known in Tibet as the ''Mahayanūttaratantrāśāstra'', ''Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma bstan bcos'' or ''Rgyud bla ma'' and is an attempt at charting all Tibetan RGV commentaries. A short presentation of their authors and their bibliographical references are given. The listing is in chronological order and the key data are provided in a chart in the appendix representing the result of research into various catalogues, hand lists, and other accounts. +
Articles/A Re-examination of the Relationship between the Awakening of Faith and Dilun School Thought, Focusing on the Works of Huiyuan +
Ching Keng’s paper challenges the prevalent assumption that the ''Awakening of Faith'' was composed under the influence of the Dilun School. Keng aims to show that in the representative works of Huiyuan, arguably the most important Dilun master, we do not find the essential doctrinal feature of the ''Awakening of Faith'', namely, the compromise or even the total obliteration of the distinction between unconditioned (''asaṃskṛta'') and conditioned (''saṃskṛta'') dharmas. Keng observes that almost all available studies of Huiyuan focus on a small piece entitled "Bashi yi" (八識義, "On the Meaning of the Eight Consciousnesses"), which shows strong influence from the "Awakening of Faith"; but that other works of Huiyuan outline a very different conceptual scheme. Taking these other works as representing Huiyuan's earlier thought, and therefore Dilun thought, Keng argues that the hallmark of Huiyuan's thought is a dualist scheme, in which the inherently pure aspect is unambiguously unconditioned, with no blending with conditioned dharmas; this inherently pure aspect can adjust to falsity (''suiwang'' 隨妄) and give rise to misconception, but without compromising its unconditioned nature. Upon this basis, Keng contends that the compromise between unconditioned and conditioned in the ''Awakening of Faith'' should be regarded as an innovation, rather than a direct outgrowth from Dilun thought. An important broader implication of Keng's argument is that Huiyuan’s thought, Dilun thought, and even the thought of the ''Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra'' has been anachronistically misinterpreted through the later, typically Chinese lens of the ''Awakening of Faith''. This suggests the sobering possibility that typically "sinitic" (or even "sinified") developments became so pervasive in the later East Asian tradition that their stamp may still lie heavy upon parts of modern Buddhology itself, and that we might therefore overlook both evidence and products of "sinifying" processes, and even the actual features of Indic materials. (Radich and Lin, introduction to ''A Distant Mirror'', 25–26)
The reign of the King Ṭhi-sroṅ-deu-tsen (Khri-sroṅ-Idehu-btsan, VII century) represents a period of the greatest importance in the early history of Tibet in general and of the spread of Buddhism in that country in particular. The activity of the great Śāntirakṣita ("Ācārya Bodhisattva") and of Padma-sambhava. the selection of the first seven Buddhist monks of Tibetan origin (''sad-mi mi bdun''), the foundation of numerous sites of Buddhist learning in Tibet, and the intense literary activity of the Tibetan learned translators (''lo-tsa-ba'')—Pal-tseg (dPal-brtsegs) and others by whom a great number of Buddhist canonical and scientific works were rendered into Tibetan,—all this has been described by Bu-ston in his History of Buddhism and in other Tibetan historical works<br> There is, however, one subject relating to the spread of Buddhism in Ṭhi-sroṅ-deu-tsen's reign, to which the Tibetan historian devotes his special attention and on which he dwells in detail. This is the strife between two parties into which the Buddhists of Tibet were at that time split. One of these parties consisted of the pupils and followers of Ācārya Śāntirakṣita who professed that form of Mahāyāna Buddhism which was generally acknowledged in India and Nepal, ''viz''. the teaching of the Path to Enlightenment through the practice of meditation connected with the dialectical analysis peculiar to the Mādhyamika school of the Buddhists and with the practice of the six Transcendental Virtues (''pāramitā'').<br> The leader of the other party was a Chinese teacher (''hwa-śaṅ'' or ''ho-shang'') known by the Sanskrit name Mahāyānadeva, who preached a doctrine of complete quietism and inactivity. According to him every kind of religious practice, the meditative exercises and all virtuous deeds as well were completely useless and even undesirable: the liberation from the bonds of phenomenal existence was to be attained merely through the complete cessation of every kind of thought and mental activity,—by abiding perpetually in a state analogous to sleep. Bu-ston'"`UNIQ--ref-00000002-QINU`"' relates how this party grew very powerful and found numerous adherents among the Tibetans, how the followers of Śāntirakṣita suffered oppression from it, and how the king who was an adherent of Śāntirakṣita's system, invited Śāntirakṣita's pupil, the teacher Kamalaśīla in order to refute the incorrect teachings of the Chinese party. The dispute between Kamalaśīla and the Chinese Ho-shang in which the latter was defeated is described by Bu-ston'"`UNIQ--ref-00000003-QINU`"' in detail. We read that the leading men of the two parties'"`UNIQ--ref-00000004-QINU`"' assembled in the presence of the king, that the Ho-shang was the first to speak in favour of his theory of quietism and inactivity and was answered by Kamalaśīla who demonstrated all the absurdity of the theses maintained by the Ho-shang and showed that the teachings of such a kind were in conflict with the main principles of Buddhism and were conducive to the depreciation and rejection of the most essential features of the Buddhist Path to Enlightenment. We read further on how the chief adherents of Kamalaśīla'"`UNIQ--ref-00000005-QINU`"' likewise refuted the theories of the Ho-shang, how the latter and his party acknowledged themselves vanquished and were expelled from Tibet by order of the king who prescribed to follow henceforth the Buddhist doctrines that were generally admitted,—the teaching of the six Virtues as regards religious practice and the Mādhvamika system of Nāgārjuna as regards the theory.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000006-QINU`"'<br> Thus the influence of the Chinese Ho-shang’s teachings over the minds of the Tibetans suffered a complete defeat and with it perhaps some political influence of China.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000007-QINU`"' This is certainly a most important event in the history of Tibetan Buddhism which has been duly appreciated by Bu-ston. It is therefore quite natural that we should be interested in finding out the sources of Bu-ston's historical record. But the text of Bu-ston's History which, as a rule, contains references to the works on the foundation of which it has been compiled, does not give us any information here. At the first glance the account of the controversy looks like the reproduction of an oral tradition and there is nothing that could make us conjecture the presence of a literary work upon which the record could have been founded- The following will show that it has now become possible to trace out this work, to compare with it the account given by Bu-ston and to ascertain its historical importance. (Obermiller, "A Sanskrit MS. from Tibet," 1–3)<br><br>
[https://ia801608.us.archive.org/2/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.277506/2015.277506.1105_W_O_text.pdf Read more here . . .]
Articles/A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra): Being a Treatise on the Tathāgatagarbha Theory of Mahāyāna Buddhism-Review by de Jong +
For several reasons the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' deserves our attention. It is the only text on the ''tathāgatagarbha'' which has been preserved in Sanskrit. There are many problems connected with its place in the history of Mahāyāna philosophy and with its authorship. The Tibetan tradition attributes the verses to Maitreya and the prose commentary to Asaṅga. This text is held in high regard as one of the five treatises composed by Maitreya. However, the Chinese tradition attributes the whole work to Sāramati. This tradition is mentioned by Yüan-ts'e (613-696) in his commentary on the ''Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra'''"`UNIQ--ref-00001439-QINU`"' and by Fa-tsang (643-712) in his commentary on the ''Dharmadhātvaviśeṣaśāstra''.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000143A-QINU`"' Probably the earliest reference to Sāramati as author of the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' is to be found in Chih-i's ''Mo-ho chih-kuan'' (''Taishō'', Vol. XLVI, Nr. 1911, p. 31b18-26) which has been dictated by him in 594 (cf. p. 125 of Tsukinowa's article mentioned in note 8). The identity of Sāramati raises many problems. Some scholars have identified him with Sthiramati,'"`UNIQ--ref-0000143B-QINU`"' others have distinguished two Sāramati's.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000143C-QINU`"' There are also many obscurities in the Chinese traditions concerning the translator of the Chinese version. Chinese catalogues mention two translations, one by Ratnamati and the other by Bodhiruci.<br> In 1931 E. Obermiller published a translation of the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' from the Tibetan: "The Sublime Science of the Great Vehicle to Salvation", ''Acta Orientalia'', Vol. IX, Part II.III, pp. 81-306.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000143D-QINU`"' His interpretation of the text is based upon a commentary by Tsoṅ-kha-pa's pupil and successor rGyal-tshab Dar-ma rin-chen (1364–1432)'"`UNIQ--ref-0000143E-QINU`"' The Sanskrit text has been edited by E. H. Johnston and published by T. Chowdhury: ''The Ratnagotravibhāga Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra'' (Patna, 1950). This edition is based upon two manuscripts found in Tibet by Rāhula Sāṁkṛtyāyana. The edition of the Sanskrit text has given a new impulse to the study of the ''Ratnagotravibhāga''. Several passages of the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' have been translated by E. Conze (''Buddhist Texts through the Ages'', Oxford, 1954, pp. 130-131, 181-184 and 216-217). In ''Die Philosophie des Buddhismus'' (Berlin, 1956, pp. 255-264) E. Frauwallner has given a summary of the ideas contained in this text and a translation of several verses.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000143F-QINU`"' In 1959 Ui Hakuju published a detailed study on the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' (''Hōshōron Kenkyū'') which contains a complete translation (pp. 471-648), together with a Sanskrit-Japanese glossary (pp. 1-60 with separate pagination).'"`UNIQ--ref-00001440-QINU`"' Professor Takasaki's translation was undertaken during his stay in India (1954-1957) and continued afterwards. Apart from this book he has published between 1958 and 1964 ten articles relating to the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' (a list is given on pp. xii-xiii).'"`UNIQ--ref-00001441-QINU`"' . . .<br> The translation of the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' by Professor Takasaki is the first to be based on the Sanskrit text and the Chinese and Tibetan translations. Obermiller utilized only the Tibetan version and his translation, excellent as it is, contains a number of mistakes which are obvious in the light of the Sanskrit text. Ui utilized both the Sanskrit text and the Chinese translation, but he was unable to consult the Tibetan translation directly. His knowledge of it was based upon a Japanese translation, made for him by Tada Tōkan, and upon Obermiller's English translation. It is clear from many indications that the Chinese translation is closer to the original than both the Sanskrit text and the Tibetan translation. However, as concerns the interpretation of the text, the Chinese translation is now always a reliable guide. There are several places where Professor Takasaki has been too much influenced by it but in general he indicates very well the wrong interpretations which are to be found in the Chinese translation. For the Tibetan translation Professor Takasaki has consulted only the Derge edition. A comparison of the passages quoted in the notes with the corresponding passages in the Peking edition (the only one at my disposal) shows that the Derge edition does not always give a satisfactory text. An edition of the Tibetan translation based on the Derge, Peking and Narthang editions would be highly desirable. In view of the importance of the vocabulary of the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' for both Buddhist Sanskrit and Mahāyāna terminology, it would also be very useful to have indexes, on the lines of those compiled by Professor Nagao for the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra''.<br><br>
[https://www.jstor.org/stable/24650390?seq=1 Read more here . . .]<br><br>
Articles/A Syntactic Analysis of the Term Tathāgatagarbha in Sanskrit Fragments and Multiple Meanings of Garbha in the Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra +
