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This teaching on “The Sky Dragon's Profound Roar,” by Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche was generously given in response to a special request for teachings by the Nalandabodhi Sangha on October 10, 1999, on the campus of Naropa University in Boulder, Colorado. Ari Goldfield served as Rinpoche’s translator. Edited by Cindy Shelton and Amita Gupta, with assistance by Meg Miller. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>The ''Sutra of Liberation and Breaking the Attributes of the Mind through the Wisdom Stored in the Ocean of Buddha-nature'' (''Foxinghai zang zhihui jietuo po xinxiang jing'' 佛性海藏智慧解脫破心相經; hereafter: ''Sutra on the Wisdom Stored in the Ocean of Buddha-nature'') is a Chinese apocryphal scripture whose origin is still obscure. For a long time, the sutra was thought to be missing. Following the discovery of the Dunhuang 敦煌 manuscripts and the stone sutras in the Grove of the Reclining Buddha (Wofoyuan 臥佛院; hereafter: the Grove), an overall version of the text can now be restored.<br> The sutra, consisting of two scrolls, is included in the ''Taishō'' edition in the volume on the “sutras in Dunhuang manuscripts whose origins are in doubt 敦煌寫本類疑似部”. The version in the Grove is an incomplete engraving of the first scroll of the sutra. For reasons that still await clarification, the text on wall e in cave 46 reads from left to right. It is preceded on wall d by scroll 22 of the ''Nirvana Sutra'', and followed on wall f by the ''Diamond Sutra''. Neither the author nor the translator of this scripture is mentioned in the Dunhuang and the Grove versions. (Shih-Chung, introductory remarks, 101) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
Until now several scholars have dealt with Tibetan texts of the manuscript collection of Tabo monastery in Spiti District, Himachal Pradesh, India.[1] With this short contribution I would like to throw light on the Tabo fragments of one of the Tibetan translations of the ''Tathāgatagarbhasūtra'', in Tibetan ''De bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po'i mdo''. l shall focus on the textual characteristics and the relation of the Tabo fragments to the versions of the sūtra contained in the other main Kanjurs. It is strictly to be kept in mind that all conclusions drawn from the presentation of the material and its evaluation can only claim validity for the ''De bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po'i mdo''. My conclusions are not meant to provide a characterization of the
Tabo Kanjur in general. Though, regarding the position of the manuscript in the general, Kanjur stemma, there seem to be certain tendencies common to all the texts of the Kanjur found in Tabo and analysed until now, each work should be seen as an individual case. Only when a sufficient number of studies will have been executed and will repeatedly confirm the results shall we be able to draw conclusions of a more general nature. (Zimmermann, introductory remarks, 177)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#See the studies in ''East and West'' 44–1, 1994, and SCHERRER-SCHAUB / STEINKELLNER 1999; further PAGEL 1999: 165–210. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
I understand the phrase 'tathagata-garbhaḥ' as the womb that gives birth to tathāgatas, the womb for tathāgatas, which is a conclusion I have arrived by taking into consideration the contents of scriptures down to the ''Laṅkāvatāra sūtra'', as well as the latter's expression, 'garbhas-tathāgatānām' (VI k. la).<br> Previously I understood the phrase (t. g.) as tathāgata abiding in the womb, which now I find inappropriate because it does not cover the whole phrase, the key-point of which is that the womb is empty of the thick coverings of kleśas.<br> For the understanding of the phrase t. g. I went through Śākyamuni's life-stories like the ''Mahāvastu'' (MV) and the ''Lalitavistara'' (LV), the Māyā chapter of the ''Gaṇḍavyūha'' (GV), the ''Śūraṃgama-samādhi sūtra'' (sss), the ''Tathāgata-garbha sūtra'' (TG), the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra'' of mahāyāna (MPN), the ''Śrīmālādevi-siṃhanāda sūtra'' (SM), and the ''Laṅkāvatāra sūtra'' (LS). Now I am certain that it constitutes the core of the philosophy of religion of Buddhism. (Tokiwa, preliminary remarks, 13) +
Articles/The Tathāgatagarbha Theory Reconsidered: Reflections on Some Recent Issues in Japanese Buddhist Studies +
The Tathāgatagarbha theory is an influential yet controversial part of the Buddhist tradition. This essay examines some of the issues related to this tradition that have been discussed recently by Buddhist scholars: the ''dhātu-vāda'' thesis and the critique of “original enlightenment,” the relationship between the terms ''tathāgatagarbha'' and ''padmagarbha'', the interpretation of dependent origination in the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'', the role of relics worship in the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra'', and the Tathāgatagarbha theory in Tibetan Buddhism. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
. . . We may conclude the characteristics of the TG [tathāgatagarbha] theory in this sūtra in the following way.
1) The biggest contribution of the MPS [''Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra''] to the history of the TG theory is the establishment of the concept of ''buddhadhātu'' as explaining the nature of ''tathāgatagarbha''. This ''dhātu'' concept as showing the essence or nature common to ''sattvas'' and the Tathāgata seems to be introduced by the AAN [''Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa''], but the MPS, succeeding the AAN, utilized it in its full scope, in which are involved various other meanings of the term ''dhātu'' developed in Buddhism, such as relic of the Buddha, the 18 component elements, the 4 gross elements, sphere of the dharma, the essence of dharmas (e.g. the ''tathāgatakāya'' is not (consisting) of elements of collected materials (''bsags paḥi khams''), but of the essence of the dharma (''chos kyi khams'') (L. 110a1–2). It suggests that '' 'dharmakāya' '' is '' 'dharmadhātu-kāya' ''), the word root, etc.
2) The most unique expression of this sūtra with respect to the TG is the ''ātman'', which is regarded as a sort of taboo in Buddhism*. Connotation of this term in the text is completely identical with ''dhātu''.
3) Inspite of the use of such an abstract concept, the MPS is far from systematization of the theory, in comparison with the AAN and the ŚMS [''Śrītmalasūtra'']. Especially the relationship between ''tathāgatagarbha'' and ''dharmakāya'', problem of the pure mind and the defilements, etc. are not discussed explicitly as in the SMS. In this respect, I hesitate a bit to suppose the date of the MPS as coming after the ŚMS.
