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|content=Here you will find a catalog of articles related to buddha-nature and tathāgatagarbha theory from both general print and digital magazines and academic sources related to all major Buddhist traditions.
 
|content=Here you will find a catalog of articles related to buddha-nature and tathāgatagarbha theory from both general print and digital magazines and academic sources related to all major Buddhist traditions.
 
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Latest revision as of 12:09, 31 January 2023

316 Articles

Here you will find a catalog of articles related to buddha-nature and tathāgatagarbha theory from both general print and digital magazines and academic sources related to all major Buddhist traditions.

Article
"Tathāgata" in Haribhadra's Commentary
No abstract given. Here is the first relevant paragraph:

From ancient times, the origin of "tathāgata", which has been usually translated as 如 來 (one who comes thus), is not unknown. This has been used as the title of Buddha, chiefly in Buddhism from the start.
      Now, I will consider the meaning of "tathāgata" in the Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñāpāramitā-vyākhyā of Haribhadra (ed. by Wogihara) (W.). This includes the Aṣṭasāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra (As.), Maitreya's Abhisamayālaṃkāraśāstra-kārikā (A.) which is a summary of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra (P.), and Haribhadra's commentary which is based on the P. and the As. Accordingly at first, I point out sentences of "tathāgata", which I think as the etymological explanations, and then survey the character of it. (Mano, "'Tathāgata' in Haribhadra's Commentary," 22)
Mano, Ryūkai. "'Tathāgata' in Haribhadra's Commentary." Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies) 16, no. 2 (1968): 22–28.
Article
"Zen is Not Buddhism": Recent Japanese Critiques of Buddha-Nature
Hongaku shisō, the idea that all beings are "inherently" enlightened, is an almost universal assumption in the Japanese Buddhist tradition. This idea also played an important role in the indigenization of Buddhism in Japan and in the development of the syncretistic religious ethos that underlies Japanese society. Through most of Japanese history, the idea of the inherent enlightenment (including non-sentient beings such as plants and rocks—which expanded to include assumptions such as the non-differentiation between "indigenous" kami and the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, and the transcendence of all dualities (including good and evil) as an ideal—was pervasive and unquestioned in much of Japanese religious activity and thought. Recently some Japanese Buddhist scholars, notably Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shirō of the Sōtō Zen sect [at] Komazawa University, have questioned the legitimacy of this ethos, claiming that it is antithetical to basic Buddhist ideas such as anātman ("no-self"), and that it is the source of many social problems in Japan. They call for a conscious recognition and rejection of this ethos, and a return to "true Buddhism." After presenting a brief outline of the history and significance of these ideas in Japan, Hakamaya and Matsumoto's critique is explained and examined. Some of the academic and social reactions to this critique are also explored.
Swanson, Paul L. "'Zen is Not Buddhism': Recent Japanese Critiques of Buddha-Nature." Numen 40, no. 2 (1993): 115–49. http://www.thezensite.com/ZenEssays/HistoricalZen/zen-is-not-BUDDHISM.pdf.
Article
'Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal's Commentary on the Dharmatā Chapter of the Dharmadharmatāvibhāgakārikās
'Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal's (1392-1481) commentary on the second chapter of the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā (RGVV) is introduced by a detailed explanation of the dharmatā chapter in the Dharmadharmatāvibhāgakārikās (DhDhVK). This is, according to gZhon nu dpal, because the detailed presentation of āśrayaparivŗtti in the DhDhV is a commentary on the bodhi chapter of the RGV. In both texts, āśrayaparivŗtti refers to a positively described ultimate which is revealed by removing adventitious stains. Whereas in the RGV this is the Buddha-element (or tathāgatagarbha) with its inseparable qualities, it is the dharmatā, suchness or natural luminosity (prakŗtiprabhāsvaratā) in the Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavŗtti (DhDhVV). This luminosity is compared to primordially pure space, gold and water which must have their adventitious stains removed before they can be discovered. From this gZhon nu dpal concludes that the DhDhVV belongs to the Madhyamaka tradition. Consequently, the typical Yogācāra negation of external objects is taken as referring to the latters' non-existence in terms of svabhāva.
      What makes gZhon nu dpal's DhDhV-commentary so interesting is his mahāmudrā interpretation of a central topic in the DhDhV, i.e., the abandonment of all "mentally created characteristic signs" (nimittas). The latter practice plays a crucial role in the cultivation of non-conceptual wisdom, which is taken as the cause or the foundation of āśrayaparivŗtti in the DhDhV. Based on Sahajavajra's (11th century) Tattvadaśakaţīkā gZhon nu dpal explains that the nimittas are abandoned by directly realizing their natural luminosity which amounts to a direct or non-conceptual experience of their true nature. To be sure, while the usual Mahāyāna approach involves an initial analysis of the nimittas, namely, an analytic meditation which eventually turns into non-conceptual abiding in the same way as a fire kindled from rubbing pieces of wood bums the pieces of wood themselves (gZhon nu dpal explains this on the basis of Kamalaśīla's commentary on the Nirvikalpapraveśadhāraņī), mahāmudrā pith-instructions enable a meditation of direct perceptions right from the beginning. In view of the fact that such direct perceptions of emptiness (or dharmatā in this context here) usually start from the first Bodhisattva-level onwards, gZhon nu dpal also tries to show that the four yogas of mahāmudrā are in accordance with the four prayogas of the DhDhV. It should be noted that such a mahāmudrā interpretation must have already existed in India, as can be seen from Jñānakīrti's (10th/11th-century) Tattvāvatāra, in which a not-specifically-Tantric form of mahāmudrā practice is related with the traditional fourfold Mahāyāna meditation by equating "Mahāyāna" in Lańkāvatārasūtra X.257d with mahāmudrā. The pādas X.257cd "A yogin who is established in a state without appearances sees Mahāyāna" thus mean that one finally sees or realizes mahāmudrā.
      To sum up, the DhDhV plays an important role for gZhon nu dpal in that it provides a canonical basis for his mahāmudrā tradition, and by showing that the dharmatā portion of the DhDhV is a commentary on the second chapter of the RGV, gZhon nu dpal skillfully links his mahāmudrā interpretation to the standard Indian work on Buddha-nature, and thus to a concept which considerably facilitated the bridging of the Sūtras with the Tantras. (Source Accessed April 1, 2020)
Mathes, Klaus-Dieter. "'Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal's Commentary on the Dharmatā Chapter of the Dharmadharmatāvibhāgakārikās." Studies in Indian Philosophy and Buddhism 12 (2005): 3–39.
Article
'Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal's Extensive Commentary on and Study of the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā
In this paper I present some preliminary observations on 'Gos Lo tsā ba Gzhon nu dpal's (1392-1481) commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā, which I am editing and evaluating as a part of my habilitation project. Three years ago I gained access to a photocopy of a 698-folio-long handwritten dbu med version of this text.'"`UNIQ--ref-00004293-QINU`"' Like the Indian vyākhyā, the commentary is divided into five chapters. Their headings are listed together with the folio numbers on a cover page, which bears the seal of the Zhva dmar pa and assigns the letter ha to the volume containing Gzhon nu dpal's commentary. It is thus reasonable to assume that the original was kept in the library of the Shamarpas in Yangpacan, probably already from the time of the famous Fourth Shamarpa Chos kyi grags pa (1453-1524), who was a disciple of Gzhon nu dpal. After the war with Prithivi Narayan Shah in 1792, Yangpacan was seized by the Gelug government and the text found its way to Drepung, where many other Kagyu texts were kept. Recently I received a photocopy of a Yangpacan block-print from Tibet with the same text on 463 folios. This could be the text described by A khu ching Shes rab rgya mtsho as having 461 folios.'"`UNIQ--ref-00004294-QINU`"' The numbering starts anew with each chapter; thus a small calculation mistake could explain the difference of two folios. (Mathes, introductory remarks, 79)
Mathes, Klaus-Dieter. "'Gos Lo tsā ba Gzhon nu dpal's Extensive Commentary on and Study of the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā." In Religion and Secular Culture in Tibet, edited by Henk Blezer with the assistance of Abel Zadoks, 79–96. Proceedings of the Ninth Seminar of the International Association of Tibetan Studies, Leiden 2000. Brill’s Tibetan Studies Library 2/2. Leiden: Brill, 2002.
Article
A Clue to the Authorship of the Awakening of Faith: "Śikṣānanda's" Redaction of the Word "Nien"
The text, Ta-ch'eng ch'i-hsin lunf (The Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna, henceforth abbreviated as AFM), has been the center of a long controversy in the field of Buddhist studies. It has been suspected by Mochizuki Shinkōg'"`UNIQ--ref-000041D9-QINU`"' and others to be a Chinese fabrication, while Tokiwa Daijō and others defend its alleged Indian origin. The present short article will not review the past and present scholarship on the AFM or bring in my own studies on the matter.'"`UNIQ--ref-000041DA-QINU`"' It will be devoted to one tiny but crucial issue: the fate of a key concept in the two "translations"—Paramārtha's original (AFM) and Śikṣānanda's version (AFMS for short). The concept is nien and wu-nien. To state the conclusion here so as to simplify our discussion: the nien complex, in my opinion, cannot be understood without reference to a pre-Buddhist (Han Chinese) usage of the term. It is foreign or jarring enough to the person responsible for the AFMS that it has been systematically modified or outright substituted so as to bring the AFM in line with the Yogācāra (Wei-shih,i Vijñaptimātratā) philosophy. By showing the sinitic character of the nien ideology, its centrality in the AFM, and the redaction of it by the AFMS, we can come one step closer to resolving the long controversy over the authorship of the AFM. From the limited evidence in this one short study, it would appear that the AFM was authored in China and the AFMS was a conscious redaction of the AFM in China (or Korea?'"`UNIQ--ref-000041DB-QINU`"') to bring this work into line with the demands of Hsüan-tsang'sj Wei-shih philosophy.
      We will begin with a survey of modern Sanskritists' attempts at identifying nien and why such attempts have ultimately failed. Then we will look at a similar attempt by the AFMS to edit off the nien ideology and how by so doing it violated the integrity of the original AFM message. The sinitic meaning of the term nien and wu-nien will be demonstrated with precedents in Han thought, usages in the Six Dynasties and in Ch'an.k I will conclude with a word on why AFMS was produced. (Lai, "A Clue to the Authorship of the Awakening of Faith," 34–35)
Lai, Whalen. "A Clue to the Authorship of the Awakening of Faith: 'Śikṣānanda's' Redaction of the Word 'Nien'." Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 3, no. 1 (1980): 34–53. https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jiabs/article/view/8506/2413.
Article
A Comment on the Term Ārambaṇa in the Ratnagotravibhāga, I, 9
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

The term ' ārambaṇa ' is one of the technical terms unique to Buddhism. Being equivalent to Pali ' ārammaṇa ' and Cl. Skt. ' ālambana ' it is usually used in the sense of 'basis of cognition' or 'sense-object', e.g. rūpa as ārambaṇa of cakṣurvijñāna, or dharma as that of manovijñāna. The usual equivalent to this term in Tibetan and Chinese language is ' dmigs pa ' and '所 縁', respectively.
      What I am going to examine here is whether or not the same meaning mentioned above can be applied to this term used in the Ratnagotravibhāga (RGV), I, 9.

Read more here . . .
Takasaki, Jikidō. "A Comment on the Term Ārambaṇa in the Ratnagotravibhāga, I, 9," Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies) 10, no. 2 (1962): 26–33. https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/ibk1952/10/2/10_2_757/_pdf/-char/en.
Article
A Comparative Study of Taehyŏn, Wŏnhyo, and Fazangs’ Views on Ālayavijñāna and Tathāgatagarbha
The concept of ālayavijñāna has been accepted in East Asia by either demonstrating its association to tathāgatagarbha or negating it, since Bodhiruci (fl. 508-35) introduced it by translating the Daśabhūmikasūtra-śāstra. It was in this context that the Awakening of Faith (C. Dasheng qixin lun 大乘起信論) drew East Asian Buddhist scholiasts’ attention. The central message of the Awakening of Faith that tathāgatagarbha is synthesized to ālayavijñāna in neither-identical-nor-different condition is directly associated to the contemporary issue of how ālayavijñāna serves as the basis of sentient being’s enlightenment. Silla Yogācāra exegete Taehyŏn 大賢 (ca. 8th century) is one of the East Asian monks who noted the Awakening of Faith and articulates the relationship between tathāgatagarbha and ālayavijñāna in the Taesŭng kisillon naeŭi yak t’amgi 大乘起信論內義略探記, his commentary of the Awakening of Faith. This article explores Taehyŏn’s views on ālayavijñāna and tathāgatagarbha in his commentary of the Awakening of Faith in comparison to those of other exegetes, such as Wŏnhyo 元曉 (617–686) and Fazang 法藏 (643–712). This article seeks to demonstrate on the basis of this examination that there were distinct doctrinal positions on the tathāgatagarbha of the Awakening of Faith, which are also associated to their understandings of consciousness system.
Lee, Sumi. "A Comparative Study of Taehyŏn, Wŏnhyo, and Fazangs’ Views on Ālayavijñāna and Tathāgatagarbha." (In Korean.) Journal of Eastern-Asia Buddhism and Culture 32, no. 12 (2017): 101–29.
Article
A Critical Edition and Translation of a Text Fragment from Abhayākaragupta's Āmnāyamañjarī: Göttingen, Cod.ms.sanscr.259b
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

An encyclopedic author active during the reign of King Rāmapāla (ca. 1084–1126/1077– ca. 1119) of the Pāla Dynasty, Abhayākaragupta is renowned for his erudition in a vast range of subjects in Buddhism.[1] His expertise is especially prominent in, though not limited to, the area of Tantric Buddhism, as attested by the well-known "Garland Trilogy" (phreng ba skor gsum), i.e. his three major works on Tantric ritual (Vajrāvalī, Jyotirmañjarī, and Niṣpannayogāvalī), which exercised a great influence on the Buddhism of the later period in Nepal and Tibet.
      The Peking bsTan 'gyur includes twenty-six works ascribed to Abhayākaragupta, of which twenty-three are in the domain of Tantra; the other three deal with non-Tantric Buddhism.[2] Though most of these works are only available through Tibetan translation, some important texts of Abhayākaragupta are preserved in Sanskrit. The following works in Sanskrit have hitherto been edited: Niṣpannayogāvalī; Vajrāvalī; Jyotimañjarī; Ucchuṣmajambhalasādhana; Svādhiṣṭhānakramopadeśa.[3] In addition, Sanskrit manuscripts are known to exist of the Pañcakramatātparyapañjikā Kramakaumudī, Kālacakrāvatāra, and Abhayapaddhati.[4] According to some recent information, furthermore, Sanskrit manuscripts of the Āmnāyamañjarī, Munimatālaṅkāra and Madhyamakamañjarī[5] have been discovered in Tibet [6]
      The Amnāyamañjarī, which may be called the magnum opus of Abhayākaragupta, is a commentary on the Saṃpuṭodbhavatantra and an encyclopedic compendium of Indian Tantric Buddhism. According to Bühnemann, Abhayākaragupta undertook the composition of the Amnāyamañjarī before 1101 or 1108 C.E. (twenty-fifth regnal year of Rāmapāla) and completed it in 1113 or 1120 C.E (thirty-seventh year of Rāmapāla). As has been remarked,[7] the Saṃpuṭodbhavatantra, though traditionally considered to be an Explanatory Tantra (vyākhyātantra) of the Hevajra and Saṃvara cycles, integrates many doctrinal and ritual elements adopted from several heterogeneous textual traditions such as that of the Guhyasamāja. Because of this "ecumenical" character of the Saṃpuṭodbhavatantra, the Amnāyamañjarī as its commentary also encompasses a great variety of subjects relating to the doctrine and ritual of Tantric Buddhism. The Amnāyamañjarī is referred to several times by Abhayākaragupta himself in his other works, such as the Munimatālaṅkāra, Abhayapaddhati, Pañcakramatātparyapañjikā, and Vajrāvalī.[8] In turn, the Āmnāyamañjarī refers to his other works [9]
      Though, as remarked above, the existence of a presumably complete Sanskrit manuscript of the Āmnāyamañjarī has been reported, it still remains inaccessible to us. However, a single folio fragment of this text has been recently identified in the collection of Sanskrit manuscripts in Göttingen. In this paper, we describe this manuscript fragment and present a critical edition and an annotated translation of the text contained in it. We also include as appendices an edition of the corresponding part of the Tibetan translation as well as parallel passages found in Kamalanātha's Ratnāvalī and Abhayākaragupta's Abhayapaddhati. (Tomabechi and Kano, Abhayākaragupta and the Āmnāyamañjarī, 22–23)