The current of ''tathāgatagarbha'' thought that was born in Indian Mahayana Buddhism spread throughout the cultural sphere of Mahayana Buddhism in Asia and has also long held a fascination for people far beyond its geographical confines. The academic foundations for the study of ''tathāgatagarbha'' thought in India were laid by Takasaki Jikido, and the task left to us is to repeatedly reexamine each of Takasaki's findings on the basis of existing and newly discovered materials and corroborate or emend them. <br> Takasaki argued that the first extant text to use the word ''tathāgatagarbha'' was the ''Tathāgatagarbhasūtra''. Since Takasaki's research was published, there have been some remarkable advances in research on the ''Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra'', and in recent years scholars such as S. Hodge and M. Radich have begun to argue that it was the ''Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra'' that was the first Buddhist text to use the word ''tathāgatagarbha''. The question of which of these two sūtras came first has not yet been definitively resolved, but it may be generally accepted that both belong to the oldest stratum of Buddhist texts dealing with ''tathāgatagarbha''.<br> On a previous occasion (Kano 2017), focusing on this point, I collected Sanskrit fragments of both texts containing the word ''tathāgatagarbha'' and discussed differences in the expressions in which it is used. In particular, taking into account the findings of Shimoda Masahiro, I argued that if the word ''tathāgatagarbha'' appearing in the ''Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra'' is interpreted as a ''bahuvrīhi'' compound qualifying ''stūpa'', this would accord with the word's usage in this sūtra and with the gist of the chapter "Element of the Tathāgata" (Habata 2013: §§ 375–418). This does not mean, however, that this understanding needs to be applied uniformly to every example of its use in the ''Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra''. Because in this earlier article I focused somewhat unduly on the interpretation of ''tathāgatagarbha'' as a ''bahuvrīhi'' compound, the fact that there are instances of wordplay making use of the multiple meanings of ''garbha'' in the ''Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra'' needs to be added, together with some concrete examples. (In the passages of this sūtra, it is natural to understand the term ''tathāgatagarbha'' as a substantive in the sense of "''garbha'' of ''tathāgata''" or "''garbha'' that is ''tathāgata''," namely, ''tatpuruṣa'' or ''karmadhāraya'', and I do not exclude this possibility as discussed in Kano 2017: 39–42.) In addition, there were some redundant aspects in the structure of my earlier article. In this article I rework these aspects so as to sharpen the focus on the points at issue and add some supplementary points. In the first half I clarify some grammatical characteristics to be observed in examples of the use of ''tathāgatagarbha'' in Sanskrit fragments of the ''Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra'', while in the second half I ascertain the polysemy of the word ''garbha'' on the basis of some concrete examples. (Kano, "A Syntactic Analysis," 17–18)
Jamie Hubbard explores some specifically Chinese materials in his contribution "Perfect Buddhahood, Absolute Delusion—The Universal Buddha of the San-chieh-chiao". [''sic''] The San-chieh-chiao wanted to hold together a radically pessimistic view of the capacities of human persons for religious practice with a strong assertion of a fundamental identity between living beings and Buddha. The subtle scholastic discussion by the San-chieh-chiao of how these two affirmations were to be held together focused upon the theoretical question of the relations between pure, undefiled Suchness (''tathatā'') and the realm of ordinary living beings—for the assertion of a fundamental identity between the two cannot be allowed to call into question the pressing apparent reality of defilements in this degenerate age. The central soteriological affirmation running through these discussions is that all beings will inevitably realize Buddhahood; the metaphysical problem is to show how this can be the case; and the practical problem is to delineate the kind of religious practice that is appropriate if it is the case. All these challenges the San-chieh-chiao attempted to meet, and it is the burden of Hubbard's careful exegesis to detail the subtle metaphysical and exegetical distinctions they constructed to do so. (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to ''Buddha Nature'', 4–5) +
The ''Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna'' (''Dasheng qixinlun'') is one of the most influential philosophical texts in East Asian Buddhism. It is most important for developing the Indian Buddhist doctrine of an inherent potentiality for Buddhahood (''tathāgatagarbha'') into a monistic ontology based on the mind as the ultimate ground of all experience. Its most significant contribution to East Asian Buddhist thought is its formulation of the idea of original enlightenment (''benjue'', or in Japanese, ''hongaku''). ([https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/awakening-of-faith-in-mahayana/v-1 Source Accessed Jun 3, 2020]) +
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It has recently been alleged by scholars of the Tibetan "Ancient" (rnying ma) tradition that although buddha-nature theory was well known in Tibet from as early as the eighth century, it played quite an insignificant role in early Nyingma exegesis.'"`UNIQ--ref-000002B6-QINU`"' I intend in this chapter to challenge this assertion by demonstrating that buddha-nature concepts played a highly significant part in Dzokchen thought during the so-called early diffusion (''snga dar'') period, albeit mostly in the form of autochthonous *''bodhigarbha'' (''byang chub snying po'') or bodhi-nature concepts rather than their well-known Indian counterpart ''tathāgatagarbha'''"`UNIQ--ref-000002B7-QINU`"' (''de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po''), as well as the as yet unattested but virtually synonymous *''sugatagarbha'''"`UNIQ--ref-000002B8-QINU`"' (''bde bar gshegs pa'i snying po''), which are both usually translated as buddha-nature. Although this family of terms is widespread in preclassical Dzokchen exegesis and therefore of inestimable importance for understanding the early development of buddha-nature theories in Tibet, it has hitherto received no attention in contemporary Buddhist studies. In determining the reasons for the obvious predilection for this indigenous family of buddha-nature concepts from the eighth to eleventh centuries, my aim is to clarify how bodhi-nature was understood by early Dzokchen authors, why it was distinguished from mainstream Mahāyāna-based buddha-nature concepts, and how it eventually became overshadowed by these latter during the classical period (13th–14th c.) as Indian non-tantric buddha-nature theories and controversies took center stage.'"`UNIQ--ref-000002B9-QINU`"' It is hoped that this short survey of Dzokchen bodhi-nature ideas and their cultural milieu will fill some gaps in our still fragmentary understanding of the origins of Tathāgatagarbha theory in Tibet. At the very least, it will show that a decidedly affirmative indigenous current of buddha-nature teachings flourished in Tibet several centuries prior to the ascendancy of the New (''gsar ma'') traditions and their polemically heated debates over rangtong (''rang stong'') and zhentong (''gzhan stong'') interpretations of buddha-nature. (Higgins, "*Bodhigarbha," 29)
Sallie B. King, in her essay "Buddha Nature Thought and Mysticism", offers a characterization of the phenomenon of mysticism and analyzes three Buddha Nature texts to see whether and to what extent the thought of those texts may properly be called 'mystical'. All three of the texts she discusses are extant only in Chinese. Two of them—the ''Buddha Nature Treatise'' (''Fo hsing lun'') and the ''Supreme Basis Sūtra'' (''Fo shuo wu shang i ching'')—are translations made by Paramārtha in the sixth century CE; and there is some question as to whether he may have actually composed them rather than simply translated them. The third, the ''No Increase, No Decrease Sutra'', was also translated into Chinese in the sixth century CE (by Bodhiruci), and there almost certainly was an Indic original for this text. Each of these texts belongs, more or less, to the Tathāgatagarbha tradition, but King wishes to classify only the Buddha Nature Treatise and the ''No Increase, No Decrease Sūtra'' as properly mystical texts. The ''Supreme Basis Sūtra'', she argues, endorses devotionalism rather than direct mystical experience for the practitioner; it cannot therefore be classified as a mystical text. King therefore distinguishes different threads or emphases within the Buddha Nature thought of the period with which she deals. (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to ''Buddha Nature'', 5–6) +
William G. Grosnick, in his essay "Buddha Nature as Myth", makes a distinction between "empirically verifiable propositions", statements that make claims about the nature of reality whose truth both is and is expected to be capable of clear articulation and demonstration, and "mythic views of reality" that provide a nonverifiable framework of great religious power for the expression of fundamentally important religious orientations. He then argues that Buddha Nature thought—at least as expressed in the early Indic sūtras devoted to it—is of the latter kind. Its function, he suggests, is to provide a mythic orientation toward the world and the religious potential of the individual Buddhist, and so to make the practice of Buddhism possible. It is just because "all beings universally possess Buddha
Nature" that the practice of the path is possible. (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to ''Buddha Nature'', 4) +
Buddha-nature (''tathāgatagarbha'') is a central topic the in Mahāyāna Buddhist thought. As the pure nature of mind and reality, it conveys the nature of being and the relationship between the buddha(s) and sentient beings. Buddha-nature is that which allows for sentient beings to become buddhas. It is the living potential for awakening.<br>
In this chapter I will look into interpretations of buddha-nature starting with the ''Sublime Continuum'' (''Uttaratantra'', ca. fourth century), the first commentarial treatise focused on this subject. I will then present its role(s) in Mahāyāna Buddhism in general, and in the interpretations of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka in particular. Next I will discuss the role of buddha-nature as a key element in the theory and practice of Buddhist tantra, which will lead into a discussion of this doctrine in light of ''pantheism'' ("all is God"). Thinking of buddha-nature in terms of pantheism can help bring to light significant dimensions of this strand of Buddhist thought. (Duckworth, introduction, 235) +
This encyclopedia entry discusses the historical origins and dissemination of the idea that Buddha-nature exists not only in sentient beings but also in insentient things. This doctrine emerged in various ways in medieval China with thinkers such as [[Jingying Huiyuan]] (523-592), [[Jiaxiang Jizang]] (549-623), and most prominently with [[Jingxi Zhanran]] (711-782) of the Tiantai school. This position later spread to Japan, being advocated by figures such as [[Kūkai]] and [[Dōgen]]. The underlying rationale for this position is generally grounded on the principle of nonduality and the idea of the Buddha’s all-pervading and embracing nature. The notion of the Buddha-nature of insentient beings is not only a doctrinal matter but also functions as a meditation technique whereby one learns to view phenomena as direct expressions of ultimate reality and to see oneself and the “outside” world as identical. +
In the original of its so-called Mahāyāna version the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra bears the Sanskrit title Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000078B-QINU`"' The Sanskrit original of this text has come down to us only in fragments. For the reconstruction of the Sanskrit text from these fragments, it is essential to compare the text with the word-for-word Tibetan translation completed at the beginning of the 9th century by Jinamitra, Jñānagarbha and Devacandra. Fǎxiǎn 法顯 translated it into Chinese under the title ''Dà bānnihuán jīng'' 大般泥洹經 in 6 fascicles (''juàn'' 卷), and Dharmakṣema 曇無讖 translated it as ''Dà bānnièpán jīng'' 大般涅槃經 in 40 fascicles. Both translations were completed at the beginning of the 5th century. The Chinese translations of this sūtra played an important role in the history of Chinese and Japanese Buddhism. The sūtra is famous especially for the formula "切眾生西有佛性 ''yíqiè zhongshēng xī yǒu fóxìng''," "Every living being has the Buddha-nature." The skill of the Chinese translators is evident from their use of the word ''fóxing'' 佛性, which is commonly translated into English as "Buddha-nature." While the underlying Sanskrit term and its intended meaning poses difficulties, as will be shown below, the Chinese term ''fóxing'', although not resulting from a very literal translation, has been accepted in dogmatical and philosophical interpretations in China and Japan.