4) Inspite of frequent references to the ''icchantika'', the term ''agotra'' is not used. In general, the ''gotra'' concept is lacking in the MPS. This point is common to the AAN, and the ŚMS. (Takasaki, section 6, 9–10)
[https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/ibk1952/19/2/19_2_1024/_pdf/-char/en Read more here . . .]
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
In his comprehensive study of the development of the ''tathāgatagarbha'' teaching, J. Takasaki also deals with the sūtra which bears the name of this Mahāyāna philosophical current.[1] The ''Tathāgatagarbhasūtra'' (''TGS'') has generally been referred to as the earliest expression of this doctrine and the term ''tathāgatagarbha'' itself seems to have been coined by this very sūtra. In this paper I intend to introduce the textual history and doctrinal content of the ''TGS'' and offer some speculations concerning the possible motivations lying behind its compilation. By pointing out some interesting parallels concerning the structure and formulations in the ''Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra'' (''SP''), I shall then suggest that the ''SP'' and the ''TGS'' carry a similar compositional line. Finally, I shall determine the position and role of the ''TGS'' in Mahāyāna Buddhism as a sūtra presupposing the doctrine of the ''SP'' and providing its metaphysical foundation. (Zimmermann, introductory remarks, 143–44)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Jikidō Takasaki 高崎直道, ''Nyoraizō shisō no keisei (Formation of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory)'', Tokyo 1974 (Shunjū-sha): pp. 40–68. +
Articles/The Tathāgatôtpattisaṃbhava-nirdeśa of the Avataṃsaka and the Ratnagotravibhāga, with Special Reference to the Term Tathāgata-gotra-saṃbhava +
No abstract given. Here is the first relevant paragraph: <br><br>
The point now I am going to express here is the discovery of the use of a compound noun ' ''tathāgata-gotra-saṃbhava'' ' in the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra), which seems to be the Sanskrit original for '如來性起', one of the important terms in the philosophy of the Hua-yen (華嚴) Sect of Chinese Buddhism, but is actually not found in the Avataṃsaka, the basic scripture for that sect. (Takasaki, para. 1, 48)<br><br>
[https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/ibk1952/7/1/7_1_348/_pdf/-char/en Read more here . . . ] +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Hardly any Sanskrit manuscripts of Buddhist scriptures remain in India today, even though such manuscripts have been discovered in surrounding regions. Tibet in particular is one of the richest treasuries of precious Sanskrit manuscripts from as early as the 8th century. These became widely known to the scholarly world in the 1930s thanks to discoveries by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana (1893-1963) in monasteries of Tsang (Tib. gTsang) province, in the Western part of Central Tibet. He had little success, however, in accessing Sanskrit manuscripts in monasteries of Ü (Tib. dBus) province, in the Eastern part of the Central Tibet among which Retreng (Tib. Rwa sgreng) monastery[1] was especially famous for its rare manuscript collection. Retreng, the former centre of the Kadam tradition located about 120 km to the Northwest of Lhasa, was founded by Dromtön Gyalwe jungne (Tib. 'Brom ston rGyal ba'i 'byung
gnas, 1008-1064) in 1056. The aim of the present paper is to trace the Sanskrit
manuscript collection once preserved at Retreng monastery by focusing on the transmission of individual manuscripts, and in the process to shed light on one historical aspect of Indo-Tibetan cross-cultural exchanges.
In the following, I shall (1) sketch the challenges faced by explorers trying to access the manuscript collection of Retreng monastery in the early 20th century, and then try to (2) trace the origin of the collection in Tibetan historical sources, (3) collect references to the manuscripts belonging to the collection, (4) draw up a title list of scriptural texts contained in it, (5) trace and identify its current location, and finally (6) evaluate the historicity of Atiśa's ownership of the manuscripts. (Kano, preliminary remarks, 82–83)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#For historical sources on Retreng, see Kano, "Rāhula," 123, n. 1. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>Philosophical discourse on Buddhist soteriology––theoretically coherent ways of talking, writing, and thinking about how to transcend suffering––is structured around the metaphor of “the path” on which a person may move along a spiritual trajectory that is, in the end, removed from the otherwise unavoidable suffering of conditioned existence. Within the Mahāyāna tradition of Buddhism, “practicing the Buddhist path” means changing from an ordinary person naturally mired in suffering into an enlightened buddha, a being composed of perfect wisdom and compassion. At the heart of this idea is a paradox playing an important role in Buddhist intellectual history: if an ordinary being is conditioned by nature, and this conditioning constitutes a state of suffering, how is it that this conditioned state of bondage can transform into the unconditioned state of freedom and enlightenment of a buddha? Resolving the apparent contradiction at the heart of this essential Buddhist teaching is “buddha-nature,” a term used to describe the basic potential said to be inherent within all beings. It is our buddha-nature, then, that makes it possible to be transformed by the path from an ordinary person into an enlightened buddha.
Within Buddhist intellectual culture, philosophers have made good use of the ambiguities connected the concept of buddha-nature to foster one of the most important sites of philosophical discourse within the Buddhist religion. The premium on rational coherence in Buddhist philosophy means interested theorists must consider whether, and to what degree, over-emphasis on the distinction between the unenlightened being and the enlightened ''buddha'' evinces a unbridgeable gap; or whether over-emphasis on the immanence of enlightenment within an ordinary being—often spoken of in genealogical or genetic terms––collapses the foundational path/fruition distinction thus rendering the notion of the path meaningless. These issues have been central to Mahāyāna for more than one thousand years; and they form the backdrop to Tsering Wangchuk’s recently published study of the Tibetan reception and interpretation of one seminal Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist treatise on the topic, ''The Uttaratantra in the Land of Snows: Tibetan Thinkers Debate the Centrality of the Buddha-Nature Treatise''.
[https://readingreligion.org/books/uttaratantra-land-snows Read more here . . .]