Notes
  1. For the dates and works of Abhayākaragupta, see Erb 1997: 27–29: Bühnemann and Tachikawa 1991: Bühnemann 1992.
  2. For bibliographical information on these works, see Bühnemann 1992: 123–125.
  3. The Svādhiṣṭhānakramopadeśa (or Dvibhujasaṃvaropadeśa) was edited by Okuyama (1993).
  4. The Centre for Tantric Studies at University of Hamburg is currently working on a joint project to the Abhayapaddhati in collaboration with CTRC (China Tibetology Research Centre). Tomabechi is preparing a critical edition of the Kramakaumudī based on the manuscript copy preserved at CTRC.
  5. The latter text is not included in the bsTan 'gyur, but is mentioned by Abhayākaragupta himself in the Munimatālaṅkāra, D 145v6; P 179r8: mdor bsdus pa ni kho bos dbu ma'i snye mar phul du byung bar rnam par bshad do; Āmnāyamañjarī, D 28r1; P 31r2–3: 'di'i skye ba dang 'jig pa de dag kyang dbu ma'i snye mar nges par dpyad zin pas (P: pa'i) ... ; D 76v7–77r1; P 86v2-3: thsad ma gang gis 'di rang bzhin med pa nyid du bsgrub pa de ni bdag cag gis rgyas pa dang bcas par dbu ma'i snye mar nye bar bkod cing; D 162r5–6; P 179v1: bzlog pa kho na las de kho na nyid 'di rnams so zhes dbu ma'i snye mar nges par dpyad zin to (P: te). See also Isoda 1984: 3 n. 14.
  6. These texts are registered in the (unpublished) catalogue of microfilms kept at the CTRC in Beijing. Tomabechi confirmed the existence of the copies of these manuscripts during his visit to Beijing in May–June 2007.
  7. Noguchi 1984 and Skorupski 1996: 201.
  8. See Munimatālaṅkāra, D 89r4; P 93v2, D 218r7; P 287r4, Kramakaumudī, fol. 22v4, 27r1, 53v4. For the Abhayapaddhati see Bühnemann and Tachikawa 1991: xiv and Bühnemann 1992:123; and for the Vajrāvalī, see Bühnemann and Tachikawa 1991: xvi and Bühnemann 1992: 125.
  9. Vajrāvalī (in ĀM D 72v3; P 82r2, D 97r1; P 108r7, D 188v7; P 208r5, D 24Or2; P 266v4, D 257v2; P 288r4, D 260r4; P 291r5–6), Jyotirmañjarī (in ĀM D 24Or2; P 266v3, D 260r3; P 291r4), Madhyamakamañjarī (in ĀM D 28r1; P 31r2–3, D 76v7-77r1; P 86v2–3, D 162r6; P 179v1; See note 6 above), Munimatālaṃkāra (in ĀM D 12r3; P 13v3, D 24v5; P 27v2, D 24v6; P 27v4, D 33v4; P 37v1–2, D 41v7–42r1; P 47r2, D 52r1; P 56r6, D 77r1; P 86v3, D 112v5–6); P 125r3, D 174v7; P 193r8, D 225v3; P 249r2, D 270r1–2; P 302v6), Abhayapaddhati (in ĀM D 77r1; P 86v2, D 209r2; P 229v8), Cakrasaṃvarābhisamaya (in ĀM D 172v6; P 191r6–7, D 242v3; P 269v7).
Tomabechi, Tōru, and Kazuo Kano. "A Critical Edition and Translation of a Text Fragment from Abhayākaragupta's Āmnāyamañjarī: Göttingen, Cod.ms.sanscr.259b." Tantric Studies 1 (2008): 22–44.
Article
A Eulogy of Mind’s Connate Qualities, Zhwa dmar Chos grags ye shes on the Hidden Meaning of Luminosity
The Fourth Zhwa dmar pa Chos grags ye shes (1453–1524) as well as being a prominent student and biographer of the famous 'Gos Lo tsā ba, also established himself as a scholar, a central Tibetan ruler, and a monk. His collected works discuss among much else the topic of luminosity as it is developed in the Bka' brgyud pa Mahāmudrā tradition.
      This paper focuses on his writings on the "hidden meaning of luminosity". According to Chos grags ye shes the nonaffirming negation in the second cycle of the Buddha's teaching is of not fully perfected definitive meaning while the affirming negation of the third wheel, the inseparability of mind's emptiness and luminosity, in other words mahāmudrā, constitutes the fully perfected definitive meaning. (Draszczyk, introduction, 1)
Draszczyk, Martina. "A Eulogy of Mind's Connate Qualities, Zhwa dmar Chos grags ye shes on the Hidden Meaning of Luminosity." In Zentralasiatische Studien 44 (Part 1), edited by Klaus-Dieter Mathes, 99–120. Andiast, Switzerland: International Institute for Tibetan and Buddhist Studies GmbH, 2015. http://www.bodhi.at/files/draszczyk_2015b_a_eulogy_of_mind_s_connate_qualities_zas.pdf.
Article
A Fragment of the "Uttaratantra" in Sanskrit
A study and facsimile of a Sanskrit fragment of the Ratnagotravibhāga, published before the complete Sanskrit text became available.
Bailey, Harold W., and E. H. Johnston. "A Fragment of the Uttaratantra in Sanskrit." Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies 8, no. 1 (1935): 77–89.
Article
A History of Buddha-Nature Theory: The Literature and Traditions
A lengthy historical survey of buddha-nature theory through the literature and traditions, based on academic scholarship.
Gardner, Alex. "A History of Buddha-Nature Theory: The Literature and Traditions." Buddha-Nature: A Tsadra Foundation Initiative, October 9, 2019. https://buddhanature.tsadra.org/index.php/Articles/A_History_of_Buddha-Nature_Theory:_The_Literature_and_Traditions.
Article
A Late Proponent of the Jo nang gZhan stong Doctrine: Ngag dbang tshogs gnyis rgya mtsho (1880–1940)
Although the doctrines and leading early figures of the Jonang tradition have been the focus of increasing scholarly attention over the past thirty years, much has yet to be written about developments in the tradition during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The goal of this paper is to shed light on this later period by focusing on one particular Jo nang thinker, Ngag dbang tshogs gnyis rgya mtsho (1880-1940). In order to contextualize his distinctive view and style, I will begin by sketching the historical evolution of the Jo nang tradition across Central and Eastern Tibet, and by providing some biographical and doctrinal information about Tshogs gnyis rgya mtsho’s main teacher, ’Ba’ mda’ Thub bstan dge legs rgya mtsho (1844-1904).
Brambilla, Filippo. "A Late Proponent of the Jo nang gZhan stong Doctrine: Ngag dbang tshogs gnyis rgya mtsho (1880–1940)." Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines 45 (2018): 5–50.
Article
A Look at the Diversity of the Gzhan stong Tradition
This article introduces two studies by classical Tibetan Buddhist scholars that explain the range of meanings of the term zhentong. The two texts—one by Pema Bidza (twentieth century), the other by Tāranātha (1575–1634)—are analytical studies that summarize and compare the various views of previous scholars who wrote on zhentong. Such interpretive studies are valuable in that they present us with different ways of interpreting the heterogeneous material classified under the rubric "zhentong." They also suggest ways of contextualizing the different levels of discourse found within this material.
Burchardi, Anne. “A Look at the Diversity of the Gzhan stong Tradition.” Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies 3 (2007): 1–24. http://www.thlib.org?tid=T3128
Article
A Luminous Transcendence of Views: The Thirty Apophatic Topics in dPal dbyangs's Thugs kyi sgron ma
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

The constructed nostalgia of the later Great Perfection, or rDzogs chen, tradition gazes backward temporally and geographically toward eighth-century India, reminiscing an era in which the subcontinent is thought to have served as generous benefactor of Dharma gifts to the fledging Buddhist empire of Tibet. Insistence on the familiar Buddhist requirements for true transmission—authenticity and legitimacy founded in lineage and longevity—certainly inspired many of its textual "revelations" beginning in the eleventh century. Many of those nostalgic constructions of rNying ma history have been well documented by modern scholars.
      It would be rash to assert, however, that despite all those imaginings, there were no historical primordia of the Great Perfection in the preceding centuries. The textual roots of the Mind Series (sems sde) texts are testament to these early stirrings, as are the Dunhuang manuscripts identified by Sam van Schaik as expressing a form of “Tibetan Zen.”[1] A third seed was planted via the Tibetan Mahāyoga tantra tradition, and within it, germinations of Great Perfection gnoseology, observable prominently in the ninth-century works of dPal dbyangs, who in some colophons and later histories is designated gNyan dPal dbyangs. His works include six canonical verse texts retrospectively entitled sGron ma drug, or Six Lamps,[2] and the rDo rje sems dpa’ zhus lan (Vajrasattva Questions and Answers) catechism found at Dunhuang in three manuscript copies. I have discussed these texts and their most likely Indian inspirations elsewhere. Here, I highlight a particular text within the Six Lamps, his Thugs kyi sgron ma (Lamp of the Mind), as intending to establish, quite early on, a standard set of topics we see well developed in systemizations of the early Great Perfection tradition a few centuries later, and perhaps even before that, in Mind Series texts such as those attributed to Mañjuśrīmitra like the Byang chub kyi sems rdo la gser zhun and the Byang chub sems bsgom pa.[3]
      Of all dPal dbyangs’s texts, the Thugs kyi sgron ma is the ideological, linguistic, and practical hinge to his Mayājāla corpus as a whole, linking the other five of the Six Lamps texts and providing convincing evidence for accepting those Six Lamps as a collection, as well as offering insight to the later interpretations of his catechism. The Thugs kyi sgron ma displays dPal dbyangs’s full range of presentation. It includes, on the one hand, dPal dbyangs’s direct recommendations to Mahāyoga tantra, and on the other hand, his depictions of the realization of reality as utterly unstructured, unmediated, and transcendent of any dichotomization or reification, using the apophatic language sprinkled throughout the rest of the Six Lamps texts. Thus, by emphasizing these two elements—the transgressive and the transcendent—within a single text, the Thugs kyi sgron ma may have served as a valuable field guide to early Tibetan Mahāyoga and at least to some degree as a useful strategic plan for the cultivation of something more sustainable and vibrant on Tibetan soil, the Great Perfection. As I hope to show, dPal dbyangs’s very deliberate indexing of these topics appears to have been intended to standardize them as interpretive categories even while undercutting the value of reliance upon them as such, redefining Mahāyoga tantra as it found its earliest shape in Tibet. (Takahashi, introductory remarks, 159–60)

Notes
  1. Sam van Schaik, “The Early Days of the Great Perfection,” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 27.1: 167 and 201.
  2. The Six Lamps texts are as follows: The Lamp of the Mind (Thugs kyi sgron ma), The Lamp of the Correct View (lTa ba yang dag sgron ma), The Lamp Illuminating the Extremes (mTha'i mun sel sgron ma), The Lamp of Method and Wisdom (Thabs shes sgron ma), The Lamp of the Method of Meditation (bsGom thabs kyi sgron ma), and The Lamp of the Precious View (lTa ba rin chen sgron ma). These are P5918, P5919, P5920, P5921, P5922, and P5923, respectively. There are other Lamp collections in both Nyingma and Bön traditions, usually comprising four or six texts. The most prominent example of these is from the Bönpo Great Perfection lineage, the sGron ma drug gi gdams pa. See Christopher Hatchell's "Advice on the Six Lamps" in Naked Seeing: The Great Perfection, the Wheel of Time, and Visionary Buddhism in Renaissance Tibet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), and Jean-Luc Achard’s English translation in the Six Lamps: Secret Dzogchen Instructions of the Bön Tradition (Boston: Wisdom, 2017).
  3. See Namkhai Norbu and Kennard Lipman’s Primordial Experience: An Introduction to rDzogs-chen Meditation (Boston: Shambhala, 2001). Karen Liljenberg has discovered parallel passages to dPal dbyangs’s Lamp text the Thabs shes sgron ma in the rTse mo byung rgyal, a text she has identified as belonging to the sems sde corpus the Sems sde lung chen po bco brgyad. Karen Liljenberg, “A Critical Study of the Thirteen Later Translations of the Dzogchen Mind Series” (doctoral dissertation, SOAS, 2012), 57-60. I suspect there are further discoveries to be made of such borrowings between early Tibetan Mahāyoga texts and those of the early Mind Series. See also Liljenberg's paper elsewhere in this issue.
Takahashi, Kammie. "A Luminous Transcendence of Views: The Thirty Apophatic Topics in dPal dbyangs's Thugs kyi sgron ma." In Vol. 2 of "Etudes rDzogs Chen," under the direction of Jean-Luc Achard, special issue, Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines 44 (2018): 159–77. http://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/collections/journals/ret/pdf/ret_44_06.pdf.
Article
A Manuscript of the Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa, a Sanskrit Commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga
Takasaki, Jikidō. "A Manuscript of the Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa, a Sanskrit Commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga." (In Japanese.) Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies) 23, no. 2 (1975) 52–59.
Takasaki, Jikidō. "A Manuscript of the Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa, a Sanskrit Commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga." (In Japanese.) Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies) 23, no. 2 (1975) 52–59.
Article
A Multi-associative Term: Why Tathāgatagarbha Is Not One and the Same
This essay deals with how the Sanskrit term tathāgatagarbha is used in the Mahāyāna text to which it gave its name, the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra. Whether the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra is the oldest text in which the term appears or not, the particular way in which it is applied there documents that the authors created or made use of it while associating it with many diverse aspects, less in a philosophical or abhidharma-like way but rather in a loose and associative style, opening the door to incorporate the different connotations described metaphorically in the sūtra. The rich illustrations found in the sūtra help us understand the early context in which the term was coined and took shape. It will become evident that it is impossible to reduce the genesis and meaning of the term tathāgatagarbha by way of a monoexplanatory model.
Zimmermann, Michael. "A Multi-associative Term: Why Tathāgatagarbha Is Not One and the Same." In "What is Tathāgatagarbha: Buddha-Nature or Buddha Within?" Edited by Akira Saitō. Special issue, Acta Asiatica 118 (2020): 41–55.
Article
A Note on Ratnagotravibhāga I.52 = Bhagavadgītā XIII.32
Gokhale, Vasudeva Vishnunath. "A Note on Ratnagotravibhāga I.52 = Bhagavadgītā XIII.32." In Studies in Indology and Buddhology: Presented in Honour of Professor Susumu Yamaguchi on the Occasion of His Sixtieth Birthday, edited by Gadjin Nagao, 90–91. Kyoto: Hozokan, 1955.
Gokhale, Vasudeva Vishnunath. "A Note on Ratnagotravibhāga I.52 = Bhagavadgītā XIII.32." In Studies in Indology and Buddhology: Presented in Honour of Professor Susumu Yamaguchi on the Occasion of His Sixtieth Birthday, edited by Gadjin Nagao, 90–91. Kyoto: Hozokan, 1955.
Article
A Prayer for "Plants and Trees, Countries and Lands, All Become Buddhas"
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

A Philosophy of Plants

The philosopher Tomonobu Imamichi (1922–2012) pointed out that most Japanese family crests are based on plant designs, indicating that, compared with cultures that employ dragons and eagles, or lions and tigers in their heraldry, Japanese cultural patterns show a strong tendency toward adaptability and harmony. Plants survive not as individuals but by species adaptation. This means that they grow where their seed randomly falls, existing within a pattern of dramatic change as their branches and leaves grow. Imamichi wrote, "In the very workings of their life, plants are a reiteration of elegant beauty as they bud, bloom, fall, proliferate, fruit, and change color, all within an intense yet inconspicuous struggle for life" (Tōyō no bigaku [Aesthetics of the East], TBS Britannica, 1980). Plants take root in that space where their seed falls and form a community with other plants. They maintain harmony with their surroundings and continually transform themselves, adapting to changes in their environment. As Imamichi stated, the workings of their life are inconspicuous, but there is no doubt a severity of struggle to survive and flourish.

Are Plants and Trees Nonsentient?

Mahayana Buddhism in general does not consider trees and plants to be capable of sensation and, with the exception of the Lotus and Śūraṅgama sutras, does not hesitate to place them on a par with tiles and stones. For example, the Mahāratnakūṭa Sūtra (Sutra of the Great Accumulation of Treasures) says, "Plants and trees, tiles and stones, like shadows, are not sentient" (Mahāratnakūṭa Sūtra, 78, Discourse to Pūrṇa, 17.2.4). Why is this so?
      The geographer Yutaka Sakaguchi reports that recent research has shown that from the middle of the third century to around the sixth or seventh century the world experienced severe climate change in the form of cooling, drier conditions (see "Kako ichiman sanzennen no kikō no henka to jinrui no rekishi" [Climate change and the history of human beings during the past thirteen thousand years], Kōza, bunmei to kankyō, 6: Rekishi to kikō [Lecture series, 6, Civilization and the environment: History and climate] [Asakura Shoten, 1995 (revised edition, 2008)], 1–11). The Mahayana sutras, with their prohibition of meat eating, were compiled at this time. Why this prohibition was added to the small simple meals demanded by asceticism can thus be explained in ecoreligious terms. In all probability, the acceptance of ascetic behavior in relation to food and the rejection of meat by religious practitioners and the societies that supported them derived from severe and long-term food shortages. At such a time, rather than rearing pigs and other animals on plant food and then eating their meat, many more human lives could be sustained by a considerably lesser volume by eating vegetable foodstuffs directly. "Hence, in order to keep both monks and lay followers free from what was deemed unnecessary inconvenience and qualms, the sentience of plants was, by and large, ignored [in the precept against the taking of life]" (Lambert Schmithausen, Buddhism and Nature: The Lecture Delivered on the Occasion of the EXPO 1990 [International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1991], 7).

Plants and the Lotus Sutra
Chapter 5 of the Lotus Sutra, "The Parable of the Herbs," likens the teachings of the Buddha benefiting all beings equally to the rain that falls on all trees, shrubs, herbs, and grasses, enabling them to grow and blossom, producing fruits. This chapter was to have an important influence on the Chinese Tiantai and Japanese Tendai schools of Buddhism. Whereas the Chinese Huayan school held that plants are not sentient and cannot achieve enlightenment, in commentaries such as Fazang's (643–712) Huayanjing tanxuanji (Records of the search for the profundities of the Avataṃsaka Sūtra), Tiantai scholars advocated plants' capability of attaining buddhahood. This must have been because of the image presented in "The Parable of the Herbs." (Read the entire article here)
Okada, Shinsui. "A Prayer for 'Plants and Trees, Countries and Lands, All Become Buddhas'." Dharma World 45 (2018): 13–15. https://rk-world.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/DW18_7-12.pdf.
Article
A Preliminary Analysis of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra as Found in the Lang Kanjur
No abstract given. Here is the appendix in full:

Common throughout the De bźin bśegs pa’i sñiṅ po’i mdo (Tathāgatagarbha sūtra) of the Lang Kanjur are several features which are generally assumed to be archaic, such as the ya btags in all words beginning with m- followed by the vowel i or e (e.g. myi, myed, etc.), the usage of the da drag, the tsheg placed before śad, the mtha’ rten ’a (e.g. dpe’ ), occasionally a reversed gi gu, la(s) (b)stsogs pa for la sogs pa, the omission of genitive particles and, in the verses, the reading ’i instead of yi ( ’i counting as a full syllable).
      The version of the sūtra represents the canonical transmission (and not the translation found in the “Kanjur from Bathang”).[85] Stemmatically, the text in the Lang Kanjur is very close to the three Phug brag versions of the sūtra, which have been shown to derive from one and the same archetype.[86] It shares mistakes with this archetype. In other instances it is, however, free of the secondary readings found in all three of the Phug brag versions. In all the cases where Phug brag shares a mistake with the representatives of the Tshal pa-line, the Kanjur version from Dolpo also has this secondary reading. Its use for establishing the stemma of the canonical versions of the De bźin gśegs pa’i sñiṅ po’i mdo is therefore restricted primarily to evaluating the readings of the Phug brag Kanjur in the instances where Phug brag deviates from the Tshal pa-transmission. In all the cases where the Chinese translations of the sūtra could be used to decide on the originality of a reading in the Tibetan, it turned out that whenever the variant in the Lang Kanjur was identical with the one of Tshal pa as against Phug brag, the latter variant was secondary. (Zimmermann, appendix, 104–5)

Notes
85. For more details on this paracanonical translation see Zimmermann 1998.
86. See Zimmermann 2002: 173–177.
Zimmermann, Michael. "A Preliminary Analysis of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra as Found in the Lang Kanjur." In "Establishing the Succession of the Sakya Lamas of Näsar Gompa and Lang Gompa in Dolpo (Nepal)," by Klaus-Dieter Mathes. Appendix, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 47 (2003): 104–5. http://austriaca.at/0xc1aa5576_0x00040b80.pdf.
Article
A Preliminary Report on Newly Identified Text Fragments in Śāradā Script from Źwa lu Monastery in the Tucci Collection
In the summer of 2007 I had the opportunity to participate in Francesco Sferra’s course on Kamalaśīla’s First Bhāvanākrama at the University of Hamburg. For his lectures Sferra kindly provided us with digital images of Tucci’s photographs of the Sanskrit manuscript of this text. The 27 extant folios of the Bhāvanākrama (fols. 2–28), which were used by Tucci for the editio princeps of the text,1 have been photographed in three successive multi-folio images together with nine extra folios that appear in two photos only, namely those labelled MT 41 II/01 and MT 42 II/02. My attention was caught by these folios since while the Bhāvanākrama manuscript is written in Magadhi script, these nine folios are written in Śāradā script — a rather rare phenomenon among the corpus of Sanskrit manuscripts preserved in Tibet. They and the rest of the Bhāvanākrama manuscript were originally preserved at Zwa lu Ri phug.2 The manuscripts preserved there were probably taken to Beijing (The Cultural Palace of Nationalities) in the 1960s, but were returned to Lhasa sometime after 1990 (first to Nor bu gliṅ ka and then to the Tibetan Museum).3

      Of the nine folios, Tucci photographed both sides of seven of them, while he photographed only one side of the remaining two (here labelled 7.2 and 9.2). The two sides not filmed were probably blank or contained title pages (unfortunately, Tucci did not photograph title pages). Some images are out of focus and barely legible, and thus a complete diplomatic transcription is almost impossible. If Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana photographed the same folios, this would be very helpful in deciphering them; however, I have yet to find evidence that he did. Therefore, I have only been able to go through the folios haltingly, and so identify a limited number of them. (Kano, introductory remarks, 381–82)