Comparing the Sanskrit fragments and the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'', which quotes the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra'' (that is the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra''), the original Sanskrit word ''fóxìng'' is ''buddhadhātu'', ''tathāgatadhātu'' or ''tathāgatagarbha''. Takasaki Jikidō's research on the tathāgatagarbha theory led him to conclude that the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra'' is the first known text in which the word ''buddhadhātu'' is used in this meaning.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000078C-QINU`"'
I have been studying the original text of the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra'' for some time, analyzing the Sanskrit fragments in comparison with the Tibetan and Chinese translations. From the viewpoint of the original text, the meaning of the formula "Every living being has the Buddha-nature" reveals nuances slightly different from the interpretations adopted in Chinese and Japanese Buddhism. (Habata, introduction, 176–77)
When Buddhism first entered China from India and Central Asia two thousand years ago, Chinese favourably disposed towards it tended to view it as a part or companion school of the native Chinese Huang–Lao Daoist tradition, a form of Daoism rooted in texts and practices attributed to Huangdi (the Yellow Emperor) and Laozi. Others, less accepting of this ‘foreign’ incursion from the ‘barbarous’ Western Countries, viewed Buddhism as an exotic and dangerous challenge to the social and ethical Chinese civil order. For several centuries, these two attitudes formed the crucible within which the Chinese understanding of Buddhism was fashioned, even as more and more missionaries arrived (predominantly from Central Asia) bringing additional texts, concepts, rituals, meditative disciplines and other practices. Buddhists and Daoists borrowed ideas, terminology, disciplines, cosmologies, institutional structures, literary genres and soteric models from each other, sometimes so profusely that today it can be difficult if not impossible at times to determine who was first to introduce a certain idea. Simultaneously, polemical and political attacks from hostile Chinese quarters forced Buddhists to respond with apologia and ultimately reshape Buddhism into something the Chinese would find not only inoffensive, but attractive.
In the fifth century A.D., Buddhism began to extricate itself from its quasi-Daoist pigeonhole by clarifying definitive differences between Buddhist and Daoist thought, shedding Daoist vocabulary and literary styles while developing new distinctively Buddhist terminology and genres. Curiously, despite the fact that Mahāyāna Buddhism had few adherents in Central Asia and was outnumbered by other Buddhist schools in India as well, in China Mahāyāna became the dominant form of Buddhism, so much so that few pejoratives were as stinging to a fellow Buddhist as labelling him ‘Hīnayāna’ (literally ‘Little Vehicle,’ a polemical term for non-Mahāyānic forms of Buddhism). By the sixth century, the Chinese had been introduced to a vast array of Buddhist theories and practices representing a wide range of Indian Buddhist schools. As the Chinese struggled to master these doctrines it became evident that, despite the fact that these schools were all supposed to express the One Dharma (Buddha’s Teaching), their teachings were not homogenous, and were frequently incommensurate.
By the end of the sixth century, the most pressing issue facing Chinese Buddhists was how to harmonize the disparities between the various teachings. Responses to this issue produced the Sinitic Mahāyāna schools, that is, Buddhist schools that originated in China rather than India. The four Sinitic schools are Tiantai, Huayan, Chan and Pure Land (Jingtu). Issues these schools share in common include Buddha-nature, mind, emptiness, ''tathāgatagarbha'', expedient means (''upāya''), overcoming birth and death (''saṃsāra''), and enlightenment. (Source: [https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/overview/buddhist-philosophy-chinese/v-1 Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 1])
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Articles/Can We Speak of Kadam Gzhan Stong? Tracing the Sources for Other-Emptiness in Early-Fourteenth-Century Tibet +
It has become the norm for scholars familiar with the self-emptiness (''rang stong'') and other-emptiness (''gzhan stong'')'"`UNIQ--ref-000008D3-QINU`"' in the history of Tibetan Buddhist scholastic tradition to associate the latter doctrine with Dolpopa (dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan, 1292–1361), the foremost synthesizer of the Jonang (''jo nang'') School of Tibetan Buddhism. He developed a systematic,
distinctive view of ultimate truth (''don dam bden pa''; ''paramārthasatya'') and propagated this view widely and earned much scorn for it, leading to one of the most controversial doctrinal-sectarian disputes in Tibetan Buddhist history. His explication of other-emptiness, which he equates with the ultimate truth, is deemed radical and wholly unacceptable by many of his contemporaries and later Tibetan scholars because it stands in sharp contrast to the mainstream fourteenth-century and early-fifteenth-century Tibetan interpretations of self-emptiness, the notion that all phenomena including ultimate truth do not exist inherently. The self-emptiness interpretations are based primarily on Indie sources such as the ''Prajñāpāramitāsūtras'', Nāgārjuna's (c. 200) ''Madhyamakakārikā'', and Candrakīrti's (c. 570-640) ''Madhyamakāvatāra''. In contrast, Dolpopa generally does not claim that middle wheel treatises (''’khor lo bar pa’i gzhung'') such as the ''Prajñāpāramitāsūtras'' are the fundamental sources for his presentation of an other-emptiness view. Rather, he bases his formulation of other-emptiness on tantric sources such as the ''Kālacakra'','"`UNIQ--ref-000008D4-QINU`"' last wheel sūtras {'''khor lo tha ma’i mdo'') such as ''Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra'','"`UNIQ--ref-000008D5-QINU`"' and Indic commentarial sources'"`UNIQ--ref-000008D6-QINU`"' traditionally credited to figures such as Maitreya, Asaṅga (c. 300), and Vasubandhu (c. 300).<br> As a prominent fourteenth-century Tibetan doxographer, Dolpopa, however, does not repudiate self-emptiness per se; rather, he speaks of two types of emptiness'"`UNIQ--ref-000008D7-QINU`"' that have separate referent points. For him, self-emptiness refers only to conventional phenomena such as tables, chairs, and negative defilements that do not inherently exist'"`UNIQ--ref-000008D8-QINU`"' or that are empty of their own entities. Dolpopa argues that since conventional phenomena cannot withstand analysis, in that their individual entities are essentially empty or deconstructed, as the existence of their nature is thoroughly investigated, they are empty of inherent existence. Therefore, he claims that self-emptiness is not ultimate truth.'"`UNIQ--ref-000008D9-QINU`"'<br> On the other hand, he passionately demonstrates that other-emptiness exists inherently and ultimately. Furthermore, it is identified with the ''tathāgata''-essence (''de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po'', ''tathāgatagarbha'' or buddha-nature (''sangs rgyas kyi rigs''; ''buddhagotra'') endowed with enlightened qualities that exists in all beings. Dolpopa argues that this form of emptiness is not empty of its own entity, since it ultimately and permanently exists. Also, ultimate truth is empty of all conventional phenomena that are antithetical to ultimately existent other-emptiness. So, while self-emptiness, which he refers to as "empty-emptiness" (''stong pa’i stong pa''), is primarily taught in the ''Prajñāpāramitāsūtras'' of the middle wheel teachings, it is not ultimate truth, as it is empty of its own entity and it is not free from conceptual thought. On the other hand, other-emptiness, which he dubs "non-empty-emptiness" (''mi stong pa’i stong pa''), while not primarily taught in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, is delineated in last wheel teachings of the Buddha, such as ''Tathāgatagarbhasūtra'', ''Śrīmālādevīsūtra'', and others to refer to the naturally enlightened buddha-nature that is empty of all conventional phenomena. This is Dolpopa’s position on the two types of emptiness and the hierarchy of Mahāyāna literature in a nutshell and much of the discourse that follows on other-emptiness in the history of Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism has its roots in Dolpopa’s doctrinal formulation of other-emptiness vis-à-vis self-emptiness.<br> While Dolpopa certainly gets the well-deserved credit for making other-emptiness "a place of fundamental importance in the expression of his philosophy"'"`UNIQ--ref-000008DA-QINU`"' in Tibet, his controversial interpretation of Mahāyāna texts and the relative early availability of his writings to international scholars has perhaps led some to assume that Dolpopa’s thought is more original than it really was. Fortunately, the recent release of dozens of Kadam (''bka’ gdams'') volumes of previously unknown philosophical texts that predate Dolpopa allows us to reconsider this issue. Among the new texts that might be pertinent to a reconstruction of the early history of other-emptiness discourse in Tibet is the writing of Rinchen (''rin chen ye shes'', 13th-14th c.) in conjunction with the previously available Buton’s (''bu ston rin chen grub'', 1290-1364) ''Precious Garland of Rebuttals'' (''’phrin yig gi lan rin po che’i phreng ba'').'"`UNIQ--ref-000008DB-QINU`"' I argue that Dolpopa’s unique doctrinal views with respect to ultimate truth and their related Indie sources are found in Rinchen’s doctrinal formulation of Mahāyāna literature. Furthermore, there is a good reason to argue that Dolpopa’s unique views were directly influenced by the Kadam scholar.'"`UNIQ--ref-000008DC-QINU`"' Therefore, in this article, I analyze their points of convergence and divergence on the issues of buddha-nature, textual authority, and doxographical strategy, and suggest that Kadam influence on Dolpopa needs to be recognized more than we do in modern scholarship on Dolpopa’s works. (Wangchuk, introduction, 9–11)
The Mahāyāna has sometimes been associated with the doctrine that all sentient beings will attain complete awakening, a doctrine which is often linked to some conception of the "embryo of the Tathāgata (''tathāgatagarbha'')'"`UNIQ--ref-000040D4-QINU`"'. However, according to an alternate Mahāyāna doctrine, only some sentient beings will attain the complete awakening of a buddha — and some may even be excluded from attaining any form of awakening at all. In this paper, I will examine just such a doctrine, as it is found in an Indian Yogācāra treatise, the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' ("Ornament to the Mahāyāna Sūtras"; abbr., MSA), a Sanskrit verse-text, and its prose commentary, the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra-bhāṣya'' (MSABh),'"`UNIQ--ref-000040D5-QINU`"'. Particular Tibetan and Chinese sources attribute the composition of the MSA to the bodhisattva Maitreya'"`UNIQ--ref-000040D6-QINU`"', which gives us some indication of the importance this text was understood to have within certain traditions. Nevertheless, the authorship and date of the verse-text and its commentary are not certain; I hypothesize that the MSA/Bh may be dated to the fourth century CE (perhaps c. 350 CE)'"`UNIQ--ref-000040D7-QINU`"'. It is my hope that an examination of such a source may contribute to the study of the various ways in which the contours of the Mahāyāna have been drawn from a doctrinal perspective. In the MSA/Bh, one way in which the limits of the Mahāyāna are defined is through the employment of the ''gotra''-theory, a theory which identifies the soteriological potentialities of individuals through reference to their spiritual "family" or "lineage." So in order to understand this text's discursive construction of the category "Mahāyāna," we must understand its concept of ''gotra''. (D'Amato, "Can All Beings Potentially Gain Awakening," 115–16) +
Articles/Cittaprakṛti and Ayoniśomanaskāra in the Ratnagotravibhāga: A Precedent for the Hsin-Nien Distinction of The Awakening of Faith +
The question of the authorship of the ''Ta-ch'eng chi-hsin lun'' ''The Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna'', tr. Paramārtha, hereafter referred to as the AFM), has long been a lively subject of discussion among scholars of Buddhism. Such eminent Buddhologists as Demiéville, Liebenthal, and Mochizuki (to name just a few), have debated the authenticity of the two Chinese translations of the text and discussed the possibility that the original text of the AFM might have been composed in China as part of a controversy between two branches of the ''Ti-lun'' sect.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000011D-QINU`"' In recent editions of the ''Journal of the IABS'' the question of the authorship of the AFM has been raised again. In a couple of intriguing essays, Professor Whalen Lai has presented some new arguments in support of the Chinese authorship of the text.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000011E-QINU`"'<br>
I do not intend here to try to resolve all of the many questions involved in determining the author of the AFM (such an undertaking is well beyond the scope of a short paper), but I would like to address an argument that Professor Lai raised in the first of his articles—namely his contention that the AFM's exposition of the relationship of ''hsin'' (mind) and ''nien'' (thought, thought-moment) bears such an "unmistakable sinitic stamp" that it must have been authored in China.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000011F-QINU`"' I will try to show that the AFM's central conception of an "unmoved," pure mind (''hsin'') existing as the basis of the deluded movement of thoughts (''nien'') has an important Indian precedent in the ''cittaprakṛti'' and ''ayoniśomanaskāra'' notions of the ''Ratnagotravibhāga-mahāyānottaratantraśāstra'' (hereafter referred to as the RGV), a text with which the AFM's author may well have been familiar. I do not intend this as a criticism of Professor Lai's research—the parallels he finds between Chinese thought regarding ''hsin'' and ''nien'' prior to the period of the Six Dynasties and the elucidation of these notions in the AFM deserve serious attention. I simply would like to show that similar parallels—if not direct textual influences—exist between the AFM and the Indian-composed RGV, so that there is no compelling reason to conclude that the AFM theory of mind (''hsin'') and thoughts (''nien'') demonstrates Chinese authorship. (Grosnick, "''Cittaprakṛti'' and ''Ayoniśomanaskāra'' in the ''Ratnagotravibhāga''," 35–36)<br><br>
[https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jiabs/article/view/8605/2512 Read more here . . .]