The word ''Tathagata'' means "he who has come in the manner in which he has come". Primarily, therefore, the word refers to a manifestation of the Buddha-principle. But, since, in the Greater Vehicle generally, phenomena are merely the phenomenalization of the Noumenon, the word refers to the Buddha-principle as well. ([https://search.informit.org/doi/pdf/10.3316/informit.676613417735334?download=true Source Accessed Aug 2, 2023]) +
It's not night, yet it’s so dark down where she is that if she were to hold up her hand in front of her face, only the light of her lamp would help her recognize her palm, the line she has followed down, and not much else. It's dark, and freezing, and though the light wetsuit she wears offers little protection against the cold, she doesn't feel it. Rather, she’s not aware of the cold, nor of time, or space. She doesn’t remember, she doesn’t think, she doesn't anticipate. All she knows is the weight of water. All she feels is its vastness and the blessed respite it gives her from her life above.
As she descends, the pressure of the ocean squeezes her lungs, the corresponding lack of air in them making her body heavier. This is how the ocean pulls her into its depths. This is how she lets it, not moving a single muscle, yet flying through the water in a perfect free fall. It’s not until she turns to begin her ascent that she exerts effort. She begins a slow and graceful dolphin kick that undulates through her body all the way to the tips of her fingers stretched overhead until, just before she reaches the surface, she lowers one hand and lets the last bit of momentum propel her back into the world of air and light.
She takes a breath, her first in a while, looks around, then briefly closes her eyes, the silence below already calling to her again. Nowhere else does she know this depth of quiet. Nowhere else does she feel so irrevocably, so unquestionably right. It's only in this world between two breaths where she knows herself as she really is: indivisible from water and everything that surrounds her. It's only in this world where she knows, without question, she is perfect, and whole.
I do not free dive. Or rather, I don't free dive in the ocean, although the concept fascinates me. It's not the length of time that some of these athletes spend under water that impresses me most (over ten minutes in some cases), or the depth they reach (almost 370 feet). What draws me to this art is the necessary focus and surrender and utter commitment to stillness it requires. After all, these are the same qualities needed to execute a different kind of plunge: the dive into awakening or the realization of our true nature.
Both as a water lover and as a meditator, I well understand the allure of the depths—the place where there's no sound, no thing; where there's nothing but being, and that, only faintly. That's why, for me, the figure of the free diver so perfectly captures the "immersion" we undergo in deep meditation. But I believe the metaphor becomes truly perfect in the instant when the diver breaks the surface of the water and is held suspended for a moment in both worlds: ocean and air—and by extension land and all it contains—or, in Buddhist terms, absolute and relative. ''That's'' the moment in which we realize our buddhanature. ([https://www.lionsroar.com/the-world-between-breaths/ Read more here])
Wǒn Buddhism is a new Buddhism created in Korea by Pak Chungbin (1891-1943) in 1916. In this piece, I offer a short introduction to the Wǒn Buddhist renovation of the traditional Buddhism and a translation of sections of ''Treatise on the Renovation of Korean Buddhism'' (韓國佛敎革新論) which emphasized the importance of Buddhism's engagement with the general public. One effort Wǒn Buddhism made for that purpose was to replace the traditional Buddha statue with a symbol of a circle so that people would not idolize the Buddha. Wǒn Buddhism is still active both in and outside of Korea. +
There were two main streams in Yogācāra Buddhism. On the one hand, there was the Old School of Sthiramati and Paramārtha. On the other hand, there was the New School of Dharmapāla and Hsuan Tsang. Due to the work of Yoshifumi Ueda and Gadjin Nagao in Japan, the distinction between Paramārtha and the Fahsiang School has been to a large extent clarified. The difference between their doctrines on Buddha-nature has been, however, relatively neglected by modern scholarship. This paper aims to clarify the distinction between Paramārtha and the Fa-hsiang's doctrines of Buddha-nature. Following Ueda, this paper will also differentiate Paramārtha's doctrine of Buddha-nature from the doctrine of the tathāgatagarbha presented in the Awakening of Faith. Especially, we will see that Buddha-nature in the Awakening of Faith and the Fa-hsiang School are committed to a version of essentialism. Finally, it will discern some interesting parallels between Paramārtha's doctrine and the perfect teachings of T'ien T'ai Buddhism. +
Articles/The Yogācārā and Mādhyamika Interpretations of the Buddha-nature Concept in Chinese Buddhism +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The idea of Buddha-nature was first made popular in China in the early fifth century with the translation of the Mahāyāna ''Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra'' (hereafter cited as ''MNS''),[1] and since then, it has remained one of the central themes of Chinese Buddhist thought. Already in the fifth and early sixth centuries, a wide variety of theories on the Buddha-nature had begun to appear, but extant information about them remains scanty and scattered.[2] It is in the writings of Ching-ying Hui-yüan (523–592),[3] the Yogācārin, and in Chi-tsang (549–623), the Mādhyamika, that we find the earliest available full-scale treatments of the subject. Hui-yüan and Chi-tsang hold a number of views in common with respect to the question of Buddha -nature:<br>
Nevertheless, given their very different theoretical upbringings and doctrinal affiliations, it is inevitable that they would carry to their explanations of the Buddha-nature concept some of the basic principles and assumptions of their respective philosophical traditions. In examining and comparing the Buddha-nature teachings of Hui-yüan and Chi-tsang our present study attempts to show how the Buddha-nature concept has come to assume divergent significances when read in the context of the two main streams of thought in Mahāyāna Buddhism: Yogācāra and Mādhyamika. (Liu, "The Yogācāra and Mādhyamika Interpretations of the Buddha-nature Concept in Chinese Buddhism," 171)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#For discussions of the leaching of Buddha-nature in the ''Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra'' (Hereafter cited as ''MNS''), consult Mou Tsung-san, ''Fo-hsing yü pan-jo'', (Taipei, 1977), vol. 1. pp. 179–182 and 189–216; and Ming-Wood Liu, "The Doctrine of the Buddha-nature in the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra," ''Journal of the lnternational Association of Buddhist Studies'' 5. no. 2 (1982): 63–94; hereafter cited as Liu, "Doctrine."