Notes
  1. The reproduction of these folios will appear together with a new critical edition of the Sanskrit text, a new edition of the Tibetan translation and an annotated English translation in a new issue of Manuscripta Buddhica which is being prepared by Francesco Sferra and Iain Sinclair.
  2. It should be noted that in the introduction of the editio princeps of the First Bhāvanākrama, Tucci states: "The manuscript is preserved in the monastery of sPos k’aṅ on a side valley to the right of the Myań c’u, between Gyantse and Shigatse" (Tucci 1956: 6-7). However, this information is most probably wrong for the following reasons: a) the same manuscript was most likely seen by Sāṅkṛtyāyana in Źwa lu Ri phug in 1936 (1937: 39); b) the envelope itself containing the negatives of Tucci’s photographs are labelled "Zha lu" (see above, p. 46); c) in Źwa lu Ri phug there were other manuscripts in Śāradā script, in particular a manuscript containing Sajjana’s Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa, which might be connected with the Sūtrālaḿkārapiṇḍārtha reproduced together with the first Bhavanākrama.
  3. Cf. Steinkellner 2004.
Kano, Kazuo. "A Preliminary Report on Newly Identified Text Fragments in Śāradā Script from Zhwa lu Monastery in the Tucci Collection." In Part 1 of Sanskrit Texts from Giuseppe Tucci's Collection, edited by Francesco Sferra, 381–400. Rome: Istituto Italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente (IsIAO), 2008.
Article
A Provisional List of Tibetan Commentaries on the Ratnagotravibhāga
A listing of 45 Tibetan commentaries on the Ratnagotravibhāga.
Burchardi, Anne. "A Provisional List of Tibetan Commentaries on the Ratnagotravibhāga." Tibet Journal 31, no. 4 (2006): 3–46.
Article
A Re-examination of the Relationship between the Awakening of Faith and Dilun School Thought, Focusing on the Works of Huiyuan
Ching Keng’s paper challenges the prevalent assumption that the Awakening of Faith was composed under the influence of the Dilun School. Keng aims to show that in the representative works of Huiyuan, arguably the most important Dilun master, we do not find the essential doctrinal feature of the Awakening of Faith, namely, the compromise or even the total obliteration of the distinction between unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) and conditioned (saṃskṛta) dharmas. Keng observes that almost all available studies of Huiyuan focus on a small piece entitled "Bashi yi" (八識義, "On the Meaning of the Eight Consciousnesses"), which shows strong influence from the "Awakening of Faith"; but that other works of Huiyuan outline a very different conceptual scheme. Taking these other works as representing Huiyuan's earlier thought, and therefore Dilun thought, Keng argues that the hallmark of Huiyuan's thought is a dualist scheme, in which the inherently pure aspect is unambiguously unconditioned, with no blending with conditioned dharmas; this inherently pure aspect can adjust to falsity (suiwang 隨妄) and give rise to misconception, but without compromising its unconditioned nature. Upon this basis, Keng contends that the compromise between unconditioned and conditioned in the Awakening of Faith should be regarded as an innovation, rather than a direct outgrowth from Dilun thought. An important broader implication of Keng's argument is that Huiyuan’s thought, Dilun thought, and even the thought of the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra has been anachronistically misinterpreted through the later, typically Chinese lens of the Awakening of Faith. This suggests the sobering possibility that typically "sinitic" (or even "sinified") developments became so pervasive in the later East Asian tradition that their stamp may still lie heavy upon parts of modern Buddhology itself, and that we might therefore overlook both evidence and products of "sinifying" processes, and even the actual features of Indic materials. (Radich and Lin, introduction to A Distant Mirror, 25–26)
Keng, Ching. "A Re-examination of the Relationship between the Awakening of Faith and Dilun School Thought, Focusing on the Works of Huiyuan." In A Distant Mirror: Articulating Indic Ideas in Sixth and Seventh Century Chinese Buddhism, edited by Chen-kuo Lin and Michael Radich, 183–215. Hamburg: Hamburg University Press, 2014. https://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/volltexte/2014/146/chapter/HamburgUP_HBS03_Keng_LinRadich_Mirror.pdf.
Article
A Sanskrit MS. from Tibet: Kamalaśīla's Bhāvanā-krama
The reign of the King Ṭhi-sroṅ-deu-tsen (Khri-sroṅ-Idehu-btsan, VII century) represents a period of the greatest importance in the early history of Tibet in general and of the spread of Buddhism in that country in particular. The activity of the great Śāntirakṣita ("Ācārya Bodhisattva") and of Padma-sambhava. the selection of the first seven Buddhist monks of Tibetan origin (sad-mi mi bdun), the foundation of numerous sites of Buddhist learning in Tibet, and the intense literary activity of the Tibetan learned translators (lo-tsa-ba)—Pal-tseg (dPal-brtsegs) and others by whom a great number of Buddhist canonical and scientific works were rendered into Tibetan,—all this has been described by Bu-ston in his History of Buddhism and in other Tibetan historical works
      There is, however, one subject relating to the spread of Buddhism in Ṭhi-sroṅ-deu-tsen's reign, to which the Tibetan historian devotes his special attention and on which he dwells in detail. This is the strife between two parties into which the Buddhists of Tibet were at that time split. One of these parties consisted of the pupils and followers of Ācārya Śāntirakṣita who professed that form of Mahāyāna Buddhism which was generally acknowledged in India and Nepal, viz. the teaching of the Path to Enlightenment through the practice of meditation connected with the dialectical analysis peculiar to the Mādhyamika school of the Buddhists and with the practice of the six Transcendental Virtues (pāramitā).
      The leader of the other party was a Chinese teacher (hwa-śaṅ or ho-shang) known by the Sanskrit name Mahāyānadeva, who preached a doctrine of complete quietism and inactivity. According to him every kind of religious practice, the meditative exercises and all virtuous deeds as well were completely useless and even undesirable: the liberation from the bonds of phenomenal existence was to be attained merely through the complete cessation of every kind of thought and mental activity,—by abiding perpetually in a state analogous to sleep. Bu-ston'"`UNIQ--ref-00000071-QINU`"' relates how this party grew very powerful and found numerous adherents among the Tibetans, how the followers of Śāntirakṣita suffered oppression from it, and how the king who was an adherent of Śāntirakṣita's system, invited Śāntirakṣita's pupil, the teacher Kamalaśīla in order to refute the incorrect teachings of the Chinese party. The dispute between Kamalaśīla and the Chinese Ho-shang in which the latter was defeated is described by Bu-ston'"`UNIQ--ref-00000072-QINU`"' in detail. We read that the leading men of the two parties'"`UNIQ--ref-00000073-QINU`"' assembled in the presence of the king, that the Ho-shang was the first to speak in favour of his theory of quietism and inactivity and was answered by Kamalaśīla who demonstrated all the absurdity of the theses maintained by the Ho-shang and showed that the teachings of such a kind were in conflict with the main principles of Buddhism and were conducive to the depreciation and rejection of the most essential features of the Buddhist Path to Enlightenment. We read further on how the chief adherents of Kamalaśīla'"`UNIQ--ref-00000074-QINU`"' likewise refuted the theories of the Ho-shang, how the latter and his party acknowledged themselves vanquished and were expelled from Tibet by order of the king who prescribed to follow henceforth the Buddhist doctrines that were generally admitted,—the teaching of the six Virtues as regards religious practice and the Mādhvamika system of Nāgārjuna as regards the theory.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000075-QINU`"'
      Thus the influence of the Chinese Ho-shang’s teachings over the minds of the Tibetans suffered a complete defeat and with it perhaps some political influence of China.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000076-QINU`"' This is certainly a most important event in the history of Tibetan Buddhism which has been duly appreciated by Bu-ston. It is therefore quite natural that we should be interested in finding out the sources of Bu-ston's historical record. But the text of Bu-ston's History which, as a rule, contains references to the works on the foundation of which it has been compiled, does not give us any information here. At the first glance the account of the controversy looks like the reproduction of an oral tradition and there is nothing that could make us conjecture the presence of a literary work upon which the record could have been founded- The following will show that it has now become possible to trace out this work, to compare with it the account given by Bu-ston and to ascertain its historical importance. (Obermiller, "A Sanskrit MS. from Tibet," 1–3)

Read more here . . .
Obermiller, Eugène. "A Sanskrit MS. from Tibet: Kamalaśīla's Bhāvanā-krama." Journal of the Greater India Society 2, no. 1 (1935): 1–11.
Article
A Second Tibetan Translation of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra in the Newark Manuscript Kanjur from Bathang: A Translation of the Early Period (snga dar)
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

Among the Tibetan Collection of the Newark Museum in Newark (New Jersey) there is an incomplete manuscript Kanjur from Bathang in Khams (East Tibet). In spite of the fact that this Kanjur was already donated to the museum as early as 1920 it is surprising that it has only recently become the object of a scholarly treatment of some length.[1] In his critical edition of the Mahāsūtras (cp. n. 1), Peter Skilling has used internal criteria to prove that the Bathang Kanjur is affiliated to neither the Tshal pa lineage nor to the Them spangs ma lineage of textual transmission. Its independent character can also be ascertained by external kanjurological criteria: the collection of the texts, its grouping and its order within the volumes are unique. It becomes, therefore, very plausible that "the Newark Kanjur belongs to an old and independent textual transmission that predates the compilation of the Tshal pa and Them spangs ma collections."[2]
      Contained in the ta volume of the sūtra section (mdo bsde ta) of this Kanjur is the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra (TGS).[3] In the process of editing the Tibetan text of this important Mahāyāna work, of which no Indic copies have come down to us, I used most of the available, historically relevant Kanjurs.[4] Among these 13 versions alone the TGS found in this Kanjur from Bathang represents a different, second translation (Bth). As the existence of two independent Tibetan translations of the same Indic text are of rare occurrence, this study intends to throw light on the differences between the two Tibetan texts, to describe the particular features of Bth and finally to classify it within the history of Tibetan translation activities. (Zimmermann, introductory remarks, 33–35)

Read more here . . .

Notes
  1. For a description of the Kanjur cp. Eleanor Olson, Catalogue of the Newark Museum Tibetan Collection, Vol. III, Newark 1971, p. 114, dating it to the 16th century; the most detailed analysis of the 23 volumes of the Kanjur can be found in Peter Skilling's unpublished article Kanjur Manuscripts in the Newark Museum: A Preliminary Report, Nandapurī 1995; the only study including some texts of this Kanjur in a textcritical edition is Peter Skilling's (ed.) Mahāsūtras: Great Discourses of the Buddha, Vol. I: Texts, Oxford 1994 (The Pali Text Society, Sacred Books of the Buddhists Vol. XLIV).
  2. Skilling, Kanjur Manuscripts. . . . , p. 4.
  3. Vol. ta, folios 245b1–258a8. The title at the beginning of the volume reads de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po zhes bya ba'i mdo' . The title at the beginning of the sūtra itself runs: de bzhin gshyes <pa'i> snying po zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo. It seems remarkable that the Tibetan equivalent for Skt. ārya, 'phags pa, does not appear in the titles of the Bathang translation whereas it is common to all the other major Kanjurs. The spelling mdo bsde can be found "consistently on all tags" (Skilling, Kanjur Manuscripts. . . , p. 6, n. 16).
  4. The critical edition of the TGS is part of a Ph.D. thesis to be submitted at the University of Hamburg. The collation comprises the versions of the TGS as contained in the Kanjurs from Berlin, Derge, Lithang, London, Narthang, Peking (Ōtani reprint), Phug brag (three versions), Stog, Tabo (fragmentary) and Tokyo (Toyo Bunko) compared with the two Chinese translations. Bth will be appended as a diplomatic edition.
Zimmermann, Michael. "A Second Tibetan Translation of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra in the Newark Manuscript Kanjur from Bathang: A Translation of the Early Period (snga dar)." Transactions of the International Conference of Eastern Studies 43 (1998): 33-50. https://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hamburg.de/pdf/5-personen/zimmermann/tohoku-gakkai-1998-tathagatagarbha.pdf.
Article
A Self-Aggrandizing Vehicle: Tathāgatagarbha, Tīrthikas, and the True Self
This article concerns the Indian tathāgatagarbha literature: Mahāyānist works, produced no later than the early fifth century, which assert that all sentient beings possess already the qualities of a Buddha. Early works of this tradition—perhaps even the earliest that are available to us—explain possession of the tathāgatagarbha to constitute the existence of the self (ātman). These sources, foremost the Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra, show evidence that their authors faced strong opposition from audiences committed to the more conventional Buddhist doctrine of anātman, but contend defensively that the ātman that they teach is nothing like any notion of selfhood found in non-Buddhist religious traditions.
      With reference to two of these 'ātmavādin’ tathāgatagarbha works, I present evidence that authors of this tradition used the idea of a Buddhist doctrine of the self to undermine non-Buddhist accounts of liberation: not only describing them as deficient, but as having been created (nirmita) by the Buddha himself. Such claims expand the boundaries of the Buddha’s sphere of influence, after the description of his activities found in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra: a clear influence upon these tathāgatagarbha sources. Other Mahāyānist literature of an ‘ekayānist’ orientation used this strategy also: i.e. that any teaching regarding liberation from saṃsāra finds its origin in the activities of Buddhas and bodhisattvas, but has its definitive expression in the Buddhist dharma. The tathāgatagarbha presented as a Buddhist doctrine of the self can hence be understood as a complement to a certain understanding of the Mahāyāna, here the archetype of all paths that claim to deliver an end to saṃsāra, and to an account of the Buddha as the architect of all ostensibly non-Buddhist accounts of liberation.
Jones, Christopher V. "A Self-Aggrandizing Vehicle: Tathāgatagarbha, Tīrthikas, and the True Self." Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 39 (2016): 115–70.
Article
A Study of the Early-Stage Translations of Foxing 佛性 in Chinese Buddhism: The Da Banniepan Jing 大般涅槃經 Trans. Dharmakṣema and the Da Fangdeng Rulaizang Jing 大方等如來藏經 Trans. Buddhabhadra
The Da fangdeng rulaizang jing 大方等如來藏經 (Skt. Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra), translated by Buddhabhadra 佛陀跋陀羅 (358–429) is one of the early Chinese Buddhist canon texts where the term foxing 佛性 (Jp. busshō; Buddha-nature) is clearly used to express Buddha-nature. However, the term foxing cannot be confirmed in other extant translations of the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra. Another early text in the Chinese Buddhist canon, the Da banniepan jing 大般涅槃經 (Skt. Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra), translated by Dharmakṣema 曇無讖 (385?–433), also used the term foxing, which cannot be correspondingly confirmed in the surviving Sanskrit fragments of this scripture. Some significant differences in foxing between the Sanskrit fragments and Dharmakṣema's translation of this sutra belong to the first twelve fascicles of Dharmakṣema's translation completed under his collaborators' support when he had not mastered the Chinese language. It is very likely that Faxian 法顯 (337–422) translated a version of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra that featured buddhadhātu as foxing. Buddhabhadra, in the same period, translated a version of the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra, in which he favoured the term foxing over a literal translation of the Sanskrit. As another contemporary monk with these two, Dharmakṣema translated the Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra, going further than Faxian by using the term foxing regularly. These texts influenced the Dilun monastic tradition 地論宗. Among these, the term foxing and its Sinicism explanations played the most significant role, influencing the whole of the Chinese and even East Asian Buddhist thought.
Li, Zijie. "A Study of the Early-Stage Translations of Foxing 佛性 in Chinese Buddhism: The Da Banniepan Jing 大般涅槃經 Trans. Dharmakṣema and the Da Fangdeng Rulaizang Jing 大方等如來藏經 Trans. Buddhabhadra." Religions 13, no. 7 (2022): 1–25. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13070619.
Article
A Syntactic Analysis of the Term Tathāgatagarbha in Sanskrit Fragments and Multiple Meanings of Garbha in the Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra
The current of tathāgatagarbha thought that was born in Indian Mahayana Buddhism spread throughout the cultural sphere of Mahayana Buddhism in Asia and has also long held a fascination for people far beyond its geographical confines. The academic foundations for the study of tathāgatagarbha thought in India were laid by Takasaki Jikido, and the task left to us is to repeatedly reexamine each of Takasaki's findings on the basis of existing and newly discovered materials and corroborate or emend them.
      Takasaki argued that the first extant text to use the word tathāgatagarbha was the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra. Since Takasaki's research was published, there have been some remarkable advances in research on the Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra, and in recent years scholars such as S. Hodge and M. Radich have begun to argue that it was the Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra that was the first Buddhist text to use the word tathāgatagarbha. The question of which of these two sūtras came first has not yet been definitively resolved, but it may be generally accepted that both belong to the oldest stratum of Buddhist texts dealing with tathāgatagarbha.
      On a previous occasion (Kano 2017), focusing on this point, I collected Sanskrit fragments of both texts containing the word tathāgatagarbha and discussed differences in the expressions in which it is used. In particular, taking into account the findings of Shimoda Masahiro, I argued that if the word tathāgatagarbha appearing in the Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra is interpreted as a bahuvrīhi compound qualifying stūpa, this would accord with the word's usage in this sūtra and with the gist of the chapter "Element of the Tathāgata" (Habata 2013: §§ 375–418). This does not mean, however, that this understanding needs to be applied uniformly to every example of its use in the Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra. Because in this earlier article I focused somewhat unduly on the interpretation of tathāgatagarbha as a bahuvrīhi compound, the fact that there are instances of wordplay making use of the multiple meanings of garbha in the Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra needs to be added, together with some concrete examples. (In the passages of this sūtra, it is natural to understand the term tathāgatagarbha as a substantive in the sense of "garbha of tathāgata" or "garbha that is tathāgata," namely, tatpuruṣa or karmadhāraya, and I do not exclude this possibility as discussed in Kano 2017: 39–42.) In addition, there were some redundant aspects in the structure of my earlier article. In this article I rework these aspects so as to sharpen the focus on the points at issue and add some supplementary points. In the first half I clarify some grammatical characteristics to be observed in examples of the use of tathāgatagarbha in Sanskrit fragments of the Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra, while in the second half I ascertain the polysemy of the word garbha on the basis of some concrete examples. (Kano, "A Syntactic Analysis," 17–18)
Kano, Kazuo. "A Syntactic Analysis of the Term Tathāgatagarbha in Sanskrit Fragments and Multiple Meanings of Garbha in the Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra." In "What is Tathāgatagarbha: Buddha-Nature or Buddha Within?" Edited by Akira Saitō. Special issue, Acta Asiatica 118 (2020): 17–40.
Article
A Tree In The West: Competing Tathāgatagarbha Theories in Tibet
In this paper, historical materials are employed to point the reader toward scriptural sources for the tathāgatagarbha traditions of India and Tibet, including their relationship with theories of the mind-basis-of-all (kun gzhi rnam shes, ālayavijñāna). In addition, three primary tathāgatagarbha traditions in Tibet are described and compared: those of the Jo-nang-bas following Döl-bo-ba Shay-rap-gyel-tsen (dol bo pa shes rab rgyal mtshan, 1292–1361), the Sa-ḡyas following Bu-don (bu ston, 1290–1364), and the Ge-luk-don following Dzong-ka-ba (tsong kha pa, 1357–1419). Doctrines concerning the basic constituent (khams, dhātu) and three buddha bodies are examined insofar as these doctrines shed light on theories of tathāgatagarbha. Since Dzong-ka-ba extensively refuted the Jo-nang position─often called Other Emptiness (gzhan stong)─in his Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: The Essence of Eloquence (drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par phye ba'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po) and other works on the philosophical view of emptiness, this paper examines Dzong-ka-ba's discussion and critique of the Jo-nang Other Emptiness. Ten specific criticisms of Other Emptiness made by Dzong-ka-ba and his followers are compared with presentations of Other Emptiness by Jo-nang authors. Two Jo-nang texts recently translated by Professor Jeffrey Hopkins are employed in this comparison: Döl-bo-ba Śhay-rap-gyel-tsen’s Mountain Doctrine, Ocean of Definitive Meanings (ri chos nges don rgya mtsho) and Tāranātha’s Essence of Other Emptiness (gzhan stong snying po). These comparisons show that Dzong-ka-ba's critique does not always accurately reflect the Jo-nang philosophical view.
Magee, William. "A Tree in the West: Competing Tathāgatagarbha Theories in Tibet." Chung-Hwa Buddhist Journal 19 (2006): 445–511.
Article
A propos de la date de Vasubandhu
No abstract given. The following are the first relevant paragraphs. Japanese characters following the transliteration for names and works are unavailable.