Dr. Tadeusz Skorupski in ‘Consciousness and Luminosity in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism’ invokes the juxtaposition of the phenomenal world of ''saṃsāra'' and the perfected state of nirvana, noting that they reflect and essentially correspond to the dynamic operating in the Buddhist analysis of consciousness and the propensities of the human mind: the mind produces the factors contributing to rebirth, but is also the primary vehicle in the attainment of salvation. He identifies several key features that permeate early Buddhist doctrine: the pre-eminence of mind, the notion of inherent radiance, the alien nature of the defilements that contaminate the mind, and the interplay of the image of purification and corruption. Starting with a close reading of Buddhaghosa's interpretations of the nature of luminosity, the author extends his discussion to include the Mahāsaṅgikas, who emphasize the inherent radiance of a mind obscured by adventitious defilements, and the Sarvāstivāda Vaibhāṣikas, who aver that an inherently radiant mind could not be obscured, for to them it has a propensity, rather than an innate disposition, to luminosity. Delineating various attributes of the description of consciousness according to different schools, the author moves from Pāli ''Abhidhamma'' to Mahāyana and Vajrayāna sources and Bodhicitta doctrine. Alighting on subsequent Indian Tantric theories that posit a fourfold luminosity of consciousness as four kinds of emptiness, he notes that such an understanding of consciousness and luminosity was applied in the Tibetan understanding of the processes occurring during death, as described in the work known as ''The Tibetan Book of the Dead''. The author describes this account of death, as involving the transition through four kinds of luminosity, as unique to Tibet, in particular to the Nyingma and Kagyu traditions. He concludes that although varied schools often disagree in certain features, all concur in the possibility of and access to a purified mind. Tracing the continuity between early ''Abhidhamma'' through to the various Mahāyāna schools, the author avers, provides an insightful range of perspectives on luminosity and nature of the mind itself. (Editorial Committee, introduction, 10)<br><br> [http://btmar.org/files/pdf/buddhist_philosophy_and_meditation_practice.pdf Read more here . . .]
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Buddhism began gradually to be introduced to Tibet in the seventh century C. E., more than a thousand years after Shākyamuni Buddha's passing away (''circa'' 483 B. C.).'"`UNIQ--ref-000037A3-QINU`"' The form Buddhism took in Tibet was greatly influenced by the highly developed systemization of the religion that was present in India through the twelfth century (and even later). The geographic proximity and relatively undeveloped culture of Tibet provided conditions for extensive transfer of scholastic commentaries and systems of practice, which came to have great influence throughout a vast region stretching from Kalmuck Mongolian areas in Europe where the Volga River empties into the Caspian Sea, Outer and Inner Mongolia, and the Buriat Republic of Siberia as well as Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal, and Ladakh. The sources for my discussion are drawn primarily from two of the four major orders of Tibetan Buddhism:<br>
* the old order called Nying-ma-ba,'"`UNIQ--ref-000037A4-QINU`"' which reached its full development in the fourteenth century with the scholar-yogi Long-chen-rap-jam'"`UNIQ--ref-000037A5-QINU`"'
* a highly scholastic order called Ge-luk-ba,'"`UNIQ--ref-000037A6-QINU`"' founded by the fourteenth century scholar-yogi Dzongka-ba.'"`UNIQ--ref-000037A7-QINU`"'<br>
Long-chen-rap-jam was born in 1308 Do-drong'"`UNIQ--ref-000037A8-QINU`"' in south central Tibet, received ordination at Samyay'"`UNIQ--ref-000037A9-QINU`"' Monastery, and studied the doctrines of both the old and new schools. A great scholar, he became abbot of Sam-yay Monastery early in his life but retired from that position to live in the mountains. Receiving the full corpus of the teachings of the Old Translation School of Nying-ma, he wrote prolifically, and even when he was exiled for a decade to Bhutan for his closeness with the opponents of the ruling power, he established and restored monasteries.'"`UNIQ--ref-000037AA-QINU`"'<br> Dzong-ka-ba was born in 1357 in the northeastern province of Tibet called Am-do,'"`UNIQ--ref-000037AB-QINU`"' now included by the occupying Chinese Communists not in the Tibetan Autonomous Region but in Ch'ing-hai Province. He studied the new and old schools extensively, and developed his own tradition called Ge-luk-ba. Dzongka- ba and his followers established a system of education centered especially in large universities, eventually in three areas of Tibet but primarily in Hla-sa, the capital, which in some ways was for the Tibet cultural region what Rome is for the Catholic Church. For five centuries, young men came from all over the Tibetan cultural region to these large Tibetan universities to study (I say "men" because women were, for the most part, excluded from the scholastic culture). Until the Communist takeovers, these students usually returned to their own countries after completing their degrees.<br> My presentation on the mind of clear light is largely from standard Nying-ma-ba and Ge-luk-ba perspectives on the two basic forms of what Tibetan tradition accepts as Shākyamuni Buddha's teaching—the Sūtra Vehicle and the Tantra Vehicle, also called the Vajra Vehicle.'"`UNIQ--ref-000037AC-QINU`"' (Hopkins, background, 245–46)
With Mathes' article―the last one in our volume―we move on to a "hot issue" of 15th-century scholastic philosophy, namely the contested view of "emptiness-of-other" (''gzhan stong''). The article investigates 'Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal's analysis of Buddha nature and pursues the question of whether this master advocated a ''gzhan stong'' view. Mathes faces a difficult situation regarding sources, since no philosophical work by 'Gos Lo tsā ba has come down to us apart from a commentary on the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' (in which the term ''gzhan stong'' is not mentioned). Therefore, Mathes makes use of "secondary sources" such as the Eighth Karma pa's polemical review of 'Gos Lo tsā ba's lost Kālacakra commentary and a biography composed by the Fourth Zhwa dmar pa. As Mathes is able to show, 'Gos Lo tsā ba's position on Buddha nature differs sharply from the position held by the Eighth Karma pa, who (like the Third and Seventh Karma pas) supported a type of ''gzhan stong'' view. It is, moreover, obvious that 'Gos Lo tsā ba was influenced, to a certain extent, by Tsong kha pa's scholastic exegesis and thus attempted to harmonize the latter's view of emptiness with the ''mahāmudrā'' approach of the bKaʼ brgyud pas. In the end, Mathes comes to the conclusion that it is problematic to describe 'Gos Lo tsā ba's position as ''gzhan stong'', although the Eighth Karma pa (ironically) terms it as "great ''gzhan stong''." (Sernesi and Caumanns, introduction to ''Fifteenth Century Tibet'', xix) +
DŌGEN (1200–1253) is one of the most outstanding and unique Buddhists in the history of Japanese Buddhism. He is unique in at least the following three senses.
First, rejecting all existing forms of Buddhism in Japan as unauthentic, he attempted to introduce and establish what he believed to be the genuine Buddhism, based on his own realization which he attained in Sung China under the guidance of the Zen Master Ju-ching (Nyojō, 1163-1228). He called it "the Buddha Dharma directly transmitted from the Buddha and patriarchs." He emphasized ''zazen'''"`UNIQ--ref-00000001-QINU`"'(seated meditation) as being "the right entrance to the Buddha Dharma" in the tradition of the Zen schools in China since Bodhidharma, originating from Śākyamuni Buddha. Yet he strictly refused to speak of a "Zen sect," to say nothing of a "Sōtō sect," that he was later credited with founding. For Dōgen was concerned solely with the "right Dharma," and regarded ''zazen'' as its "right entrance." "Who has used the name 'Zen sect'? No buddha or patriarch spoke of a 'Zen sect.' You should realize it is a devil that speaks of 'Zen sect.' Those who pronounce a devil's appellation must be confederates of the devil, not children of the Buddha.",'"`UNIQ--ref-00000002-QINU`"'He called himself "the Dharma transmitter Shamon Dōgen who went to China"'"`UNIQ--ref-00000003-QINU`"'with strong conviction that he had attained the authentic Dharma that is directly transmitted from buddha to buddha, and that he should transplant it on Japanese soil. Thus he rejected the idea of ''mappo'''"`UNIQ--ref-00000004-QINU`"', i.e., the last or degenerate Dharma, an idea with wide acceptance in the Japanese Buddhism of his day. It may not be too much to say of Dōgen that just as Bodhidharma transmitted the Buddha Dharma to China, he intended to transmit it to Japan.