#On the early Chinese Buddha-nature theories, refer 10 Fuse Kōgaku. ''Nehanshū no kenkyū'', 2nd ed. (Tokyo, 1973), vol. 2; T'ang Yung-t'ung, ''Han Wei Liang-Chin Nan-pai-ch'ao fo-chiao shih'', 2d ed. (Peking, 1963), pp . 677–717: Mou Tsung-san, ''Fo-hsing yü pan-jo'', pp. 182–189; and Whalen Lai, "Sinitic Speculations on Buddha-nature: The Nirvāṇa School." ''Philosophy East & West'' 32, no. 2 (April 1982): 135–149.
#Posterity often refers to Hui-yüan as "Hui-yüan of the Ching-ying Temple," in order to avoid confusion with the famous Hui-Yüan of Lu-shan (344–416).
#Hui-yuan regards the idea of Buddha-nature as the fundamental principle of the one vehicle teaching. See ''Ta-ch'eng i-chang'' (''Essentials of the Mahāyāna,'' hereafter cited as ''Essentials''). Takakusu Junjirō and Watenabe Kaikyokū, eds., ''Taishō shinshū daizōkyō'', 85 vols. (Tokyo. 1924–1934), vol. 44. p. 649a. 11.27– 28, hereafter cited as T. Chi-tsang also mentions the Buddha-nature as the most important issue of the Buddha Dharma. See ''Sheng-man-ching pao-k'u, T. vol. 37. p. 85a, 1.27.
#Both Hui-yuan and Chi-tsang have compiled commentaries on the ''MNS''. Refer to the lists of works of the two masters in Ōchō Enichi, ''Chūgoku bukkyō no kenkyü'', vol. 3 (Kyoto, 1979), pp. 153–1§4. As we shall see, a large pan of their expositions of the Buddha-nature are presented as exegeses of key passages on the subject in the ''MNS''.
#Refer to ''Essentials, T''. vol. 44. p. 477c, and Chi-tsang's ''Sheng-man-ching pao=k'u'', ''T'', vol. 37, p. 67 a–b. and ''Chung-kuan-lun su'', ''T''. vol. 42. p. 153c.
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
. . . We observe that in the non-dualist philosophy of the Uttaratantra only one ontological entity, that is, the Cosmical Body of the Buddha is recognised. The substratum of everything that exists is this Essence of the Buddha. The phenomenal nature does not really exist. It appears to exist due to the force of Transcendental Illusion. Absolute Monism is also the foundation of Modern Science. What really exists is Consciousness alone which has no plural. The plurality of the cosmos is only apparent, illusory. (Goswami, concluding remarks, 281–82) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS[1]
The theory of “Buddha Nature” or tathāgatagarbha (henceforth TG)[2] formed an important school of thought in Mahāyāna Buddhism and continues to enjoy popularity in some circles even today, although it has been dismissed by some scholars as non-Buddhist.[3] It has drawn the attention of several scholars. On the Tibetan front, David Seyfort Ruegg has through a series of publications greatly contributed to the understanding of the TG theory, particularly that of the dGe-lugs-pa tradition. A number of studies devoted to the TG theory from the perspective of the exponents of the gźan stoṅ (“extrinsic emptiness”)[4] theory have also appeared in recent years.[5] However, much remains to be explored in the works of various Tibetan authors of different traditions and periods.
One important Tibetan interpretation of TG that has been ignored so far is that of the rÑiṅ-ma school. The little attention it has received is in the context of studies pertaining to the Tibetan Madhyamaka and rDzogs-chen doctrines.[6] Can one, however, speak of a single rÑiṅ-ma interpretation of TG without the risk of oversimplification? Admittedly, not all rÑiṅ-ma scholars interpreted TG in the same way. They may differ in their erudition, style of interpretation and emphasis according to the particular time and place in which they lived. Even one and the same scholar may interpret it differently in different works, or even in different passages of the same work. Nevertheless, despite the differences in details within the various schools of Tibetan Buddhism, each of them, including the rÑiṅ-ma school, has, in my opinion, its own few archetypical intellectual figures who shape, lead and represent their respective traditions, and whose positions agree at least in substance if not always in every detail. And thus later rÑiṅ-ma-pas consider Roṅzom-pa (eleventh century), Kloṅ-chen-pa (1308-1363) and Mi-pham (1846-1912) as their three archetypical intellectual models, and their interpretations of a given doctrine as the “official” rÑiṅ-ma position.[7]
Before examining their views, I would like to briefly discuss how some of the leading rÑiṅ-ma scholars – whose interpretations of the TG doctrine are considered authoritative for the rÑiṅ-ma school – are portrayed in some secondary literature. Of the major rÑiṅ-ma scholars, Roṅ-zom-pa has been presented as clearly preferring Yogācāra–Madhyamaka by Georges Dreyfus,[8] apparently following John Pettit who merely states that Roṅ-zom-pa in his Grub mtha’i brjed byaṅ suggests that the Yogācāra–Madhyamaka is “more important” (don che ba).[9] What the closing phrase of the pertinent statement by Roṅ-zom-pa actually says is: “The treatise [or position] of Yogācāra–Madhyamaka appears (snaṅ) to be more significant.”[10] The statement gives Roṅ-zompa’s personal opinion about the then prevalent two Madhyamaka systems (i.e., Sautrāntika–Madhyamaka and Yogācāra–Madhyamaka) and not his doctrinal affiliation.