Non-representational Language in Mipam's Representation of Other-emptiness

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|AuthorAffiliation=Temple University
 
|AuthorAffiliation=Temple University
 
|PubDate=2014
 
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|ArticleContent=Buddhist traditions understand emptiness in various ways, and two streams of interpretation, “self-emptiness” (''rang stong'') and “other-emptiness” (''gzhan stong''), have emerged in Tibet that help bring into focus the extent to which interpretations diverge.<ref>1  In this article I use the THL Simplified Phonetic Transcription of Standard Tibetan, developed by David Germano and Nicolas Tournadre, to transcribe Tibetan words into English.</ref> In contrast to self-emptiness, other-emptiness does not refer to a phenomenon’s lack of its own essence; it refers to the ultimate reality’s lack of all that it is not. Rather than claiming the universality of self-emptiness (emptiness as lack of own essence), proponents of other-emptiness assert another way to understand emptiness
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|ArticleContent=Buddhist traditions understand emptiness in various ways, and two streams of interpretation, “self-emptiness” (''rang stong'') and “other-emptiness” (''gzhan stong''), have emerged in Tibet that help bring into focus the extent to which interpretations diverge.<ref>1  In this article I use the THL Simplified Phonetic Transcription of Standard Tibetan, developed by David Germano and Nicolas Tournadre, to transcribe Tibetan words into English.</ref> In contrast to self-emptiness, other-emptiness does not refer to a phenomenon’s lack of its own essence; it refers to the ultimate reality’s lack of all that it is not. Rather than claiming the universality of self-emptiness (emptiness as lack of own essence), proponents of other-emptiness assert another way to understand emptiness with regard to the ultimate (emptiness as ultimate ground). These two interpretations of emptiness—as ground and as groundless abyss—reveal a rift at the foundation of Buddhist metaphysics.
with regard to the ultimate (emptiness as ultimate ground). These two interpretations of emptiness—as ground and as groundless abyss—reveal a rift at the foundation of Buddhist metaphysics.
 
  
This essay probes the discourses of other-emptiness in the Jonang (''jo nang'') and
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This essay probes the discourses of other-emptiness in the Jonang (''jo nang'') and Nyingma (''rnying ma'') traditions. After briefly introducing other-emptiness in the Jonang tradition, the ''locus classicus'' for other-emptiness in Tibet, I will contrast the way Mipam (‘ju mi pham rgya mtsho) (1846–1912) positions the discourse of other-emptiness in his interpretative system. I will then demonstrate how Mipam’s portrayal of other-emptiness highlights the way he uses a perspectival means to incorporate a diversity of seemingly contradictory claims that he uses to support his view of ultimate reality as indeterminate. I will argue that an implication of his view is a non-representational account of language about the ultimate.
Nyingma (''rnying ma'') traditions. After briefly introducing other-emptiness in the
 
Jonang tradition, the ''locus classicus'' for other-emptiness in Tibet, I will contrast the way Mipam (‘ju mi pham rgya mtsho) (1846–1912) positions the discourse of other-emptiness in his interpretative system. I will then demonstrate how Mipam’s
 
portrayal of other-emptiness highlights the way he uses a perspectival means to incorporate a diversity of seemingly contradictory claims that he uses to support his view of ultimate reality as indeterminate. I will argue that an implication of his view is a non-representational account of language about the ultimate.
 
 
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Revision as of 13:50, 7 June 2019

Non-representational Language in Mipam's Representation of Other-emptiness
Article
Article
Citation: Duckworth, Douglas S. "Non-representational Language in Mipam's Re-presentation of Other-emptiness." Philosophy East and West 64, no. 4 (2014): 920–32. https://sites.temple.edu/duckworth/files/2013/07/NonRepresentational_duckworth.pdf.

Buddhist traditions understand emptiness in various ways, and two streams of interpretation, “self-emptiness” (rang stong) and “other-emptiness” (gzhan stong), have emerged in Tibet that help bring into focus the extent to which interpretations diverge.[1] In contrast to self-emptiness, other-emptiness does not refer to a phenomenon’s lack of its own essence; it refers to the ultimate reality’s lack of all that it is not. Rather than claiming the universality of self-emptiness (emptiness as lack of own essence), proponents of other-emptiness assert another way to understand emptiness with regard to the ultimate (emptiness as ultimate ground). These two interpretations of emptiness—as ground and as groundless abyss—reveal a rift at the foundation of Buddhist metaphysics.

This essay probes the discourses of other-emptiness in the Jonang (jo nang) and Nyingma (rnying ma) traditions. After briefly introducing other-emptiness in the Jonang tradition, the locus classicus for other-emptiness in Tibet, I will contrast the way Mipam (‘ju mi pham rgya mtsho) (1846–1912) positions the discourse of other-emptiness in his interpretative system. I will then demonstrate how Mipam’s portrayal of other-emptiness highlights the way he uses a perspectival means to incorporate a diversity of seemingly contradictory claims that he uses to support his view of ultimate reality as indeterminate. I will argue that an implication of his view is a non-representational account of language about the ultimate.

  1. 1 In this article I use the THL Simplified Phonetic Transcription of Standard Tibetan, developed by David Germano and Nicolas Tournadre, to transcribe Tibetan words into English.