Higgins, D.

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David Higgins

David Higgins received his doctorate from the University of Lausanne, Switzerland in 2012. He subsequently held a position as a Post-doc Research Fellow in the Department of South Asian, Tibetan and Buddhist Studies at the University of Vienna where he explored the relationship between Mahāmudrā and Madhyamaka philosophies in Bka’ brgyud scholasticism during the post-classical period (15th to 16th centuries). His research interests include Indo-Tibetan Buddhist philosophy and epistemology with a particular focus on Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā and Rnying ma Rdzogs chen doctrines and practices. His PhD thesis was published under the title Philosophical Foundations of Classical Rdzogs chen in Tibet: Investigating the Distinction Between Dualistic Mind (sems) and Primordial Knowing (ye shes) (Vienna, WSTB no. 78, 2013). His recent publications include Mahāmudrā and the Middle Way: Post-classical Kagyü Discourses on Mind, Emptiness and Buddha Nature (Vienna, WSTB no. 90, 2016, 2 vols.) and Buddha Nature Reconsidered: The Eighth Karma pa’s Middle Path (Vienna, WSTB, forthcoming, 2 vols.), both of which were co-authored with Martina Drazczyk. (Source Accessed July 22, 2020)

8 Library Items

Article
*Bodhigarbha: Preliminary Notes on an Early Dzokchen Family of Buddha-Nature Concepts
It has recently been alleged by scholars of the Tibetan "Ancient" (rnying ma) tradition that although buddha-nature theory was well known in Tibet from as early as the eighth century, it played quite an insignificant role in early Nyingma exegesis.[1] I intend in this chapter to challenge this assertion by demonstrating that buddha-nature concepts played a highly significant part in Dzokchen thought during the so-called early diffusion (snga dar) period, albeit mostly in the form of autochthonous *bodhigarbha (byang chub snying po) or bodhi-nature concepts rather than their well-known Indian counterpart tathāgatagarbha[2] (de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po), as well as the as yet unattested but virtually synonymous *sugatagarbha[3] (bde bar gshegs pa'i snying po), which are both usually translated as buddha-nature. Although this family of terms is widespread in preclassical Dzokchen exegesis and therefore of inestimable importance for understanding the early development of buddha-nature theories in Tibet, it has hitherto received no attention in contemporary Buddhist studies. In determining the reasons for the obvious predilection for this indigenous family of buddha-nature concepts from the eighth to eleventh centuries, my aim is to clarify how bodhi-nature was understood by early Dzokchen authors, why it was distinguished from mainstream Mahāyāna-based buddha-nature concepts, and how it eventually became overshadowed by these latter during the classical period (13th–14th c.) as Indian non-tantric buddha-nature theories and controversies took center stage.[4] It is hoped that this short survey of Dzokchen bodhi-nature ideas and their cultural milieu will fill some gaps in our still fragmentary understanding of the origins of Tathāgatagarbha theory in Tibet. At the very least, it will show that a decidedly affirmative indigenous current of buddha-nature teachings flourished in Tibet several centuries prior to the ascendancy of the New (gsar ma) traditions and their polemically heated debates over rangtong (rang stong) and zhentong (gzhan stong) interpretations of buddha-nature. (Higgins, "*Bodhigarbha," 29)
Higgins, David. "*Bodhigarbha: Preliminary Notes on an Early Dzokchen Family of Buddha-Nature Concepts." In The Other Emptiness: Rethinking the Zhentong Buddhist Discourse in Tibet, edited by Michael R. Sheehy and Klaus-Dieter Mathes, 29–52. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2019.
Book
Buddha Nature Reconsidered
This is David Higgins and Martina Draszczyk's second book together and comes out of their first study, Mahāmudrā And The Middle Way. In their follow up they have delivered another two volumes on the writings of the Eighth Karmapa Mikyö Dorje (1507-1554) and his nuanced approach to the intricacies of the buddha-nature debate. It is an approach that combines the yogic sensibilities of Mahāmudrā with the dialectic approach of the Madhyamaka, which, according to the authors, Mikyö Dorje characterizes as the Yuganaddha-Apratiṣṭhāna-Madhyamaka (zung ’jug rab tu mi gnas pa’i dbu ma), that is, as a “Nonfoundational (or Nonabiding) Middle Way consisting in Unity.” As the authors explain, "This nomenclature tells us much about the central philosophical aims and presuppositions of the Eighth Karma pa and his Karma bka’ brgyud tradition. As a Mahāmudrā proponent, Mi bskyod rdo rje gives primacy to innate modes of being and awareness, such as coemergent wisdom or buddha nature naturally endowed with qualities, that are amenable only to direct yogic perception and revealed through the personal guidance of a qualified teacher. As an exponent of yuganaddha (zung ’jug), i.e., unity (literally, “yoking together”), he espouses the tantric goal of unity beyond extremes, a goal grounded in the inseparability of the two truths or realities (bden gnyis dbyer med), of appearance and emptiness (snang stong dbyer med). In his eyes, this unity is only fully realized when one understands that the conventional has no independent existence apart from the ultimate and that the latter is a condition of possibility of the former. As an advocate of apratiṣṭhāna (rab tu mi gnas pa), i.e., nonfoundationalism, he resolutely maintains that all outer and inner phenomena, including deep features of reality disclosed through meditation, lack any ontic or epistemic essence or foundation that the mind can lay hold of. Finally, as a champion of Madhyamaka, i.e., the Buddhist Middle Way, the author attempts to ply a middle course between the extremes of existence and nonexistence, eternalism and nihilism. These various doxographical strands are deftly interwoven in the Karma pa’s view of buddha nature, which affirms the innate presence of buddha nature and its qualities in all sentient beings as well as their soteriological efficacy while denying either any ontological status." (Higgins and Draszczyk, preface, 14)
Higgins, David, and Martina Draszczyk. Buddha Nature Reconsidered: The Eighth Karma pa's Middle Path. 2 vols. Vol. 1, Introduction and Analysis. Vol. 2, An Anthology of His Writings: Critical Texts and Annotated Translations. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 95.1–95.2. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 2019.
Article
Buddha in the Storehouse: Mi bskyod rdo rje on the Relationship between Tathāgatagarbha and Ālayavijñāna