[11] Kloṅ-chen-pa and Mi-pham have been portrayed as exponents of the gźan stoṅ theory. For example, according to Samten Karmay, Kloṅ-chen-pa’s stance on the TG theory is identical to that of Dol-po-pa’s.[12] Similarly, David Germano (apparently following S.K. Hookham) describes Kloṅ-chen-pa’s comments regarding the doctrine of emptiness and TG as “fairly typical” of the gźan stoṅ concepts in Tibet.[13] These scholars’ impressions are not altogether unjustified because Kloṅ-chen-pa’s evaluation of TG prima facie looks so positive that one might assume it to be identical with that of Dol-popa’s. Even amongst the traditional Tibetan scholars there were figures like Koṅ-sprul who preferred to place Kloṅ-chen-pa and Karma-pa Raṅ-byuṅ-rdo-rje (1284-1339) in the group of gźan stoṅ exponents.[14} This doctrinal agenda is still continued by living Tibetan exponents of the gźan stoṅ doctrine. A few modern scholars have designated Mi-pham as an exponent of the gźan stoṅ theory as well. However, a closer look reveals that in most cases, it is the terminology that has led to this determination; that is, the term gźan stoṅ has not necessarily been used by these scholars in a strict technical sense. One author who seems to consciously seek to prove Mi-pham a gźan stoṅ exponent is Paul Williams.[15] Leading rÑiṅ-ma teachers of more recent times have also been presented as proponents of the gźan stoṅ theory. Cyrus Stearns’ The Buddha from Dolpo, which greatly contributes to the understanding of Dol-po-pa’s life and thoughts, tends to oversimplify the rÑiṅ-ma explanation of the TG theory. For instance, Stearns, relying on verbal communication with sDe-gźung Rin-po-che (1906-1987), maintains that rÑiṅ-ma teachers such as bDud-’joms Rin-po-che (1904-1987) and Dilmgo mKhyen-brtse (1910-1991) were proponents of the gźan stoṅ doctrine.[16] I am not aware of any textual evidence that would suggest that these teachers were proponents of the gźan stoṅ doctrine, at least not in Dol-po-pa’s sense. Both bDud-’joms Rin-po-che and Dil-mgo mKhyenbrtse, in fact, speak about the oneness of emptiness and appearance or the compatibility of the Middle and Last Cycles of Buddha’s teachings.[17]
One notices a general tendency among modern scholars to associate, in addition to the above-mentioned rÑiṅ-ma teachers, rÑiṅ-ma doctrines with gźan stoṅ teachings.[18] These scholars can be grouped into three: (a) those who are obviously predisposed to the gźan stoṅ theory, (b) those who are opposed to the gźan stoṅ doctrine and (c) those who are too generous with the use of the term gźan stoṅ.[19] One of the reasons why the rÑiṅ-ma position on TG has remained somewhat elusive appears to be the complexity of the matter itself which forbids a simplistic expression of it in terms of raṅ stoṅ or gźan stoṅ. In the following passages, I shall present (a) the early Tibetan background of the TG theory, (b) a brief historical sketch and (c) a general profile of the rÑiṅ-ma interpretation of the TG doctrine, and (d) finally my assessment of the rÑiṅ-ma stance on the TG theory in India and Tibet,19 and thereby demonstrate how complex and distinctive the rÑiṅ-ma interpretation of TG actually is. Nonetheless, although I shall strive to describe their interpretation accurately, some of my observations will remain tentative. It is, however, not my intention to discuss here whether the rÑiṅ-ma interpretation is in keeping with the TG theory as originally conceived in India.
[https://www.academia.edu/471582/Wangchuk_2004_The_r%C3%91i%E1%B9%85-ma_Interpretations_of_the_Tath%C4%81gatagarbha_Theory._Wiener_Zeitschrift_f%C3%BCr_die_Kunde_S%C3%BCdasiens_48_pp._171_213_appeared_in_2005_?source=swp_share Read More Online...]
<h5>Notes</h5>
#This article is a revised and enlarged version of the paper presented at the Tenth Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies (6th-12th September 2003) held in Oxford. I owe my gratitude to a number of individuals who contributed in different ways to bringing this article to its present form. I am grateful to my wife Orna Almogi (University of Hamburg) for painstakingly going through this article at its various stages of writing. I also owe my thanks to Prof. Lambert Schmithausen (University of Hamburg), Prof. Karin Preisendanz (University of Vienna) and Dr. Anne MacDonald (University of Vienna) for their valuable suggestions. I would also like to thank Prof. David Jackson (University of Hamburg) for going through an earlier version of this article. My thanks also go to Kazuo Kano (University of Hamburg) for his proof-reading of the final version.I am, of course, solely responsible for the content of the article.
#See Michael Zimmermann’s recent study of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, the earliest exposition on Buddha Nature in India, where he presents a detailed discussion of the term tathāgatagarbha (Zimmermann 2002: 39-50). Note that I use Tathāgatagarbhasūtra as a proper noun referring to this particular sūtra and TG sūtra as a common noun referring to a sūtra which deals primarily with the tathāgatagarbha doctrine.
#Some modern Japanese scholars have openly dismissed the TG theory as non-Buddhist, an issue which lies outside my present topic. For some details, see Zimmermann 2002: 82-84.