La question n'est pas nouvelle; plusieurs fois déjà elle a été étudiée, et diverses solutions lui ont été données. Kern, dans son Histoire du bouddhisme dans l'Inde (1), rejetant l'opinion communément admise en Extrême-Orient, plaça Vasubandhu au VIe siècle de notre ère. Buhler (2) essaya vainement de le ramener au IVe : la thèse de Kern conserva la faveur des indianistes. En 1890, M. Sylvain Lévi, dans son remarquable ouvrage sur Le théâtre indien (3), tentait d'établir que la période d'activité de Vasubandhu couvrait toute la première moitié du VIe siècle ; et dans une note sur La date de Vasubandhu (4), il la reportait même jusqu'au milieu et à la fin de ce siècle. Depuis lors à diverses reprises, notamment dans ses Donations religieuses des rois de Valabhī (5) et dans ses Notes chinoises sur l'Inde parues ici même (6), il s'est efforcé d'étayer sa thèse de nouvelles considérations. M. Takakusu Junjirō, après avoir proposé les limites de 450–550 pour l'« àge moyen » (7) dans lequel Yi-tsing range Vasubandhu et Asaṅga, essaya ensuite de les préciser davantage en ce qui concerne le premier et d'établir qu'il avait vécu de 420 à 500 environ de notre ère (8). En 1908, M. Wogihara (9) démontrait en détail ce que les anciens catalogues chinois du Tripiṭaka, Nei tien lou, K'ai-yuan lou, etc., des écrivains comme Touen-louen des T'ang dans son Yeou-kia louen ki (1), еt M. Nanjio Bunyu (2) avaient déjà dit sommairement, à savoir qu'un ouvrage d'Asaṅga, le Yogācāryabhūmi çāstra (3), avait été partiellement traduit en chinois par Dharmarakṣa entre 414 et 421, soit dès le commencement du Ve siècle (4).
      Enfin dans l'introduction de sa traduction du Mahāyāna-Sutrālaṃkāra (5) parue en 1911, M. S. Lévi, abandonnant sa première opinion, écrit à propos d'Asaṅga : « Son activité couvre toute la première moitié du Ve siècle, en débordant de part et d'autre sur les deux extrémités de cette période. » C'est peutêtre un peu long, car si Asaṅga a vécu soixante-quinze ans, les documents à notre connaissance nous disent qu'il chercha sa voie un certain temps. N'oublions pas d'ailleurs que le Yogācāryabhūmi çāstra, l'œuvre maîtresse d'Asaṅga, est de dimensions considérables: la traduction chinoise compte 100 kiuan. Son importance dogmatique n'est pas moindre. Il est l'expression d'une pensée maîtresse d'elle-mème, qui a dépassé la période des incertitudes et des tàtonnements. Il est assez peu vraisemblable, mème sans tenir compte des indications données par Paramārtha dans sa vie de Vasubandhu, qu'il ait été écrit par un tout jeune homme. En tout cas, quelque différence d'àge qu'on veuille admettre entre Asaṅga et Vasubandhu, — et il faut tenir compte de l'existence d'un troisième frère, Viriñcivatsa (6) — celui-ci, bien qu'il ait vécu quatre-vingts ans, n'aurait pu, dans ces conditions, dépasser ni mème atteindre la fin du Ve siècle.
      D'une manière générale, il semble que dans les études qui ont porté sur ce sujet, quelques documents aient été ignorés et que d'autres aient été délibérément écartés de la discussion comme douteux. En bonne logique, ce simple doute qui ne parait pas avoir jamais été sérieusement éclairci, suffirait à enlever toute sécurité aux conclusions que l'on a cru pouvoir formuler sans en tenir compte, ou si l'on préfère, elles ne sauraient ètre que provisoires tant que la menace qu'il laisse planer sur elles n'a pas été définitivement écartée. La question me parait donc devoir ètre reprise, les documents déclarés douteux soumis à un nouvel examen, et mis en œuvre aussi ceux qui n'ont pas encore été utilisés. Je n'ai pas d'ailleurs la prétention d'ètre complet. C'est à peu près uniquement à la première série, (missing characters), du Supplément du Tripiṭaka de Kyōto, œuvres hindoues et chinoises, que sont empruntés les textes qu'on trouvera au cours de cette étude. Les quelque 700 fascicules déjà parus de cette admirable publication, d'une importance capitale pour les études bouddhiques, en contiennent sans doute d'autres encore, qu'une recherche plus approfondie et plus complète ferait découvrir. Je n'ai pu que feuilleter les œuvres qui m'ont paru devoir ètre les plus intéressantes pour mon sujet par leur date, leur auteur ou leur genre. (Péri, preliminary remarks, 339–41)

Read more here . . .

Notes

1. T. II, p. 414; Annales du Musée Guimet, t. XI, p. 450; il parle principalement d'Asaṅga, et se basant sur la date de l'avènement de Çīladitya (610, propose les dates de 485 à 560. C'est évidemment à cet ouvrage que la Chronology of India de Mrs. Mabel Duff les emprunte, et non au Buddhismus de Vassilieff, auquel elle renvoie. Celui-ci ne dit rien de tel; si je ne me trompe, il donne seulement la date bouddhiste de 900 ans, dont je parlerai plus loin.
2. Die indischen Inschriften und das Alter der indischen Kunst-Poesie, dans Sitzungsberichte der Kais. Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien, 1890, p. 79 sqq.
3. Cf. I, 165, et II, 35.
4. Journal Asiatique, 1890, II, p. 552–553.
5. Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Hautes-Etudes. Sciences religieuses, vol. VII. Etudes de critique et d'histoire, p. 97.
6. La date de Candragomin. BEFEO, III (1903), 47-49.
7. A Record of the Buddhist religion.... by I-tsing, p. VIII.
8. La Sāṃkhyakārikā étudiée à la lumière de sa version chinoise, BEFEO, IV (1904), p. 37-56; et A study of Paramārtha's life of Vasubandhu and the date of Vasubandhu, dans Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1905.
9. Asaṅga's Bodhisattvabhūmi, ein dogmatischer Text der Nordbuddhisten, Leipzig. B. E. F. E.-O. T. XI. —22.
1. Grand ouvrage en 48 k., publié dans le supplément au Tripiṭaka de Kyoto, 1re série, boites LXXV, fasc. 4 et 5, et LXXVI, fasc. 1 à 4. Le passage cité se trouve boite LXXV, fasc. 4, p. 308.
2. Cf. Nanjio, Catalogue, nos 1083, 1086, etc.
3. Nanjio, Catalogue. no 1170.
4. Le canon chinois contient sept ou huit traductions partielles de cet ouvrage, faites à des époques parfois très voisines les unes des autres, sous des titres différents ; encore n'avons-nous pas toutes celles qui le furent: le K'ai-yuan lou, k. 12, en cite une dizaine pour le mème texte. Le fait qu'il en existait des extraits si nombreux, assez différents pour que des contemporains les traduisissent séparément à quelques années de distance, permet de croire qu'un intervalle assez long sépare la composition de l'ouvrage des premières traductions d'extraits faites en Chine.
5. B. E. H. E. Sciences historiques et philologiques, fasc. 190, p. *2.

6. (Characters not available). Watters, On Yuan Chwang's travels, I, p. 210, propos Bilindibhava qui paraît inadmissible. Bilindi est inconnu, tandis que viriñci est employé dans la composition de plusieurs noms ; bhava ne concorde pas avec le sens de « fils, enfant », que Paramārtha attribue aux deux dernières syllabes et qu'il expose avec beaucoup de précision, représente d'ailleurs un mot à ancienne finale dentale; quant à (missing character), c'est sùrement ici une simple faute de copiste, très fréquente du reste pour (missing character).
Péri, Nöel. "A propos de la date de Vasubandhu." Bulletin de l'Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient 11 (1911): 339–90. https://www.persee.fr/doc/befeo_0336-1519_1911_num_11_1_2695
Article
Absolute Delusion, Perfect Buddhahood—The Universal Buddha of the San-chieh-chiao
Jamie Hubbard explores some specifically Chinese materials in his contribution "Perfect Buddhahood, Absolute Delusion—The Universal Buddha of the San-chieh-chiao". [sic] The San-chieh-chiao wanted to hold together a radically pessimistic view of the capacities of human persons for religious practice with a strong assertion of a fundamental identity between living beings and Buddha. The subtle scholastic discussion by the San-chieh-chiao of how these two affirmations were to be held together focused upon the theoretical question of the relations between pure, undefiled Suchness (tathatā) and the realm of ordinary living beings—for the assertion of a fundamental identity between the two cannot be allowed to call into question the pressing apparent reality of defilements in this degenerate age. The central soteriological affirmation running through these discussions is that all beings will inevitably realize Buddhahood; the metaphysical problem is to show how this can be the case; and the practical problem is to delineate the kind of religious practice that is appropriate if it is the case. All these

challenges the San-chieh-chiao attempted to meet, and it is the burden of Hubbard's careful exegesis to detail the subtle metaphysical and exegetical distinctions they

constructed to do so. (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to Buddha Nature, 4–5)
Hubbard, Jamie. "Absolute Delusion, Perfect Buddhahood—The Universal Buddha of the San-chieh-chiao." In Buddha Nature: A Festschrift in Honor of Minoru Kiyota, edited by Paul J. Griffiths and John P. Keenan, 75–94. Tokyo: Buddhist Books International, 1990.
Article
All Buddhas and All Living Beings Are Just This One Mind: Teachings of the Buddhas and Zen Ancestors on Buddha Nature, Empty Awareness, and Nonduality—Compiled by Kokyo Henkel
This is a compilation of several sources that speak about buddha-nature. These include:

Pabhassara Sutta
Kevaddha Sutta
Nibbana Sutta
Ashtasahasrika Prajnaparamita Sutra
Samdhinirmochana Sutra
Mahaparinirvana Sutra
Shrimaladevi Sutra
Tathagatagarbha Sutra
Lankavatara Sutra
Bodhidharma’s Breakthrough Sermon
Sengcan’s Song of the Trusting Mind
Hongren’s Treatise on the Supreme Vehicle
Huineng’s Platform Sutra
Yongjia’s Song of Realizing the Way
Shitou’s Record
Shitou’s Song of the Grass-Roof Hermitage
Dongshan’s Song of the Jewel Mirror Samadhi
Caoshan’s Verse
Guishan’s Record
Mazu’s Record
Baizhang’s Record
Huangbo’s Transmission of Mind
Linji’s Record
Nanquan’s Record
Changsha’s Record
Yunmen’s Record
Yuanwu’s Letters
Hongzhi’s Record
Dogen’s Treasury of the True Dharma Eye
Ejo’s Absorption in the Treasury of Light
Keizan’s Transmission of Light
32nd Ancestor Hongren
34th Ancestor Qingyuan
38th Ancestor Dongshan
40th Ancestor Dongan
46th Ancestor Tanxia
49th Ancestor Xuedou
52nd Ancestor Dogen
53rd Ancestor Ejo
Chinul’s Complete Sudden Attainment of Buddhahood
Chinul’s Secrets of Cultivating the Mind
Bassui’s One Mind
Bankei’s Record
Hakuin’s Four Cognitions
Menzan’s Self-Enjoyment Samadhi
Shunryu Suzuki’s Mind Waves (from "Zen Mind, Beginner’s Mind")
Shunryu Suzuki’s Resuming Big Mind (from "Not Always So")
Padmasambhava’s Self-Liberation through Seeing with Naked Awareness
Dakpo Tashi Namgyal’s Clarifying the Natural State
Karma Chagmey’s Union of Mahamudra and Dzogchen

Jamgon Mipham’s Lamp that Dispels Darkness
Henkel, Kokyo. "All Buddhas and All Living Beings are Just This One Mind: Teachings of the Buddhas and Zen Ancestors on Buddha Nature, Empty Awareness, and Nonduality." Unpublished manuscript. n.d., PDF file. https://kokyohenkel.weebly.com/uploads/1/2/7/4/127410773/one_mind_buddha_nature_-_kokyo.pdf.
Article
Apophatic and Kataphatic Discourse in Mahāyāna: A Chinese View
It is a widely held view, among modern scholars of Mahāyāna as well as within certain of the Mahāyāna traditions themselves, that Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika of the sort one finds in such works as Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhya-makāirika and Vigrahavyāvartanīis the definitive rendition of the Greater Vehicle's ultimate purport. T. R. V. Murti, in his classic study, has called Mādhyamika the "Central Philosophy of Buddhism." Kenneth Inada has called Nāgārjuna "the giant among giants" of all Buddhist thinkers.Bimal K. Matilal has recently argued that "there is a sense in which the Mādhyamika position may be considered logically unassailable," thereby raising it to a status of universal rather than just Buddhist preeminence. Such judgments abound in the literature of Buddhist scholarship. Nor is it surprising that they should, for they only echo the centuries-old conviction of many eminent Buddhist that Nāgājuna's thought is the most perfect expression of the Buddha's own middle path. The pride of place accorded to it by Tsoṅ kha pa and his dGe lugs pa school is only one of the relatively more recent traditional examples of this tendency.

      There is no doubt excellent reason for such acclaim as this. The clarity, force, and elegance of Nāgārjuna's arguments are undeniable. They can easily overwhelm, and often have. However, the lavish traditional and modern appreciations of Nāgārjuna's thought have not been without untoward consequences for our understanding of other varieties of Mahāyāna. The Mahāyāna is a far more various thing than a reading of the Kārikas, or even of their antecedent Prajñāpāramitā scriptures, would indicate; and the Mādhyamika position has hardly gone unchallenged in Buddhist intellectual history. Indeed, much of the subsequent history of Mahāyāna thought may be read as a cumulative qualification of the Śūnyavāda that one finds in the Perfection of Insight Literature and in Nāgārjuna. Such at least was the case with the Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha traditions; and when Buddhism found its way to China, Chinese Buddhist thinkers often expressed a clear preference for the later qualifications or modulations of Mādhyamika rather than for the severity of an unadulterated Nāgārjunism. It may well be that our enthusiasm for Nāgārjuna along with the comparative complexity and inaccessibility of other traditions have predisposed us to give less attention than deserved to the alternative forms of Mahāyāna. Should this be so, the remarks that follow may be taken as an effort at compensation.
      The criticisms, explicit or implicit, that have been leveled against classical Śūnyavāda are many and diverse. One might undertake to examine the question of whether Mādhyamika is normative for the whole of Mahāyāna by investigating, for example, the claim of the Madhyāntavibhāga that an understanding of emptiness is crude and incomplete unless tempered by an understanding of the reality and potency of constructive imagination. For the Yogācāra authors of this text, emptiness is always and ever coincident with the imagination of the unreal (abhūtaparikalpa; hsü-wang fen-pieh) and it is only the coefficiency of the two principles that can wholly account for the way things really are. It is in recognition of this—the essential duplexity of reality—that the Madhyāntavibhāga may say, as one would not expect Nāgārjuna to say:

              na śūnyaṁ napi caśūnyam tasmat sarvvam vidhīyate
              satvad asatvāt satvāc ca madhyama pratipac ca sā

              ku shuo i-ch'ieh fa    fei k'ung fei pu-k'ung
              yu wu chi yu ku    shih ming chung-tao i

              Therefore it is said that all dharmas
              Are neither empty nor nonempty,
              Because they exist, do not exist, and yet again exist.
              This is the meaning of the "middle-path."

      One might choose also to consider the theory of the "three revolutions of the wheel of the law" found in the Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra:

      Formerly, in the second period and for the sake only of those aspiring to practice of the Mahayana-reckoning on the fact that all dharmas lack own-being, neither arise nor perish, and are originally calm and essentially of nirvāṇa—the Lord turned the Wheel of the Law which is characterized by a hidden intent (i yin-mi hsiang). [But] this too (i.e., like the first turning) had [other teachings] superior to it to which it deferred. It was of a sense still to be interpreted (yu wei liao-id; neyartha), and [thus] the subject of much dispute.
      In the present third period and for the sake of aspirants to all vehicles—reckoning [again] on the fact that all dharmas lack own-being, neither arise nor perish, are originally calm and essentially of nirvāṇa, and have the lack of own-being as their nature-the Lord has turned the Wheel of the Law which is characterized [this time] by a manifest meaning (i hsien-liao hsiang). This is the most rare and precious [of teachings]. There is nothing superior to this Turning of the Wheel of Law by the Lord and nothing to which it defers. It is of truly explicit meaning (chen liao-i; nīthārtha) and not the subject of disputes.

      The third revolution of the dharmacakra here described is, of course, the annunciation of what was to become Yogācāra Buddhism. The second corresponds to the Śunyavāda of the Prajñāpāramitā canon and, proleptically, to its Mādhyamika systematization. The implication of this passage is that although both dispensations of the law teach emptiness (here called "lack of own-being," "nonarising," etc.), the Prajñāpāramitā and Mādhyamika versions of the doctrine are inchoate, eliptical, imprecise and a source of controversy, whereas the Yogācāra version is definitive, explicit, and not liable to conflicting interpretations.
      A third approach might be to follow the masterful lead of Ruegg, Takasaki, and Wayman in considering the claims of the Tathāgatagarbha tradition to superiority over classical Śunyavāda. The Tathāgatagarbha, after all, is a tradition which argues forcefully that the reality of all things is as much "nonempty" (aśūnya; pu-k'ung) as it is "empty" (śūnya; k'ung) and which employs such un-Mādhyamika terminology in its locutions about reality as "permanence" (nītya; chang), "purity" (śubha; ching), and even "self" (ātman; wo).
      A fourth option, and the one we take here, is to look at the differences among Mādhyamika and the other varieties of Mahāyāna through the eyes of those Chinese Buddhist who, in devising their own systems of thought, were given the opportunity to compare and choose. I refer here to the numerous sixth-and-seventh-century Chinese thinkers who formulated "division of the doctrine" (p'an-chiao) and similar schemes in the course of fashioning new and uniquely sinic schools of Buddhism. Almost without exception these thinkers chose to subordinate Śūnyavāda of the sort one finds in the Perfection of Insight literature and the Kārikās to other kinds of Mahāyāna, often to doctrines and texts of Tathāgatagarbha provenance or association. The Hua-yen p'an-chiao system, for example, relegated Śūnyavāda to the category of "incipient" or "elementary" (shih) Mahāyāna but held the Tathāgatagarbha tradition to be representative of an "advanced" or "final" (chung) Mahāyāna, both of which fell short of the perfection of its own "rounded" or "comprehensive" (yüan) teaching.
      A theme that unites all of these challenges to Mādhyamika primacy—the Yoācāra, the Tathāgatagarbha, and the Chinese—is a profound dissatisfaction with the seemingly relentless apophasis of Nāgārjuna and, to a lesser extent, of his sources. All are able to acknowledge Nāgārjuna's caution—that uncritical use of the constructive language of philosophical views is a species of intellectual bondage—but they acknowledge it only as a caution, a corrective to false views. They insist, however, that the way of denial and negation, the unremitting distrust of positive language, is necessary but not sufficient unto enlightenment. It allows one to fend off error but does not actively advance one toward the truth and may even impede the practical religious life by generating more subtle forms of error and by inhibiting compassion. Therefore, the various alternatives to Mādhyamika that we have mentioned took it upon themselves to reassert the salvific value of kataphasis, the spiritual utility of positive and affirmative language. They chose, in short, eloquence over silence.