This paper addresses the age-old question of how buddha nature (tathāgatagarbha) relates to Yogācāra psychology, focusing on the Eighth Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje’s (1507-1554) responses to this question. In the centuries following the first appearance of tathāgatagarbha doctrines in India (circa 2nd c. CE), opinions became divided over whether buddha nature should be identified with or distinguished from the Yogācāra idea of a substratum consciousness (ālayavijñāna). The topic attracted a great deal of discussion and debate among Buddhist scholars, both within and beyond the borders of India. At stake were a set of specific doctrinal issues as to whether and how the Yogācāra ālayavijñāna-vāsanā model could be reconciled with [1] buddha nature theory [2] tantric buddha nature proxies such as the unconditioned ground (gzhi) and causal continuum (rgyu rgyud) [3] Indian and Chinese Buddhist conceptions of an immaculate consciousness (amalavijñāna) and [4] certain anti-foundationalist strains of Middle Way (Madhyamaka) philosophy that rejected any transcendental basis of consciousness. The Karma pa’s repeated forays into these contested subject areas reveal time and again his commitment to reconcile two contrasting lines of Buddhist thought and praxis: [1] the affirmative appraisal of the nature of mind and reality emphasized in Yogācāra and tathāgatagarbha classics, the tantras, and the songs and writings of the Buddhist mahāsiddhas and [2] the metaphysically disinclined stance of the Middle Way (Madhyamaka) philosophy that avoided extremes of affirmation and denial, existence and nonexistence. To adequately appreciate his contributions to such issues, I will first sketch in rough strokes the historical evolution of the ālayavijñāna doctrine and its complex confrontations with tathāgatagarbha doctrine in India. Against this backdrop, attention will turn to the Karma pa’s contextualist framing of the ālayavijñāna-tathāgatagarbha relationship in terms of a progressive understanding that begins with differentiation and culminates in unity. His is a view that stresses the need to initially distinguish between conditions of spiritual awakening (such as tathāgatagarbha) and delusion (such as ālayavijñāna) in order to eventually realize their underlying unity (zung ’jug) by recognizing buddha nature as an ever-present continuum (rgyud) of awareness that is a precondition of the substratum consciousness that derives and deviates from it. In his attempts to strike a balance between traditional differentiation and unity models, we encounter a thinker who was as confident about the mind’s ability to discover its own unborn and nonconceptual nature as he was skeptical about its ability to discover any underlying metaphysical foundation. (Source: Peeters Online Journals)
Higgins, David. "Buddha in the Storehouse: Mi bskyod rdo rje on the Relationship between Tathāgatagarbha and Ālayavijñāna." Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 42 (2019): 169–230.
Video
David Higgins at the 2019 Tathāgatagarbha Symposium
David Higgins explores the Eighth Karmapa Mikyö Dorje’s (1507–1554) prolific writings on tathāgatagarbha, which contain several extended discussions on the topic of how buddha-nature relates to different conceptions of selfhood.
Higgins, David. "Buddha-Nature and Selfhood." Paper presented at the University of Vienna Symposium, Tathāgatagarbha Across Asia, Vienna, Austria, July 2019. Video, 41:28. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LHzI1PxptpI.
Book
Mahāmudrā and the Middle Way
This two-volume publication explores the complex philosophy of Mahāmudrā that developed in Tibetan Dwags po Bka’ brgyud traditions between the 15th and 16th centuries CE. It examines the attempts to articulate and defend Bka’ brgyud views and practices by four leading post-classical thinkers: (1) Shākya mchog ldan (1423‒1507), a celebrated yet controversial Sa skya scholar who developed a strong affiliation with the Karma Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā tradition in the last half of his life, (2) Karma phrin las Phyogs las rnam rgyal (1456‒1539), a renowned Karma Bka’ brgyud scholar-yogin and tutor to the Eighth Karma pa, (3) the Eighth Karma pa himself, Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507‒1554), who was among the most erudite and influential scholar-hierarchs of his generation, (4) and Padma dkar po (1527‒1592), Fourth ’Brug chen of the ’Brug pa Bka’ brgyud lineage who is generally acknowledged as its greatest scholar and systematizer. It is an important academic work published in the Vienna series WSTB and is divided into two volumes: the first offers a detailed philosophical analysis of the authors’ principal views and justifications of Mahāmudrā against the background of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist doctrines on mind, emptiness and buddha nature; the second comprises an annotated anthology of their seminal writings on Mahāmudrā accompanied by critical editions and introductions. These two volumes are the result of research that was generously funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) from 2012 to 2015 under the supervision of Prof. Klaus-Dieter Mathes. The project was entitled “‘Emptiness of Other’ (Gzhan stong) in the Tibetan ‘Great Seal’ (Mahāmudrā) Traditions of the 15th and 16th Centuries” (FWF Project number P23826-G15). (Source: WSTB Description)
Higgins, David, and Martina Draszczyk. Mahāmudrā and the Middle Way: Post-Classical Kagyü Discourses on Mind, Emptiness and Buddha-Nature. 2 vols. Vol. 1, Introduction, Views of Authors and Final Reflections. Vol. 2, Translations, Critical Texts, Bibliography and Index. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 90.1–90.2. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 2016.
Article
On the rDzogs chen Distinction between Mind (sems) Primordial Knowing (ye shes): Clarifications and Transcendental Arguments
The idea that Buddist teachings ought to be applied to one's life situation in order to discover their true validity and efficacy has been a salient feature of Buddhism since its inception. It is in light of this normative constraint that Buddhism has traditionally called itself a path (mārga) or, more accurately, a series of paths formulated to lead individuals of varying needs, abilities, and aspirations toward spiritual awakening (bodhi). The complex diversity of views and practices that developed from the time of the historical Buddha were based on two presuppositions: (1) that the Buddha's awakening was of the utmost soteriological significance and therefore to be regarded as the ultimate aim of all religio-philosophical inquiry and activity, and (2) that it was to be seen neither as fortuitous nor inexplicable but as a repeatable soteriological process, one that could be personally realized through

