Property:ArticleAbstract
From Buddha-Nature
This is a property of type Text.
&
No abstract given. Here is the first relevant paragraph:<br><br>
From ancient times, the origin of "''tathāgata''", which has been usually translated as 如 來 (one who comes thus), is not unknown. This has been used as the title of Buddha, chiefly in Buddhism from the start.<br> Now, I will consider the meaning of "''tathāgata''" in the ''Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñāpāramitā-vyākhyā'' of Haribhadra (ed. by Wogihara) (W.). This includes the ''Aṣṭasāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra'' (''As.''), Maitreya's ''Abhisamayālaṃkāraśāstra-kārikā'' (''A.'') which is a summary of the ''Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra'' (''P.''), and Haribhadra's commentary which is based on the ''P.'' and the ''As.'' Accordingly at first, I point out sentences of "''tathāgata''", which I think as the etymological explanations, and then survey the character of it. (Mano, "'Tathāgata' in Haribhadra's Commentary," 22) +
''Hongaku shisō'', the idea that all beings are "inherently" enlightened, is an almost universal assumption in the Japanese Buddhist tradition. This idea also played an important role in the indigenization of Buddhism in Japan and in the development of the syncretistic religious ethos that underlies Japanese society. Through most of Japanese history, the idea of the inherent enlightenment (including non-sentient beings such as plants and rocks—which expanded to include assumptions such as the non-differentiation between "indigenous" kami and the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, and the transcendence of all dualities (including good and evil) as an ideal—was pervasive and unquestioned in much of Japanese religious activity and thought. Recently some Japanese Buddhist scholars, notably Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shirō of the Sōtō Zen sect [at] Komazawa University, have questioned the legitimacy of this ethos, claiming that it is antithetical to basic Buddhist ideas such as ''anātman'' ("no-self"), and that it is the source of many social problems in Japan. They call for a conscious recognition and rejection of this ethos, and a return to "true Buddhism." After presenting a brief outline of the history and significance of these ideas in Japan, Hakamaya and Matsumoto's critique is explained and examined. Some of the academic and social reactions to this critique are also explored. +
Articles/'Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal's Commentary on the Dharmatā Chapter of the Dharmadharmatāvibhāgakārikās +
'Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal's (1392-1481) commentary on the second chapter of the ''Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā'' (RGVV) is introduced by a detailed explanation of the ''dharmatā'' chapter in the ''Dharmadharmatāvibhāgakārikās'' (DhDhVK). This is, according to gZhon nu dpal, because the detailed presentation of ''āśrayaparivŗtti'' in the DhDhV is a commentary on the ''bodhi'' chapter of the RGV. In both texts, ''āśrayaparivŗtti'' refers to a positively described ultimate which is revealed by removing adventitious stains. Whereas in the RGV this is the Buddha-element (or ''tathāgatagarbha'') with its inseparable qualities, it is the ''dharmatā'', suchness or natural luminosity (''prakŗtiprabhāsvaratā'') in the ''Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavŗtti'' (DhDhVV). This luminosity is compared to primordially pure space, gold and water which must have their adventitious stains removed before they can be discovered. From this gZhon nu dpal concludes that the DhDhVV belongs to the Madhyamaka tradition. Consequently, the typical Yogācāra negation of external objects is taken as referring to the latters' non-existence in terms of ''svabhāva''.<br> What makes gZhon nu dpal's DhDhV-commentary so interesting is his ''mahāmudrā'' interpretation of a central topic in the DhDhV, i.e., the abandonment of all "mentally created characteristic signs" (''nimittas''). The latter practice plays a crucial role in the cultivation of non-conceptual wisdom, which is taken as the cause or the foundation of ''āśrayaparivŗtti'' in the DhDhV. Based on Sahajavajra's (11th century) ''Tattvadaśakaţīkā'' gZhon nu dpal explains that the ''nimittas'' are abandoned by directly realizing their natural luminosity which amounts to a direct or non-conceptual experience of their true nature. To be sure, while the usual Mahāyāna approach involves an initial analysis of the ''nimittas'', namely, an analytic meditation which eventually turns into non-conceptual abiding in the same way as a fire kindled from rubbing pieces of wood bums the pieces of wood themselves (gZhon nu dpal explains this on the basis of Kamalaśīla's commentary on the ''Nirvikalpapraveśadhāraņī''), ''mahāmudrā'' pith-instructions enable a meditation of direct perceptions right from the beginning. In view of the fact that such direct perceptions of emptiness (or ''dharmatā'' in this context here) usually start from the first Bodhisattva-level onwards, gZhon nu dpal also tries to show that the four yogas of ''mahāmudrā'' are in accordance with the four ''prayogas'' of the DhDhV. It should be noted that such a ''mahāmudrā'' interpretation must have already existed in India, as can be seen from Jñānakīrti's (10th/11th-century) ''Tattvāvatāra'', in which a not-specifically-Tantric form of ''mahāmudrā'' practice is related with the traditional fourfold Mahāyāna meditation by equating "Mahāyāna" in ''Lańkāvatārasūtra'' X.257d with ''mahāmudrā''. The ''pādas'' X.257cd "A yogin who is established in a state without appearances sees Mahāyāna" thus mean that one finally sees or realizes ''mahāmudrā''.<br> To sum up, the DhDhV plays an important role for gZhon nu dpal in that it provides a canonical basis for his ''mahāmudrā'' tradition, and by showing that the ''dharmatā'' portion of the DhDhV is a commentary on the second chapter of the RGV, gZhon nu dpal skillfully links his ''mahāmudrā'' interpretation to the standard Indian work on Buddha-nature, and thus to a concept which considerably facilitated the bridging of the Sūtras with the Tantras. ([https://www.researchgate.net/publication/29770680_Gos_Lo_tsa_ba_gZhon_nu_dpal's_Commentary_on_the_Dharmata_Chapter_of_the_Dharmadharmatavibhagakarikas Source Accessed April 1, 2020])
Articles/'Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal's Commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā (Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos kyi 'grel bshad de kho na nyid rab tu gsal ba'i me long)-Review by Hugon +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
This book contains a critical edition of a Tibetan commentary composed by 'Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal (1392-1481) on the ''Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā''. The ''Ratnagotravibhāga'', attributed to Maitreya, and its ''vyākhyā'', attributed to Asaṅga, are of special significance in Buddhism for the discussion of the 'buddha-nature' (''tathāgatagarbha''), i.e. the idea that the nature of a buddha is inherent in every human being. gZhon nu dpal's commentary (hereafter: ZhP), which has never been published before, provides an account on this issue which is imposing both in view of its size as well as its historical and philosophical importance. Mathes' edition thus provides an important and valuable contribution to future studies on the subject.<br> The edition proper (pp. 1-576) is preceded by a brief introduction (pp. ix–xvii) which, besides editorial remarks, deals with gZhon nu dpal's life and education on the basis of an unpublished biography by his disciple Zhwa dmar Chos kyi grags pa (1453-1524), and of the ''bKa' gdams chos 'byung'' of Las chen Kun dga' rgyal mtshan (b. 1440), another of his disciples.[1] This information adds to the preliminary observations by Mathes in an article entitled '"Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal's Extensive Commentary on and Study of the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā" (Mathes 2002)[2], which gives a more detailed biographical account and discusses the position that gZhon nu dpal holds in ZhP.<br> 'Gos Lo tsā ba Yid bzang rtse ba gZhon nu dpal is well known to Tibetologists for his work entitled ''The Blue Annals'' (''Deb ther sngon po''), composed a few years earlier than ZhP.[3] This mine of biographical, bibliographical and historical information already gives us an idea of the mastery that this remarkable scholar had of all fields of Buddhist studies. Mathes' introduction informs us of the key elements of gZhon nu dpal's thorough education in all the major religious traditions with the most important masters of the time, such as Tsong kha pa (1357-1419), the Fifth Karmapa De bzhin gshegs pa (1384-1415), the rNying ma pa teacher sGrol ma ba Sangs rgyas rin chen (1350-1430), or the Sa skya master Rong ston Shes bya kun rig (1367-1449). gZhon nu dpal distinguishes himself by his open-minded and non-sectarian approach, which is reflected in his ZhP, where he combines the commentarial tradition of rNgog Blo ldan shes rab (1059-1109) with sGam po pa's (1079- 1153) "Great Seal" (''mahāmudrā'') interpretation. The introduction also deals with the circumstances of the redaction of ZhP — composed in 1473 as gZhon nu dpal was nearly blind and had to dictate his work from memory over a period of four months — and of the carving of the printing blocks as described in the colophon. Mathes notes that gZhon nu dpal obviously had access to the Sanskrit original of the ''Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā'' as he frequently discusses Sanskrit words from this text and occasionally mentions or (politely) criticizes the existing translation by rNgog Lo tsä ba Bio ldan shes rab, which is the one found in the canon (sDe dge ''bsTan 'gyur'' 4024–4025).[4] Mathes (p.xv) also mentions a translation by Nag tsho Lo tsā ba which gZhon nu dpal occasionally discusses, but gives no specifics about this translator.[5] By comparing the quotations of the ''Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā'' in ZhP with the Sanskrit text (edited by E.H. Johnston)[6] and the Tibetan translation found in the canon (edited by Z. Nakamura on the basis of Sde dge, Narthang and Peking ''bsTan 'gyur'')[7], Mathes establishes that gZhon nu dpal's version, in several cases, better fits the original (p. xiv).
[https://www.e-periodica.ch/digbib/view?pid=ast-002%3A2006%3A60%3A%3A248#252 Read more here . . .]
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Other bigraphical sources mentioned in Mathes 2002:80 (see n.2) include the ''Kaṃ tshang brgyud pa rin po che'i rnam thar'' of Situ and 'Be lo, the ''Gangs can mkhas grub rim byon ming mdzod'', and Khetsun Sangpo's ''Bibliographical Dictionary''.
#Published in: ''Religion and Secular Culture in Tibet'', Tibetan Studies II, PIATS 2000, ed. by H. Blezer with the assistance of A. Zadoks. Brill's Tibetan Studies Library Vol. 2/2. Leiden: Brill, pp. 79-96.
#For a translation of this work, see George N. Roerich, ''The Blue Annals'', reprint Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass [First ed. Calcutta, 1949; second ed. Delhi, 1976; reprints Delhi, 1978, 1988, 1995, 1996].
#Mathes (p.xv n.44) gives two references of such passages in ZhP; in the first one, gZhon nu dpal says that rNgog Blo ldan shes rab's translation is "somewhat incorrect" (''cung zad mi legs te'') (ZhP 94,4).
#It is most probably Nag (')tsho Lo tsä ba Tshul khrims rgyal ba (1011-1064), who was a student of Atisa. According to gZhon nu dpal's ''Blue Annals'' (''Deb ther sngon po''), Nag tsho Lo tsā ba and Atiśa were asked by rNgog Byang chub 'byung gnas of Yer pa to translate Asaṅga's commentary on the ''Mahāyāna-Uttaratantra'', i.e. the ''Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā''. See George N. Roerich, op. cit., p. 259. In ZhP 4,19-20, gZhon nu dpal refers to a translation by Dīpaṃkara and Nag tsho. A discussion of Nag tsho's translation appears for instance in ZhP 482,16.
#The ''Ratnagotravibhāga Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra'', Patna, 1950: The Bihar Research Society.
#''Zōwa-taiyaku Kukyōichijōhōshōron-kenkyū'', Tokyo, 1967: Suzuki Gakujutsu Zaidan.
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>’Gos Lo-tsa-ba gZhon-nu-dpal (1392-1481) was one of the most brilliant scholars in Tibet and is famous for his religious history, the ''Blue Annals'' {''Deb thersngon po''). He is also known as a translator (''lo tsa ba'') and for his contributions to Buddhist doctrine and philosophy. However, except for the ''Blue Annals'' his own work has not been available until now. For this reason this first publication of a doctrinal commentary, ''Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos kyi ’grel bshad de kho na nyid rab tu gsal ba’i me long'' (''ZhP''), is most welcome. In this commentary he presents a unique interpretation of the teaching of the Buddha-nature (''tathagatagarbha'') in the ''Ratnagotravibhaga/vyakhya'' (''RGV/V'') following the ''mahāmudrā'' tradition. Of more than fifty commentaries on the ''RGV'' known to have been written in Tibet, the ''ZhP'' is one of the most extensive and remarkable.<br> The editor, Klaus-Dieter Mathes, has previously contributed to the study of the Tibetan hermeneutical traditions of Yogācāra works such as the ''Dharmadharmatāvibhāga''. He has already published a survey of this ''RGV'' commentary (p. xviii), and has also studied this commentary for his Habilitation, currently being prepared for publication (p. xi). In the introduction to the book under review, Mathes presents a brief biography of gZhon-nu-dpal and sketches his general philosophical position (pp. ix-xi). He then discusses the sources on which his edition is based (pp. xi-xiv), selected particular features of the ''ZhP'' (pp. xiv-xv), and his editorial method (pp. xv-xvi), ending with technical notes (pp. xvi-xvii) and bibliography (pp. xviii-xix).<br> The main part of this book consists of a critical edition of the ''ZhP'' in 576 pages, based on a manuscript in ''dbu-med'' script (A) and a block print (B). The block print was completed in 1479, soon after the composition of the ''ZhP'' in 1473 (pp. xii-xiii). Regarding the relationship between the manuscript and block print, Mathes states: "This leaves us with the probable case that A and B share a common source" (p. xii). As to the editorial method, he states, "My editing policy has been to compare gZhon nu dpal’s quotations with the Derge and Peking editions of the Kanjur and Tanjur, but to leave the original reading wherever possible." He also states, "Unusual or wrong spellings have been adapted to the usage of modern Tibetan," and he provides a list of emended spellings (pp. xv-xvi). Mathes has thus "corrected" the old orthography found in the two manuscripts into modern spellings. Though this allows a smoother reading for modern Tibetan readers, it might have been better to retain as much as possible the spellings current in the late fifteenth century, if they can be identified as such. (Kano, "Review of '''Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal's Commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā''," 143)<br><br>
[https://www.jstor.org/stable/20064310?seq=1 Read more here . . .]
Articles/'Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal's Extensive Commentary on and Study of the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
In this paper I present some preliminary observations on 'Gos Lo tsā ba Gzhon nu dpal's (1392-1481) commentary on the ''Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā'', which I am editing and evaluating as a part of my habilitation project. Three years ago I gained access to a photocopy of a 698-folio-long handwritten ''dbu med'' version of this text.[1] Like the Indian ''vyākhyā'', the commentary is divided into five chapters. Their headings are listed together with the folio numbers on a cover page, which bears the seal of the Zhva dmar pa and assigns the letter ''ha'' to the volume containing Gzhon nu dpal's commentary. It is thus reasonable to assume that the original was kept in the library of the Shamarpas in Yangpacan, probably already from the time of the famous Fourth Shamarpa Chos kyi grags pa (1453-1524), who was a disciple of Gzhon nu dpal. After the war with Prithivi Narayan Shah in 1792, Yangpacan was seized by the Gelug government and the text found its way to Drepung, where many other Kagyu texts were kept. Recently I received a photocopy of a Yangpacan block-print from Tibet with the same text on 463 folios. This could be the text described by A khu ching Shes rab rgya mtsho as having 461 folios.[2] The numbering starts anew with each chapter; thus a small calculation mistake could explain the difference of two folios. (Mathes, introductory remarks, 79)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#'Gos ''Lo tsā ba'' Gzhon nu dpal: ''Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos kyi 'grel bshad de kho na nyid rab tu gsal ba'i me long'', 698 fols. (''dbu med''), unpublished.
#See Lokesh Chandra (1963.1:523.11341), l am indebted to B. Quessel, British Library, for this reference. +
A
Articles/A Clue to the Authorship of the Awakening of Faith: "Śikṣānanda's" Redaction of the Word "Nien" +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The text, ''Ta-ch'eng ch'i-hsin lun''<sup>f</sup> (The Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna, henceforth abbreviated as AFM), has been the center of a long controversy in the field of Buddhist studies. It has been suspected by Mochizuki Shinkō<sup>g</sup>[1] and others to be a Chinese fabrication, while Tokiwa Daijō and others defend its alleged Indian origin. The present short article will not review the past and present scholarship on the AFM or bring in my own studies on the matter.[2] It will be devoted to one tiny but crucial issue: the fate of a key concept in the two "translations"—Paramārtha's original (AFM) and Śikṣānanda's version (AFMS for short). The concept is ''nien'' and ''wu-nien''. To state the conclusion here so as to simplify our discussion: the ''nien'' complex, in my opinion, cannot be understood without reference to a pre-Buddhist (Han Chinese) usage of the term. It is foreign or jarring enough to the person responsible for the AFMS that it has been systematically modified or outright substituted so as to bring the AFM in line with the Yogācāra (Wei-shih,<sup>i</sup> Vijñaptimātratā) philosophy. By showing the sinitic character of the ''nien'' ideology, its centrality in the AFM, and the redaction of it by the AFMS, we can come one step closer to resolving the long controversy over the authorship of the AFM. From the limited evidence in this one short study, it would appear that the AFM was authored in China and the AFMS was a conscious redaction of the AFM in China (or Korea?[3]) to bring this work into line with the demands of Hsüan-tsang's<sup>j</sup> Wei-shih philosophy.<br> We will begin with a survey of modern Sanskritists' attempts at identifying ''nien'' and why such attempts have ultimately failed. Then we will look at a similar attempt by the AFMS to edit off the ''nien'' ideology and how by so doing it violated the integrity of the original AFM message. The sinitic meaning of the term ''nien'' and ''wu-nien'' will be demonstrated with precedents in Han thought, usages in the Six Dynasties and in Ch'an.<sup>k</sup> I will conclude with a word on why AFMS was produced. (Lai, "A Clue to the Authorship of the ''Awakening of Faith''," 34–35)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Mochizuki, ''Daijo kishinron no kenkyu<sup>cn</sup> (Kyoto, 1922).
#Ongoing project since my dissertation (Harvard, 1975).
#Mochizuki suggests Korea because of the discovery of the AFMS in Korea.
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>The term ' ''ārambaṇa'' ' is one of the technical terms unique to Buddhism. Being equivalent to Pali ' ''ārammaṇa'' ' and Cl. Skt. ' ''ālambana'' ' it is usually used in the sense of 'basis of cognition' or 'sense-object', e.g. ''rūpa'' as ''ārambaṇa'' of ''cakṣurvijñāna'', or ''dharma'' as that of ''manovijñāna''. The usual equivalent to this term in Tibetan and Chinese language is ' ''dmigs pa'' ' and '所 縁', respectively.<br> What I am going to examine here is whether or not the same meaning mentioned above can be applied to this term used in the Ratnagotravibhāga (RGV), I, 9.<br><br>
[https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/ibk1952/10/2/10_2_757/_pdf/-char/en Read more here . . .] +
Articles/A Comparative Study of Taehyŏn, Wŏnhyo, and Fazangs’ Views on Ālayavijñāna and Tathāgatagarbha +
The concept of ''ālayavijñāna'' has been accepted in East Asia by either demonstrating its association to ''tathāgatagarbha'' or negating it, since Bodhiruci (fl. 508-35) introduced it by translating the ''Daśabhūmikasūtra-śāstra''. It was in this context that the ''Awakening of Faith'' (C. ''Dasheng qixin lun'' 大乘起信論) drew East Asian Buddhist scholiasts’ attention. The central message of the ''Awakening of Faith'' that ''tathāgatagarbha'' is synthesized to ''ālayavijñāna'' in neither-identical-nor-different condition is directly associated to the contemporary issue of how ''ālayavijñāna'' serves as the basis of sentient being’s enlightenment. Silla Yogācāra exegete Taehyŏn 大賢 (ca. 8th century) is one of the East Asian monks who noted the ''Awakening of Faith'' and articulates the relationship between ''tathāgatagarbha'' and ''ālayavijñāna'' in the ''Taesŭng kisillon naeŭi yak t’amgi'' 大乘起信論內義略探記, his commentary of the ''Awakening of Faith''. This article explores Taehyŏn’s views on ''ālayavijñāna'' and ''tathāgatagarbha'' in his commentary of the ''Awakening of Faith'' in comparison to those of other exegetes, such as Wŏnhyo 元曉 (617–686) and Fazang 法藏 (643–712). This article seeks to demonstrate on the basis of this examination that there were distinct doctrinal positions on the ''tathāgatagarbha'' of the ''Awakening of Faith'', which are also associated to their understandings of consciousness system. +
Articles/A Critical Edition and Translation of a Text Fragment from Abhayākaragupta's Āmnāyamañjarī: Göttingen, Cod.ms.sanscr.259b +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
An encyclopedic author active during the reign of King Rāmapāla (ca. 1084–1126/1077–
ca. 1119) of the Pāla Dynasty, Abhayākaragupta is renowned for his erudition in a vast range of subjects in Buddhism.[1] His expertise is especially prominent in, though not limited to, the area of Tantric Buddhism, as attested by the well-known "Garland Trilogy" (''phreng ba skor gsum''), i.e. his three major works on Tantric ritual (''Vajrāvalī'', ''Jyotirmañjarī'', and ''Niṣpannayogāvalī''), which exercised a great influence on the Buddhism of the later period in Nepal and Tibet.<br> The Peking bsTan 'gyur includes twenty-six works ascribed to Abhayākaragupta, of which twenty-three are in the domain of Tantra; the other three deal with non-Tantric Buddhism.[2] Though most of these works are only available through Tibetan translation, some important texts of Abhayākaragupta are preserved in Sanskrit. The following works in Sanskrit have hitherto been edited: ''Niṣpannayogāvalī''; ''Vajrāvalī''; ''Jyotimañjarī''; ''Ucchuṣmajambhalasādhana''; ''Svādhiṣṭhānakramopadeśa''.[3] In addition, Sanskrit manuscripts are known to exist of the ''Pañcakramatātparyapañjikā Kramakaumudī'', ''Kālacakrāvatāra'', and ''Abhayapaddhati''.[4] According to some recent information, furthermore, Sanskrit manuscripts of the ''Āmnāyamañjarī'', ''Munimatālaṅkāra'' and ''Madhyamakamañjarī''[5] have been discovered in Tibet [6]<br> The ''Amnāyamañjarī'', which may be called the magnum opus of Abhayākaragupta, is a commentary on the ''Saṃpuṭodbhavatantra'' and an encyclopedic compendium of Indian Tantric Buddhism. According to Bühnemann, Abhayākaragupta undertook the composition of the ''Amnāyamañjarī'' before 1101 or 1108 C.E. (twenty-fifth regnal year of Rāmapāla) and completed it in 1113 or 1120 C.E (thirty-seventh year of Rāmapāla). As has been remarked,[7] the ''Saṃpuṭodbhavatantra'', though traditionally considered to be an Explanatory Tantra (''vyākhyātantra'') of the ''Hevajra'' and ''Saṃvara'' cycles, integrates many doctrinal and ritual elements adopted from several heterogeneous textual traditions such as that of the ''Guhyasamāja''. Because of this "ecumenical" character of the ''Saṃpuṭodbhavatantra'', the ''Amnāyamañjarī'' as its commentary also encompasses a great variety of subjects relating to the doctrine and ritual of Tantric Buddhism. The ''Amnāyamañjarī'' is referred to several times by Abhayākaragupta himself in his other works, such as the ''Munimatālaṅkāra'',
''Abhayapaddhati'', ''Pañcakramatātparyapañjikā'', and ''Vajrāvalī''.[8] In turn, the ''Āmnāyamañjarī''
refers to his other works [9]<br> Though, as remarked above, the existence of a presumably complete Sanskrit manuscript of the ''Āmnāyamañjarī'' has been reported, it still remains inaccessible to us. However, a single folio fragment of this text has been recently identified in the collection of Sanskrit manuscripts in Göttingen. In this paper, we describe this manuscript fragment and present a critical edition and an annotated translation of the text contained in it. We also include as appendices an edition of the corresponding part of the Tibetan translation as well as parallel passages found in Kamalanātha's ''Ratnāvalī'' and Abhayākaragupta's ''Abhayapaddhati''. (Tomabechi and Kano, Abhayākaragupta and the ''Āmnāyamañjarī'', 22–23)<br><br>
<h5>Notes</h5>
#For the dates and works of Abhayākaragupta, see Erb 1997: 27–29: Bühnemann and Tachikawa 1991: Bühnemann 1992.<br>
#For bibliographical information on these works, see Bühnemann 1992: 123–125.<br>
#The ''Svādhiṣṭhānakramopadeśa'' (or ''Dvibhujasaṃvaropadeśa'') was edited by Okuyama (1993).<br>
#The Centre for Tantric Studies at University of Hamburg is currently working on a joint project to the ''Abhayapaddhati'' in collaboration with CTRC (China Tibetology Research Centre). Tomabechi is preparing a critical edition of the ''Kramakaumudī'' based on the manuscript copy preserved at CTRC.<br>
#The latter text is not included in the bsTan 'gyur, but is mentioned by Abhayākaragupta himself in the ''Munimatālaṅkāra'', D 145v6; P 179r8: ''mdor bsdus pa ni kho bos dbu ma'i snye mar phul du byung bar rnam par bshad do; Āmnāyamañjarī'', D 28r1; P 31r2–3: '' 'di'i skye ba dang 'jig pa de dag kyang dbu ma'i snye mar nges par dpyad zin pas'' (P: ''pa'i'') ... ; D 76v7–77r1; P 86v2-3: ''thsad ma gang gis 'di rang bzhin med pa nyid du bsgrub pa de ni bdag cag gis rgyas pa dang bcas par dbu ma'i snye mar nye bar bkod cing; D 162r5–6; P 179v1: bzlog pa kho na las de kho na nyid 'di rnams so zhes dbu ma'i snye mar nges par dpyad zin to (P: ''te''). See also Isoda 1984: 3 n. 14.<br>
#These texts are registered in the (unpublished) catalogue of microfilms kept at the CTRC in Beijing. Tomabechi confirmed the existence of the copies of these manuscripts during his visit to Beijing in May–June 2007.<br>
#Noguchi 1984 and Skorupski 1996: 201.<br>
#See ''Munimatālaṅkāra'', D 89r4; P 93v2, D 218r7; P 287r4, ''Kramakaumudī'', fol. 22v4, 27r1, 53v4. For the ''Abhayapaddhati'' see Bühnemann and Tachikawa 1991: xiv and Bühnemann 1992:123; and for the ''Vajrāvalī'', see Bühnemann and Tachikawa 1991: xvi and Bühnemann 1992: 125.<br>
#''Vajrāvalī'' (in ĀM D 72v3; P 82r2, D 97r1; P 108r7, D 188v7; P 208r5, D 24Or2; P 266v4, D 257v2; P 288r4, D 260r4; P 291r5–6), ''Jyotirmañjarī'' (in ĀM D 24Or2; P 266v3, D 260r3; P 291r4), ''Madhyamakamañjarī'' (in ĀM D 28r1; P 31r2–3, D 76v7-77r1; P 86v2–3, D 162r6; P 179v1; See note 6 above), ''Munimatālaṃkāra'' (in ĀM D 12r3; P 13v3, D 24v5; P 27v2, D 24v6; P 27v4, D 33v4; P 37v1–2, D 41v7–42r1; P 47r2, D 52r1; P 56r6, D 77r1; P 86v3, D 112v5–6); P 125r3, D 174v7; P 193r8, D 225v3; P 249r2, D 270r1–2; P 302v6), ''Abhayapaddhati'' (in ĀM D 77r1; P 86v2, D 209r2; P 229v8), ''Cakrasaṃvarābhisamaya'' (in ĀM D 172v6; P 191r6–7, D 242v3; P 269v7).
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The Sanskrit text, unearthed by Dr. Bailey, contains a passage from which important deductions may be drawn on a vexed question of the history of Buddhist dogma. It falls into two parts, the first of which consists of the opening verses of several works. Two of these, the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra'' and the ''Mūlamadhyamakārikās'', are too well known to need comment, though the copyist distinguishes himself by transposing the authors' names. Of the remainder, the first is from an unnamed work, which I cannot identify but which dealt perhaps with the "false views", and the third is attributed to the ''Mahāyānasamāsa'', a title apparently unknown to the Tibetan and Chinese translations; the application of the epithet ''nirmala'' to ''dharma'' suggests the possibility that it is a work of the Prajñāpāramitā school. The last verse in this part is described as opening the ''Ratnagotravibhāgaśāstra'' of the Bodhisattva Maitreya, that is, the ''Uttaratantra'', the crabbed Tibetan version of which has recently been rendered into English with remarkable skill by Dr. Obermiller in ''Acta Orientalia'', ix. The Chinese translation (Taisho Issaikyo ed., No. 1611) is usually styled the ''Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra'', despite the fact that the title literally translated, as pointed out long ago by Nanjio, is ''Uttaraikayānaratnagotraśāstra'', where ''ekayāna'' should presumably be taken as the translator's interpretation of the significance of the term ''tantra''. According to P. C. Bagchi, ''Le Canon bouddhique en Chine'', p. 249, a Chinese catalogue of A.D. 597 knows an alternative title, of which the first part is ''Ratnagotravibhāga'', in agreement with the roll. The second part of the text is an excerpt of nine verses from the same work, chapter iii, 1-7 and 9, according to Dr. Obermiller, who has amalgamated the two verses, 5 and 6, into one; the copyist has also numbered the verses, but wrongly, treating the ''Śārdūlavikrīḍita'' verse, number 7, as two, by reason of the transcription dividing each ''pāda'' into two parts at the cæsura. (Bailey and Johnson, "A Fragment of the ''Uttaratantra'' in Sanskrit," 76–78)
Buddha-nature theory, the idea that all beings possess in some way the potential for enlightenment, is found in all Mahāyāna Buddhist traditions. First appearing in India around the third or fourth century CE, it spread to China beginning in the fifth century with the translation of the ''Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra'' and other buddha-nature scriptures, where it inspired the concept of original enlightenment, most famously articulated in the ''Awakening of Faith''. Tibetans received the teaching first in the eighth century with the translations of the sūtras, but it only began to have an impact in the eleventh century with the translation of the ''Ratnagotravibhāga''. Conforming to neither Madhyamaka nor Yogācāra, buddha-nature has been incorporated somewhat uneasily into both, although as a positivistic theory of reality it has been more easily accepted by Yogācārin traditions. +
Articles/A Late Proponent of the Jo nang gZhan stong Doctrine: Ngag dbang tshogs gnyis rgya mtsho (1880–1940) +
Although the doctrines and leading early figures of the Jonang tradition have been the focus of increasing scholarly attention over the past thirty years, much has yet to be written about developments in the tradition during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The goal of this paper is to shed light on this later period by focusing on one particular Jo nang thinker, Ngag dbang tshogs gnyis rgya mtsho (1880-1940). In order to contextualize his distinctive view and style, I will begin by sketching the historical evolution of the Jo nang tradition across Central and Eastern Tibet, and by providing some biographical and doctrinal information about Tshogs gnyis rgya mtsho’s main teacher, ’Ba’ mda’ Thub bstan dge legs rgya mtsho (1844-1904). +
This article introduces two studies by classical Tibetan Buddhist scholars that explain the range of meanings of the term ''zhentong''. The two texts—one by Pema Bidza (twentieth century), the other by Tāranātha (1575–1634)—are analytical studies that summarize and compare the various views of previous scholars who wrote on zhentong. Such interpretive studies are valuable in that they present us with different ways of interpreting the heterogeneous material classified under the rubric "zhentong." They also suggest ways of contextualizing the different levels of discourse found within this material. +
Articles/A Luminous Transcendence of Views: The Thirty Apophatic Topics in dPal dbyangs's Thugs kyi sgron ma +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
The constructed nostalgia of the later Great Perfection, or rDzogs chen, tradition gazes backward temporally and geographically toward eighth-century India, reminiscing an era in which the subcontinent is thought to have served as generous benefactor of Dharma gifts to the fledging Buddhist empire of Tibet. Insistence on the familiar Buddhist requirements for true transmission—authenticity and legitimacy founded in lineage and longevity—certainly inspired many of its textual "revelations" beginning in the eleventh century. Many of those nostalgic constructions of rNying ma history have been well documented by modern scholars.<br> It would be rash to assert, however, that despite all those imaginings, there were no historical primordia of the Great Perfection in the preceding centuries. The textual roots of the Mind Series (''sems sde'') texts are testament to these early stirrings, as are the Dunhuang manuscripts identified by Sam van Schaik as expressing a form of “Tibetan Zen.”[1] A third seed was planted via the Tibetan Mahāyoga tantra tradition, and within it, germinations of Great Perfection gnoseology, observable prominently in the ninth-century works of dPal dbyangs, who in some colophons and later histories is designated gNyan dPal dbyangs. His works include six canonical verse texts retrospectively entitled ''sGron ma drug'', or ''Six Lamps'',[2] and the ''rDo rje sems dpa’ zhus lan'' (''Vajrasattva Questions and Answers'') catechism found at Dunhuang in three manuscript copies. I have discussed these texts and their most likely Indian inspirations elsewhere. Here, I highlight a particular text within the ''Six Lamps'', his ''Thugs kyi sgron ma'' (''Lamp of the Mind''), as intending to establish, quite early on, a standard set of topics we see well developed in systemizations of the early Great Perfection tradition a few centuries later, and perhaps even before that, in Mind Series texts such as those attributed to Mañjuśrīmitra like the ''Byang chub kyi sems rdo la gser zhun'' and the ''Byang chub sems bsgom pa''.[3]<br> Of all dPal dbyangs’s texts, the ''Thugs kyi sgron ma'' is the ideological, linguistic, and practical hinge to his Mayājāla corpus as a whole, linking the other five of the ''Six Lamps'' texts and providing convincing evidence for accepting those ''Six Lamps'' as a collection, as well as offering insight to the later interpretations of his catechism. The ''Thugs kyi sgron ma'' displays dPal dbyangs’s full range of presentation. It includes, on the one hand, dPal dbyangs’s direct recommendations to Mahāyoga tantra, and on the other hand, his depictions of the realization of reality as utterly unstructured, unmediated, and transcendent of any dichotomization or reification, using the apophatic language sprinkled throughout the rest of the ''Six Lamps'' texts. Thus, by emphasizing these two elements—the transgressive and the transcendent—within a single text, the ''Thugs kyi sgron ma'' may have served as a valuable field guide to early Tibetan Mahāyoga and at least to some degree as a useful strategic plan for the cultivation of something more sustainable and vibrant on Tibetan soil, the Great Perfection. As I hope to show, dPal dbyangs’s very deliberate indexing of these topics appears to have been intended to standardize them as interpretive categories even while undercutting the value of reliance upon them as such, redefining Mahāyoga tantra as it found its earliest shape in Tibet. (Takahashi, introductory remarks, 159–60)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Sam van Schaik, “The Early Days of the Great Perfection,” ''Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies'' 27.1: 167 and 201.
#''The Six Lamps'' texts are as follows: ''The Lamp of the Mind'' (''Thugs kyi sgron ma''), ''The Lamp of the Correct View'' (''lTa ba yang dag sgron ma''), ''The Lamp Illuminating the Extremes'' (''mTha'i mun sel sgron ma''), ''The Lamp of Method and Wisdom'' (''Thabs shes sgron ma''), ''The Lamp of the Method of Meditation'' (''bsGom thabs kyi sgron ma''), and ''The Lamp of the Precious View'' (''lTa ba rin chen sgron ma''). These are P5918, P5919, P5920, P5921, P5922, and P5923, respectively. There are other ''Lamp'' collections in both Nyingma and Bön traditions, usually comprising four or six texts. The most prominent example of these is from the Bönpo Great Perfection lineage, the ''sGron ma drug gi gdams pa''. See Christopher Hatchell's "Advice on the Six Lamps" in ''Naked Seeing: The Great Perfection, the Wheel of Time, and Visionary Buddhism in Renaissance Tibet'' (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), and Jean-Luc Achard’s English translation in the ''Six Lamps: Secret Dzogchen Instructions of the Bön Tradition'' (Boston: Wisdom, 2017).
#See Namkhai Norbu and Kennard Lipman’s ''Primordial Experience: An Introduction to rDzogs-chen Meditation'' (Boston: Shambhala, 2001). Karen Liljenberg has discovered parallel passages to dPal dbyangs’s ''Lamp'' text the ''Thabs shes sgron ma'' in the ''rTse mo byung rgyal'', a text she has identified as belonging to the ''sems sde'' corpus the ''Sems sde lung chen po bco brgyad''. Karen Liljenberg, “A Critical Study of the Thirteen Later Translations of the Dzogchen Mind Series” (doctoral dissertation, SOAS, 2012), 57-60. I suspect there are further discoveries to be made of such borrowings between early Tibetan Mahāyoga texts and those of the early Mind Series. See also Liljenberg's paper elsewhere in this issue.
This essay deals with how the Sanskrit term ''tathāgatagarbha'' is used in the Mahāyāna text to which it gave its name, the ''Tathāgatagarbhasūtra''. Whether the ''Tathāgatagarbhasūtra'' is the oldest text in which the term appears or not, the particular way in which it is applied there documents that the authors created or made use of it while associating it with many diverse aspects, less in a philosophical or ''abhidharma''-like way but rather in a loose and associative style, opening the door to incorporate the different connotations described metaphorically in the sūtra. The rich illustrations found in the sūtra help us understand the early context in which the
term was coined and took shape. It will become evident that it is impossible to reduce the genesis and meaning of the term ''tathāgatagarbha'' by way of a monoexplanatory model. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
=====A Philosophy of Plants=====
The philosopher Tomonobu Imamichi (1922–2012) pointed out that most Japanese family crests are based on plant designs, indicating that, compared with cultures that employ dragons and eagles, or lions and tigers in their heraldry, Japanese cultural patterns show a strong tendency toward adaptability and harmony. Plants survive not as individuals but by species adaptation. This means that they grow where their seed randomly falls, existing within a pattern of dramatic change as their branches and leaves grow. Imamichi wrote, "In the very workings of their life, plants are a reiteration of elegant beauty as they bud, bloom, fall, proliferate, fruit, and change color, all within an intense yet inconspicuous struggle for life" (''Tōyō no bigaku'' [Aesthetics of the East], TBS Britannica, 1980). Plants take root in that space where their seed falls and form a community with other plants. They maintain harmony with their surroundings and continually transform themselves, adapting to changes in their environment. As Imamichi stated, the workings of their life are inconspicuous, but there is no doubt a severity of struggle to survive and flourish.<br>
=====Are Plants and Trees Nonsentient?=====
Mahayana Buddhism in general does not consider trees and plants to be capable of sensation and, with the exception of the Lotus and Śūraṅgama sutras, does not hesitate to place them on a par with tiles and stones. For example, the Mahāratnakūṭa Sūtra (Sutra of the Great Accumulation of Treasures) says, "Plants and trees, tiles and stones, like shadows, are not sentient" (Mahāratnakūṭa Sūtra, 78, Discourse to Pūrṇa, 17.2.4). Why is this so?<br> The geographer Yutaka Sakaguchi reports that recent research has shown that from the middle of the third century to around the sixth or seventh century the world experienced severe climate change in the form of cooling, drier conditions (see "Kako ichiman sanzennen no kikō no henka to jinrui no rekishi" [Climate change and the history of human beings
during the past thirteen thousand years], ''Kōza, bunmei to kankyō, 6: Rekishi to kikō'' [Lecture series, 6, Civilization and the environment: History and climate] [Asakura Shoten, 1995 (revised edition, 2008)], 1–11). The Mahayana sutras, with their prohibition of meat eating, were compiled at this time. Why this prohibition was added to the small simple meals demanded by asceticism can thus be explained in ecoreligious terms. In all probability, the acceptance of ascetic behavior in relation to food and the rejection of meat by religious practitioners and the societies that supported them derived from severe and long-term food shortages. At such a time, rather than rearing pigs and other animals on plant food and then eating their meat, many more human lives could be sustained by a considerably lesser volume by eating vegetable foodstuffs directly. "Hence, in order to keep both monks and lay followers free from what was deemed unnecessary inconvenience and qualms, the sentience of plants was, by and large, ignored [in the precept against the taking of life]" (Lambert Schmithausen, ''Buddhism and Nature: The Lecture Delivered on the Occasion of the EXPO 1990'' [International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1991], 7).<br>
=====Plants and the Lotus Sutra=====
Chapter 5 of the Lotus Sutra, "The Parable of the Herbs," likens the teachings of the Buddha benefiting all beings equally to the rain that falls on all trees, shrubs, herbs, and grasses, enabling them to grow and blossom, producing fruits. This chapter was to have an important influence on the Chinese Tiantai and Japanese Tendai schools of Buddhism. Whereas the Chinese Huayan school held that plants are not sentient and cannot achieve enlightenment, in commentaries such as Fazang's (643–712) ''Huayanjing tanxuanji'' (Records of the search for the profundities of the Avataṃsaka Sūtra), Tiantai scholars advocated plants' capability of attaining buddhahood. This must have been because of the image presented in "The Parable of the Herbs." (Read the entire article [https://rk-world.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/DW18_7-12.pdf here])
No abstract given. Here is the appendix in full:<br><br>
Common throughout the De bźin bśegs pa’i sñiṅ po’i mdo (Tathāgatagarbha sūtra) of the Lang Kanjur are several features which are generally assumed to be archaic, such as the ''ya btags'' in all words beginning with ''m''- followed by the vowel ''i'' or ''e'' (e.g. ''myi'', ''myed'', etc.), the usage of the ''da drag'', the ''tsheg'' placed before ''śad'', the ''mtha’ rten ’a'' (e.g. ''dpe’ ''), occasionally a reversed ''gi gu'', ''la''(''s'') (''b'')''stsogs pa'' for ''la sogs pa'', the omission of genitive particles and, in the verses, the reading '' ’i'' instead of ''yi'' ('' ’i'' counting as a full syllable).<br> The version of the ''sūtra'' represents the canonical transmission (and not the translation found in the “Kanjur from Bathang”).[85] Stemmatically, the text in the Lang Kanjur is very close to the three Phug brag versions of the ''sūtra'', which have been shown to derive from one and the same archetype.[86] It shares mistakes with this archetype. In other instances it is, however, free of the secondary readings found in all three of the Phug brag versions. In all the cases where Phug brag shares a
mistake with the representatives of the Tshal pa-line, the Kanjur version from Dolpo also has this secondary reading. Its use for establishing the stemma of the canonical versions of the De bźin gśegs pa’i sñiṅ po’i mdo is therefore restricted primarily to evaluating the readings of the Phug brag Kanjur in the instances where Phug brag deviates from the Tshal pa-transmission. In all the cases where the Chinese translations of the ''sūtra'' could be used to decide on the originality of a reading in the Tibetan, it turned out that whenever the variant in the Lang Kanjur was identical with the one of Tshal pa as against Phug brag, the latter variant was secondary. (Zimmermann, appendix, 104–5)
<h5>Notes</h5>
85. For more details on this paracanonical translation see Zimmermann 1998.<br>86. See Zimmermann 2002: 173–177.
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
By the 12th century at least nine commentaries on The ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' had been written in Tibet, of which apparently only one has been preserved and reproduced. In the following two centuries at least 16 ''RGV'' commentaries were composed, of which ten, perhaps more, have been preserved. In the 15th and 16th centuries it seems that only eight ''RGV'' commentaries were written, of which at least five have been preserved. Only two commentaries were written in the 17th and 18th centuries, one of which has been preserved and in the 19th and 20th centuries seven ''RGV'' commentaries were written, all of which are preserved.
Here 45 Tibetan commentaries on the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' (''RGV''), better known in Tibet as the ''Mahayanūttaratantrāśāstra'', ''Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma bstan bcos'' or ''Rgyud bla ma'' are introduced as an attempt at charting all Tibetan ''RGV'' commentaries. A short presentation of their authors and their bibliographical references are given. The listing is in chronological order and the key data are provided in a chart in the appendix representing the result of research into various catalogues, hand lists and other accounts. It is my hope that some of those texts, which here are listed as lost, eventually will turn out to have been preserved. [1]
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Since ''Tathāgatagarbha'' in its various interpretations appear in a wide variety of literary compositions, the delimiting factor for compiling this list has been Tibetan commentaries that in their title explicitly state that they are commentaries on ''Ratnagotravibhāga''. (Burchardi, preliminary remarks, 1) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The reign of the King Ṭhi-sroṅ-deu-tsen (Khri-sroṅ-Idehu-btsan, VII century) represents a period of the greatest importance in the early history of Tibet in general and of the spread of Buddhism in that country in particular. The activity of the great Śāntirakṣita ("Ācārya Bodhisattva") and of Padma-sambhava. the selection of the first seven Buddhist monks of Tibetan origin (''sad-mi mi bdun''), the foundation of numerous sites of Buddhist learning in Tibet, and the intense literary activity of the Tibetan learned translators (''lo-tsa-ba'')—Pal-tseg (dPal-brtsegs) and others by whom a great number of Buddhist canonical and scientific works were rendered into Tibetan,—all this has been described by Bu-ston in his History of Buddhism and in other Tibetan historical works<br> There is, however, one subject relating to the spread of Buddhism in Ṭhi-sroṅ-deu-tsen's reign, to which the Tibetan historian devotes his special attention and on which he dwells in detail. This is the strife between two parties into which the Buddhists of Tibet were at that time split. One of these parties consisted of the pupils and followers of Ācārya Śāntirakṣita who professed that form of Mahāyāna Buddhism which was generally acknowledged in India and Nepal, ''viz''. the teaching of the Path to Enlightenment through the practice of meditation connected with the dialectical analysis peculiar to the Mādhyamika school of the Buddhists and with the practice of the six Transcendental Virtues (''pāramitā'').<br> The leader of the other party was a Chinese teacher (''hwa-śaṅ'' or ''ho-shang'') known by the Sanskrit name Mahāyānadeva, who preached a doctrine of complete quietism and inactivity. According to him every kind of religious practice, the meditative exercises and all virtuous deeds as well were completely useless and even undesirable: the liberation from the bonds of phenomenal existence was to be attained merely through the complete cessation of every kind of thought and mental activity,—by abiding perpetually in a state analogous to sleep. Bu-ston[1] relates how this party grew very powerful and found numerous adherents among the Tibetans, how the followers of Śāntirakṣita suffered oppression from it, and how the king who was an adherent of Śāntirakṣita's system, invited Śāntirakṣita's pupil, the teacher Kamalaśīla in order to refute the incorrect teachings of the Chinese party. The dispute between Kamalaśīla and the Chinese Ho-shang in which the latter was defeated is described by Bu-ston[2] in detail. We read that the leading men of the two parties[3] assembled in the presence of the king, that the Ho-shang was the first to speak in favour of his theory of quietism and inactivity and was answered by Kamalaśīla who demonstrated all the absurdity of the theses maintained by the Ho-shang and showed that the teachings of such a kind were in conflict with the main principles of Buddhism and were conducive to the depreciation and rejection of the most essential features of the Buddhist Path to Enlightenment. We read further on how the chief adherents of Kamalaśīla[4] likewise refuted the theories of the Ho-shang, how the latter and his party acknowledged themselves vanquished and were expelled from Tibet by order of the king who prescribed to follow henceforth the Buddhist doctrines that were generally admitted,—the teaching of the six Virtues as regards religious practice and the Mādhvamika system of Nāgārjuna as regards the theory.[5]<br> Thus the influence of the Chinese Ho-shang’s teachings over the minds of the Tibetans suffered a complete defeat and with it perhaps some political influence of China.[6] This is certainly a most important event in the history of Tibetan Buddhism which has been duly appreciated by Bu-ston. It is therefore quite natural that we should be interested in finding out the sources of Bu-ston's historical record. But the text of Bu-ston's History which, as a rule, contains references to the works on the foundation of which it has been compiled, does not give us any information here. At the first glance the account of the controversy looks like the reproduction of an oral tradition and there is nothing that could make us conjecture the presence of a literary work upon which the record could have been founded- The following will show that it has now become possible to trace out this work, to compare with it the account given by Bu-ston and to ascertain its historical importance. (Obermiller, "A Sanskrit MS. from Tibet," 1–3)
[https://ia801608.us.archive.org/2/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.277506/2015.277506.1105_W_O_text.pdf Read more here . . .]
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Cf. my ''Translation'', Vol. II. p. 192
#''Ibid'': pp. 192, 193.
#Known by the Chinese names Tön-mün (sTon-mun, the party of the Ho-shong) and Tsen-min (rTsen-min, the adherents of Kamalaśīla).
#Śrīghoṣa (Tib. dpal-dbyaṅs) and Jñānendra (Tib, Ye-śes-dbaṅ-po).
#Henceforth the Mādhyamika has become the predominant school in Tibet.
#Kamalaśīla was subsequently murdered by the Ho-shang's adherents.
Articles/A Second Tibetan Translation of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra in the Newark Manuscript Kanjur from Bathang: A Translation of the Early Period (snga dar) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
Among the Tibetan Collection of the Newark Museum in Newark (New Jersey) there is an incomplete manuscript Kanjur from Bathang in Khams (East Tibet). In spite of the fact that this
Kanjur was already donated to the museum as early as 1920 it is surprising that it has only recently become the object of a scholarly treatment of some length.[1] In his critical edition of the ''Mahāsūtras'' (cp. n. 1), Peter Skilling has used internal criteria to prove that the Bathang Kanjur is affiliated to neither the ''Tshal pa'' lineage nor to the ''Them spangs ma'' lineage of textual transmission. Its independent character can also be ascertained by external kanjurological
criteria: the collection of the texts, its grouping and its order within the volumes are unique. It becomes, therefore, very plausible that "the Newark Kanjur belongs to an old and independent textual transmission that predates the compilation of the ''Tshal pa'' and ''Them spangs ma'' collections."[2]<br> Contained in the ''ta'' volume of the sūtra section (''mdo bsde ta'') of this Kanjur is the ''Tathāgatagarbhasūtra'' (''TGS'').[3] In the process of editing the Tibetan text of this important Mahāyāna work, of which no Indic copies have come down to us, I used most of the available, historically relevant Kanjurs.[4] Among these 13 versions alone the ''TGS'' found in this Kanjur from Bathang represents a different, second translation (''Bth''). As the existence of two independent Tibetan translations of the same Indic text are of rare occurrence, this study intends to throw light on the differences between the two Tibetan texts, to describe the particular features of ''Bth'' and finally to classify it within the history of Tibetan translation activities. (Zimmermann, introductory remarks, 33–35)<br><br>
[https://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hamburg.de/pdf/5-personen/zimmermann/tohoku-gakkai-1998-tathagatagarbha.pdf Read more here . . .]<br><br>
<h5>Notes</h5>
#For a description of the Kanjur cp. Eleanor Olson, ''Catalogue of the Newark Museum Tibetan Collection'', Vol. III, Newark 1971, p. 114, dating it to the 16th century; the most detailed analysis of the 23 volumes of the Kanjur can be found in Peter Skilling's unpublished article ''Kanjur Manuscripts in the Newark Museum: A Preliminary Report'', Nandapurī 1995; the only study including some texts of this Kanjur in a textcritical edition is Peter Skilling's (ed.) ''Mahāsūtras: Great Discourses of the Buddha'', Vol. I: Texts, Oxford 1994 (The Pali Text Society, Sacred Books of the Buddhists Vol. XLIV).