Secondly, though Dōgen came to a realization of the right Dharma under the guidance of a Chinese Zen master whom he continued to revere throughout his life, the understanding of the right Dharma is unique to Dogen. With religious awakening and penetrating insight, Dōgen grasped the Buddha Dharma in its deepest and most authentic sense. In doing so, he dared to reinterpret the words of former patriarchs, and even the sutras themselves. As a result, his idea of the right Dharma presents one of the purest forms of Mahayana Buddhism, in which the Dharma that was realized in the Buddha's enlightenment reveals itself most profoundly. All of this, it is noteworthy, is rooted in Dōgen's own existential realization, which he attained in himself through long and intense seeking. Based on this idea of the right Dharma, he not only rejected, as stated above, all existing forms of Buddhism in Japan, but also severely criticized certain forms of Indian and Chinese Buddhism, though, it is true, he generally considered Buddhism in these two countries as more authentic than that in Japan.
The third reason Dōgen is unique in the history of Japanese Buddhism, is because of his speculative and philosophical nature. He was a strict practicer of ''zazen'', who earnestly emphasized ''shikantaza'''"`UNIQ--ref-00000005-QINU`"', i.e., just sitting. His whole life was spent in rigorous discipline as a monk. He encouraged his disciples to do the same. Yet he was endowed with keen linguistic sensibility and a philosophical mind. His main work, entitled ''Shōbōgenzō'''"`UNIQ--ref-00000006-QINU`"', "A Treasury of the Right Dharma Eye," perhaps unsurpassable in its philosophical speculation, is a monumental document in Japanese intellectual history. In Dōgen, we find a rare combination of religious insight and philosophical ability. In this respect, he may be well compared with Thomas Aquinas, born twenty five years after him.
He wrote his main work, ''Shōbōgenzō'', in Japanese, in spite of the fact that leading Japanese Buddhists until then had usually written their major works in Chinese. Dōgen made penetrating speculations and tried to express the world of the Buddha Dharma in his mother tongue by mixing Chinese Buddhist and colloquial terms freely in his composition. The difficult and unique style of his Japanese writing is derived from the fact that, in expressing his own awakening, he never used conventional terminology, but employed a vivid, personal style grounded in his subjective speculations. Even when he used traditional Buddhist phrases, passages, etc., he interpreted them in unusual ways in order to express the Truth as he understood it. In Dōgen, the process of the search for and realization of the Buddha Dharma and the speculation on and expression of that process are uniquely combined.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000007-QINU`"'
In this paper I shall discuss Dōgen's idea of Buddha nature, which may be regarded as a characteristic example of his realization. (Abe, "Dōgen on Buddha Nature", 28–30)
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The Buddhist schools are rich and varied in their perspectives, but these many points of view all advance the Buddhist concept of the middle view (''madhya-drshti'' in Sanskrit and ''ume tawa'' in Tibetan). +
Original sin vs. original goodness: Mahayana Buddhism offers a more hopeful view of human nature. Zen teacher Melissa Myozen Blacker reveals how nondual practice frees us from our temporary obscurations and reveals our true, awakened nature. +
[[Gyatrul Rinpoche]] is a famed modern Tibetan teacher of the [[Nyingmapa school]] and holder of the Dudjom Tersar Lineage. This short teaching is a clear and pithy presentation of the Tibetan Buddhist view of buddha-nature from the Nyingma viewpoint that reminds us not only that it is obvious that all sentient beings have buddha-nature, but also that recognizing our buddha-nature depends upon learning in a deep way. We must "chew" on what we have learned and really take it to heart: "If you don’t know your buddhanature, learn about it! Don’t just complain that you don’t understand, or say it is too difficult. How can you see it? How can you recognize it? By learning." +
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Before you fully embark on the path of the bodhisattvas and buddhas, says Chan master Sheng Yen, you must first practice the four steps to magical powers. What are these steps and what are the magical powers you need? +
This is part 2 of a report on the fragments of hitherto unknown commentary on the Tattvasańgraha.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000000D-QINU`"' The folio we report on here, photographed in frames 32 (recto) and 33 top (verso), constitutes a part of the commentary on Tattvasańgraha stanzas 177–181. Tis is where various arguments for the existence of ''ātman'' is presented.<br> Here, we give the tex of the Tattvasańgraha along with the Tattvasańgrahapañjikā in full. Unlike in the previous fragment, our commentary is brief, and due to its fragmentary nature, it is hard to understand. Having the Tattvasańgrahapañjikā next to our text greatly helps in reconstructing and understanding our text. (Harimoto and Kano, introduction, 5) +
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Although Tsongkhapa did not author a commentary on the ''Ultimate Continuum'', his main student and successor at his main seat of Ganden, Gyaltsap Je Darma Rinchen, composed an elaborate commentary on the ''Ultimate Continuum''. The commentary, filling 230 folios, was composed at Nenying temple at the request of Gungru Gyaltsen Zangpo and others after Gyaltsap had received teachings on it from both Rendawa and Tsongkha. One Tagtsel Kharkhap Dhondup Kunga served as the scribe for this voluminous and meticulous commentary, in which Gyaltsap carries out a relentless critique of the theory that buddha-nature is inherently endowed with qualities of the Buddha or that it is an absolute eternal reality empty only of other adventitious conventional phenomena. +
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The question of ever-present change must be as old as the discipline of philosophy itself. The notion of constant flux attributed to Heraclitus (c. 535–c. 475 BC) and known as “''panta rhei''” was largely forgotten in the later development of Greek thought, but in India the notion of universal flux developed from around the sixth century BCE onward and inspired different philosophical systems, among them the Buddhist philosophy.
The Buddha’s statement “all that is conditioned'"`UNIQ--ref-00003ED5-QINU`"' is impermanent!”'"`UNIQ--ref-00003ED6-QINU`"' is known as one of The “Four Seals,” the cornerstone of all Buddhist traditions. In Buddhist logic this seal became the basis for the equation: “Whatever is conditioned is impermanent and whatever is impermanent is conditioned. Whatever is not conditioned is not impermanent and whatever is not impermanent is not conditioned.”
In Buddhism, the doctrine of the impermanence of conditioned entities is interwoven with the doctrine of causality. The fact that an entity is conditioned by previous causes and moments makes it subject to impermanence. The doctrine of impermanence was further refined into the doctrine of momentariness. This doctrine postulates a process of momentary arising and cessation on the micro level that happens so fast that it is perceived as a continuity.'"`UNIQ--ref-00003ED7-QINU`"'
The following presentation will highlight different definitions and classifications of what the terms ''conditioned'' and ''impermanent'' might mean for a number of selected Tibetan Buddhist masters in their interpretations of the true nature of the mind. Their literary works are invariably based, directly or indirectly, upon Indian Buddhist ''śāstras'' translated into Tibetan.
The point of the exploration in general is to facilitate access to the insights of Tibetan Buddhist masters as they are formulated within the framework of a philosophical discussion. A characteristic feature of their statements is that they are not based on intellectual speculation, but on meditative experience.
Here, we will be concerned mainly with the interpretation of statements pertaining to this issue in two Indian ''śāstras'', the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' and the ''Madhyāntavibhāga'', both attributed to Maitreya. However, as we will see, some of our Tibetan authors also draw on Indian works on Buddhist logic, epistemology, and ontology such as Dharmakīrti’s ''Pramāṇavārttika'', Vasubandhu’s ''Abhidharmakośa'', and Asaṅga’s ''Abhidharmasamuccaya''. The latter texts were studied in the monastic colleges of Tibet in the form of simplified manuals that constitute their own literary genre known as “Collected Topics” (''Bsdus grwa'') and “Classifications of Mind” (''blo rigs'').'"`UNIQ--ref-00003ED8-QINU`"'
In Buddhism, a mind conditioned by “actions” (''karmasaṃkleśa'') and “defilements” (''kleśasaṃkleśa'') is by definition a changeable mind—or one could even say—an unstable mind. As different mental factors make their appearance in our minds, our mental states change. Over the course of a day, an ordinary mind experiences many different mental states or factors caused by various defilements. But what should we think about the ultimate nature of the mind?
The mind or mental state in which the ultimate nature of mind is experienced, is considered the goal of the Buddhist path. It is called the enlightened mind, the true nature that is revealed when ''kleśa'' (“defilements”) and karma have subsided. This observation leaves us with two fundamental questions: Is this ultimate nature also described as conditioned and impermanent? Second, if this is the case, why is ultimate nature described in such a way? I will return to these questions below.
In order to introduce the selected Tibetan authors and their works, it may be helpful to reiterate that the so-called “Empty in itself'"`UNIQ--ref-00003ED9-QINU`"'-Empty of other”'"`UNIQ--ref-00003EDA-QINU`"' distinction that arose in Tibet is based on different interpretations of the nature of the mind or the so called “buddha-nature.” These interpretations stem from different readings of the seminal text for the presentation of the buddha-nature, the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' (hereafter abbreviated as RGV). The Buddha nature teachings are traditionally associated with the so-called third turning of the wheel of the Dharma, which the “Empty of other” proponents as well as other thinkers assert to be the highest level of the Buddhist teachings, following the division of the Buddha’s teachings provided in the seventh chapter of the ''Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra'' into three stages or wheels of doctrine, the first two being classified as provisional and the third and final stage as definitive.'"`UNIQ--ref-00003EDB-QINU`"'
In the RGV the nature of the mind is described in a way that lends itself to various interpretations. More than fifty commentaries'"`UNIQ--ref-00003EDC-QINU`"' were written in Tibet based on this ''śāstra''. Some were composed by authors classified as proponents of the “Empty in itself” philosophy and others by proponents of the “Empty of other” philosophy. The latter were often accused of interpreting the RGV’s statements too literally, taking the true nature of the mind to be a truly existent entity which was anathema to the Madhyamaka teachings based on the so-called second turning of the wheel of the Dharma. There was also the question of the qualities attributed to buddha-nature. If it contains qualities (as the RGV says it does) how can it be empty at the same time? The ontological status of the nature of the mind vis-à-vis the nature of emptiness is a central topic much discussed in the Tibetan tradition.