#A tradition may for polemical reasons label a rival tradition as a proponent of gźan stoṅ (“extrinsic emptiness”) or raṅ stoṅ (“intrinsic emptiness”). However, as suggested in Kapstein 2000: 121, it would be, from a methodological point of view, sensible to refrain from using labels such as gźan stoṅ and raṅ stoṅ unless a given tradition prefers to use one of these terms to describe its own conception of emptiness. Furthermore, since we tend to be too generous with the use of the terms raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ, I would like to make clear from the very outset how rÑiṅma scholars understand these terms. For them, a given “x” (no matter what) is said to be raṅ stoṅ if it cannot withstand (bzod pa) the logical analysis of Madhyamaka reasoning. A given “x” that can withstand such a scrutiny, which is for them an impossibility, would imply its “true or hypostatic existence” (bden par grub pa). Please note that my translation of the technical term bden par grub pa or bden grub is based on Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 37 where it is explained as “a permanent substantial entity established ‘in truth’, i.e., hypostatically (bden par grub pa).” See also Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 320 and Seyfort Ruegg 2002: 296, Indices, s.v. bden grub. Hence, if the logical analysis of Madhyamaka reasoning is applied, for example, on a cow or TG, neither of them will be able to withstand the force of logical analysis. A single case of “hypostatic existence” would be sufficient to cause the collapse of the entire Madhyamaka system. Thus, from the perspective of such a scrutiny, a given “x” is always raṅ stoṅ. Further, if a given “x” is empty of a numerically different given “y,” then “x” is said to be gźan stoṅ. In this sense, a given “x” is always empty of “y” and hence always gźan stoṅ. For example, a cow is always empty of a bull and so is TG empty of adventitious impure phenomena of saṃsāra. Thus, from this viewpoint, a given “x” can be both raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ. On the other hand, for Dol-po-pa Śes-rab-rgyal-mtshan (1292-1361), the initiator of the gźan stoṅ theory, whether or not “x” is raṅ stoṅ or gźan stoṅ would depend on whether “x” is a conventional phenomenon or absolute reality. If “x” is a conventional phenomenon, it is raṅ stoṅ, and if it is absolute reality, it is gźan stoṅ. Hence, Dol-po-pa uses the expressions kun rdzob raṅ stoṅ or kun rdzob stoṅ ñid and don dam gźan stoṅ or don dam stoṅ ñid (Ri chos, p. 305.8) and states that the banal (tha śal) emptiness (i.e., itaretaraśūnyatā) belittled in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra is neither of the two (ibid., p. 154.15-155.15). In principle, Dol-po-pa could have described this itaretaraśūnyatā (“emptiness of reciprocity”) as kun rdzob gźan stoṅ in opposition to what he called kun rdzob raṅ stoṅ and don dam gźan stoṅ but has apparently, for strategic reasons, refrained from doing so. Designating itaretaraśūnyatā as kun rdzob gźan stoṅ would have been self-defeating because then he would have been forced to concede that there is at least one kind of gźan stoṅ which is unacceptable even by his own standard. Thus, he could consolidate his gźan stoṅ theory by insisting that only the absolute can be gźan stoṅ and only gźan stoṅ can be absolute (ibid., p. 308.12-15).
#See, e.g., Seyfort Ruegg 1963; Broido 1989; Hookham 1991 and 1992; Stearns 1999; Mathes 1998, 2000 and 2002. Note, however, that one may have to be careful not to anachronistically presuppose that one homogenous gźan stoṅ theory existed at every place and time in Tibet (e.g., see the Si tu’i raṅ rnam, p. 266.7-267.2; Smith 2001: 265). In fact, the comparing and contrasting of the various gźan stoṅ interpretations would shed important light on the history of the concept and might contribute to a better understanding of the evolution, continuation and reception of such concepts.
#Kloṅ-chen-pa’s discussion of TG occurring in the seventh chapter of his Tshig don mdzod is assessed in Germano 1992: 77-82. John Pettit published a translation of Mi-pham’s Ṅes śes sgron me and its commentary by ’Khro-chu ’Jam-dpal-rdo-rje (Pettit 1999a) and also included a translation of Mi-pham’s gŹan stoṅ seṅ ge’i ṅa ro, p. 359-378.4. See “The Lion’s Roar Proclaiming Extrinsic Emptiness,” in Pettit 1999a: 415-427. The recent doctoral dissertation by Karma Phuntsho also discusses Mi-pham’s stance on the TG theory (Phuntsho 2003).
#One might ask just how authoritative and representative Roṅ-zom-pa, Kloṅchen-pa and Mi-pham were and are for the rÑiṅ-ma school. Mi-pham himself considered Roṅ-zom-pa and Kloṅ-chen-pa as the most authoritative interpreters of the rÑiṅ-ma doctrine and he saw himself as the follower of the two. See the Dam chos dogs sel, p. 378.5-379.2, the dBu ma rgyan ’grel, p. 42.5, the Ṅes śes sgron me, p. 121.1-2. See also the colophon to his Roṅ zom bla rnal, p. 61.6: mtshuṅs med ma hā paṇḍi ta chen po’i rjes su ’jug par khas ’che ba mi pham rnam par rgyal bas zla tshe bzaṅ po la bris pa dge’o /. The fact that Mi-pham is responsible for the latest systematisation of the rÑiṅ-ma doctrine and that he did so primarily by relying on Roṅ-zom-pa and Kloṅ-chen-pa, is, in my view, sufficient for considering the three as representative and authoritative, as they are indeed perceived by the rÑiṅ-ma tradition today. See also Smith 2001: 16.
#See Dreyfus 2003: 331.
#Pettit 1999a: 90-91, 485, n. 315.
#lTa ba’i brjed byaṅ, p. 11.11-14: dbu ma rnam gñis kun rdzob kyi tshul mi mthun pa la / luṅ daṅ rigs pa gaṅ che ba ni rgyud daṅ mdo sde spyi’i gźuṅ daṅ / rigs pa spyi’i tshul daṅ / dbu ma’i mkhan po gźuṅ phyi mo mdzad pa’i slob dpon klu sgrub daṅ / ārya de ba’i gźuṅ ltar na yaṅ / rnal ’byor spyod pa’i dbu ma’i gźuṅ don che bar snaṅ ṅo /.
#If one wishes to speak about Roṅ-zom-pa’s doctrinal affiliation, then one can safely state that he was, in the first place, affiliated with rDzogs-chen doctrines, and that his method of establishing emptiness is closer to that of the Prāsaṅgika– Madhyamaka than to any other Buddhist system, regardless of whether or how much access he had to Prāsaṅgika texts. This becomes particularly evident in his Theg chen tshul ’jug and was also the impression of some traditional Tibetan scholars such as Mi-pham (see, for example, the Ṅes śes sgron me, p. 75.3-4, the dBu ma rgyan ’grel, p. 309.6-310.1 and the Dam chos dogs sel, p. 378.6) and Blobzaṅ-mdo-sṅags Chos-kyi-rgya-mtsho (1903-1957), a dGe-lugs-cum-rÑiṅ-ma scholar from Khams, who even went on to prove that Roṅ-zom-pa’s view is a Prāsaṅgika view (see the lTa ba’i dris lan, p. 70-71). Whether the Prāsaṅgika–Madhyamaka view was in some form present during the early propagation of Buddhism in Tibet may depend, among other things, on whether Śāntideva was indeed a Prāsaṅgika–Mādhyamika as the Tibetan tradition has perceived him to be.
#See Karmay 1988: 184-185; cf. Kapstein 1992: 23, n. 1.
#See Germano 1992: 78. See also Hookham 1991: 136, 150.