      In what follows we offer for consideration one example of the rejection of an exclusive apophasis in favor of a disciplined kataphasis. We will examine the argument of a brief but important text entitled Discernments of the Dharma-Element of the Avataṁsaka (Hua-yen fa-chieh kuan-men) attributed to Tu-shunq (557-640), the reputed "first patriarch" of China's Hua-yen (Avataṁsaka) school of Buddhism. This very influential text has been put to many uses in the history of East Asian Buddhism, both within and without the Hua-yen tradition. It is, of course, not simply a text "about Buddhist theories of language." But without denying the broader range of its meanings we do suggest that it does serve our particular purpose well; it offers a significant vision of the place of language in the religious life. (Gimello, "Apophatic and Kataphatic Discourse in Mahāyāna," 117–20)
Gimello, Robert M. "Apophatic and Kataphatic Discourse in Mahāyāna: A Chinese View." Philosophy East and West 26, no. 2 (1976): 117–36.
Article
Appendix F: Inventory List of Manuscripts in Sanskrit, Khotanese, and Kuchean
The following preface was added by Aurel Stein to Appendix F, which was prepared for this publication by A. F. Rudolf Hoernle:

[NOTE. The materials embodied in this list were received in a final form from Dr. Hoernle. early in 1918. The typed press copy prepared from them was after his death in November of that year checked with the original under the kind supervision of Dr. F. W. Thomas.

Owing to various reasons difficulty was experienced about verifying the exact reading of all extracts quoted by Dr. Hoernle from particular MSS., mainly in Khotanese language. It being thus impossible to assure in this respect the degree of accuracy which that most painstaking collaborator would have aimed at, I have thought it advisable to reduce the reproduction of such quotations within narrow limits. For convenient reference by future students the original Inventory ' slips' as received from Dr. Hoernle's hand, as well as a typed copy of them, have been deposited at the India Office Library.—A. STEIN.]

Read more here . . .
Stein, Aurel. "Appendix F: Inventory List of Manuscripts in Sanskrit, Khotanese, and Kuchean". Prepared by A. F. Rudolf Hoernle. In Serindia: Detailed Report of Explorations in Central Asia and Westernmost China. Vol. 3, Text, 1432–59. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921. http://dsr.nii.ac.jp/toyobunko/VIII-5-B2-9/V-3/page/0402.html.en
Article
Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna
The Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna (Dasheng qixinlun) is one of the most influential philosophical texts in East Asian Buddhism. It is most important for developing the Indian Buddhist doctrine of an inherent potentiality for Buddhahood (tathāgatagarbha) into a monistic ontology based on the mind as the ultimate ground of all experience. Its most significant contribution to East Asian Buddhist thought is its formulation of the idea of original enlightenment (benjue, or in Japanese, hongaku). (Source Accessed June 3, 2020)
Gregory, Peter. "Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna." In Vol. 2 of Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward Craig, 603–4. London: Routledge, 1998.
Article
BCom ldan rig ral cho Daijō kukyōron sōgonka: Wayaku oyobi kōtei tekusuto (1)
Kano, Kazuo. "bCom ldan rig ral cho Daijō kukyōron sōgonka: Wayaku oyobi kōtei tekusuto (1)" (A Critical Edition and Translation of bCom ldan rig ral's rGyud bla ma'i ṭī ka rgyan gyi me tog (1)). Kōyasan Daigaku Ronsō (Journal of Kōyasan University) 45 (2010): 13–55.
Kano, Kazuo. "bCom ldan rig ral cho Daijō kukyōron sōgonka: Wayaku oyobi kōtei tekusuto (1)" (A Critical Edition and Translation of bCom ldan rig ral's rGyud bla ma'i ṭī ka rgyan gyi me tog (1)). Kōyasan Daigaku Ronsō (Journal of Kōyasan University) 45 (2010): 13–55.
Article
BCom ldan rig ral cho Daijō kukyōron sōgonka: Wayaku oyobi kōtei tekusuto (2): Hōshōron I.4–22 no chūkai
Kano, Kazuo. "bCom ldan rig ral cho Daijō kukyōron sōgonka: Wayaku oyobi kōtei tekusuto (2): Hōshōron I.4–22 no chūkai" (A Critical Edition and Annotated Translation of bCom ldan rig ral's rGyud bla ma'i ṭī ka rgyan gyi me tog (2): Commentary on Ratnagotravibhāga I.4–22). Kōyasan Daigaku Ronsō (Journal of Kōyasan University) 48 (2013): 1–14.
Kano, Kazuo. "bCom ldan rig ral cho Daijō kukyōron sōgonka: Wayaku oyobi kōtei tekusuto (2): Hōshōron I.4–22 no chūkai" (A Critical Edition and Annotated Translation of bCom ldan rig ral's rGyud bla ma'i ṭī ka rgyan gyi me tog (2): Commentary on Ratnagotravibhāga I.4–22). Kōyasan Daigaku Ronsō (Journal of Kōyasan University) 48 (2013): 1–14.
Article
Beings, Non-Beings, and Buddhas: Contrasting Notions of Tathāgatagarbha in the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta and *Mahābherī Sūtra
This article concerns a little studied text of the Mahāyānist tathāgatagarbha literature, namely the *Mahābherī Sūtra, and its relation to other Indian texts which advance forms of tathāgatagarbha doctrine. Its focus will be the contrast between the content of this sūtra and the only other text of the tathāgatagarbha tradition which discusses a particular issue: the unchanging mass of existing sentient beings, without the possibility of any decrease or increase in their number. This is an issue addressed also by the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta, which I shall argue presents a more sophisticated and likely later consideration, both of this matter and of tathāgatagarbha doctrine, than that exhibited by the *Mahābherī Sūtra. Though it is not clear that either text knew of the other, their different treatments of how one should understand the nature and number of existing sentient beings casts light on their respective places in two distinct strains—one very likely older than the other—of Indian tathāgatagarbha thought.
Jones, Christopher V. "Beings, Non-Beings, and Buddhas: Contrasting Notions of Tathāgatagarbha in the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta and *Mahābherī Sūtra." Journal of the Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies 10 (2016): 53–84. http://jocbs.org/index.php/jocbs/article/view/133.
Article
*Bodhigarbha: Preliminary Notes on an Early Dzokchen Family of Buddha-Nature Concepts
It has recently been alleged by scholars of the Tibetan "Ancient" (rnying ma) tradition that although buddha-nature theory was well known in Tibet from as early as the eighth century, it played quite an insignificant role in early Nyingma exegesis.[1] I intend in this chapter to challenge this assertion by demonstrating that buddha-nature concepts played a highly significant part in Dzokchen thought during the so-called early diffusion (snga dar) period, albeit mostly in the form of autochthonous *bodhigarbha (byang chub snying po) or bodhi-nature concepts rather than their well-known Indian counterpart tathāgatagarbha[2] (de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po), as well as the as yet unattested but virtually synonymous *sugatagarbha[3] (bde bar gshegs pa'i snying po), which are both usually translated as buddha-nature. Although this family of terms is widespread in preclassical Dzokchen exegesis and therefore of inestimable importance for understanding the early development of buddha-nature theories in Tibet, it has hitherto received no attention in contemporary Buddhist studies. In determining the reasons for the obvious predilection for this indigenous family of buddha-nature concepts from the eighth to eleventh centuries, my aim is to clarify how bodhi-nature was understood by early Dzokchen authors, why it was distinguished from mainstream Mahāyāna-based buddha-nature concepts, and how it eventually became overshadowed by these latter during the classical period (13th–14th c.) as Indian non-tantric buddha-nature theories and controversies took center stage.[4] It is hoped that this short survey of Dzokchen bodhi-nature ideas and their cultural milieu will fill some gaps in our still fragmentary understanding of the origins of Tathāgatagarbha theory in Tibet. At the very least, it will show that a decidedly affirmative indigenous current of buddha-nature teachings flourished in Tibet several centuries prior to the ascendancy of the New (gsar ma) traditions and their polemically heated debates over rangtong (rang stong) and zhentong (gzhan stong) interpretations of buddha-nature. (Higgins, "*Bodhigarbha," 29)
Notes
  1. Wangchuk, "rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations" 179. "Yet even though the [buddha-nature] theory has certainly been present from early times in the rÑiṅ-ma literature, it seems to have played quite an insignificant role and never gained prominence or an independent status, in the way it was conceived, for instance, in the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra" This conclusion is repeated by Almogi, Rong-zom-pa's Discourse on Buddhology 160.
  2. For a detailed discussion of the term buddha-nature, see Zimmermann 2002, 39-40.
  3. Although *sugatagarbha is not attested in Sanskrit (see Seyfort Ruegg, Traite du tathagatagarbha 68), Wangchuk, "rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations" 178 and n. 21, points out (on the basis of references provided to him by Kazuo Kano) that "the term bde gśegs sñiṅ po does occur in the Tibetan translations of the Aṅgulimālīyasūtra (P fol. 174a5; D fol. 166b2: bde gśegs sñiṅ po theg pa che las skyes) and Ghanavyūhasūtra (P fol. 62b 1; D fol. 55b 1: bde gśegs sñiṅ po dge ba'aṅ de; cf., however, Taisho 747a7) for which the Sanskrit is not extant." We may add that the term bde [bar] gshegs [pa'i] snying po occurs in a large number of Tibetan translations of Indian works. A search of the Derge Bka' 'gyur and Bstan 'gyur canons using the contraction bde gshegs snying po turned up occurrences in the following sūtras in addition to those mentioned earlier: Bhadrakalpika (D 94), Sūtrasammucayabhāṣtaratnālokālaṃkāra (D 3935), Laṅkāvatāravṛttitathāgatahṛdayālaṃkāra (D 4031), and Sūtrālaṃkārapaṇḍārtha (D4031). It is also found in twenty-two tantric works: D 453, 829, 832, 833, 834, 837 (these last four belong to the Māyājāla-Guhyagarbha cycle), 1202, 1401, 1407, 1414, 1613, 1630, 1644, 2128, 2304, 2626, 2816, 2834, 2837, 3713, 3723, and 4449. The unabbreviated bde bar gshegs pa'i snying po occurs in the following tantric works: Kaṇha's Hevajranāmamahātantrarājadvikalpamāyapañjikāsṃrtinipāda (Rgyud kyi rgyal po dgyes pa'i rdo rje zhes bya ba sgyu ma brtag pa gnyis pa'i dka 'grel dran pa'i 'byung gnas), which, however, does not contain the term buddha-nature, D 1187; Mañjuśrīnāmasaṃgītiṭīkāvimalaprabhā ('Jam dpal gyi mtshan yang dag par brjod pa'i grel pa dri ma med pa'i od), D 1398; Bhagavatsarvadurgatipariśodhanatejorajatathāgatāhatsamyaksaṃbuddhamahātantrarājavyākhyāsundarālaṃkāra (Bcom Idan 'das de bzhin gshegs pa dgra bcom pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas ngan song thams cad yongs su sbyong ba gzi brjid kyi rgyal po chen po'i rnam par bshad pa mdzes pa'i rgyan), D 2626; Vajravidāraṇānāmadhāraṇīpaṭalakramabhāṣyavṛttipradīpa (Rdo rje rnam par 'joms pa'i gzung zhes bya ba'i rim par phye ba'i rgya cher 'grel ba gsal ba'i sgron ma), D 2687; Tantrārthāvatāravyākhyāna (Rgyud kyi don la 'jug pa'i grel bshad), D 2502; Mahābalikarmakramavṛtti (Gtor ma chen po'i las kyi rim pa'i grel pa), D 3773. This is not the place for an analysis of these occurrences. It is hoped that future research may determine whether any of them can be traced to an extant Indian work containing the term *sugatagarbha.
  4. On problems of Tibetan historical periodization and a useful variant based on existing schemes, see Cuevas, "Some Reflections." For a useful doctrinal-historical periodization scheme based on developments in Tibetan Buddhist epistemology, see van der Kuijp 1989. Loosely following van der Kuijp's proposed periodization, we can distinguish (1) the Ancient (rnying ma) period (8th-9th c.) corresponding to the Early Dissemination (snga dar) and Early Translation (snga gyur) period, which witnessed a massive program of translating Indian works into Tibetan and the growth of early Tibetan monastic communities under the sponsorship of the Tibetan Empire; (2) the Preclassical period (late 10th-12th c.) corresponding to the Late Dissemination (phyi dar) and New Translation (gsar gyur) periods following the collapse of the Tibetan Imperium (and ensuing Period of Fragmentation, ca. 910-1056), which witnessed a campaign of new reformed translations of Indian Buddhist texts and the ascendency of the so-called New (gsar ma) Tibetan Buddhist schools (and their scholastic traditions) that were henceforth distinguished from the Ancients (rnying ma); (3) the Classical period (13th-14th c.), which was characterized by the expansion of the major Tibetan Buddhist schools and the consolidation and systematization of their representative doctrines and practices; and (4) the Postclassical period (15th c. onward) characterized by the intensification of intersectarian dialogue and polemicism fueled by the increasingly fractious sectarian politics as Tibetan orders vied for patronage by foreign powers (Mongols and Chinese) and domestic aristocratic clans.
Higgins, David. "*Bodhigarbha: Preliminary Notes on an Early Dzokchen Family of Buddha-Nature Concepts." In The Other Emptiness: Rethinking the Zhentong Buddhist Discourse in Tibet, edited by Michael R. Sheehy and Klaus-Dieter Mathes, 29–52. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2019.
Article
Buddha Nature Thought and Mysticism
Sallie B. King, in her essay "Buddha Nature Thought and Mysticism", offers a characterization of the phenomenon of mysticism and analyzes three Buddha Nature texts to see whether and to what extent the thought of those texts may properly be called 'mystical'. All three of the texts she discusses are extant only in Chinese. Two of them—the Buddha Nature Treatise (Fo hsing lun) and the Supreme Basis Sūtra (Fo shuo wu shang i ching)—are translations made by Paramārtha in the sixth century CE; and there is some question as to whether he may have actually composed them rather than simply translated them. The third, the No Increase, No Decrease Sutra, was also translated into Chinese in the sixth century CE (by Bodhiruci), and there almost certainly was an Indic original for this text. Each of these texts belongs, more or less, to the Tathāgatagarbha tradition, but King wishes to classify only the Buddha Nature Treatise and the No Increase, No Decrease Sūtra as properly mystical texts. The Supreme Basis Sūtra, she argues, endorses devotionalism rather than direct mystical experience for the practitioner; it cannot therefore be classified as a mystical text. King therefore distinguishes different threads or emphases within the Buddha Nature thought of the period with which she deals. (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to Buddha Nature, 5–6)
King, Sallie B. "Buddha Nature Thought and Mysticism." In Buddha Nature: A Festschrift in Honor of Minoru Kiyota, edited by Paul J. Griffiths and John P. Keenan, 139–52. Tokyo: Buddhist Books International, 1990.
Article
Buddha Nature and the Concept of Person
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

Buddhism has a profound and thoroughly developed set of teachings on human being. One might well argue that the question of human being is the question par excellence with which the Buddhist tradition as a whole struggles. According to the traditional account, for example, the point of departure for the Buddha's own search, discoveries, and teachings was the dilemma of the human condition. Moreover, vast numbers of Buddhist texts speak out of or address human experience as such, consciously focusing upon it as the source of both question and answer. Nonetheless, many questions a modern Westerner asks as a matter of course about human being are not directly addressed in the Buddhist texts. There are of course important reasons for this. Our concept of and assumptions about human individuality are profoundly different from Buddhist views of the same. Our two worlds of discourse about the value and meaning of finite bodily existence, the course of history, the meaning of suffering, and the nature of possible human greatness are set up on entirely different foundations. Thus, for a contemporary Westerner to ask the question "What is a person? What is a human being?" of a Buddhist text is to set oneself up to receive an answer that does not satisfy the intent of the question. Yet, while Buddhist views and assumptions differ so markedly from our own, Buddhist texts reveal in their own way a preoccupation with the human condition as intent as that of our own hyperindividualistic, anthropocentric culture.
      With such a shared fixation, it is inevitable that persons on both sides of the cultural boundaries will attempt to gain light from the other side on this subject, despite the incommensurability of each other's questions and answers. The present essay is one such attempt: not an East-West comparison, but an effort to address a Buddhist text from the perspective of cross-cultural philosophy (still, despite the name, a thoroughly Western enterprise) . Herein I will engage in dialogue the Buddha Nature Treatise (Chinese: Fo Hsing Luna; hereafter, BNT), a text representative of the Buddha nature tradition that contains an extensive discussion of the concept of Buddha nature, a crucial component, if not the most crucial component, of the East Asian Buddhist concept of human being. I will attempt to wrest from the text answers to two categories of questions-it s view of the ontological nature of human being and its view of the existential status of human beings. In the course of the discussion I will ask such questions as: What roles do individuality and freedom play in the view of human being portrayed in this text? What value, if any, does an individual human personality possess? Is there anything of value in human history? Clearly, the text itself does not speak in these terms; these are the questions of a twentieth-century, philosophically inclined American. In order to bridge the cultural gap, I will first give a summary account of the text's concept of Buddha nature in its own terms and in its own format. Then, acknowledging that the text itself neither speaks this language nor shares my concerns, I will put my questions to the text and attempt to extract from the text its implications for the subject of my concern. In other words, I cannot claim that the author of the BNT does make the statements I will give as responses to my questions about human being, but I do claim that these views are implicit in and follow from the statements he does make about Buddha nature. Granting that human freedom requires us to expect the unexpected, nonetheless, I believe that if the author of the BNT were here today and could engage in dialogue with me, as long as my interlocutor remained consistent, something close to the views I will articulate in the course of this essay would emerge. (King, "Buddha Nature and the Concept of Person," 151–52)
King, Sallie B. "Buddha Nature and the Concept of Person." Philosophy East and West 39, no. 2 (1989): 151–70.
Article
Buddha Nature and the Omniscient Mind
Kyabje Lama Zopa Rinpoche explained how we can attain the state of the omniscient mind at the 14th Kopan Course in 1981. This is an edited excerpt from Lecture 3, Section One of the course. Click here to read more.
Zopa, Thubten. "Buddha Nature and the Omniscient Mind." Lecture 3, Section One of the Fourteenth Kopan Course at Kopan Monastery, Nepal, 1981. Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive, 2020. https://www.lamayeshe.com/article/buddha-nature-and-omniscient-mind.
Article
Buddha Nature as Myth
William G. Grosnick, in his essay "Buddha Nature as Myth", makes a distinction between "empirically verifiable propositions", statements that make claims about the nature of reality whose truth both is and is expected to be capable of clear articulation and demonstration, and "mythic views of reality" that provide a nonverifiable framework of great religious power for the expression of fundamentally important religious orientations. He then argues that Buddha Nature thought—at least as expressed in the early Indic sūtras devoted to it—is of the latter kind. Its function, he suggests, is to provide a mythic orientation toward the world and the religious potential of the individual Buddhist, and so to make the practice of Buddhism possible. It is just because "all beings universally possess Buddha Nature" that the practice of the path is possible. (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to Buddha Nature, 4)
Grosnick, William. "Buddha Nature as Myth." In Buddha Nature: A Festschrift in Honor of Minoru Kiyota, edited by Paul J. Griffiths and John P. Keenan, 65–74. Tokyo: Buddhist Books International, 1990.
Article
Buddha Nature: Sharon Salzberg Post on Our Inner Lives
A blog post about buddha-nature by a contemporary American teacher.
Salzberg, Sharon. "Buddha Nature." Our Inner Lives: Spirit, Faith, and Action (blog). A project of Feminist.com. January 6, 2011. https://www.feminist.com/ourinnerlives/inspiration_realhappiness8.html.
Article
Buddha Nature: The Inconceivable Inseparability of Emptiness and Compassionate Awareness
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs

To understand what is meant by “Buddha Nature,” we can look at the story of the three turnings of the wheel of Dharma taught by Shakyamuni Buddha. The first turning of the Dharma wheel is the four noble truths: that discontent arises from grasping the ever-changing phenomena of body and mind as “me,” and that freedom from this discontent is revealed through the path of not grasping anything as truly me. The four noble truths is a kind of deconstruction method. However, in this first turning, all the different elements that we can deconstruct this person into really do exist. Earth, wind, fire and water, for example: those kind of physical elements, when you break them down into their smallest bits, are indestructible elemental energies or physical matter, atoms. Early Buddhists, who were first turning exponents, had this kind of theory—that the world is made up of atoms—several centuries B.C., long before modern scientists discovered atoms. We don’t really exist as independent “persons”; we are a conglomeration of all this stuff that we think is a real “me,” but if we look closely, we only find atoms. This turning of the Dharma wheel was only the first.