In this article, I will focus on explanations by selected authors, some of which have been classified as proponents of the “empty of other” philosophy. It is by now generally accepted that their works have been underrepresented, if not misrepresented, within the Tibetan scholastic tradition, partly as a consequence of the political persecution of the Jonang school. (Burchardi, "How Can a Momentary and Conditioned Mind Be Integral to ''Gzhan Stong''?, 55–57)
Articles/Hu-Jan Nien-Ch'i (Suddenly a Thought Rose): Chinese Understanding of Mind and Consciousness +
''The Issue'': In the ''Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna'' (''Ta-ch'eng ch'i-hsin lun'',<sup>b</sup> henceforth abbreviated as AFM), is found a unique explanation of the origin of ''avidyā'', ignorance:<br>
:''Hu-jan nien-ch'i, ming wei wu-ming<sup>c</sup>
:Suddenly a thought rose; this is called ignorance<br>
This idea has baffled many modern scholars as it has traditionally charmed many a Far Eastern Buddhist. What is meant by "suddenly"? What constitutes "thought"? The most recent translator of the AFM, Yoshito Hakeda, has appended this remark to the passage:<br>
:There has been much discussion on the meaning of ''hu-jan'' in connection with the origin of ignorance, mainly on the basis of interpretations proposed by Fa-tsang,<sup>d</sup> (1) that ignorance alone becomes the source of defiled states of being. It is the subtlest; no other state of being can be the origin of this. It is therefore said in the text that ignorance emerges suddenly. (2) Commenting on a quotation from a ''sūtra'', he says "suddenly" means "beginninglessly," since the passage quoted makes clear that there is no other state of being prior to the state of ignorance. (3) The word "suddenly" is not used from the stand point of time, but is used to account for the emergence of ignorance without any instance of inception.
:. . . A monk of Ming<sup>e</sup> China, glosses "suddenly" as ''pu-chüeh'',<sup>f</sup> which may mean "unconsciously" or "without being aware of the reason."
:. . . If ''hu-jan'' is a translation of a Sanskrit word, the original word ''asasmāt'' may be posited. ''Akasmāt'' means "without reason" or "accidentally."'"`UNIQ--ref-00000DE3-QINU`"'<br>
The above remark does not actually answer the question of the origin of the concept, ''hu-jan'' (suddenly) or the identity of ''nien''<sup>g</sup> (thought). We become only more aware that ''hu-jan'' is one crucial justification for ''ch'an''<sup>h</sup> (zen) "sudden enlightenment," itself a unique idea. Concerning the meaning of ''nien'' and ''wu-nien''<sup>i</sup> (no-thought), I have shown in a related article that (a) Hakeda is not the first repeatedly to read ''nien'' as ''wang-nien'',<sup>j</sup> ''vikalpa''; Śikṣānanda's AFM was bothered by the same term; (b) but both managed to distort the original meaning; for (c) ''nien'' is rooted in a peculiar understanding in pre-Buddhist Han China.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000DE4-QINU`"' Nien is the incipient thought, associated with ''yin''<sup>k</sup> that disrupts the (otherwise passive, ''yang'',<sup>l</sup> mind. In this present article, I will cite more evidences—this time focusing upon the concepts of ''shih'',<sup>m</sup> consciousness, and ''hu-jan'', suddenness—to show again why the AFM cannot be fully understood without reference to the native mode of thought. (Lai, "''Hu-Jan Nien Ch'i'' (Suddenly a Thought Rose)," 42–43)
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Articles/Image-likeness and the Tathāgatagarbha: A Reading of William of St. Thierry's Golden Epistle and the Ratnagotravibhāga +
In Book 10 of his ''Confessions'' Augustine marvels as he meditates on the qualities of the ''memoria'' in human beings:<br>
'"`UNIQ--poem-00000136-QINU`"'
This concern with the ''memoria'', and its function in the human mind, was to be one of the most important spiritual legacies Augustine would leave to the Latin, and especially monastic, Middle Ages. In fact, it would be possible to say without much exaggeration that the entire history of monastic spirituality in the Latin Middle Ages (at least until approximately A.D. 1200) is the record of the development of understanding of the power of ''memoria''.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000138-QINU`"' A central reason for this is that ''memoria'' was described as a faculty that worked by recalling the human person to the knowledge and intuition that they were created in the image and likeness of God. Thus the words of ''Genesis'' 1:26–27 stand at the beginning of an entire spiritual tradition: "God said let us make man in our own image, in the likeness of ourselves. . . . God created man in the image of himself, in the image of God he created him, male and female he created them." Augustine frequently exhorts himself, as in ''Confessions'' 7.10, to "return to myself" ''(redite ad memet ipsum)''. This was also the continual refrain of the Cistercian author of the twelfth century, William of St. Thierry, in his ''Golden Epistle'', and it serves as one of the themes on which he builds this work. William's treatise, folloing in the path of Augustine, is a call to discover the image and likeness of God in the individual person.<br> In the presentation to follow I would like to set out two spiritual traditions for us to consider: the image-likeness tradition based on Genesis 1:26 and developed by the Latin and Greek Fathers of the Church until approximately A.D. 1200, and the ''tathāgatagarbha'' teachings on Buddha-nature in Mahayana Buddhism, which flourished in India and then spread to Tibet and other parts of the Far East in the first six centuries C.E. I shall do this bby presenting two texts: the ''Golden Epistle'' of William of St, Thierry, and the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' (third to fifth centuries A.D.), variously attributed to Saramati or Maitreya. My thesis here is that while the language and concepts used in these two treatises are different, and the two worldviews of which they are representative also vary widely, we can find nonetheless underlying themes that express central concerns of each tradition, especially concerning the brith of a basic nature in the person, and the inability of either sin or defilements ''(kleśa)'' to cover over that nature that is coming to birth.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000139-QINU`"' (Groves, "Image-likeness and ''Tathāgatagarbha''," 97–98)
Few premodern Japanese thinkers have received as much attention from Western philosophical circles as the thirteenth century Sōtō Zen master Dōgen. This interest has been sparked and facilitated by insightful English translations of key portions of Dōgen's masterful collected work, the ''Shōbōgenzō'' (especially those by Norman Waddell and Masao Abe), and by several book-length studies of Dōgen's thought—most notably those by Hee-jin Kim, Steven Heine, and Carl Bielefeldt. Kim and Heine, in particular, have examined Dōgen from a cross-cultural philosophic perspective.<br> Professor Stambaugh, whose background is primarily German Philosophy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, first turned to Dōgen in the climactic chapter of her book ''The Real in Not the Rational'' [Albany, NY, 1986]. Also the author of ''The Problem of Time in Nietzsche'' [Lewisburg, 1987], she has combined in her present work many of the concerns and issues raised in these previous works while embarking on several new avenues of investigation. She is genuinely impressed with Dōgen, and portrays him as a strong and critical voice capable of insights that frequently go beyond the formulations proffered by the Western philosophers whim whom she compares him, philosophers such as Aristotle, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger.<br> Generally her method of argument in each chapter consists of setting out basic categories—such as transcendence-immanence, identity-difference, etc.— or sketching the view of a particular philosopher—such as Hegel's notion of dialectic—and then allowing Dōgen to either supplement or supplant what has been introduced. In the earlier chapter this method proves fruitful and she repeatedly zeroes in on crucial passages from Dōgen's seminal works: ''Uji'' ('"Being Time"), ''Genjokōan'' ("Actualizing the Kōan"), ''Busshō'' ("Buddha-nature"), ''Gyōji'' ("Ceaseless Practice"), and so on. She is a careful reader, sensitive to many of the philosophical subtleties of Dōgen's writings, and her insights are frequently illuminating and lucid. This is no mean task, given the difficult and unusual language Dōgen uses to express himself.<br> She is particularly effective, I think, in her discussion of the Buddha-nature fascicle, clearly explaining why, for Dōgen, Buddha-nature is neither something that someone possesses nor a potentiality that someone develops or brings to fruition. (Lusthaus, Review of ''Impermanence Is Buddha-Nature'', 69-70)
Change isn’t just a fact of life we have to accept and work with, says Norman Fischer. Practitioners have always understood impermanence as the cornerstone of Buddhist teachings and practice. All that exists is impermanent; nothing lasts. Therefore nothing can be grasped or held onto. When we don’t fully appreciate this simple but profound truth we suffer, as did the monks who descended into misery and despair at the Buddha’s passing. When we do, we have real peace and understanding, as did the monks who remained fully mindful and calm... +
Any steps to be taken in the direction of investigating the Indian roots of Ch'an are hindered by the thicket of legends in which the tradition shrouded itself. The Ch'annists must also be blamed for the fact that the question of what was the original form of this peculiarly Chinese version of Buddhism remains open, still obscured by the fallacious assumption that Ch'an was a monolithic, clearly defined school or tradition. Progress in this area is further hampered by the fact that in both India and China the early history of the movements that gave rise to Ch'an belongs to mystical traditions existing on the margins of the scholarly establishment of Buddhism. On the other hand, the broader question of contacts, connections, agreements and disagreements between Ch'an and Indian Buddhism can now be the object of documented study thanks to the indefatigable efforts of Buddhist scholars in Russia, France and Japan, who have attempted to verify the facts and meaning of an incident known as the "Council of Lhasa." (Gómez, "Indian Materials," 393) +
Articles/Introduction: The History of the Rang stong-Gzhan stong Distinction from Its Beginning through the Ris-med Movement +