particular modes of inquiry and praxis available to most (if not all) humans.
      From this second assumption stemmed the idea that humans are predisposed to spiritual awakening, that they, in other words, have within them some germinal capacity (bīja), spiritual affiliation (gotra), element (dhātu), or quintessence (garbha) that is a condition of possibility of this awakening. Alongside these "buddha-nature" concepts developed a family of systematically related gnoseological ideas referring to an abiding, unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) mode of consciousness—variously termed the Mind of awakening (bodhicitta), naturally luminous Mind (prakṛtiprabhāsvaracitta), the nature of mind (citta-dharmatā)—that was identified with the condition of awakening itself, but also viewed as the tacit background whence dualistic mind, that is, the source of all error and obscuration, emerges. Central to this cluster of related ideas was the view that conditions of awakening and delusion are both located within the complex and heterogeneous structure of lived experience itself. In Indian Buddhism, this paradigm found its most detailed and influential expression in the hybridized Yogācāra-Tathāgatagarbha works of Maitreya, the Indian Buddhist Siddha literature and the Buddhist tantras.
       In light of the foregoing considerations, the doctrinal history of Buddhism may be regarded as an ongoing attempt to work out precisely what it was that made its founder a buddha or "awakened one" so that such knowledge could be systematically pursued by his followers. That this soteriological imperative has been central to Buddhist philosophical and psychological investigations from early on is discernible in the long history of attempts to clarify the defining features of consciousness that can be traced back to the systematic analyses of mind and mental factors (citta-caitta) presented in the Abhidhammapiṭaka of the Pali Canon. For, in investigating the nature and structure of consciousness, Buddhist scholars were above all concerned with articulating the conditions necessary for a sentient being (sems can) to become an awakened one, a being in whom (if we follow the Tibetan rendering of "buddha" as sangs rgyas) all cognitive and affective obscurations have dissipated (sangs) so that inherent capacities for knowing and caring (mkhyen brtse nus ldan) can unfold (rgyas).
      In Tibet, this soteriologically oriented investigation of consciousness was central to the philosophy of mind that developed within the syncretistic rDzogs chen ("Great Perfection") tradition of the rNying ma ("Ancient Ones") school between the eighth and fourteenth centuries. This philosophy developed around a nexus of core soteriological ideas concerning buddha-nature, the nature of reality, and the nature of mind that served to draw attention to a primordial, nondual mode of being and awareness that usually remains hidden behind the mind's own objectifying and subjectivizing reifications.
      A cornerstone of the rDzogs chen philosophy of mind was a basic distinction between dualistic mind (sems) and primordial knowing (ye shes) that was first systematically presented in the seventeen Atiyoga tantras (rgyud bcu bdun) that make up the Heart Essence (snying thig) subclass of the Esoteric Guidance Class (man ngag sde') of rDzogs chen teachings and are traditionally associated with Vimalamitra. rNying ma historical and biographical works trace this distinction to the teachings of early rDzogs chen masters of the Royal Dynastic Period, in particular the oral transmissions of Vimalamitra (bi ma snyan brgyud), an identification that appears at first glance to be supported by the many passages on the two distinctions found scattered among rNying ma collections such as the Bi ma snying thig, Bai ro rgyud 'bum, rNying ma rgyud 'bum, and dGongs pa zang thal. These teachings often take the form of personal instructions advising the practitioner to discern within the flux of adventitious thoughts and sensations that characterize dualistic mind (sems) an invariant prerepresentational structure of awareness known as primordial knowing (ye shes), open awareness (rig pa), or the nature of mind (sems nyid), from which this turmoil arises. The idea is to directly recognize (ngo sprod) and become increasingly familiar with this abiding condition without confusing it with any of its derivative and distortive aspects. In Klong chen pa's view, this distinction provides an indispensable key to understanding the views and practices that are central to the rDzogs chen tradition.
       Although this tradition has attracted increasing interest in recent decades, both popular and academic, there has been little to date in the way of critical study of its philosophical foundations or key doctrinal developments. A noteworthy case in point is the absence of any systematic appraisal of rNying ma ("Ancient Ones") views on the nature of mind that traces their evolution and complex relationships with Indian Cittamātra, Madhyamaka, Pramāṇvāda, and Vajrayāna views. As a step toward at least defining the parameters of this crucial but neglected field of inquiry,