Read more here
Henkel, Kokyo. "Buddha Nature: The Inconceivable Inseparability of Emptiness and Compassionate Awareness." Unpublished manuscript. n.d., PDF file. https://kokyohenkel.weebly.com/uploads/1/2/7/4/127410773/buddha_nature.pdf.
Article
Buddha in the Storehouse: Mi bskyod rdo rje on the Relationship between Tathāgatagarbha and Ālayavijñāna
This paper addresses the age-old question of how buddha nature (tathāgatagarbha) relates to Yogācāra psychology, focusing on the Eighth Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje’s (1507-1554) responses to this question. In the centuries following the first appearance of tathāgatagarbha doctrines in India (circa 2nd c. CE), opinions became divided over whether buddha nature should be identified with or distinguished from the Yogācāra idea of a substratum consciousness (ālayavijñāna). The topic attracted a great deal of discussion and debate among Buddhist scholars, both within and beyond the borders of India. At stake were a set of specific doctrinal issues as to whether and how the Yogācāra ālayavijñāna-vāsanā model could be reconciled with [1] buddha nature theory [2] tantric buddha nature proxies such as the unconditioned ground (gzhi) and causal continuum (rgyu rgyud) [3] Indian and Chinese Buddhist conceptions of an immaculate consciousness (amalavijñāna) and [4] certain anti-foundationalist strains of Middle Way (Madhyamaka) philosophy that rejected any transcendental basis of consciousness. The Karma pa’s repeated forays into these contested subject areas reveal time and again his commitment to reconcile two contrasting lines of Buddhist thought and praxis: [1] the affirmative appraisal of the nature of mind and reality emphasized in Yogācāra and tathāgatagarbha classics, the tantras, and the songs and writings of the Buddhist mahāsiddhas and [2] the metaphysically disinclined stance of the Middle Way (Madhyamaka) philosophy that avoided extremes of affirmation and denial, existence and nonexistence. To adequately appreciate his contributions to such issues, I will first sketch in rough strokes the historical evolution of the ālayavijñāna doctrine and its complex confrontations with tathāgatagarbha doctrine in India. Against this backdrop, attention will turn to the Karma pa’s contextualist framing of the ālayavijñāna-tathāgatagarbha relationship in terms of a progressive understanding that begins with differentiation and culminates in unity. His is a view that stresses the need to initially distinguish between conditions of spiritual awakening (such as tathāgatagarbha) and delusion (such as ālayavijñāna) in order to eventually realize their underlying unity (zung ’jug) by recognizing buddha nature as an ever-present continuum (rgyud) of awareness that is a precondition of the substratum consciousness that derives and deviates from it. In his attempts to strike a balance between traditional differentiation and unity models, we encounter a thinker who was as confident about the mind’s ability to discover its own unborn and nonconceptual nature as he was skeptical about its ability to discover any underlying metaphysical foundation. (Source: Peeters Online Journals)
Higgins, David. "Buddha in the Storehouse: Mi bskyod rdo rje on the Relationship between Tathāgatagarbha and Ālayavijñāna." Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 42 (2019): 169–230.
Article
Buddha-Nature (1): Revering Buddha-Nature
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

Emulating Never Disrespectful Bodhisattva

The Quest of the Monk Sōō to Practice Revering Buddha-Nature

The "marathon monks" of Japan are one of the iconic images of Japanese Buddhism, familiar to people the world over. These monks walk excruciating mountain circuits on Mount Hiei near Kyoto and Mount Kinpu in Nara Prefecture for a summer retreat of one hundred days. A handful in the posar period have performed the insufferable thousand-day version of this retreat, and also completed additional ascetic practices to gain the title of Great Acarya. Having achieved the humanly impossible, they are sometimes referred to as living buddhas.
      Hagiographic sources tell us that the founder of this practice, the Tendai monk Sōō (831-918), was motivated to seek enlightenment when as a novice monk he studied the part of the Lotus Sutra that tells the story of Never Disrespectful Bodhisattva. Sōō set his heart on emulating Never Disrespectful's way of practice, walking about making obeisances to other people as future buddhas. Unfortunately, Sōō's responsibilities to look after his teacher, and the daily task of going into the mountains to harvest anise-tree leaves for the offerings at the monastery's central hall, prevented him from dedicating himself solely to the reverence of other people's buddha-nature. According to tradition, however, Sōō's daily forays into the mountain became the origin of today's marathon-monk practice, in which ascetic monks revere the shrines of Buddhist deities and places where Japanese divinities abide in the mountains. It is often said that the marathon monk's true object of reverence is the buddha-nature of the natural world.
      The Lotus Sutra's Never Disrespectful Bodhisattva is an archetype of respect for the inherent dignity of sentient beings. As told in chapter 20 of the Lotus Sutra, one time in the past there was a monk who did not practice by chanting sutras but instead went around making obeisance to every person he met, telling them, "I would never dare to disrespect you, because surely you are all to become buddhas!" As the reader can probably anticipate, the Lotus Sutra tells us that Never Disrespectful was oftentimes ridiculed, even physically attacked, but he bore it all patiently and through this practice not only purified his mind and body but also transformed the hearts and minds of the people around him. The Lotus Sutra tells us that performing this practice leads to quickly attaining the Buddha Way. (Scarangello, "Buddha-Nature (1)," 28-29) (Read entire article here)
Scarangello, Dominick. "Buddha-Nature (1): Revering Buddha-Nature." Dharma World 45 (2018): 28–36.
Article
Buddha-Nature (2): We Are Children of the Buddha
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

In the last installment of this column we explored the concept of buddha-nature—its meaning, the Lotus Sutra's teaching of revering buddha-nature, and how Buddhists can reveal the buddha-nature of themselves and others by demonstrating respect for people and discovering their goodness. This time we will consider another way of realizing buddha-nature that is inspired by the stories of the Lotus Sutra. Rissho Kosei-kai members speak of awakening to buddha-nature as attaining the conviction that both oneself and others are, in the allegorical language of the Lotus Sutra, "children of the Buddha." Rev. Nikkyo Niwano, the founder of Rissho Kosei-kai, held that feelings of worthlessness thwarted people's ability to improve their own lives and brought them much suffering, and for this reason he employed the sutra's allegory of the parent-child relationship to help people see themselves as future buddhas and heirs to all the qualities that the Buddha Shakyamuni possessed. The belief that living beings are children of the Buddha also encourages the appreciation of all human life. As members of the human family, all people are our brothers and sisters, possessing the same inherent dignity and human potential as the Buddha. Today some people may not be entirely comfortable with the gendered language of the Lotus Sutra's allegory, but a close reading of the text can open pathways to an understanding appropriate to contemporary society and twenty-first century social norms. (Scarangello, "Buddha-Nature (2)," 35) (Read the entire article here)
Scarangello, Dominick. "Buddha-Nature (2): We Are Children of the Buddha." Dharma World 46 (2019): 35–41. https://rk-world.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/DW19_Spring.pdf.
Article
Buddha-Nature and Personality as the Ground of Ethics: A Metaethical Dialogue between Dōgen and Berdyaev
This paper seeks to contribute to the ongoing Buddhist-Christian dialogue by bringing together the teachings of Zen Master Dōgen and the Russian Christian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev. This dialogue discusses a metaethical question: What is the foundation of ethical practice? I aim to show that Dōgen's idea of "buddha-nature" and Berdyaev's idea of "personality" can be understood as the foundations of ethical practice in ways that are similar and mutually clarifying in their total affirmation of human temporal existence. We begin by discussing the general contours of Dōgen's practice-realization and Berdyaev's creative ethics, and then proceed to a comparative examination of the foundation of ethics found in Dōgen's notion of Buddha-nature and Berdyaev's notion of personality. The comparison considers four facets of Buddha-nature and personality: being, time, nothingness, and impermanence. First, we show how both thinkers consider the ground of ethics to be something inseparable from the entire being of an individual and the being of all existence as a whole. This refutes the tendency to see the foundation of goodness as a mere fragment of human existence or as restricted to particular existents. Second, we show how both thinkers consider this foundation to be manifest not merely in the future or the past, but in every moment seen as a whole in itself. Third, we examine the collision between this immanent foundation and individuality, and show how the non-substantiality of Buddha-nature and God make room for creative and individual expressions of authenticity. Finally, we consider the problem of impermanence, and show how the ground of ethics is not an escape from impermanence but an acceptance and embracing of this impermanence as the ground of the efficacy and dynamism of ethical practice. (Source: Budhi)
Sevilla, Anton Luis. "Buddha-Nature and Personality as the Ground of Ethics: A Metaethical Dialogue between Dōgen and Berdyaev." Budhi 16, no. 1 (2012): 42–73.
Article
Buddha-Nature and the Logic of Pantheism
Buddha-nature (tathāgatagarbha) is a central topic the in Mahāyāna Buddhist thought. As the pure nature of mind and reality, it conveys the nature of being and the relationship between the buddha(s) and sentient beings. Buddha-nature is that which allows for sentient beings to become buddhas. It is the living potential for awakening.
      In this chapter I will look into interpretations of buddha-nature starting with the Sublime Continuum (Uttaratantra, ca. fourth century), the first commentarial treatise focused on this subject. I will then present its role(s) in Mahāyāna Buddhism in general, and in the interpretations of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka in particular. Next I will discuss the role of buddha-nature as a key element in the theory and practice of Buddhist tantra, which will lead into a discussion of this doctrine in light of pantheism ("all is God"). Thinking of buddha-nature in terms of pantheism can help bring to light significant dimensions of this strand of Buddhist thought. (Duckworth, introduction, 235)
Duckworth, Douglas S. "Buddha-Nature and the Logic of Pantheism." In The Buddhist World, edited by John Powers, 235–47. London: Routledge, 2016. https://sites.temple.edu/duckworth/files/2016/01/logic-of-pantheism.pdf.
Article
Buddha-Nature of Insentient Beings
This encyclopedia entry discusses the historical origins and dissemination of the idea that Buddha-nature exists not only in sentient beings but also in insentient things. This doctrine emerged in various ways in medieval China with thinkers such as Jingying Huiyuan (523-592), Jiaxiang Jizang (549-623), and most prominently with Jingxi Zhanran (711-782) of the Tiantai school. This position later spread to Japan, being advocated by figures such as Kūkai and Dōgen. The underlying rationale for this position is generally grounded on the principle of nonduality and the idea of the Buddha’s all-pervading and embracing nature. The notion of the Buddha-nature of insentient beings is not only a doctrinal matter but also functions as a meditation technique whereby one learns to view phenomena as direct expressions of ultimate reality and to see oneself and the “outside” world as identical.
Chen, Shuman. "Buddha-Nature of Insentient Beings." In Vol. 1 of Encyclopedia of Psychology and Religion. 2nd ed. Edited by David A. Leeming, Kathryn Madden, and Stanton Marlan, 208–12. Boston: Springer, 2014.
Article
Buddha-Nature or Buddha Within?: Revisiting the Meaning of Tathāgata-garbha
The topic on what the compound tathāgata-garbha means has indeed a long history of research in the !eld of Mahāyāna Buddhism. However, despite a good number of studies so far executed on this topic, it is most unfortunate for us to recognize that the above question remains unsolved. The present paper, therefore, tries again to solve the question through an analytical inquiry into the Ratnagotravibhāga (RGV) in rather a wide perspective.
Saitō, Akira. "Buddha-Nature or Buddha Within?: Revisiting the Meaning of Tathāgata-garbha." In "What is Tathāgatagarbha: Buddha-Nature or Buddha Within?" Edited by Akira Saitō. Special issue, Acta Asiatica 118 (2020): 1–15.
Article
Buddha-nature, Critical Buddhism, and Early Chan
This article begins with a reflection on why medieval Chinese Buddhist thought has not been more conspicuous in recent comparative work on Buddhism and Western philosophy. The Japanese proponents of "Critical Buddhism" (hihan bukkyō 批判仏教), Matsumoto Shirō 松本史朗 and Hakamaya Noriaki 袴谷憲昭, would see this neglect as merited since, in their view, East Asian Buddhism in general, and Chinese Chan in particular, is philosophically crippled owing to its embrace of tathāgatagarbha and buddha-nature thought. Indeed, Matsumoto singles out Shenhui 荷澤神會 (670-762), one of the architects of the Southern School of Chan, as an example of the early Chan advocacy of buddha-nature doctrine.
      This article is not concerned with whether buddha-nature and tathāgatagarbha thought is actually deleterious to critical philosophical work. Rather, the concern is to demonstrate that, far from embracing buddha-nature doctrine, the eighth-century founders of Southern Chan had serious concerns with it. Evidence for this is found in: (1) the writings of Shenhui, notably in his opposition to the doctrine of the "buddha-nature of insentient objects" (wuqing foxing 無情佛性); and (2) the Platform Scripture of the Sixth Patriarch (Liuzu tanjing 六祖壇經), particularly in the variant versions of Huineng's famous "enlightenment verse." Thus the Southern School may be viewed as a forerunner of the Critical Buddhist anti-dhātuvāda polemics. The article closes with comments on the ongoing problems Chinese Buddhist exegetes had in marrying the metaphysical monism of Yogācāra and tathāgatagarbha teachings with the anti-foundationalist thrust of Madhyamaka and Prajñāpāramitā literature.
Sharf, Robert. "Buddha-nature, Critical Buddhism, and Early Chan." Critical Review for Buddhist Studies 22 (2017): 105–50.
Article
Buddhadhātu, Tathāgatadhātu and Tathāgatagarbha in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra
ln the original of its so-called Mahāyāna version the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra bears the Sanskrit title Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra. The Sanskrit original of this text has come down to us only in fragments. For the reconstruction of the Sanskrit text from these fragments, it is essential to compare the text with the word-for-word Tibetan translation completed at the beginning of the 9th century by Jinamitra, Jñānagarbha and Devacandra. Fǎxiǎn 法顯 translated it into Chinese under the title Dà bānnihuán jīng 大般泥洹經 in 6 fascicles (juàn 卷), and Dharmakṣema 曇無讖 translated it as Dà bānnièpán jīng 大般涅槃經 in 40 fascicles. Both translations were completed at the beginning of the 5th century. The Chinese translations of this sūtra played an important role in the history of Chinese and Japanese Buddhism. The sūtra is famous especially for the formula "切眾生西有佛性 yíqiè zhongshēng xī yǒu fóxìng," "Every living being has the Buddha-nature." The skill of the Chinese translators is evident from their use of the word fóxing 佛性, which is commonly translated into English as "Buddha-nature." While the underlying Sanskrit term and its intended meaning poses difficulties, as will be shown below, the Chinese term fóxing, although not resulting from a very literal translation, has been accepted in dogmatical and philosophical interpretations in China and Japan.

Comparing the Sanskrit fragments and the Ratnagotravibhāga, which quotes the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra (that is the Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra), the original Sanskrit word fóxìng is buddhadhātu, tathāgatadhātu or tathāgatagarbha. Takasaki Jikidō's research on the tathāgatagarbha theory led him to conclude that the Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra is the first known text in which the word buddhadhātu is used in this meaning.

I have been studying the original text of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra for some time, analyzing the Sanskrit fragments in comparison with the Tibetan and Chinese translations. From the viewpoint of the original text, the meaning of the formula "Every living being has the Buddha-nature" reveals nuances slightly different from the interpretations adopted in Chinese and Japanese Buddhism. (Habata, introduction, 176–77)
Habata, Hiromi. "Buddhadhātu, Tathāgatadhātu and Tathāgatagarbha in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra." Hōrin 18 (2015): 176–96.
Article
Buddhanature: You're Perfect as You Are
Why feel bad about yourself when you are naturally aware, loving, and wise? Mingyur Rinpoche explains how to see past the temporary stuff and discover your own buddhanature.
Mingyur Rinpoche. "Buddhanature: You're Perfect as You Are." Lion's Roar, November 8, 2019.
Article
Buddhism and Nature—East Asian
Barnhill, David L. "Buddhism and Nature—East Asian." In Vol. 1 of Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature, edited by Bron Taylor, 236–39. London: Continuum, 2008. https://www.uwosh.edu/facstaff/barnhill/244-intro/buddhism-ern.
Barnhill, David L. "Buddhism and Nature—East Asian." In Vol. 1 of Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature, edited by Bron Taylor, 236–39. London: Continuum, 2008. https://www.uwosh.edu/facstaff/barnhill/244-intro/buddhism-ern.
Article
Buddhist Philosophy, Chinese
When Buddhism first entered China from India and Central Asia two thousand years ago, Chinese favourably disposed towards it tended to view it as a part or companion school of the native Chinese Huang–Lao Daoist tradition, a form of Daoism rooted in texts and practices attributed to Huangdi (the Yellow Emperor) and Laozi. Others, less accepting of this ‘foreign’ incursion from the ‘barbarous’ Western Countries, viewed Buddhism as an exotic and dangerous challenge to the social and ethical Chinese civil order. For several centuries, these two attitudes formed the crucible within which the Chinese understanding of Buddhism was fashioned, even as more and more missionaries arrived (predominantly from Central Asia) bringing additional texts, concepts, rituals, meditative disciplines and other practices. Buddhists and Daoists borrowed ideas, terminology, disciplines, cosmologies, institutional structures, literary genres and soteric models from each other, sometimes so profusely that today it can be difficult if not impossible at times to determine who was first to introduce a certain idea. Simultaneously, polemical and political attacks from hostile Chinese quarters forced Buddhists to respond with apologia and ultimately reshape Buddhism into something the Chinese would find not only inoffensive, but attractive.

In the fifth century A.D., Buddhism began to extricate itself from its quasi-Daoist pigeonhole by clarifying definitive differences between Buddhist and Daoist thought, shedding Daoist vocabulary and literary styles while developing new distinctively Buddhist terminology and genres. Curiously, despite the fact that Mahāyāna Buddhism had few adherents in Central Asia and was outnumbered by other Buddhist schools in India as well, in China Mahāyāna became the dominant form of Buddhism, so much so that few pejoratives were as stinging to a fellow Buddhist as labelling him ‘Hīnayāna’ (literally ‘Little Vehicle,’ a polemical term for non-Mahāyānic forms of Buddhism). By the sixth century, the Chinese had been introduced to a vast array of Buddhist theories and practices representing a wide range of Indian Buddhist schools. As the Chinese struggled to master these doctrines it became evident that, despite the fact that these schools were all supposed to express the One Dharma (Buddha’s Teaching), their teachings were not homogenous, and were frequently incommensurate.