#Śes bya rgya mtsho, p. 567.8-10; Smith 2001: 338, n. 888.
#See Williams 1998 (particularly, p. 199-216). For reviews of Williams 1998, see Kapstein 2000, Tatz 2001: 78-79. A few words should be said here regarding Paul Williams’ study of “auto-perception” (raṅ rig: svasaṃvedana/svasaṃvitti) and his attempt to connect it with the controversial issue of gźan stoṅ. To agree with Mi-pham’s understanding or interpretation of “auto-perception” is one thing and to understand his position accurately is yet another matter. In my view, Williams seems to have missed the point regarding the controversial issue of “auto perception,” particularly in regard to Mi-pham’s stance on this issue. If he had studied Mi-pham’s interpretation of “means of valid cognition” (pramāṇa), he would have seen why the theory of “auto-perception” was crucial for Mi-pham. According to him, the whole theoretical structure of perception and inference developed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti would collapse without the theory of “auto-perception.” Mi-pham insists that as long as one accepts conventional valid cognition (tha sñad tshad ma), one must accept “auto-perception,” at least on the conventional level, just as one accepts “perception of others” (gźan rig). Thus, without a clear concept of Mi-pham’s background and his view on pramāṇa, any study of Mi-pham’s view on “auto-perception” is destined to be less than successful. A proper assessment of Mi-pham’s understanding of Madhyamaka would have revealed that for Mi-pham, there is no phenomenon that can withstand (bzod) the Madhyamaka logical analysis, and this includes “auto-perception.” The Prāsaṅgika–Mādhyamikas (such as Candrakīrti and Śāntideva) do refute the Yogācāra notion of “auto-perception” but, for Mi-pham, this is done so in the context of establishing absolute reality or “that which is free from manifoldness” (niṣprapañca). However, even Prāsaṅgika–Mādhyamikas should, according to Mi-pham, have no problem in accepting “autoperception” on the conventional level, just as they have no problem accepting “perception of others.” For Mi-pham, anything that can be attested by means of conventional valid cognition is acceptable on the conventional level. If a thing is impossible even on the conventional level, then it should be something like a “permanent sound” (sgra rtag pa) or a “rabbit’s horn” (ri boṅ gi rwa). But, for him, neither is “auto-perception” like a “permanent sound” nor did Candrakīrti and Śāntideva consider it to be so. However, Tsoṅ-kha-pa believed that Candrakīrti and Śāntideva held “auto-perception” to be impossible even on the conventional level. This is the point of departure of the actual issue and the controversy took place within the contextual framework of Pramāṇa and Madhyamaka, which were seen by Mi-pham as complementing and strengthening rather than as excluding or nullifying each other. Hence, bringing in rDzogs-chen and gźan stoṅ issues in this context is unwarranted. If Williams had studied rDzogs-chen or the rÑiṅ-ma interpretation of TG, he would have realised that for the rÑiṅ-ma-pas (including Mi-pham), there is a strict distinction between mind (sems) and gnosis (ye śes). The expression so sor raṅ gis rig par bya ba (pratyātmavedanīya) which actually means “accessible to personal experience only” or “to be known directly and introspectively,” an idea also acceptable to Candrakīrti or Śāntideva, has also been taken out of context by Williams. Unless we understand the methods of interpretation systematized by Mi-pham, we will never fully comprehend the way he conceives Pramāṇa, Madhyamaka, TG and rDzogs-chen or his conception of their intricate relationship with one another. And unless we have a clear picture of how Mi-pham understood raṅ rig in these systems, we shall only have a fragmentary and distorted idea of Mi-pham’s stance on raṅ rig.
#See Stearns 1999: 215, n. 137-138.
#bDud-’joms Rin-po-che explicitly states: “Thus, by clinging to and postulating one of the positions of appearance and emptiness, one would not be able to avert the erroneous (lit. “bad”) views that hold on to the extremes. Therefore, it is necessary to properly establish the sphere of reality (dharmadhātu), the union of appearance and emptiness [or] the ultimate [and] actual absolute truth, as the equality of [saṃsāric] existence and [nirvāṇic] calmness” (bsTan pa’i rnam gźag, fol. 109b2-4: des na snaṅ stoṅ gaṅ ruṅ re’i phyogs su źen ciṅ bzuṅ bas ni mthar ’dzin gyi lta ba ṅan pa bzlog mi nus pas / chos dbyiṅs snaṅ stoṅ zuṅ ’jug mthar thug rnam graṅs ma yin pa’i don dam srid źi mñam ñid du legs par gtan la ’bebs dgos śiṅ /). Dil-mgo mKhyen-brtse likewise considers the Middle and Last Cycles as complementary, for he explains absolute reality as “the ultimate of what is to be established in a way that the purports of the Middle and the Last Promulgations become entwined as one and is the finale of the ocean-like systems of sūtra and tantra” (bDud rtsi’i snaṅ ba, fol. 71a6: ’khor lo bar mtha’ dgoṅs pa gcig dril gyis gtan la dbab bya mthar thug pa mdo sṅags grub mtha’ rgya mtsho’i skyel so yin la). See also the Zil gnon dgoṅs gsal (fol. 178a6-b2) where Dil-mgo mKhyen-brtse speaks about the union (zuṅ ’jug) of the “primordial purity” (ka dag), which is equated with “freedom from the eight extremes of manifoldness” (spros pa’i mtha’ brgyad las ’das pa), and the “immanently present” (lhun grub) Buddha bodies (sku) and gnosis (ye śes) constituting the TG, and his ’Jam dpal dgoṅs rgyan (fol. 239a2-b5), where TG (among several other terms) is indicated as a synonym of the emptiness of the Middle Promulgation. See also his rDo rje mdud grol (fol. 136a5-b4 & 150a3-4) where he explains the view of Prāsaṅgika–Madhyamaka in the same way Mi-pham does.