this paper will consider some key arguments in support of the "mind/primordial knowing" (sems/ye shes) distinction adumbrated by rNying ma scholars in the classical period. Of particular interest are arguments that were used to justify and defend this distinction by the renowned fourteenth-century rNying ma thinker Klong chen rab 'byams pa in a number of his treatises, commentaries, and poetic works. In a wide range of doctrinal contexts, Klong chen pa will argue that the entire edifice of Buddhist doctrine becomes incoherent in theory and amiss in practice when one fails to recognize the primacy of a primordial mode of awareness and to unequivocally distinguish it from dualistic mind. This paper first examines in detail some of the arguments he employed to convince his audience of the acceptability of such a distinction in light of theoretical and practical drawbacks of not recognizing it. It then focuses on two types of transcendental argument (of the general form "for y to be possible x must be the case") that Klong chen pa repeatedly invokes to show that the mind/primordial knowing distinction was not only tacitly presupposed in Indian Buddhist soteriology but was, in fact, indispensable for making sense of the Buddhist path and goal-realization according to Buddhist doxastic norms. (Higgins, "On the rDzogs chen Distinction between Mind (sems) and Primordial Knowing (ye shes), 23–26)
Higgins, David. "On the rDzogs chen Distinction between Mind (sems) and Primordial Knowing (ye shes): Clarifications and Transcendental Arguments." Journal of Buddhist Philosophy 2 (2016): 23–54.
Book
The Other Emptiness: Rethinking the Zhentong Buddhist Discourse in Tibet
This book brings together perspectives of leading international Tibetan studies scholars on the subject of zhentong or “other-emptiness.” Defined as the emptiness of everything other than the continuous luminous awareness that is one’s own enlightened nature, this distinctive philosophical and contemplative presentation of emptiness is quite different from rangtong—emptiness that lacks independent existence, which has had a strong influence on the dissemination of Buddhist philosophy in the West. Important topics are addressed, including the history, literature, and philosophy of emptiness that have contributed to zhentong thinking in Tibet from the thirteenth century until today. The contributors examine a wide range of views on zhentong from each of the major orders of Tibetan Buddhism, highlighting the key Tibetan thinkers in the zhentong philosophical tradition. Also discussed are the early formulations of buddhanature, interpretations of cosmic time, polemical debates about emptiness in Tibet, the zhentong view of contemplation, and creative innovations of thought in Tibetan Buddhism. Highly accessible and informative, this book can be used as a scholarly resource as well as a textbook for teaching graduate and undergraduate courses on Buddhist philosophy. (Source: SUNY Press)
Sheehy, Michael R., and Klaus-Dieter Mathes, eds. The Other Emptiness: Rethinking the Zhentong Buddhist Discourse in Tibet. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2019.
Book
The Philosophical Foundations of Classical rDzogs Chen in Tibet
An updated book version of David Higgins' dissertation on the presentations of the disparities between dualistic mind (sems) as opposed to primordial knowing (ye shes) and dharmakāya as opposed to the ‘ground of all’ (kun gzhi) conditioned experience, and so forth, in 8th-14th century Nyingma Dzogchen literature.
Higgins, David. The Philosophical Foundations of Classical rDzogs chen in Tibet: Investigating the Distinction between Dualistic Mind (sems) and Primordial Knowing (ye shes). Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, 2013.