#Skilling, ''Kanjur Manuscripts''. . . . , p. 4.
#Vol. ''ta'', folios 245b1–258a8. The title at the beginning of the volume reads ''de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po zhes bya ba'i mdo' ''. The title at the beginning of the sūtra itself runs: ''de bzhin gshyes <pa'i> snying po zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo''. It seems remarkable that the Tibetan equivalent for Skt. ''ārya'', '' 'phags pa'', does not appear in the titles of the Bathang translation whereas it is common to all the other major Kanjurs. The spelling ''mdo bsde'' can be found "consistently on all tags" (Skilling, ''Kanjur Manuscripts''. . . , p. 6, n. 16).
#The critical edition of the ''TGS'' is part of a Ph.D. thesis to be submitted at the University of Hamburg. The collation comprises the versions of the ''TGS'' as contained in the Kanjurs from Berlin, Derge, Lithang, London, Narthang, Peking (Ōtani reprint), Phug brag (three versions), Stog, Tabo (fragmentary) and Tokyo (Toyo Bunko) compared with the two Chinese translations. ''Bth'' will be appended as a diplomatic edition.
This article concerns the Indian ''tathāgatagarbha'' literature: Mahāyānist works, produced no later than the early fifth century, which assert that all sentient beings possess already the qualities of a Buddha. Early works of this tradition—perhaps even the earliest that are available to us—explain possession of the ''tathāgatagarbha'' to constitute the existence of the self (''ātman''). These sources, foremost the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra'', show evidence that their authors faced strong opposition from audiences committed to the more conventional Buddhist doctrine of ''anātman'', but contend defensively that the ''ātman'' that they teach is nothing like any notion of selfhood found in non-Buddhist religious traditions.<br> With reference to two of these '' 'ātmavādin’ '' ''tathāgatagarbha'' works, I present evidence that authors of this tradition used the idea of a Buddhist doctrine of the self to undermine non-Buddhist accounts of liberation: not only describing them as deficient, but as having been created (''nirmita'') by the Buddha himself. Such claims expand the boundaries of the Buddha’s sphere of influence, after the description of his activities found in the ''Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra'': a clear influence upon these ''tathāgatagarbha'' sources. Other Mahāyānist literature of an ‘ekayānist’ orientation used this strategy also: i.e. that any teaching regarding liberation from ''saṃsāra'' finds its origin in the activities of Buddhas and bodhisattvas, but has its definitive expression in the Buddhist dharma. The ''tathāgatagarbha'' presented as a Buddhist doctrine of the self can hence be understood as a complement to a certain understanding of the Mahāyāna, here the archetype of all paths that claim to deliver an end to ''saṃsāra'', and to an account of the Buddha as the architect of all ostensibly non-Buddhist accounts of liberation. +
Buddhanature, or tathagatagarbha: some say it is not Buddhist, some say it is quintessentially so. I do not want to push either judgment upon you; there is more than one way to be a Buddhist! Instead, I want to provide a roundup of some formative buddhanature texts and allow you to see what is unique about them, in the hope that you might explore these fascinating works for yourself.
In the texts outlined below, we see innovative steps taken away from the philosophical preoccupation with emptiness (sunyata) and not-self (anatman) with which much early Buddhist scholasticism was concerned, with a focus instead on a type of liberative phenomenology that allows us to uncover our “true” nature and realize liberation. ([https://www.lionsroar.com/a-short-guide-to-key-buddhanature-texts/ Read more here]) +
Articles/A Study of the Early-Stage Translations of Foxing 佛性 in Chinese Buddhism: The Da Banniepan Jing 大般涅槃經 Trans. Dharmakṣema and the Da Fangdeng Rulaizang Jing 大方等如來藏經 Trans. Buddhabhadra +
The ''Da fangdeng rulaizang jing'' 大方等如來藏經 (Skt. ''Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra''), translated by Buddhabhadra 佛陀跋陀羅 (358–429) is one of the early Chinese Buddhist canon texts where the term ''foxing'' 佛性 (Jp. ''busshō''; Buddha-nature) is clearly used to express Buddha-nature. However, the term ''foxing'' cannot be confirmed in other extant translations of the ''Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra''. Another early text in the Chinese Buddhist canon, the ''Da banniepan jing'' 大般涅槃經 (Skt. ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra''), translated by Dharmakṣema 曇無讖 (385?–433), also used the term ''foxing'', which cannot be correspondingly confirmed in the surviving Sanskrit fragments of this scripture. Some significant differences in ''foxing'' between the Sanskrit fragments and Dharmakṣema's translation of this sutra belong to the
first twelve fascicles of Dharmakṣema's translation completed under his collaborators' support when he had not mastered the Chinese language. It is very likely that Faxian 法顯 (337–422) translated a version of the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra'' that featured ''buddhadhātu'' as ''foxing''. Buddhabhadra, in the same period, translated a version of the ''Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra'', in which he favoured the term ''foxing'' over a literal translation of the Sanskrit. As another contemporary monk with these two, Dharmakṣema translated the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra'', going further than Faxian by using the term ''foxing'' regularly. These texts influenced the Dilun monastic tradition 地論宗. Among these, the term ''foxing'' and its Sinicism explanations played the most significant role, influencing the whole of the Chinese and even East Asian Buddhist thought. +
In this paper, historical materials are employed to point the reader toward scriptural sources for the tathāgatagarbha traditions of India and Tibet, including their relationship with theories of the mind-basis-of-all (kun gzhi rnam shes, ālayavijñāna). In addition, three primary tathāgatagarbha traditions in Tibet are described and compared: those of the Jo-nang-bas following Döl-bo-ba Shay-rap-gyel-tsen (dol bo pa shes rab rgyal mtshan, 1292–1361), the Sa-ḡyas following Bu-don (bu ston, 1290–1364), and the Ge-luk-don following Dzong-ka-ba (tsong kha pa, 1357–1419). Doctrines concerning the basic constituent (khams, dhātu) and three buddha bodies are examined insofar as these doctrines shed light on theories of tathāgatagarbha. Since Dzong-ka-ba extensively refuted the Jo-nang position─often called Other Emptiness (gzhan stong)─in his Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: The Essence of Eloquence (drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par phye ba'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po) and other works on the philosophical view of emptiness, this paper examines Dzong-ka-ba's discussion and critique of the Jo-nang Other Emptiness. Ten specific criticisms of Other Emptiness made by Dzong-ka-ba and his followers are compared with presentations of Other Emptiness by Jo-nang authors. Two Jo-nang texts recently translated by Professor Jeffrey Hopkins are employed in this comparison: Döl-bo-ba Śhay-rap-gyel-tsen’s Mountain Doctrine, Ocean of Definitive Meanings (ri chos nges don rgya mtsho) and Tāranātha’s Essence of Other Emptiness (gzhan stong snying po). These comparisons show that Dzong-ka-ba's critique does not always accurately reflect the Jo-nang philosophical view. +
No abstract given. The following are the first relevant paragraphs. Japanese characters following the transliteration for names and works are unavailable.<br><br>
La question n'est pas nouvelle; plusieurs fois déjà elle a été étudiée, et diverses solutions lui ont été données. Kern, dans son ''Histoire du bouddhisme dans l'Inde'' (<sup>1</sup>), rejetant l'opinion communément admise en Extrême-Orient, plaça Vasubandhu au VI<sup>e</sup> siècle de notre ère. Buhler (<sup>2</sup>) essaya vainement de le ramener au IV<sup>e</sup> : la thèse de Kern conserva la faveur des indianistes. En 1890, M. Sylvain Lévi, dans son remarquable ouvrage sur ''Le théâtre indien'' (<sup>3</sup>), tentait d'établir que la période d'activité de Vasubandhu couvrait toute la première moitié du VI<sup>e</sup> siècle ; et dans une note sur ''La date de Vasubandhu'' (<sup>4</sup>), il la reportait même jusqu'au milieu et à la fin de ce siècle. Depuis lors à diverses reprises, notamment dans ses ''Donations religieuses des rois de Valabhī'' (<sup>5</sup>) et dans ses ''Notes chinoises sur l'Inde parues ici même'' (<sup>6</sup>), il s'est efforcé d'étayer sa thèse de nouvelles considérations. M. Takakusu Junjirō, après avoir proposé les limites de 450–550 pour l'« àge moyen » (<sup>7</sup>) dans lequel Yi-tsing range Vasubandhu et Asaṅga, essaya ensuite de les préciser davantage en ce qui concerne le premier et d'établir qu'il avait vécu de 420 à 500 environ de notre ère (<sup>8</sup>). En 1908, M. Wogihara (<sup>9</sup>) démontrait en détail ce que les anciens catalogues chinois du Tripiṭaka, ''Nei tien lou'', ''K'ai-yuan lou'', etc., des écrivains comme Touen-louen des T'ang dans son ''Yeou-kia louen ki'' (<sup>1</sup>), еt M. Nanjio Bunyu (<sup>2</sup>) avaient déjà dit sommairement, à savoir qu'un ouvrage d'Asaṅga, le ''Yogācāryabhūmi çāstra'' (<sup>3</sup>), avait été partiellement traduit en chinois par Dharmarakṣa entre 414 et 421, soit dès le commencement du V<sup>e</sup> siècle (<sup>4</sup>).<br>
Enfin dans l'introduction de sa traduction du ''Mahāyāna-Sutrālaṃkāra'' (<sup>5</sup>) parue en 1911, M. S. Lévi, abandonnant sa première opinion, écrit à propos d'Asaṅga : « Son activité couvre toute la première moitié du V<sup>e</sup> siècle, en débordant de part et d'autre sur les deux extrémités de cette période. » C'est peutêtre un peu long, car si Asaṅga a vécu soixante-quinze ans, les documents à notre connaissance nous disent qu'il chercha sa voie un certain temps. N'oublions pas d'ailleurs que le ''Yogācāryabhūmi çāstra'', l'œuvre maîtresse d'Asaṅga, est de dimensions considérables: la traduction chinoise compte 100 ''kiuan''. Son importance dogmatique n'est pas moindre. Il est l'expression d'une pensée maîtresse d'elle-mème, qui a dépassé la période des incertitudes et des tàtonnements. Il est assez peu vraisemblable, mème sans tenir compte des indications données par Paramārtha dans sa vie de Vasubandhu, qu'il ait été écrit par un tout jeune homme. En tout cas, quelque différence d'àge qu'on veuille admettre entre Asaṅga et Vasubandhu, — et il faut tenir compte de l'existence d'un troisième frère, Viriñcivatsa (<sup>6</sup>) — celui-ci, bien qu'il ait vécu quatre-vingts ans, n'aurait pu, dans ces conditions, dépasser ni mème atteindre la fin du V<sup>e</sup> siècle.<br>
D'une manière générale, il semble que dans les études qui ont porté sur ce sujet, quelques documents aient été ignorés et que d'autres aient été délibérément écartés de la discussion comme douteux. En bonne logique, ce simple doute qui ne parait pas avoir jamais été sérieusement éclairci, suffirait à enlever toute sécurité aux conclusions que l'on a cru pouvoir formuler sans en tenir compte, ou si l'on préfère, elles ne sauraient ètre que provisoires tant que la menace qu'il laisse planer sur elles n'a pas été définitivement écartée. La question me parait donc devoir ètre reprise, les documents déclarés douteux soumis à un nouvel examen, et mis en œuvre aussi ceux qui n'ont pas encore été utilisés. Je n'ai pas d'ailleurs la prétention d'ètre complet. C'est à peu près uniquement à la première série, (missing characters), du Supplément du Tripiṭaka de Kyōto, œuvres hindoues et chinoises, que sont empruntés les textes qu'on trouvera au cours de cette étude. Les quelque 700 fascicules déjà parus de cette admirable publication, d'une importance capitale pour les études bouddhiques, en contiennent sans doute d'autres encore, qu'une recherche plus approfondie et plus complète ferait découvrir. Je n'ai pu que feuilleter les œuvres qui m'ont paru devoir ètre les plus intéressantes pour mon sujet par leur date, leur auteur ou leur genre. (Péri, preliminary remarks, 339–41)<br><br>
[https://www.persee.fr/doc/befeo_0336-1519_1911_num_11_1_2695 Read more here . . .]
<h5>Notes</h5>
1. T. II, p. 414; ''Annales du Musée Guimet'', t. XI, p. 450; il parle principalement d'Asaṅga, et se basant sur la date de l'avènement de Çīladitya (610, propose les dates de 485 à 560. C'est évidemment à cet ouvrage que la ''Chronology of India'' de Mrs. Mabel Duff les emprunte, et non au ''Buddhismus'' de Vassilieff, auquel elle renvoie. Celui-ci ne dit rien de tel; si je ne me trompe, il donne seulement la date bouddhiste de 900 ans, dont je parlerai plus loin.<br>
2. ''Die indischen Inschriften und das Alter der indischen Kunst-Poesie'', dans ''Sitzungsberichte der Kais. Akademie der Wissenschaften'', Wien, 1890, p. 79 sqq.<br>
3. Cf. I, 165, et II, 35.<br>
4. ''Journal Asiatique'', 1890, II, p. 552–553.<br>
5. ''Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Hautes-Etudes''. Sciences religieuses, vol. VII. ''Etudes de critique et d'histoire'', p. 97.<br>
6. ''La date de Candragomin. BEFEO'', III (1903), 47-49.<br>
7. ''A Record of the Buddhist religion.... by I-tsing'', p. VIII.<br>
8. ''La Sāṃkhyakārikā étudiée à la lumière de sa version chinoise, BEFEO'', IV (1904), p. 37-56; et ''A study of Paramārtha's life of Vasubandhu and the date of Vasubandhu'', dans ''Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society'', 1905.<br>
9. ''Asaṅga's Bodhisattvabhūmi, ein dogmatischer Text der Nordbuddhisten'', Leipzig. B. E. F. E.-O. T. XI. —22.<br>
1. Grand ouvrage en 48 k., publié dans le supplément au Tripiṭaka de Kyoto, 1<sup>re</sup>
série, boites LXXV, fasc. 4 et 5, et LXXVI, fasc. 1 à 4. Le passage cité se trouve boite LXXV, fasc. 4, p. 308.<br>
2. Cf. Nanjio, ''Catalogue'', n<sup>os</sup> 1083, 1086, etc.<br>
3. Nanjio, ''Catalogue''. n<sup>o</sup> 1170.<br>
4. Le canon chinois contient sept ou huit traductions partielles de cet ouvrage, faites à des époques parfois très voisines les unes des autres, sous des titres différents ; encore n'avons-nous pas toutes celles qui le furent: le ''K'ai-yuan lou'', k. 12, en cite une dizaine pour le mème texte. Le fait qu'il en existait des extraits si nombreux, assez différents pour que des contemporains les traduisissent séparément à quelques années de distance, permet de croire qu'un intervalle assez long sépare la composition de l'ouvrage des premières traductions d'extraits faites en Chine.<br>
5. B. E. H. E. Sciences historiques et philologiques, fasc. 190, p. *2.<br>
6. (Characters not available). Watters, ''On Yuan Chwang's travels'', I, p. 210, propos Bilindibhava qui paraît inadmissible. ''Bilindi'' est inconnu, tandis que ''viriñci'' est employé dans la composition de plusieurs noms ; ''bhava'' ne concorde pas avec le sens de « fils, enfant », que Paramārtha attribue aux deux dernières syllabes et qu'il expose avec beaucoup de précision, représente d'ailleurs un mot à ancienne finale dentale; quant à (missing character), c'est sùrement ici une simple faute de copiste, très fréquente du reste pour (missing character).
This is a compilation of several sources that speak about buddha-nature. These include:
Pabhassara Sutta<br>
Kevaddha Sutta<br>
Nibbana Sutta<br>
Ashtasahasrika Prajnaparamita Sutra<br>
Samdhinirmochana Sutra<br>
Mahaparinirvana Sutra<br>
Shrimaladevi Sutra <br>
Tathagatagarbha Sutra <br>
Lankavatara Sutra<br>
Bodhidharma’s Breakthrough Sermon<br>
Sengcan’s Song of the Trusting Mind<br>
Hongren’s Treatise on the Supreme Vehicle<br>
Huineng’s Platform Sutra<br>
Yongjia’s Song of Realizing the Way<br>
Shitou’s Record<br>
Shitou’s Song of the Grass-Roof Hermitage <br>
Dongshan’s Song of the Jewel Mirror Samadhi <br>
Caoshan’s Verse<br>
Guishan’s Record<br>
Mazu’s Record<br>
Baizhang’s Record<br>
Huangbo’s Transmission of Mind <br>
Linji’s Record<br>
Nanquan’s Record<br>
Changsha’s Record <br>
Yunmen’s Record <br>
Yuanwu’s Letters <br>
Hongzhi’s Record<br>
Dogen’s Treasury of the True Dharma Eye<br>
Ejo’s Absorption in the Treasury of Light<br>
Keizan’s Transmission of Light<br>
32nd Ancestor Hongren<br>
34th Ancestor Qingyuan<br>
38th Ancestor Dongshan <br>
40th Ancestor Dongan <br>
46th Ancestor Tanxia<br>
49th Ancestor Xuedou<br>
52nd Ancestor Dogen<br>
53rd Ancestor Ejo <br>
Chinul’s Complete Sudden Attainment of Buddhahood<br>
Chinul’s Secrets of Cultivating the Mind<br>
Bassui’s One Mind<br>
Bankei’s Record<br>
Hakuin’s Four Cognitions<br>
Menzan’s Self-Enjoyment Samadhi<br>
Shunryu Suzuki’s Mind Waves (from "Zen Mind, Beginner’s Mind")<br>
Shunryu Suzuki’s Resuming Big Mind (from "Not Always So")<br>
Padmasambhava’s Self-Liberation through Seeing with Naked Awareness<br>
Dakpo Tashi Namgyal’s Clarifying the Natural State<br>
Karma Chagmey’s Union of Mahamudra and Dzogchen<br>
Jamgon Mipham’s Lamp that Dispels Darkness +
The following preface was added by Aurel Stein to Appendix F, which was prepared for this publication by A. F. Rudolf Hoernle:
[NOTE. The materials embodied in this list were received in a final form from Dr. Hoernle. early in 1918. The typed press copy prepared from them was after his death in November of that year checked with the original under the kind supervision of Dr. F. W. Thomas.
Owing to various reasons difficulty was experienced about verifying the exact reading of all extracts quoted by Dr. Hoernle from particular MSS., mainly in Khotanese language. It being thus impossible to assure in this respect the degree of accuracy which that most painstaking collaborator would have aimed at, I have thought it advisable to reduce the reproduction of such quotations within narrow limits. For convenient reference by future students the original Inventory ' slips' as received from Dr. Hoernle's hand, as well as a typed copy of them, have been deposited at the India Office Library.—A. STEIN.]<br><br>
[http://dsr.nii.ac.jp/toyobunko/VIII-5-B2-9/V-3/page/0402.html.en Read more here . . .] +
B
Articles/Beings, Non-Beings, and Buddhas: Contrasting Notions of Tathāgatagarbha in the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta and *Mahābherī Sūtra +
This article concerns a little studied text of the Mahāyānist ''tathāgatagarbha'' literature, namely the *''Mahābherī Sūtra'', and its relation to other Indian texts which advance forms of ''tathāgatagarbha'' doctrine. Its focus will be the contrast between the content of this ''sūtra'' and the only other text of the ''tathāgatagarbha'' tradition which discusses a particular issue: the unchanging mass of existing sentient beings, without the possibility of any decrease or increase in their number. This is an issue addressed also by the ''Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta'', which I shall argue presents a more sophisticated and likely later consideration, both of this matter and of ''tathāgatagarbha'' doctrine, than that exhibited by the *''Mahābherī Sūtra''. Though it is not clear that either text knew of the other, their different treatments of how one should understand the nature and number of existing sentient beings casts light on their respective places in two distinct strains—one very likely older than the other—of Indian ''tathāgatagarbha'' thought. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>Buddhism has a profound and thoroughly developed set of teachings on human being. One might well argue that the question of human being is the question ''par excellence'' with which the Buddhist tradition as a whole struggles. According to the traditional account, for example, the point of departure for the Buddha's own search, discoveries, and teachings was the dilemma of the human condition. Moreover, vast numbers of Buddhist texts speak out of or address human experience as such, consciously focusing upon it as the source of both question and answer. Nonetheless, many questions a modern Westerner asks as a matter of course about human being are not directly addressed in the Buddhist texts. There are of course important reasons for this. Our concept of and assumptions about human individuality are profoundly different from Buddhist views of the same. Our two worlds of discourse about the value and meaning of finite bodily existence, the course of history, the meaning of suffering, and the nature of possible human greatness are set up on entirely different foundations. Thus, for a contemporary Westerner to ask the question "What is a person? What is a human being?" of a Buddhist text is to set oneself up to receive an answer that does not satisfy the intent of the question. Yet, while Buddhist views and assumptions differ so markedly from our own, Buddhist texts reveal in their own way a preoccupation with the human condition as intent as that of our own hyperindividualistic, anthropocentric culture.<br> With such a shared fixation, it is inevitable that persons on both sides of the cultural boundaries will attempt to gain light from the other side on this subject, despite the incommensurability of each other's questions and answers. The present essay is one such attempt: not an East-West comparison, but an effort to address a Buddhist text from the perspective of cross-cultural philosophy (still, despite the name, a thoroughly Western enterprise) . Herein I will engage in dialogue the ''Buddha Nature Treatise'' (Chinese: ''Fo Hsing Lun''<sup>a</sup>; hereafter, ''BNT''), a text representative of the Buddha nature tradition that contains an extensive discussion of the concept of Buddha nature, a crucial component, if not the most crucial component, of the East Asian Buddhist concept of human being. I will attempt to wrest from the text answers to two categories of questions-it s view of the ontological nature of human being and its view of the existential status of human beings. In the course of the discussion I will ask such questions as: What roles do individuality and freedom play in the view of human being portrayed in this text? What value, if any, does an individual human personality possess? Is there anything of value in human history? Clearly, the text itself does not speak in these terms; these are the questions of a twentieth-century, philosophically inclined American. In order to bridge the cultural gap, I will first give a summary account of the text's concept of Buddha nature in its own terms and in its own format. Then, acknowledging that the text itself neither speaks this language nor shares my concerns, I will put my questions to the text and attempt to extract from the text its implications for the subject of my concern. In other words, I cannot claim that the author of the ''BNT'' does make the statements I will give as responses to my questions about human being, but I do claim that these views are implicit in and follow from the statements he does make about Buddha nature. Granting that human freedom requires us to expect the unexpected, nonetheless, I believe that if the author of the ''BNT'' were here today and could engage in dialogue with me, as long as my interlocutor remained consistent, something close to the views I will articulate in the course of this essay would emerge. (King, "Buddha Nature and the Concept of Person," 151–52)
Kyabje Lama Zopa Rinpoche explained how we can attain the state of the omniscient mind at the 14th Kopan Course in 1981. This is an edited excerpt from Lecture 3, Section One of the course. [https://www.lamayeshe.com/article/chapter/section-one-lectures-1-5 Click here] to read more. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs
To understand what is meant by “Buddha Nature,” we can look at the story of the three turnings of the wheel of Dharma taught by Shakyamuni Buddha. The first turning of the Dharma wheel is the four noble truths: that discontent arises from grasping the ever-changing phenomena of body and mind as “me,” and that freedom from this discontent is revealed through the path of not grasping anything as truly me. The
four noble truths is a kind of deconstruction method. However, in this first turning, all the different elements that we can deconstruct this person into really do exist. Earth, wind, fire and water, for example: those kind of physical elements, when you break them down into their smallest bits, are indestructible elemental energies or physical matter, atoms. Early Buddhists, who were first turning exponents, had this kind of theory—that the world is made up of atoms—several centuries B.C., long before modern scientists discovered atoms. We don’t really exist as independent “persons”; we are a conglomeration of all this stuff that we think is a real “me,” but if we look closely, we only find atoms. This turning of the Dharma wheel was only the first.
Read more [https://kokyohenkel.weebly.com/uploads/1/2/7/4/127410773/buddha_nature.pdf here] +
Articles/Buddha in the Storehouse: Mi bskyod rdo rje on the Relationship between Tathāgatagarbha and Ālayavijñāna +
This paper addresses the age-old question of how buddha nature (''tathāgatagarbha'') relates to Yogācāra psychology, focusing on the Eighth Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje’s (1507-1554) responses to this question. In the centuries following the first appearance of ''tathāgatagarbha'' doctrines in India (circa 2nd c. CE), opinions became divided over whether buddha nature should be identified with or distinguished from the Yogācāra idea of a substratum consciousness (''ālayavijñāna''). The topic attracted a great deal of discussion and debate among Buddhist scholars, both within and beyond the borders of India. At stake were a set of specific doctrinal issues as to whether and how the Yogācāra ''ālayavijñāna-vāsanā'' model could be reconciled with [1] buddha nature theory [2] tantric buddha nature proxies such as the unconditioned ground (''gzhi'') and causal continuum (''rgyu rgyud'') [3] Indian and Chinese Buddhist conceptions of an immaculate consciousness (''amalavijñāna'') and [4] certain anti-foundationalist strains of Middle Way (Madhyamaka) philosophy that rejected any transcendental basis of consciousness. The Karma pa’s repeated forays into these contested subject areas reveal time and again his commitment to reconcile two contrasting lines of Buddhist thought and praxis: [1] the affirmative appraisal of the nature of mind and reality emphasized in Yogācāra and ''tathāgatagarbha'' classics, the tantras, and the songs and writings of the Buddhist ''mahāsiddhas'' and [2] the metaphysically disinclined stance of the Middle Way (Madhyamaka) philosophy that avoided extremes of affirmation and denial, existence and nonexistence. To adequately appreciate his contributions to such issues, I will first sketch in rough strokes the historical evolution of the ''ālayavijñāna'' doctrine and its complex confrontations with ''tathāgatagarbha'' doctrine in India. Against this backdrop, attention will turn to the Karma pa’s contextualist framing of the ''ālayavijñāna-tathāgatagarbha'' relationship in terms of a progressive understanding that begins with differentiation and culminates in unity. His is a view that stresses the need to initially distinguish between conditions of spiritual awakening (such as ''tathāgatagarbha'') and delusion (such as ''ālayavijñāna'') in order to eventually realize their underlying unity (''zung ’jug'') by recognizing buddha nature as an ever-present continuum (''rgyud'') of awareness that is a precondition of the substratum consciousness that derives and deviates from it. In his attempts to strike a balance between traditional differentiation and unity models, we encounter a thinker who was as confident about the mind’s ability to discover its own unborn and nonconceptual nature as he was skeptical about its ability to discover any underlying metaphysical foundation. (Source: [https://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&id=3287479&journal_code=JIABS Peeters Online Journals])
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
====Emulating Never Disrespectful Bodhisattva====
'''''The Quest of the Monk Sōō to Practice Revering Buddha-Nature'''''
The "marathon monks" of Japan are one of the iconic images of Japanese Buddhism, familiar to people the world over. These monks walk excruciating mountain circuits on Mount Hiei near Kyoto and Mount Kinpu in Nara Prefecture for a summer retreat of one hundred days. A handful in the posar period have performed the insufferable thousand-day version of this retreat, and also completed additional ascetic practices to gain the title of Great Acarya. Having achieved the humanly impossible, they are sometimes referred to as living buddhas.<br> Hagiographic sources tell us that the founder of this practice, the Tendai monk Sōō (831-918), was motivated to seek enlightenment when as a novice monk he studied the part of the Lotus Sutra that tells the story of Never Disrespectful Bodhisattva. Sōō set his heart on emulating Never Disrespectful's way of practice, walking about making obeisances to other people as future buddhas. Unfortunately, Sōō's responsibilities to look after his teacher, and the daily task of going into the mountains to harvest anise-tree leaves for the offerings at the monastery's central hall, prevented him from dedicating himself solely to the reverence of other people's buddha-nature. According to tradition, however, Sōō's daily forays into the mountain became the origin of today's marathon-monk practice, in which ascetic monks revere the shrines of Buddhist deities and places where Japanese divinities abide in the mountains. It is often said that the marathon monk's true object of reverence is the buddha-nature of the natural world.<br> The Lotus Sutra's Never Disrespectful Bodhisattva is an archetype of respect for the inherent dignity of sentient beings. As told in chapter 20 of the Lotus Sutra, one time in the past there was a monk who did not practice by chanting sutras but instead went around making obeisance to every person he met, telling them, "I would never dare to disrespect you, because surely you are all to become buddhas!" As the reader can probably anticipate, the Lotus Sutra tells us that Never Disrespectful was oftentimes ridiculed, even physically attacked, but he bore it all patiently and through this practice not only purified his mind and body but also transformed the hearts and minds of the people around him. The Lotus Sutra tells us that performing this practice leads to quickly attaining the Buddha Way. (Scarangello, "Buddha-Nature (1)," 28-29) (Read entire article [https://rk-world.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/DW18_7-12.pdf here])
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
In the last installment of this column we explored the concept of buddha-nature—its meaning, the Lotus Sutra's teaching of revering buddha-nature, and how Buddhists can reveal the buddha-nature of themselves and others by demonstrating respect for people and discovering their goodness. This time we will consider another way of realizing buddha-nature that is inspired by the stories of the Lotus Sutra. Rissho Kosei-kai members speak of awakening to buddha-nature as attaining the conviction that both oneself and others are, in the allegorical language of the Lotus Sutra, "children of the Buddha." Rev. Nikkyo Niwano, the founder of Rissho Kosei-kai, held that feelings of worthlessness thwarted people's ability to improve their own lives and brought them much suffering, and for this reason he employed the sutra's allegory of the parent-child relationship to help people see themselves as future buddhas and heirs to all the qualities that the Buddha Shakyamuni possessed. The belief that living beings are children of the Buddha also encourages the appreciation of all human life. As members of the human family, all people are our brothers and sisters, possessing the same inherent dignity and human potential as the Buddha. Today some people may not be entirely comfortable with the gendered language of the Lotus Sutra's allegory, but a close reading of the text can open pathways to an understanding appropriate to contemporary society and twenty-first century social norms. (Scarangello, "Buddha-Nature (2)," 35) (Read the entire article [https://rk-world.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/DW19_Spring.pdf here]) +
Articles/Buddha-Nature and Personality as the Ground of Ethics: A Metaethical Dialogue between Dōgen and Berdyaev +
This paper seeks to contribute to the ongoing Buddhist-Christian dialogue by bringing together the teachings of Zen Master Dōgen and the Russian Christian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev. This dialogue discusses a metaethical question: What is the foundation of ethical practice? I aim to show that Dōgen's idea of "buddha-nature" and Berdyaev's idea of "personality" can be understood as the foundations of ethical practice in ways that are similar and mutually clarifying in their total affirmation of human temporal existence. We begin by discussing the general contours of Dōgen's practice-realization and Berdyaev's creative ethics, and then proceed to a comparative examination of the foundation of ethics found in Dōgen's notion of Buddha-nature and Berdyaev's notion of personality. The comparison considers four facets of Buddha-nature and personality: being, time, nothingness, and impermanence. First, we show how both thinkers consider the ground of ethics to be something inseparable from the entire being of an individual and the being of all existence as a whole. This refutes the tendency to see the foundation of goodness as a mere fragment of human existence or as restricted to particular existents. Second, we show how both thinkers consider this foundation to be manifest not merely in the future or the past, but in every moment seen as a whole in itself. Third, we examine the collision between this immanent foundation and individuality, and show how the non-substantiality of Buddha-nature and God make room for creative and individual expressions of authenticity. Finally, we consider the problem of impermanence, and show how the ground of ethics is not an escape from impermanence but an acceptance and embracing of this impermanence as the ground of the efficacy and dynamism of ethical practice. (Source: [https://journals.ateneo.edu/ojs/index.php/budhi/article/view/3 Budhi]) +
The topic on what the compound ''tathāgata-garbha'' means has indeed a long history of research in the !eld of Mahāyāna Buddhism. However, despite a good number of studies so far executed on this topic, it is most unfortunate for us to recognize that the above question remains unsolved. The present paper, therefore, tries again to solve the question through an analytical inquiry into the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' (RGV) in rather a wide perspective. +
This article begins with a reflection on why medieval Chinese Buddhist thought has not been more conspicuous in recent comparative work on Buddhism and Western philosophy. The Japanese proponents of "Critical Buddhism" (''hihan bukkyō'' 批判仏教), Matsumoto Shirō 松本史朗 and Hakamaya Noriaki 袴谷憲昭, would see this neglect as merited since, in their view, East Asian Buddhism in general, and Chinese Chan in particular, is philosophically crippled owing to its embrace of ''tathāgatagarbha'' and buddha-nature thought. Indeed, Matsumoto singles out Shenhui 荷澤神會 (670-762), one of the architects of the Southern School of Chan, as an example of the early Chan advocacy of buddha-nature doctrine.<br> This article is not concerned with whether buddha-nature and ''tathāgatagarbha'' thought is actually deleterious to critical philosophical work. Rather, the concern is to demonstrate that, far from embracing buddha-nature doctrine, the eighth-century founders of Southern Chan had serious concerns with it. Evidence for this is found in: (1) the writings of Shenhui, notably in his opposition to the doctrine of the "buddha-nature of insentient objects" (''wuqing foxing'' 無情佛性); and (2) the ''Platform Scripture of the Sixth Patriarch'' (''Liuzu tanjing'' 六祖壇經), particularly in the variant versions of Huineng's famous "enlightenment verse." Thus the Southern School may be viewed as a forerunner of the Critical Buddhist anti-''dhātuvāda'' polemics. The article closes with comments on the ongoing problems Chinese Buddhist exegetes had in marrying the metaphysical monism of Yogācāra and ''tathāgatagarbha'' teachings with the anti-foundationalist thrust of Madhyamaka and ''Prajñāpāramitā'' literature. +
Buddhist traditions express our potential for awakening in diverse ways: natural luminous mind; suchness; nondual awareness; basic goodness; ''dharmakaya''; the unity of emptiness, self-existing wakefulness; unconfined capacity; and so forth, all under the rubric of "buddhanature" (''tathagatagarbha''). Mahayana Buddhists understand this dimension of our mind to be an innate source of joy, compassion, courage, and wisdom. It is always operative and always available. ([https://www.lionsroar.com/buddhanature-beyond-mere-concept/ Read more here]) +
The primary aim of this article is to outline the Buddhist idea of a pure, luminous mind. First, the conception of a “luminous mind” (''pabhassara citta'') from the Pāḷi Nikāyas is considered. Two functions ascribed to this idea are examined: its soteriological role, i.e. pure mind as a enlightenment-enabling factor, and its role as a “link” between consecutive ''saṃsāric'' existences. Next comes the examination of the Theravāda idea of ''bhavaṅga'', which is seen as being related to the pure mind in its diachronic function. Main part of the article deals with combining the notion of a pure mind with Mahāyāna Buddhism by showing the role of the “innate mind” (''cittaprakṛti'') in tathāgatagarbha tradition. +
C
This essay is an investigation into the concept of insentient things possessing Buddha-nature with a focus on [[Jingxi Zhanran]]’s thoughts. In the history of Chinese Buddhism, Zhanran was not the originator of such a concept; however, he was the first Tiantai thinker to advocate this idea. He strongly argues that according to the Tiantai Perfect Teaching, Buddha-nature certainly extends to insentient things, which refers to inanimate objects without a nervous system, i.e., tangible or formless nonliving existents. This essay therefore aims at revealing this intent of Zhanran by exploring his argument of insentient things’ Buddha-nature. For Zhanran, the key quality of Buddha-nature is all-pervasiveness, and thus naturally, not only animate beings but also inanimate things are imbued with Buddha-nature. According to the principle of mutual inclusion, each dharma realm includes the other nine realms. Also, because body and land are mutually identical, the bodies and lands of Buddhas are interfused with those of the dwellers in the other nine realms. Thus, the inanimate lands also have Buddhanature. Lastly, mutual inclusion reveals a two-way relationship between the sentient and the insentient, thereby giving the possibility of reversing the positions of the subjective observer and the objective phenomenon. As such, it is conducive to my conclusion that insentient things can also take up an active role on the path of Buddhahood, as Zhanran contends that they inherently possess the threefold Buddha-nature. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
Critical Buddhism was inevitable. That it was given voice by prominent Japanese scholars noted for their work in non-East Asian Buddhism was also inevitable. That it has provoked strong, even hostile, reactions was inevitable as well. Inevitable means that the causes and conditions that gave rise to Critical Buddhism can be analyzed and understood to show that it has a context, a history, and a necessity. Critical Buddhism is necessary. Thinking about what arises through causes and conditions, especially in terms of how that impacts on cultural and social realities, is a principal component of both Critical Buddhism and Buddhism properly practiced.<br> This essay will examine some—but certainly not all—of the factors that have contributed to Critical Buddhism. Some arguments and observations will be offered that, while not retellings from the writings of the Critical Buddhists, run parallel to them. These parallels, which I offer as supplements, recast some of their arguments and focus on issues and areas germane to their undertaking. After discussing the inevitability of Critical Buddhism in the context of twentieth-century Japanese Buddhist scholarship, I will turn to some of the events that took place in China during the seventh and eighth centuries that were decisive for the prevalence in East Asia of the type(s) of Buddhism they criticize. This will be followed by a critique of what has happened to the notion of enlightenment in East Asian Buddhism, particularly in the Ch’an and Zen traditions, with reference to the problem of ''hongaku'' (original enlightenment) and the authority of lineage transmission. Then, stepping back into a wider context, I will suggest that, far from being the idiosyncratic, misguided departure depicted by its detractors, Critical Buddhism is the inevitable revisiting of a theme that has been central to Buddhism since its onset. All the above points concern inevitabilities: the trajectory and accomplishments of Japanese scholarship in this century coupled with the crisis of Buddhism in the modern world; the decisive historical events that have established a pervasive ideological underpinning in East Asian Buddhism that Matsumoto and Hakamaya have labeled ''dhātu-vāda'', combined with the exclusion of other, counteracting Buddhist tendencies found elsewhere in the Buddhist world, such as Buddhist logic; the undermining of certain foundational Buddhist notions, such as enlightenment, as a result of or in tandem with the growth of ''dhātu-vāda'' ideology; the persistent self-criticism and self-reevaluation that Buddhism has subjected itself to, often glorifying the critique and the critics (Nāgārjuna being the most famous example)—all these points have made it inevitable that Critical Buddhism appear today in Japan (and elsewhere). Finally, while examining an aspect of Matsumoto’s critique of ''The Record of Lin-chi'', I will suggest some tactical distinctions that should be considered by those critical of Critical Buddhism (Lusthaus, "Critical Buddhism and Returning to the Sources," 30–31)
Articles/Critical Edition of the Sanskrit Text of the Munimatālaṃkāra Chapter 1 (fol. 58r5–59v4): Passages on Caturāryasatya and Trisvabhāva Borrowed from Kamalaśīla's Madhyamakāloka +
The ''Munimatālaṃkāra'' of Abhayākaragupta (composed 1113) is an encyclopedic overview of the entire system of non-tantric Buddhist doctrines and practices. Recently the existence of a Sanskrit manuscript was reported by Li Xuezhu (China Tibetology Center), and the textual study of the ''Munimatālaṃkāra'' is drastically evolving. The present paper is a part of results of our on-going project that deals with a critical edition of the Sanskrit text of the ''Munimatālaṃkāra''. In the text portion edited in this paper, Abhayākaragupta establishes the Four Truths of Noble ones and the Three Characteristics by borrowing passages from Kamalaśīla’s ''Madhyamakāloka'', which still lacks a Sanskrit original. We can recover parts of the Sanskrit original of the ''Madhyamakāloka'' on the basis of the Sanskrit text of the ''Munimatālaṃkāra''. The Appendix provides ''Bodhicittavivaraṇa'' verses 51, 67, 68, 88–93, and 108 cited in the newly available Sanskrit-Tibetan bilingual manuscript of Abhayākaragupta’s ''Āmnāyamañjarī''. +
D
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
Valley sounds are the long, broad<br> tongue.<br>Mountain colors are not other than<br> the unconditioned body.<br>Eighty-four thousand verses are<br> heard through the night.<br>What can I say about this in the<br> future?<br><br>
This poem is almost a thousand years old. It was presented to a Chinese Zen master by a follower, Su Shi, who went on to become one of China's greatest poets. In Zen these four lines are considered to be Su's enlightenment verse. In addition to being a poet, Su Shi (1037–1101) was a statesman, an essayist, a painter, and a calligrapher. He practiced Zen as a layperson, not a monk, receiving instruction from Donglin Changcong, a leading master. In China, Su is still honored as one of "the four greats" in several fields, including cooking.<br> Let’s take a look at the poem, using the above translation by Kazuaki Tanahashi (''Treasury of the True Dharma Eye: Zen Master Dōgen’s Shōbō Genzō'' [Shambhala, 2012], 86)<br> ''Valley sounds are the long, broad tongue''. "Valley sounds" are the sounds of a stream.<br> "Long, broad tongue" refers to the Buddha and his teachings, known as the Dharma. Restated unpoetically: natural phenomena such as streams are capable of expressing the highest truth. (Read entire article [https://rk-world.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/DW18_7-12.pdf here]) +
Articles/Does a Dog See into Its Buddha-Nature? Re-posing the Question of Animality-Humanity in Zen Buddhism +
Using as his point of departure the well-known koan that asks whether or not a dog has Buddha-nature, Bret Davis traces the background of this question in his demonstration of the complexity of the relation between humans and animals as conceived during the development of East Asian Buddhism. In his analysis, he argues that on the one hand, Buddha-nature becomes ever more inclusive in this history, while on the other, it tends to remain firmly, albeit somewhat paradoxically, anthropocentric with regard to the capacity to "realize" this spiritual inclusivity. The issue arising from this analysis in Davis' chapter, "Does a Dog See Into its Buddha-Nature? Re-posing the Question of Animality in Zen Buddhism," is whether only humans have the potential to "see into" their Buddha-nature. His project throughout is to show how the question of animality is inseparable from the question of humanity, and how it emerges continuously and in various intertwined ways for those who inherit the weave of Buddhist texts and contexts for thought and practice. (Jones, ''Buddha Nature and Animality'', 9) +
In "The Way of the Dialetheist: Contradictions in Buddhism," Yasuo Deguchi, Jay Garfield, and Graham Priest (hereafter DGP) claimed that in certain parts of the Buddhist tradition contradictions are to be accepted as literally true. I shall confine my remarks to the case of Indian Madhyamaka, more specifically the Madhyamaka of the ''Mūlamadhyamakakārikā'' of Nāgārjuna (''MMK'') and its four extant Indian commentaries. About East Asian Buddhism I am not qualified to speak. The DGB thesis might also be thought to apply to Indian Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha thought, but those cases would require separate treatment. What I shall claim is that the Madhyamaka of Nāgārjuna and his commentators is best interpreted as rejecting the claim that a contradiction might be true. More recently DGP seem to have conceded that the interpretation of Madhyamaka that I favor is "orthodox" while their own is "heretical." So apparently we do not disagree as to which interpretation was more commonly accepted in the tradition. There remains a disagreement as to which is the more philosophically defensible. In defending the view I favor I shall be engaging in a considerable amount of textual exegesis, for which I feel I should apologize in advance. What I seek to show is not only that no Madhyamika accepted the dialetheist view that contradictory statements can be true, but also that their position makes good philosophical sense when understood within the confines of classical logic. My working assumption (which I believe I share with DGP) is that the Madhyamikas under discussion were astute philosophers who were well aware of the further implications of the methods they used. Given this assumption, textual exegesis becomes an important component in the investigation of the question at issue between us. +
Articles/Does a Table Have Buddha-Nature? A Moment of Yes and No. Answer! But Not in Words or Signs! A Response to Mark Siderits +
Siderits argues that Nāgārjuna is not committed to the paradoxical claim that emptiness is the lack of intrinsic nature and that it is the intrinsic nature of all things, on the ground that the apparently paradoxical claims Nāgārjuna makes are simply admonitions to recuse oneself from the project of ontology. We argue that to recuse oneself from that project is to do ontology and so is no route out of paradox. We dispute Siderits' reading of several crucial passages, demonstrating that his readings are unattested in the commentarial literature and that they are implausible. Siderits argues on the basis of these readings that Candrakīrti and Nāgārjuna are not committed to paradoxes. We show that more plausible readings that are better attested in the commentarial literature do so commit them. Siderits and we agree that the ultimate nature of reality is to lack any ultimate nature. He thinks that this is consistent; we think that it is paradoxical. +
Articles/Dolpopa and Gyaltsab Debate Tathāgatagarbha: Two Distinct Interpretations of Buddha-Nature in Tibet +
Buddhists have discussed the concept of enlightenment since the time of the Buddha, but the notion that all sentient beings have buddha-nature is found in Mahāyāna Buddhism. For the Mahāyāna thinkers, one of the crucial questions at the center of how all beings can achieve enlightenment is this apparent paradox: frailty, ignorance, and delusions presumably exist concomitantly with buddha-nature in all sentient beings. This article provides a brief survey of the textual history of the buddha-nature literature followed by an in-depth discussion of buddha-nature in the terms set out by two influential Tibetan thinkers, Dolpopa and Gyaltsab; the debate between these thinkers is set in relation to extant discourses of Buddhist ontology, epistemology, and enlightenment within the Tibetan Buddhist scholastic tradition. +
This article provides an introduction to Dzogchen. Dzogchen refers to an integrated set of texts, practices, philosophical perspectives, and theories of subjectivity unique to the most esoteric Buddhist and Bon traditions of Tibet. The philosophical core of Dzogchen is its emphasis on experiencing mind-nature and understanding its relationship to ordinary mental states. To be fully and nonconceptually aware of one's nature is called open presence. Dzogchen philosophy elaborates the issues and conundrums raised by this core tenet. Among Tibet's Buddhist traditions, it is only Nyingma, the most ancient school, that explicitly takes Dzogchen as its esoteric tradition. Both Nyingma and Bon see Dzogchen as the highest in a ninefold system known as the Nine Vehicles. ([https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195328998.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195328998-e-24 Source Accessed July 24, 2020]) +
Roger Jackson reviews ''Heart of the Great Perfection: Dudjom Lingpa’s Visions of the Great Perfection, Vol. 1'', by B. Alan Wallace. +
E
Articles/Eight Folios from a Sanskrit Manuscript of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya from Ngor Monastery +
The Sanskrit text of the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya'' (abbr. MSABh) was published for the first time by Sylvain Levi in 1907. This ''editio princeps'' was prepared based on a paper manuscript (NGMPP Reel No. A114/1; siglum Ns) written in Nepal in Samvat 798 (A.D. 1677 or 1678). All other Sanskrit manuscripts of MSABh from the Kathmandu Valley so far reported have been identified as apographs of this single manuscript. A single manuscript dating from the 17th century is, however, not sufficient in itself to base the editing of a text composed before the 5th century on. Other witnesses, namely, older Sanskrit manuscripts belonging to other transmission lines separate from that of Ns, can therefore be expected to help improve upon the ''editio princeps''.<br> The present paper offers just such crucial material: eight folios from a Sanskrit manuscript of MSABh from Tibet. This is the first part of a series of studies dealing with the subject. +
Emerson wrote with excitement of his discovery of "God-within" in his poem "Gnothi Seauton": "There doth sit the Infinite embosomed in a man." He furthermore preached in his sermon "The Genuine Man" that "the essential man" dwells in the innermost soul, and that this indwelling essential self is a higher self, God's image, and "Reason." The doctrine of "Buddha-womb," tathāgatagarbha meaning "essence of self" or "Buddha-nature," buddhadātu meaning "true self," is an important teaching in Mahāyāna Buddhism, which affirms that each sentient being contains the indwelling potency for attaining Buddhahood and enlightenment. This notion is explained when referring to the boundless, nurturing, sustaining, and deathless Self of the Buddha. The affinities between Emersonian Transcendentalism and Mahāyāna Buddhism, especially Zen, have often been pointed out. In this article the comparison between Emerson's "God-within" and Mahāyāna Buddhism's "Buddha-womb" or "Buddha-nature" will be examined. +
In this teaching a student asks Gyatrul Rinpoche for advice on understanding buddhanature. This transcription contains Gyatrul Rinpoche's advice on how we can we know buddhanature for ourselves and trust that we have buddhanature. +
The ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' (abbr. ''RGV'') was very likely composed around the 4th or 5th century in India. But traces of the ''RGV'' fell into obscurity after the late 6th century, and again begin to appear after the early 11th century. The teaching relating to the RGV was transmitted from India to Tibet mainly via two routes: one from Vikramaśīla through Atiśa (ca. 982–1054) and the other from Kashmir through Sajjana, rNgog Blo-ldan-shes-rab (ca. 1059–1109) and others. rNgog is one of the most influential masters who established exegetical traditions of the ''RGV'' in Tibet, and his understanding of the ''RGV'' is strongly influenced by the Kashmiri tradition, for he studied it in Kashmir. In this regard, the Kashmiri tradition of the ''RGV'' is crucial to learn the foundation of the Tibetan development of the ''RGV'''s exegesis. Fortunately, we have some materials to learn about how Kashmiri Buddhists understood the ''RGV'', but they have not been systematically studied in this regard. I have focused on Sajjana's ''Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa'' in my previous paper in 2015, and in the present paper, I shall extend the range of target to wider context in Kashmir tradition in 11th to 12th century focusing on works by Sajjana, Mahājana, Amṛtākara, and Jayānanda. (Kano, "Exegeses", 1) +
“If you believe there is a thing called mind, it is just a thought. If you believe there is no thing called mind, it’s just another thought. Your natural state, free of any kind of thought is buddhanature.” Tulku Urgyen Rinpoche gives a teaching on the existence and nonexistence of mind. +
F
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
For over thirty years I have been encountering a motif or set of motifs in Japanese culture that is, outside of folklore and the children's story, virtually unheard of in European literature. Japanese literature and theater are rife with stories in which the protagonists are not human but are, rather, plants, trees, animals, or supernatural beings. For many Westerners, such tales seem indicative of some kind of arrested development in the Japanese psyche, as if their culture had failed to become modern or, worse, "grow up."<br> When I ask my Japanese colleagues about this, most see no problem at all: both Shinto and Buddhism acknowledge that sentience can exist across a broad spectrum of life, from the simplest organic structures to supernatural entities that, though invisible, may direct our lives in ways we still don’t understand. Arguably, the Japanese themselves feel a kinship with these other entities to a degree that many people in Europe or North America do not, though such a sensibility is common among indigenous peoples around the world. As unique as they are, human beings do not occupy any God-given, privileged place in this scheme. Th e word animism is brought out to explain much of this, though the term itself is vaguely used.<br> I began to realize that a radically different metaphysical construct of the world gives rise to a distinctive poetics and dramaturgy, and that typical EuroAmerican critical tools fail to adequately interpret even Japanese discursive texts, to say nothing of many of their greatest works of poetry, fiction, and drama. (Poulton, "Flowers of Sentience," 20) (Read the entire article [https://rk-world.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/DW18_7-12.pdf here]) +
In this article, I hope to suggest (1) a fertile ground for human rights and social ethics within Japanese intellectual history and (2) a possible angle for connecting Dōgen's ethical views with his views on private religious practice. I begin with a review of the attempts to found the notion of rights within Buddhism. I focus on two well-argued attempts: Damien Keown's foundation of rights on the Four Noble Truths and individual soteriology and Jay Garfield's foundation of rights on the compassionate drive to liberate others. I then fuse these two approaches in a single concept: Buddha-nature. I analyze Dōgen's own view on the practice-realization of Buddha-nature, and the equation of Buddha-nature with being, time, emptiness, and impermanence. I end with tentative suggestions concerning how Dōgen's particular view on Buddha-nature might affect any social ethics or view of rights that is founded on it. +
Kazuo Kano, an assistant professor at Koyasan University in Japan, joins forces with Kengo Harimoto, of the NGMCP in Hamburg, to present an early manuscript fragment of an otherwise unknown commentary on the ''Tattvasaṅgraha'' of Śāntarakṣita. Identified some twenty years [ago] by Prof. Kazunobu Matsuda, the well-known ‘manuscript-hunter’, this fragment has never before been studied in detail or published. Here Harimoto and Kano edit and translate the first of two surviving folios, with material which they show to be important for our understanding of the history of the Sāṃkhya system. (Isaacson, editorial, 1) +
Articles/From the Three Natures to the Two Natures: On a Fluid Approach to the Two Versions of Other-Emptiness from Fifteenth-Century Tibet +
In recent years there has been a surge of scholarly interest in diverse systems of Buddhist thought and practice that Tibetan thinkers characterize as “other-emptiness” (''gzhan stong''), contrasting them with systems of “self-emptiness” (''rang stong''). While the theories of such exponents of other emptiness as Dölpopa Sherap Gyeltsen (dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan, 1292–1361)1 are relatively well known, those of other Tibetan thinkers are only beginning to receive scholarly attention. This paper addresses one such lesser-known other-emptiness theory that was developed by the seminal Tibetan thinker Serdok Penchen Shakya Chokden (gser mdog paṇ chen shākya mchog ldan, 1428–1507).<br> Shakya Chokden articulated his position on other-emptiness in works written during the last thirty years of his life. In those works he advocated both Alīkākāravāda Yogācāra and Niḥsvabhāvavāda Madhyamaka systems as equally valid forms of Madhyamaka, regarding the former as a system of other-emptiness and the latter as a system of self-emptiness. Instead of approaching the two systems as irreconcilable, he presented them as equally valid and effective, emphasized their respective strengths, and promoted one or the other depending on context and audience. Partly for these reasons, his own philosophical outlook does not neatly fall into the categories of other-emptiness or self-emptiness, and placing him squarely into the camp of “followers of other-emptiness” (''gzhan stong pa'')—as some advocates of later sectarian traditions did—does not do justice to him as a thinker. (Source: [https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/classicsfacpub/132/ DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln]) +
Articles/Further Folios from the Set of Miscellaneous Texts in Śāradā Palm-leaves from Zha lu Ri phug +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
The present report overviews further findings from the set of miscellaneous texts in Śāradā palm-leaves from Zha lu ri phug. The palm-leaf set was first reported by Kano Kazuo (2008), who utilized nine folios in two photographic images (Sferra Cat. MT 42 II/1& 2) preserved at the Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente (IsIAO) in Rome with the help of Francesco Sferra. We have known on the basis of catalogue descriptions that there are further folio images from the same set preserved in other institutes, viz. the China Tibetology Research Center (中国藏学研究中心, CTRC) and the China Ethnic Library (中国民族图书馆, CEL). In other words, the photographic images of the set have been scattered and separately preserved in the three institutes. Ye Shaoyong and Li Xuezhu have independently paid special attention to these materials and researched them.[1]<br>
It was during a lunch break on 2 August 2012 on the occasion of the 5th Beijing International Seminar on Tibetan Studies at CTRC that the present authors (Ye, Li, Kano) met together and became aware of the fact that we were studying folios from one and the same collection. We quickly decided collaboration by unifying each one’s results and sharing all related materials (As for the CTRC material, we share transcription prepared by Li). After collecting the folios together, we have come to know the number of folios of the set as 87 in total, in which 46 folios are found in CTRC images (Sang De Cat. No. 100, [3], [5] = Luo Cat., 136ff., No. 44, [3], [5]) and 41 are found in CEL images (Wang Cat. No.10, 15, 16, 17). The nine leaves in IsIAO images as reported by Kano (2008) overlap with those in CEL (Wang Cat. 10, 16). These folios contain more than fifteen works, most of which are, unfortunately, incomplete, and the remaining folios are yet to be found. There are also folios yet to be identified among the available ones. In the present report, we shall provide a preliminary survey on the Śāradā folios and an update of the report of Kano (2008) by supplying further identifications. (Ye, Li, and Kano, introduction, 30–31)<br><br>
===Notes===
1. See Ye 2012 and Li 2011.
G
One time, a monk asked Chan master Shishuang Qingzhu (807–888), "I heard that buddha-nature is like space; is that correct?" Shishuang replied, "It's present when you sleep; absent when you sit." Similarly, when asked by a monk whether a dog has buddhanature or not, Chan master Zhaozhou Congshen (778–897) said, "No!" These two examples are like a fish asking another fish, "I heard that fish swim in water. Is that correct? There are such things as fish and water, right?" Ridiculous questions deserve ridiculous answers.