#According to Karmay, who relied on the Italian edition (1973) of The Religions of Tibet, Tucci maintains that the doctrines of rDzogs-chen and of the Jonaṅ-pas were developed from the Hva-śaṅ’s doctrine of TG (see Karmay 1988: 87). This claim, however, does not appear in the later English translation of the book. S.K. Hookham describes rDzogs-chen as typically gźan stoṅ-type teachings and claims that giving it a raṅ stoṅ gloss is the attempt of the present Dalai Lama “to abate the long standing hostility” towards rDzogs-chen and to protect it “from the ravages of the ‘exclusive Rangtongpa’” (Hookham 1991: 16; see also Hookham 1992: 151-152, n. 4). For reviews of Hookham 1991, see Ehrhard 1993 and Griffiths 1993. See also Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 87.
#See, for example, Smith 2001: 231, where it is stated that “Mi pham’s open advocacy of the Gzhan stong was another red cape, and the bulls were not slow to charge,” and ibid., p. 327, n. 788 where both the sToṅ thun seṅ ge’i ṅa ro (p. 563-606.5) and the gŹan stoṅ seṅ ge’i ṅa ro (p. 359-378.4) are said to be works on the gźan stoṅ theory. It is of course true that Mi-pham wrote on the gźan stoṅ theory and even defended it and can be thus called a “gźan stoṅ sympathiser.” He, however, did not consider himself a gźan stoṅ pa (Dam chos dogs sel, p. 378.5-379.1: ñams mtshar tsam du bris pa yin na yaṅ / raṅ bzos bde gśegs dam chos bslad mi ruṅ / ’chal ṅag soṅ na rgyal ba rnams la bśags / raṅ bzos bśad na ci yaṅ zad mtha’ med / bdag la gźan stoṅ sgrub pa’i khur kyaṅ med / roṅ kloṅ rnam gñis klu sgrub gźuṅ daṅ mthun / dman pa bdag kyaṅ rtse gcig der ’dun kyaṅ / ma bris dbaṅ med pha rol tshig gis bskul /). Surprisingly, although the Ṅes śes sgron me is the locus classicus for the rÑiṅ-ma position regarding the issue of raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ, John Pettit, in his study of this work, seems to be uncertain about Mi-pham’s position (Pettit 1999a: 114-124). However, cf. Pettit 1999b.
Articles/The self reflexive awareness in Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology: How can the classical Buddhist science of consciousness enter into a cross cultural dialog with the science of cognition? +
The Tibetan Buddhist presentations of the self reflexive awareness, also
called apperception (Tibetan: rang rig), and the perspectives related to its
systematic training might contribute valuable information about the firstperson
perspective to the science of consciousness. This would bring new
resources to current cognition research while at the same time preserving
valuable aspects of a central factor of the Tibetan cultural heritage, namely
Tibetan Buddhism. +
According to Vajrayana Buddhism, the fast track to awakening is to look directly at your own mind and discover its true nature. Tsoknyi Rinpoche shows us how to experience two of mind’s most profound qualities. +
At first glance, one cannot find any more statements more at odds with each other than the two following emblematic stanzas. Nagarjuna's ''Mulamadhyamakakarika'' XIII.7 says:
:If there were anything nonempty,<br>there'd also be something "empty."<br>There is nothing that is nonempty,<br>so how could there be the empty?
Maitreya's ''Uttaratantra'' I.155 declares:
:The basic element is empty of the adventitious,<br>which has the characteristic of being separable.<br>It is not empty of the unsurpassable attributes,<br>having the characteristic of being inseparable
Let's explore the relationship between these stanzas, which seem to make arguments for what I'll call here "not to be" and "to be." Nagarjuna (considered to have lived during the second century CE) is of course most famous—or notorious—for his Madhyamaka approach of relentlessly nixing all phenomena, including even buddhahood. Most of his lesser-known praises also evidence this approach, discussing familiar notions such as emptiness, nonarising, lack of nature, no-self, and dependent origination. Even the ''Dharmadhatustava'' ("Praise of the Dharmadhatu"), which otherwise presents the ''dharmadhatu'' (in the sense of mind's luminous nature; often used synonymously with buddhanature) in a positive light, clarifies "not to be":
:As the dharmadhatu is not a self,<br>neither any woman nor any man,<br>free of all that could be grasped,<br>how could it be designated "self"?
…
:The dharma purifying mind the best<br>consists of the very lack of a nature
…
:But once we see the double lack of self,<br>the seeds of our existence find their end.
…
:The nonbeing of all beings—<br>this nature is its sphere.
Such verses illustrate the underlying unity of Nagarjuna's thought, as far as emptiness goes, in his Madhyamaka texts and praises.
However, some of Nagarjuna's praises express phenomena's nature and buddhahood in more affirmative terms, supporting "to be," which are absent in Madhyamaka. His ''Niruttarastava'' states:
:Your luminous singular wisdom<br>determines all knowable objects
His ''Niraupamyastava'' says:
:O flawless one, you overcame afflictions<br>at their very roots, their latent tendencies.<br>At the same time you procured the nectar<br>that is the very nature of these afflictions.
…
:Your body is eternal, immutable, peaceful,<br>consisting of the dharma, and victorious.
Nagarjuna's ''Acintyastava'' even uses several terms as synonyms of ultimate reality that have a strong ontological flavor (super "to be"!) and are common in non-Buddhist systems, but also among ''sravakas'' (disciples) and Yogacaras ("yoga practitioners"):
:It is said to be a nature of its own, the primordial nature,<br>true reality, the basic substance, and the real thing too
Nagarjuna's ''Cittavajrastava'' says:
:I pay homage to my own mind,br>that dispels the mind’s oblivion<br>by ridding the mind-sprung web<br>through this very mind as such.
…
:As it is familiarization with the vajra of mind,<br>this is what is designated "supreme awakening."
Such passages are reminiscent of the teachings on buddhanature in Maitreya's ''Uttaratantra''. The clearest example of this approach among Nagarjuna's praises is his ''Dharmadhatustava'', with its many similes of how the ''dharmadhatu''—mind's luminous nature, the sphere of ultimate reality—is obscured, but completely untainted, by adventitious stains and can be revealed. ([https://www.lionsroar.com/to-be-or-not-to-be-be-a-buddha/ Read more here])