Mahāmudrā - Mahāmudrā refers to an advanced meditation tradition in Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna forms of Into-Tibetan Buddhism that is focused on the realization of the empty and luminous nature of the mind. It also refers to the resultant state of buddhahood attained through such meditation practice. In Tibet, this tradition is particularly associated with the Kagyu school, although all other schools also profess this tradition. The term also appears as part of the four seals, alongside dharmamūdra, samayamudrā, and karmamudrā. Skt. महामुद्रा Tib. ཕྱག་རྒྱ་ཆེན་པོ།

Madhyamaka - Along with Yogācāra, it is one of the two major philosophical schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Founded by Nāgārjuna around the second century CE, it is rooted in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras, though its initial exposition was presented in Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Skt. मध्यमक Tib. དབུ་མ་ Ch. 中觀見

WSTB - Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde - Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien.

Madhyamaka - Along with Yogācāra, it is one of the two major philosophical schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Founded by Nāgārjuna around the second century CE, it is rooted in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras, though its initial exposition was presented in Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Skt. मध्यमक Tib. དབུ་མ་ Ch. 中觀見

Kagyu - The Kagyu school traces its origin to the eleventh-century translator Marpa, who studied in India with Nāropa. Marpa's student Milarepa trained Gampopa, who founded the first monastery of the Kagyu order. As many as twelve subtraditions grew out from there, the best known being the Karma Kagyu, the Drikung, and the Drukpa. Tib. བཀའ་བརྒྱུད་

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