Buddhanature is our true nature, already free from self (Skt. ''atman''), vexations (Skt. ''klesas''), and delusions (Skt. ''avidya''). The personal experience of this freedom is called awakening (Skt. ''bodhi''). Mahayana scriptures have already clarified that buddhanature is present everywhere, in all beings, and have provided many metaphors for it (e.g., spacious and vast like the sky or ocean)—so why ask?
We ask because we are trapped in our narrow, myopic perceptions, seeing only good and bad, joy and sorrow, right and wrong, success and failure, having and lacking, fair and unfair, self and other. The self, or the "me, I, mine," come into being when we are caught up with these perceptions. This is delusion—it vanishes when we personally experience the emptiness of these perceptions—when we see through the veil of these constructs. This is wisdom, awakening. A fish doesn't have to imagine the "water" in swimming—it just swims. It's through swimming that the water is experienced. The important thing is to keep swimming. ([https://www.lionsroar.com/glimpses-of-buddhanature/ Read more here]) +
Buddha Shakyamuni's first impressions after enlightenment move me every time:
:This peace so profound-this unpolluted, uncreated clear light-this nectar-like dharma I have found: to whomever I may teach it, it would remain enigmatic. So I will stay silent, keeping to the forest. (''Lalitavistara'', Sutra of the Panoramic Play)
What wonder is this that can enchant a mind so unbound into hushed humility?
Hearing the verse as the Buddha's ''doha'', his hymn of realizing buddhanature, is my touchstone for discerning buddhanature-first in his teachings, then my own experience.
To begin, why might the Buddha choose not to teach? Explicit statements about buddhanature are tricky. The unabashed Tibetan ''Shentong'' (Empty of All Else) philosophy; infamous for not shying away from assertion, speaks of "sublime peace," a mystical synergy beyond false binaries of permanent/impermanent, suffering/bliss, self/nonself. An enigma, to be sure. And readily misconstrued. In the reaches of the inexpressible, understanding dawns by degrees.
Sometimes silence is more articulate. The Buddha famously leaves certain questions unanswered. Nor does he mention clear light, enigmas, or buddhanature in his first public discourse, only weeks after invoking his doha. Instead, the Four Truths meet us in what we know all too well: life's sticky sorrow, even amidst its sweetness. The Buddha exhorts us to recognize dukkha, eradicate its origin, and actualize its cessation by relying on the path. ([https://www.lionsroar.com/glimpses-of-buddhanature/ Read more here]) +
A member of our incarcerated sangha once mentioned that our presence "smelled like freedom." It brought to mind the following quote from Nichiren Shonin (1222–1282):
:A singing bird in a cage attracts uncaged birds, and the sight of these uncaged birds will make the caged bird want to be free. Likewise, the chanting of ''Odaimoku'' will bring out the Buddha-nature within ourselves.
His comment was an opening to further explore the concept of buddhanature: What was it ''really''? I had learned that buddhanature meant that we all have the seed of buddha within, that we possess the wisdom that illuminates that seed, and that we engage in. the practice that manifests that wisdom. ([https://www.lionsroar.com/glimpses-of-buddhanature/ Read more here]) +
Buddhism, with its manifold jeweled nets of cause and effect and co-dependent arisings, naturally has various articulations of the concept of buddhanature. Shinnyo-en traces its idea of buddhanature through various threads of Mahayana Buddhism, which comprises a large number of sutras and commentaries. The idea that anyone has the potential to become a buddha is a prominent theme found amongst the schools of Mahayana Buddhism. As it is expressed in a key phrase found in the Mahayana ''Mahaparinirvana Sutra'', often referred to as the ''Nirvana Sutra'': "All sentient beings have a buddha-nature."
In Sanskrit, the language in which the ''Mahaparinirvana Sutra'' was most likely first written, the word for buddhanature is ''buddha-dhatu''. "Dhatu" conveys a sense of essence or quality, indicating that "buddhaness" is the true essence or quality of all beings, and as a result, all beings possess the possibility of becoming a buddha. It is a very optimistic approach to the nature of humanity. ([https://www.lionsroar.com/glimpses-of-buddhanature/ Read more here]) +
Sunrays slanted through the overcast sky, and Ganges River dolphins swam playfully beside us. From time to time, the shiny gray bulk of a hippopotamus emerged from the water's surface. It was the winter of 1999, and the great Tibetan Buddhist master, Chatral Sangye Dorje Rinpoche (1913-2015), was conducting his annual fish release. I was part of a team of twelve of Rinpoche's disciples who worked for ten days to release 94,600 pounds of live fish into the mouth of the Ganges River near Kolkata. The fish were mostly farmed silver carp destined for fish markets across West Bengal,
where they would face gruesome, untimely deaths.
Each day, twenty trucks arrived in the parking lot. The fish were weighed, dumped into fifty-five-gallon plastic buckets, and hauled on bicycle-drawn wagons to the top of the steps of the Barrackpore Gandhi Ghat, a memorial to Mahatma Gandhi. From there, we carried the sloshing buckets down the steps, past an assortment of Hindu devotees bathing in the holy Ganges River, and heaved the buckets onto wooden boats. We added a splash of dharma medicine to each bucket and clamped the lids down to keep the frenzied, thrashing fish from leaping out. "Chalo! Chalo!" we shouted to the boatmen, "''Let's go!''"
All day long, they motored us out to the middle of the river, where Rinpoche sat on an anchored boat reciting aspiration prayers and blowing a white conch shell. As the haunting sound of the Dharma resounded across the water, awakening all beings from the sleep of ignorance, we tipped the fish over the sides of the boats to freedom. ([https://www.lionsroar.com/glimpses-of-buddhanature/ Read more here]) +
Mind is originally free from all fixed reference points—in Zen it is said that "mind cannot be grasped." At the same time, mind is luminously clear and aware—as one saying goes, "everyone is radiant light, but when looked for it can't be found." This empty clarity of mind is naturally and effortlessly compassionate when facing suffering, since self and other are nondual. The ungraspable, luminous, compassionate nature of ordinary awareness itself is called buddhanature.
One time during sesshin, an intensive Zen retreat, a sense of openness and ease arose, and I went to check it out with my teacher, Tenshin Anderson Roshi. I asked, "What if there's some peace in the midst of all this suffering?" He asked me to tell him about the experience, which I did. We were walking slowly down the path during one of the breaks. He put his arm around my shoulder as we walked, and he asked, "Can anything touch it?"
The question surprised me, and I began to investigate. If an experience is any kind of object known by mind, it can be touched by ideas of good and bad, it can be grasped or rejected, it will arise and cease. Awareness itself, the empty space of buddhanature, cannot be touched by anything since it is not an experience that comes and goes. The unchanging empty space of awareness can intimately host all experiences, but is not itself affected by any of them. By looking deeply into this question as the retreat continued, confidence in the untouchable peace of ever-present buddhanature arose. ([https://www.lionsroar.com/glimpses-of-buddhanature/ Read more here]) +
This paper discusses syntheses forged in Tibet among the doctrines of Madhyamaka, Yogācāra, and buddha-nature (''tathāgatagarbha''). Buddha-nature is a distinctively Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrine, taking a place along side of the Yogācāra doctrine of the basic consciousness (''ālayavijñāna'') and the universal emptiness (''śūnyatā'') of Madhyamaka. As a fundamental ground of reality, buddha-nature comes to be identified with a positive side of emptiness (in the case of Madhyamaka) and is assimilated with the basic consciousness (in the case of Yogācāra) as well. As the intrinsic purity of mind, buddha-nature also plays a causal role as the potential for complete awakening.
Buddha-nature comes to shape a Madhyamaka interpretation of emptiness in a positive light in a way that parallels its place in a Yogācāra interpretation (as a positive foundation of mind and reality). Buddha-nature supplements a Yogācāra theory of mind and reality by offering a positive alternative to a theory of consciousness that otherwise functions simply as the distorted cognitive structure of suffering. It thus is not only the potential for an awakened mind, but the cognitive content of awakening, too.
In Tibet we see the interpretation of buddha-nature converge with Mahāyāna doctrines in structurally parallel ways. Paired with buddha-nature, the doctrine of emptiness in Madhyamaka pivots from a “self-empty” lack of intrinsic nature to an “other-empty,” pure ground that remains. In narratives of disclosure characteristic of the doctrine of buddha-nature, we also see parallel shifts in the foundations of Yogācāra, as grounds of distortion like the basic consciousness, the dependent nature, and self-awareness are reinscribed into a causal story that takes place within a pure, gnostic ground. +
Although Tsongkhapa did not author a commentary on the ''Ultimate Continuum'', his main student and successor at his main seat of Ganden, Gyaltsap Je Darma Rinchen, composed an elaborate commentary on the ''Ultimate Continuum''. The commentary, filling 230 folios, was composed at Nenying temple at the request of Gungru Gyaltsen Zangpo and others after Gyaltsap had received teachings on it from both Rendawa and Tsongkha. One Tagtsel Kharkhap Dhondup Kunga served as the scribe for this voluminous and meticulous commentary, in which Gyaltsap carries out a relentless critique of the theory that buddha-nature is inherently endowed with qualities of the Buddha or that it is an absolute eternal reality empty only of other adventitious conventional phenomena. +
H
The realization of one's buddhanature is made possible only through an awakening to our limitations and inherent human imperfections. This paradoxical relationship is central to understanding the experience of awakening taught by Shinran Shonin ( 1173–1263 ), founder of Jodo Shinshu, or Shin Buddhism, the largest school of Buddhism in Japan and one of the oldest in America.
Shinran famously declared in the ''Tannisho'' (''A Record in Lament of Divergences'') that "hell is decidedly my abode whatever I do." This brutally honest assessment of himself and the human condition is a hallmark of Shrinran's thought; he posits awakening as a twofold awareness of one's own karmic evil (lack of buddhanature within oneself) and the working of the Buddha's great compassion, which embraces unconditionally enabling our enlightenment. Shinran's realization of his true inner self, which he perceived to be the exact opposite of an enlightened being, leads to his humbling confession of how he does not see the existence of buddhanature within himself, and yet, simultaneously awakens him to the activity of Amida Buddha's Primal Vow, which is inconceivably directed to him. ([https://www.lionsroar.com/hope-for-the-hopeless/ Read more here]) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The question of ever-present change must be as old as the discipline of philosophy itself. The notion of constant flux attributed to Heraclitus (c. 535-c. 475 BC) and known as "''panta rhei''" was largely forgotten in the later development of Greek thought, but in India the notion of universal flux developed from around the sixth century BCE onward and inspired different philosophical systems, among them the Buddhist philosophy.
The Buddha’s statement "all that is conditioned[1] is impermanent!"[2] is known as one of The "Four Seals," the cornerstone of all Buddhist traditions. In Buddhist logic this seal became the basis for the equation: "Whatever is conditioned is impermanent and whatever is impermanent is conditioned. Whatever is not conditioned is not impermanent and whatever is not impermanent is not conditioned."
In Buddhism, the doctrine of the impermanence of conditioned entities is interwoven with the doctrine of causality. The fact that an entity is conditioned by previous causes and moments makes it subject to impermanence. The doctrine of impermanence was further refined into the doctrine of momentariness. This doctrine postulates a process of momentary arising and cessation on the micro level that happens so fast that it is perceived as a continuity.[3]
The following presentation will highlight different definitions and classifications of what the terms ''conditioned'' and ''impermanent'' might mean for a number of selected Tibetan Buddhist masters in their interpretations of the true nature of the mind. Their literary works are invariably based, directly or indirectly, upon Indian Buddhist ''śāstras'' translated into Tibetan.
<h5>Notes</h5>
#S. ''saṃskṛta'', T. ''<i>’</i>du byas'' or ''<i>’</i>du byed''.
#S. ''anitya'', T. ''mi rtag pa''.
#See Stcherbatsky’s ''Buddhist Logic'', von Rospatt’s ''The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness'', and Dreyfus’s ''Recognizing Reality'' for a detailed treatment of the Buddhist notions of impermanence and momentariness.
According to traditional biographies, Gautama Buddha had a special relationship with trees. He was born among trees in Lumbini Grove, when his mother went into premature labor. As a child, while sitting under a tree and watching his father plow a field as part of a religious ceremony, he naturally fell into a meditative trance. Later, when he left home on his spiritual quest, he went into the forest, where he studied with two teachers, later engaged in ascetic practices, and then meditated by himself under a tree, where he awakened. Afterward he continued to spend most of his time outdoors, often teaching under trees and eventually dying between two trees.<br> Unsurprisingly, the Buddha often expressed his appreciation of trees and other plants. According to one story in the Vinaya monastic code, a tree spirit appeared to him and complained that a monk had chopped down its tree. In response, the Buddha prohibited monastics from damaging trees or bushes, including cutting off limbs, picking flowers, or even plucking green leaves. One wonders what he would say about our casual destruction of whole ecosystems today.<br> We may also wonder about the larger pattern: why religious founders so often experience their spiritual transformation by leaving human society and going into the wilderness by themselves. Following his baptism, Jesus went into the desert, where he fasted for forty days and nights. Mohammed's revelations occurred when he retreated into a cave, where the archangel Gabriel appeared to him. The ''Khaggavisana Sutta'' (Rhinoceros Horn Sutra), one of the earliest in the
Pali canon, encourages monks to wander alone in the forest, like a rhinoceros. Milarepa lived and practiced in a cave by himself for many years, as did many Tibetan yogis after him. Today, in contrast, most of us meditate inside buildings with screened windows, which insulate us from insects, the hot sun, and chilling winds. There are many advantages to this, of course, but is something significant also lost?<br> Although we normally relate to nature in a utilitarian way, the natural world is an interdependent community of living beings that invites us into a different kind of relationship. The implication is that withdrawing into it, especially by oneself, can disrupt our usual ways of seeing and open us up to an alternative experience. Does that also point to why we enjoy being in nature so much? We find it healing, even when we don't understand why or how, but clearly it has something to do with the fact that the natural world offers us a temporary escape from our instrumentalized lives. (Read the entire article [https://rk-world.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/DW18_7-12.pdf here].)
The concept of buddhanature (''bussho''), as interchangeable with ''tathagatagarbha'' (womb or embryo of ''tathagata''; "one who has thus come," an epithet of the Buddha), arose in Mahayana Buddhism after Nagarjuna (second to third century CE) and before Vasubandhu (fourth to fifth century CE). Sutras from this period are considered middle Mahayana sutras. Before the development of the Mahayana, people generally did not believe they could become buddhas, but some Mahayana Buddhists began to teach that any one of us can become a bodhisattva—a buddha-to-be—if we arouse ''bodhicitta'' (awakening mind), take bodhisattva vows, receive bodhisattva precepts, and practice the six paramitas (generosity, discipline, patience, exertion, meditation, and wisdom).
However, probably because they observed themselves and the conditions of the samsaric world—in which so many are self-centered, competitive, in conflict, and have hatred for each other—they needed to instill some faith that buddhahood was within reach. Even if the people of the world were deluded, their minds defiled with the three poisons, they could eventually reach buddhahood if they continued to practice the Buddha's teachings.
They developed the concept of buddhanature—that is, the pure undefiled mind as the essential self-nature, hidden and covered as it may be thanks to our deluded, discriminative minds. According to those middle Mahayana sutras, buddhanature is permanent, without change, whether in deluded living beings or in enlightened buddhas. It continues to exist, life after life, until buddhahood is reached, no matter how long it might take. Some people criticized this theory, arguing that buddhanature sounded like ''atman,'' the permanent self that Shakyamuni had negated.
In India, others argued that all living beings have buddhanature, or that some do, but that especially deluded people, called ''icchantika'', lacked it. In the later part of the ''Nirvana Sutra'' (second century CE), it is said that all living beings, without exception, have buddhanature. This idea heavily influenced almost all traditions of Chinese Buddhism. Some Chinese Buddhists, including the ancestors of today’s Zen practitioners, further maintained that not only sentient beings but also nonsentient beings, have buddhanature. ([https://www.lionsroar.com/how-insentient-beings-expound-dharma/ Read more here])
No abstract given. Below are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>A monk asked Zhaozhou: ‘‘Does a dog have buddha-nature?’’ Zhaozhou replied: ‘‘No.’’<br><br>
This pithy exchange between an unidentified Buddhist monk and the Tang dynasty Chan master Zhaozhou Congshen (778–897) is perhaps the best-known example of a Chan ''gong’an'', or ‘"public case." Although the passage occurs in a collection of Zhaozhou's sayings supposedly compiled by his disciples, its notoriety is due to a Song dynasty master, Wumen Huikai (1183–1260), who placed this exchange at the beginning of his famous ''gong’an'' collection, ''Gateless Barrier of the Chan Tradition'' (''Chanzong wumen guan'', 1228).[1] Wumen’s compilation, consisting of forty-four such exchanges and anecdotes accompanied by Wumen’s comments, is one of the most important works of Chan literature. And as the first case in Wumen’s collection, "Zhaozhou’s dog" became the single most influential ''gong’an'' in the Chinese Chan, Korean Son, and Japanese Zen traditions. It is often the first and sometimes the only ''gong’an'' assigned to monks, and many traditional commentators claim, following Wumen’s lead, that this single ''gong’an'' holds the key to all others.<br> Wumen’s work was neither the earliest nor the most comprehensive compilation of Chan cases. Indeed, the ''Gateless Barrier'' is relatively short and straightforward in comparison to two earlier collections, the ''Blue Cliff Record of Chan Master Foguo Yuanwu'' (''Foguo Yuanwu Chanshi Biyan lu''), published in 1128, and the ''Congrong Hermitage Record of the Commentaries by Old Wansong on the Case and Verse [Collection] by Reverend Jue of Tiantong [Mountain]'' (''Wansong laoren pingzhang Tiantong Jue heshang songgu Congrongan lu''), published in 1224. The cases that
make up these texts are each based on an individual anecdote, verbal exchange, or quandary known as the ''benze'' (original edict), to which has been added comments in prose and verse brushed by later masters. Whereas the ''Gateless Barrier'' contains forty-four such anecdotes accompanied by a brief comment and verse by Wumen, the ''Blue Cliff Record'' and ''Congrong Hermitage Record'' each contain one hundred cases including several layers of appended judgments, verses, and interlinear glosses. (The same "original edict" may appear in two or more collections, but the exegesis will invariably differ. More will be said about the structure of these
collections below.) Many more ''gong’an'' collections gained currency in China, and the Chan tradition would come to speak of seventeen hundred authoritative cases (although this number was probably not meant to be taken literally). By the end of the Song the ''gong’an'' had assumed a central role in the ideological, literary, and institutional identity of the Chan school.<br> Popular books on Chan and Zen Buddhism present ''gong’an'' as intentionally incoherent or meaningless. They are, it is claimed, illogical paradoxes or unsolvable riddles intended to frustrate and short-circuit the intellect in order to quell
thought and bring the practitioner to enlightenment. This understanding of ''gong’an'' is allied with a view of Chan as an iconoclastic and anti-intellectual tradition that rejects scripture, doctrine, philosophy, and indeed all forms of conceptual understanding in favor of unmediated or "pure" experience. ''Gong’an'' are intended, according to this view, not to communicate ideas so much as to induce a transformative experience. To grasp at the literal meaning of a Chan case is to
miss its point.<br> Recently scholars have begun to question the instrumental view of Chan that underlies this approach to Chan cases, arguing that it is based on a misreading of the historical and ethnographic record.[2] Chan ranks among the most ritualistic forms of Buddhist monasticism, and a master’s enlightenment is constituted within a prescribed set of institutional and ritual forms.[3] Moreover, the notion that Chan is designed to induce a nonconceptual or pure experience can be traced in part to late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Japanese intellectuals such as D. T. Suzuki and Nishida Kitarō, who were culling from Western sources, notably William James.[4] The notion that Chan is anti-intellectual and repudiates "words and letters" is belied by the fact that the Chan tradition produced the largest literary corpus of any Buddhist school in East Asia.[5] This corpus consists in large part of "recorded sayings" (''yulu'') and "records of the transmission of the flame" (''chuandenglu'') texts—texts recounting the careers and teachings of past patriarchs from which the original edicts were drawn.<br> Scholars now appreciate that Chan is more complex than early apologists and enthusiasts cared to admit; it is no longer possible to reduce Chan practice and Chan literature to a mere means intended to engender a singular and ineffable
spiritual experience. Accordingly, scholars of Chan ''gong’an'' have begun to attend to the institutional context and literary history of the genre,[6] and one scholar has devoted an entire monograph to the folkloric themes that appear in a single case.[7] Be that as it may, little progress has been made in deciphering the doctrinal and exegetical intent of Chan ''gong’an''; it would appear that scholars remain reluctant to treat ''gong’an'' as a form of exegesis at all. This reluctance may be due to the enduring legacy of an earlier apologetic mystification of the ''gong’an'' literature. The primary objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that such reluctance is misguided and that it is indeed possible to recover the original meaning and doctrinal purport of at least some of the cases. The task is not easy, however, as the cases are philosophically subtle and hermeneutically sophisticated, and the authors of the collections delighted in obscure allusions, clever puns, and deft wordplay. (Sharf, "How to Think with Chan ''Gong’an''," 205–7)<br><br>
<h5>Notes</h5>
My thanks to Charlotte Furth and Elizabeth Horton Sharf for their comments and
suggestions on earlier drafts of this chapter and to Ling Hon Lam for his meticulous
editorial attention.<br>
#T 2005:48.292c20–24. The exchange is also featured in case no. 18 of the ''Wansong Laoren pingzhang Tiantong Jue heshang songgu Congrongan lu'', T 2004:48.238b21–39a28. Textual details concerning Zhaozhou’s recorded sayings (''Zhaozhou Zhenji Chanshi yulu'') will be found below.
#Faure, ''The Rhetoric of Immediacy'' and ''Chan Insights and Oversights''; Foulk, "Myth, Ritual, and Monastic Practice"; Sharf, "The Zen of Japanese Nationalism," "Whose Zen?" and "Experience."
#Foulk and Sharf, "On the Ritual Use"; Sharf, "Ritual."
#Sharf, "Whose Zen?"
#On the sometimes controversial place of literary endeavors in the Song monastic institution, see esp. Gimello, "Mārga and Culture"; and Keyworth, "Transmitting the Lamp," 281–324.
#See esp. Heine and Wright, eds., ''The Kōan''.
#Heine, ''Shifting Shape''.
Articles/Hōshōron miroku chosaku setsu no kagen nendai saikō: Tonkō bonbun dankan IOL Khot S 5 to Pelliot 2740 no setsugō fukugen to nendai suitei +
It was reported by H. W. Bailey that a Khotanese-hybrid Sanskrit manuscript fragment from Dunhuang, IOL Khot S5 (abbr. S5) verso side, quotes verses from the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' (abbr. RGV) and attributes them to Maitreya. S5 is the earliest text hitherto known that ascribes the authorship of the RGV to Maitreya. While Bailey dates the S5 verso side to the period between the end of the 8th century and the 11th century, we can now further specify the date of composition as some time between the first half of the 9th century and the 11th century. Our rationale for this more specific ''terminus post quem'' is that the Chinese version of the ''Aparimitāyurjñānadhāraṇī'' (無量寿宗要経) written on the recto side of S5 is likely one of the numerous copies of the sūtra produced during (or shortly after) the reign of king Khri gtsug lde btsan, that is, during the first half of the 9th century. This fact is attested by two witnesses: Pelliot Tibétain 999 and the colophon of S5 recto side. There is also another Dunhuang Sanskrit fragment (Pelliot Chinois 2740) which quotes the RGV, and it is identified as the missing part of S5: the text of Pelliot 2740 recto precisely supplies the missing portion of S5 recto, and the two fragments are very similar in terms of size, material, and scripts. (Source: [https://www.academia.edu/5417315/_Dating_the_Earliest_Source_that_Attributes_the_Ratnagotravibh%C4%81ga_to_Maitreya_Sanskrit_Fragments_IOL_Khot_S_5_and_Pelliot_2740_from_Dunhuang_Indogaku_Bukkyogaku_Kenkyu_60-2_2012_._pp._168-174_in_Japanese_ Academia.edu]) +
I
No abstract given. Here is the first relevant paragraph: <br><br>
I have been able to trace a hitherto unidentified quotation in the ''Ratnagotravibhāga(vrtti)'' (''RGV(V)'') to the ''Tathāgatagarbhasūtra'' (''TGS''). The sentence in question occurs in the ''RGV(V)'' in the context of the explanation of the three ''svabhāvas'' of the ''dhātu'', viz., ''dharmakāya'', ''tathatā'' and ''gotra'', the three key terms of verses 1.27-28, which constitute the central section of the ''RGVV''. The quotation is part of the commentary on the third aspect, i.e., ''gotra'', and is placed after the last of the three interpretations of the compound ''tathāgatagarbha''. In this context the ''dhātu'' of living beings, i.e., their buddha essence, has
just been declared to mean "cause" (''hetu'').<br><br>
[http://iriab.soka.ac.jp/publication/aririab.html Read the rest of this article in Vol. 3 of the Annual Report of the International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology . . .] +
Articles/In Defense of His Guru: Dratsepa's Rebuttal to the Challenges Articulated by the Proponents of the Other-Emptiness Doctrine +
The buddha-nature literature has a significant place within the Indian Mahāyāna tradition and Tibetan Buddhism. While it is usually included in the so-called Last Wheel of the Buddha’s teachings, many Tibetan thinkers began to cast doubts about the textual significance of buddha-nature discourse in fourteenth century Tibet. In this article, I will examine one particular case where there is apparent tension between multiple Tibetan masters over the importance of buddhanature teachings. This paper primarily analyzes Dratsepa’s commentary to the ''Ornament'' (''mdzes rgyan'') written by his teacher, Buton. Dratsepa construes the ''Ornament'' as a work critiquing Dolpopa’s interpretation of the buddha-nature literature. He levels a barrage of criticisms against Dolpopa by referring to Indian śāstras and sūtras that are equally important to both of them, and also by tracing his own assessment of the tathāgata-essence teachings to early Tibetan scholars. In contradistinction to Dolpopa’s claims, Dratsepa offers several nuanced readings of the buddha-nature literature and complicates the notion of what it means to have tathāgata-essence, what a definitive or provisional meaning entails, and the relationship between the Middle Wheel and the Last Wheel teachings. In brief, Dratsepa’s text sheds light on one of the earliest discourses on the tension between self-emptiness and other-emptiness presentations. +
Articles/Is "Buddha-Nature" Buddhist? Doctrinal Tensions in the Srimala Sutra: An Early Tathagatagarbha Text +
Recent controversies in Japanese Buddhist scholarship have focused upon the Mahayana notion of a "Buddha nature" within all sentient beings and whether or not the concept is compatible with traditional Buddhist teachings such as ''anātman'' (no-abiding-self). This controversy is not only relevant to Far Eastern Buddhism, for which the notion of a Buddha-nature is a central doctrinal theme, but also for the roots of this tradition in those Indian Mahāyāna ''sūtras'' which utilised the notion of ''tathāgatagarbha'' (Buddha-embryo or Buddha womb). One of the earliest Buddhist texts to discuss this notion is the ''Queen Śrīmālā Sūtra'' (''Śrīmālādevīsūtra''), which appears to display a transitional and revisionist attitude towards traditional Mahāyāna doctrines such as emptiness (''śūnyatā'') and no-abiding-self (''anātman''). These and related issues are examined as they occur in the ''Śrīmālā Sūtra'' and as they might relate to the issue of the place of Buddha-nature thought within the Buddhist tradition. Finally some concluding remarks are made about the quest for "true" Buddhism. +
Modern exponents of mindfulness meditation promote the therapeutic effects of “bare attention”—a sort of non-judgmental, non-discursive attending to the moment-to-moment flow of consciousness. This approach to Buddhist meditation can be traced to Burmese Buddhist reform movements of the first half of the 20th century, and is arguably at odds with more traditional Theravāda Buddhist doctrine and meditative practices. But the cultivation of present-centered awareness is not without precedent in Buddhist history; similar innovations arose in medieval Chinese Zen (Chan) and Tibetan Dzogchen. These movements have several things in common. In each case the reforms were, in part, attempts to render Buddhist practice and insight accessible to laypersons unfamiliar with Buddhist philosophy and/or unwilling to adopt a renunciatory lifestyle. In addition, these movements all promised astonishingly quick results. And finally, the innovations in practice were met with suspicion and criticism from traditional Buddhist quarters. Those interested in the therapeutic effects of mindfulness and bare attention are often not aware of the existence, much less the content, of the controversies surrounding these practices in Asian Buddhist history. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>In this chapter I examine some medieval Buddhist doctrines that, at least on the surface, seem similarly strange and implausible. Indeed, some of the Buddhist notions to be examined below were perplexing to audiences in their own day, much as discussions of brain transplants are perplexing to us today. On the Indian side, I will begin with the notion of ''nirodha-samāpatti'', a meditative state akin to a vegetative coma in which all consciousness has ceased. I will then turn to a class of beings known as “beings without conception” (''asaṃjñika-sattvāḥ''), denizens of a celestial realm who are devoid of sentience, thought, and consciousness. In both cases, an insentient state seems to be followed by (or gives rise to) a sentient state, which poses serious challenges to the classical Buddhist understanding of karma. On the Chinese side, we will consider the debate over the buddha-nature of insentient objects—can an insentient thing such as a wall or roof tile attain buddhahood and preach the dharma? This doctrine too could be (and was) seen as a threat to the coherence of Buddhist teachings.<br> Modern scholars tend to approach such doctrines as the products of intelligent but misguided scholastics struggling to make sense of the universe, all the while hobbled by the dictates of tradition, scripture, and a prescientific understanding of the cosmos. They are the proverbial schoolmen calculating how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. But I would suggest another perspective. Such theories, I argue, serve as frames of reference for pondering issues of personal identity, ethical responsibility, sentience, and death. Given that we ourselves are still far from clarity on these issues, and given that we too devise fanciful thought experiments to help gain a conceptual toehold, perhaps it is time to look afresh at what the Buddhists might have been up to.[11] (Sharf, preamble, 144–45)
<h5>Notes</h5>
11. For an articulate defense of Buddhist scholasticism, along different lines, see Paul John Griffiths, “Scholasticism: The Possible Recovery of an Intellectual Practice,” in ''Scholasticism: Cross-Cultural and Comparative Perspectives'', ed. José Ignacio Cabezón (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 201–35.
There have been several attempts of late to read Yogācāra through the lens of Western phenomenology. I approach the issue through a reading of the ''Cheng weishi lun'' (''Treatise on the Perfection of Consciousness Only''), a seventh-century Chinese compilation that preserves the voices of multiple Indian commentators on Vasubandhu’s ''Triṃśikāvijñaptikārikā'' (''Thirty Verses on Consciousness''). Specifically, I focus on the "five omnipresent mental factors" (''pañcasarvatraga'', Chin. ''wu bianxing xinsuo'') and the “four aspects” (Chin. ''sifen'') of cognition. These two topics seem ripe, at least on the surface, for phenomenological analysis, particularly as the latter topic includes a discussion of “self-awareness” (''svasaṃvedana'', ''svasaṃvitti'', Chin. ''zizheng''). Yet we find that the ''Cheng weishi lun'' account has little in common with the tradition associated with Husserl and his heirs. The categories and modes of analysis in the ''Cheng weishi lun'' do not emerge from or aver to a systematic reflection on the nature of “lived experience” so much as they are focused on subliminal processes and metaphysical entities that belong to the domain of the noumenal. In my conclusion I suggest that the later ''pramāṇa'' tradition associated with Dignāga and Dharmakīrti—a tradition that profoundly influenced later Yogācāra exegesis in Tibet—did indeed take a “phenomenological turn.” But my comparison shows that both traditions falter when it comes to relating conceptual content to non-conceptual experience, and thus there is reason to be skeptical about claims that phenomenology is epistemologically grounded in how the world presents itself first-personally. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The Trikāya doctrine of Buddhism, i.e., the doctrine that the Buddha has three "bodies," is notorious for its complexities. Attributed to the Yogācāra, but regarded as typical of the Mahāyāna in general, it is customarily cited in books on Buddhism in terms of the triad ''dharma-kāya'', ''saṃbhoga-kāya'' (or ''saṃbhogika-kāya'') and ''nirmāṇa-kāya'' (or ''nairmāṇika-kāya''). Taking these in ascending order of abstraction, the ''nirmāṇa-kāya'', usually translated "apparitional body," "phantom body," "transformation body," etc., is the physical manifestation of Buddhahood, the ordinary perishable human form, as exemplified by the "historical Buddha," Siddhartha Gautama. The ''saṃbhoga-kāya'' ("body of bliss," "reward body," "enjoyment body," etc.) is a more exalted and splendid manifestation of the enlightened personality, still in the realm of form, but visible only to bodhisattvas, those of advanced spiritual capabili-ties. By contrast, the ''dharma-kāya'' ("''Dharma''-body," "Body of Truth," "Cosmic Body," "Absolute Body," etc.) is both formless and imperishable, representing the identification of the Buddha with the truth which he revealed, or with reality itself. As such the ''dharma-kāya'' is often linked with various terms for reality, such as ''dharmatā'', ''dharma-dhātu'', and so on, and has even been regarded as a kind of Buddhist absolute, or at least at one with it.[2] In this light the ''dharma-kāya'' is understood as the primal "source" or "ground" from which the other two types of bodies emanate.[3] While many scholars are content to describe this in purely abstract terms, others impute personal characteristics to it;[4] and at least one writer has gone so far as to compare it to the Christian idea of Godhead.[5]
As a summary of the Trikāya doctrine this is, of course, over-simplified. We are dealing here with a complex theory which underwent many accretions and refinements, as Buddhists continued down through the centuries to speculate on the nature of Buddhahood, on the nature of reality, and on the relationship between them.[6] It is hardly surprising, then, that attempts to plot the course of such arcane speculations have not always been entirely successful in reaching a clear consensus, although the arguments advanced, even in recent writing on the subject, do tend to follow similar lines. A good example of this is the authoritative treatment by Nagao, "On the Theory of Buddha-body (''Buddha-kāya'')" first published in English in 1973.[7] Generally Nagao distinguishes three phases: an initial one-body theory, a two-body theory, and the three-body theory elaborated by the Yogācāras. According to him (p. 104), the two-body theory (i.e., ''rūpa-kāya'' and ''dharma-kāya'') "became stabilized in a variety of earlier sūtras,[8] and in early Mahāyāna sūtras, the ''Prajñāpāramitā'', the ''Saddharmapuṇḍarīka'', and so forth. The ''rūpa-kāya'' is the Buddha seen in a human body, while the ''dharma-kāya'' is the Buddha's personality seen in the dharma or dharma-nature." Elsewhere (pp. 106-7) Nagao states that the two-body theory was the one held "until the time of the ''Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra'' and the time of Nāgārjuna," even though the raw materials for the third body, the ''saṃbhoga-kāya'', were also to hand before the time of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, as a consequence of the ''bodhisattva''-concept and the idea that a ''bodhisattva''<i>'</i>s performance of meritorious actions produced a body which was their manifest "reward." Nagao's article contains many valuable observations, but, as we shall see, some of its assertions are rather too imprecise, both chronologically and philosophically, to be of much use in unravelling the early development of the doctrine at issue. Another recent treatment of the subject by Makransky (1989) also describes certain features of the putative earlier two-body theory before the Yogācāras remodelled it (see esp. pp. 51-53), and distinguishes it sharply from the previous Mainstream[9] (in this case, Sarvāstivādin) formulations. This analysis, too, is open to question in certain respects, as I shall show. In these and other articles on the subject[10] there is a general tendency to postulate a one-body/two-body/three-body progression, in terms of which a single personality is divided into a physical and a "spiritual" body, and then the physical body is further split in two, yielding the final complement of three. Some writers, however, point to the existence of three bodies even in the Pāli sources, what one scholar has called the "primitive triad," i.e., ''pūti''- or ''cātur-mahābhūtika-kāya'', ''mano-maya-kāya'', and ''dhamma-kāya''.[11] The first is the corruptible physical body formed out of the four elements, while the second is the mind-made body with which the Buddha visits the celestial realms (believed by some to be a forerunner of the ''saṃbhoga-kāya''); the third is the so-called "''Dhamma''-body." Now, although both these ways of approaching the subject—the assumption of a linear process, and the belief that the Pāli Canon contains an embryonic Trikāya schema—raise certain difficulties, I do not propose in this paper to discuss the evolution of the Trikāya theory in its entirety, since that would be a mammoth undertaking. What I wish to do is address one aspect of it only, viz., the early development of the idea of ''dharma-kāya'', in the hope that clarifying this will open the way to a better understanding of Mahāyāna buddhology as a whole. (Harrison, introduction, 44–46)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#(From the title) A preliminary version of this paper was presented at Berkeley and at the 10th Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies in Paris in July, 1991. I wish to thank all those friends and colleagues who either heard or read this first draft and made helpful comments on it, in particular Rolf Giebel, Richard Gombrich, Kevin Lee, Jan Nattier, David Seyfort Ruegg, Lambert Schmithausen, Gregory Schopen and Jonathan Silk.
#See, e.g., Murti 1955: 284-287.
#See, e.g., Reynolds and Hallisey 1987: 330-331.
#See, e.g., Murti 1955: 285: "The Dharmakāya is still a Person, and innumerable merits and powers etc. are ascribed to him."
#See Suzuki 1930: 308-338. Suzuki's discussion of the whole subject has a distinctly "theological" flavour (see especially pp. 308, 310), to which we shall return later.
#For example, sometimes the ''dharma-kāya'' is also referred to as the ''svābhāvika-kāya'' or "essential body," sometimes this latter is said to constitute a fourth body. The dispute over this issue is the focus of the article by John Makransky (1989).
#This article was reprinted with inconsequential changes in Nagao 1991: 103-122. All citations are from this later version.
#Presumably Nagao means Mainstream Buddhist scriptures here. "Mainstream Buddhism" is the term I employ to refer to non-Mahāyāna Buddhism, in preference to the other terms in current use, none of which is totally satisfactory. "Theravāda" is patently inaccurate and anachronistic, "Hīnayāna" is pejorative and potentially offensive, "Śrāvakayāna" is more subtly pejorative, and also makes it hard to place the Pratyeka-buddhayāna (whatever that was), while "Nikāya" or "Sectarian Buddhism," although neutral, are historically misleading, given the fact that the Mahāyāna was a pan-Buddhist movement running across Nikāya or Vinaya school/ordination lineage boundaries. This means that monks and nuns converted to the Mahāyāna continued to belong also to the Nikāya in which they had been ordained, to uphold its Vinaya, and so on. However, they remained in the minority, at least in India. The term "Mainstream" reflects this situation.
#See above, n. 8.
#Other valuable recent contributions are by Kajiyama (1984/1989) and Williams (1989: 167-184). The lengthy discussion by Dutt (1977: 141-177) cannot be recommended. For an excellent survey of earlier scholarly work on this question and of the Buddhist sources themselves, see de La Vallee Poussin 1929: 762-813.
#See Lancaster 1968: 92; see also de La Vallee Poussin 1929: 764.
J
In this conversation with ''Buddhadharma'', the Insight Meditation Society cofounder applies the "harmonized understanding" approach championed in his book ''One Dharma'' to the idea of buddhanature. In the end, it's not about who's right or wrong about it. It's about what leads us to less clinging.
BUDDHADHARMA: Thanks for talking with us, Joseph. We're hoping you might talk about buddanature from your unique perspective as a Buddhist primarily trained in Theravada, but then in other modes, too. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN: It's not a term that I've come across a lot in early Buddhist teachings; it seems to come about more in Mahayana and in Vajrayana. And so it would be helpful to find a common definition that would make sense in terms of early Buddhism. Basically, the Pali texts talk about the enlightened mind, free of defilements. That would, I think, be a good cross-tradition term.
In ''One Dharma'', you list some of the names for the ultimate freedom that buddhanature represents: the unconditioned, dharmakaya, the unborn, pure heart, mind essence, nature of mind, ultimate bodhicitta, nirvana. Some of those terms are used more often in the later traditions. I think a popular understanding of some of the later traditions is that we're already enlightened, and we simply have to realize it. That might imply that it's more accessible than it actually is. Whether we phrase it in terms of "we're already enlightened and we just need to realize it," or "we're not yet enlightened and we have to get there," the task is formidable. ([https://www.lionsroar.com/joseph-goldstein-its-not-either-or/ Read more here]) +
L
No abstract given. Here is the first relevant paragraph:<br><br>
Du III au VII siècle de notre ère, selon la chronologie la plus souvent admise, la pensée bouddhique en Inde a trouvé une expression particulièrement brillante dans l'école dite du Vijñānavāda «doctrine de la connaissance». Les premiers ouvrages ressortissant à cette école en tant que telle peuvent être datés du début du Ill siècle. Au cours de ce siècle et du suivant, elle constitue peu à peu ses thèses, notamment à travers les ouvrages de Maitreya-nātha, d'Asaṅga et de Vasubandhu l'ancien. Je désignerai les développements de cette période sous le nom de Vijñānavāda ancien. Au V siècle, Vasubandhu le jeune cherche à fixer et à synthétiser la doctrine; ses travaux ouvrent la période de ce que j'ai appelé le Vijñānavāda classique, caractérisée par une abondante littérature de commentaires qu'illustrent en particulier les noms de Sthiramati, Dharmapāla et Hiuan-tsang. Le present exposé s'attachera à retracer brièvement l'histoire du Vijñānavāda, puis à exposer la doctrine classique. (May, "La philosophie bouddhique idéaliste," 265)<br><br>
English Translation:<br><br>
From the third to the seventh century AD, according to the most commonly accepted chronology, Buddhist thought in India found a particularly brilliant expression in the school known as the Vijñānavāda "doctrine of knowledge". The first works coming out of this school as such can be dated to the beginning of the 11th century. During this century and the following, it gradually built up its theses, notably through the works of Maitreya-nātha, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu the Elder. I will designate the developments of this period under the name of ancient Vijñānavāda. In the fifth century, Vasubandhu the Younger sought to fix and synthesize the doctrine; his works open the period of what I have called the classical Vijñānavāda, characterized by an abundant literature of commentaries that illustrate in particular the names of Sthiramati, Dharmapāla and Hiuan-tsang. This presentation will focus on briefly recounting the history of Vijñānavāda, then explaining classical doctrine.