By the end of the sixth century, the most pressing issue facing Chinese Buddhists was how to harmonize the disparities between the various teachings. Responses to this issue produced the Sinitic Mahāyāna schools, that is, Buddhist schools that originated in China rather than India. The four Sinitic schools are Tiantai, Huayan, Chan and Pure Land (Jingtu). Issues these schools share in common include Buddha-nature, mind, emptiness, tathāgatagarbha, expedient means (upāya), overcoming birth and death (saṃsāra), and enlightenment. (Source: Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 1)
Lusthaus, Dan. "Buddhist Philosophy, Chinese." In Vol. 1 of Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward Craig, 80–92. London: Routledge, 1998.
Article
Buddyjska koncepcja świetlistego umysłu i jej rola w tradycji tathagatagarbhy
The primary aim of this article is to outline the Buddhist idea of a pure, luminous mind. First, the conception of a “luminous mind” (pabhassara citta) from the Pāḷi Nikāyas is considered. Two functions ascribed to this idea are examined: its soteriological role, i.e. pure mind as a enlightenment-enabling factor, and its role as a “link” between consecutive saṃsāric existences. Next comes the examination of the Theravāda idea of bhavaṅga, which is seen as being related to the pure mind in its diachronic function. Main part of the article deals with combining the notion of a pure mind with Mahāyāna Buddhism by showing the role of the “innate mind” (cittaprakṛti) in tathāgatagarbha tradition.
Zapart, Jarosław. "Buddyjska koncepcja świetlistego umysłu i jej rola w tradycji tathagatagarbhy" (The Buddhist Concept of a Luminous Mind and Its Role in the Tathāgatagarbha Tradition). Studia Religiologica 48, no. 2 (2015): 117–30. https://ruj.uj.edu.pl/xmlui/bitstream/handle/item/18873/zapart_buddyjska_koncepcja_swietlistego_umyslu_2015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
Article
Can We Speak of Kadam Gzhan Stong? Tracing the Sources for Other-Emptiness in Early-Fourteenth-Century Tibet
It has become the norm for scholars familiar with the self-emptiness (rang stong) and other-emptiness (gzhan stong)1 in the history of Tibetan Buddhist scholastic tradition to associate the latter doctrine with Dolpopa (dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan, 1292–1361), the foremost synthesizer of the Jonang (jo nang) School of Tibetan Buddhism. He developed a systematic,

distinctive view of ultimate truth (don dam bden pa; paramārthasatya) and propagated this view widely and earned much scorn for it, leading to one of the most controversial doctrinal-sectarian disputes in Tibetan Buddhist history. His explication of other-emptiness, which he equates with the ultimate truth, is deemed radical and wholly unacceptable by many of his contemporaries and later Tibetan scholars because it stands in sharp contrast to the mainstream fourteenth-century and early-fifteenth-century Tibetan interpretations of self-emptiness, the notion that all phenomena including ultimate truth do not exist inherently. The self-emptiness interpretations are based primarily on Indie sources such as the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, Nāgārjuna's (c. 200) Madhyamakakārikā, and Candrakīrti's (c. 570-640) Madhyamakāvatāra. In contrast, Dolpopa generally does not claim that middle wheel treatises (’khor lo bar pa’i gzhung) such as the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras are the fundamental sources for his presentation of an other-emptiness view. Rather, he bases his formulation of other-emptiness on tantric sources such as the Kālacakra,2 last wheel suūtras {'khor lo tha ma’i mdo) such as Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra,3 and Indic commentarial sources4 traditionally credited to figures such as Maitreya, Asaṅga (c. 300), and Vasubandhu (c. 300).
      As a prominent fourteenth-century Tibetan doxographer, Dolpopa, however, does not repudiate self-emptiness per se; rather, he speaks of two types of emptiness5 that have separate referent points. For him, self-emptiness refers only to conventional phenomena such as tables, chairs, and negative defilements that do not inherently exist6 or that are empty of their own entities. Dolpopa argues that since conventional phenomena cannot withstand analysis, in that their individual entities are essentially empty or deconstructed, as the existence of their nature is thoroughly investigated, they are empty of inherent existence. Therefore, he claims that self-emptiness is not ultimate truth.7
      On the other hand, he passionately demonstrates that other-emptiness exists inherently and ultimately. Furthermore, it is identified with the tathâgata-essence (de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po, tathdgatagarbha or buddha-nature (sangs rgyas kyi rigs; buddhagotra) endowed with enlightened qualities that exists in all beings. Dolpopa argues that this form of emptiness is not empty of its own entity, since it ultimately and permanently exists. Also, ultimate truth is empty of all conventional phenomena that are antithetical to ultimately existent other-emptiness. So, while self-emptiness, which he refers to as "empty-emptiness" (stong pa’i stong pa), is primarily taught in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras of the middle wheel teachings, it is not ultimate truth, as it is empty of its own entity and it is not free from conceptual thought. On the other hand, other-emptiness, which he dubs "non-empty-emptiness" (mi stong pa’i stong pa), while not primarily taught in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, is delineated in last wheel teachings of the Buddha, such as Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, Śrīmālādevīsūtra, and others to refer to the naturally enlightened buddha-nature that is empty of all conventional phenomena. This is Dolpopa’s position on the two types of emptiness and the hierarchy of Mahāyāna literature in a nutshell and much of the discourse that follows on other-emptiness in the history of Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism has its roots in Dolpopa’s doctrinal formulation of other-emptiness vis-à-vis self-emptiness.
      While Dolpopa certainly gets the well-deserved credit for making other-emptiness "a place of fundamental importance in the expression of his philosophy"8 in Tibet, his controversial interpretation of Mahāyāna texts and the relative early availability of his writings to international scholars has perhaps led some to assume that Dolpopa’s thought is more original than it really was. Fortunately, the recent release of dozens of Kadam (bka’ gdams) volumes of previously unknown philosophical texts that predate Dolpopa allows us to reconsider this issue. Among the new texts that might be pertinent to a reconstruction of the early history of other-emptiness discourse in Tibet is the writing of Rinchen (rin chen ye shes, 13th-14th c.) in conjunction with the previously available Buton’s (bu ston rin chen grub, 1290-1364) Precious Garland of Rebuttals (’phrin yig gi lan rin po che’i phreng ba).9 I argue that Dolpopa’s unique doctrinal views with respect to ultimate truth and their related Indie sources are found in Rinchen’s doctrinal formulation of Mahāyāna literature. Furthermore, there is a good reason to argue that Dolpopa’s unique views were directly influenced by the Kadam scholar.10 Therefore, in this article, I analyze their points of convergence and divergence on the issues of buddha-nature,

textual authority, and doxographical strategy, and suggest that Kadam influence on Dolpopa needs to be recognized more than we do in modern scholarship on Dolpopa’s works. (Wangchuk, introduction, 9–11)
Wangchuk, Tsering. "Can We Speak of Kadam Gzhan Stong? Tracing the Sources for Other-Emptiness in Early-Fourteenth-Century Tibet." Journal of Buddhist Philosophy 2 (2016): 9–22.
Article
Can All Beings Potentially Attain Awakening? Gotra-theory in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra
The Mahāyāna has sometimes been associated with the doctrine that all sentient beings will attain complete awakening, a doctrine which is often linked to some conception of the "embryo of the Tathāgata (tathāgatagarbha)'"`UNIQ--ref-0000162B-QINU`"'. However, according to an alternate Mahāyāna doctrine, only some sentient beings will attain the complete awakening of a buddha — and some may even be excluded from attaining any form of awakening at all. In this paper, I will examine just such a doctrine, as it is found in an Indian Yogācāra treatise, the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra ("Ornament to the Mahāyāna Sūtras"; abbr., MSA), a Sanskrit verse-text, and its prose commentary, the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra-bhāṣya (MSABh),'"`UNIQ--ref-0000162C-QINU`"'. Particular Tibetan and Chinese sources attribute the composition of the MSA to the bodhisattva Maitreya'"`UNIQ--ref-0000162D-QINU`"', which gives us some indication of the importance this text was understood to have within certain traditions. Nevertheless, the authorship and date of the verse-text and its commentary are not certain; I hypothesize that the MSA/Bh may be dated to the fourth century CE (perhaps c. 350 CE)'"`UNIQ--ref-0000162E-QINU`"'. It is my hope that an examination of such a source may contribute to the study of the various ways in which the contours of the Mahāyāna have been drawn from a doctrinal perspective. In the MSA/Bh, one way in which the limits of the Mahāyāna are defined is through the employment of the gotra-theory, a theory which identifies the soteriological potentialities of individuals through reference to their spiritual "family" or "lineage." So in order to understand this text's discursive construction of the category "Mahāyāna," we must understand its concept of gotra. (D'Amato, "Can All Beings Potentially Gain Awakening," 115–16)
D'Amato, Mario. "Can All Beings Potentially Attain Awakening? Gotra-theory in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra." Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 26, no. 1 (2003): 115–38. https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jiabs/article/view/8933/2826.
Article
Chinese Tiantai Doctrine on Insentient Things’ Buddha-Nature
This essay is an investigation into the concept of insentient things possessing Buddha-nature with a focus on Jingxi Zhanran’s thoughts. In the history of Chinese Buddhism, Zhanran was not the originator of such a concept; however, he was the first Tiantai thinker to advocate this idea. He strongly argues that according to the Tiantai Perfect Teaching, Buddha-nature certainly extends to insentient things, which refers to inanimate objects without a nervous system, i.e., tangible or formless nonliving existents. This essay therefore aims at revealing this intent of Zhanran by exploring his argument of insentient things’ Buddha-nature. For Zhanran, the key quality of Buddha-nature is all-pervasiveness, and thus naturally, not only animate beings but also inanimate things are imbued with Buddha-nature. According to the principle of mutual inclusion, each dharma realm includes the other nine realms. Also, because body and land are mutually identical, the bodies and lands of Buddhas are interfused with those of the dwellers in the other nine realms. Thus, the inanimate lands also have Buddhanature. Lastly, mutual inclusion reveals a two-way relationship between the sentient and the insentient, thereby giving the possibility of reversing the positions of the subjective observer and the objective phenomenon. As such, it is conducive to my conclusion that insentient things can also take up an active role on the path of Buddhahood, as Zhanran contends that they inherently possess the threefold Buddha-nature.
Chen, Shuman. "Chinese Tiantai Doctrine on Insentient Things' Buddha-Nature." Chung-Hwa Buddhist Journal 24 (2011): 71–104.
Article
Cittaprakṛti and Ayoniśomanaskāra in the Ratnagotravibhāga: A Precedent for the Hsin-Nien Distinction of The Awakening of Faith
The question of the authorship of the Ta-ch'eng chi-hsin lun The Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna, tr. Paramārtha, hereafter referred to as the AFM), has long been a lively subject of discussion among scholars of Buddhism. Such eminent Buddhologists as Demiéville, Liebenthal, and Mochizuki (to name just a few), have debated the authenticity of the two Chinese translations of the text and discussed the possibility that the original text of the AFM might have been composed in China as part of a controversy between two branches of the Ti-lun sect. In recent editions of the Journal of the IABS the question of the authorship of the AFM has been raised again. In a couple of intriguing essays, Professor Whalen Lai has presented some new arguments in support of the Chinese authorship of the text.
      I do not intend here to try to resolve all of the many questions involved in determining the author of the AFM (such an undertaking is well beyond the scope of a short paper), but I would like to address an argument that Professor Lai raised in the first of his articles—namely his contention that the AFM's exposition of the relationship of hsin (mind) and nien (thought, thought-moment) bears such an "unmistakable sinitic stamp" that it must have been authored in China. I will try to show that the AFM's central conception of an "unmoved," pure mind (hsin) existing as the basis of the deluded movement of thoughts (nien) has an important Indian precedent in the cittaprakṛti and ayoniśomanaskāra notions of the Ratnagotravibhāga-mahāyānottaratantraśāstra (hereafter referred to as the RGV), a text with which the AFM's author may well have been familiar. I do not intend this as a criticism of Professor Lai's research—the parallels he finds between Chinese thought regarding hsin and nien prior to the period of the Six Dynasties and the elucidation of these notions in the AFM deserve serious attention. I simply would like to show that similar parallels—if not direct textual influences—exist between the AFM and the Indian-composed RGV, so that there is no compelling reason to conclude that the AFM theory of mind (hsin) and thoughts (nien) demonstrates Chinese authorship. (Grosnick, "Cittaprakṛti and Ayoniśomanaskāra in the Ratnagotravibhāga," 35–36)
Grosnick, William. "Cittaprakṛti and Ayoniśomanaskāra in the Ratnagotravibhāga: A Precedent for the Hsin-Nien Distinction of The Awakening of Faith." Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 6, no. 2 (1983): 35–47. https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jiabs/article/view/8605/2512.
Article
Consciousness and Luminosity in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism
Dr. Tadeusz Skorupski in ‘Consciousness and Luminosity in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism’ invokes the juxtaposition of the phenomenal world of saṃsāra and the perfected state of nirvana, noting that they reflect and essentially correspond to the dynamic operating in the Buddhist analysis of consciousness and the propensities of the human mind: the mind produces the factors contributing to rebirth, but is also the primary vehicle in the attainment of salvation. He identifies several key features that permeate early Buddhist doctrine: the pre-eminence of mind, the notion of inherent radiance, the alien nature of the defilements that contaminate the mind, and the interplay of the image of purification and corruption. Starting with a close reading of Buddhaghosa's interpretations of the nature of luminosity, the author extends his discussion to include the Mahāsaṅgikas, who emphasize the inherent radiance of a mind obscured by adventitious defilements, and the Sarvāstivāda Vaibhāṣikas, who aver that an inherently radiant mind could not be obscured, for to them it has a propensity, rather than an innate disposition, to luminosity. Delineating various attributes of the description of consciousness according to different schools, the author moves from Pāli Abhidhamma to Mahāyana and Vajrayāna sources and Bodhicitta doctrine. Alighting on subsequent Indian Tantric theories that posit a fourfold luminosity of consciousness as four kinds of emptiness, he notes that such an understanding of consciousness and luminosity was applied in the Tibetan understanding of the processes occurring during death, as described in the work known as The Tibetan Book of the Dead. The author describes this account of death, as involving the transition through four kinds of luminosity, as unique to Tibet, in particular to the Nyingma and Kagyu traditions. He concludes that although varied schools often disagree in certain features, all concur in the possibility of and access to a purified mind. Tracing the continuity between early Abhidhamma through to the various Mahāyāna schools, the author avers, provides an insightful range of perspectives on luminosity and nature of the mind itself. (Editorial Committee, introduction, 10)
Skorupski, Tadeusz. "Consciousness and Luminosity in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism." In Buddhist Philosophy and Meditation Practice: Academic Papers Presented at the 2nd IABU Conference, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Main Campus, Wang Noi, Ayutthaya, Thailand, edited by Khammai Dhammasami, Padmasiri de Silva, Sarah Shaw, Dion Peoples, Jamie Cresswell, and Toshiichi Endo, 43–64. Ayutthaya, Thailand: Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, 2012.
Article
Continuum vs. Teachings: Discrepancies in the Translation of the Term Tantra (rgyud) in the Subtitle of the Ratnagotravibhāga
Ostensen, Morten. "Continuum vs. Teachings: Discrepancies in the Translation of the Term Tantra (rgyud) in the Subtitle of the Ratnagotravibhāga." Buddha-Nature: A Tsadra Foundation Initiative, July 9th, 2019. https://buddhanature.tsadra.org/index.php/Articles/Continuum_vs._Teachings.
Ostensen, Morten. "Continuum vs. Teachings: Discrepancies in the Translation of the Term Tantra (rgyud) in the Subtitle of the Ratnagotravibhāga." Buddha-Nature: A Tsadra Foundation Initiative, July 9th, 2019. https://buddhanature.tsadra.org/index.php/Articles/Continuum_vs._Teachings.
Article
Critical Buddhism and Returning to the Sources
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

Critical Buddhism was inevitable. That it was given voice by prominent Japanese scholars noted for their work in non-East Asian Buddhism was also inevitable. That it has provoked strong, even hostile, reactions was inevitable as well. Inevitable means that the causes and conditions that gave rise to Critical Buddhism can be analyzed and understood to show that it has a context, a history, and a necessity. Critical Buddhism is necessary. Thinking about what arises through causes and conditions, especially in terms of how that impacts on cultural and social realities, is a principal component of both Critical Buddhism and Buddhism properly practiced.
      This essay will examine some—but certainly not all—of the factors that have contributed to Critical Buddhism. Some arguments and observations will be offered that, while not retellings from the writings of the Critical Buddhists, run parallel to them. These parallels, which I offer as supplements, recast some of their arguments and focus on issues and areas germane to their undertaking. After discussing the inevitability of Critical Buddhism in the context of twentieth-century Japanese Buddhist scholarship, I will turn to some of the events that took place in China during the seventh and eighth centuries that were decisive for the prevalence in East Asia of the type(s) of Buddhism they criticize. This will be followed by a critique of what has happened to the notion of enlightenment in East Asian Buddhism, particularly in the Ch’an and Zen traditions, with reference to the problem of hongaku (original enlightenment) and the authority of lineage transmission. Then, stepping back into a wider context, I will suggest that, far from being the idiosyncratic, misguided departure depicted by its detractors, Critical Buddhism is the inevitable revisiting of a theme that has been central to Buddhism since its onset. All the above points concern inevitabilities: the trajectory and accomplishments of Japanese scholarship in this century coupled with the crisis of Buddhism in the modern world; the decisive historical events that have established a pervasive ideological underpinning in East Asian Buddhism that Matsumoto and Hakamaya have labeled dhātu-vāda, combined with the exclusion of other, counteracting Buddhist tendencies found elsewhere in the Buddhist world, such as Buddhist logic; the undermining of certain foundational Buddhist notions, such as enlightenment, as a result of or in tandem with the growth of dhātu-vāda ideology; the persistent self-criticism and self-reevaluation that Buddhism has subjected itself to, often glorifying the critique and the critics (Nāgārjuna being the most famous example)—all these points have made it inevitable that Critical Buddhism appear today in Japan (and elsewhere). Finally, while examining an aspect of Matsumoto’s critique of The Record of Lin-chi, I will suggest some tactical distinctions that should be considered by those critical of Critical Buddhism (Lusthaus, "Critical Buddhism and Returning to the Sources," 30–31)
Lusthaus, Dan. "Critical Buddhism and Returning to the Sources." In Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism, edited by Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson, 56–80. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997.
Article
Critical Edition of the Sanskrit Text of the Munimatālaṃkāra Chapter 1 (fol. 58r5–59v4): Passages on Caturāryasatya and Trisvabhāva Borrowed from Kamalaśīla's Madhyamakāloka
The Munimatālaṃkāra of Abhayākaragupta (composed 1113) is an encyclopedic overview of the entire system of non-tantric Buddhist doctrines and practices. Recently the existence of a Sanskrit manuscript was reported by Li Xuezhu (China Tibetology Center), and the textual study of the Munimatālaṃkāra is drastically evolving. The present paper is a part of results of our on-going project that deals with a critical edition of the Sanskrit text of the Munimatālaṃkāra. In the text portion edited in this paper, Abhayākaragupta establishes the Four Truths of Noble ones and the Three Characteristics by borrowing passages from Kamalaśīla’s Madhyamakāloka, which still lacks a Sanskrit original. We can recover parts of the Sanskrit original of the Madhyamakāloka on the basis of the Sanskrit text of the Munimatālaṃkāra. The Appendix provides Bodhicittavivaraṇa verses 51, 67, 68, 88–93, and 108 cited in the newly available Sanskrit-Tibetan bilingual manuscript of Abhayākaragupta’s Āmnāyamañjarī.
Kano, Kazuo, and Xuezhu Li . "Critical Edition of the Sanskrit Text of the Munimatālaṃkāra Chapter 1 (fol. 58r5–59v4): Passages on Caturāryasatya and Trisvabhāva Borrowed from Kamalaśīla's Madhyamakāloka." [In Japanese with English Summary.] Mikkyō Bunka [Journal of Esoteric Buddhism] 238 (2017): 7–27.
Article
Death, Sleep, and Orgasm: Gateways to the Mind of Clear Light
Buddhism began gradually to be introduced to Tibet in the seventh century C. E., more than a thousand years after Shākyamuni Buddha's passing away (circa 483 B. C.).[1] The form Buddhism took in Tibet was greatly influenced by the highly developed systemization of the religion that was present in India through the twelfth century (and even later). The geographic proximity and relatively undeveloped culture of Tibet provided conditions for extensive transfer of scholastic commentaries and systems of practice, which came to have great influence throughout a vast region stretching from Kalmuck Mongolian areas in Europe where the Volga River empties into the Caspian Sea, Outer and Inner Mongolia, and the Buriat Republic of Siberia as well as Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal, and Ladakh. The sources for my discussion are

drawn primarily from two of the four major orders of Tibetan Buddhism:

  • the old order called Nying-ma-ba,[2] which reached its full development in the fourteenth century with the scholar-yogi Long-chen-rap-jam[3]
  • a highly scholastic order called Ge-luk-ba,[4] founded by the fourteenth century scholar-yogi Dzongka-ba.[5]

Long-chen-rap-jam was born in 1308 Do-drong[6] in south central Tibet, received ordination at Samyay[7] Monastery, and studied the doctrines of both the old and new schools. A great scholar, he became abbot of Sam-yay Monastery early in his life but retired from that position to live in the mountains. Receiving the full corpus of the teachings of the Old Translation School of Nying-ma, he wrote prolifically, and even when he was exiled for a decade to Bhutan for his closeness with the opponents of the ruling power, he established and restored monasteries.[8]
      Dzong-ka-ba was born in 1357 in the northeastern province of Tibet called Am-do,[9] now included by the occupying Chinese Communists not in the Tibetan Autonomous Region but in Ch'ing-hai Province. He studied the new and old schools extensively, and developed his own tradition called Ge-luk-ba. Dzongka- ba and his followers established a system of education centered especially in large universities, eventually in three areas of Tibet but primarily in Hla-sa, the capital, which in some ways was for the Tibet cultural region what Rome is for the Catholic Church. For five centuries, young men came from all over the Tibetan cultural region to these large Tibetan universities to study (I say "men" because women were, for the most part, excluded from the scholastic culture). Until the Communist takeovers, these students usually returned to their own countries after completing their degrees.