By the time Tibetans inherited Indian Buddhism, it had already witnessed two major doctrinal developments, namely, the notion elucidated in the "Discourses on the Perfection of Insight" (''Prajñāpāramitāsūtras'') that all factors of existence (''dharmas'') lack an own-being (emptiness), and the Yogācāra interpretation of this emptiness based on the imagined (''parikalpita''-), dependent (''paratantra''-) and perfect natures (''pariniṣpannasvabhāva''). Closely related to this threefold distinction was the Tathāgatagarbha restriction of emptiness to adventitious stains that cover an ultimate nature, that of buddha-qualities. Throughout Tibetan intellectual history it has been a controversial issue whether these teachings require a distinction between two modes of emptiness: being "empty of an own-being" (''rang stong''), and "empty of other" (''gzhan stong''). While a follower of the ''rang-stong'' view insists that everything (and that includes the Buddha and his qualities) shares the same mode of emptiness (i.e., the absence of an independent existence), some followers of ''gzhan stong'' claim that the ultimate nature of mind and its inherent buddha qualities do have an independent existence, since they are only empty of everything else ("the other") that does not belong to them. This must be distinguished from a more moderate form of ''gzhan stong'', which admits the ''rang stong'' mode of emptiness for both the adventitious stains of relative truth as well as the ultimate nature of mind, but insists that for a practitioner with an immediate experience of the ultimate nature, it is essential to distinguish the latter from the adventitious states of mind that do not reflect how the nature of mind truly is. While forerunners of ''rang stong/gzhan stong'' distinctions can be already identified in a variety of Indian texts and early bKa'-gdams-pa manuscripts,'"`UNIQ--ref-00000F91-QINU`"' their most influential proponents doubtlessly were Dol-po-pa Shes-rab rgyal-mtshan (1292–1361) and Gser-mdog paṇ-chen Shākya mchog-ldan (1427–1507). At the other end of our time frame, new insights into the development of ''gzhan stong'' at the very end of the ''ris-med'' movement can now be gained from the collected works of Zhe-chen Mkhan-chen Gang-shar dbang-po (1925–1958/59?).<br> The contributions to this volume were presented at the ''gzhan stong'' panel organized by Klaus-Dieter Mathes (University of Vienna) at the Twelfth Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies in Vancouver, Canada, in August 2010. Its full name was "The History of the ''Rang stong''/''Gzhan stong'' Distinction from its Beginning through the ''Ris-med'' Movement." The contributors were, besides the organizer, Karl Brunnhölzl (Tsadra Foundation), Anne Burchardi (The University of Copenhagen and The Royal Library of Denmark), Douglas Duckworth (Temple University), David Higgins (University of Vienna), Yaroslav Komarovski (University of Nebraska-Lincoln), and Tsering Wangchuk (University of San Francisco). It is regretted that Karl Brunnhölzl and Douglas Duckworth were unable to include their work in the present publication. (Mathes, introduction, 4–5)
Peter Gregory’s essay, "Is Critical Buddhism Really Critical?," takes the thought of Tsung-mi as a
case study in order to ask whether the pursuit of "true Buddhism" is not in turn positing some sort of ''dhātu-vāda''-like essence of Buddhism, hence mirroring the object of its own criticism. Preferring to see Buddhism as a "product of a complex set of interdependent and ever-changing conditions (''pratītyasamutpāda''),” he looks at Tsung-mi's thought not to determine whether or not it is "truly Buddhist" but in order to discover the causes and conditions that brought it into existence. In a manner similar to Sallie King's argument that Buddha-nature can be understood as a catalyst for positive social change, Gregory argues that for Tsung-mi the doctrine of original enlightenment was tied not to a linguistic transcendentalism but rather to an affirmation of language in response to the more radical critiques of the ''prajñā-pāramitā'' tradition. (Hubbard, introduction to ''Pruning the Bodhi Tree'', xvii) +
The Trikāya doctrine of Buddhism, i.e., the doctrine that the Buddha has three "bodies," is notorious for its complexities. Attributed to the Yogācāra, but regarded as typical of the Mahāyāna in general, it is customarily cited in books on Buddhism in terms of the triad ''dharma-kāya'', ''saṃbhoga-kāya'' (or ''saṃbhogika-kāya'') and ''nirmāṇa-kāya'' (or ''nairmāṇika-kāya''). Taking these in ascending order of abstraction, the ''nirmāṇa-kāya'', usually translated "apparitional body," "phantom body," "transformation body," etc., is the physical manifestation of Buddhahood, the ordinary perishable human form, as exemplified by the "historical Buddha," Siddhartha Gautama. The ''saṃbhoga-kāya'' ("body of bliss," "reward body," "enjoyment body," etc.) is a more exalted and splendid manifestation of the enlightened personality, still in the realm of form, but visible only to bodhisattvas, those of advanced spiritual capabilities. By contrast, the ''dharma-kāya'' ("''Dharma''-body," "Body of Truth," "Cosmic Body," "Absolute Body," etc.) is both formless and imperishable, representing the identification of the Buddha with the truth which he revealed, or with reality itself. As such the ''dharma-kāya'' is often linked with various terms for reality, such as ''dharmatā'', ''dharma-dhātu'', and so on, and has even been regarded as a kind of Buddhist absolute, or at least at one with it.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000192-QINU`"' In this light the ''dharma-kāya'' is understood as the primal "source" or "ground" from which the other two types of bodies emanate.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000193-QINU`"' While many scholars are content to describe this in purely abstract terms, others impute personal characteristics to it;'"`UNIQ--ref-00000194-QINU`"' and at least one writer has gone so far as to compare it to the Christian idea of Godhead.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000195-QINU`"'<br> As a summary of the Trikāya doctrine this is, of course, oversimplified. We are dealing here with a complex theory which underwent many accretions and refinements, as Buddhists continued down through the centuries to speculate on the nature of Buddhahood, on the nature of reality, and on the relationship
between them.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000196-QINU`"' It is hardly surprising, then, that attempts to plot the course of such arcane speculations have not always been entirely successful in reaching a clear consensus, although the arguments advanced, even in recent writing on the subject, do tend to follow similar lines. A good example of this is the authoritative treatment by Nagao, "On the Theory of Buddha-body (''Buddha-kāya'')," first published in English in 1973.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000197-QINU`"' Generally Nagao distinguishes three phases: an initial one-body theory, a two-body theory, and the three-body theory elaborated by the Yogācāras. According to him (p. 104), the two-body theory (i.e., ''rūpa-kāya'' and ''dharma-kāya'') "became stabilized in a variety of earlier sūtras,'"`UNIQ--ref-00000198-QINU`"' and in early Mahāyāna sūtras, the ''Prajñāpāramitā'', the ''Saddharmapuṇḍarīka'', and so forth. The rūpa-kāya is the Buddha seen in a human body, while the dharma-kāya is the Buddha's personality seen in the dharma or dharma-nature." Elsewhere (pp. 106–7) Nagao states that the two-body theory was the one held "until the time of the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra and the time of Nāgārjuna," even though the raw materials for the third body, the ''saṃbhoga-kāya'', were also to hand before the time of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, as a consequence of the ''bodhisattva''-conccpt and the idea that a ''bodhisattva'''s performance of meritorious actions produced a body which was their manifest "reward." Nagao's article contains many valuable observations, but, as we shall see, some of its assertions are rather too imprecise, both chronologically and philosophically, to be of much use in unravelling the early development of the doctrine at issue. Another recent treatment of the subject by Makransky (1989) also describes certain features of the putative earlier two-body theory before the Yogācāras remodelled it (see esp. pp. 51–53), and distinguishes it sharply from the previous Mainstream'"`UNIQ--ref-00000199-QINU`"' (in this case, Sarvāstivādin) formulations. This analysis, too, is open to question in certain respects, as I shall show. In these and other articles on the subject'"`UNIQ--ref-0000019A-QINU`"' there is a general tendency to postulate a one-body/two-body/three-body progression, in terms of which a single personality is divided into a physical and a "spiritual" body, and then the physical body is further split in two, yielding the final complement of three. Some writers, however, point to the existence of three bodies even in the Pali sources, what one scholar has called the "primitive triad," i.e., ''pūti-'' or ''cātur-mahābhūtika-kāya'', ''mano-maya-kāya'', and ''dhamma-kāya''.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000019B-QINU`"' The first is the corruptible physical body formed out of the four elements, while the second is the mind-made body with which the Buddha visits the celestial realms (believed by some to be a forerunner of the ''saṃbhoga-kāya''); the third is the so-called "''Dhamma-body''." Now, although both these ways of approaching the subject—the assumption of a linear process, and the belief that the Pāli Canon contains an embryonic Trikāya schema—raise certain difficulties, I do not propose in this paper to discuss the evolution of the Trikāya theory in its entirety, since that would be a mammoth undertaking. What I wish to do is address one aspect of it only, viz., the early development of the idea of ''dharma-kāya'', in the hope that clarifying this will open the way to a better understanding of Mahāyāna buddhology as a whole. (Harrison, introduction, 44–46)<br><br>[https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jiabs/article/view/8792/2699 Read more here . . .]
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Jñānaśrīmitra (ca. 980–1030)'"`UNIQ--ref-00000001-QINU`"' contributed significantly not only to developing Nirākārajñānavāda theories but also to the resurrection of the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' (abbr. RGV) in early-11th-century India. The ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' was very likely composed sometime around the 4th or 5th century in India. The work fell into obscurity towards the late 6th century, only to slowly regain recognition starting from the early 11th century (see Appendix A).<br> The earliest masters of this period who quote or refer to the RGV are Maitrīpa (1007/1010-?), Jñānaśrīmitra (ca. 980–1030), and Ratnākaraśānti (late 10th to early 11th century).'"`UNIQ--ref-00000002-QINU`"' Maitrīpa was the common disciple of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnākaraśānti, and, according to a story in Tibetan documents, rediscovered a Sanskrit manuscript of the RGV in a stūpa in Magadha.<br> If this rediscovery story is a historical event, Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnākaraśānti would have received the teaching of the RGV from their common disciple Maitrīpa; but we have no concrete witness to corroborate it.<br> Maitrīpa’s knowledge of the RGV is attested by a quotation of RGV II. 61b in his ''Pañcatathāgatamudrāvivaraṇa''; he introduces a Nirākāravijñānavādin’s propounding the arising of the Dharmakāya from the Saṃbhogakāya and Nirmāṇakāya, but does not discuss Buddha-nature.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000003-QINU`"' In contrast to Maitrīpa, who does not discuss Buddha-nature, we find extensive discussions of the topic in compositions of Jñānaśrīmitra and
Ratnākaraśānti.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000004-QINU`"' In the present paper, I shall focus on quotations from the RGV in Jñānaśrīmitra’s ''Sākārasiddhiśāstra'' and ''Sākārasaṃgrahasūtra'', and on his understanding of the RGV, so as to shed light on the reception of the RGV in the early 11th century. (Kano, introductory remarks, 7–8)
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Articles/Kaḥ thog Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita's Doxographical Position: The Great Madhyamaka of Other-Emptiness (gzhan stong dbu ma chen po) +