It’s surprisingly easy to achieve lasting happiness — we just have to understand our own basic nature. The hard part, says Mingyur Rinpoche, is getting over our bad habit of seeking happiness in transient experiences. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra consists of ten chapters, named respectively —(1) Rāvaṇādhyeṣaṇā parivarta, (2) Sarvadharmasamuccaya parivarta, (3) Anityatā parivarta, (4) Abhisamaya parivarta, (5) Tathāgata - nityānityatva, (6) Kṣaṇika parivarta, (7) Nairmāṇika parivarta, (8) Māṃsabhakṣaṇa parivarta, (9) Dhāraṇīparivarta, and (10) the Parisamāpti parivarta, which bears no special name.<br> Throughout the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra the speaker is Buddha himself. The first chapter of the book is addressed to Rāvaṇa, while the person spoken to in the remaining nine chapters is Mahāmati. Rāvaṇa prayed to Buddha for the solution of two questions, viz. : (1) what is the distinction between ''dharma'' and ''adharma'', and (2) how could one pass beyond both ''dharma'' and ''adharma''? Buddha’s answers to these questions form the subject-matter of the first chapter. Thereafter 108 questions were asked by Mahāmati, and
Buddha’s answers to these questions form the topics of the remaining nine chapters. (Vidyābhūṣaṇa, para 10–11, 833)<br><br>
[https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.70554/page/n863/mode/2up Read more here . . .] +
Articles/Lost in Translation? The Treatise on the Mahāyāna Awakening of Faith (Dasheng qixin lun) and Its Modern Readings +
The ''Treatise on the Mahāyāna Awakening of Faith'', an indigenous Chinese composition written in the guise of an Indian Buddhist treatise, is one of the most influential texts in the history of East Asian Buddhism. Its outline of the doctrines of buddha nature (''foxing''), buddha bodies (''foshen''), and one mind (''yixin''), among others, served from the medieval period onwards as one of the main foundations of East Asian Buddhist thought and practice. The ''Treatise'' is putatively attributed to the Indian writer Aśvaghoṣa, and its current Chinese version was traditionally conceived of as a translation from an original Sanskrit text. In the course of the twentieth century, however, many important scholars of Buddhism have called into question the textual history of the ''Treatise''. Even if the specific circumstances of its creation are still largely unknown, the view that the ''Treatise'' is an original Chinese composition (not necessarily written by a native Chinese) is now prevalent among scholars. Meanwhile, and for more than one hundred years, the text has also become a source of knowledge of Buddhism in the West thanks to a number of English translations. After examining the early textual history of the two existing versions of the text, this article will offer some examples of its modern appropriation by a novel group of readers and interpreters, an appropriation that took place during the first decades of the twentieth century amidst efforts to re-envision Chinese and East Asian Buddhist history and the place of Buddhism in modern society. +
M
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
The present paper provides an annotated translation of Sajjana’s ''Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa'' along with a reading text of this Sanskrit work (a critical edition of which is under preparation for publication). I started to work on this text in 2005 when I received a copy of a photographic image of a manuscript containing it from Professor Jikidō Takasaki. I published a study dealing with this manuscript in 2006 (Kano 2006b) and provided a critical edition of the Sanskrit text in my doctoral thesis, submitted to Hamburg University in 2006 (Kano 2006a). I also prepared a preliminary annotated translation of this text in 2006 and gave the draft to Karl Brunnhölzl together with my unpublished doctoral thesis.<br> It came as a surprise for me to learn that Brunnhölzl copied and published the draft of my translation under his name in his book ''When the Clouds Part: The Uttaratantra and Its Meditative Tradition as a Bridge between Sūtra and Tantra'' (Boston/London: Snow Lion, 2014), pp. 461–472. Brunnhölzl (p. 1121, n. 1718) says in his book: “All topical headings are inserted by the translator (corresponding to my outline above). Though my translation sometimes differs from Kano’s, I am indebted to both his translation and his Sanskrit edition of the text with critical apparatus (Kano 2006, 513–35), which in turn owe much to Profs. Schmithausen and Isaacson as well as Dr. Diwakar Acharya.” The fact is, however, that he has in many cases simply copied my earlier work.<br> Since the translation used by Brunnhölzl was an unpublished draft, my earlier mistakes found their way into his book, inasmuch as that draft was based in turn on an early draft of my Sanskrit edition, which itself contains serious misreadings, especially in verses 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 15, along with a number of errors in the interlinear glosses. All his striving to make sense of my misreadings of the Sanskrit have been to no avail; his interpretations and analysis (Brunnhölzl, ''ibid''. pp. 288–300 ) based on these errors need to be fundamentally revised. I have since made improvements to the Sanskrit edition and translation, and this is reflected in the differences between his published translation and the one I offer here.[1] (Kano, preface, 1–2)<br><br>
===Notes===
1. I am grateful for a number of suggestions and improvements of my critical edition of Sajjana's ''Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa'' to Prof. Harunaga Isaacson, Prof. Diwakar Acharya, Prof. Lambert Schmithausen, Dr. Pascale Hugon, and all participants of a workshop “From Kashmir to Tibet: A set of proto-Śāradā palm leaves and two works on the ''Ratnagotravibhāga''” held on 21. April 2015 at Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften Institut für Kultur-und Geistesgeschichte Asiens. I would like to thank to Dr. David Reigle and Mr. Philip Pierce for much valuable information regarding difficult points of the text and English proof-reading of my translation.
Connecting with our buddhanature, our enlightened nature, often feels very far away, like it's not even possible. But it is much closer than we think. For example, when we are suddenly moved to compassion for someone, right then our buddhanature is shining through us. If we tune into ourselves at that moment, we can feel our innate goodness, our unconditioned pure being. Or when someone
looks at us with complete love, we can allow it in and feel the same.
Tonglen, which means taking and sending, is a meditation practice that cultivates unconditional compassion and love. In Tonglen, as we open to our own or others' suffering and allow it to be transformed into compassion, we awaken to the compassion and love that is at the core of who we are. We first bring loving awareness to ourselves, and then we exchange self for others. Taking and sending for ourselves can unearth feelings of self-hatred, low self-worth, deficiency, and unworthiness, among others. As we gradually work through these feelings and open to increased kindness and compassion for ourselves, it helps heal our core wounds and loosens our self-fixation, facilitating a deeper opening into compassion and love. ([https://www.lionsroar.com/meditations-on-buddhanature/ Read more here]) +
The approach to cutting our ties to samsara in the Dzogchen and Mahamudra meditation traditions of Vajrayana Buddhism is to allow samsara to manifest and immediately recognize that it is the expression or display of primordial wisdom.
In Dzogchen practice, the most important thing is the recognition of inner space or emptiness. If you can practice this, then whatever phenomena of samsara arise are dissolved into wisdom mind. For this to happen, your recognition of mind nature has to be unwaver-ing. If you can achieve this, then anything that arises in your mind-stream-any emotions, thoughts, likes, dislikes, perceptions of good and bad, and so on-is naturally released without effort.
The problem is, when phenomena arise from confusion and igno-rance, they dominate your perception and result in suffering. However, habitual negative emotions like fear can be naturally liberated by allowing them to dissolve into the inner space of mind. You can do this because the essence of these habitual emotions is actually wisdom.
The key point is to let go of the grasping within the emotion and see its true nature. When habitual emotions arise, you neither sup-press nor get caught up in them. You do not get carried away by clinging to self and other. If you just allow the emotion to dissolve, the energy trapped within it is released and blossoms as wisdom. ([https://www.lionsroar.com/recognizing-clarity-a-dzogchen-meditation/ Read more here]) +
The only way to acquire all the great qualities of Enlightenment is to repeat many times the short moment of recognising mind essence.
There is no other method.
One reason for short moments is that, as there is no stability right now, the recognition of awareness doesn't last for more than a brief moment, whether we like it or not.
By practicing many times, we get used to it. (From ''Vajra Speech'', published by Rangjung Yeshe Publications.) ([https://www.lionsroar.com/meditations-on-buddhanature/ Read more here]) +
It was early morning at the turn of the millennium, and I was in San Miguel de Allende, Mexico, with a sangha friend for a week of rest from our demanding work. On a little shelf on the wall of my bedroom, I had placed a picture of my root teacher, Kalu Rimpoche, which I always traveled with. While I was still in bed, the thoughts began to form: I will brush my teeth, light some incense, and sit. Suddenly, wayward thoughts came through: ''Why do you have to brush your teeth? Why do you need to light incense? Why not just sit?''
From some deeper knowing, I'd realized that all the content in my mind was made up, all based on conventions and determined by the culture I was embedded in. I felt my whole conceptual scaffolding fall down. I was left with a profound openness, without content, yet filled with the deepest peace, wonder, tenderness, and vulnerability. I completely lost all sense of time. For the remainder of that week, I continued to be filled with awe and wonder, unable to do much of what was planned.
On a visit to a pink stone cathedral built by indigenous people, I watched an elderly indigenous man come in to pay respect to the Virgin. He knelt on one knee and bent his whole body forward in a bow of surrender and reverence that seemed to offer everything, with nothing held back. My heart was deeply touched and I recognized how this level of surrender and devotion made a new stage of practice possible. It then took me four years to find my precious Dzogchen teacher.
Dzogchen (Dzogpachempo/Great Perfection/Ati Yoga) is a tradition of teachings within the Nyingma lineage of Tibetan Buddhism. Its teachings are centered on the direct recognition of our intrinsic timeless, nonconceptual awareness, which lies beyond the intellect and its frameworks. This is referred to as "The View." This recognition is most often brought about by an accomplished teacher pointing it out to the student. This "pointing out" can happen in many different ways. It may be done through specific instructions, symbols/gestures, or mind-to-mind transmission. We may be instructed to look directly at our mind, noticing that behind the thoughts, there is an empty cognizance that is timeless, pervasive, and lucid. Or the teacher may say a word, make a gesture, or hold an object that suddenly opens the view. It may also happen by being in the presence of a realized teacher whose field of timeless awareness is so powerful that there is a mind-to-mind transmission for students whose devotion opens the door. ([https://www.lionsroar.com/meditations-on-buddhanature/ Read more here])
The Bka’ brgyud lineage tradition of Nā ro pa (c.956-1040), Mar pa lo tsā ba chos kyi blo gros (1002/1012-1097), and Sgam po pa rin chen dpal (1079-1153) is broadly characterized by the transmission tradition of tantric teachings and practices outlined in Nā ro pa’s six doctrines (''nā ro’i chos drug''). This tantric framework along with direct pointing-out instructions (''ngo sprod kyi gdams pa'') to the nature of one’s mind (''sems kyi rang bzhin'') within the context of Mahāmudrā teachings are the primary methods to liberation employed by Bka’ brgyud practitioners. The doctrine of luminosity (''’od gsal ba'') is fundamental to both methods since the nature of one’s mind is pointed out as luminosity and the yogic practice of inducing meditative states where one is able to recognize luminosity is a central doctrine for Nā ro pa’s tantric system, especially during the time of sleep (''gnyid kyi ’od gsal''). These methods eventually become synthesized into a cohesive soteriological program, as exemplified by instructions on merging ignorance (''gti mug'') and luminosity as found within Bka’ brgyud merging (''bsre ba'') literature, the focus of this study. (Source: [https://www.academia.edu/22793746/_Merging_Ignorance_and_Luminosity_in_Early_Bka_brgyud_Bsre_ba_Literature_Zentralasiatische_Studien_44_35_50._2015 Academia.edu]) +
A simple three-word koan. Or just a one-word koan: buddhanature. So deceptively simple, so easy to leave in the realm of concept, yet it penetrates to the very heart of the matter. Here’s Geoffery Shugen Arnold, Sensei, on Case 30 of the Gateless Gate, “Mazu’s ‘Mind is buddha.'” +
The Tibetan teacher Khenchen Thrangu Rinpoche offers instruction on key verses from one of the Mahamudra’s seminal texts, A Song for the King by the Indian sage Saraha. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>The Chan tradition is renowned as the “meditation” school of East Asia. Indeed, the Chinese term ''chan'' 禪 (Jpn: ''zen'') is an abbreviated transliteration of ''dhyāna'', the Sanskrit term arguably closest to the modern English word “meditation.” Scholars typically date the emergence of this tradition to the early Tang dynasty (618–907), although Chan did not reach institutional maturity until the Song period (960–1279). In time, Chinese Chan spread throughout East Asia, giving birth to the various Zen, Sŏn, and Thiê`n lineages of Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, respectively. Today these traditions continue to promote, at least in theory, meditation practices, and these have been the subject of considerable scholarly interest.[1]<br> It may then come as a surprise to learn just how little is known about the meditation techniques associated with the “founders” of this tradition—the masters associated with the nascent (or proto-) Chan lineages of the seventh and eighth centuries. It was during this fertile period—which, following scholarly convention, I will call “early Chan”—that the lineage myths, doctrinal innovations, and distinctive rhetorical voice of the Chan, Zen, Sŏn, and Thiê`n schools first emerged. Although hundreds of books and articles have appeared on the textual and doctrinal developments associated with early Chan, relatively little has been written on the distinctive meditation practices, if any, of this movement.<br> This essay emerged from an attempt to answer a seemingly straightforward question: what kinds of meditation techniques were promulgated in early Chan circles? The answer, it turned out, involved historical and philosophical forays into the notion of “mindfulness”—a style of meditation practice that has become popular among Buddhists (and non-Buddhists) around the globe. Accordingly, I will digress briefly to consider the roots of the modern mindfulness movement, and will suggest possible sociological parallels between the rise of the Buddhist mindfulness movement in the twentieth century and the emergence of Chan in the medieval period. (Sharf, "Mindfulness and Mindlessness in Early Chan," 933)<br><br>
<h5>Notes</h5>
#The literature is vast; on modern Japanese Zen and Korean Sŏn meditation practice in English see, for example, Buswell 1992, Hori 2000, and Hori 2003. On the history of these practices see Bielefeldt 1988, Buswell 1987, Collcutt 1981, Foulk 1993, and Schlütter 2008.
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br>
<br>
The different philosophies of the Buddhist tradition are chiefly concerned with the understanding of mind, consciousness, and mental states. In Buddhist literature, the relative nature of mental phenomena are described in a rather detailed manner, but more interestingly certain sections contain significant hints pointing to the so-called true nature of the mind and, in particular, how to access it. One of the terms referring to this true nature of mind is ''Buddha-nature'', describing a quality of potential awakening inherent to the mind of everyone.<br>
In ''Mipam on Buddha-Nature'', Douglas S. Duckworth seeks to illustrate the Tibetan contexts in which this so-called Buddha-nature is variously described, conceptualized, and experienced. In doing so, he draws on approximately twenty-eight different Tibetan texts written by Mi pham ('' 'jam mgon mi pham rgya mtsho'', 1846–1912) that he quotes; translating and paraphrasing the quotes in order to discuss their purport in relation to a significant number of interpretations of the issue by earlier Tibetan Buddhist authors, all of which are based on the explanations found in the earlier Indian Buddhist literature. However, the main text selected and translated in full is Mi pham’s ''Bde gshegs snying po’i stong thun chen mo seng ge’i nga ro''. Duckworth also cites later masters commenting on Mi pham’s writings, notably Bötrul (''Bod sprul mdo sngags bstan pa’i nyi ma'', 1898–1959).<br>
His work primarily contributes insight into textual discussions taking place over centuries within the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist tradition and, secondarily, attempts to position the issues discussed within a comparative philosophical dialogue. However, the aim of the book—in the words of its author—is “to provide a holistically-oriented account of Mipham’s view of Buddha-nature” (xvii). Duckworth’s book represents a valuable presentation that seeks to define and summarize the philosophical and ideological views of this significant and influential Tibetan Buddhist master. (Burchardi, Review of ''Mipam on Buddha-Nature'', 734)
N
Thanks to several previous studies, the ''Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra'' (''MPNS'') has been proved to shift its central thought from the ''buddhakāya'' idea to the ''tathāgatagarbha/buddhadhātu'' idea. The present author has shown in another paper (Suzuki [1999]) that the movement between the ''buddhakāya'' idea and the ''tathāgatagarbha/buddhadhātu'' idea appears in the larger context including the ''MPNS'', and has extracted this context from the various Mahāyāna ''sūtras'' under the name of the ''Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra''-Group (''MPNS''-G), which consists of the ''Mahāmeghasūtra'' (''MMS''), the ''MPNS'', the ''Aṅgulimālīyasūtra'' (''AMS'') and the ''Mahābherisūtra'' (''MBhS''). While the ''AMS'' is a direct successor of the ''MPNS'', the ''MBhS'' succeeds the ''MPNS'' critically and shifts back its central thought from the ''tathāgatagarbha/buddhadhātu'' idea to the ''buddhakāya'' idea again.<br> The ''MPNS''-G declares or suggests the non-emptiness of the ''tathāgata''. This is reinterpretation of the ''pratītyasamutpāda'' and the ''śūnyatā'' idea, and follows the rule of the historical Buddhist hermeneutics. It is especially worthwhile to note that the ''MBhS'', like the ''Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra'' in the ''Vijñāptimātra'' idea, devaluates the ''śūnyatā'' idea as imperfect. This quite negative attitude toward the ''śūnyatā'' idea does not appear in any other Indian texts on the ''tathāgatagarbha'' idea including the ''MPNS'' and the ''AMS''. Aiming at establishing the theory that every sentient being is able to perform religious efforts and become ''buddha'' on account of the nonemptiness and the eternalness of the ''tathāgata'', the ''MBhS'' must reject any ''sūtra'' concerning the śūnyatā idea as imperfect. Though the ''MPNS'' is a pioneer in reinterpretation of the the ''śúnyatā'' idea, the ''MPNS'' cannot devaluate it perfectly because the ''śūnyatā'' idea is one of the main backgrounds to the ''MPNS''. The ''MBhS'''s decisive attitude toward the ''śūnyatā'' idea devaluation becomes possible by having the ''MPNS'' as its basis. (Source: [https://repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/?action=pages_view_main&active_action=repository_view_main_item_detail&item_id=27072&item_no=1&page_id=28&block_id=31 UTokyo Repository])
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
Prof. Hauer has started a series of studies, chiefly dedicated to the critical investigation of Indian religion.[1] We cannot help being very greateful to him for this, because we must acknowledge that the various aspects of Indian religion are not yet studied as they deserve.<br> I do not need to insist on proving the great importance of this research, which is likely to throw much light on many a problem; chiefly on that of the extent of the influences exercised by the aboriginal element on the evolution of Indian religious thought and Indian civilization in general. The Vedas have a great importance, no doubt,
but it is also true that Indian gods, mythology, practices, theories about sacrifice, etc., are, on the whole, very different from the religious ideas expounded in that famous book. The study of the
last phases of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and of its relation with the Hindu systems proper, will prove of the greatest importance for this kind of research; because it is just in the literature of that period that we find the most important documents of these new conceptions and meet the names of a host of gods, demons and goblins of whom we did not hear before that time.<br> For this reason I think that Prof. Hauer is quite justified in having started his Series with the study of such an important Mahāyāna text as the Laṅkāvatāra, which contains some very interesting allu- sions to the relation between the Buddha and the gods of Hinduism (cf. e.g., p. 192).<br> The first of the papers dedicated to our text is chiefly concerned with the refutation of the Sāṅkhya system contained in the Laṅk., X, 546 ff. This section has been translated by the author, as he thinks that it represents the reply of the Mahāyāna to the new claim of the Sāṅkhya to be the doctrine of salvation (p. 5.). This Sāṅkhya is, according to the A., the new exposition of the system as contained in the Sāṅkhyakārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇna. The chronology of either text seems to support this view. In fact, this refutation is contained in the tenth Chapter of the Laṅk., which is wanting in the first Chinese translation by Guṇabhadra (443 A.D.), while it is found in the second
translation, made by Bodhiruci in the year 513 A.D. On the other hand, we may suppose that the ''kārikā'' was composed about 450 A.D. That is true, but I do not think we are allowed to infer from this, that there is any interdependence of this kind between the ''kārikā'' and the Xth Chapter of the Laṅk. First of all, the history of the various redactions of this text, represents a very difficult and complex problem. I have compared the three Chinese translations with the Sanskrit original and I already had the opportunity to point out that the text of the Laṅkāvatāra underwent many changes,[1] so that we may safely assume that different redactions of the Laṅk, circulated not only at different times, but also in different places. It is true that the allusion to the Huns, which is found in X, 785, must go back to the first decade of the 7th century A.D., but the fact remains that the Sanskrit text of the Xth Chapter, as it has been handed down to us in the Nepalese manuscripts, looks like a compilation from various sources. Thus it has been enlarged by the insertion of various ''ślokas'' already quoted in the preceding chapters in prose.[2] As a rule, all these double verses cannot be found in the translation of Śikṣānanda. This I say in order to show that the problem of the various strata composing the vulgata of the Laṅk, as well as the other concerning the age to which they must be attributed is a very complex one. They can only be solved by the comparative study of the Tibetan and Chinese translations. Therefore it is evident that the chronology based upon any passage of the present text cannot be relied upon as definitive, until the history of the text has been reconstructed. On the other hand, the refutation of the Sāṅkhya system, as contained in X, 558 ff, is neither one of the earliest, nor one of the best. The refutation of the ''satkāryavāda'' (Sāṅkhya) as well as of the ''asatkāryavāda'' (Vaiśeṣika) forms one of the chief contents of the dogmatical works of Mahāyāna Buddhism. It can be found in the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-Śāstra of Nāgārjuna, in the Śataśāstra of Āryadeva, in the Buddhagotraśāstra attributed to Vasubandhu etc.[1] Nor shall we forget that Vasubandhu and
Diṅnāga refuted at length the Sāṅkhya theories in their Paramārthasaptati and Pramāṇasamuccaya respectively. Moreover, as Diṅnāga himself tells us in his commentary upon the Nyāyamukha, he wrote a book exclusively devoted to refuting the Sāṅkhya system. Shen T'ai, a disciple of Yuan Chwang, who commented upon the Nyāyamukha, tells us that this work was a very large one, as it contained six thousand ''ślokas''.<br> Therefore I do not think that this criticism of the Sāṅkhya as contained in the Laṅkāvatāra can really throw much light on the history of the controversy between the two systems. In fact, we must acknowledge that the value of the Laṅkāvatāra, as a philosophical hook, is rather limited, although it is of the highest importance for the history of the evolution of the Mahāyāna Buddhologie and "Erlosungslehre."<br> But I can hardly believe that the passage in question is expressly directed against the Sāṅkhya system. It is only meant to assert the idealistic view which is expounded throughout the book. Kapila, it is true, is referred to by name in the verse X, 558 and in three other places; but Kaṇāda also is quoted in X, 548. . . .<br> But to which school did the Laṅkāvatāra originally belong? It is in general believed that it represents Yogācāra ideas. But, of course, we cannot learn very much from this mere name, because Yogācāra has certainly a very wide meaning. It is also considered as a synonym of Vijñānavāda, and therefore even the ''vijñaptimātratā'' theory of Vasubandhu is put under that same item.<br> In fact, according to the Chinese tradition the book is considered as one of the six ''sūtras'' of the Lakṣaṇa school. But if we read these volumes it will be easy to recognize that, though there are some fundamental notions that can be found all throughout, each text or group of texts presents its own peculiarities.<br><br>
[https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.501828/page/n607/mode/2up Read more here . . .]<br><br>
<h5>Notes</h5>
1. J. W. Hauer, Das Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra und das Sāṅkhya (eine vorläufige Skizzeo, Stuttgart, 1927.<br> Id, Die Dhāraṇī im nördlichen Buddhismus und ihre parallelen in der sogennannten Mithrasliturgie. Ibid.<br> Beitrage zur Indischen Sprachwissenschaft und Religionsgeschichte.<br>1. See. my Studio comparative fra le tre versioni cinesi ed il testo sanskrito del i capitolo del Laṅkāvatāra, Memorie della R. Accademia dei Lincei, serie v, vol xviii, fasc, 5; and Una nuova edizione del Laṅkāvatāra in Studi Mahāyanici, Rivista di studi Orientali, vol. X.<br>2. In Studi Mahāyanici, pp. 574 ff., I have given a list of the verses inserted in the text, which have been repeated in the tenth chapter. This fact makes me rather doubtful whether many of the other verses collected there are not taken from some Mahāyāna text belonging to the same current of thought. Prof. Hauer thinks that the first Chapter belongs to the most ancient redaction of the book. I can hardly believe that; in fact, it cannot be found in the translation of Gunabhadra, and it has but very little relation with the rest of the book. On the other hand, I think that the gāthās represent the most ancient nucleus of the book, as it is shown by the numerous Prakritisms that have survived and that the redactors of the present vulgata could not avoid: e.g., desemi, pp. 76, 176, 181; vibhāvento, p. 95 ; vikalpenti, pp. 185 186; nāśenti, p. 190 ; deśyante for deśyamāne, p. 201.<br>1. For other references see Ui’s, Vaiśeṣika philosophy.<br>2. See my English translation of the Nyāyamukha in "''Materiailen zur Kunde des Buddhismus''" edited by Prof. Walleser, Heidelberg, to be published shortly.<br>
Buddhists often talk about suffering, emptiness, interdependence, and other philosophies and practices, but behind all of it is one simple teaching: buddhanature. Buddhism is notoriously complex, and sometimes it seems difficult for people to know where to start. From my perspective, we should always start with buddhanature.
Simple, yet profound, the teachings on buddhanature are relatable for contemporary audiences, but more importantly it is this most fundamental seed that precedes the entire path of Buddhist practice. Buddhanature is what makes Buddhist practice possible. . . .
When Tsadra Foundation decided to launch a series of online resource projects for education about Buddhism, we had many years of translation and publications on the most advanced philosophies and practices of Tibetan Buddhism to draw from. However, instead of focusing on the 84,000 other topics we could have begun with, we started with buddhanature, developing the most complete multimedia resource library on the topic, conducting interviews and supporting conferences, meetings, translation projects, and ongoing writing on the subject. Many people were surprised by the choice of topic, and I in turn was surprised by some of the derisive reactions to the topic as a whole, as if Madhyamaka or Dzogchen were so much higher and more important.
Nothing is more important than your buddhanature. The teachings on it form the basis for Mahamudra, Dzogchen, and the entirety of Tantric practice in any tradition.
While undoubtedly making it easier to connect with people around the world, most of our media these days primarily tells us that we are not good enough, we don't have enough, or that there is something wrong with us, and this has inspired an epidemic of mental distress and self-loathing on a scale never seen before. What if, instead of being told we are not good enough, we were brought up with the knowledge that each one of us is by nature capable of complete freedom from suffering, and that we possess wisdom and compassion on a nearly
unthinkable scale? What if we knew that fundamentally our deepest self is actually a wellspring of goodness and wisdom that is always present?
When I asked my friend Karl Brunnhölzl, a practitioner, scholar, teacher, and master translator of Buddhist texts, what he thought buddhanature is, he said, off the cuff: "Buddhanature is the innate primordial freedom of the mind, which is naturally imbued with wisdom, compassion, power, and bliss."
If we pause a moment and try to unpack that statement, the entirety of Buddhist teachings falls out of it. And if we take issue with it, and say, "yes, but emptiness ... ," the same will occur. The history of Buddhism is filled with debates about what exactly buddhanature means, and it is through investigating its meaning, and the arguments around it, that I have learned so much, and gained so much personally in my own life.
Having spent many years working with Tsadra Foundation on projects that support the balanced study and practice of Tibetan Buddhism, I am so pleased that this website is focused on this essential topic. I hope the creation of this website will inspire you to explore these teachings further via the many online resources we at Tsadra have made available here at buddhanature.org.
D. S. Ruegg, in his ''La Théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra'' and other works,[1] has mentioned the need for further study of the various Tibetan exegetical traditions involved in the controversies surrounding the ''tathāgata-garbha'' doctrine. He has relied extensively on the exegesis developed by dGe lugs-pa scholars. This paper is an initial attempt to address this need voiced by Ruegg, by presenting the views of a bKa'-brgyud-pa and two rNying-ma-pa scholars. In particular, the focus will be on elucidating how they applied the interpretive devices of ''nītārtha'' (''nges-don'', certain, definitive meaning) and ''neyārtha'' (''drang-don'', indirect meaning which is to be established) to texts dealing with the tathāgatagarbha.[2] One of the basic philosophical problems the Tibetans faced in this regard was the relationship between the concepts of ''sûnyatā'' and ''tathāgatagarbha'' emphasized in the second and third "turnings of the wheel of Dharma" (''dharmacakra-pravartana'') respectively. +
O
The ''Treatise on the Awakening of Faith according to the Mahāyāna'' (''Dasheng qixin lun'' 大乗起信論) is an immensely important treatise popular in all traditions of Buddhism in East Asia. It was written in China in the middle of the sixth century, heavily influenced by Indian Yogācāra and ''tathāgatagarbha'' teachings, providing a scriptural foundation for both buddha-nature theory and the doctrine of original enlightenment. The text synthesized tathāgatagarbha and ''ālayavijñāna'' theories to explain how the mind is the source for both enlightenment and ignorance. A relatively short text at just nine pages, it lucidly, if densely, explains important topics such as the nature of mind and consciousness and the threefold bodies of the Buddha, concluding with elegant meditation instructions. +
Articles/On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
Everyone who has had at least some glimpses at Buddhism knows that it contains various philosophical theories as well as various spiritual practices. The term ' ''philosophical theory'' ' should be understood here in a general sense comprising any attempt to make rational statements about the true nature or the fundamental principles of the totality or some part of the existent, or about those aspects of it of which everyday experience is not aware. In this sense, philosophical theories in Buddhism are, e.g., the doctrine that there is no substantial Self, no ''ātman''; or the doctrine that the whole universe consists of momentary factors, of factors each of which lasts only for the time of an extremely short moment. ' ''Spiritual practice'' ', in the case of Buddhism, consists essentially of moral or ethical exercises, and of practices of meditation, deep concentration, or trance. As an example, we may adduce the so-called four 'infinitudes', or 'unlimited ones' (''apramāṇa''), i.e. the meditative practice of the attitudes of friendliness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and impartiality or equanimity with regard to all living beings. Another example is the 'contemplation of the impure' (''aśubhabhāvanā''). Here the Yogin, in order to subdue excessive covetousness, contemplates dead bodies in their different stages of decomposition. In this exercise, it is not necessary that the Yogin actually stays at a cemetery for the whole time. He may well continue the exercise at any other place, making use of a special meditative practice in which he is able to ''visualize'' those dead bodies he saw previously. <br> In this article I want to contribute to the solution of the problem of the ''historical relation'' of these two elements — philosophical theory and spiritual practice — in Buddhism. Did Buddhism usually start from philosophical theories and afterwards develop corresponding spiritual practices? Or is it more typical for Buddhism that first there are spiritual practices and that philosophical theories are only the result of a subsequent reflection which leads to a theoretical consolidation and generalization of those spiritual practices? (Schmithausen, "On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism," 235)
The Indian treatise that this website identifies as the ''Ratnagotravibhāga Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra'' is also known by a handful of other titles in multiple languages. It is fairly common for ancient works of literature to be known by many names, especially if, like the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' (to give it its abbreviated name), it has been translated into many languages. This essay will explain the multiple names, discuss what is known of its authorship, and briefly survey the existing recensions and translations. +
Articles/On the Ālayavijñāna in the Awakening of Faith: Comparing and Contrasting Wŏnhyo and Fazang’s Views on Tathāgatagarbha and Ālayavijñāna +
The ''Awakening of Faith'', one of the most seminal treatises in East Asian Buddhism, is well-known for its synthesis of the two Mahāyāna concepts of ''tathāgatagarbha'' and ''ālayavijñāna''. Unlike early Yogācāra texts, such as the ''Yogācārabhūmi'', in which ''ālayavijñāna'' is described as a defiled consciousness, the ''Awakening of Faith'' explains it as a "synthetic" consciousness, in which ''tathāgatagarbha'' and the defiled mind are unified in a neither-identical-nor-different condition. East Asian Buddhist exegetes noted the innovative explanation of the ''Awakening of Faith'' and compiled the commentaries, among which Huayan master Fazang’s (643–712) commentary had a profound effect on the process of the establishment of the treatise as one of the most representative ''tathāgatagarbha'' texts in East Asia. However, as scholarly perceptions that the commentators’ interpretations do not always represent the ''Awakening of Faith''’s tenets themselves have grown, the propriety of relying on Fazang’s commentary for understanding the treatise has also been questioned. What attracts our attention in this regard is that the Silla scholar-monk Wǒnhyo’s (617–686) commentaries, which are known to have significantly influenced Fazang’s, present very different views. This article demonstrates that two distinct interpretations existed in Wǒnhyo’s days for ''tathāgatagarbha'' and ''ālayavijñāna'' of the ''Awakening of Faith'' by comparing Wǒnhyo and Fazang’s commentaries, and further considers the possibility that the ''Awakening of Faith''’s doctrine of ''ālayavijñāna'' is not doctrinally incompatible with that of early Yogācāra on the basis of Wǒnhyo’s view on ''ālayavijñāna''. +
In this article, I chart a trajectory from deconstruction to embodiment in the intellectual history of Buddhist traditions in Tibet. I focus on embodiment as a participatory approach to radically deconstructed and unthematized meaning, in contrast to an interpretation of truth as purely an analytic category or an approach to meaning that deals with values, such as emptiness, as simply truth claims or representations. I show how certain Buddhists in Tibet have represented the meaning of emptiness as a uniquely participatory encounter in such a way that its meaning is necessarily embodied. To speak of it otherwise, I argue, is to misrepresent its meaning fundamentally. An important way that the embodiment of emptiness is formulated is through the discourses of buddha-nature (''tathāgatagarbha''). I show how Tibetan interpretations of Buddha-nature reflect postmodern concerns about metaphysics and onto-theology. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The varying answers given to the single question of whether the mind is pure by nature or defiled by nature form a convenient lenses through which to view the development of Yogācāra thought. If the mind is pure, then where do the defilements originate? If it is defiled, where does purity originate? Though the classical formulation of Asaṇga and Vasubandhu sees consciousness as ''paratantric'', the source of defilement yet only the ''support'' of purity (an important distinction that necessitates an external source of purity), another view which was taken up by Yogācāran thinkers is that of the originally pure mind (''viśuddhi cittaprakṛiti''); a third schema brings the structure of consciousness together with that purity as seen, for example, within the *''Mahāyāna śraddhotpādaśāstra'' (''The Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith''). (Hubbard, introductory remarks, 1) +
In understanding the ongoing process of the development of any doctrinal system, isolated insights into particular texts or particular doctrinal themes are not sufficient. No number of monographs on ''ālayavijñāna'' or ''trisvabhāva'' suffices, for, although such studies do clarify particular themes, no understanding is gained of the overall purpose for which these themes were developed. What is desired is an overall insight into what the system is trying to achieve. In the case of the Yogācāra system, the question of its basic intent and overall purpose is not easily determined. There are, it would appear, two reasons for this situation. The first is that the complex of questions regarding the dating, authorship, and compilation of the various textual data have not yet received definite answers in many instances, and yet each of these questions bears directly upon the understanding of the lines of doctrinal development. A second reason is that the doctrinal focuses of some of the basic Yogācāra texts appear to differ.<br> The intent of this paper is to treat this latter concern. It will attempt to describe the basic doctrinal focus of four early Yogācāra texts, suggest the intent of their authors, and draw a hypothesis concerning the lines of development of early Yogācāra as seen in these texts. The texts selected are the ''[[Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārakārikā|Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra]]'', the ''[[Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra]]'', the ''[[Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra]]'', and the ''[[Madhyāntavibhāga|Madyāntavibhāgaśāstra]]''. All four texts were composed before the time of the classical formulation of Yogācāra by [[Asaṅga]] and [[Vasubandhu]]. Although it is not possible to determine with any degree of certitude the temporal relationship among these texts, insight into their doctrinal emphases would help to identify the overall problematic that led the early, pre-Asaṅgan Yogācārins to develop their thinking. ([https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jiabs/article/view/8560/2467 Source Accessed Jan 28, 2020])
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
In this essay I aim to clarify the meaning of other-emptiness in the Jonang (''jo nang'')
tradition of Buddhism of Tibet. I will focus on the writings of Dölpopa (''dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan'') (1292–1361), the renowned forefather of this tradition. Dölpopa famously differentiated two types of emptiness, or two ways of being empty—self-emptiness (''rang stong'') and other-emptiness (''gzhan stong'')—and proclaimed the
superiority of the latter.
In contrast to the meaning of self-emptiness, other-emptiness is not a phenomenon’s emptiness of its own essence. It refers to ultimate reality’s emptiness of all that it is not. Also, it does not just refer to a (relative) phenomenon being empty of another phenomenon (like an ox lacking the quality of a sheep), but rather refers to the ultimate ground that is empty of all relative phenomena. Other-emptiness also is a way of articulating that the qualities of nirvāṇa lack the qualities of saṃsāra (i.e., nirvāṇa is empty of its other). By endorsing the superiority of other-emptiness, Dölpopa laid out a distinctive claim that became the hallmark of his Jonang tradition’s interpretation of emptiness:
:All that is said about emptiness is not exclusively self-emptiness; there is a division between the emptiness that is the profound other-emptiness and the emptiness that is selfemptiness, which is not profound. Moreover, there are two: the emptiness that is ultimate and the emptiness that is relative. And there are two: the emptiness that is thoroughly established and the emptiness that is imputed. Furthermore, there are two: the emptiness that is natural and innate and the emptiness that is artificial and contingent.[1]
While it is not controversial for a Buddhist to claim that the ultimate truth is not the
relative truth or that nirvāṇa lacks the qualities of saṃsāra, it is controversial to claim
that other-emptiness is a more profound form of emptiness than self-emptiness, or
that it is the most profound meaning of emptiness. This is just what Dölpopa claims.
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Dölpopa, ''Elucidation of Emptiness'', pp. 294–295.
Scholars of Buddhism writing in European languages have celebrated, derided, and frequently misinterpreted the doctrine of ''tathāgatagarbha'' for well over a hundred years. While some have seen it as a crucial theoretical step to explain how deluded, impure sentient beings can become buddhas, others have dismissed the entire idea as non-Buddhist. Following Chinese and Tibetan scholiasts, Western scholars have labeled tathāgatagarbha as either Yogācāra or Madhyamaka, although most now understand that the doctrine arose independently of either of these main Mahāyāna schools. The philosophical question of whether ultimate reality can or should be described in positive terms, and the ethical matters of faith and practice all come to the fore in discussions of tathāgatagarbha, and scholars have for the most part spent the last century explicating the scripture and commentary that have sought to make sense of it all. To the degree that academics have assumed the role of interpreting Buddhist doctrine to Western audiences, tathāgatagarbha—“buddha-nature” to the popular reader—seems now to be the foremost shared interest of the academic and the practitioner. This essay attempts to be exhaustive, referencing all books, articles, and chapters that take buddha-nature as the primary focus. It discusses only scholarship published in European languages. +
P
Articles/Paramārtha's Doctrine of a Ninth Consciousness, as Transmitted in Tibetan Texts: Tsong kha pa's Kun gzhi dka' gter and Its Context +
This study aims to elucidate a portion of the reception and evaluation of Paramārtha's doctrines in Tibet, taking as its entry point controversy about Paramārtha's theory of a ninth consciousness as seen in Tsong kha pa's (Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa, 1357-1419) Kun gzhi dka' gter, while simultaneously investigating the background to that text. The development of our argument will incorporate new insights gained through investigation of the texts upon which Tsong kha pa based himself: Wǒnch'ŭk's commentary on the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, and commentaries on the Abhidharmasamuccaya by gZad ring (gZad ring Dar ma tshul khrims, latter half of the 12th century), bCom ldan rig ral (1227-1305), Bu ston (Bu ston Rin chen grub, 1290-1364) and Blo gros brtan pa (dPang Blo gros brtan pa, 1276-1342).<br> Wǒnch'ŭk, bCom ldan rig ral and Bu ston understood that ninth consciousness is ultimately the seeds of the eighth consciousness, or else the pure part thereof. In terms of the content of the controversy, gZad ring, bCom ldan rig ral and Bu ston largely follow a common archetype. They introduce the ninth consciousness without mentioning Paramārtha; they refer to tathāgatagarbha doctrine, relying upon a passage from the Samādhirāja-sūtra as their proof-text; and in rejecting the doctrine of ninth consciousness, they propose that ninth consciousness must exist either actually or potentially, and then reject both alternatives. Since these two points cannot be identified in Wǒnch'ŭk's commentary, we can postulate that the controversy between these scholars was an innovative creation and development from within Tibetan Buddhism. Furthermore, it also seems that in the transmission of ninth consciousness doctrine in Tibet, there arose certain distortions (or deviations from Wǒnch'ŭk's theories), such as when gZad ring ascribes the doctrine of ninth consciousness not to Paramārtha, but to Bhavya.<br> We also must not neglect the fact that the doctrine of ninth consciousness affirmed in these commentaries to the Abhidharmasamuccaya is not completely identical to that described by Tsong kha pa. Comparison with these texts, which constitute the immediate context for his discussion, highlights the fact that in discussing Paramārtha's doctrine of ninth consciousness as it appears in Wonchuk, Tsong kha pa cites Wonchuk's work directly, rather than second-hand (i.e. rather than relying upon predecessors who utilize Wonchuk's exposition); and in refuting the doctrine of ninth consciousness, he attempts to construct proofs on the basis of his own original viewpoint, rather than recycling the arguments of his predecessors. We are surely justified in judging that it was Tsong kha pa's achievement to absorb Wonchuk's commentary for himself, and to attempt to correct the distortions incidental to the transmission of ninth consciousness doctrine in Tibet. ([https://koyasan-u.academia.edu/Departments/Esoteric_Buddhist_Studies/Documents?page=2 Source Accessed June 16, 2020])
The present paper [in German] consists of two sections. The first section is concerned with the structure of the Ratnagotravibhāgaḥ (RGV). The starting point is the analysis given by J. Takasaki in his book "A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga" (Rome 1966). Takasaki's distinction between basic verses, commentary verses and prose commentary certainly has to be accepted. His attempt however to recover an original RGV of only 27 verses by declaring most of the basic verses to be later enlargements of the basic text seems open to doubt, because even this pretended original RGV admits of being split up again. Therefore, to my opinion the original RGV is constituted by the totality of basic verses. But this original RGV seems to have made use of several (perhaps only partly remodelIed) older materials. — The second section of the present paper is dedicated to suggesting corrections of the Sanskrit text and — in some cases — of the translation of single RGV-passages. +
Is Dōgen a philosopher? Or even an example of what he scolds a "word-counting scholar"? Despite the difficulties of classifying Dōgen, many would still agree, at least with regard to his ''magnum opus'', the ''Shōbōgenzō'', that his writings are philosophical. This, however, requires some clarification, since there is not much left of this work if one were to exclude all the fascicles that are not explicitly cited for philosophical interpretation. The philosophic scope becomes even smaller if one were to consider the respective passages of the few fascicles pertinent for explicit philosophical reading. At the risk of oversimplifying, the philosophical reception of Dōgen's works is almost entirely grounded in the fascicle "Uji", which is distinguished for its thought–provoking discourse on time. Furthermore the philosophical reading of other fascicles, including "Genjōkōan" and "Zenki" revolves around a related interpretation of "Uji."<br> Nevertheless, we can still ask if there might be yet another accessible vantage point from which one could regard Dōgen's ''Shōbōgenzō'' as philosophical? This paper will argue that the answer is "yes," there is such a vantage point, so long as one distinguishes ''what'' Dōgen writes from ''how'' Dōgen writes. For the claim of the paper is that while it remains ambiguous to maintain that his writings exhibit a philosophical system based on content, their form realizes what philosophy is at its core, i.e. reflexivity or philosophy’s inherent self reference. (Müller, "Philosophy and the Practice of Reflexivity," 545–46)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#English quoted from W/A 16; jap. DZZ 2: 467−68: ｢文字をかぞふる学者｣. Note: The original text references quote from ''Dōgen zenji zenshū'', ["DZZ"]. The English translations of the three main writings (''Bendōwa'' [辦道話], "Busshō" [仏性], and ''Hōkyōki'' [宝慶記]) are based on Norman Waddell and Masao Abe (2002) ["W/A"]; and, respectively, Takashi James Kodera (1980), ["K"].
#As has already been pointed out, most philosophical readers only consider Dōgen's ''Shōbōgenzō'' (正法眼蔵). In fact, there is probably no reader of Dōgen who would blatantly disregard the religious practitioner's interpretation of Dōgen in favor of that of a strictly theoretical interpretation of a philosopher. Since, to my understanding, most existing philosophical readings of Dōgen are not radically different, it seems worth reevaluating these readings by dismantling both the historical and rhetorical layers of the respective author's prose to relate the effective ambitions and the factual interpretations. — In the case of Tanabe Hajime's 1939 reading of Dōgen (see Tanabe 2011 and Müller 2006 for translation and commentary), Masunaga Reihō (1939) presents the earliest and most comprehensive critique of Tanabe's philosophical reading including a set of six objections (pp. 627–630) building on Tanabe's own question of the systematic relation of religion and philosophy. Taking Tanabe's reading seriously would require a similar critique from his own vantage point. — A more recent outline of Western readers of Dōgen by Hee-Jin Kim (2004: xv-xxii) subsumes his own approach in contradistinction to the "textual-historical" and "comparative philosophical" method as "methodological-hermeneutical" (p. xviii) to show "how Dōgen does his religion, especially his way of appropriating language and symbols soteriologically" (ibid.). The present article evolves Kim's reasoning with regards to the way Dōgen does philosophy in a similar vein.
#See Elberfeld 2006 for a recent interpretation of the fascicle "Uji" in the horizon of the Indian and Chinese Buddhist tradition. Still worth reading is Heine 1985.
#有時.
#現成公案 and 全機.
Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche presents the essential teachings of Mahamudra and its three main approaches to practice, each offering effective methods for directly pointing out mind’s true nature. +
Articles/Presenting a Controversial Doctrine in a Conciliatory Way: Mkhan chen Gang shar dbang po's (1925–1958-59?) Inclusion of Gzhan stong ("Emptiness of Other") within Prāsaṅgika +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Positive descriptions of the ultimate, which are based on direct access to the luminous nature of one’s mind, as taught in the various traditions of Mahāmudrā or Great Perfection, look back upon a long history. Such systems found doctrinal support in the teachings of the third turning of the wheel of the ''dharma'' (''dharmacakra''), which is not only based on the doctrine of emptiness, but also distinguishes between the imputed and the real (i.e., phenomena and their true nature, or adventitious stains and
buddha-nature).[1] Some took this third ''dharmacakra'' as a teaching of definitive meaning and went so far as to stress the need to define its distinction between the imputed and the real in terms of two modes of emptiness: being "empty of an own-being" (''rang stong'') and being "empty of other" (''gzhan stong''). The most prominent proponent of ''gzhan stong'', Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan (1292-1561), takes relative truth as being empty of a true own-being, but the ultimate as not being empty of such an own-being.[2] In terms of the theory of three natures, Dol po pa equates this ultimate with the perfect nature. It alone is ''gzhan stong'', that is, empty of the imagined and dependent natures.[3] Such an interpretation mainly follows the Extensive Commentary (''Bṛhaṭṭīkā'')[4] on the Discourses of the Perfection of Wisdom
(while also drawing support from the teaching of a buddha-nature, if one equates the latter with the perfect nature and the adventitious stains with the imagined and dependent natures) and requires one to reinterpret the traditional Yogācāra formula according to which the perfect is the dependent empty of the imagined. In the final analysis, the Jo nang pas go so far as to restrict the perfect to its unchangeable nature, with the perfect in terms of its unmistaken aspect (i.e., as nonconceptual wisdom) being taken as the "pure dependent."[5] The basis of emptiness thus is the ultimate or the unchangeable aspect of the perfect nature, everything dependent being part of the negandum which includes the entire relative truth. It should be noted that the Jo nang pa variety of ''gzhan stong'' is based on a particular understanding of the relation between the two truths, which requires a clear-cut distinction between an existing transcendent ultimate and a relative that does not exist in this fundamental state.[6]
<h5>Notes</h5>
#According to ''Discourse Revealing the True Intention'' (''Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra'') VII.30, the Buddha taught the Four Noble Truths in the first ''dharmacakra''. Both the second and the third ''dharmacakras'' he taught beginning with the lack of an own-being in phenomena, and going on to the fact that these latter neither arise nor pass out of existence, that they are quiescent from the beginning, and that they are naturally in a state of ''nirvāṇa''—in other words, emptiness as taught in the Discourses on the Perfection of Wisdom (Prajñāpāramitāsūtras) and the analytical Madhyamaka works of Nāgārjuna. The third ''dharmacakra'' stands out, though, for the fine distinctions it offers, and for this reason alone it has—contrary to the first two—definitive meaning (''nitārtha''), and so outshines the second ''dharmacakra'' by an uncountable factor (SNS, 85; and Powers, ''Wisdom of the Buddha; The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra'', 138-41).
#Dol po pa: ''Bden gnyis gsal ba’i nyi ma'', 4<sub>1–3</sub>: "Any object of consciousness, that which is, from its own side, empty of a true own-being, this is the defining characteristic of relative truth. . . . Any object of the genuine wisdom of the noble ones, that which is, from its own side, not empty of its respective own-being, this is the defining characteristic of the ultimate." (''rnam shes kyi yul gang zhig'' / ''gshis la rang gi ngo bo bden pas stong pa ni'' / ''kun rdzob bden pa'i mtshan nyid . . . ’phags pa’i ye shes dam pa’i yul gang zhig'' / ''gzhis la rang rang gi ngo bo bden pas mi stong pa ni'' / ''don dam pa’i mtshan nyid de'' /). See Mathes, "Vordergründige und höchste Wahrheit im ''gZan stoṅ''-Madhyamaka," 459.
#Dol po pa: ''Jo nang ri chos nges don rgya mtsho'', 150<sub>4–6</sub>: "Since it has been said that the ''dharmatā'' [or] perfect [nature], which is empty of the imagined and dependent [natures], ultimately exists, the ultimate is well established as being ''gzhan stong'' alone." (''kun btags dang gzhan dbang gis stongpa’i chos nyid yongs grub don dam du yod par gsungs pa’i phyir don dam gzhan stong nyid du legs par grub po'' /).
#Derge Bstan ’gyur 3808, fol. 287a<sub>4–5</sub>: "The imagined nature [of phenomena] is that aspect [of them that leads to] form and the other [modes of] phenomena being called "form" and so forth. The dependent nature is that aspect [of them which], under the sway of ignorance and so forth, appears to consciousness as phenomena in a mistaken way. [Their] ultimate—perfect—nature is that ineffable aspect beyond characteristic signs, which is free from the [said] aspects of names and mistaken appearances." (''de la gzugs la sogs pa chos rnams la gzugs zhes bya ba la sogs par mngon par brjod pa’i rnam pa gang yin pa de ni kun brtags pa’i ngo bo nyid do'' / ''ma rig pa la sogs pa’i dbang gis rnam par shes pa la chos rnams su phyin ci log tu snang ba’i mam pa gang yin pa de ni gzhan dbang gi ngo bo nyid do'' / ''gang ming dang'' /''phyin ci log tu snang ba’i rnam pa de dang bred ba brjod du med pa'' / ''mtshan ma med pa’i rnam pa gang yin pa de ni don dam pa yongs su grub pa’i ngo bo nyid de /). See also my first discussion of this passage in Mathes, "Tāranātha's 'Twenty-One Differences with Regard to the Profound Meaning'—Comparing the Views of the Two ''gŹan stoṅ'' Masters Dol po pa and Śākya mchog Idan," 317.
#Mathes, "Tāranātha's Presentation of ''trisvabhāva'' in the ''gŹan stoṅ sñiṅ po''," 218-20.
#Mathes, ''A Direct Path to the Buddha Within: Go Lotsāwa's Mahāmudrā Interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhāga'', 79-80.
