Garfield, J.

Jay L. Garfield

Jay L. Garfield chairs the Philosophy department and directs Smith’s logic and Buddhist studies programs and the Five College Tibetan Studies in India program. He is also visiting professor of Buddhist philosophy at Harvard Divinity School, professor of philosophy at Melbourne University and adjunct professor of philosophy at the Central University of Tibetan Studies.

Garfield’s research addresses topics in the foundations of cognitive science and the philosophy of mind; the history of Indian philosophy during the colonial period; topics in ethics, epistemology and the philosophy of logic; methodology in cross-cultural interpretation; and topics in Buddhist philosophy, particularly Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka and Yogācāra.

Garfield’s most recent books are Getting Over Ourselves: How to be a Person Without a Self (2022), Knowing Illusion: Bringing a Tibetan Debate into Contemporary Discourse (with the Yakherds 2021, Buddhist Ethics: A Philosophical Exploration (2021), ̛What Can’t Be Said: Paradox and Contradiction in East Asian Thought (with Yasuo Deguchi, Graham Priest, and Robert Sharf 2021), The Concealed Influence of Custom: Hume’s Treatise From the Inside Out (OUP 2019), Minds Without Fear: Philosophy in the Indian Renaissance (with Nalini Bhushan, 2017), Dignāga’s Investigation of the Percept: A Philosophical Legacy in India and Tibet (with Douglas Duckworth, David Eckel, John Powers, Yeshes Thabkhas and Sonam Thakchöe, 2016) Engaging Buddhism: Why it Matters to Philosophy (2015), Moonpaths: Ethics and Emptiness (with the Cowherds, 2015) and (edited, with Jan Westerhoff), Madhyamaka and Yogācāra: Allies or Rivals? (2015). (Source Accessed on January 19, 2024)

Doris Silbert Professor in the Humanities and Professor of Philosophy

Department of Philosophy Smith College Northampton, MA 01063 USA

Library Items

Article

Does a Table Have Buddha-Nature? A Moment of Yes and No. Answer! But Not in Words or Signs! A Response to Mark Siderits

Siderits argues that Nāgārjuna is not committed to the paradoxical claim that emptiness is the lack of intrinsic nature and that it is the intrinsic nature of all things, on the ground that the apparently paradoxical claims Nāgārjuna makes are simply admonitions to recuse oneself from the project of ontology. We argue that to recuse oneself from that project is to do ontology and so is no route out of paradox. We dispute Siderits' reading of several crucial passages, demonstrating that his readings are unattested in the commentarial literature and that they are implausible. Siderits argues on the basis of these readings that Candrakīrti and Nāgārjuna are not committed to paradoxes. We show that more plausible readings that are better attested in the commentarial literature do so commit them. Siderits and we agree that the ultimate nature of reality is to lack any ultimate nature. He thinks that this is consistent; we think that it is paradoxical.

Deguchi, Yasuo, Jay L. Garfield, and Graham Priest. "Does a Table Have Buddha-Nature? A Moment of Yes and No. Answer! But Not in Words or Signs! A Response to Mark Siderits." Philosophy East and West 63, no. 3 (2013): 387–98.

Deguchi, Yasuo, Jay L. Garfield, and Graham Priest. "Does a Table Have Buddha-Nature? A Moment of Yes and No. Answer! But Not in Words or Signs! A Response to Mark Siderits." Philosophy East and West 63, no. 3 (2013): 387–98.;Does a Table Have Buddha-Nature? A Moment of Yes and No. Answer! But Not in Words or Signs! A Response to Mark Siderits;Buddha-nature of insentient things;Nāgārjuna;śūnyatā;niḥsvabhāva;Yasuo Deguchi; Jay L. Garfield;Graham Priest

Affiliations & relations

Smith College · workplace affiliation
jaygarfield.org · websites