This paper cxplores the doctrinal position of Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita ’Gyur med tshe dbang mchog grub'"`UNIQ--ref-000034FC-QINU`"' (1761-1829) namely, the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness (''gzhan stong dbu ma chen po''). Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita was the first of the Dge rtse reincarnation lineage, and served as an abbot of the Kah thog monastery of the Rnying ma school of Tibetan Buddhism in Khams, in eastem Tibet.'"`UNIQ--ref-000034FD-QINU`"' Apart from the fact that Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita edited the Sde dge edition of the ''Rnying ma rgyud ’bum'','"`UNIQ--ref-000034FE-QINU`"' little is known of him or his own works.'"`UNIQ--ref-000034FF-QINU`"'<br> This paper will examine Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita’s doxography, considering the way in which he attempts to demonstrate that the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness is ultimate within the Buddhist doctrinal history originating from India. According to Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita, the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness is said to have been the intent of the Last Tuming of the Wheel of the Dharma which is of definitive meaning, teaches the Buddha-nature (''tathāgatagarbha''), and, as pointed out by Duckworth, "accords with the Great Perfection"'"`UNIQ--ref-00003500-QINU`"' (''rdzogs chen''). Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita’s ''gzhang stong'' view is explicitly taught in the following doxographical texts: the ''Bde gshegs snying po'i rgyan'', the ''Grub mtha'i rnam gzhag nges don dgongs gsal'', the ''Rton pa bzhi ldan gyi gtam'', the first chapter of the ''Rnying ma rgyud 'bum dkar chag lha'i rnga bo che'','"`UNIQ--ref-00003501-QINU`"' and the ''Sangs rgyas gnyis pa'i dgongs pa'i rgyan'','"`UNIQ--ref-00003502-QINU`"' which is Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita's commentary on the ''Gsang sngags lam gyi rim pa sal ba'i sgron me'', a ''gter ma'' of Nyang ral Nyi ma 'od zer (1124/1136-1192/1204).<br> This paper will also suggest that Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita should be recognized as a forerunner of the ''ris med'' movement in Khams, as supported by the following facts: his view on the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness embraces the major practice lineages (''sgrub brgyud'')—Jo nang pa, Bka' brgyud pa, Sa skya pa, early Dge lugs pa, Rnying ma pa, and Zhi byed—within a single overriding intent of the Buddha’s teachings;'"`UNIQ--ref-00003503-QINU`"' Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita as the teacher of Zhe chen dbon sprul ’Gyur med mthu stobs rnam rgyal, also known as Zhe chen Mahāpaṇḍita (b. 1787), who was a ''gzhan stong pa'','"`UNIQ--ref-00003504-QINU`"' and who in tum was the teacher of the three masters Kong sprul (1813-99), Mkhyen brtse'i dbang po (1820–2), and Dpal sprul (1808-87).'"`UNIQ--ref-00003505-QINU`"' Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita’s ''Legs bshad gser gyi thur ma'', which is his response to the ''Lta ba'i gsung mgur'' by Lcang skya Rol pa'i rdo rje (1717-86),'"`UNIQ--ref-00003506-QINU`"' would hint at the seeds of the ''ris med'' movement which grew up among the three schools, the Sa skya, Bka' brgyud, and Rnying ma.'"`UNIQ--ref-00003507-QINU`"' With this paper, then, I hope to add to our understanding of the practice lineages of Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka. (Makidono, introduction, 77–80)
Khenpo Dawa Paljor's Teaching on Buddha-Nature following Mipham Rinpoche's Word-by-Word Commentary on the Uttaratantra Shastra. Recorded in Tibetan with English Translation. +
This article examines an exposition of the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness by 'Jam mgon Kong sprul Bio gros mtha' yas (1813-99)'"`UNIQ--ref-00001B37-QINU`"' of the Bka' brgyud school of Tibetan Buddhism, in his ''Stainless Ray of Light of the Adamantine Moon: An Instruction on the View of the Great Madhyamaka of Other-Emptiness'' (''Gzhan stong dbu ma chen po'i Ita khrid rdo rje zla ba dri ma med pa'i 'od zer zhes bya ba'', henceforth ''Instruction on the View''). In it, Kong sprul sets forth the theory and practice of the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness, centered upon the doctrine of Buddha-nature. The ''Instruction on the View'' largely consists of three main outlines: (1) the origin of the doctrine of the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness (''gang nas byung ba'i khung''); (2) the main part of the Instruction on the View (''Jta khrid dngos''); and (3) an explanation of the benefits (''phan yon bshad pa''). In this article, I will first summarize the contents of the ''Instruction on the View'', according to its topical outlines,'"`UNIQ--ref-00001B38-QINU`"' and then discuss a hermeneutical issue related to textual interpretations of authoritative scriptures, comparing Kong sprul's approach with that of Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita (1761-1829) and Mi pham rgya mtsho (1846-1912). (Makidono, introduction, 151–52) +
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Among the numerous texts discovered at Drepung monastery’s library through the efforts of [[Alak Zenkar Rinpoche]] and his team is a hitherto unknown commentary by one [[Lhodrak Dharma Senge]]. Although the manuscript is incomplete and missing the final pages which may have contained the colophon, the title on the first page and a note at the start of the commentary explicitly mention Lhodrakpa Dharma Senge as the author. Yet, apart from the obvious association of the author with the southern Lhodrak region of Central Tibet, we have no information on when and where he lived. +
Roger R. Jackson, in his essay "Luminous Mind Among the Logicians", treats the Indo-Tibetan commentarial discussions of the affirmation of the mind's natural luminosity (''prabhāsvaratā'') found in ''Pramāṇavārttika'' II.208. Such an affIrmation, as he shows, has deep roots in the Buddhist tradition, and is usually connected with ''tathāgatagarbha'' thought. That it is also affirmed by Dharmakīrti and discussed extensively by his commentators in India and Tibet shows that it is not without significance for the logicoepistemological tradition represented by Dignāga and his successors. The idea that the mind is naturally luminous or radiant and that
its defIlements have only an adventitious status is of obvious relevance to Buddhist soteriology; it affirms that, in some important sense, the goal of Buddhist religious practice has already been attained or is already present. The importance of Jackson's study is that it shows the same idea to be relevant also to Buddhist epistemological theory: it is precisely the mind's natural radiance that makes apprehension of things as they really are a possibility. It is this metaphysical and epistemological fact which leads Jackson to categorize Dharmakīrti and his school as epistemological optimists. (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to ''Buddha Nature'', 5) +
Articles/Lying to Tell the Truth-Upaya in Mahayana Buddhism and Oikonomia in Alexandrian Christianity +
Roger Gregory-Tashi Corless, in his essay "Lying to Tell the Truth", explores the use of intentional vagueness and obscurity in the texts of Clement of Alexandria and Origen, and relates this to the intentional use of falsehood (or, perhaps better, nontruth) in the ''Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra''. Both in second century Alexandria and in third century India, he suggests, one fmds a self-conscious use
of graded, hierarchically ordered sets of "false truths" as pedagogical devices. For the ''Lotus'', Corless suggests, the "true truth" is that all living beings are in fact possessors of Buddha Nature; it is this toward which the pedagogically useful though partial truths (''upāya'') found in other assertions point. This position is illustrated with extensive quotations from [[Kūkai]], and is compared with positions taken by a series of Christian thinkers from Nicholas of Cusa to John Henry Newman. (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to ''Buddha Nature'', 3–4) +
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A simple three-word koan. Or just a one-word koan: buddhanature. So deceptively simple, so easy to leave in the realm of concept, yet it penetrates to the very heart of the matter. Here’s Geoffery Shugen Arnold, Sensei, on Case 30 of the Gateless Gate, “Mazu’s ‘Mind is buddha.'” +
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The study of the ''Mahāyāna-śraddhotpāda Śāstra'''"`UNIQ--ref-00000E80-QINU`"') has a long history. French, Chinese and Japanese scholars have participated in the discussion, some of them great authorities in the field of Sino-Indian Studies, as P. Demieville, Ui Hakuju, Tokiwa Daijō, and Mochizuki Shinkō'"`UNIQ--ref-00000E81-QINU`"') . That I dare to add my grain to the store of knowledge already collected, though not even fully acquainted with the earlier efforts , demands an explanation. When studying Chinese Buddhism and slowly progressing through the centuries I came before the stumbling block of this text and found that without more definite knowledge about the ''Mahāyāna-śraddhotpāda Śāstra'' a clear picture of Medieval Buddhism could not be attained. As no answer has yet been given to this problem acceptable to all the debaters I had to look into it myself. Unfortunately, the Indian libraries in my reach are very incomplete with respect to Japanese and Chinese books and periodicals. So I was confronted with a dilemma which worries many scholars to-day, namely, whether I should continue my studies in spite of this handicap or stop altogether. Finally I decided that I would try to get a result by using what was available to me and adding material which I collected myself. This led to what I consider as a result worth while to be submitted as a basis of discussion. The professors Matsunami Seiren and Hayashi Kemmyō kindly sent me reprints of their papers.<br> The present state of the discussion may in short be characterized as follows. The traditional view that (1) the ''Śāstra'' is a translation of a Sanskrit original and (2) that the translator is Paramārtha, is now generally abandoned'"`UNIQ--ref-00000E82-QINU`"'). It is also known that the ''lntroduction'' is forged.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000E83-QINU`"') It is further known that the Sanskrit text translated by Śikṣānanda was itself a translation from the extant Chinese version'"`UNIQ--ref-00000E84-QINU`"'). If so much is accepted, early doubts of Chinese Buddhists concerning the ''Śāstra'' gain weight'"`UNIQ--ref-00000E85-QINU`"').<br> Hui-chün, an early seventh century witness, in the passage quoted above p. 156 note 4, speaks of "former" Dāśabhūmikas who forged the ''Śraddhotpāda''. Chi-tsang (549-623) blames Dāśabhūmikas "of a former generation"
that they mistook the eighth ''vijñāna'' for Buddha-nature (T. vol. 34 380 b 20 f.). In another place he speaks of "old" Dāśabhūmikas (T. vol. 42 104 c 7). This implies that we have to distinguish between late Dāśabhūmikas (after the arrival of the ''Mahāyāna-saṁgraha'') and early ones (the first and second generations after the translators of the ''Daśabhūmika Śāstra'')'"`UNIQ--ref-00000E86-QINU`"') . Among them, those who belonged to the early generation are said to have forged the ''Śraddhotpāda Śāstra'''"`UNIQ--ref-00000E87-QINU`"').<br> Tokiwa believes in a Chinese author who mainly relied on the ''Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra'' both translations of which (Sung and Wei) he amalgamated. This may be correct though I could not find allusions peculiar to Guṇabhadra's (Sung) translation.<br> Mochizuki has proved that the Chinese author was acquainted not only with the ''Laṅkāvatāra'' but with several other texts. He proposes as author T'an-tsun, a disciple of Fa-shang who dictated the ''Śāstra'' to his disciple T'an -ch'ien. See below p. 160.<br> Hayashi Kemmyō, has traced material in Liang Wu-ti's writings and the ''Pao-tsang lun''. Liang Wu-ti believed in immortal souls'"`UNIQ--ref-00000E88-QINU`"'). The ''Śraddhotpāda Śāstra'' contains nothing of that sort. Though influence from that side cannot be excluded, I do not feel this material to be significant enough to permit us to place the author in the South.<br> Matsunami Seiren believes in Aśvaghoṣa if not as author yet as the spiritual father of the ''Śraddhotpāda''. I have compared his quotations from the ''Sauṇdarānanda Kāvya'' etc . which are interesting. But I think we might consider as established that the author of the ''Śraddhotpāda Śāstra'' was a Chinese and work upon that assumption'"`UNIQ--ref-00000E89-QINU`"'). Besides, the main tenets of the ''Śāstra'' have not been found in the ''Kāvya''.<br> I pass by other theories of which I have only heard . Scholars are searching in all directions and undoubtedly will find material unknown to me which will throw even more light on the intricate problem of our text. Meanwhile I shall consider as established that the ''Śāstra'' was composed by an early Dāśabhūmika and limit my investigation to the question who this person was. (Liebenthal, "New Light on the Mahāyāna-Śraddhotpāda Śāstra," 155–58)