East Asian Yogācāra Buddhism has been explained through traditional bifurcations, such as “Old” and “New” Yogācāra Buddhism, Tathāgatagarbha and Yogācāra, One Vehicle (一乘, S. ''eka-yana'') and Three Vehicles (三乘, S. ''tri-yana''), or Dharma Nature School (法性宗) and Dharma Characteristics School (法相宗). These conceptual pairs have served as useful tools in explaining the historical development and doctrinal evolvement of East Asian Yogācāra tradition. These simplistic binary frames, however, contain historical and/or doctrinal problems in understanding the complicated aspects of the development of the Yogācāra tradition in East Asia. In this regards, this paper critically reflects on theoretical implications of the traditional bifurcations by analyzing previous studies related to this subject, thereby disclosing fundamental problems of the binary frame. The paper finally discusses the prospect of studies on East Asian Yogācāra Buddhism. +
R
Ratnākaraśānti (ca. 11th cent.) is one of the most influential figures in the final phase of Indian Buddhism, and more than thirty works are available in Tibetan translations (some of them are also available in Sanskrit originals). However, previous studies have pointed out that some works are of another person with the same namesake, because, among the works attributed to him, we find some serious diversity in their doctrinal systems. The present paper focuses on the diversity in interpretation of the Buddha-nature doctrine.<br> We can find two types of interpretation, i.e., (1) that in accord with the ''yānatraya'' doctrine (in the ''Prajñāpāramitopadeśa'', ''Muktāvalī'', and ''Kusumāñjali''), and (2) that in accord with the ''ekayāna'' doctrine (in the ''Sūtrasamuccayabhāṣya'' and ''Triyānavyavasthāna''). The two positions are clearly contradicting each other. The first interpretation (1) is based on traditional Yogācāra doctrine that admits the ''gotrabheda'' doctrine ("differences of spiritual potentials"), while the second (2) premises the Madhyamaka doctrine that does not accept the ''gotrabheda'' doctrine on the ultimate level and claims all beings equally have the same potential to become a buddha.<br> Furthermore, the existence of the diversity between the two interpretations is supported by other doctrinal issues, for instance, two different attitudes toward the understanding of ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' I.39.<br> As a conclusion, the doctrinal position in the ''Sūtrasamuccayabhāṣya'' and ''Triyānavyavasthāna'' is different from that of the ''Prajñāpāramitopadeśa'' etc. The aim of the present paper is to show the clear diversity attested in the works attributed to Ratnākaraśānti, which will, hopefully, contribute to solving the question of the authorship of the works, i.e., whether they are composed by one person or not. (Source: [https://www.academia.edu/5418196/_Two_Different_Positions_toward_the_Buddha-nature_Doctrine_found_in_Ratn%C4%81kara%C5%9B%C4%81ntis_Compositions_Ratn%C4%81kara%C5%9B%C4%81nti_no_shochosaku_ni_okeru_nyoraiz%C5%8D_rikai_no_niruikei_Mikkyo_bunka._225._2011._pp._7-35_publ._2013_in_Japanese_%E3%83%A9%E3%83%88%E3%83%8A%E3%83%BC%E3%82%AB%E3%83%A9%E3%82%B7%E3%83%A3%E3%83%BC%E3%83%B3%E3%83%86%E3%82%A3%E3%81%AE%E8%AB%B8%E8%91%97%E4%BD%9C%E3%81%AB%E3%81%8A%E3%81%91%E3%82%8B%E5%A6%82%E6%9D%A5%E8%94%B5%E7%90%86%E8%A7%A3%E3%81%AE%E4%BA%8C%E9%A1%9E%E5%9E%8B_%E5%AF%86%E6%95%99%E6%96%87%E5%8C%96_225_2011%E5%B9%B4_2013%E5%B9%B47%E6%9C%88%E5%87%BA%E7%89%88_7-35%E9%A0%81 Academia.edu])
Ratnākaraśānti (ca. 11th cent.) is one of the most influential figures in the final phase of Indian Buddhism, and more than thirty works are available in Tibetan translations (some of them are also available in Sanskrit originals). However, previous studies have pointed out that some works are of another person with the same namesake, because, among the works attributed to him, we find some serious diversity in their doctrinal systems. The present paper focuses on the diversity in interpretation of the Buddha-nature doctrine. We can find two types of interpretation, i.e., (1) that in accord with the ''yānatraya'' doctrine (in the ''Prajñāpāramitopadeśa'', ''Muktāvalī'', and ''Kusumāñjali''), and (2) that in accord with the ''ekayāna'' doctrine (in the ''Sūtrasamuccayabhāṣya'' and ''Triyānavyavasthāna''). The two positions are clearly contradicting each other. The first interpretation (1) is based on traditional Yogācāra doctrine that admits the ''gotrabheda'' doctrine (“differences of spiritual potentials”), while the second (2) premises the Madhyamaka doctrine that does not accept the ''gotrabheda'' doctrine on the ultimate level and claims all beings equally have the same potential to become a buddha. Furthermore, the existence of the diversity between the two interpretations is supported by other doctrinal issues, for instance, two different attitudes toward the understanding of ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' I.39. As a conclusion, the doctrinal position in the ''Sūtrasamuccayabhāṣya'' and ''Triyānavyavasthāna'' is different from that of the ''Prajñāpāramitopadeśa'' etc. The aim of the present paper is to show the clear diversity attested in the works attributed to Ratnākaraśānti, which will, hopefully, contribute to solving the question of the authorship of the works, i.e., whether they are composed by one person or not. (Source: [https://www.academia.edu/28610706/Ratn%C4%81kara%C5%9B%C4%81nti_s_Understanding_of_Buddha-nature._China_Tibetology_25_2015._pp._52_77 Academia.edu])
Articles/Reading the Writing on the Wall: "Sengchou's" Cave at Xiaonanhai, Early Chinese Buddhist Meditation, and Unique Portions of *Dharmakṣema's Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra +
The ''Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra'' (particularly in the version entitled ''Da banniepan jing'' 大般涅槃經 T374, translated by *Dharmakṣema ca. 421-432) features centrally in the textual and iconographic programme of a remarkable cave at Xiaonanhai 小南海 in northern Henan 河南, which was rediscovered in the 1980s. The cave has close connections with Sengchou 僧稠 (480-560), a famous meditator, and one of the leading clerics in Northern China in the sixth century. This paper argues for a new interpretation of the programme of the cave, and considers what it allows us to see about religious life and practice in Sengchou's time. An appendix examines implications of the textual material featured at the cave for the nature and provenance of the bulky portions of Dharmakṣema's version of the ''Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra'' that are unparalleled in our other three main independent witnesses. (Source: [https://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&id=3287487&journal_code=JIABS Peeters Online Journals]) +
Articles/Reburying the Treasure—Maintaining the Continuity: Two Texts by Śākya Mchog Ldan on the Buddha-Essence +
The rich and interconnected universe of Śākya Mchog Ldan’s views, including those on the buddha-essence, cannot be limited to or summarized in a few neat categories. Nevertheless, the following two interrelated ideas are crucial for understanding Śākya Mchog Ldan’s interpretation of the buddha-essence: 1) only Mahāyāna āryas ('' ’phags pa'') have the buddha-essence characterized by the purity from adventitious stains (''glo bur rnam dag''); 2) the buddha-essence is inseparable from the positive qualities (''yon tan'', ''guṇa'') of a buddha; In his writings, Śākya Mchog Ldan argues against identifying the buddha-essence as a mere natural purity (''rang bzhin rnam dag''), i.e., the state of natural freedom from obscurations as it is taught in the Middle or Second Wheel of Doctrine (''chos ’khor'', ''dharmacakra'') and its commentaries. The buddha-essence has to be posited as inseparability from positive qualities of a buddha.<br>
Śākya Mchog Ldan approaches the buddha-essence inseparable from positive qualities of a buddha in two ways. In some texts, such as the ''Essence of Sūtras and Tantras'', he argues that it has to be identified only as purity from adventitious stains, i.e., the removal of all or some negative qualities that prevent one from directly seeing the buddha-essence. In other texts, such as ''The Sun Unseen Before'', he interprets it as the purity from adventitious stains and the natural purity as it is taught in some sūtras of the Third Wheel of Doctrine and their commentaries. That type of natural purity is understood as the state of natural freedom from all obscurations ''inseparable from'' positive qualities of a buddha. Thereby, in this second type of texts, Śākya Mchog Ldan arrives at positing two types of the buddha-essence: relative (''kun rdzob'', ''saṃvṛti'') and ultimate (''don dam'', ''paramārtha''). Despite different interpretations of the natural purity, the identification of the buddha-essence as the purity from adventitious stains is present in both.<br>
In his interpretation of the buddha-essence, Śākya Mchog Ldan utilizes the categories of the three levels found in the ''Sublime Continuum'': the impure (''ma dag'', ''aśuddha''), impure-pure (''ma dag dag pa'', ''aśuddhaśuddha'', i.e. partially pure) and very pure (''shin tu rnam dag'', ''suviśuddha'') levels that correspond respectively to the categories of sentient beings, bodhisattvas (understood as ārya bodhisattvas in this context), and tathāgatas.<br>
Śākya Mchog Ldan argues that one becomes a possessor of the buddha-essence free from adventitious stains only on the impure-pure level. In other words, when bodhisattvas enter the Mahāyāna Path of Seeing (''mthong lam'', ''darśanamārga'') simultaneously with the attainment of the first boddhisattva [''sic''] ground (''byang chub sems pa’i sa'', ''bodhisattavabhūmi'') of Utmost Joy (''rab tu dga’ ba'', ''pramuditā''), they become āryas, i.e. ‘exalted’ or ‘superior’, bodhisattvas, directly realize the ultimate truth (''don dam bden pa'', ''paramārthasatya''), and thereby for the first time generate an antidote to obscurations of knowables (''shes bya’i sgrib pa'', ''jñeyāvaraṇa''). They start gradually removing them, and thereby actually see at least a partial purification of stains ‘covering’ the buddha-essence, and its inseparability from at least some positive qualities. Such is not possible for anyone below that level, even for the non-Mahāyāna arhats (i.e., śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas). Thus, only Mahāyāna āryas have the buddha-essence characterized by the purity from adventitious stains; ārya bodhisattvas have only a part of it, while buddhas have it completely.<br>
This article contains the complete text (in English translation) of ''The Essence of Sūtras and Tantras: Explanation of the Buddha-essence'' and ''The Sun Unseen Before: Definitive Meaning of the “Sublime Continuum” Treatise''. (Source: [https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/classicsfacpub/79/ DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln])
This paper is published in ''Acta Asiatica'' no.118, which concerns recent scholarship on ''tathāgatagarbha'', or Buddha-nature thought, in Indian literature. In light of recent reassessments of the development of ''tathāgatagarbha'' thought in India, this paper considers instances in which ''tathāgatagarbha'' is unpacked to refer to some "essence" (''dhātu'') of a Buddha present in all sentient beings. My observation is that this articulation of Buddha-nature teaching is found throughout Indian ''tathāgatagarbha'' literature, from the ''Nirvāṇa Sūtra'' through to supposedly "basic" materials of the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'', but is conspicuously absent where Buddhist authors are invested in (re)interpreting Buddha-nature in terms of the basic nature of the mind: an influential innovation that I believe is first evident in the ''Śrīmālā Sūtra''. ([https://www.academia.edu/42138584/Reconsidering_the_Essence_of_Indian_Buddha-Nature_Literature Source Accessed April 3, 2020]) +
The tantric path of Buddhism is complex and arduous, but its surprising culmination is the practice of spaciousness, ease, and simplicity known as Dzogchen, the Great Perfection. +
With an intention to contribute a little to gaining a fuller and more accurate picture of the intellectual agenda and philosophical edifice of Rong-zom Chos-kyi-bzang-po (henceforth: Rong-zom-pa), an eleventh-century Tibetan scholar, I wish to address in this article merely one question, namely, how Rong-zom-pa interprets what we shall call the positivistic ontology of the Tathāgatagarbha school[1] while he himself undoubtedly proposes a radically negativistic ontology of a Madhyamaka sub-school
called Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda. To be sure, the word ontology is used here in the sense of the philosophical theory about the true or ultimate reality of phenomena (according to any given Buddhist system).[2] In particular, the idea that the “root-less-ness” of the mind (or, the rootless mind) is the "root" of all phenomena, or ideas similar to it, is explicit in a number of textual sources that are de facto considered the literature of the Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda by Rong-zom-pa.[3]
<h5>Notes</h5>
#It was apparently Lambert Schmithausen who employed the term "Tathāgatagarbha school" (i.e. “Tathāgatagarbha-Schule”) for the first time. See, for example, Schmithausen 1969, 167–168. In a public lecture in 1998, however, he employed the term "Tathāgatagarbha-Richtung" with the explanation that at least in India, this strand of Mahāyāna Buddhism, unlike Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, does not seem to have devolved into a bigger and independent school. See Schmithausen 1998, 2; Schmithausen 1973, 132.
#As a response to some points raised by the reviewers of this article, I wish to offer here some words of explanation. First, in a short article such as this, it has been impossible to either explain at length all the doctrinal backgrounds and arguments that have been presupposed by Rong-zom-pa or cite chunks of relevant Tibetan passages and critically edit and translate them. This will have to wait for another occasion. Second, insofar as every philosophical Buddhist system or sub-system would have its own conception of true reality, thereby using various terms (e.g. ''śūnyatā'', ''tathatā'', ''dharmadhātu'', ''bhūtakoṭi'', ''samatā'', ''dharmatā'', and so on), one can indeed speak of the ontology of any given Buddhist philosophical system, no matter whether it is positivistic or negativistic. The Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda, too, has its own very distinct theory of true reality, which, according to Rong-zom-pa, is the "indivisibility of the two modes of reality" (''bden pa gnyis dbyer med pa''). In my view, the argument that because Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda denies any (metaphysical) substratum, be it theistic or otherwise, one cannot even speak of “negativistic” ontology, for it is no ontology at all, does not hold. Such a claim is unfounded insofar as we are speaking here of a "negativistic" ontology of all saṃsāric and nirvāṇic phenomena. Third, it is true that the expression "the ontology of substratum-less-less" indeed sounds like an oxymoron, but we cannot deny that, in general, Mahāyāna sources abound in paradoxical statements, as exemplified by the idea of what are called the "eight [kinds of] profundity" (''zab mo brgyad'') (Mi-pham, mKhas 'jug, 238.1-241.4), which are said to be often misunderstood as contradictions, and a comprehension of them is said to be a realization (''abhisamaya'': ''mngon par rtogs pa'') of a bodhisattva of the eighth stage. Fourth, one question that recurs when dealing with the Tathāgatagarbha theory is why emptiness, purity, or "substratum-less-ness" of rocks or vegetables cannot qualify to be tathāgatagarbha and why rocks and vegetables cannot become buddhas. There may be several explanations why the Tibetan tradition, to my knowledge, never came to accept that inanimate entities (such as rocks) and vegetative entities (such as plants) can become buddhas. I can think of three possible explanations. (a) They followed the Indian tradition, and as far as I am concerned, Indian Buddhism did not propose that entities such as rocks and vegetables can become buddhas. (b) Following the Tibetan (and certainly also Indian) Buddhist understanding of the trans/ultra-phenomenal reality (e.g. ''tathatā'', ''śūnyatā'', ''dharmatā'', and ''tathāgatagarbha''), it makes no sense whatsoever to speak as if there were multiple and separate ''śūnyatā''s or ''tathāgatagarbha''s, for example, one confined to a piece of carrot and one to a rabbit. From the perspective of ''dharmatā'', there is only one trans/ultra-phenomenal reality, although one does speak of, for example, sixteen kinds of ''śūnyatā'' merely on the basis of ''dhamas''/''dharmins''. This ''dharma'' / ''dharmin''-based distinction of the various kinds of ''dharmatā'' is said to be true also in the case of the difference between the non-essentiality of persons (''pudgalanairātmya'': ''gang zag gi bdag med pa'') and non-essentiality of phenomena (''dharmanairātmya'': ''chos kyi bdag med pa''). In other words, there is one ''dharmatā'' that underlies all ''pudgala''s (e.g. rabbit) and ''dharma''s (e.g. carrot), and whoever gains deep meditative insight into the ''dharmatā'' would become awakened. Theoretically, if a piece of rock or a piece of carrot were able to gain deep meditative insight into the ''dharmatā'', they would become a buddha, but the Tibetan tradition (following the Indian one) did not accept the sentience of entities such as rocks and carrots, and hence for them it is ridiculous to speak of rocks or carrots becoming buddhas. (c) It appears that one of the reasons why it makes no sense to talk of the possibility of inanimate or insentient entities becoming buddhas is that the Tibetan tradition, no matter which school, seems to take one of the two kinds of Buddhist idealism as a point of departure, namely, what may be called the "idealism according to which there is no other creator (i.e. other than one’s mind)" (''byed pa po gzhan med pa’i sems tsam'') and "idealism according to which there is no external entities" (''phyi don med pa’i sems tsam''). Various scholars and systems may disagree about the ontological status of the mind. That is, for some, what underlies the mind as its true reality is śūnyatā, and for others what underlies the mind as its true reality is the innate gnosis. But all would agree that the principle point of departure is the mind.
#See, for example, the *''Guhyagarbhatantra'' (Wangchuk 2007, 213, n. 72): ''rtsa ba med pa’i sems nyid ni // chos rnams kun gyi rtsa ba yin''//.
S
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>With in the history of Buddhism in East Asia the world of nature gained and retained a high position —something seen as having inherent religious value. This two-part essay reviews aspects of the history of this upward valuation of nature in Chinese and Japanese Buddhism and analyzes the interpretative shifts and changes made necessary by this impulse toward the attribution of increasingly great religious significance to nature. The development is carried as far as the twelfth century in Japan and the poetry of the Buddhist monk Saigyō (1118- 90), poetry which not only itself moved the valorization of nature beyond the point where earlier writers had brought it, but also, since as poetry it gained a position in the public mind and a place in the popular imagination of the Japanese people, historically "fixed" a lasting nexus between Buddhism and nature in the popular consciousness of the Japanese people. Saigyō, therefore, is of great significance in the history of Japanese religion, a fact that has always been implicitly recognized in the Japanese regard for him as Japan's greatest "medieval Buddhist nature poet." His poetry is important not only as literature but also as a document in the history of Japanese religion.<br> Although in what follows I am more interested in an analysis of Saigyō's verse—in relationship to the Buddhist view of nature—than in details of his life, it is of importance to note here that Saigyō, whose name before he became a monk was Satō Norikiyo, saw his Buddhist vocation as something to be carried out in the mountains rather than in temples and monasteries. Before becoming a monk he had been a military guard in the service of Emperor Toba and a member of an elite corps of palace guards known as the ''Hokumen no Bushi'' or "North-facing warriors." But at age twenty-three he relinquished his career in court and became a Buddhist monk . He was at first loosely attached to Shingon and Tendai temples in the vicinity of Heian-kyō or Kyoto and seems to have retained a lifelong attachment to the memory of Kūkai (774-835), the Japanese founder of the Shingon school. But Saigyō's forte lay in his composition of ''waka'' or thirty-one-syllable verse and it is in the context of his writing of these verses that we gain an understanding of his vision of nature, Buddhism, and the correlation of these two. For Saigyō the world of nature was the primary world of Buddhist values, and it is this that I wish to investigate in what follows. (LaFleur, "Saigyō and the Buddhist Value of Nature," 93–94)
The present paper aims to clarify work-titles of writings of Sajjana and his son Mahājana, the 11th and 12th century lay Buddhists of Kashmir; especially Sajjana is sometimes regarded as a crucial individual for Yogācāra exegesis tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. Although, until recently, their writings had not been known except for works available in Tibetan canon, further works that are not included in Tibetan canon have gradually been found in a Sanskrit manuscript, which we call here Sajjana-Mahājana codex. As for Sajjana, in addition to his Putralekha, that is, an epistile addressed to his son Mahājana (only in Tib.), two further works, i.e., Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa and Sūtrālaṃkārapiṇḍārtha, have been available (both only in Skt.). With regard to Mahājana, (1) Sūtrālaṃkārādhikārasaṅgati (only in Skt.) has become newly available found in the Sajjana-Mahājana codex, in addition to (2) his Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya commentary (only in Tib.). In (2), Mahājana refers to two of his own writings, i.e., (3) ’Brel pa grub pa chung ngu’i yongs su shes pa and (4) rNam par nges pa’i yongs su shes pa. We can identify (3) as the Pratibandhasiddhiparicaya which is available only as a Sanskrit fragment in the Sajjana-Mahājana codex. On the baisis of this identification, we can assume the Sanskrit title of (4) as *Viniścayaparicaya (yet to be found). Accordingly, the Sanskrit title of (1) can be known as Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayaparicaya as attested in the Peking Tanjur (Derge's reading -arthaparijñāna does not seem to reflect the original). Furthermore, there are two other works with the word paricaya in their titles, i.e., Sūtrālaṃkāraparicaya and *Mahāyānottaratantraparicaya, included in the Sajjana-Mahājana codex. Although their colophons that refer to the author's name are yet to be found, these two are most prabably Mahājana's compositions as this particular title paricaya and this particular situation (being included in the same codex) suggests. +
Articles/Sanskrit Manuscripts and Photographs of Sanskrit Manuscripts in Giuseppe Tucci’s Collection +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
During his scientific expeditions to India, Nepal, Tibet and Pakistan in the nineteen thirties, forties and fifties, Giuseppe Tucci (1894-1984) had the opportunity of photographing, and in many cases of having someone copy, several important Buddhist works.[1] Subsequently, most of the manuscripts that he photographed or copied entered the collections in Nepalese, Chinese and Pakistani libraries, but others were lost. At present Tucci’s reproductions of some of these manuscripts are the only documentation at our disposal.<br> The study and cataloguing of the photographs and manuscripts now held in Rome in the Library of the Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente (IsIAO) was begun in 1997 (officially on 12th June 1998) by Claudio Cicuzza and myself. The first results of our work have been published as an appendix to the first version of this paper published in Warsaw in 2000. At that time the scanning of the negatives was still underway, so our list was highly provisional, based mainly on the short titles written on the envelopes of the negatives and on the photographs already printed.<br> During the last few years, not only it has been possible to correct this list here and there, sometimes with the help of other scholars, as we shall see below, but also to find further manuscripts and photographs of Sanskrit manuscripts that belonged to the Italian scholar –in the IsIAO Library, in the Museo Nazionale d’Arte Orientale ‘Giuseppe Tucci’ (MNAOr) and in a small but important private collection near Rome–and eventually to gather more information regarding the history of Tucci’s expeditions and of the formation of his collection.[2] (Sferra, introduction, 15)
[https://archive.org/details/sanskrittextsfromgiuseppetuccicollectionfrancescosferrapart1seeotherbooks_664_J/page/n5/mode/2up Read more here . . .]
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Certainly Tucci did not photograph the MSS personally, for he declares his complete unfamiliarity with any kind of device, including the camera (“[F]ra me e quale che sia macchina, anche la macchina fotografica, resta un’assoluta incapacità di intesa”, 1996b: 17). Among his companions on the expeditions there was always a person responsible for the photographic reproductions.
#This aspect of Tucci’s work has been studied by Oscar Nalesini; see below, pp. 79-112.
No abstract given. These are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
During my last journey to Tibet in 1929–30, I was able to collect a mass of Tibetan works, either originally translated from Sanskrit or Indian Vernaculars, or original works composed by Tibetan scholars themselves. Though I had heard numerous rumours about the existence of Sanskrit Palm-leaf MSS, but after search I found them unfounded. After several trials I drew the conclusion, that there was hardly much of a possibility of getting Palm-leaf MSS. in Tibet. But on my return, while studying the materials thus collected there for my little monograph in Hindi entitled "A Short History of Buddhism in Tibet" (Devanagari not available)), I felt convinced about the existence of them, at least a hundred in number.<br> Last time, after my return from Tibet, I felt it necessary to restore some of the great works of the Buddhist logicians, from Tibetan to Sanskrit. In fact I was restoring the Pramāṇa-Vārtika of Dharmakīrti, when a friend of mine wrote to me that the work in original Sanskrit was discovered by the Royal Preceptor Paṇḍita Hemarāja Sarman of Nepal, whose knowledge of Sanskrit is encyclopaedic and love for it, proverbial; so I gave up the tasks and thought it prudent to see first those Sanskrit MSS. which were still preserved in Tibet, before taking any restoration work, lest it might prove an useless labour after the discovery of the original MSS. One thing that prompted me to under take the second tour of Tibet was to search for those ancient Palm-leaf MSS. originally taken from India. I remained on Tibetan soil from April 4, till November 10, 1934—about six and a half months<br> Though the import of palm-leaf MSS. begins from the middle of the seventh century during the reign of the Emperor Srong-btsan-sgam-po (630–693 A.D.) their number was very few. Intense activity in the field of translation is witnessed during four centuries, viz., from the middle of the ninth century to the middle of the thirteenth century. During this period many thousands of palm-leaf MSS. were taken to Tibet, and in the normal course, they ought to be found there. But we know that great monasteries of Bsam-yas and Tho-gling (near Mansarowar) were destroyed by fire, in which many precious collections were burnt. Though the monastery of Sa-skya, where many hundreds of Sanskrit books were translated into Tibetan, was never destroyed after its ascendance, yet, later hierarchs did not care for these MSS. which had no meaning for them; and, they allowed the scholars of their sect to take the MSS. away to their monasteries. In fact, the MSS. which are found in the monasteries of Sha-lu and Ngor, originally belonged to Sa-skya. There are two other causes which are responsible for the disappearance of the MSS. The devout people consider it a great meritorious deed to enshrine the palm-leaf MSS. inside a stūpa or image. In this way hundreds of books are now beyond our reach. I heard at Sa-skya that a palm-leaf MS. copy of Dharmakīrti's great work Pramāṇa-vārtika is enshrined inside an image of him, kept in one of the chapels of the Lha-khang-chen-mo of Sa-skya. A few years back, an old stucco image in Bsam-yas had fallen down and inside it many such MSS. were found. The image was reconstructed and MSS. were put back into it again. The other practice is more atrocious. In some of these monasteries Lamas cut the MSS. in pieces and offer them to those pilgrims who bring rich presents. These small pieces are said to possess the miraculous power of healing all kinds of diseases when a drop of water in which the piece has been dipped is administered to the patient.<br> After reaching Lhasa on the 19th May, 1934, I began to search for MSS. The first MS. I saw was a commentary (Devanagari not available) on the Śiśupāla-badham of Māgha by Bhavadatta, along with a few pages of a grammatical work. These MSS. were afterwards purchased and now they are preserved in Patna Museum. Next to that, a Palm-leaf M.S. of a commentary on Abhisamayālaṅkāra by Buddhaśrījñāna (a co-student of the Ācārya Haribhadra, the famous commentator of several philosophical treatises, and a disciple of the Ācārya Śāntarakṣita) was brought to me. Its size is 12<sup>3/4"</sup>X 2" and contains 27 leaves. The owner was reluctant to disclose his name, but he allowed it to be photographed. I saw a copy of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñā-Pāramitā with a Nepalese merchant, written in Rañjana character, and more than a hundred pages of the Śatasāhasrikā Prajñā-Pāramitā, the latter being the property of the heirs of the late Tergi-Thai-Je. Though they· were of no great importance, yet they encouraged me to further pursuit. l was very much helped by the enlightened Sä-ku-śo of the feudal house of Zur-kang, whose. mother is the direct descendant of Srong-btsan-sgam-po (630–693 A.D.), the first emperor and maker of Tibet. One day, the second (brother) Sä-ku-śo of Zur-khang brought the news, that they have got some palm-leaf MSS. in the library of Kun-bde-gling monastery, which were recently discovered while they were preparing a catalogue of the books. On the 18th June, he took me to that monastery which is not far from the famous POTALA PALACE. Only two MSS. were shown, and my joy knew no bounds when I found one of them to be a commentary on the Vādanyāya of Dharmakīrti by Ācārya Śāntarakṣita, the famous author of the Tatvasaṅgraha. I found it difficult to persuade the authorities to allow me to take a photograph of the work; and I was advised to see the Ka-Ion Lama, one of the four Ministers of the Tibetan Government. When he heard of my mission, he appreciated it very much, and at once sent for the officer-in-charge. He ordered that I should be allowed to take photographs of any MS. I thought useful. Ka-lon Lama also told me, that he would issue a general permit from the Cabinet to get help from all local authorities as well as private individuals. After the death of Dalai Lama, he was the most influential man in Tibet, but he also died a few days afterwards, which is an irreparable loss to Tibet.<br> I had heard from Re-ḍing-rin-po-che, the Regent King of Tibet, that his monastery possesses a half-bumt palm-leaf MS. which originally belonged to the collection of books which the Ācārya Dīpaṅkara Śrījñāna (982–1054 A.D.) brought with him from India. I was very keen to see that MS. and the Regent gave me a letter to the officer-in-charge of his monastery, but owing to a serious omission in the letter, the officer could not show it to me. I was informed that it was a half-burnt copy of the Prajñā-pāramitā.<br> After my return from Re-ḍing, I intended to visit Lho-kha Province, where in the monasteries of Bsamyas and Smin-ḍo-gling I heard about the existence of some MSS. About Bsam-yas, I was told that it has got two or three palm-leaf MSS. which are in the custody of the local magistrate (Dzong), and it is not possible to see them without a special permission of the Cabinet. The Chief Lama of Smin-ḍo-gling, who is also one of the heads of Ñig-ma-pa sect, told me that his monastery possessed four MSS. He was very eager to take me to his monastery which is only two days' journey from Lhasa. But as I had spent more than a month in the hope of getting the letter from the Cabinet, there was little time left at my· disposal. Moreover, I heard that those four MSS. are duplicate copies of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā, and Karuṇā-puṇḍarīka(?). In Lho-kha, some of the monasteries belonging to Sa-skya sect may possess palm-leaf MSS., but their number will not be considerable.<br> Information received from reliable sources disclosed the possibility of the existence of many MSS. in the monasteries of Tsang. Finding that there would still be much delay in getting the permit from the Cabinet, and as winter was approaching, I left for Tsang. I visited some of the ancient monasteries. of that province. In the monasteries of Spos-khang-tshog-pa (one day's journey from Gyan-tse), Sha-lu (a few hour's journey from Shi-ga-rtse on Gyantse side), Ngor (one day's journey from Shi-ga-rtse) and Sa-skya, I saw some of the MSS. which are described in the following pages. The list of the MSS. in Sha-Lu monastery is not complete. I was told that there are still some palm-leaf MSS. in the heap of Tibetan MSS. which are stored in a big room there and many more hands are required to sort them out than what they possessed at that time.<br> The people, who had seen them with their own eyes, told me that Ña-rig-ri-phug monastery (about half a day's journey from Shi-ga-rtse) possesses two palm-leaf MSS. At Ngor I met a Lama of the Thub-rtan-rnam-rgyal monastery of Rta-nag (two days' journey from Shi-ga-rtse) who told me that his monastery possesses two palm-leaf MSS. The contents of these four MSS. are not known.<br> If a search is properly made, we can discover some more MSS. in the province of Tsang, A few monasteries of the Kham province (eastern Tibet) are also said to possess some. (Sāṅkṛtyāyana, preliminary remarks, 21–26)<br><br>
[https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.282236/page/n37/mode/2up Read more here . . .]
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The present paper provides newly available Sanskrit fragments (11½ verses) from the
''Triśaraṇasaptati'' attributed to Candrakīrti.[2] These verses are found in the Sanskrit manuscript of Abhayākaraguptaʼs ''Munimatālaṃkāra''.[3]
The ''Triśaraṇasaptati'' is a small versified work consisting 68 ''ślokas'', the full text of which is preserved only in Tibetan translation. We find two versions (i.e. recensions) of the ''Triśaraṇasaptati'' in all the Tanjurs. The two versions are almost the same, having been translated by the same translation team (Atiśa and Rin chen bzang po).
Sorensen translated the Tibetan text into English and added to them six verses (12, 13, 33, 45, 46, and 47) in Sanskrit traced in the form of quotations in other works. Sorensenʼs English translation is for the most part faithful to the Tibetan text. The Tibetan translation itself, when compared with the Sanskrit original, is seen on occasion to be imprecise (see below, "Philological Remarks").
Other quotations from the ''Triśaraṇasaptati'' have been found in two passages in the
''Munimatālaṃkāra'': Passage A (Skt. Ms. 7v1-4; Tib. D 82a7-b3; verses 1, 34, 51, 54, 55, 67) in ''Munimatālaṃkāra'' chapter 1 (the Bodhicittāloka chapter)[4] and Passage B (Skt. 132r1-3; Tib. D 219a5-b1; 7-9ab, 22-23) in chapter 3 (the ''Aṣṭābhisamayāloka'' chapter). When we collate these 11½ verses with the 6 verses independently collected by Sorensen, the total number becomes 17½, which is about 26% of the
whole text of the ''Triśaraṇasaptati''. (Kano and Xuezhu, premilinary remarks, 4) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
This was my fourth journey to Tibet. We left Kalimpong on the 4th May, 1938. At the beginning our party consisted of three members ''viz''. the Tibetan Scholar Geshe Gendun Chhomphel, the photo-artist Mr. Fany Mockerjee and myself. Afterwards our number was increased to five when Pandit Abhay Singh Parera and Mr. Kanwal Krishna, an assistant to Mr. Mockerjee joined our party. This time we were fortunate enough to get the wholehearted support from the Tibetan Government through the help of Reding-Chhang, the young regent, who has great love for Tibetan learning and its art. We were provided not only with three ponies and three pack-animals free of charge for our conveyance, but we were also given special letters of introduction to the local Government officials and the heads of the monasteries where the precious manuscripts are kept. The Tibetan Government was ready to extend the field of our research to the country surrounding Lhasa and Samye where there was some possibility of finding new Sanskrit palm-leaf manuscripts, but unfortunately, all our time was spent in taking photographs of the MSS. in the monasteries of Ṣhalu, Pökhang, Ngor and Sa-skya, and the winter was close. So we could not avail of the generous offer.<br> We were also helped by the Political Officer of Sikkim—Mr. Gould and the British Trade Agent Mr. Richardson. Both the gentlemen were ever ready to give useful advice and needful facilities for the work of our party.<br> We reached Ṣhalu on the 27th May. Our old friend Risur Lama was present, and so it was not difficult to begin our work without delay. In my last journey, though I searched this monastery twice, the search was not thorough. So I wanted to make a fresh attempt in order to discover some new MSS. Our trouble was rewarded by the fresh discovery of a complete set of the twelve works on Buddhist Logic by the great logician Jñāna Śrī and two chapters of ''Yôgāchārabhūmi'' viz., ''Śrāvakabhūmi'' and ''Pratyekabuddhabhūmi''. Besides these two important volumes, I found six more volumes which are mentioned in my catalogue here. It took more than a fortnight to finish the work at Ṣhalu. Last time we took Photographs of some of these MSS., but we had failed to get good result. This time we were very particular about this matter, since failure of even one leaf was enough to spoil the utility of the whole treatise.<br> In my second trip to Tibet, I visited the monastery of Pökhang where I saw three bundles of Sanskrit MSS. in which I noticed an important work by the great poet Aśvaghôṣa. My visit was so brief that I could not go through the whole work. Last time, I tried my best to visit Pökhang, but I could not go. This time I reached Pökhang on the 27th June. When the three volumes were brought, I found that one was ''Tridaṇḍamālā'' by Aśvaghôsha with a separate work named ''Parikathā'' by a later author. They are not poetical works, but their importance is great, since they deal with the art of eloquence. In fact, they are practical lessons to the students of those days who wanted to become good speakers. The first work by Aśvaghôṣa is rather more primitive, but the later work is far advanced, which shows that since the time of Aśvaghôṣa (1st century A.C.) up to the 8th century when probably this second work was composed the art of public speech was greatly developed. The monastery of Pökhang was established sometime towards the end of the 13th century when the Indian teacher Vajrapāṇi or Gyagar Chhagna as he is known to the Tibetan, visited Tibet. The monastery has got some important relics among which we may specially mention the Chīvaras (monk's garb), alms-bowl, a pair of shoes, all belonging to Śākyaśrībhadra, the last hierarch of the Buddhist church in India and the Head of the Vikramaśilā monastery, who went to Tibet in 1203 after the destruction of the Buddhist institutions in India. The monastery has got about one hundred and five paintings in so-called Tibetan banners which were executed by a famous artist of the time (Stag-rtse-mkhas-pa) Rab-bratan-Kun-bsang under the patronage of king Kun-dzang-rabtan of the 15th century. There is also one small plaster-cast statue of Śākyaśrī which was moulded by (Dbus-kyi--rgya-ma-rin-chen-rgang Rza-mkhan) Bkra-sis-ḥod-ḥvar possibly during the life-time of the Indian teacher.<br> After staying for a few weeks at Shigartse we went to Ngor on the 31st July. The monastery of Ngor is one of the three monasteries in Tibet which have got the largest collection of Sanskrit MSS. In subject-matter the collection of this monastery is more important. We did not give previous information of our arrival. We feared that the chief custodian may play a trick by absenting himself as his predecessors did last time. During the months of June, July and August the climate is agreeable since cold is not intense, but at the same time, the rain which is rare and the clouds which are always there in the sky obstruct the work of taking photographs. It took sixteen days to finish our work.<br> Narthang is not very far from the monastery of Ngor. Though there was no possibility of finding any Sanskrit MS. in this ancient monastery which is famous for its wooden block-prints of Kanjur and Tanjur, it has got some very old paintings which were imported to Tibet from Nepal or were executed under the direction of Indian or Nepali master-artists. The work seems to belong to the 13th century<br> From Narthang we proceeded to Śākya where we reached on the 1st September. We were welcomed by the present Śākya-hierarch, the Lama of Phunchhog palace, our old friend and patron who greatly helped me in my previous journey. We went to Chhag-pe-lha-Khang, the Manuscript-library, to make a further search for fresh MSS. This time we made a more thorough search, but we could not get any new MS. We took the photographs of some important MSS. which I discovered in my previous journey. We could not finish our work before the 15th September. The temperature was going down and there was the less possibility of continuing our work in Tibet, but we had great desire to visit some of the important monasteries in the vicinity of Lhasa and Samye, since I knew that it was a rare opportunity for our search in which we had the full cooperation and help of the Tibetan Government. We were still undecided when we left śākya, but after crossing the second pass of Dobta, we met a band of robbers who were camping not very far from the route. Fortunately, at first they did not notice the importance of our caravan. We halted in the next village. We did not know that there was any danger ahead. We met a few donkey-men who were coming from the opposite direction. They informed that about a dozen of robbers were encamping on the road two miles ahead. Our pack-animals left us hours before. We thought that our animals were going to fall in their hands. We hurried. The robbers had no clear idea about our party. They put a few simple questions to us, but did not try to harm us. Afterwards we were informed by our men that the robbers enquired about us and they were told that the things belonged to the hierarch of śākya who was coming behind. Thus both we and our things were saved. We reached the next village, and when the pack-animals were returning to their home, our men saw the same robbers encamping on the other bank of a river about a mile from the village in which we were staying. Fearing that they might not be robbed of their animals, they came back in the village. We learnt that it was the same band of robbers whom we met the previous day. Now they had full information about our identity and of our numeral and armed strength. So they were earnest in their pursuit. All night not only ourselves, but the whole village was in fear of their attack. The dogs were unchained, and we were ready with our revolvers. Nothing, however, happened. The same night we decided to reach the Indian Frontier as soon as possible, since the road before us was more wild with scanty human habitation. We entered Tibet on the 9th May and left for India on the 25th September. Thus we spent in Tibet about four and a half months in which we took about fourteen hundred photographs of Sanskrit MSS. and important objects of art. (Sāṅkṛtyāyana, preliminary remarks, 137–42)<br><br>
[https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.280582/page/n377/mode/2up Read more here . . .]
When on the 16th February, 1936, I left for Tibet, I was still very weak after having suffered from a severe attack of typhoid and my friends' advice was against undertaking such an arduous journey. But on the last occasion I was not able to copy the last chapter of the Pramāṇa-vārttika-Bhāṣya by Prajñākaragupta which had the original Kārikās. The Pramāṇa-vārttika-text was already in the press. Though the missing portions of the other three chapters I had restored from Tibetan into Sanskrit, the missing part of the fourth chapter I did not like to restore as the original was available. I reached Nepal on the 18th February. There was ample time to recoup my health since generally the Tibetan passes are open by the end of April.<br> I left Katmandu on the 15th April. My pecuniary resources were very meagre consisting of a hundred rupees in all, plus 4 dozen film packs, two cameras, and some provisions. But I had resolved to copy as much as I could. I took my old traversed road to Nenam, the seat of the frontier Tibetan Magistrate, which I reached on the 23rd April. One of the two magistrates recently had been to Nepal where he saw me. There is a strict order to officials on the frontiers not to allow any Indian to pass in, but in my case the two magistrates had to make special concessions, as they knew my object and that I am known to many big officials and noblemen in Lhasa, having twice visited that sacred city.<br> I departed from Nenam on the 27th and after crossing Thong-la and other passes, reached Sa-skya on the 6th May. Early in the morning, streams were still frozen when I entered that sacred seat of the famous Buddhist teachers who, in the past, did splendid work for Buddhistic studies, translations of scriptures and even for the spread of Buddhism in the far-off Mongolia. Like other parts of Tibet, this locality is also devoid of vegetation. A few poplars and willows in palace gardens have had just a few buds on their branches and there was yet no green foliage to be seen. My former host Kusho Do-ni-chhen-po greeted me with a broad smile when he saw me.<br> Now the first task before me was to copy the last chapter of the Pramāṇa-Vārttika-Bhāṣya. At that time I thought I would have to stay for a fortnight. l had least suspicion that Sa-skya will take about three months to finish my work there. The same day I visited the Phun-chhog and Dol-ma palaces, the heads of which ascend the throne of Sa-skya hierarchy alternately. I was sorry to find that the Lama of Dol-ma Palace who was the last hierarch and had greatly helped me when last time I visited Sa-skya, was no more. His two sons and their kind-hearted mother welcomed me with open hearts and showed great sympathy for my work like the late Lama. The childlike simplicity of the head of Phun-chhog Palace who is to succeed to the throne, is unforgettable. Since last time whenever I visited him he tried his best to make me quite at home. He has a very inquisitive mind. He asked so many questions about my last journey to Japan, and Buddhism, and then ships, railways, aeroplanes, radios, and what not. The Sa-skya hierarchy is not only the head of one of the four most important Buddhist sects, but they have got a big state in which they enjoy the right to rule.<br> On the 8th, the MS. was brought and I began to copy it. It took 11 days to finish the chapter containing more than 5000 ślokas. In five days more I compared the portion of the third chapter which was published in the JBORS. vol. XXI, Pt. II and also the new copy. On the 25th, I went to the two palaces to bid good-bye to them. The hierarch-designate told me in so many words that there must be more Sanskrit palm-leaf MSS. in Sa-skya. But the Sa-skya monastery is not a small temple. There can reside more than 4000 monks in its dormitories and chapels. There are many big cathedrals. Many of them have got several thousand volumes of Kan-jur, Tan-jur and other MSS. In such a jungle of books even for dozens of men, it is difficult to hunt for any particular book in a few days.<br><br>
[https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.280581/page/n9/mode/2up Read more here . . .]
An interview with Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche that turned into a Mahamudra teaching on the spot. +
Framed as a consideration of the other contributions to the present volume of the ''Journal of Indian Philosophy'', this essay attempts to scout and characterize several of the interrelated doctrines and issues that come into play in thinking philosophically about the doctrine of ''svasaṃvitti'', particularly as that was elaborated by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Among the issues thus considered are the question of how ''mānasapratyakṣa'' (which is akin to ''manovijñāna'') might relate to ''svasaṃvitti''; how those related doctrines might be brought to bear with respect to some problems addressed with reference to the further doctrine (also closely related to ''svasaṃvitti'') concerning ''pramāṇaphala''; and the distinctiveness of Dharmakīrti’s ''sahopalambhaniyama'' argument for ''svasaṃvitti''. A question recurrently considered throughout the essay has to do with whether (following Akeel Bilgrami) ''svasaṃvitti'' reflects a ''perceptual'' or a ''constitutive'' understanding of self-awareness. +
The concept of "self-awareness" (''svasaṃvedana'') enters Buddhist epistemological discourse in the ''Pramāṇasamuccaya'' and -''vṛtti'' by Dignāga (ca. 480–540), the founder of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition. Though some of the key passages have already been dealt with in various publications, no attempt has been made to comprehensively examine all of them as a whole. A close reading is here proposed to make up for this deficit. In connection with a particularly difficult passage (PS(V) 1.8cd-10) that presents the means of valid cognition and its result (''pramāṇa''/''pramāṇaphala''), a new interpretation is suggested, inspired by the commentary of Jinendrabuddhi. This interpretation highlights an aspect of self-awareness that has hitherto not been claimed for Dignāga: self-awareness offers essentially subjective access to one’s own mental states and factors. +
Articles/Shakya Chokden's Interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhāga: "Contemplative" or "Dialectical"? +
This reconciliation of the dialectical and contemplative approaches to the buddha-essence is related to and closely resembles Shakchok’s reconciliation of the two approaches to ultimate reality advocated respectively by Niḥsvabhāvavāda (''ngo bo nyid med par smra ba'', “Proponents of Entitylessness”) system of Madhyamaka and Alīkākāravāda (''rnam rdzun pa'', “False Aspectarians”) system of Yogācāra. These approaches in turn are connected respectively to the explicit teachings (''dngos bstan'') of the second dharmacakra (''chos ’khor'', “Wheel of Dharma”) and the definitive teachings (''nges don'', ''nītārtha'') of the third dharmacakra that he also presents in a reconciliatory manner. In the same way as the teachings of the last two dharmacakras, as well as the Niḥsvabhāvavāda and Alīkākāravāda systems that derive from them, come to the same point, the dialectical and contemplative traditions also come to the same point. This point is the above-mentioned naturally pure primordial mind luminous by nature, the ultimate reality. In Shakchok’s opinion, application of non-affirming negations is a powerful tool for accessing direct realization of that reality, while its identification as primordial mind (''ye shes'', ''jñāna'') is important for maintaining that realization and turning it into the basis of unfolding positive qualities on the path to buddhahood. When in the passage above Shakchok says that the two traditions are not contradictory, and when he reconciles the two last dharmacakras together with Alīkākāravāda and Niḥsvabhāvavāda, he is not arguing that their words are non-contradictory. They obviously are! Nevertheless, those systems ''are'' non-contradictory in terms of complementing each other in getting access to and maintaining realization of the ultimate reality of primordial mind. (Source: [https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/classicsfacpub/115/ DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln]) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>The field of Ch'an studies has seen some very lively disputes over the course of the twentieth century, but there has been general agreement on the proposition that the doctrine of sudden enlightenment represents the highest expression of the doctrinal mainstream of early Chinese Ch’an Buddhism. Although there is some quibbling regarding details and specific interpretations, scholars working in this field often describe the history of the doctrine of sudden enlightenment within Ch’an in terms of three subjects: (1) Hui-neng’s doctrine of sudden enlightenment as shown in his "mind verse" (''hsin-chieh'') in the ''Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch'' (''Liu-tsu t'an-ching''); (2) Shen-hui’s campaign in opposition to the gradual teaching of the Northern school and in support of the public recognition of Hui-neng as sixth patriarch; and (3) the continuation of the spirit of Hui-neng in the teachings and religious practice of Ma-tsu, Shih-t'ou, and the later Ch’an tradition <br> Research done in recent years has shown that the traditional interpretations of these three subjects are all substantially incorrect, although the implications of these findings have not yet been fully realized. The history of early Ch'an is in the process o f being thoroughly rewritten, but it is already clear that the doctrine of sudden enlightenment and the dispute between the sudden and gradual teachings should no longer be used as yardsticks by which the religious message of Ch'an and its widespread acceptance in T'ang dynasty China are understood. (McRae, "Shen-hui and the Teaching of Sudden Enlightenment in Early Ch'an Buddhism," 227) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
"Buddha-nature" (Japanese, ''Bussho'') has been regarded in the Sōtō sect as one of the three central fascicles of the ''Shōbōgenzō'', together with ''Genjōkōan'' and ''Bendōwa''. Dōgen delivered it the tenth month of 1241 to the followers gathered around him at the Kōshō-ji south of Kyoto. The work as we now have it, however, is a considerably revised form of that original text. Although neither the original or revised manuscript exists in Dōgen's holograph, a copy by his disciple Ejō (1198-1280), including Dōgen's later revisions, is preserved in the Eihei-ji. In most editions, ''Shōbōgenzō Buddha-nature'' is the third fascicle in the collection, following ''Genjōkōan'' and ''Makahannya-haramitsu''.<br> The idea that sentient beings all possess the Buddha-nature and the possibility of attaining Buddhahood is central to most of the schools of the Mahayana. Yet Dōgen's treatment, reflecting his own unique Zen standpoint, can be said to be apart from all the rest. Strictly adhering to a nondualistic interpretation, he comments on passages from Zen and other Buddhist writings that have some bearing on this theme. What is most striking about this commentary is the manner in which it gives clear priority to religious meaning over normal grammatical syntax. In more than a few cases Dōgen chooses to read these passages in ways which are dubious, and sometimes even impossible, from a grammatical point of view. But he does it for a definite purpose. It focuses attention on what he feels to be inadequacies in the traditional ways the texts are read, and at the same time it clearly sets forth his own understanding and rectification of those inadequacies based on his religious awakening.<br> For example, at the very beginning of the work he quotes a passage from the ''Nirvana Sutra'' ("Northern" version) well-known to all Buddhists: "All sentient beings without exception have the Buddha-nature". This is the general Mahayana statement, which is emphasized in particular in the ''Nirvana Sutra''. Dōgen goes beyond it, by reading the passage as, "All sentient beings-whole being is the Buddha-nature." This he does by reading the characters ''shitsuu'' normally "without exception have,'' as "whole being'' (he is aided by the fact that the character ''u'' means both "to be," or "being," and "to have"). This changes the traditional emphasis of sentient beings having a Buddha-nature, to stress a standpoint more in keeping with the basic nondualistic Mahayana position: whole being is the Buddha-nature, in which "whole being" means not only sentient beings but all beings. This avoids the duality of subject (sentient beings) and object (the Buddha-nature possessed by them), the duality which regards the Buddha-nature as a potentiality to be actualized in the future, and the duality of means and end, where practice is taken as a means and realization of Buddha-nature the end. Dōgen's reading "whole being is the Buddha-nature" thus indicates the nondualistic oneness of the realizer (whole being) and the realized (Buddha-nature), the simultaneity of Buddha-nature and enlightenment (Buddha), and the identity of practice and attainment. It is the key to his understanding of the Buddha-nature as it is developed in various aspects throughout the rest of the work*<br> ''Buddha-nature'' is the eighth fascicle to appear in this series of translations from Dōgen's ''Shōbōgenzō'' which began in May 1971 with ''Bendōwa''. As in the past, we have provided rather extensive footnotes. Their aim is to provide the English language reader a means of better arriving at some understanding of this extremely difficult work, much of which would be incomprehensible without them. We of course do not pretend that they are in any way definitive. They could not be, given the profoundly complicated and suggestive nature of the text. We have attempted, however, to have them exemplify a consistent view of the work as a whole. The edition followed is that of Õkubo Dōshū: ''Shōbōgenzō'' (Tokyo: Chikuma, 1971), pp. 14–35. We would like to express our gratitude to Professor Nishitani Keiji for his valuable suggestions.<br> ''N.B.'' In the text, Dōgen quotes passages from Zen and other Buddhist writings at the heads of the various sections. In order to make clear both the way they are normally read and Dōgen's own sometimes peculiar interpretative reading, we have translated them according to the normal reading when the italicized quotation first appears ''en bloc'' at the beginning of the sections; then, when Dōgen's different reading makes it necessary, we have generally retranslated the same words as close to his meaning as the English will allow in the following phrase by phrase discussion of the quotation. When this is done the discrepancy between the two renderings is detailed in the footnotes. (Waddell and Abe, introduction, 94–96)
<h5>Notes</h5>
* See Abe Masao, "Dōgen on Buddha-nature," ''Eastern Buddhist'', IV, I.
This is the second part of Waddell and Abe's translation of Dōgen's ''Shōbōgenzō Busshō'' ("Buddha-nature"). Part 1 appears in ''The Eastern Buddhist'' vol. 8, no. 2 (1975); Part 3 appears in vol. 9, no. 2 (1976). For the authors' complete introductory remarks, see [[Shōbōgenzō Buddha-Nature: Part 1]]. +
This is the final part of a translation of Dōgen's ''Shōbōgenzō Busshō'' ("Buddha-nature") by Norman Waddell and Masao Abe. Parts 1 and 2 appeared in ''The Eastern Buddhist'' vols, 8, no. 2 (1975) and 9, no. 1 (1976). For the translators' complete introductory remarks, see [[Shōbōgenzō Buddha-Nature: Part 1]] +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The universality of Buddha-nature is a doctrine accepted by all Chinese schools of Buddhism. The Wei-shih(a) (Fa-hsiang(b), Vijñaptimātratā) school of Hsuantsang(c), for reviving the notion that the ''icchantika'' is ''agotra'', devoid of this seed of enlightenment, had been summarily dismissed as "Hīnayānist" for that reason. The idea of "the enlightenability of the ''icchantika''" is associated with the later named "Nirvana School," a group of scholars in the Southern Dynasties (420-589) that chose to specialize on the ''Nirvāṇa Sūtra'', the Mahayana scripture narrating the last day and teaching of Śākyamuni on earth. The person credited with discovering this doctrine, before even the full ''sūtra'' was available to vindicate his stand, is Chu Tao-sheng(d) (375?-434), perhaps better known for his stand on "sudden enlightenment." The school as such flourished best in the Liang dynasty (502-557); but because it was then aligned with scholarship focusing on the ''Ch'eng-shih-lun''(e) (''Satyasiddhi''? ) by Harivarman, it came under criticism when the latter was denounced as Hinayanist in the Sui dynasty. It is usually said that the T`ien-t'ai(f) school, based on the ''Lotus Sūtra'', superseded the Nirvāṇa school by incorporating many of its ideas, while the Ch'eng-shih school suffered irredeemably under the attack of Chi-tsang(g) of the San-lun(h) (Three Treatise or Madhyamika) school at the same time. Henceforth, the Nirvāṇa school faded away while its old association with the Ch'eng-shih tradition was judged an unnecessary mistake.(1) This article will introduce three moments from the history of this Nirvāṇa school, showing the main trends of development and, somewhat contrary to traditional opinion, justifying the necessity for the detour into Harivarmans scholarship. Emphasis will also be put on the interaction between Buddhist reflections and the native traditions. (Lai, introductory remarks, 135)
No translation of the Ratnagotravibhāga seems to have existed in Tibet before the 11th century, inasmuch as no catalogue of the imperial period (the 9th century) shows any record of one. Although only a single Tibetan translation is extant (that of rNgog Blo ldan shes rab [1069-1109] and Sajjana), ’Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal (1392-1481) reports that up to his time six translations had already been made. In the present paper, I will examine what can be learned about the six translations, those of: (1) Atiśa and Nag tsho Tshul khrims rgyal ba, (2) rNgog Blo ldan shes rab and Sajjana (late 11th cent.), (3) Pa tshab Nyi ma grags, (4) Mar pa Do pa Chos kyi dbang phyug (1042–1136), (5) Jo nang Lo tsā ba Blo gros dpal (1299–1353 or 1300–1364), and (6) Yar klungs Lo tsā ba. +
In this paper, I shall discuss the titles of Sthiramati's works available in Sanskrit: ''Tattvārthā Abhidharmakośaṭīkā'', ''Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā'', and ''Abhidharmasamuccaya''. I will first clarify the meaning of the title of the ''Tattvārthā'', and then reconsider the titles of the ''Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā'' and ''Abhidharmasamuccaya'', reexamining their colophons in Sanskrit manuscripts. Additionally , I will discuss the Sanskrit title of Sthiramati's ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' commentary. Finally, I will examine the reliability of titles found in colophons. +
In order to overcome the five main obstacles facing a bodhisattva, says Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche, we must realize that all beings are primordially pure. He presents the essential teachings on buddhanature from Maitreya’s ''Uttaratantra Shastra''. +
T
Articles/T'ien-t'ai Chih'i's Concept of Threefold Buddha Nature-A Synergy of Reality, Wisdom, and Practice +
Paul L. Swanson's contribution, on Chih-i's threefold concept of Buddha Nature, places T'ien-t'ai thought on this matter in a broader conceptual context. He presents it as one more application of the fundamental T'ien-t' ai idea of synergy—that there is a deeply symbiotic relationship between the way things really are (reality), the awareness of the way things really are (wisdom), and the religious practice that produces such an awareness (practice). Swanson bases his exposition on the ''Fa-hua hsüan-i'', in which Buddha Nature, along with nine other Buddhist concepts, is interpreted through the threefold pattern already adverted to. Swanson shows how Chih-i, drawing upon both the ''Nirvāṇa Sūtra'' and the ''Lotus Sūtra'', accommodates Buddha Nature terminology and concepts into the structure of his own thought. (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to ''Buddha Nature'', 6) +
Articles/Tathāgatagarbaḥ Sarvasattvānāṃ: A Hypothetical Interpretation of a Declarative Formula in the Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra +
In this paper, I shall propose a hypothetical interpretation of the phrase ''tathāgatagarbhaḥ sarvasattvānāṃ'', which is a declarative formula of the ''Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra'' (abbr. MPMS) and is preserved as original Sanskrit. This phrase confirms that the word ''tathāgatagarbha''—if this is a ''bahuvrīhi'' compound—cannot grammatically go with the word ''sattvānāṃ'' unlike the case of the ''Tathāgatagarbhasūtra'', in which ''tathāgatagarbha'', being a ''bahuvrīhi'', qualifies the noun ''sattva'' (''sarvasattvās tathāgatagarbhāḥ''). Previous studies have mostly interpreted ''tathāgatagarbhaḥ'' of the MPMS, as a ''tatpuruṣa'', whereas I shall keep this as a ''bahuvrīhi'' and take it to be an adjective which qualifies some undescribed noun—that is, ''stūpa'', omitted in the phrase, based on the following reasons: (1) The word ''tathāgatagarbha'' in the formula is probably premising such expressions like ''tathāgatadhātugarbhān stūpān, dhātugarbhe caitye'' (which is paraphrased by the expression ''sadhātuke caitye'' "a ''caitya'' that contains relics"), etc., as found in other Mahāyāna scriptures, where ''tathāgatadhātugarbha'', as a ''bahuvrīhi'', qualifies the noun ''stūpa'' "a ''stūpa'' that contains ''tathāgata'' 's relics”; (2) the omission of the noun ''stūpa'' in the formula might reflect the same omission found in expressions, such as ''dhātudhṛk'' or ''dhātudharaḥ'' (both omitting ''stūpaḥ''), as found in Buddhist inscriptions; (3) The declarative formula of the MPMS should naturally be relevant to the main topic of the MPMS, which deals with ''tathāgata'''s ''nirvāṇa'' and his relics that were found in ''stūpas'' (which, in turn, are reinterpreted in the MPMS from the viewpoint of the ''dharmakāya'' and ''tathāgatagarbha''); (4) The MPMS precisely declares that all beings are real ''stūpa''/''caitya'', and this declaration fits well with the phrase ''tathāgatagarbhaḥ sarvasattvānāṃ'' “all beings have ''tathāgatagarbha'' (i.e. ''stūpa'')”; (5) We find yet another expression (''asmākam upari tathāgatagarbho 'sti'' "there is ''tathāgatagarbha'' above us") in the Sanskrit fragment of the MPMS; however, the word ''tathāgatagarbha'', in this expression, does not disturb the abovementioned interpretation. Instead, this reminds us of the famous scene taught in the ''Saddharmapuṇḍarīka''—the stūpa arising in the sky above the audience: ''saptaratnamayaḥ stūpo ’bhyudgataḥ ... parṣanmaṇḍalasyopari vaihāyasaṃ tiṣṭhet''. Accordingly, I shall tentatively propose to interpret the word ''tathāgatagarbhaḥ'' in the formula as a ''bahuvrīhi'' which qualifies the noun ''stūpa''. I think, however, it is possible to apprehend ''tathāgatagarbha'' as a ''tatpuruṣa'', to be the secondary meaning of the word because the MPMS most probably utilizes the word with double or triple meaning in order to preserve the semantic richness of the word ''garbha'', which has already been pointed out by Masahiro Shimoda and Michael Radich.
Articles/Tathāgatagarbha Influences in the Three Nature (Trisvabhāva) Theory of the Maitreya Works +
Retaining the Abhidharma distinction between the "real" (''dravyasat'') factors of existence (''dharma'') and the mere nominal existence (''prajñaptisat'') of false projections, the Yogācāras restricted the emptiness of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras to the imagined nature (''parikalpitasvabhāva''). The latter is taken to be a product of dependently arising dharmas, i.e., the dependent nature, which is admitted a higher degree of reality than the one of the imagined nature. Together with the perfect nature (''pariniṣpannasvabhāva''), defined as the absence of the fictive from the real, the imagined and dependent natures constitute the Yogācāra model of reality. Besides this Yogācāra type of ontological distinction between real and nominal existence there are also, throughout the Maitreya Works, influences of the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' model of an ultimate ''tathāgatagarbha'' (once even referred to as such in one of the Yogācāra texts of the Maitreya Works, namely in MSABh on IX.37) that is devoid of adventitious stains. In the present paper it is argued that the integration of the ''tathāgatagarbha'' model of reality contributes to remedying the flaws Yogācāra has in the eyes of Mādhyamikas, namely that a considerable group of sentient beings is completely cut off from liberation or that a dependently arising mind exists on the level of ultimate truth. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
There is no traditional rubric of ''tathāgatagarbha'' scriptures, though modem scholars (e.g. Takasaki, 1974) have treated several scriptures as belonging to a thematic class, namely the ;;Tathāgatagarbhasūtra'', the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta'', the ''Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanādasūtra'', the (Mahāyāna) ''Mahaaparinirvāṇamahāsūtra'', the ''Mahāmeghasūtra'', the *''Mahābherīhārakasūtra'', and the Mahāyāna ''Aṅgulimālīya'' (or ''Aṅgulimālīyasūtra''). This classification is based in the first instance on the use of
these and related works as proof texts in the Indian treatise ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' (''Mahāyānottaratantra''). The category is thus in some sense conceptually coherent even in an Indian context. Moreover, many of these texts take on a very significant role in East Asia where, again, they are often appealed to in various groupings.
The notion of ''tathāgatagarbha'' (embryo of the tathāgatas), a Mahāyāna innovation, signifies the presence in every sentient being of the innate capacity for buddhahood. Although different traditions interpret it variously, the basic idea is either that all beings are already awakened, but simply do not recognize it, or that all beings possess the capacity, and for some the certainty, of attaining buddhahood, but adventitious defilements (''āgantukakleśa'') for the moment prevent the realization of this potential. (Radich, "Tathāgatagarbha Sūtras," 261) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
The historical approach to Zen in Heinrich Dumoulin's major work, ''A History of Zen'', published over twenty years ago, broke new ground in Western Zen studies. Up to that time Zen publication in the West dealt primarily with interpretive accounts of Zen and translations of Zen or Zen-related texts. I follow here an alternate approach to Zen and seek to place it in the context of one or another aspect of Mahāyāna tradition. One might read Zen in the perspective of Indian Mādhyamika or Yogācāra, or in terms of the Chinese ''prajñic'' or Hua-yen doctrinal development. But I would like to place it within the perspective of Tathāgatagarbha thought. (Kiyota, "Tathāgatagarbha Thought," 207)<br><br>
[https://nirc.nanzan-u.ac.jp/nfile/2311 Read more here . . .] +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
Humans have long grappled with the question of the nature of our Self, defined here as the ultimate reality inherent to our individual being. Religious traditions can be a great place to look when attempting to understand this aspect of our humanity. Broadly speaking, when contemplating ideas of Self in Buddhism and Hinduism, the relationship between the Buddhist notion of Buddha-nature (''tathāgatagarbha'') and the Hindu notion of Self (''ātman''), is an intriguing one: How can we understand them to be similar or different? How do the Buddhist concepts of emptiness (''śūnyatā'') and mind-only (''cittamātra'') relate to the concepts of ''tathāgatagarbha'' and ''ātman''? Is emptiness contrary to these ideas? Are ''tathāgatagarbha'' and the Hindu teaching that ''ātman'' is equal to brahman (ultimate reality), both expressions of a non-dualistic state of mind? Although it is commonly taught that Hinduism and Buddhism differ in their understanding of Self, one thing that becomes apparent is that these are not simple questions, perhaps mainly because their answers are contextual. There are many answers that come from many different types of Hindus and Buddhists in various places. For this paper, I will be looking at commentary on the Buddhist text the ''Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra'' and its use of the concept of a permanent Self and how this relates to emptiness (''śūnyatā'') and skillful means (''upāya''). This paper seeks to support my claim that, through skillful means, ''ātman'' and ''anātman'' (no-Self) are both saying something quite similar—despite the apparent paradoxical nature of this statement—and will look at Buddha-nature in the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra'' as a way to understand and help articulate this thought. (Laughlin, "''Tathāgatagarbha'' and ''Ātman''," 57) +
La traduction anglaise, par T. Suzuki, du ''Mahāyānaçraddhotpāda'' (Chicago, Open Court, 1900), ainsi que la version française, par S. Lévi, du ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' (Paris, Champion, 1911), ont attiré l'attention sur duex notions mahayaniques—Tathāgathagarbha et Ālayavijñāna—qui parurent abstruses, faute de termes correspondants en la philosophie européenne. Leur valeur exacte, distincte déjà dans ces deux textes, apparaìtra peu-être sous un jour autre quand nous aurons accès a un plus grand nombre de documents, après explorartion du canon bouddhique dans les diverses langues où il s'est exprimé. Dès à présent toutefois il semble possible de redresser certaines erreurs et d'entrevoir la portée des deux notions. (Masson-Oursel, "Tathāgatagarbha et Ālayavijñāna," 295)<br><br>
[https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k93310p/f299.image Read more here . . .] +
Articles/Textual and Philosophical Problems in the Translation and Transmission of Tathāgatagarbha Texts +
This article examines philological problems relating to descriptions defining the ''tathāgatagarbha'', or "buddha-nature," in Sanskrit sūtras and exegetical literature, together with the variant Tibetan translations of these descriptions in the bKa’ ’gyur and bsTan ’gyur. Attention is called also to some possible philosophical implications of these variant descriptions. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
Buddhism, and especially early Buddhism, is known for the ''anātman'' (no self) teaching. By any account, this teaching is central to both doctrine and practice from the beginning. Zen Buddhism (Chinese Ch'an), in contrast, is known for its teaching that the single most important thing in life is to discover the 'true self'. Is there a real, or only an apparent, conflict between these two versions of Buddhism? Certainly there is at the least a radical change in the linguistic formulation of the teaching. Examining the two teachings on the linguistic level, we note that the use of the term 'true' in the phrase 'true self' may indicate that we have here a conscious reformation of the place of the term 'self' in the tradition, or perhaps that the use of this phrase in Zen is the product of such a conscious formulation. Thus we may expect, upon investigation, to find an evolution from one teaching to the other, rather than a true doctrinal disparity. The apparent, or linguistic, conflict between the two, however, remains; hence we must also expect to find a doctrinal formulation at some point in this evolution in which the apparent conflict is consciously apprehended and resolved.<br> That is, Buddhism embraces both the teaching that there is no self and the teaching that the goal of life is to discover the true self. Not only does Buddhism embrace these two formulations, but each in its own context is the central pivot of the teachings of the school or community concerned. Two questions arise here. (1) How can a single tradition affirm both no self and true self? How can the two ideas be reconciled? (This is the philosophical question.) (2) In linking early Buddhism and Zen we are discussing two religious movements separated by approximately 12 centuries and by their development in two vastly different cultures, the Indian and the Chinese. What is there in the course of this development that could account for the transition from talk of no self to talk of true self? (This is the question of intellectual history.) In the present essay I will attempt to show that it is by examining the Buddha nature (''fo hsing'' 佛性) concept and understanding it as a term representing certain actions that these questions may be answered. (King, "The Buddha Nature," 255)
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
So far, no lifeless universe has been discovered. That is, the occurrence of matter without the occurrence of life is, judging by the available empirical evidence viewed globally, something that does not happen. In every case that matter has been there in any universe, life has occurred—eventually.<br> I do not mean that there has never been a time, a single snapshot moment or a billion such moments, during which there was only matter but no life. Nor do I mean that there is no part of the universe in which, considered in isolation from all other parts, there is only lifelessness. "In every case that matter has been there in any universe, life has occurred" is true even if there are immense periods of time, considered in isolation, and immense swaths of space, considered in isolation, where there is no life.<br> The crux of the problem, however, lies in those three words, "considered in isolation." Everything depends on how we divide things up, where our definition of "one thing" begins and ends.<br> For what I mean when I say that "matter without life has never existed" is that, scientifically speaking, there has never appeared even one particle of any kind of matter found in any non-life-producing universe, considering that universe as a whole. For no non-life-producing universe has yet been discovered. Likewise, there is no lifeless matter in any period of time that is not part of at least one sequence of time that produces life.<br> All matter that has ever been discovered has existed only in a universe that also contains life, and all lifeless times were part of this sequence of time we are now in, the total sequence of time that produced this life.<br> No lifeless universe has ever been discovered. Among all the universes that have been discovered so far, there is not even one that is devoid of life. I challenge you or anyone to show me even one particle of matter, or even one moment of time, from a universe without life.<br> At this point we have merely been speaking empirically about what has so far been discovered. There are very few things that we can know with absolute certainty without relying on empirical contingency. But in fact this is one thing we can know with absolute certainty: no universe ''will ever be discovered'' devoid of life.<br> We can know this for two reasons. The first is perhaps relatively trivial, although some philosophers attach great significance to it. It is that the act of "discovering" itself requires a living being. Ipso facto, wherever any discovering is done, life is also present. Therefore no universe devoid of life can ever be discovered.<br> The second reason has to do with how we define universe. Th is is the hidden premise of the claims I am making here: it is because we understand the idea of "universe" in a certain way that we can claim, with absolute certainty, that there is no lifeless universe. If the universe is taken in its broadest meaning, which is also its most commonsensical meaning, it means "all that exists." All that exists certainly includes this planet, this solar system, this period of time. The universe in this broadest sense is what includes any more-narrowly construed universes—for example, all alternate universes. If we call the sum total of all possible universes "the universe," then it is obvious that there is no universe but this one, and since this one contains life, no universe can be discovered that is devoid of life. Whatever might be discovered is by definition part of this totality that includes our lives.<br> All of the above is true even if life exists only once, for a few million years, on one small planet. Even if there was no life for billions of years—and in most of the universe there never has been and never will be life—even if the phenomenon "life" is a peculiar flash that occurs only on planet Earth between the Hadean Eon 4,500 million years ago until 2018 CE, and never arises anywhere ever again, it is still true that there is no universe devoid of life and that there can never be any universe devoid of life.<br> And yet people often contemplate those vast billions of years and expanses of space and speak of "lifeless matter." This makes sense only if we divide the world in a certain way. That is, it is only because we are in the habit of dividing self and other, or mind and its objects, or—to put it most generally—inside and outside, that it is possible to speak of lifeless matter. Only if any one part of the universe is thought of as an entity truly separate from all other parts can anything be lifeless. The key question is how much of the universe do we consider to be "one thing." Where do we draw the line that divides inside from outside? If "me and that rock" are one thing, that one thing has life, just as "my skin and my fingernails" has life. If me and that rock are separate, then my body has life and the rock has no life.<br> Mahāyāna Buddhism, particularly that developed in the Madhyamaka school and further elaborated in Tiantai Buddhism, holds that the separation of "inside and outside" is impossible to sustain in any nonambiguous way. These schools generally develop this idea logically by use of reductio ad absurdum arguments that try to demonstrate that any way of drawing common-sense dividing lines to define one object in distinction to another end up being self-contradictory. (Read the entire article [https://rk-world.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/DW18_7-12.pdf here]).
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
Buddhist doctrine refers to entities possessing mind (Skt., ''citta'') as sentient beings (Skt., ''sattva'') and considers them to undergo rebirth through the six realms of existence (hells, hungry spirits, animals, asuras, human beings, heavenly beings). It is because they possess mind that they give rise to the defilements, accumulating the negative karma that is the cause of rebirth. The purpose of Buddhism therefore is to release beings from the suffering associated with rebirth, a condition called liberation (Skt., ''vimokśa'') and nirvana. Mahayana calls it the attainment of buddhahood (Jpn., ''jōbutsu''). There also exist nonsentient beings (Skt., ''asattva''). Since they do not possess mind, they do not undergo the cycle of rebirth and so cannot attain liberation, nirvana, or buddhahood. In principle, therefore, plants, like inorganic substances not possessing "mind," are not understood to undergo rebirth. It is therefore impossible to discuss their attainment of buddhahood. However, when Buddhism entered China, the potential for buddhahood of nonsentient beings became an important subject for debate. Since China had not previously had any concept of sentient beings, no strict distinction was made between sentient and nonsentient, which was why the question of nonsentient buddhahood was taken up. The ''Jingangbi lun'' (Diamond Scalpel Treatise) of the sixth Tiantai patriarch, Zhanran (711–82), confronted the issue directly and asserted that nonsentient beings could attain buddhahood. This did not, however, mean that they could aspire to enlightenment, practice, and achieve buddhahood of themselves. Rather, when a sentient being attains buddhahood, the whole environment becomes the Buddha's realm. A sentient being's subjective existence (Jpn., ''shōhō'') arises from past karmic effects and this causes the realm of the environment (Jpn., ''ehō'') to arise. Environment is thus dependent on subjective existence, and therefore, when a sentient being attains enlightenment, so do nonsentient beings. What is important here is that sentient beings attain enlightenment through their own practice, whereas nonsentient beings can only do so as the environment of sentient beings. This was a solution consonant with Chinese ideas that placed significance on a person's own actions, seen typically in Confucianism. The Japanese did not view human beings in any special way as did the Chinese. Furthermore, they tended to look on nature in terms of plants. The land of Japan was called the "middle land of the reed beds" (''ashihara no nakatsu kuni''), its landscape being described as a swamp where reeds grew. The fecundity of plants symbolized the evolution of the world. According to the ''Nihon shoki'' (Chronicle of Japan, eighth century), before Ninigi, grandson of the sun goddess Amaterasu, descended from the heavenly plain, the land of Japan was where "the standing trees, and even the single blade of grass, uttered words." This is thought to represent the disordered state of nature that existed before the land was civilized. Humankind was referred to as people grass (''hitogusa''); in other words, the mass of people was understood through the model of grasses and trees.<br> In Japan, therefore, nature was thought of in terms of plants, and people were thought to be close to them. Japan's view of nature is often described as animism, but this is not necessarily appropriate. Not all natural phenomena were regarded as spiritual entities, nor were they objects of veneration. Deities (''kami'') resided in the depths of nature, manifesting themselves in natural objects serving as receptacles (''yorishiro''). For example, at Ōmiwa Shrine in Nara Prefecture, Mount Miwa is described as the body (''shintai'') of its ''kami''. Originally, though, the mountain was regarded as sacred because it was the place to which the kami descended: it was not itself the ''kami''. The buddhahood of grasses and trees came to be a concern precisely because human beings and plants were thought of as being of the same quality. Whereas in China tiles and stones were presented as representative of nonsentient existence, in Japan it was grasses and trees. (Read the entire article [https://rk-world.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/DW18_7-12.pdf here])
The purpose of this paper is to explore how the ''tathāgatagarbha'' tradition might shed light on the current political and economic impasse between the dominant voices in U.S. politics, conservative libertarians and reform liberals. I will begin by describing the two opposing sides and highlighting their implicit anthropologies, their views of human being. I will then lay out the nondual anthropology suggested by a key text in the ''tathāgatagarbha'' tradition, the fifth-century CE ''Ratnagotravibhāga''. Finally, I will discuss what guidance this ''tathāgatagarbha'' perspective might offer in moving us past the current political and economic impasse. +
"''Tathāgatagarbha''" refers to a theory in Mahāyāna Buddhism which interprets the nature of the mind as intrinsically pure (unconditioned) yet defiled (conditioned). The objective of this theory is to link living beings with the Buddha, encouraging them to attain enlightenment. In the ''Śrīmālādevī-sūtra'', a major scriptural authority on Tathāgatagarbha, a correlation between the nature of Emptiness and the nature of mind is explicated. The devlopment of ideas first presented in the ''Śrīmālādevī-sūtra'' greatly influenced the evolution of the notion of ''ālayavijñāna'', the key concept in the second major Mahāyāna school known as ''Vijn̄ãnavāda''. It will be demonstrated that Tathāgatagarbha accounts for the possibility of change from a defiled to an enlightened state due to the two dimensions of the inherently pure nature of mind as "embryo" and "womb." +
The concept of the "innate purity of the mind" (cittaprakṛtiprabhasvara) is a very important notion in the Mahayana Buddhism and has a great influence on the Chinese Buddhism. It is often used synonymously with "tathāgatagarbha" in many Mahayana texts. However, the origin of the concept can be traced back to the ''Āgamas'' and the ''Nikāyas''. It is quite interesting to find such a concept in these sutras which vey much emphasize the concepts of impermanence and non-ego. The purpose of this study is to clarify the true meaning of this concept of the innately pure mind in the ''Āgamas'' and the ''Nikāyas''. This paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, the original statements concerning this concept are discussed within the context of the entire collection of the Buddha's discourses. Since the formula of this concept involves the defilements of the mind, the second part of this study focuses on the types of the defilements which contaminate the mind. The analogies found in the texts discussing the defilements also help to further clarify the meaning and functions of the concept discussed in part one. As there is a lot of debate on this concept in the Abhidharma literature, the third part presents some of the debate to illuminate the issues concerning whether the mind can be truly polluted and the relationship between the mind and the defilements. In the conclusion, in addition to summing up the discussion on the true meaning of the concept of the innately pure mind in the ''Āgamas'' and the ''Nikāyas'', the difference between its use in these sutras and that in the Tathāgatagarbha sutras is also briefly mentioned. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The debate over the role of the ''Awakening of Faith'' in the theory and practice of Chinese Buddhism is one of the central ongoing debates among both Chinese Buddhists and scholars of Buddhism in the modern period. To understand this debate, and the views contained within it, it is necessary to contextualize it within the history of modern East Asian Buddhism. The following review focuses both on a critical assessment of the ''Awakening of Faith''<i>’</i>s authenticity, as well as the role Ouyang played in shifting the course of this debate. This disputation was at the heart of Ouyang’s quest for authenticity. The chapter will not be a comprehensive treatment of all the thinkers involved in these debates; I will deal here only with dimensions of the text that became contentious for Ouyang and with the contribution of other participants who carried forward the debate at that time. (Aviv, introduction, 69)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#The ''Awakening of Faith'' exists in two purported “translations.” One is attributed to Paramārtha, T.32.1666.0575a03–0583b17, in 554 ce; the other, later version is attributed to Śikṣānanda, T.32.1667.0583b21–0591c22, in 695–700 ce. While the title includes the term Mahāyāna, and the text is often translated as the ''Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna'' or ''according to the Mahāyāna'', I take the term Mahāyāna as part of the customary classificatory term in the canon rather than as part of the actual title, as is common with other texts with the same classificatory term and other texts marked with terms such as Abhidharma (阿毘達磨) or the mothers of the Buddha (佛母). +
"Whatever anybody does is a manifestation of their Buddha-nature, but still we are capable of ethical infringement." +
Articles/The Doctrinal Transformation of Twentieth-Century Chinese Buddhism: Master Yinshun's Interpretation of the Tathāgatagarbha Doctrine +
In this paper, I examine Yinshun’s interpretation of the ''tathāgatagarbha'' (''rulaizang'') and its relationship to the following concepts: the Buddha’s epithet ‘the thus come one’ (Skt. ''tathāgata''; Chn. ''rulai'') and the theory of ‘the selfhood of the ''tathāgatagarbha''’ (''rulaizangwo''). Yinshun regards these two ideas as playing substantial roles in the evolution of the ''tathāgatagarbha'' theory. His conception of their connection to the theory clarifies what I contend has been and continues to be Yinshun’s doctrinal agenda; namely, re-asserting the doctrine of emptiness (Skt. ''śūnyatā''; Chn. ''kong'') as the definitive expression of Buddhist truth and relegating the ''tathāgatagarbha'' teaching to the category of expedient means. I base the following discussion primarily on Yinshun’s text ''A Study of the Tathāgatagarbha'' (''Rulaizang Zhi Yanjiu''), for it serves as his most exhaustive statement about the ''tathāgatagarbha'' and related doctrines. Finally, the interpretation of the relationship between the ''tathāgatagarbha'' and the doctrine of emptiness has been and continues to be a contested issue in the Buddhist tradition. Therefore, before turning to Yinshun’s explanation of its connection to the aforementioned concepts, I first place his interpretation of the ''tathāgatagarbha'' within the context of this on-going dispute. (Hurley, "The Doctrinal Transformation of Twentieth-Century Chinese Buddhism," 30) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
One of the most important arguments made by the exponents of Critical Buddhism is, as Matsumoto Shirõ asserts in the title of one of his papers, that "The Doctrine of ''Tathāgata-garbha'' Is Not Buddhist." In brief, the claim made by Matsumoto and Hakamaya Noriaki is that ''tathāgata-garbha'' or Buddha-nature thought is ''dhātu-vāda'', an essentialist philosophy closely akin to the monism of the Upaniṣads. In Matsumoto and Hakamaya’s view, only thought that strictly adheres to the anti-essentialist principle of ''pratītyasamutpāda'' taught by Śākyamuni should be recognized as Buddhist. Buddha-nature thought, being a ''dhātu-vāda'' or essentialist philosophy, is in fundamental violation of this requirement and consequently should not be regarded as Buddhist. On the basis of this reading of Buddha-nature thought, Matsumoto and Hakamaya proceed to make the several subsequent claims documented in this volume. Since the assertion that Buddha-nature thought is ''dhātu-vāda'' is such a foundational claim, I will focus my remarks upon this one point in their corpus, though at the end of this chapter I will have a few words to say regarding their charge that Buddha-nature thought is to blame for the weakness of Japanese Buddhist social ethics.
I propose in this paper to challenge Matsumoto and Hakamaya’s reading of Buddha-nature thought. In my understanding, while Buddha-nature thought uses some of the terminology of essentialist and monistic philosophy, and thus may give the reader the impression that it is essentialist or monistic, a careful study of how those terms are used—how they actually function in the text—leads the reader to a very different conclusion. I will attempt to demonstrate that Buddha-nature thought is by no means ''dhātu-vāda'' as charged, but is instead an impeccably Buddhist variety of thought, based firmly on the idea of emptiness, which in turn is a development of the principle of ''pratītyasamutpāda''. (King, preliminary remarks, 174–75)
The doctrine of Buddha-Nature (Buddhadhātu) is one of the most important doctrines in Mahayana Buddhism. This doctrine can be found in a number of Mahayana texts that were composed at least by the 3rd to the 5th century C. E., and traces of this doctrine can be found in the development of Chinese, Korean and Japanese Buddhism. The doctrine of Buddha-nature basically teaches that all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature and that they can all attain Buddhahood. The Buddha-nature is described as pure and immaculate, free from emotional and conceptual defilements that plague sentient beings. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>Among the many concepts current among Chinese Buddhists, "Buddha-nature" is undoubtedly the most central and the most widely debated. As is well-known, the idea "Buddha-nature" first became popular in China with the translation of the Mahayana ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra'' (hence-forth referred to as ''MNS'') in the early fifth century; since then, a variety of theses have been proposed on several aspects of the subject. These are worth examining not only because of the important role they play in the history and development of Chinese Buddhist thought, but also because they reflect more fundamental doctrinal differences. Once these differences have been clarified, a more comprehensive picture of the various dominant philosophical trends in the field of Chinese Buddhism will appear. This paper will unravel the diverse streams of thought which came to be associated with the Buddha-nature concept during the Northern and Southern Dynasties, i.e., in the first two centuries of the propagation of the Buddha-nature doctrine in China. (Liu, foreword, 1) +
Articles/The Eighth Karmapa Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507-1554) on the Relation between Buddha Nature and Its Adventitious Stains +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Accepting the possibility of enlightenment as a fundamental Buddhist axiom, one has to either explain the causal process of its production, or accept its primordial existence, for example in terms of a buddha nature (''tathāgatagarbha''). The latter also applies, of course, when buddhahood is not taken to be produced from scratch. The way this basic issue is addressed is an ideal touchstone for systematically comparing various masters and their philosophical hermeneutical positions in the complex landscape of Tibetan intellectual history. The diversity of views on buddha nature has its roots in the multilayered structure of the standard Indian treatise on buddha nature, the ''Ratnagotravibhāga''. Depending on whether one follows the
original intent of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtras (which can be identified in the earliest layer of the ''Ratnagotravibhāga''), or the Yogācāra interpretation of the latter in the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'', buddha nature can refer to either an already fully developed buddha, or the naturally present potential (''prakṛtisthāgotra'') or natural luminosity of mind, i.e., sentient beings’ ability to become buddhas. While some saw in such positive descriptions of the ultimate only synonyms for the emptiness of mind,[1] or simply teachings of provisional meaning,[2] the Jo nang pas, and many bKa’ brgyud pas and rNying ma pas as well, took them as statements of definitive meaning.[3] Among the latter, i.e., those for whom buddha nature is more than just emptiness, there was disagreement about the relationship between such a positively described
buddha nature and its adventitious stains, which include all ordinary states of mind and the world experienced by the latter.
For my analysis of Mi bskyod rdo rje’s view on the relation between buddha nature and its adventitious stains I have chosen his ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' commentary, the ''rGan po’i rlung sman'',[4] which contains a critical review of ’Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal’s (1392-1481) ''rGyud gsum gsang ba''; the ''sKu gsum ngo sprod rnam bshad''; the ''Phyag rgya chen po’i sgros ‘bum'' and Mi bskyod rdo rje’s independent work on ''gzhan stong'', the ''dBu ma gzhan stong smra ba’i srol legs par phye ba’i sgron me''. While these texts have in common that they endorse a robust distinction between buddha nature and the adventitious stains, the respective ''gzhan stong'' ("other empty") views underlying this relationship slightly differ, or are not mentioned in explicit
terms. The homogeneous clear-cut distinction between impure sentient beings and a pure mind, ''dharmadhātu'', or buddha nature is strikingly similar to what we find in the relevant works of the third Karma pa Rang byung rdo rje (1284-1339).5) Even though Rang byung rdo rje does not explicitly mention the word ''gzhan stong'' in his mainly Yogācāra-based presentation of buddha nature, Karma Phrin las pa’s[6] (1456-1539) and Kong sprul Blo gros mtha’ yas’s (1813-1899) description of Rang byung rdo rje as a ''gzhan stong pa''[7] is at least understandable on the grounds that Mi bskyod rdo rje
uses this label for a doctrine similar to Rang byung rdo rje’s.[8] In order to further contextualize Mi bskyod rdo rje’s distinction between buddha nature and adventitious stains I have also consulted relevant passages from his commentaries on the ''Madhyamakāvatāra'' and the ''dGongs gcig''. (Mathes, introductory remarks, 65–67)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#This mainly is the position of rNgog Blo ldan shes rab (1059-1109), who claims in his ''Theg chen rgyud bla’i don bsdus pa'', 5b3: "The mental continuum, which has emptiness as its nature, is the [buddha] element (i.e., buddha nature)." (... ''stong pa nyid kyi rang bzhin du gyur pa’i sems kyi rgyud ni khams yin no''). A similar line of thought is followed by the dGe lugs pas, for whom emptiness is what is taught in the doctrine of ''tathāgatagarbha'' (see Seyfort Ruegg 1969, 402).
#This is, for example, the position maintained by Sa skya Paṇḍita (1182-1251) and Bu ston Rin chen ‘grub (1290-1364) (Seyfort Ruegg 1973, 29-33).
#For rNgog Blo ldan shes rab and some dGe lugs pas, too, buddha nature has definitive meaning on the grounds that it is a synonym of emptiness (see Mathes 2008:26-27; and Seyfort Ruegg 1969, 402) .
#This is how the author originally referred to his work, even though it appears in the Collected Works in the less irreverent title ''Sublime Fragrance of the Nectar of Analysis'' (Higgins and Draszczyk 2016, vol. 1, 12).
#I.e., the ''Zab mo nang don'' and its autocommentary, the ''sNying po bstan pa'', the ''Dharmadhātustava'' commentary, and the ''Rang byung rdo rje’i mgur rnams''. See Mathes 2008, 51-75.
#See Karma 'Phrin las pa: "Dris lan yid kyi mun sel zhes bya ba lcags mo’i dris lan bzhugs", 91, 1-4. For the Tibetan text and an English translation, see Mathes 2008, 55 & 441.
#See Kong sprul Blo gros mtha’ yas: ''Shes bya kun khyab mdzod'', vol. 1, 460, 2-13.
#The fact that the relation between buddha nature and its adventitious stains is only occasionally labelled ''gzhan stong'' by Mi bskyod rdo rje is not very telling, since in his ''dBu ma gzhan stong smra ma’i srol'' the main topic is the said relation, and Mi bskyod rdo rje refers to it as ''gzhan stong'' merely in the title.
The Great Perfection (Rdzogs chen) is one of the most important tantric traditions to develop in Tibet, but much of its early history has been obscured by the tradition’s visionary narratives of revelation, concealment, and excavation regarding its core scriptures. In addition, the over-reliance on the rubric “Great Perfection” itself obscures a broad diversity of distinct traditions, each with its own distinct rubric of self-identification and often quite divergent characteristics. This includes at the most general level the Three Series (Sde gsum), Four Cycles (Skor bzhi), Crown Pith (Spyi ti), and Ultra Pith (Yang ti). The present essay utilizes a simple hermeneutic of two trajectories – labeled “pristine” and “funerary,” respectively – to offer a developmental history of these movements in broad strokes from the eighth to fourteenth century. In doing so, it interprets the major variants of the Great Perfection historically in terms of their interrelations via development, influence, and criticism. +
Articles/The Gotra, Ekayāna and Tathāgatagarbha Theories of the Prajñāpāramitā according to Dharmamitra and Abhayākaragupta +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>In the course of his monumental work on the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras E. Conze has written: 'It is quite a problem how the Dharma-element which is common to all can be regarded as the source of a variety of "lineages" [''gotra'']'.[1] It has been the endeavour of the present writer in a series of publications starting in 1968 to shed light on this very fundamental and interesting question. An article in the ''Festschrift'' dedicated to the late E. Frauwallner was devoted to the interconnexion between the single, unique and undifferentiated ''dharmadhātu'', the naturally existent spiritual element or germ (''prakṛtisthaṃ gotram'') and the variously conditioned psycho-spiritual categories (''gotra'')[2] recognized by the Buddhist texts as explained by Ārya Vimuktisena (ca. 500 ?) and his successor Bhadanta Vimuktisena in their commentaries on the '''''Abhisamayālaṃkāra''''' (i. 37-39), which they correlate with the topics of the '''''Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā'''''.[3] And shortly afterwards there followed a more detailed study of this question as it relates to the notion of the ''tathāgatagarbha'' or buddha-nature in '''''[[La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra: Études sur ta sotériologie et la gnoséologie du bouddhisme]]''''' (Paris, 1969) and '''''[[Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub]]''''' (Paris, 1973). In the last publications Haribhadra's commentaries on the Prajñāpāramitā were discussed, and the importance of the doctrine of the One Vehicle (''ekayāna''), was taken up at some length not only from the point of view of soteriology but also from that of gnoseology<br> Between the two Vimuktisenas and Haribhadra (fl. c. 750-800) on the one side and the Tibetan exegetes on the other there lived a number of important Indian commentators whose work could be only briefly touched on in the '''''Théorie'''''. Amongst the most important of these later Indian masters of the Prajñāpāramitā are Dharmamitra and Abhayākaragupta, both of whom have been reckoned by Buddhist doxographers as being, for certain systematic reasons, close to the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika school, and Ratnākaraśānti (first half of the 11th century), a Vijñānavādin (of the Alīkākāravāda branch) who appears to have undertaken a harmonization of the Vijñānavāda and the Madhyamaka in the manner of the synthesizing movements especially characteristic of later Buddhist thought in India.<br> One of Ratnākaraśānti's main works on the Prajñāpāramitā—the ''Sārottamā'' (or ''Sāratamā'' ?), a Pañjikā on the '''''Aṣṭasāhasrikā''''', which until recently was known only by its Tibetan version in the Bstan 'gyur—has now been recovered in an incomplete Sanskrit manuscript. Since the promised publication of this text is awaited with keenest interest by students of this literature, his work must be left for another occasion.[4] The present paper will therefore consider the discussions by Dharmamitra and Abhayākaragupta of the relation between the ''gotra'', the ''dharmadhātu'', the ''ekayāna'', and the ''tathāgatagarbha''. (Ruegg, "The ''Gotra'', ''Ekayāna'' and ''Tathāgatagarbha'' Theories of the Prajñāpāramitā," 283–284)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#E. Conze, '''''The Large Sūtra on Perfect Wisdom''''' (London 1961), p. 105 note 2. References hereunder to the folios of Tibetan translations of Indian texts contained in the Bstan 'gyur relate to the Peking edition as reproduced in the Japanese reprint published by the Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Institute (Tokyo and Kyoto). Prints of other editions of the Bstan 'gyur were unfortunately unavailable during the writing of the present paper.
#On the meanings of the term ''gotra'', and in particular on the two meanings '(spiritual) element, germ, capacity' and '(spiritual) lineage, class, category' which might be described respectively as the intensional and extensional meanings of the word when the ''gotra'' as germ determines the classification of persons possessing it in a ''gotra'' as category, see the present writer's article in ''BSOAS'' 39 (1976) p. 341sq.
#"Ārya and Bhadanta Vimuktisena on the ''gotra''-theory of the Prajñāpāramitā," '''''Beitriige zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens (Festschrift fur Erich Frauwallner)''''', ''WZKSO'' 12-13 (1968/1969), pp. 303–317.<br>4. Ratnākaraśānti's other work on the subject, a commentary on the ''AA'' entitled '''''Śuddhimatī''''', (or: '''''Śuddhamatī''''') will be referred to below.
Articles/The Gzhan stong Model of Reality: Some More Material on Its Origin, Transmission, and Interpretation +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
By the time Tibetans inherited Indian Buddhism, it had already witnessed two major doctrinal developments, namely the notion of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras that all factors of existence (''dharmas'') lack an own-being (emptiness), and the Yogācāra interpretation of this emptiness based on the imagined (''parikalpita''-), dependent (''paratantra''-) and perfect natures (''pariniṣpanna svabhāva'').[2] Closely related to this threefold distinction was the Tathāgatagarbha restriction of emptiness to adventitious stains which cover over an ultimate nature of buddha-qualities. There can be, of course, only one true reality towards which the Buddha awakened, so that exegetes were eventually forced to explain the canonical sources (i.e., Mahāyāna Sūtras) which contain mutually competing models of reality. This set the stage for the well-known hermeneutic strategies of the Tibetan schools. The main issue at stake was whether or not one needs to distinguish two modes of emptiness: being "empty of an own-being (Tib. ''rang stong''), and being "empty of other" (Tib. ''gzhan stong''). (Mathes, preliminary remarks, 187)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#(For the title) This is an enlarged version of my paper read at the 2008 IABS Conference in Atlanta, where it had the title: "Was the Third Karmapa Rang byung rdo rje (1284–1339) a Proponent of Gzhan stong? Some More Material from Rje Bkra shis 'od zer's (15th/16th cent.) ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' Commentary."
#This threefold distinction is related to the three ''niḥsvabhāvatās'' of the ''Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra'': the lack of essence in terms of characteristics (''lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā''), arising (''utpatti-n.'') and the ultimate (''paramārtha-n.''). See Mathes 1996: 161. +
Tibetans use the concept of the “Five Treatises of Maitreya” (''Byams chos sde lnga'') to refer to a group of texts that they attribute to Maitreya through Asaṅga, including the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' (''Mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan, AA''), the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' (''Theg pa chen po’i mdo sde rgyan, MSA''), the ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' (''Dbus dang mtha’ rnam par ’byed pa, MV''), the ''Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga'' (''Chos dang chos nyid rnam par dbye ba, DDV''), and the ''Ratnagotravibhāga (RGV)'', which Tibetans most often refer to as the ''Mahāyāna-Uttaratantra'' (''Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma''). Some of the Five Treatises were present at the time of the first dissemination of Buddhism in Tibet (''snga dar''), and some were discovered or brought later to Tibet. The first set comprises the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'', the ''Sūtrālaṃkāra'', and the ''Madhyāntavibhāga'', while the texts that were later discovered and translated are the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' and the ''Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga''. Although the Five Treatises cover a variety of topics and seem to defend several philosophical positions about these topics, the Tibetan tradition still takes very seriously the idea that they form a unit, and share to some extent a single intent.<br> Modern scholarship on the Five Treatises has so far privileged studying the texts of the Five Treatises individually, not giving much importance to the concept of the Five Treatises per se and its consequences on the interpretation of the texts that form it. In the following pages I argue that, on the contrary, the notion of the Five Treatises and the idea that they form a unit is crucial enough for Tibetan interpreters that we cannot fully understand Tibetan interpretations of those texts without taking this into consideration. If we look at the way Tibetan interpreters define the category and how they form their interpretations around it, we come to the conclusion that a study of Tibetan interpretations of individual treatises cannot represent fully the influence of those texts on Tibetan Buddhist literature and thought<br> In order to establish that claim, having explained the concept of the Five Treatises as a unit and where that unit fits among Tibetan Buddhist scriptures, I will trace its origin and development from the recognition of Maitreya’s authorship of the Treatises to the notion that the Five Treatises form a single work. I will conclude by explaining how the study of the Five Treatises as a whole and of that concept itself allows us to understand things that the study of the texts individually cannot provide. (Turenne, introduction, 215–16)
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shirō are convinced that ''tathāgatagarbha'' theory and the Yogacara school share a common framework that they call ''dhātu-vāda'' or "locus theory." The word ''dhātu-vāda'' itself is a neologism introduced by Matsumoto[1] and adopted by Hakamaya.[2] They argue that the ''dhātu-vāda'' idea stands in direct contradiction to the authentic Buddhist theory of ''pratītyasamutpāda'' or "dependent origination," which in turn leads them to consider ''tathāgata-garbha'' and Yogacara theories to be non-Buddhist. In their opinion, not only these Indian theories but also the whole of "original enlightenment thought" (''hongaku shisō'') in East Asia fell under the shadow of the ''dhātu-vāda'' idea,[3] with the result that most of its Buddhism is dismissed as not Buddhist at all.[4]
The idea of ''dhātu-vāda'' is thus an integral part of the Critical Buddhism critique and as such merits careful examination in any evaluation of the overall standpoint. Since Matsumoto first found the ''dhātu-vāda'' structure in Indian ''tathāgata-garbha'' and Yogacara literature, we need to begin with a look at the texts in question. My approach here will be purely philological and will limit itself to the theoretical treatises (sastras).
<h5>Notes</h5>
#I do not know exactly when Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shirō began their critique of ''tathāgata-garbha'' thought and ''hongaku shisō'', but the first time I myself ran across it was in Hakamaya's "Thoughts on the Ideological Background of Social Discrimination."
#A text quoted as the basis for the ''Mahāyāna-saṅgraha'', but not extant.
#''Sutra of Neither Increase Nor Decrease'', T No. 668, 16.466–8.
#I have published an expanded discussion of this topic under the title "'Mushi jirai no kai' no saikō" [A reexamination of ''anādhikāliko-dhātuḥ''] in ''Suguro Shinjō Hakase Koki Kinen Ronbunshū'' [Festschrift for Dr. Suguro Shinjō] (Tokyo: Sankibō Busshorin, 1996), 41–59.
The point of zazen, says Shunryu Suzuki Roshi, is to live each moment in complete combustion, like a clean-burning kerosene lamp. In this talk at the Tassajara sesshin in the summer of 1969, the great Zen master explains Dogen’s teaching on practicing within imperfection and warns against the arrogance of the false self. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Anne Burchardi[1]
The present article is a contribution to the discussion on the place of epistemology in Tibetan Buddhism in relation to the doctrine of Mahāmudrā, drawing on a selection of Tibetan sources from the 16th century as well as Bhutanese sources from the 19th century.
While Buddhist epistemology may seem dry and cerebral, it plays a special role as a gateway to Mahāmudrā according to certain masters associated with the ''gzhan stong'' philosophy.[2] For them, not only can direct valid cognition (''mngon sum tshad ma'') in general be linked to the non-conceptual states associated with Mahāmudrā meditation, but the basic epistemological definition of mind as luminous and cognisant (''gsal zhing rig pa'') is a precursor to the pointing-out instructions for recognising the nature of mind. According to some interpretations, it is the direct valid cognition of apperception[3] (''rang rig mngon sum tshad mo''), which experiences this true nature, and the direct yogic valid cognition (''mal 'byor mngon sum tshad ma''), which realises it. (Burchardi, preliminary remarks, 27)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#An early version of this paper was presented at the 15th IABS Conference in Atlanta in 2008 as well as at the Seventh Nordic Tibet Research Conference in Helsinki, 2009. It appeared in the proceedings of the latter which were published as the ''Himalayan Discoveries'' in 2013. It appears here in an amended version with the kind permission of the editors. I would like to thank Lopon Norbu Gyaltsen for his explanations as well as Karl Brunnhölzl, Per Sørensen, Jan-Ulrich Sobisch, Julian Pollock and Yaroslav Komarovski for their comments and improvements to the previous version of this article. I would like to thank Olaf Czaja for his suggestions, which inspired a revision of the translations in the first half of the present version of the paper.
#The connection between direct yogic valid cognition and Mahāmudrā most probably predates the inception of the ''gzhan stong'' movement in Tibet.
#Often translated as reflexive awareness.
With this article I examine Pāli discourse references to luminosity of the mind in the light of their parallels, with a view to discerning early stages in the development of a notion that has had a considerable impact on Buddhist thought and practice. +
Articles/The Mahāparinirvāṇa-Mahāsūtra and the Emergence of Tathāgatagarbha Doctrine-Review by Lee +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs: <br><br>
Previous Buddhist scholarship has generally regarded the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra'' as a “side line” or “offshoot” from the “mainstream” group of ''tathāgatagarbha'' scriptural texts, such as the ''Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra''. This view has been also supported by the presumed chronological order between the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra'' and the ''Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra'': The ''Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra'', which is also the putative earliest ''tathāgatagarbha'' text, has been considered to be an earlier text than the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra'', on the basis of the supposed evidence that the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra'' refers to the ''Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra'' by its title on the one hand and borrows one simile from the ''Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra'' on the other. Michael Radich’s book, The ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra and the Emergence of Tathāgatagarbha Doctrine'', fundamentally challenges such previous scholarship on the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra''. Employing meticulous analysis of vast range of primary-source materials, Radich convincingly demonstrates that the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra'' is most likely “our earliest” ''tathāgatagarbha'' text. More importantly, Radich, presents an insightful perspective on the matter of the origin of the ''tathāgatagarbha'' doctrine: He argues that the ''tathāgatagarbha''/*''buddhadhātu'' ideas of the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra'' constitutes part of a broader pattern of docetic Buddhology, the idea that the buddhas’ appearance is not the reality of their true nature.<br> The ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra and the Emergence of Tathāgatagarbha Doctrine'' consists of two parts. Part I, which is divided into three chapters, mainly concerns chronological issues revolving around the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra'', thereby arguing that the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra'' is the earliest ''tathāgatagarbha'' text available to us. In Chapter 1, Radich argues that the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra'' can be considered a ''tathāgatagarbha'' text proper, by questioning the scholarly presumption that the “Buddha nature” (*''buddhadhātu'') doctrine of the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra'' derives from the center of ''tathāgatagarbha'' doctrinal discourse. Through a careful comparative analysis of the text common to the four versions of the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra'', Radich shows that the sūtra in fact speaks of ''tathāgatagarbha'' much more than it speaks of *''buddhadhātu'', and that even when it mentions *''buddhadhātu'', it is used in an interchangeable manner with ''tathāgatagarbha''. In this way, Radich undermines the previous scholarly tendency to distinguish the concept of *''buddhadhātu'' from ''tathāgatagarbha'' and to regard the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra'' as a side-line of the ''tathāgatagarbha'' doctrine. (Lee, "Review of ''The Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra and the Emergence of Tathāgatagarbha Doctrine''," 199–200)
Articles/The Mahāparinirvāṇa-Sūtra and Its Earliest Interpreters in China: Two Prefaces by Tao-lang and Tao-sheng +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>One of the most popular sūtras in China is the ''Ta-pan nieh-pan ching'', the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra'' translated by Dharmakṣema in 421 A.D. Its doctrine of "universal Buddha-nature" has endeared itself to the Orient so much that it became an axiom of sorts, and any challenge to this doctrine would be seen as a challenge against Mahayana itself. To this day, this sūtra, TPNPC for short, is well received by all major Buddhist schools. The Pali canon preserved its version of the teaching of the Buddha at his ''parinirvāṇa'', great extinction, in the ''Dighanikaya''. The Mahayana tradition's redaction is the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra'', of which the Chinese translations alone survive. Prior to Dharmakṣema, Fa-hsien the pilgrim and Buddhabhadra translated a shorter ''Ta-pan ni-yüan ching'' in six chapters. This version was based on an earlier Sanskrit text that corresponds now to the first ten chapters of the forty-chaptered TPNC. The texts were unknown to Kumārajīva (d. 413) the Kuchan translator who produced the authoritative ''Miao-fa lien-hua ching'', the ''Saddharma-puṇḍarīka'' or ''Lotus-sūtra''. When the TPNPC was known to the Chinese, it was almost immediately crowned as the final, ultimate 'positive'—that is affirming the permanence of the Buddha-nature ''qua Dharmakāya qua mahā-nirvāṇa''—teaching of the Buddha. Even the ''Lotus-sūtra'' was placed, both in time and in content, second to it. In the Sui dynasty, however, T'ien-t'ai master Chih'i, establishing the Lotus school, reversed the judgement somewhat.[2] It is in part to uncover the glory that once belonged to the TPNPC that the present essay tries to analyze the initial reception of this ''sūtra''. (Lai, "The ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-Sūtra'' and Its Earliest Interpreters in China," 99)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#The placement of note #1 in the text is unclear in the original. Nevertheless it reads: On the impact of the TPNPC, see Kenneth Ch'en, ''Buddhism in China'' (Princeton: Princeton University, 1964), pp. 112-129 or Fuse Kōgaku, ''Nehanshū no kenkyū'', I, II (Tokyo, Sōbun, 1942) and Tokiwa Daijō, ''Busshō no kenkyū'' (Tokyo, Meiji, 1944).
#On Chih-i's ''p'an-chiao'', see Leon Hurvitz, "Chih-i," ''Melanges chinois et Bouddhiques'', XII, (Brussells, 1960-62), esp. appendix on ''p'an-chiao''.
Although the textual study of Mahāyāna sūtras has made gradual progress over the past few decades, there are a number of major sutras of considerable importance for an understanding of the development of Mahāyāna doctrinally and socially which still remain rather neglected in the West, such as the ''Tathāgataguhyaka'', the ''Samādhi-rāja'', and the ''Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa''. Of these, the ''Mahāyāna Mahā-parinirvāṇa-sūtra'' (hereafter MPNS), when not casually dismissed as a Hinduizing aberration, until recently has attracted interest almost solely as a source for studies of the so-called “Buddha-nature” or ''tathāgata-garbha'' doctrine. Moreover, the value of such studies has often been compromised by an uncritical, synchronic use of the text, completely ignoring the problems of stratification and interpolation which I shall highlight in this paper.<br> Yet the significance of the MPNS goes well beyond that restricted topic, despite its interest to many. For example, when utilized to the fullest, the available textual materials for the MPNS allow unique insights into the creation, development & transmission of Mahāyāna texts in general. Additionally, I believe that the composition of the main elements of the MPNS can be reliably dated to a narrow period from the middle decades to the end years of the 1st century CE, when read in conjunction with the small group of associated texts (the ''Mahāmegha-sūtra'', ''Mahā-bherī-sūtra'' and the ''Aṅgulimālīya-sūtra''), due to the specific mention in them of the Sātavāhana ruler Gautamīputra Sātakarṇi in conjunction with the timetable of a dire eschatological prophesy. There would also seem to be biographical details of a certain individual who may have been the founder or author of the MPNS “movement”. In sum, this situation seems to be virtually unique among all Mahāyāna sutras and, if properly understood, should have far-reaching ramifications for the study of the early Mahāyāna movements, for the MPNS may now be taken as a fixed reference point for constructing a relative chronology for many other early Mahāyāna sutras, though with the usual caveats concerning interpolated material. (Hodge, introduction, 1)
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>The word ''gotra'' is frequently used in the literature of Mahāyāna Buddhism to denote categories of persons classified according to their psychological, intellectual, and spiritual types. The chief types usually mentioned in this kind of classification are the Auditors making up the ''śrāvaka-gotra'', the Individual Buddhas making up the ''pratyehabuddha-gotra'', and the Bodhisattvas making up the ''bodhisattva-gotra''.[2] In the ''Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra'' these three types constitute altogether different ''gotras'', which thus coincide with the three separate Vehicles (''yāna'') as recognized by the Yogācārin/Vijñaptimātratā, school.[3] To these three some sources add the further category of the undetermined (''aniyatagotra''), which is made up of persons not yet definitively attached to one of the three preceding classes; and the non-''gotra'' (''agotra''), that is the category made up of persons who cannot be assigned to any spiritual class.[4] Each of the first three categories is thus comprised of persons capable of achieving a particular kind of maturity and spiritual perfection in accordance with their specific type or class, the Auditor then attaining the Awakening (''bodhi'') characteristic of the Śrāvaka and so on.[5] Especially remarkable in this connexion, and somewhat anomalous as a ''gotra'', is the non-''gotra'', i.e. that category of persons who seem to have been considered, at least by certain Yogācārin authorities, as spiritual ‘outcastes’ lacking the capacity for attaining spiritual perfection or Awakening of any kind; since they therefore achieve neither ''bodhi'' nor ''nirvāṇa'', they represent the same type as the ''icchantikas'' to the extent that the latter also are considered to lack this capacity.[6]<br> The three ''gotras'' mentioned first together with the ''aniyatagotra'' and the ''agotra'' are discussed chiefly in the Śāstras of the Yogācārins[7] and in the commentaries on the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra''.[8]<br> In addition, the ''gotra'' functions so to speak as a spiritual or psychological 'gene' determining the classification of living beings into the above-mentioned categories, which may be either absolutely or temporarily different according to whether one accepts the theory that the three Vehicles (''yāna'') are ultimately and absolutely separate because they lead to the three quite different kinds of Awakening of the Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha, and Bodhisattva—namely the extreme ''triyāna'' doctrine-or, on the contrary, the theory that the Vehicles are ultimately one because all sentient beings are finally to attain Awakening and buddhahood which are essentially one—in other words the characterized Mādhyamika version of the ''ekayāna'' theory.[9]
<h5>Notes</h5>
#(Note 1 belongs to title): A shortened version of this paper was read before the Indological section of the twenty-ninth International Congress of Orientalists in Paris in July 1973.<br> The following abbreviations are used.<br> ''IBK'' ''Indogaku-Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū''.<br> ''MSA'' ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' (ed. Lévi).<br> ''RGV'' ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' (Sanskrit text ed. E. H. Johnston).<br> ''RGVV'' ''Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā'' (Sanskrit text ed. E. H. Johnston).<br> ''TGS'' ''Tathāgatagarbhasūtra'' (Tibetan translation in the lHa-sa ed. of the bKa'-'gyur).<br>''Théorie'' D. Seyfort Ruegg, ''La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra'' (Publications de l'École Française d'Extreme-Orient, LXX, Paris, 1969).
#''v. Laṅkāvatārasūtra'', ed. Nanjō, 2, pp. 63-6, and the other sources quoted in Ruegg, ''Théorie'', 74 f.
#''Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra'' 7.15, 24; cf. ''Théorie'', 73-4.
#''Laṅkāvatārasūtra'' 2, p. 63.
#''v. Laṅkāvatārasūtra'' 2, pp. 63-5; ''MSABh.'' 3.2.
#''Laṅkāvatārasūtra'' 2, pp. 65-6; ''MSABh''. 3.11: ''aparinirvāṇadharmaka''. There are two categories of persons not attaining ''nirvāṇa'', those who do not attain it for a certain length of time (''tatkālāparinirvāṇadharman'') and those who never do so (''atyantāparinirvāṇadharman''). The theory that some persons are destined never to attain ''nirvāṇa'' and buddhahood is considered characteristic of the Yogācārin school, which does not admit the doctrine of universal buddhahood implied by the usual interpretation of the ''ekayāna'' theory (see ''Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra'' 7.24) and the theory of the ''tathāgatagarbha'' present in all sentient beings. (''MSA'' 9.37 does not, it seems, refer to the fully developed ''tathāgatagarbha'' theory which is based on three factors—the irradiation of the ''dharmakāya'', the non-differentiation of the ''tathatā'', and the presence of the ''gotra'' [see ''RGV'' 1.27 f.]—and concerns only the non-differentiation of the ''tathatā'', and the ''tathāgatatva'', which all beings possess as their embryonic essence. Cf. below, n. 50.)<br> The ''agotra'' doctrine to the extent that it assumes a class of spiritual 'outcastes' being evidently incompatible with the ''tathāgatagarbha'' theory, the question arises as to the significance of the allusion to persons without a ''gotra'' in ''RGV'' 1.41. The reference there seems to be to a hypothetical case (opposed to the author's own view expressed before in ''RGV'' 1.40-41c), which is not, however, admitted by the author; and the revised reading of ''pāda'' 1.41d ''agotrāṇāṃ na tad yataḥ'' (cf. L. Schmithausen, ''WZKS'', xv, 1971, 145) 'since this is not so for those without ''gotra'' ' makes this interpretation easier (see p. 346). Indeed, according to ''RGVV'' 1.41, any allusion to an ''icchantika'' who does not attain ''nirvāṇa'' is to be interpreted as referring to a certain interval of time (''kālāntarābhiprāya'') only, and not to a permanent incapacity. On the ''icchantika'' cf. D. S. Ruegg, ''Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub'', Paris, 1973, p. 12, n. 1. The ''aparinirvāṇagotra'' is also mentioned in ''RGVV'' 1.32-3, 1.38, and 1.41, and the ''aparinirvāṇadharman'' in 1.41.
#cf. ''MSA'', ch. 3; ''Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya'' and º''ṭīkā'', 2.1, 4.15-16.
#cf. ''Théorie'', 123 f.
#''v. Théorie'', 177 f.; ''MSA'' 11.53-9; ''Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā'' 3.1a, 22. On the equivalence of ''nirvāṇa'' and buddhahood, see ''RGV'' 1.87.
In this article Joseph Goldstein, a very experienced and influential Insight meditation teacher, explores his confusion about the apparent difference of opinion between different schools of Theravada Buddhism, Korean Ch’an and Dzogchen on the status of consciousness / awareness. His own tradition teaches consciousness is something transitory whilst Ch’an and Dzogchen believe awareness – pure awareness, rigpa, is the uncreated, unconditioned Buddha Nature, Tathagatagarbha. How can they both be right? ([https://bath-bristol-mindfulness-courses.co.uk/the-nivana-debate-joseph-goldstein-extract/ Source Accessed March 6, 2020]) +
Articles/The Original Ratnagotravibhāga and Its Yogāçāra Interpretation as Possible Indian Precedents of Gzhan stong ("Empti-ness of Other") +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
In his pioneering study of the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' (RGV) TAKASAKI Jikido showed that the standard Indian treatise on ''tathāgatagarbha'' consists of different layers and reduced it to what he considered to be the original ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' by excluding later strands of the text. Schmithausen continued this "textual archaeology," which left us with an original text of fifteen verses only. While these ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' verses (which in the following I shall refer to as "the original" version) support the idea of an already fully developed "buddha-element" ''(buddhadhātu}'' in sentient beings, the final (standard) version of the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' and its ''vyākhyā'' exhibit a systematic Yogāçāra interpretation of the original ''tathāgatagarbha'' theory. The original and final ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' represent the prototypes of at least two different ''gzhan stong'' interpretations, which mainly differ in whether they restrict or not the basis of emptiness to an unchanging perfect nature. (Mathes, "The Original ''Ratnagotravibhāga''," 119)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#TAKASAKI Jikido, ''A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra) Being a Treatise on the Tathāgatagarbha Theory of Mahāyāna Buddhism'', Rome Oriental Series, vol. 33 (Rome: Istituto Italiano per ii Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1966), pp. 10–19.
#Lambert Schmithausen, "Philologische Bemerkungen zum ''Ratnagotravibhāga''," Wiener Zeitschriftfur die Kunde Sudasiens 15 (1971), pp. 123-177, see pp. 123-130.
#Used interchangeably with the term ''tathāgatagarbha'' in the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' and its ''vyākhyā''. +
Contrary to certain currents of widespread opinion both among Eastern and Western scholars, there are two fundamentally different views of the nature of man, the mind and the spiritual path within the Buddhist tradition, each of which has equal claim to orthodoxy.<br>
In this paper, which is exploratory in nature, I shall briefly outline these two views and then ask the question of what the psychological or social effects of holding one or other of these views might be. The views I have in mind are expressed in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition as the view of self-emptiness and the view of other-emptiness (''rangstong'' and ''gzhan-stong''). (Hookham, "The Practical Implications of the Doctrine of Buddha-nature," 149) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
In the present chapter I will discuss how the seventh Karma pa, Chos grags rgya mtsho (1454-1506), connects ''rang rig'',[1] in the sense of ''tshad ma'i 'bras bu'' (San: ''pramāṇaphala''),[2] with tathāgatagarbha in his major work, the ''Rig gzhung rgya mtsho''.[3] Si tu Paṇ chen Chos kyi 'byung gnas (1699-1776) has pointed out that "there were several different brands of ''gzhan stong'', among which he adhered most closely to that of the Seventh Lord and Zi lung pa, which was somewhat different than that of Dol po pa."[4] This statement points to the fact that the kind of ''gzhan stong'' ("empty-of-other" doctrine) that Si tu Paṇ chen blended with mahāmudrā and spread throughout the Karma Bka' brgyud pa traditions of Khams was derived from the seventh Karma pa.[5]
The seventh Karma pa also influenced the great Sa skya scholar Shakya mchog Idan's later writings. While the seventh Karma pa is remembered as one of the most outstanding masters of the lineage and the founder of the Karma bka' brgyud bshad grwa at Mtshur phu, Shakya mchog Idan is described as "the most influential advocate of the ''gzhan stong'' in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries."[6] Both masters are, in their own ways, still sources of the continued presence of an influential type of modified ''gzhan stong'' in the Bka' brgyud tradition,[7] distinct from Dol po pa's position.[8] The seventh Karma pa's ''Rigs gzhung rgya mtsho'' was studied at all the ''bshad grwas'' of the Karma Bka' brgyud tradition, with special emphasis on the first and the third part of the text,[9] while Shakya mchog ldan's writings have played an important role in the 'Brug pa Bka' rgyud ''bshad grwa'' tradition of Bhutan.[10]
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Skt. ''svasaṃvitti'', or ''svasaṃvedanā'', and variously translated as "self-cognition," "apperception," and "reflexive awareness."
#See Dreyfus and Lindtner 1989 for an important analysis of Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's presentations of ''pramāṇa'' and ''pramāṇaphala''.
#The full title is ''Tshad ma legs par bshad pa thams cad kyi chu bo yongs su du ba rigs pa'i gzhung lugs kyi rgya mtsho''.
#Trans. Steams 1999: 76. The "Seventh Lord" here is the seventh Karma pa and "Zi lung pa" refers to Shakya mchog ldan (1428-1507). The Tibetan original (from Si tu's ''Chos kyi 'byung gnas Ta'i si tur 'bod pa karma bstan pa'i nyin byed kyi rang tshul drangs par brjod pa dri bral shel gyi me long'', in ''Autobiography and Diaries of Si tu Paṇ chen'': 267) is given in Stearns 1999, p. 214, note 129, as follows: ''bdag gis ni gzhan stong rang la' ang bzhed tshul cung zad mi 'dra ba 'ga' re yod pa'i nang nas / dol po'i bzhed pa las thal rang gnyis po 'ang rig [sic!] tshogs kyi dgongs pa rma med du 'dod pa ni khyad par dang / rje bdun pa dang zi lung pa'i bzhad pa dang ches nye ba zhig 'dod pa yin no''.
#Smith 2000: 250.
#Stearns 1999: 60-61.
#See Mathes 2004 for a comparison of Shākya mchog Idan and Dol po pa's views. For different kinds of ''gzhan stong'' see Burchardi 2007.
#See Kapstein 1992 and 2000a for valuable information about Dol po pa and his work. See Stearns 1999 for a history of Dol po pa's life and a translation of his text the ''Bka' bsdu bzhi pa''. See Hopkins 2006 for a translation of his definitive treatise on tathāgatagarbha and ''gzhan stong'', the ''Ri chos nge don rgya mtsho''.
#Personal communication from Thrangu Rinpoche, 2007.
#See Burchardi 2008.
Buddha Nature, or tathagatagarbha in Sanskrit, is a core element of Buddhist philosophical discourse and doctrinal debate. Who or what possesses Buddha Nature, how it manifests itself, and what role it plays in Buddhist soteriology have been sustained questions in actual Buddhist practices and in the works of Buddhologists from ancient times to the present. Based on the author’s textual interpretation, this paper attempts to present a threefold argument: Buddha Nature is not separate from its alleged opposite, sentience; it is not a tangible substance but a state of being whose felt meaning is only metaphorically conveyed; and finally it is a heuristic device or a means of provoking a Buddhist or anyone who takes interest in Buddhism, to visualize the inner complexity of his or her sentient mode of being. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The well-known motto of Ch'an Buddhism is that "perceiving the true self, one becomes a Buddha." The "true self" signifies the Buddha nature inherent in all sentient beings. The discovering of the "true self" has become the single most important pursuit of the Buddhist, especially in Sino-Japanese Buddhism. On the contrary, early Buddhism teaches that ultimately no substantial self (i.e., 'anatman') can be found, since the self is nothing but the union of the five aggregates. Modern Buddhologists as well as the Buddhists have been intrigued by the inconsistency that one single tradition teaches both that there is no self on the one hand, and that the goal of religious life is to discover the true self, on the other hand.
The big questions concerning these two contradictory doctrines include:
* How did they develop during the course of Buddhist history?
* How can they be reconciled?
* Are these two ideas actually as contradicting as they appear to be?
* Is the concept of the Buddha nature an outcome of the influence of other Indian religious thought upon Buddhism?
It is out of the scope of this short paper to answer all these questions. Therefore, this paper will deal with the antecedent and synonymous concept of the Buddha nature, that is, 'tathagata- garbha' ('ju lai tsang'). Specifically, this paper will examine the meaning and significance of the 'tathagatagarbha' (Buddha nature) based on three 'tathagatagarbha' texts and argue that the 'tathagatagarbha'/Buddha nature does not represent a substantial self ('atman'); rather, it is a positive language and expression of 'sunyata' (emptiness) and represents the potentiality to realize Buddhahood through Buddhist practices. In other words, the intention of the teaching of 'tathagatagarbha'/Buddha nature is soteriological rather than theoretical.
Read more [https://www.budsas.org/ebud/ebdha191.htm here] +
This teaching on “The Sky Dragon's Profound Roar,” by Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche was generously given in response to a special request for teachings by the Nalandabodhi Sangha on October 10, 1999, on the campus of Naropa University in Boulder, Colorado. Ari Goldfield served as Rinpoche’s translator. Edited by Cindy Shelton and Amita Gupta, with assistance by Meg Miller. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>The ''Sutra of Liberation and Breaking the Attributes of the Mind through the Wisdom Stored in the Ocean of Buddha-nature'' (''Foxinghai zang zhihui jietuo po xinxiang jing'' 佛性海藏智慧解脫破心相經; hereafter: ''Sutra on the Wisdom Stored in the Ocean of Buddha-nature'') is a Chinese apocryphal scripture whose origin is still obscure. For a long time, the sutra was thought to be missing. Following the discovery of the Dunhuang 敦煌 manuscripts and the stone sutras in the Grove of the Reclining Buddha (Wofoyuan 臥佛院; hereafter: the Grove), an overall version of the text can now be restored.<br> The sutra, consisting of two scrolls, is included in the ''Taishō'' edition in the volume on the “sutras in Dunhuang manuscripts whose origins are in doubt 敦煌寫本類疑似部”. The version in the Grove is an incomplete engraving of the first scroll of the sutra. For reasons that still await clarification, the text on wall e in cave 46 reads from left to right. It is preceded on wall d by scroll 22 of the ''Nirvana Sutra'', and followed on wall f by the ''Diamond Sutra''. Neither the author nor the translator of this scripture is mentioned in the Dunhuang and the Grove versions. (Shih-Chung, introductory remarks, 101) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
Until now several scholars have dealt with Tibetan texts of the manuscript collection of Tabo monastery in Spiti District, Himachal Pradesh, India.[1] With this short contribution I would like to throw light on the Tabo fragments of one of the Tibetan translations of the ''Tathāgatagarbhasūtra'', in Tibetan ''De bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po'i mdo''. l shall focus on the textual characteristics and the relation of the Tabo fragments to the versions of the sūtra contained in the other main Kanjurs. It is strictly to be kept in mind that all conclusions drawn from the presentation of the material and its evaluation can only claim validity for the ''De bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po'i mdo''. My conclusions are not meant to provide a characterization of the
Tabo Kanjur in general. Though, regarding the position of the manuscript in the general, Kanjur stemma, there seem to be certain tendencies common to all the texts of the Kanjur found in Tabo and analysed until now, each work should be seen as an individual case. Only when a sufficient number of studies will have been executed and will repeatedly confirm the results shall we be able to draw conclusions of a more general nature. (Zimmermann, introductory remarks, 177)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#See the studies in ''East and West'' 44–1, 1994, and SCHERRER-SCHAUB / STEINKELLNER 1999; further PAGEL 1999: 165–210. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
I understand the phrase 'tathagata-garbhaḥ' as the womb that gives birth to tathāgatas, the womb for tathāgatas, which is a conclusion I have arrived by taking into consideration the contents of scriptures down to the ''Laṅkāvatāra sūtra'', as well as the latter's expression, 'garbhas-tathāgatānām' (VI k. la).<br> Previously I understood the phrase (t. g.) as tathāgata abiding in the womb, which now I find inappropriate because it does not cover the whole phrase, the key-point of which is that the womb is empty of the thick coverings of kleśas.<br> For the understanding of the phrase t. g. I went through Śākyamuni's life-stories like the ''Mahāvastu'' (MV) and the ''Lalitavistara'' (LV), the Māyā chapter of the ''Gaṇḍavyūha'' (GV), the ''Śūraṃgama-samādhi sūtra'' (sss), the ''Tathāgata-garbha sūtra'' (TG), the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra'' of mahāyāna (MPN), the ''Śrīmālādevi-siṃhanāda sūtra'' (SM), and the ''Laṅkāvatāra sūtra'' (LS). Now I am certain that it constitutes the core of the philosophy of religion of Buddhism. (Tokiwa, preliminary remarks, 13) +
Articles/The Tathāgatagarbha Theory Reconsidered: Reflections on Some Recent Issues in Japanese Buddhist Studies +
The Tathāgatagarbha theory is an influential yet controversial part of the Buddhist tradition. This essay examines some of the issues related to this tradition that have been discussed recently by Buddhist scholars: the ''dhātu-vāda'' thesis and the critique of “original enlightenment,” the relationship between the terms ''tathāgatagarbha'' and ''padmagarbha'', the interpretation of dependent origination in the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'', the role of relics worship in the ''Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra'', and the Tathāgatagarbha theory in Tibetan Buddhism. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
. . . We may conclude the characteristics of the TG [tathāgatagarbha] theory in this sūtra in the following way.
1) The biggest contribution of the MPS [''Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra''] to the history of the TG theory is the establishment of the concept of ''buddhadhātu'' as explaining the nature of ''tathāgatagarbha''. This ''dhātu'' concept as showing the essence or nature common to ''sattvas'' and the Tathāgata seems to be introduced by the AAN [''Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa''], but the MPS, succeeding the AAN, utilized it in its full scope, in which are involved various other meanings of the term ''dhātu'' developed in Buddhism, such as relic of the Buddha, the 18 component elements, the 4 gross elements, sphere of the dharma, the essence of dharmas (e.g. the ''tathāgatakāya'' is not (consisting) of elements of collected materials (''bsags paḥi khams''), but of the essence of the dharma (''chos kyi khams'') (L. 110a1–2). It suggests that '' 'dharmakāya' '' is '' 'dharmadhātu-kāya' ''), the word root, etc.
2) The most unique expression of this sūtra with respect to the TG is the ''ātman'', which is regarded as a sort of taboo in Buddhism*. Connotation of this term in the text is completely identical with ''dhātu''.
3) Inspite of the use of such an abstract concept, the MPS is far from systematization of the theory, in comparison with the AAN and the ŚMS [''Śrītmalasūtra'']. Especially the relationship between ''tathāgatagarbha'' and ''dharmakāya'', problem of the pure mind and the defilements, etc. are not discussed explicitly as in the SMS. In this respect, I hesitate a bit to suppose the date of the MPS as coming after the ŚMS.
4) Inspite of frequent references to the ''icchantika'', the term ''agotra'' is not used. In general, the ''gotra'' concept is lacking in the MPS. This point is common to the AAN, and the ŚMS. (Takasaki, section 6, 9–10)
[https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/ibk1952/19/2/19_2_1024/_pdf/-char/en Read more here . . .]
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
In his comprehensive study of the development of the ''tathāgatagarbha'' teaching, J. Takasaki also deals with the sūtra which bears the name of this Mahāyāna philosophical current.[1] The ''Tathāgatagarbhasūtra'' (''TGS'') has generally been referred to as the earliest expression of this doctrine and the term ''tathāgatagarbha'' itself seems to have been coined by this very sūtra. In this paper I intend to introduce the textual history and doctrinal content of the ''TGS'' and offer some speculations concerning the possible motivations lying behind its compilation. By pointing out some interesting parallels concerning the structure and formulations in the ''Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra'' (''SP''), I shall then suggest that the ''SP'' and the ''TGS'' carry a similar compositional line. Finally, I shall determine the position and role of the ''TGS'' in Mahāyāna Buddhism as a sūtra presupposing the doctrine of the ''SP'' and providing its metaphysical foundation. (Zimmermann, introductory remarks, 143–44)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Jikidō Takasaki 高崎直道, ''Nyoraizō shisō no keisei (Formation of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory)'', Tokyo 1974 (Shunjū-sha): pp. 40–68. +
Articles/The Tathāgatôtpattisaṃbhava-nirdeśa of the Avataṃsaka and the Ratnagotravibhāga, with Special Reference to the Term Tathāgata-gotra-saṃbhava +
No abstract given. Here is the first relevant paragraph: <br><br>
The point now I am going to express here is the discovery of the use of a compound noun ' ''tathāgata-gotra-saṃbhava'' ' in the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra), which seems to be the Sanskrit original for '如來性起', one of the important terms in the philosophy of the Hua-yen (華嚴) Sect of Chinese Buddhism, but is actually not found in the Avataṃsaka, the basic scripture for that sect. (Takasaki, para. 1, 48)<br><br>
[https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/ibk1952/7/1/7_1_348/_pdf/-char/en Read more here . . . ] +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
Hardly any Sanskrit manuscripts of Buddhist scriptures remain in India today, even though such manuscripts have been discovered in surrounding regions. Tibet in particular is one of the richest treasuries of precious Sanskrit manuscripts from as early as the 8th century. These became widely known to the scholarly world in the 1930s thanks to discoveries by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana (1893-1963) in monasteries of Tsang (Tib. gTsang) province, in the Western part of Central Tibet. He had little success, however, in accessing Sanskrit manuscripts in monasteries of Ü (Tib. dBus) province, in the Eastern part of the Central Tibet among which Retreng (Tib. Rwa sgreng) monastery[1] was especially famous for its rare manuscript collection. Retreng, the former centre of the Kadam tradition located about 120 km to the Northwest of Lhasa, was founded by Dromtön Gyalwe jungne (Tib. 'Brom ston rGyal ba'i 'byung
gnas, 1008-1064) in 1056. The aim of the present paper is to trace the Sanskrit
manuscript collection once preserved at Retreng monastery by focusing on the transmission of individual manuscripts, and in the process to shed light on one historical aspect of Indo-Tibetan cross-cultural exchanges.
In the following, I shall (1) sketch the challenges faced by explorers trying to access the manuscript collection of Retreng monastery in the early 20th century, and then try to (2) trace the origin of the collection in Tibetan historical sources, (3) collect references to the manuscripts belonging to the collection, (4) draw up a title list of scriptural texts contained in it, (5) trace and identify its current location, and finally (6) evaluate the historicity of Atiśa's ownership of the manuscripts. (Kano, preliminary remarks, 82–83)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#For historical sources on Retreng, see Kano, "Rāhula," 123, n. 1. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>Philosophical discourse on Buddhist soteriology––theoretically coherent ways of talking, writing, and thinking about how to transcend suffering––is structured around the metaphor of “the path” on which a person may move along a spiritual trajectory that is, in the end, removed from the otherwise unavoidable suffering of conditioned existence. Within the Mahāyāna tradition of Buddhism, “practicing the Buddhist path” means changing from an ordinary person naturally mired in suffering into an enlightened buddha, a being composed of perfect wisdom and compassion. At the heart of this idea is a paradox playing an important role in Buddhist intellectual history: if an ordinary being is conditioned by nature, and this conditioning constitutes a state of suffering, how is it that this conditioned state of bondage can transform into the unconditioned state of freedom and enlightenment of a buddha? Resolving the apparent contradiction at the heart of this essential Buddhist teaching is “buddha-nature,” a term used to describe the basic potential said to be inherent within all beings. It is our buddha-nature, then, that makes it possible to be transformed by the path from an ordinary person into an enlightened buddha.
Within Buddhist intellectual culture, philosophers have made good use of the ambiguities connected the concept of buddha-nature to foster one of the most important sites of philosophical discourse within the Buddhist religion. The premium on rational coherence in Buddhist philosophy means interested theorists must consider whether, and to what degree, over-emphasis on the distinction between the unenlightened being and the enlightened ''buddha'' evinces a unbridgeable gap; or whether over-emphasis on the immanence of enlightenment within an ordinary being—often spoken of in genealogical or genetic terms––collapses the foundational path/fruition distinction thus rendering the notion of the path meaningless. These issues have been central to Mahāyāna for more than one thousand years; and they form the backdrop to Tsering Wangchuk’s recently published study of the Tibetan reception and interpretation of one seminal Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist treatise on the topic, ''The Uttaratantra in the Land of Snows: Tibetan Thinkers Debate the Centrality of the Buddha-Nature Treatise''.
[https://readingreligion.org/books/uttaratantra-land-snows Read more here . . .]
The word ''Tathagata'' means "he who has come in the manner in which he has come". Primarily, therefore, the word refers to a manifestation of the Buddha-principle. But, since, in the Greater Vehicle generally, phenomena are merely the phenomenalization of the Noumenon, the word refers to the Buddha-principle as well. ([https://search.informit.org/doi/pdf/10.3316/informit.676613417735334?download=true Source Accessed Aug 2, 2023]) +
It's not night, yet it’s so dark down where she is that if she were to hold up her hand in front of her face, only the light of her lamp would help her recognize her palm, the line she has followed down, and not much else. It's dark, and freezing, and though the light wetsuit she wears offers little protection against the cold, she doesn't feel it. Rather, she’s not aware of the cold, nor of time, or space. She doesn’t remember, she doesn’t think, she doesn't anticipate. All she knows is the weight of water. All she feels is its vastness and the blessed respite it gives her from her life above.
As she descends, the pressure of the ocean squeezes her lungs, the corresponding lack of air in them making her body heavier. This is how the ocean pulls her into its depths. This is how she lets it, not moving a single muscle, yet flying through the water in a perfect free fall. It’s not until she turns to begin her ascent that she exerts effort. She begins a slow and graceful dolphin kick that undulates through her body all the way to the tips of her fingers stretched overhead until, just before she reaches the surface, she lowers one hand and lets the last bit of momentum propel her back into the world of air and light.
She takes a breath, her first in a while, looks around, then briefly closes her eyes, the silence below already calling to her again. Nowhere else does she know this depth of quiet. Nowhere else does she feel so irrevocably, so unquestionably right. It's only in this world between two breaths where she knows herself as she really is: indivisible from water and everything that surrounds her. It's only in this world where she knows, without question, she is perfect, and whole.
I do not free dive. Or rather, I don't free dive in the ocean, although the concept fascinates me. It's not the length of time that some of these athletes spend under water that impresses me most (over ten minutes in some cases), or the depth they reach (almost 370 feet). What draws me to this art is the necessary focus and surrender and utter commitment to stillness it requires. After all, these are the same qualities needed to execute a different kind of plunge: the dive into awakening or the realization of our true nature.
Both as a water lover and as a meditator, I well understand the allure of the depths—the place where there's no sound, no thing; where there's nothing but being, and that, only faintly. That's why, for me, the figure of the free diver so perfectly captures the "immersion" we undergo in deep meditation. But I believe the metaphor becomes truly perfect in the instant when the diver breaks the surface of the water and is held suspended for a moment in both worlds: ocean and air—and by extension land and all it contains—or, in Buddhist terms, absolute and relative. ''That's'' the moment in which we realize our buddhanature. ([https://www.lionsroar.com/the-world-between-breaths/ Read more here])
Wǒn Buddhism is a new Buddhism created in Korea by Pak Chungbin (1891-1943) in 1916. In this piece, I offer a short introduction to the Wǒn Buddhist renovation of the traditional Buddhism and a translation of sections of ''Treatise on the Renovation of Korean Buddhism'' (韓國佛敎革新論) which emphasized the importance of Buddhism's engagement with the general public. One effort Wǒn Buddhism made for that purpose was to replace the traditional Buddha statue with a symbol of a circle so that people would not idolize the Buddha. Wǒn Buddhism is still active both in and outside of Korea. +
There were two main streams in Yogācāra Buddhism. On the one hand, there was the Old School of Sthiramati and Paramārtha. On the other hand, there was the New School of Dharmapāla and Hsuan Tsang. Due to the work of Yoshifumi Ueda and Gadjin Nagao in Japan, the distinction between Paramārtha and the Fahsiang School has been to a large extent clarified. The difference between their doctrines on Buddha-nature has been, however, relatively neglected by modern scholarship. This paper aims to clarify the distinction between Paramārtha and the Fa-hsiang's doctrines of Buddha-nature. Following Ueda, this paper will also differentiate Paramārtha's doctrine of Buddha-nature from the doctrine of the tathāgatagarbha presented in the Awakening of Faith. Especially, we will see that Buddha-nature in the Awakening of Faith and the Fa-hsiang School are committed to a version of essentialism. Finally, it will discern some interesting parallels between Paramārtha's doctrine and the perfect teachings of T'ien T'ai Buddhism. +
Articles/The Yogācārā and Mādhyamika Interpretations of the Buddha-nature Concept in Chinese Buddhism +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The idea of Buddha-nature was first made popular in China in the early fifth century with the translation of the Mahāyāna ''Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra'' (hereafter cited as ''MNS''),[1] and since then, it has remained one of the central themes of Chinese Buddhist thought. Already in the fifth and early sixth centuries, a wide variety of theories on the Buddha-nature had begun to appear, but extant information about them remains scanty and scattered.[2] It is in the writings of Ching-ying Hui-yüan (523–592),[3] the Yogācārin, and in Chi-tsang (549–623), the Mādhyamika, that we find the earliest available full-scale treatments of the subject. Hui-yüan and Chi-tsang hold a number of views in common with respect to the question of Buddha -nature:<br>
Nevertheless, given their very different theoretical upbringings and doctrinal affiliations, it is inevitable that they would carry to their explanations of the Buddha-nature concept some of the basic principles and assumptions of their respective philosophical traditions. In examining and comparing the Buddha-nature teachings of Hui-yüan and Chi-tsang our present study attempts to show how the Buddha-nature concept has come to assume divergent significances when read in the context of the two main streams of thought in Mahāyāna Buddhism: Yogācāra and Mādhyamika. (Liu, "The Yogācāra and Mādhyamika Interpretations of the Buddha-nature Concept in Chinese Buddhism," 171)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#For discussions of the leaching of Buddha-nature in the ''Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra'' (Hereafter cited as ''MNS''), consult Mou Tsung-san, ''Fo-hsing yü pan-jo'', (Taipei, 1977), vol. 1. pp. 179–182 and 189–216; and Ming-Wood Liu, "The Doctrine of the Buddha-nature in the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra," ''Journal of the lnternational Association of Buddhist Studies'' 5. no. 2 (1982): 63–94; hereafter cited as Liu, "Doctrine."
#On the early Chinese Buddha-nature theories, refer 10 Fuse Kōgaku. ''Nehanshū no kenkyū'', 2nd ed. (Tokyo, 1973), vol. 2; T'ang Yung-t'ung, ''Han Wei Liang-Chin Nan-pai-ch'ao fo-chiao shih'', 2d ed. (Peking, 1963), pp . 677–717: Mou Tsung-san, ''Fo-hsing yü pan-jo'', pp. 182–189; and Whalen Lai, "Sinitic Speculations on Buddha-nature: The Nirvāṇa School." ''Philosophy East & West'' 32, no. 2 (April 1982): 135–149.
#Posterity often refers to Hui-yüan as "Hui-yüan of the Ching-ying Temple," in order to avoid confusion with the famous Hui-Yüan of Lu-shan (344–416).
#Hui-yuan regards the idea of Buddha-nature as the fundamental principle of the one vehicle teaching. See ''Ta-ch'eng i-chang'' (''Essentials of the Mahāyāna,'' hereafter cited as ''Essentials''). Takakusu Junjirō and Watenabe Kaikyokū, eds., ''Taishō shinshū daizōkyō'', 85 vols. (Tokyo. 1924–1934), vol. 44. p. 649a. 11.27– 28, hereafter cited as T. Chi-tsang also mentions the Buddha-nature as the most important issue of the Buddha Dharma. See ''Sheng-man-ching pao-k'u, T. vol. 37. p. 85a, 1.27.
#Both Hui-yuan and Chi-tsang have compiled commentaries on the ''MNS''. Refer to the lists of works of the two masters in Ōchō Enichi, ''Chūgoku bukkyō no kenkyü'', vol. 3 (Kyoto, 1979), pp. 153–1§4. As we shall see, a large pan of their expositions of the Buddha-nature are presented as exegeses of key passages on the subject in the ''MNS''.
#Refer to ''Essentials, T''. vol. 44. p. 477c, and Chi-tsang's ''Sheng-man-ching pao=k'u'', ''T'', vol. 37, p. 67 a–b. and ''Chung-kuan-lun su'', ''T''. vol. 42. p. 153c.
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
. . . We observe that in the non-dualist philosophy of the Uttaratantra only one ontological entity, that is, the Cosmical Body of the Buddha is recognised. The substratum of everything that exists is this Essence of the Buddha. The phenomenal nature does not really exist. It appears to exist due to the force of Transcendental Illusion. Absolute Monism is also the foundation of Modern Science. What really exists is Consciousness alone which has no plural. The plurality of the cosmos is only apparent, illusory. (Goswami, concluding remarks, 281–82) +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS[1]
The theory of “Buddha Nature” or tathāgatagarbha (henceforth TG)[2] formed an important school of thought in Mahāyāna Buddhism and continues to enjoy popularity in some circles even today, although it has been dismissed by some scholars as non-Buddhist.[3] It has drawn the attention of several scholars. On the Tibetan front, David Seyfort Ruegg has through a series of publications greatly contributed to the understanding of the TG theory, particularly that of the dGe-lugs-pa tradition. A number of studies devoted to the TG theory from the perspective of the exponents of the gźan stoṅ (“extrinsic emptiness”)[4] theory have also appeared in recent years.[5] However, much remains to be explored in the works of various Tibetan authors of different traditions and periods.
One important Tibetan interpretation of TG that has been ignored so far is that of the rÑiṅ-ma school. The little attention it has received is in the context of studies pertaining to the Tibetan Madhyamaka and rDzogs-chen doctrines.[6] Can one, however, speak of a single rÑiṅ-ma interpretation of TG without the risk of oversimplification? Admittedly, not all rÑiṅ-ma scholars interpreted TG in the same way. They may differ in their erudition, style of interpretation and emphasis according to the particular time and place in which they lived. Even one and the same scholar may interpret it differently in different works, or even in different passages of the same work. Nevertheless, despite the differences in details within the various schools of Tibetan Buddhism, each of them, including the rÑiṅ-ma school, has, in my opinion, its own few archetypical intellectual figures who shape, lead and represent their respective traditions, and whose positions agree at least in substance if not always in every detail. And thus later rÑiṅ-ma-pas consider Roṅzom-pa (eleventh century), Kloṅ-chen-pa (1308-1363) and Mi-pham (1846-1912) as their three archetypical intellectual models, and their interpretations of a given doctrine as the “official” rÑiṅ-ma position.[7]
Before examining their views, I would like to briefly discuss how some of the leading rÑiṅ-ma scholars – whose interpretations of the TG doctrine are considered authoritative for the rÑiṅ-ma school – are portrayed in some secondary literature. Of the major rÑiṅ-ma scholars, Roṅ-zom-pa has been presented as clearly preferring Yogācāra–Madhyamaka by Georges Dreyfus,[8] apparently following John Pettit who merely states that Roṅ-zom-pa in his Grub mtha’i brjed byaṅ suggests that the Yogācāra–Madhyamaka is “more important” (don che ba).[9] What the closing phrase of the pertinent statement by Roṅ-zom-pa actually says is: “The treatise [or position] of Yogācāra–Madhyamaka appears (snaṅ) to be more significant.”[10] The statement gives Roṅ-zompa’s personal opinion about the then prevalent two Madhyamaka systems (i.e., Sautrāntika–Madhyamaka and Yogācāra–Madhyamaka) and not his doctrinal affiliation.[11] Kloṅ-chen-pa and Mi-pham have been portrayed as exponents of the gźan stoṅ theory. For example, according to Samten Karmay, Kloṅ-chen-pa’s stance on the TG theory is identical to that of Dol-po-pa’s.[12] Similarly, David Germano (apparently following S.K. Hookham) describes Kloṅ-chen-pa’s comments regarding the doctrine of emptiness and TG as “fairly typical” of the gźan stoṅ concepts in Tibet.[13] These scholars’ impressions are not altogether unjustified because Kloṅ-chen-pa’s evaluation of TG prima facie looks so positive that one might assume it to be identical with that of Dol-popa’s. Even amongst the traditional Tibetan scholars there were figures like Koṅ-sprul who preferred to place Kloṅ-chen-pa and Karma-pa Raṅ-byuṅ-rdo-rje (1284-1339) in the group of gźan stoṅ exponents.[14} This doctrinal agenda is still continued by living Tibetan exponents of the gźan stoṅ doctrine. A few modern scholars have designated Mi-pham as an exponent of the gźan stoṅ theory as well. However, a closer look reveals that in most cases, it is the terminology that has led to this determination; that is, the term gźan stoṅ has not necessarily been used by these scholars in a strict technical sense. One author who seems to consciously seek to prove Mi-pham a gźan stoṅ exponent is Paul Williams.[15] Leading rÑiṅ-ma teachers of more recent times have also been presented as proponents of the gźan stoṅ theory. Cyrus Stearns’ The Buddha from Dolpo, which greatly contributes to the understanding of Dol-po-pa’s life and thoughts, tends to oversimplify the rÑiṅ-ma explanation of the TG theory. For instance, Stearns, relying on verbal communication with sDe-gźung Rin-po-che (1906-1987), maintains that rÑiṅ-ma teachers such as bDud-’joms Rin-po-che (1904-1987) and Dilmgo mKhyen-brtse (1910-1991) were proponents of the gźan stoṅ doctrine.[16] I am not aware of any textual evidence that would suggest that these teachers were proponents of the gźan stoṅ doctrine, at least not in Dol-po-pa’s sense. Both bDud-’joms Rin-po-che and Dil-mgo mKhyenbrtse, in fact, speak about the oneness of emptiness and appearance or the compatibility of the Middle and Last Cycles of Buddha’s teachings.[17]
One notices a general tendency among modern scholars to associate, in addition to the above-mentioned rÑiṅ-ma teachers, rÑiṅ-ma doctrines with gźan stoṅ teachings.[18] These scholars can be grouped into three: (a) those who are obviously predisposed to the gźan stoṅ theory, (b) those who are opposed to the gźan stoṅ doctrine and (c) those who are too generous with the use of the term gźan stoṅ.[19] One of the reasons why the rÑiṅ-ma position on TG has remained somewhat elusive appears to be the complexity of the matter itself which forbids a simplistic expression of it in terms of raṅ stoṅ or gźan stoṅ. In the following passages, I shall present (a) the early Tibetan background of the TG theory, (b) a brief historical sketch and (c) a general profile of the rÑiṅ-ma interpretation of the TG doctrine, and (d) finally my assessment of the rÑiṅ-ma stance on the TG theory in India and Tibet,19 and thereby demonstrate how complex and distinctive the rÑiṅ-ma interpretation of TG actually is. Nonetheless, although I shall strive to describe their interpretation accurately, some of my observations will remain tentative. It is, however, not my intention to discuss here whether the rÑiṅ-ma interpretation is in keeping with the TG theory as originally conceived in India.
[https://www.academia.edu/471582/Wangchuk_2004_The_r%C3%91i%E1%B9%85-ma_Interpretations_of_the_Tath%C4%81gatagarbha_Theory._Wiener_Zeitschrift_f%C3%BCr_die_Kunde_S%C3%BCdasiens_48_pp._171_213_appeared_in_2005_?source=swp_share Read More Online...]
<h5>Notes</h5>
#This article is a revised and enlarged version of the paper presented at the Tenth Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies (6th-12th September 2003) held in Oxford. I owe my gratitude to a number of individuals who contributed in different ways to bringing this article to its present form. I am grateful to my wife Orna Almogi (University of Hamburg) for painstakingly going through this article at its various stages of writing. I also owe my thanks to Prof. Lambert Schmithausen (University of Hamburg), Prof. Karin Preisendanz (University of Vienna) and Dr. Anne MacDonald (University of Vienna) for their valuable suggestions. I would also like to thank Prof. David Jackson (University of Hamburg) for going through an earlier version of this article. My thanks also go to Kazuo Kano (University of Hamburg) for his proof-reading of the final version.I am, of course, solely responsible for the content of the article.
#See Michael Zimmermann’s recent study of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, the earliest exposition on Buddha Nature in India, where he presents a detailed discussion of the term tathāgatagarbha (Zimmermann 2002: 39-50). Note that I use Tathāgatagarbhasūtra as a proper noun referring to this particular sūtra and TG sūtra as a common noun referring to a sūtra which deals primarily with the tathāgatagarbha doctrine.
#Some modern Japanese scholars have openly dismissed the TG theory as non-Buddhist, an issue which lies outside my present topic. For some details, see Zimmermann 2002: 82-84.
#A tradition may for polemical reasons label a rival tradition as a proponent of gźan stoṅ (“extrinsic emptiness”) or raṅ stoṅ (“intrinsic emptiness”). However, as suggested in Kapstein 2000: 121, it would be, from a methodological point of view, sensible to refrain from using labels such as gźan stoṅ and raṅ stoṅ unless a given tradition prefers to use one of these terms to describe its own conception of emptiness. Furthermore, since we tend to be too generous with the use of the terms raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ, I would like to make clear from the very outset how rÑiṅma scholars understand these terms. For them, a given “x” (no matter what) is said to be raṅ stoṅ if it cannot withstand (bzod pa) the logical analysis of Madhyamaka reasoning. A given “x” that can withstand such a scrutiny, which is for them an impossibility, would imply its “true or hypostatic existence” (bden par grub pa). Please note that my translation of the technical term bden par grub pa or bden grub is based on Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 37 where it is explained as “a permanent substantial entity established ‘in truth’, i.e., hypostatically (bden par grub pa).” See also Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 320 and Seyfort Ruegg 2002: 296, Indices, s.v. bden grub. Hence, if the logical analysis of Madhyamaka reasoning is applied, for example, on a cow or TG, neither of them will be able to withstand the force of logical analysis. A single case of “hypostatic existence” would be sufficient to cause the collapse of the entire Madhyamaka system. Thus, from the perspective of such a scrutiny, a given “x” is always raṅ stoṅ. Further, if a given “x” is empty of a numerically different given “y,” then “x” is said to be gźan stoṅ. In this sense, a given “x” is always empty of “y” and hence always gźan stoṅ. For example, a cow is always empty of a bull and so is TG empty of adventitious impure phenomena of saṃsāra. Thus, from this viewpoint, a given “x” can be both raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ. On the other hand, for Dol-po-pa Śes-rab-rgyal-mtshan (1292-1361), the initiator of the gźan stoṅ theory, whether or not “x” is raṅ stoṅ or gźan stoṅ would depend on whether “x” is a conventional phenomenon or absolute reality. If “x” is a conventional phenomenon, it is raṅ stoṅ, and if it is absolute reality, it is gźan stoṅ. Hence, Dol-po-pa uses the expressions kun rdzob raṅ stoṅ or kun rdzob stoṅ ñid and don dam gźan stoṅ or don dam stoṅ ñid (Ri chos, p. 305.8) and states that the banal (tha śal) emptiness (i.e., itaretaraśūnyatā) belittled in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra is neither of the two (ibid., p. 154.15-155.15). In principle, Dol-po-pa could have described this itaretaraśūnyatā (“emptiness of reciprocity”) as kun rdzob gźan stoṅ in opposition to what he called kun rdzob raṅ stoṅ and don dam gźan stoṅ but has apparently, for strategic reasons, refrained from doing so. Designating itaretaraśūnyatā as kun rdzob gźan stoṅ would have been self-defeating because then he would have been forced to concede that there is at least one kind of gźan stoṅ which is unacceptable even by his own standard. Thus, he could consolidate his gźan stoṅ theory by insisting that only the absolute can be gźan stoṅ and only gźan stoṅ can be absolute (ibid., p. 308.12-15).
#See, e.g., Seyfort Ruegg 1963; Broido 1989; Hookham 1991 and 1992; Stearns 1999; Mathes 1998, 2000 and 2002. Note, however, that one may have to be careful not to anachronistically presuppose that one homogenous gźan stoṅ theory existed at every place and time in Tibet (e.g., see the Si tu’i raṅ rnam, p. 266.7-267.2; Smith 2001: 265). In fact, the comparing and contrasting of the various gźan stoṅ interpretations would shed important light on the history of the concept and might contribute to a better understanding of the evolution, continuation and reception of such concepts.
#Kloṅ-chen-pa’s discussion of TG occurring in the seventh chapter of his Tshig don mdzod is assessed in Germano 1992: 77-82. John Pettit published a translation of Mi-pham’s Ṅes śes sgron me and its commentary by ’Khro-chu ’Jam-dpal-rdo-rje (Pettit 1999a) and also included a translation of Mi-pham’s gŹan stoṅ seṅ ge’i ṅa ro, p. 359-378.4. See “The Lion’s Roar Proclaiming Extrinsic Emptiness,” in Pettit 1999a: 415-427. The recent doctoral dissertation by Karma Phuntsho also discusses Mi-pham’s stance on the TG theory (Phuntsho 2003).
#One might ask just how authoritative and representative Roṅ-zom-pa, Kloṅchen-pa and Mi-pham were and are for the rÑiṅ-ma school. Mi-pham himself considered Roṅ-zom-pa and Kloṅ-chen-pa as the most authoritative interpreters of the rÑiṅ-ma doctrine and he saw himself as the follower of the two. See the Dam chos dogs sel, p. 378.5-379.2, the dBu ma rgyan ’grel, p. 42.5, the Ṅes śes sgron me, p. 121.1-2. See also the colophon to his Roṅ zom bla rnal, p. 61.6: mtshuṅs med ma hā paṇḍi ta chen po’i rjes su ’jug par khas ’che ba mi pham rnam par rgyal bas zla tshe bzaṅ po la bris pa dge’o /. The fact that Mi-pham is responsible for the latest systematisation of the rÑiṅ-ma doctrine and that he did so primarily by relying on Roṅ-zom-pa and Kloṅ-chen-pa, is, in my view, sufficient for considering the three as representative and authoritative, as they are indeed perceived by the rÑiṅ-ma tradition today. See also Smith 2001: 16.
#See Dreyfus 2003: 331.
#Pettit 1999a: 90-91, 485, n. 315.
#lTa ba’i brjed byaṅ, p. 11.11-14: dbu ma rnam gñis kun rdzob kyi tshul mi mthun pa la / luṅ daṅ rigs pa gaṅ che ba ni rgyud daṅ mdo sde spyi’i gźuṅ daṅ / rigs pa spyi’i tshul daṅ / dbu ma’i mkhan po gźuṅ phyi mo mdzad pa’i slob dpon klu sgrub daṅ / ārya de ba’i gźuṅ ltar na yaṅ / rnal ’byor spyod pa’i dbu ma’i gźuṅ don che bar snaṅ ṅo /.
#If one wishes to speak about Roṅ-zom-pa’s doctrinal affiliation, then one can safely state that he was, in the first place, affiliated with rDzogs-chen doctrines, and that his method of establishing emptiness is closer to that of the Prāsaṅgika– Madhyamaka than to any other Buddhist system, regardless of whether or how much access he had to Prāsaṅgika texts. This becomes particularly evident in his Theg chen tshul ’jug and was also the impression of some traditional Tibetan scholars such as Mi-pham (see, for example, the Ṅes śes sgron me, p. 75.3-4, the dBu ma rgyan ’grel, p. 309.6-310.1 and the Dam chos dogs sel, p. 378.6) and Blobzaṅ-mdo-sṅags Chos-kyi-rgya-mtsho (1903-1957), a dGe-lugs-cum-rÑiṅ-ma scholar from Khams, who even went on to prove that Roṅ-zom-pa’s view is a Prāsaṅgika view (see the lTa ba’i dris lan, p. 70-71). Whether the Prāsaṅgika–Madhyamaka view was in some form present during the early propagation of Buddhism in Tibet may depend, among other things, on whether Śāntideva was indeed a Prāsaṅgika–Mādhyamika as the Tibetan tradition has perceived him to be.
#See Karmay 1988: 184-185; cf. Kapstein 1992: 23, n. 1.
#See Germano 1992: 78. See also Hookham 1991: 136, 150.
#Śes bya rgya mtsho, p. 567.8-10; Smith 2001: 338, n. 888.
#See Williams 1998 (particularly, p. 199-216). For reviews of Williams 1998, see Kapstein 2000, Tatz 2001: 78-79. A few words should be said here regarding Paul Williams’ study of “auto-perception” (raṅ rig: svasaṃvedana/svasaṃvitti) and his attempt to connect it with the controversial issue of gźan stoṅ. To agree with Mi-pham’s understanding or interpretation of “auto-perception” is one thing and to understand his position accurately is yet another matter. In my view, Williams seems to have missed the point regarding the controversial issue of “auto perception,” particularly in regard to Mi-pham’s stance on this issue. If he had studied Mi-pham’s interpretation of “means of valid cognition” (pramāṇa), he would have seen why the theory of “auto-perception” was crucial for Mi-pham. According to him, the whole theoretical structure of perception and inference developed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti would collapse without the theory of “auto-perception.” Mi-pham insists that as long as one accepts conventional valid cognition (tha sñad tshad ma), one must accept “auto-perception,” at least on the conventional level, just as one accepts “perception of others” (gźan rig). Thus, without a clear concept of Mi-pham’s background and his view on pramāṇa, any study of Mi-pham’s view on “auto-perception” is destined to be less than successful. A proper assessment of Mi-pham’s understanding of Madhyamaka would have revealed that for Mi-pham, there is no phenomenon that can withstand (bzod) the Madhyamaka logical analysis, and this includes “auto-perception.” The Prāsaṅgika–Mādhyamikas (such as Candrakīrti and Śāntideva) do refute the Yogācāra notion of “auto-perception” but, for Mi-pham, this is done so in the context of establishing absolute reality or “that which is free from manifoldness” (niṣprapañca). However, even Prāsaṅgika–Mādhyamikas should, according to Mi-pham, have no problem in accepting “autoperception” on the conventional level, just as they have no problem accepting “perception of others.” For Mi-pham, anything that can be attested by means of conventional valid cognition is acceptable on the conventional level. If a thing is impossible even on the conventional level, then it should be something like a “permanent sound” (sgra rtag pa) or a “rabbit’s horn” (ri boṅ gi rwa). But, for him, neither is “auto-perception” like a “permanent sound” nor did Candrakīrti and Śāntideva consider it to be so. However, Tsoṅ-kha-pa believed that Candrakīrti and Śāntideva held “auto-perception” to be impossible even on the conventional level. This is the point of departure of the actual issue and the controversy took place within the contextual framework of Pramāṇa and Madhyamaka, which were seen by Mi-pham as complementing and strengthening rather than as excluding or nullifying each other. Hence, bringing in rDzogs-chen and gźan stoṅ issues in this context is unwarranted. If Williams had studied rDzogs-chen or the rÑiṅ-ma interpretation of TG, he would have realised that for the rÑiṅ-ma-pas (including Mi-pham), there is a strict distinction between mind (sems) and gnosis (ye śes). The expression so sor raṅ gis rig par bya ba (pratyātmavedanīya) which actually means “accessible to personal experience only” or “to be known directly and introspectively,” an idea also acceptable to Candrakīrti or Śāntideva, has also been taken out of context by Williams. Unless we understand the methods of interpretation systematized by Mi-pham, we will never fully comprehend the way he conceives Pramāṇa, Madhyamaka, TG and rDzogs-chen or his conception of their intricate relationship with one another. And unless we have a clear picture of how Mi-pham understood raṅ rig in these systems, we shall only have a fragmentary and distorted idea of Mi-pham’s stance on raṅ rig.
#See Stearns 1999: 215, n. 137-138.
#bDud-’joms Rin-po-che explicitly states: “Thus, by clinging to and postulating one of the positions of appearance and emptiness, one would not be able to avert the erroneous (lit. “bad”) views that hold on to the extremes. Therefore, it is necessary to properly establish the sphere of reality (dharmadhātu), the union of appearance and emptiness [or] the ultimate [and] actual absolute truth, as the equality of [saṃsāric] existence and [nirvāṇic] calmness” (bsTan pa’i rnam gźag, fol. 109b2-4: des na snaṅ stoṅ gaṅ ruṅ re’i phyogs su źen ciṅ bzuṅ bas ni mthar ’dzin gyi lta ba ṅan pa bzlog mi nus pas / chos dbyiṅs snaṅ stoṅ zuṅ ’jug mthar thug rnam graṅs ma yin pa’i don dam srid źi mñam ñid du legs par gtan la ’bebs dgos śiṅ /). Dil-mgo mKhyen-brtse likewise considers the Middle and Last Cycles as complementary, for he explains absolute reality as “the ultimate of what is to be established in a way that the purports of the Middle and the Last Promulgations become entwined as one and is the finale of the ocean-like systems of sūtra and tantra” (bDud rtsi’i snaṅ ba, fol. 71a6: ’khor lo bar mtha’ dgoṅs pa gcig dril gyis gtan la dbab bya mthar thug pa mdo sṅags grub mtha’ rgya mtsho’i skyel so yin la). See also the Zil gnon dgoṅs gsal (fol. 178a6-b2) where Dil-mgo mKhyen-brtse speaks about the union (zuṅ ’jug) of the “primordial purity” (ka dag), which is equated with “freedom from the eight extremes of manifoldness” (spros pa’i mtha’ brgyad las ’das pa), and the “immanently present” (lhun grub) Buddha bodies (sku) and gnosis (ye śes) constituting the TG, and his ’Jam dpal dgoṅs rgyan (fol. 239a2-b5), where TG (among several other terms) is indicated as a synonym of the emptiness of the Middle Promulgation. See also his rDo rje mdud grol (fol. 136a5-b4 & 150a3-4) where he explains the view of Prāsaṅgika–Madhyamaka in the same way Mi-pham does.
#According to Karmay, who relied on the Italian edition (1973) of The Religions of Tibet, Tucci maintains that the doctrines of rDzogs-chen and of the Jonaṅ-pas were developed from the Hva-śaṅ’s doctrine of TG (see Karmay 1988: 87). This claim, however, does not appear in the later English translation of the book. S.K. Hookham describes rDzogs-chen as typically gźan stoṅ-type teachings and claims that giving it a raṅ stoṅ gloss is the attempt of the present Dalai Lama “to abate the long standing hostility” towards rDzogs-chen and to protect it “from the ravages of the ‘exclusive Rangtongpa’” (Hookham 1991: 16; see also Hookham 1992: 151-152, n. 4). For reviews of Hookham 1991, see Ehrhard 1993 and Griffiths 1993. See also Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 87.
#See, for example, Smith 2001: 231, where it is stated that “Mi pham’s open advocacy of the Gzhan stong was another red cape, and the bulls were not slow to charge,” and ibid., p. 327, n. 788 where both the sToṅ thun seṅ ge’i ṅa ro (p. 563-606.5) and the gŹan stoṅ seṅ ge’i ṅa ro (p. 359-378.4) are said to be works on the gźan stoṅ theory. It is of course true that Mi-pham wrote on the gźan stoṅ theory and even defended it and can be thus called a “gźan stoṅ sympathiser.” He, however, did not consider himself a gźan stoṅ pa (Dam chos dogs sel, p. 378.5-379.1: ñams mtshar tsam du bris pa yin na yaṅ / raṅ bzos bde gśegs dam chos bslad mi ruṅ / ’chal ṅag soṅ na rgyal ba rnams la bśags / raṅ bzos bśad na ci yaṅ zad mtha’ med / bdag la gźan stoṅ sgrub pa’i khur kyaṅ med / roṅ kloṅ rnam gñis klu sgrub gźuṅ daṅ mthun / dman pa bdag kyaṅ rtse gcig der ’dun kyaṅ / ma bris dbaṅ med pha rol tshig gis bskul /). Surprisingly, although the Ṅes śes sgron me is the locus classicus for the rÑiṅ-ma position regarding the issue of raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ, John Pettit, in his study of this work, seems to be uncertain about Mi-pham’s position (Pettit 1999a: 114-124). However, cf. Pettit 1999b.
Articles/The self reflexive awareness in Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology: How can the classical Buddhist science of consciousness enter into a cross cultural dialog with the science of cognition? +
The Tibetan Buddhist presentations of the self reflexive awareness, also
called apperception (Tibetan: rang rig), and the perspectives related to its
systematic training might contribute valuable information about the firstperson
perspective to the science of consciousness. This would bring new
resources to current cognition research while at the same time preserving
valuable aspects of a central factor of the Tibetan cultural heritage, namely
Tibetan Buddhism. +
According to Vajrayana Buddhism, the fast track to awakening is to look directly at your own mind and discover its true nature. Tsoknyi Rinpoche shows us how to experience two of mind’s most profound qualities. +
At first glance, one cannot find any more statements more at odds with each other than the two following emblematic stanzas. Nagarjuna's ''Mulamadhyamakakarika'' XIII.7 says:
:If there were anything nonempty,<br>there'd also be something "empty."<br>There is nothing that is nonempty,<br>so how could there be the empty?
Maitreya's ''Uttaratantra'' I.155 declares:
:The basic element is empty of the adventitious,<br>which has the characteristic of being separable.<br>It is not empty of the unsurpassable attributes,<br>having the characteristic of being inseparable
Let's explore the relationship between these stanzas, which seem to make arguments for what I'll call here "not to be" and "to be." Nagarjuna (considered to have lived during the second century CE) is of course most famous—or notorious—for his Madhyamaka approach of relentlessly nixing all phenomena, including even buddhahood. Most of his lesser-known praises also evidence this approach, discussing familiar notions such as emptiness, nonarising, lack of nature, no-self, and dependent origination. Even the ''Dharmadhatustava'' ("Praise of the Dharmadhatu"), which otherwise presents the ''dharmadhatu'' (in the sense of mind's luminous nature; often used synonymously with buddhanature) in a positive light, clarifies "not to be":
:As the dharmadhatu is not a self,<br>neither any woman nor any man,<br>free of all that could be grasped,<br>how could it be designated "self"?
…
:The dharma purifying mind the best<br>consists of the very lack of a nature
…
:But once we see the double lack of self,<br>the seeds of our existence find their end.
…
:The nonbeing of all beings—<br>this nature is its sphere.
Such verses illustrate the underlying unity of Nagarjuna's thought, as far as emptiness goes, in his Madhyamaka texts and praises.
However, some of Nagarjuna's praises express phenomena's nature and buddhahood in more affirmative terms, supporting "to be," which are absent in Madhyamaka. His ''Niruttarastava'' states:
:Your luminous singular wisdom<br>determines all knowable objects
His ''Niraupamyastava'' says:
:O flawless one, you overcame afflictions<br>at their very roots, their latent tendencies.<br>At the same time you procured the nectar<br>that is the very nature of these afflictions.
…
:Your body is eternal, immutable, peaceful,<br>consisting of the dharma, and victorious.
Nagarjuna's ''Acintyastava'' even uses several terms as synonyms of ultimate reality that have a strong ontological flavor (super "to be"!) and are common in non-Buddhist systems, but also among ''sravakas'' (disciples) and Yogacaras ("yoga practitioners"):
:It is said to be a nature of its own, the primordial nature,<br>true reality, the basic substance, and the real thing too
Nagarjuna's ''Cittavajrastava'' says:
:I pay homage to my own mind,br>that dispels the mind’s oblivion<br>by ridding the mind-sprung web<br>through this very mind as such.
…
:As it is familiarization with the vajra of mind,<br>this is what is designated "supreme awakening."
Such passages are reminiscent of the teachings on buddhanature in Maitreya's ''Uttaratantra''. The clearest example of this approach among Nagarjuna's praises is his ''Dharmadhatustava'', with its many similes of how the ''dharmadhatu''—mind's luminous nature, the sphere of ultimate reality—is obscured, but completely untainted, by adventitious stains and can be revealed. ([https://www.lionsroar.com/to-be-or-not-to-be-be-a-buddha/ Read more here])
Articles/Towards an Understanding of Tathāgatagarbha Interpretation in Tibet with Special Reference to the Ratnagotravibhāga +
This essay seeks to highlight a number of the complexities underlying the hermeneutical process of ''tathāgatagarbha'' interpretation in Tibet based on the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' (henceforth: ''RGV''). This is followed by an overview of literature that might help illuminate this field, by providing a provisional list of Tibetan commentaries explicitly based on the ''Ratnagotravibhāga''. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
This new translation is the work of four leading scholars in the field—John Jorgensen, Dan Lusthaus, John Makeham, and Mark Strange—who have been writing prolifically on Buddhist and East Asian philosophy and are thus ideal translators for the treatise. The translation is the product of a long process of concerted effort, starting as a workshop exercise in 2012, growing over the years to incorporate researches from various perspectives, and eventually appearing in 2019 as the second of the Oxford Chinese Thought series, a series aimed to introduce the riches of Chinese thought to the West.
Read more [https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=55295 here]. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
In the tradition of Buddhism which has been transmitted to China and Japan, we can see two basically different streams of thought in the Yogācāra philosophy. Although this fact is well-known among Japanese scholars, it does not seem to be widely known among American, European, and Indian scholars. In order to understand correctly the Yogācāra philosophy, however, the clear understanding of these two streams of thought, their mutual differences, and their relation to the theories of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu is indispensable.<br> One of these two streams was introduced into China by Hsuang-tsang. Although the thought of this stream can be known through the works of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu as translated by Hsuang-tsang, it can be known in its most all-inclusive and systematic form in the ''Ch'eng wei shih lun'' of Dharmapāla.[1] This stream of thought continued from the time of Hsuang-tsang to the present day. Happily, it did not die out in China and Japan where its study was continued and where present-day scholars are well acquainted with it. There is no unclear point as regards the more important aspects of this stream of thought.<br> The other stream of thought, represented by the works of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu as translated by Buddhasānta, Bodhiruci, Paramārtha, Dharmagupta, Prabhākaramitra, and others, was introduced into China before the time of Hsuang-tsang. The translations of these masters, unlike those of the other stream, were not widely studied and the actual nature of its thought is difficult to determine. With the exception of Paramārtha, there are only one or two translated works of each of these masters. And, even in the study of their works, it is not possible to determine the differences from the other stream of Yogācāra thought.<br> Paramārtha, however, translated a great many of the important works of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu. And, with the discovery and publication of the Sanskrit texts, eminent scholars of Japan have done comparative studies based on the Sanskrit original and the Chinese and Tibetan translations in order to determine the extent to which the stream of thought introduced into China before the time of Hsuang-tsang differs from that stream which was introduced by Hsuang-tsang. The results of this research clearly show that there is a fundamental difference between the theory introduced by Paramārtha and that of Hsuang-tsang. The importance of this difference lies in the fact that the theories introduced by Paramārtha and Hsuang-tsang are both said to be the theories of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu. If the theories of Paramārtha and Hsuang-tsang are fundamentally different, the problem arises as to which transmission is faithful to the theories of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu; or, if they are both separate traditions, what was the theory of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu? This has been the focus of attention of present-day Japanese scholars doing research in the Yogācāra philosophy. As the studies of the Yogācāra philosophy by Western and Indian scholars have been lacking in knowledge of these two streams of thought, their interpretations of the central problems of the Yogācāra philosophy have been ambiguous and often erroneous and do not show a clear understanding of it. Their understanding of the Yogācāra philosophy is not in accord with the theory of either one of these two streams of thought. And, because the differences between their interpretations and the two streams of thought are not clear, one cannot find a clear-cut understanding of the theories of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu.<br> It is my aim in this paper to present the differences of interpretation of these two streams of thought relating to the theories of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu which were transmitted to China and to examine the question of which of the two streams is faithful to the thought of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu. As this paper cannot possibly deal with the whole of the Yogācāra philosophy, it will deal with only a few of the essential points. (Ueda, preparatory remarks, 155–56)
[https://www.scribd.com/document/165746617/Two-Main-Streams-of-Thought-in-Yogacara-Philosophy-YogacaraYoshifumi-Ueda Read more here . . .]
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Dharmapāla and others, ''Ch'eng wei shih lun'',<sup>P</sup> Taishō-Daizōkyō, Vol. 31, No. 1585. French translation: "''Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi''," by Dharmapāla, translated from Chinese into French by La Vallée Poussin (Paris, 1928-1929).
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
In Giuseppe Tucci’s collection of Sanskrit manuscripts and photographed materials, a set of positive prints of texts filmed at Ñor monastery contains a codex unicus of
Vairocanaraksita’s (fl. 11th/12th century) Yogācāra/Tathāgatagarbha commentarial
works:<br><br>
1. ''Viṃśikāṭikāvivṛti'' (glosses on Vasubandhu’s ''Viṃśikāvṛtti'' and Vinītadeva’s ''Viṃśikāṭīkā'');<br>
2. ''Triṃśikāṭīkāvivṛti'' (glosses on Sthiramati’s ''Triṃśikābhāṣya'' and Vinītadeva’s ''Triṃśikāṭīkā'');<br>
3. ''Madhyāntavibhāgakatipayapadavivṛti'' (glosses on Vasubandhu’s ''Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya''<br> and Sthiramati’s ''Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā'');<br>
4. ''Mahāyānottaratantraṭippaṇī'' (glosses on the ''Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā'');<br>
5. *''Sūtrālaṃkāravivṛti'' (glosses on Vasubandhu’s ''Sūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya'')<sup>2</sup> and<br>
6. *''Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavivṛti'' (glosses on Vasubandhu’s ''Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavṛtti'').<sup>3</sup><br><br>
V. Gokhale (1978) was the first to study these works, using Saṅkṛtyāyana’s negatives and the prints made from them, which have been preserved in Patna. He reported titles of the six works, without, however, going into detail because of the poor quality of the images. Subsequently the details of the works remained unknown for a long time, and no complete editions have been published. To be sure, Zuiryū Nakamura edited the text of folios 9''v''<sub>2</sub>–14''v''<sub>7</sub> of the ''Mahāyānottaratantraṭippaṇī'' (the text of folios 15''r''<sub>1</sub>–17''r''<sub>5</sub> remains to be edited);<sup>4</sup> and Mathes in his translation of the ''Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavṛtti'' referred to some sentences from the *''Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavivṛti''.<sup>5</sup> I myself also edited a small portion of the *''Sūtrālaṃkāravivṛti''.<sup>6</sup><br>
The present paper contains an ''editio princeps'' of the ''Viṃśikāṭīkāvivṛti'' and *''Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavivṛti''. Critical editions of the other three works are under preparation: Francesco Sferra is preparing a critical edition of the ''Madhyāntavibhāgakatipayapadavivṛti'', and I am preparing critical editions of the ''Mahāyānottaratantraṭippaṇī'', the ''Triṃśikāṭīkāvivṛti'' and the *''Sūtrālaṃkāravivṛti'' for publication. (Kano, introduction, 343-44)<br><br>
<h5>Notes</h5>
#[From title] I am grateful to Prof. Francesco Sferra and Prof. Harunaga Isaacson for a number of text-critical suggestions, and Prof. Lambert Schmithausen for permitting me to use his preliminary handwritten transcription of Vairocanarakṣita’s *''Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavivṛti'', and also for his very valuable suggestions concerning that text. I am indebted, too, to Mrs. Bärbel Mund of Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen for giving me the permission to use photographic images of the Göttingen Collection, to Dr. Diwakar Acharya for his help with deciphering barely legible letters in the manuscript, to Prof. Toru Yagi for his very valuable suggestions regarding Vairocanarakṣita’s grammatical explanations, to Dr. Martin Delhey, Dr. Kengo Harimoto and Dr. Koichi Takahashi for reading my draft and making many valuable suggestions, and to Prof. Robert Kritzer and Philip Pierce for their English proofreading.
#The title of the work is not ascertainable from the colophon: ''sūtrālaṃkāraḥ samāptaḥ'' II II ''kṛtiḥ paṇḍitavairocanarakṣitapādānaṃ'' II II. Other possible Sanskrit titles are ''Sūtrālaṃkāravivṛti'', ''Sūtrālaṃkārakatipayapadavivṛti'', or ''Sūtrālaṃkāraṭippaṇī''.
#The title of the work is not ascertainable from the colophon: ''dharmadharmatāvibhā''[''gaḥ'']. The two illegible ''akṣaras'' after °''vibhā'' in the bottom margin are probably ''gaḥ''. Cf. the colophon to the *''Sūtrālaṃkāravivṛti''. One might expect something like ''Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavivṛti'', ''Dharmadharmatāvibhāgakatipayapadavivṛti'' (as suggested by Gokhale 1978: 638), or ''Dharmadharmatāvibhāgaṭippaṇī''. In Kano 2005: 142, I referred to this work under the title “Dharmadharmatāvibhā''[''gaṭīkā''],” supplying the three ''akṣaras'' enclosed by square brackets. However, in view of its scope, it can hardly be a ''ṭīkā'', a type of commentary typically more extensive in nature.
#For his edition, see Nakamura 1985. For studies of this text, see Nakamura 1980, 1982, 1992. Unfortunately, Nakamura’s edition contains many errors (around 190). It is remarkable that his edition shares some notable errors with Jagdishwar Pandey’s modern transcription preserved at Göttingen under the shelf-mark Xc14/90 (which contains a transcription of the full text of the ''Mahāyānottaratantraṭippaṇī''); we can deduce that one of the two was made on the basis of the other. In my unpublished dissertation (Kano 2006b), I have critically edited the whole text of the ''Mahāyānottaratantraṭippaṇī'' and presented a list of corrections to Nakamura’s edition.
#See Mathes 1996: 37, 115-135.
#The text of folio 17''r''>sub>7</sub>–''v''<sub>6</sub> of this work is edited in Kano 2006a: 92, n. 40.
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
For a short but brilliant analysis of the positions of Dol po pa and Śākya mchog Idan we are very much indebted to the Jonang master Tāranātha, who is considered to be a follower and proponent of Dol po pa's doctrine. In each of the ''Twenty-one Differences with regard to the Profound Meaning'' a fictive initial statement of Śākya mchog Idan is followed by a similarly fictive reply of Dol po pa, Tāranātha being, of course, well aware of the fact that this is all ahistorical.[1] To be sure, it is not possible to establish Śākya mchog ldan's or Dol po pa's views on the basis of this short text alone, but it does sharpen our awareness of the subtle aspects of ''gźan stoṅ'' when studying the bulky and often not very systematic works of these masters. Furthermore, critically evaluating these doctrinal differences against the background of pertinent Indian texts in such traditions as the Madhyamaka, Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha promises to be a second interesting task. Both are, however, beyond the scope of this paper. Such an evaluation will, however, be undertaken with regard to the different presentations of ''trisvabhāva'' as an example of how one might proceed.<br> Tāranātha begins his somewhat delicate task of comparing the two masters Dol po pa and Śākya mchog ldan in a conciliating manner, by explaining that both supposedly see what is profound reality and hence should not have different thoughts about it. It is only in order to accommodate the different needs of their disciples that they enunciate variant views. Even though the essential ''gźan stoṅ'' view and meditation practices of both masters are the same, there are a lot of minor differences regarding tenets (''grub mtha''') that arise when formulating the view on the level of apparent truth.[2]<br> The first four of the twenty-one points address differences in the exegesis of the Madhyamaka and Maitreya texts which are considered to be commentaries on the Buddha's intention underlying the second and third turnings of the "Wheel of the Dharma" (''dharmacakra'').[3] Points 5-8 embody Śākya mchog ldan's and Dol po pa's different understanding of non-dual wisdom. In points 9-16, their views on the ''trisvabhāva'' theory are distinguished. In a related topic, Tāranātha also elaborates the different understandings of self-awareness (point 11), entities and non-entities, and conditioned and unconditioned phenonema (all in point 13). Next, our attention is drawn to different ways of relating the four noble truths with the apparent and ultimate (point 17). The last four points deal with the two masters' views on the Buddha-nature. (Mathes, "Tāranātha's 'Twenty-One Differences with Regard to the Profound Meaning'," 294–95)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#Taranatha: "Zab don ñer gcig pa", 792,1. 4.
#These remarks should not be taken too seriously, though. 'Ba' ra ba rGyal mtshan dpal bzaṅ (1310-1391) launches into his "Chos rje rnam gñis kyi dgoṅs bśad ñi ma'i 'od zer" (496-8) by stating, in a similar way, that Dol po pa and Bu ston (sic) are both omniscient and must see the same reality, but teach it in various ways with hidden intentions.
#The Indo-Tibetan exegetical traditions summarize the teachings of the Buddha in three circles or "[turnings of the] Wheel of the Dharma" (''dharmacakra''). See Mathes 1996: 155.
[https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jiabs/article/view/8952/2845 Read more here . . .]
V
Many people find the Vajrayana teachings strange and confusing, but they offer a direct path to enlightenment. In this teaching, the late Karma Kagyu master Khenpo Karthar Rinpoche — who died on October 6, 2019 — presents a clear explanation of Vajrayana and its main practices of generation and completion, based on a song by the great seventeenth-century yogi, Karma Chakme Rinpoche. +
W
Articles/Was Mi-pham a Dialectical Monist? On a Recent Study of Mi-pham's Interpretation of the Buddha-Nature Theory +
Douglas S. Duckworth’s ''Mipam on Buddha-Nature'' characterises Mi-pham’s (1846–1912) philosophy (or philosophical approach) as "dialectical monism." We should instead characterise it with a neo-Sanskritism, namely, "Yuganaddhavāada" (''zung 'jug tu smra ba''), lest we get bogged down by the usage of the term "dialectical monism." While Duckworth is absolutely right in identifying Mi-pham as a proponent of "dialectical monism," there is still a need to define and refine our understanding of Mi-pham's position, offer plausible explanations for it, and present various argumentative strategies employed for it by Mi-pham, all based on critically assessed textual sources that engage the idea of "unity" (''zung 'jug'': ''yuganaddha''). +
Articles/We Are All Gzhan stong pas: Reflections on the Reflexive Nature of Awareness: A Tibetan Madhyamaka Defence by Paul Williams +
The present review article discusses aspects of Paul Williams' excellent and highly recommended book, which focuses on the question of "reflexive awareness" (Tib. ''reng rig''), Skt. ''svasaṃvittiḥ'', ''svasaṃvedana'') in Tibetan Mādhyamika thought. In particular, I am concerned with his characterization of ''so so rang rig ye shes'' and its relation to Rdzogs-chen teaching, and his notions of the ''gzhan stong'' doctrine and its place in the intellectual life of Far-eastern Tibet. My critical remarks on these topics are in many respects tentative, and I would welcome correspondence about them. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:<br><br>
According to the ''Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra'', an ''icchantika'' (Tib. '' 'dod chen pa''), therefore, is a monk who, claiming (or fancies; ''icchanti'', Tib. '' 'dod pa'') himself to be an Arhat, rejects the teaching of the ''Vaipulya'' — namely the Mahāyāna ''Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra'' itself— as told by ''Māra''. Judging from the above-cited descriptions: "he ... also looks like a Mahāsattva," "'The Blessed One is impermanent. The ''Dharma'' and the ''Saṅgha'' will also become extinct. Such signs of the extinction of the Good ''Dharma'' are also evident.' — this is explained clearly in the (true) Mahāyāna (scriptures)," we may assume that ''icchantikas'' were monks who, following the traditional Mahāyāna teachings, did not approve (''icchanti'') of the then emerging theory of the eternity of the ''Tathāgata'' — which is the main theme of the Mahāyāna ''Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra''.<br> The word ''icchantika'' is either formed from the present active participle ''icchant''- with the suffix -''ka'', as Edgerton suggested, or derived from ''icchā'' + ''anta''. As we have seen above, the word ''icchant''-('' 'dod pa'') has the meanings "fancying; claiming, maintaining; admitting, approving of" in addition to its usual definition "desiring." Accordingly, the noun ''icchā'' has the meaning "assertion, claim" in addition to "desire." What is meant by ''icchantika'' is, then, probably "one who claims." When a monk—who claimed (''icchati'') to be an "Arhat" also was revered as an "Arhat" or a "Mahasattva" by his followers and thus, was an authority and spiritual leader of the Buddhist community—did not recognise (''nêchanti'') new ideas such as the eternity of the ''Tathāgata'' and the ''tathāgatagarbha'' theory as the Buddha's teachings, then the newly-risen, would-be "''Vaipulya'' teachings" (probably the older stratum of the Mahāyāna ''Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra'') may have been branded as unorthodox. That is what was meant by the word "rejection" (''pratikṣepa''; Tib. ''spong ba''). If a simple, common monk rejects a new theory, his voice may not reach anybody. Being rejected and condemned by none other than the authorities of the Buddhist communities, those who advocated new ideas and their followers must have faced a crisis. Then, they may have condemned the authoritative monks repeatedly as being "arrogant," "evil" and "irredeemable," as well as calling them, in a derogatory term, ''icchantika'' ("one who claims [to be an authority]") in the newly-added chapters of the ''Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra''. However, if one looks at the descriptions cited above from a different point of view, those monks, who were condemned as ''icchantikas'' in the "Sutra," might have been respected conservative monks who stayed with the traditional (Mahāyāna) Buddhist teachings, while opposing new ideas concerning Buddhahood. They might have been so-called "fundamentalists" but never "evil monks."<br> Those, who composed the later stratum of the Mahāyāna ''Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra'', were probably the first to label those monks, who did not approve of the eternity of the ''Tathāgata'' and the ''tathāgatagarbha'' theory, as ''icchantikas''. Following in the wake of the ''Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra'', the composers of later Buddhist texts, putting forth the same ''tathāgatagarbha'' theory, continued to condemn those who did not approve of their theory, regarding them as ''icchantika''. Claiming that their texts were part of the "true Mahāyāna" tradition, the former condemned the latter as rejecters of the "Mahāyāna" teachings.<br> However, much later, the word ''icchantika'' seems to have come to be interpreted, not as meaning "one who claims" but "one who desires (transmigration)." This is clearly seen in the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'':<br> p. 28, l. 14f. ''ye nâpi saṃsāram icchanti yathêcchantikā'' ( "They are not seeking for the<br> Phenomenal Life as the Icchantikas do, ... ")<br> p. 29, l. 1f. ''tatra ye sattvā bhavâbhilāṣiṇa icchantikās tanniyatipatitā ihadhārmikā evôcyante<br> mithyātvaniyataḥ satttvarāśir iti'' ("And here, those people who cling to this worldly life,<br> i.e. the Icchantikas and those who, though belonging to this Our Religion, have<br> definitely fallen into the former's way are called the group of people who confirm in<br> the wrong way.")<br> p. 31, l. 8f. ''tatra mahāyānadharmapratihatānām icchantikānām aśucisamsārâbhirati-<br> viparyayeṇa bodhisattvānāṃ mahāyānadharmâdhimuktibhāvanāyāḥ śubhapāramitâdhigamaḥ<br> phalaṃ draṣṭavyam'' ("Here, being opposite to the taking of delight in the 'impure'<br> Phenomenal Life by the Icchantikas who have hatred against the Doctrine of Great<br> Vehicle, it should be understood that the acquisition of the Supreme Purity is the<br> result of 'Practice of the Faith in the Doctrine of Great Vehicle' by the Bodhisattvas.")<br>The shift in meanings of the word ''icchantika'' from "one who claims" to "one who desires (transmigration)," may indicate the actual disappearance of those, who had disapproved of the ''tathāgatagarbha'' theory, at least from the vicinity. It may further suggest that followers of the theory might have increased in number, making them much more self-confident of their theory; or that the theory itself might have come to be fully recognised as a genuine Mahāyāna teaching. (Karashima, "Who Were the ''Icchantikas?''", 76–79)
*Author's notes have been omitted<br><br>
To read this whole article, see [http://iriab.soka.ac.jp/en/publication/aririab.html Vol. X of The Annual Report of The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology at Soka University]
Sometime in the 1990s, I attended a Zen retreat with Harada Sekkei Roshi at the Mahabodhi Society in Bangalore. It was a rare, perhaps even unique, event at that time where Buddhists from all three main traditions of East Asian, Tibetan, and Theravada Buddhism came together for a Zen retreat. As we sat around the Roshi to begin the first session, he stated in a loud and solemn voice: “You are all buddhas.” The statement, telling from the manner it was delivered, was meant to be rousing in a Zen sort of way, and it did stir some thoughts in the audience. Most participants in the retreat were Theravada members of the Mahabodhi Society, and they clearly appeared bemused. During the break, one member privately protested, saying that such a claim is a Mahayana aberration and that all ordinary beings cannot surely be Buddhas. Being a follower of orthodox Theravada, he found the claim preposterous and provocative.
I was at that time a young monk engaged in studies on Buddhist hilosophy, particularly the course on the Ultimate Continuum, the main book on buddhanature in Tibetan Buddhism, at Ngagyur Nyingma Institute, Mysore. The concept of a universal buddhanature is central to Tibetan Buddhist theory and practice and a very common topic in monastic education. I was familiar with the idea of buddhanature as a capacity for enlightenment and freedom present in all beings; the Nyingma and Kagyu traditions in which I received most of my training likened buddhanature to the bright sun that is temporarily obscured by clouds of samsara. When the clouds are fully cleared, the magnificence of the sun would become manifest in its full form. All Buddhist endeavors—from study, debates, rituals, art, yoga, chanting, and visualization to quiet meditation—are seen as paths to remove adventitious obscurations and reveal our true nature. Thus, the statement did not surprise me or have the intended effect of shock therapy that the Zen master perhaps hoped to achieve. ([https://www.lionsroar.com/why-buddhanature-matters/ Read more here])
This article aims at providing an outlook on the possible origin of tathāgatagarbha theory with a special reference to its relation to the soteriological and formal solutions found in the ''Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra'' and ''Avataṃsaka-sūtra''. Through comparative textual analysis, the first work of this tradition, ''Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra'', is shown as a text providing a metaphysical foundation for the postulate of universal Buddhahood posited by the ''Lotus Sutra''. The realization of this postulate was possible through the implementation of 'Buddha-wisdom' (''tathāgatajñāna'') — a quality intrinsic to all living beings, which comes from the Tathāgata's all-encompassing compassion — taken from the "Manifestation of the Tathāgata" chapter of ''Avataṃsaka''. By combining these influences the ''Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra'' is presented as a culmination of an important soteriological trend of the early Mahāyāna, and at the same time the starting point for an influential 'buddha-nature' tradition. ([https://scholar.google.com.ua/citations?user=p1gfBrcAAAAJ&hl=uk#d=gs_md_cita-d&u=%2Fcitations%3Fview_op%3Dview_citation%26hl%3Duk%26user%3Dp1gfBrcAAAAJ%26citation_for_view%3Dp1gfBrcAAAAJ%3Au5HHmVD_uO8C%26tzom%3D420 Source accessed June 26, 2020]) +
Articles/Wǒnhyo's Conception of Buddha-Nature in the Thematic Essential of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra +
Wǒnhyo interprets Buddha-nature as nature of One Mind (一心). He insists that the essence of Buddha-nature is precisely the same as essence of One Mind. The essence of One Mind is only realized by the Buddha. Hence it is explained that this Mind is Buddha-nature. Wǒnhyo himself considers Buddha-nature to be the One Mind, since the essence of One Mind leaves all extremes far off, has no corresponding place and thus corresponds to every place. The essence of One Mind transcends and embraces cause and effect. Wǒnhyo interprets Buddha-nature
as having the same meaning i.e. One Mind, in all Buddhist scriptures. His unique ''Hoe'tong'' (會通, harmonization) theory is focused on harmonizing different doctrines and sects within the same Buddhist Teaching. He combined all the different Buddhist theories into One Flavor (一味). Wǒnhyo did not reject the existing assertions on Buddha-nature but integrated them in a system elucidating the process of One Mind. +
Z
Articles/Zhanran's Arguments in Support of His Buddha-Nature Theory, as Presented in His Diamond Scalpel Treatise: Starting from an Analysis of the Title +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
The Sinicised schools of Buddhism – such as Tiantai 天台 – are deeply rooted in the Indian Buddhist teachings, but at the same time, their masters reinterpreted the inherited teachings, and attributed new meanings to the translated texts, by shifting the emphasis, changing the point of views, etc. Through the process of interpreting and reinterpreting, some new theories emerged having diametrically different ideas from those of the original Buddhist teachings. All of them are original and intriguing examples of a Chinese way of thinking and worth of being subjects of a more detailed examination. When creating commentaries to the Indian ''sūtras'' and treatises, the Chinese masters elaborated their own theories. Rather than the word by word, sentence by sentence type of commentaries, these commentaries attempting to explain and expand the 'subtle' meaning of a parable, a symbol or certain characters, proved to be more adequate to the purpose of elaborating original, ingenious ideas, reaching far beyond the original textual meaning, and the presupposed intention of the author or translator.[1] A typical example of such approach is the ''magnum opus'' of the ''de facto'' founder of the Tiantai school, Zhiyi 智顗 (538–597), ''The Subtle Meaning of the Lotus Sūtra'' (''Miaofa lianhua jing xuanyi'' 妙法蓮華經玄義; T33: 1716), where the author presents the basic tenets of the Tiantai school, in the form of explaining the character 'miao' 妙 (meaning 'subtle' or 'wonderful'), the very first character of the most well-known Chinese translation of the ''Lotus Sūtra''.[2] In the eyes of the author (and his followers), this single character offers sufficient basis to expound his novel insights, in a way that, despite their novelty, are at the same time linked to the Buddhist tradition. A substantial part of the lengthy commentary is centered on the 'explanation' of the term 'subtle'. According to Zhiyi, this notion is the best expression of ultimate reality. 'For Chih-i the word 'subtle' symbolizes and summarizes that which is beyond conceptual understanding, and thus it is the word most appropriate to describe reality, which is ultimately indescribable.'[3]<br> From this, we can draw the conclusions that for a Tang Dynasty (618–907) monk, trained on the teachings and traditions of a Sinitic school of Buddhism, the title of a Buddhist writing is highly important, for mainly two reasons: (1.) it can bear the very essence, the 'subtle' meaning of the whole work, and (2.) it can serve as an anchor, that bounds it to the 'original' Buddhist teachings, serving as a means of legitimatisation, at the same time. These two aims can be detected in Zhanran's[4] 湛然 (711−782) choice of the title for his ''Diamond Scalpel'' (''Jin’gang bei'' 金剛錍; T46:1932) treatise. The ''Diamond Scalpel'' treatise, in one fascicle, written in his old age, is a relatively short work, compared to his lengthy commentaries, yet well deserves to be considered his most creative, genuine work. The main theme of the treatise is the Tiantai interpretation of the teaching of Buddha-nature, as inherently including insentient realm, as well as all sentient beings. While expounding the topic, and presenting his arguments, the main tenets of the Tiantai school emerge one after the another, offering the reader a complete picture of the self and the world, suffering and the ways to liberation, etc. – i.e. problems of utmost importance for a Buddhist practitioner –, as seen by a Tang Dynasty Buddhist monk. At a first reading, the title of the treatise does not seem to tell us a lot about its content, but taking a closer look, and applying a more careful, meticulous examination, we find that Zhanran's choice of title must have been the result of a thoughtful consideration, for it perfectly suites the above mentioned two criteria. Following Zhiyi’s legacy, Zhanran chooses a title, which 'symbolizes and summarizes' the main issues to be discussed in his treatise. More precisely, first of all, it hides an allusion to a simile from a mahāyāna ''sūtra'' (thought to render the words of the Buddha), and thus anchors, bounds the whole work to the 'original' teachings of the Buddha, and secondly, after decoding the symbols and references, and interpreting them in the light of Tiantai philosophy, we find that these three characters can truly be regarded the quintessence of the work, the very argument in support of the theory of Buddha-nature of the insentient. Zhanran, following the example of his great predecessor, Zhiyi, expounds and argues based on the most important texts and tenets of mahāyāna Buddhism, while interpreting, reinterpreting, and often furnishing these with new, ingenious meanings.<br> First, we are going to examine the provenance and possible interpretations of the title – i.e. the context in which the basic notions appear, before Zhanran's time –, Zhanran's own explanation of the title, i.e. the very first paragraph of his work, and further interpretations of the title (and its explanation) found in later commentaries, written to the treatise, by Tang and Song Dynasty monks. Through this one, particular example we can get a glimpse into the complex process of how Chinese monks interpreted and reinterpreted the texts inherited from India, the way in which through focusing on, and/or consciously selecting certain motifs, similes or even terms, embellished these with new meanings, which were further used as tools to prove their own ideas and theories, as if these were identical with the original teachings of Buddha Śākyamuni. Secondly, we are going to examine the most important arguments Zhanran is using to prove his theory about the Buddha-nature of the insentient. I will argue that these arguments can be grouped around two key concepts, already concealed within the title. (Pap, "Zhanran’s Arguments in Support of his Buddha-Nature Theory," 129–130)
<h5>Notes</h5>
#For a comprehensive study of Chinese Buddhist commentaries, see: Hamar 2003: 259-271.
#The most popular translation of the ''Lotus Sūtra'' (''Saddharmapuṇḍarīka'') is Kumārajīva’s (344–413 / 409) work, entitled ''Miaofa lianhua jing'' (T09: 262), literally '' 'The Lotus Sūtra' of the Subtle Dharma’ ''.
#Quoted from: Swanson 1989: 14.
#Zhanran was the ninth patriarch of Tiantai school, according to the traditional lineage, conferring the title of the first patriarch to the Indian Nāgārjuna (2nd Century AD). Zhanran was the second most influential figure of the school, after the ''de facto'' founder, Zhiyi, to whom the Tang Dynasty renaissance of Tiantai philosophy is credited. Following Zhiyi’s footsteps, he further elaborated the system of classification of teachings (''panjiao'' 判教), and entering into debate with influential scholar monks of his time, brought forth a solid argumentation in favor of the theory of the insentient world having Buddha-nature. For Zhanran’s life see: Penkower pp. 10-141.
Ś
The first part of this article will shed light on the unique role played by the 9th Je khenpo Śākya Rin chen (1709/10-1759) of Bhutan in the preservation of Śākya mchog ldan's texts in Bhutan. Not only did Śākya Rin chen effectuate the physical preservation of the actual texts, but he also promoted their study in the monastic colleges, thereby enfusing vitality into the tradition of understanding their meaning and ensuring the continuity of this transmission of knowledge.<br> The second part will demonstrate the immense value of the preservation of these texts by giving an example of Śākya mchog ldan's writings, in the form of an English translation of his ''Rgyud bla ma'i rnam bshad sngon med nyi ma'',[1] a commentary on The ''Rgyud Blama''- also known as The ''Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra''- in which he outlines his hermeneutical schema for understanding the Buddha nature.<br> The third part will list the titles contained in Śākya mchog ldan's Collected Works reproduced and published in Bhutan in 1975 according to the copies kept at The National Library, Thimphu, including provisional references of published studies in English that have dealt with them.<br>
<h5>Notes</h5>
#In Śākya mchog ldan's Collected Works, '' 'dzam gling sangs rgyas bstan pa'i rgyan mchog yongs rdzogs gnas lngar mkhyen pa'i pandita chen po gser mdog pan chen shākya mchog ldan gyi gsung 'bum legs bshad gser gyi bdud rtsi'', vol. 13, Thimphu 1975. +
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:
This paper is being presented as part of a panel on the topic of Reformulations of Yogācāra in
Tibet. Particularly, it relates to Tibetan commentary on ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' (''AA'') I:39, in
which it is taught that the foundation (''pratiṣṭhā'') for religious practice is the ''dharmadhātu'' and
that since the ''dharmadhātu'' is undifferentiated (''asaṃbhedā''), there are ultimately no distinct
''gotras'' corresponding to the three vehicles. This teaching is usually interpreted as a
Mādhyamaka justification for one final vehicle, as opposed to the three-vehicle theory,
attributed to Cittamātra/Vijñaptimātratā, and which is closely related to the doctrine of three
gotras found in sutras such as ''Saṃdhinirmocana'' and ''Laṅkāvatāra'' and śāstras such as
''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra''. However, there are some Tibetan writers outside the influential
Gelug tradition who see the equation of ''gotra'' with ''dharmadhātu'' as an essentially Yogācāra
doctrine. This alternative viewpoint implies that Yogācāra and Cittamātra are not, as is
commonly held to be the case, the same thing and brings to the fore the question of whether
Yogācāra is better understood as a tradition that transcends traditional doxographic categories.
Through an analysis of Śākya-mchog-ldan’s explanation of ''AA'' I:39, which includes a
differentiation of two other terms that are also often held to be synonymous, namely ''gotra''
and buddha-essense (or ''tathāgatagarbha''), I aim to highlight some of the ways in which his
‘reformulation’ of Yogācāra implies a reformulation of certain Cittamātra doctrines. Finally, I
conclude the paper with a brief discussion on the extent to which doxographical discourse
both restricts and allows for the formulation of an individual point of view. (Gilks, introduction, 1) +