      My presentation on the mind of clear light is largely from standard Nying-ma-ba and Ge-luk-ba perspectives on the two basic forms of what Tibetan tradition accepts as Shākyamuni Buddha's teaching—the Sūtra Vehicle and the Tantra Vehicle, also called the Vajra Vehicle.[10] (Hopkins, background, 245–46)
Hopkins, Jeffrey. "Death, Sleep, and Orgasm: Gateways to the Mind of Clear Light." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 25, no. 2 (1998): 245–60.
Article
Did ’Gos lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal (1392–1481) Espouse a gZhan stong View?
With Mathes' article―the last one in our volume―we move on to a "hot issue" of 15th-century scholastic philosophy, namely the contested view of "emptiness-of-other" (gzhan stong). The article investigates 'Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal's analysis of Buddha nature and pursues the question of whether this master advocated a gzhan stong view. Mathes faces a difficult situation regarding sources, since no philosophical work by 'Gos Lo tsā ba has come down to us apart from a commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga (in which the term gzhan stong is not mentioned). Therefore, Mathes makes use of "secondary sources" such as the Eighth Karma pa's polemical review of 'Gos Lo tsā ba's lost Kālacakra commentary and a biography composed by the Fourth Zhwa dmar pa. As Mathes is able to show, 'Gos Lo tsā ba's position on Buddha nature differs sharply from the position held by the Eighth Karma pa, who (like the Third and Seventh Karma pas) supported a type of gzhan stong view. It is, moreover, obvious that 'Gos Lo tsā ba was influenced, to a certain extent, by Tsong kha pa's scholastic exegesis and thus attempted to harmonize the latterʼs view of emptiness with the mahāmudrā approach of the bKa' brgyud pas. In the end, Mathes comes to the conclusion that it is problematic to describe 'Gos Lo tsā ba's position as gzhan stong, although the Eighth Karma pa (ironically) terms it as "great gzhan stong."
Mathes, Klaus-Dieter. "Did 'Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal (1392-1481) Espouse a gZhan sTong View?" In Fifteenth Century Tibet: Cultural Blossoming and Political Unrest; Proceedings of a Conference Held in Lumbini, Nepal, March 2015, edited by Volker Caumanns and Marta Sernesi, 291–311. LIRI Seminar Proceedings Series 8. Lumbini, Nepal: Lumbini International Research Institute, 2017.
Article
Do you have buddhanature?
Investigating the most famous koan of all time, Buddhadharma‘s deputy editor Koun Franz helps us to understand buddhanature.
Franz, Koun. "Do you have buddhanature?." Lion's Roar, December 23, 2020. https://www.lionsroar.com/do-you-have-buddhanature/.
Article
Does My Dog Have Buddhanature?
Remembering her beloved childhood pet, Andrea Miller ponders one of Zen’s most famous questions.
Miller, Andrea. "Does My Dog Have Buddhanature?" Lion's Roar, October 25, 2019.
Article
Does a Dewdrop Teach Dharma? Zen Perspectives on the Teachings of the Insentient
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

Valley sounds are the long, broad
      tongue.
Mountain colors are not other than
      the unconditioned body.
Eighty-four thousand verses are
      heard through the night.
What can I say about this in the
      future?

This poem is almost a thousand years old. It was presented to a Chinese Zen master by a follower, Su Shi, who went on to become one of China's greatest poets. In Zen these four lines are considered to be Su's enlightenment verse. In addition to being a poet, Su Shi (1037–1101) was a statesman, an essayist, a painter, and a calligrapher. He practiced Zen as a layperson, not a monk, receiving instruction from Donglin Changcong, a leading master. In China, Su is still honored as one of "the four greats" in several fields, including cooking.
      Let’s take a look at the poem, using the above translation by Kazuaki Tanahashi (Treasury of the True Dharma Eye: Zen Master Dōgen’s Shōbō Genzō [Shambhala, 2012], 86)
      Valley sounds are the long, broad tongue. "Valley sounds" are the sounds of a stream.
      "Long, broad tongue" refers to the Buddha and his teachings, known as the Dharma. Restated unpoetically: natural phenomena such as streams are capable of expressing the highest truth. (Read entire article here)
Kraft, Kenneth. "Does a Dewdrop Teach Dharma? Zen Perspectives on the Teachings of the Insentient." Dharma World 45 (2018): 6–9. https://rk-world.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/DW18_7-12.pdf.
Article
Does a Dog See into Its Buddha-Nature? Re-posing the Question of Animality-Humanity in Zen Buddhism
Using as his point of departure the well-known koan that asks whether or not a dog has Buddha-nature, Bret Davis traces the background of this question in his demonstration of the complexity of the relation between humans and animals as conceived during the development of East Asian Buddhism. In his analysis, he argues that on the one hand, Buddha-nature becomes ever more inclusive in this history, while on the other, it tends to remain firmly, albeit somewhat paradoxically, anthropocentric with regard to the capacity to "realize" this spiritual inclusivity. The issue arising from this analysis in Davis' chapter, "Does a Dog See Into its Buddha-Nature? Re-posing the Question of Animality in Zen Buddhism," is whether only humans have the potential to "see into" their Buddha-nature. His project throughout is to show how the question of animality is inseparable from the question of humanity, and how it emerges continuously and in various intertwined ways for those who inherit the weave of Buddhist texts and contexts for thought and practice. (Jones, Buddha Nature and Animality, 9)
Davis, Bret W. "Does a Dog See into Its Buddha-nature? Re-posing the Question of Animality/Humanity in Zen Buddhism." In Buddha Nature and Animality, edited by David Jones, 83–126. Fremont, CA: Jain Publishing Company, 2007.
Article
Does a Table Have Buddha-Nature?
In "The Way of the Dialetheist: Contradictions in Buddhism," Yasuo Deguchi, Jay Garfield, and Graham Priest (hereafter DGP) claimed that in certain parts of the Buddhist tradition contradictions are to be accepted as literally true. I shall confine my remarks to the case of Indian Madhyamaka, more specifically the Madhyamaka of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna (MMK) and its four extant Indian commentaries. About East Asian Buddhism I am not qualified to speak. The DGB thesis might also be thought to apply to Indian Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha thought, but those cases would require separate treatment. What I shall claim is that the Madhyamaka of Nāgārjuna and his commentators is best interpreted as rejecting the claim that a contradiction might be true. More recently DGP seem to have conceded that the interpretation of Madhyamaka that I favor is "orthodox" while their own is "heretical." So apparently we do not disagree as to which interpretation was more commonly accepted in the tradition. There remains a disagreement as to which is the more philosophically defensible. In defending the view I favor I shall be engaging in a considerable amount of textual exegesis, for which I feel I should apologize in advance. What I seek to show is not only that no Madhyamika accepted the dialetheist view that contradictory statements can be true, but also that their position makes good philosophical sense when understood within the confines of classical logic. My working assumption (which I believe I share with DGP) is that the Madhyamikas under discussion were astute philosophers who were well aware of the further implications of the methods they used. Given this assumption, textual exegesis becomes an important component in the investigation of the question at issue between us.
Siderits, Mark. "Does a Table Have Buddha-Nature?" Philosophy East and West, 63 no. 3 (2013): 373–86.
Article
Does a Table Have Buddha-Nature? A Moment of Yes and No. Answer! But Not in Words or Signs! A Response to Mark Siderits
Siderits argues that Nāgārjuna is not committed to the paradoxical claim that emptiness is the lack of intrinsic nature and that it is the intrinsic nature of all things, on the ground that the apparently paradoxical claims Nāgārjuna makes are simply admonitions to recuse oneself from the project of ontology. We argue that to recuse oneself from that project is to do ontology and so is no route out of paradox. We dispute Siderits' reading of several crucial passages, demonstrating that his readings are unattested in the commentarial literature and that they are implausible. Siderits argues on the basis of these readings that Candrakīrti and Nāgārjuna are not committed to paradoxes. We show that more plausible readings that are better attested in the commentarial literature do so commit them. Siderits and we agree that the ultimate nature of reality is to lack any ultimate nature. He thinks that this is consistent; we think that it is paradoxical.
Deguchi, Yasuo, Jay L. Garfield, and Graham Priest. "Does a Table Have Buddha-Nature? A Moment of Yes and No. Answer! But Not in Words or Signs! A Response to Mark Siderits." Philosophy East and West 63, no. 3 (2013): 387–98.
Article
Dolpopa and Gyaltsab Debate Tathāgatagarbha: Two Distinct Interpretations of Buddha-Nature in Tibet
Buddhists have discussed the concept of enlightenment since the time of the Buddha, but the notion that all sentient beings have buddha-nature is found in Mahāyāna Buddhism. For the Mahāyāna thinkers, one of the crucial questions at the center of how all beings can achieve enlightenment is this apparent paradox: frailty, ignorance, and delusions presumably exist concomitantly with buddha-nature in all sentient beings. This article provides a brief survey of the textual history of the buddha-nature literature followed by an in-depth discussion of buddha-nature in the terms set out by two influential Tibetan thinkers, Dolpopa and Gyaltsab; the debate between these thinkers is set in relation to extant discourses of Buddhist ontology, epistemology, and enlightenment within the Tibetan Buddhist scholastic tradition.
Wangchuk, Tsering. "Dolpopa and Gyaltsab Debate Tathāgatagarbha: Two Distinct Interpretations of Buddha-Nature in Tibet." Religion Compass 4, no. 11 (2010): 669–78.
Article
Dzogchen (Anne Klein)
This article provides an introduction to Dzogchen. Dzogchen refers to an integrated set of texts, practices, philosophical perspectives, and theories of subjectivity unique to the most esoteric Buddhist and Bon traditions of Tibet. The philosophical core of Dzogchen is its emphasis on experiencing mind-nature and understanding its relationship to ordinary mental states. To be fully and nonconceptually aware of one's nature is called open presence. Dzogchen philosophy elaborates the issues and conundrums raised by this core tenet. Among Tibet's Buddhist traditions, it is only Nyingma, the most ancient school, that explicitly takes Dzogchen as its esoteric tradition. Both Nyingma and Bon see Dzogchen as the highest in a ninefold system known as the Nine Vehicles. (Source Accessed July 24, 2020)
Klein, Anne. "Dzogchen." In The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy, edited by Jay L. Garfield and William Edelglass, 265–78. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Article
Dzogchen Explained
Roger Jackson reviews Heart of the Great Perfection: Dudjom Lingpa’s Visions of the Great Perfection, Vol. 1 by B. Alan Wallace. From the Spring 2017 issue of Buddhadharma: The Practitioner’s Quarterly.
Jackson, Roger R. "Dzogchen Explained." Buddhadharma: The Practitioner's Quarterly. April 13, 2017.
Article
Dōgen on Buddha Nature
DŌGEN (1200–1253) is one of the most outstanding and unique Buddhists in the history of Japanese Buddhism. He is unique in at least the following three senses.

First, rejecting all existing forms of Buddhism in Japan as unauthentic, he attempted to introduce and establish what he believed to be the genuine Buddhism, based on his own realization which he attained in Sung China under the guidance of the Zen Master Ju-ching (Nyojō, 1163-1228). He called it "the Buddha Dharma directly transmitted from the Buddha and patriarchs." He emphasized zazen"`UNIQ--ref-000031D2-QINU`"'(seated meditation) as being "the right entrance to the Buddha Dharma" in the tradition of the Zen schools in China since Bodhidharma, originating from Śākyamuni Buddha. Yet he strictly refused to speak of a "Zen sect," to say nothing of a "Sōtō sect," that he was later credited with founding. For Dōgen was concerned solely with the "right Dharma," and regarded zazen as its "right entrance." "Who has used the name 'Zen sect'? No buddha or patriarch spoke of a 'Zen sect.' You should realize it is a devil that speaks of 'Zen sect.' Those who pronounce a devil's appellation must be confederates of the devil, not children of the Buddha.",'"`UNIQ--ref-000031D3-QINU`"'He called himself "the Dharma transmitter Shamon Dōgen who went to China"'"`UNIQ--ref-000031D4-QINU`"'with strong conviction that he had attained the authentic Dharma that is directly transmitted from buddha to buddha, and that he should transplant it on Japanese soil. Thus he rejected the idea of mappo"`UNIQ--ref-000031D5-QINU`"', i.e., the last or degenerate Dharma, an idea with wide acceptance in the Japanese Buddhism of his day. It may not be too much to say of Dōgen that just as Bodhidharma transmitted the Buddha Dharma to China, he intended to transmit it to Japan.

Secondly, though Dōgen came to a realization of the right Dharma under the guidance of a Chinese Zen master whom he continued to revere throughout his life, the understanding of the right Dharma is unique to Dogen. With religious awakening and penetrating insight, Dōgen grasped the Buddha Dharma in its deepest and most authentic sense. In doing so, he dared to reinterpret the words of former patriarchs, and even the sutras themselves. As a result, his idea of the right Dharma presents one of the purest forms of Mahayana Buddhism, in which the Dharma that was realized in the Buddha's enlightenment reveals itself most profoundly. All of this, it is noteworthy, is rooted in Dōgen's own existential realization, which he attained in himself through long and intense seeking. Based on this idea of the right Dharma, he not only rejected, as stated above, all existing forms of Buddhism in Japan, but also severely criticized certain forms of Indian and Chinese Buddhism, though, it is true, he generally considered Buddhism in these two countries as more authentic than that in Japan.

The third reason Dōgen is unique in the history of Japanese Buddhism, is because of his speculative and philosophical nature. He was a strict practicer of zazen, who earnestly emphasized shikantaza"`UNIQ--ref-000031D6-QINU`"', i.e., just sitting. His whole life was spent in rigorous discipline as a monk. He encouraged his disciples to do the same. Yet he was endowed with keen linguistic sensibility and a philosophical mind. His main work, entitled Shōbōgenzō"`UNIQ--ref-000031D7-QINU`"', "A Treasury of the Right Dharma Eye," perhaps unsurpassable in its philosophical speculation, is a monumental document in Japanese intellectual history. In Dōgen, we find a rare combination of religious insight and philosophical ability. In this respect, he may be well compared with Thomas Aquinas, born twenty five years after him.

He wrote his main work, Shōbōgenzō, in Japanese, in spite of the fact that leading Japanese Buddhists until then had usually written their major works in Chinese. Dōgen made penetrating speculations and tried to express the world of the Buddha Dharma in his mother tongue by mixing Chinese Buddhist and colloquial terms freely in his composition. The difficult and unique style of his Japanese writing is derived from the fact that, in expressing his own awakening, he never used conventional terminology, but employed a vivid, personal style grounded in his subjective speculations. Even when he used traditional Buddhist phrases, passages, etc., he interpreted them in unusual ways in order to express the Truth as he understood it. In Dōgen, the process of the search for and realization of the Buddha Dharma and the speculation on and expression of that process are uniquely combined.'"`UNIQ--ref-000031D8-QINU`"'

In this paper I shall discuss Dōgen's idea of Buddha nature, which may be regarded as a characteristic example of his realization. (Abe, "Dōgen on Buddha Nature", 28–30)
Abe, Masao. "Dōgen on Buddha Nature." The Eastern Buddhist 4, no. 1 (1971): 28–71.
Article
Eight Folios from a Sanskrit Manuscript of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya from Ngor Monastery
The Sanskrit text of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya (abbr. MSABh) was published for the first time by Sylvain Levi in 1907. This editio princeps was prepared based on a paper manuscript (NGMPP Reel No. A114/1; siglum Ns) written in Nepal in Samvat 798 (A.D. 1677 or 1678). All other Sanskrit manuscripts of MSABh from the Kathmandu Valley so far reported have been identified as apographs of this single manuscript. A single manuscript dating from the 17th century is, however, not sufficient in itself to base the editing of a text composed before the 5th century on. Other witnesses, namely, older Sanskrit manuscripts belonging to other transmission lines separate from that of Ns, can therefore be expected to help improve upon the editio princeps.
      The present paper offers just such crucial material: eight folios from a Sanskrit manuscript of MSABh from Tibet. This is the first part of a series of studies dealing with the subject.
Kano, Kazuo. "Eight Folios from a Sanskrit Manuscript of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya from Ngor Monastery: Diplomatic and Critical Editions on X.9–XI.3 — Studies of Göttingen Xc14/57 (1)." China Tibetology 18, no.1 (2012): 33–47.
Article
Elucidating the Zhentong View: A Condensation of the Threefold Nature of Reality
Sheehy, Michael R., trans. "Elucidating the Zhentong View: A Condensation of the Threefold Nature of Reality." By Tsen Kawoche (btsan kha bo che). JonangFoundation.org, n.d. https://jonangfoundation.org/sites/default/files/translation-elucidatingzhentong.pdf.
Sheehy, Michael R., trans. "Elucidating the Zhentong View: A Condensation of the Threefold Nature of Reality." By Tsen Kawoche (btsan kha bo che). JonangFoundation.org, n.d. https://jonangfoundation.org/sites/default/files/translation-elucidatingzhentong.pdf.
Article
Emerson's "God-Within" and the Buddhist "Buddha-Womb"
Emerson wrote with excitement of his discovery of "God-within" in his poem "Gnothi Seauton": "There doth sit the Infinite embosomed in a man." He furthermore preached in his sermon "The Genuine Man" that "the essential man" dwells in the innermost soul, and that this indwelling essential self is a higher self, God's image, and "Reason." The doctrine of "Buddha-womb," tathāgatagarbha meaning "essence of self" or "Buddha-nature," buddhadātu meaning "true self," is an important teaching in Mahāyāna Buddhism, which affirms that each sentient being contains the indwelling potency for attaining Buddhahood and enlightenment. This notion is explained when referring to the boundless, nurturing, sustaining, and deathless Self of the Buddha. The affinities between Emersonian Transcendentalism and Mahāyāna Buddhism, especially Zen, have often been pointed out. In this article the comparison between Emerson's "God-within" and Mahāyāna Buddhism's "Buddha-womb" or "Buddha-nature" will be examined.
Takanashi, Yoshio. "Emerson's 'God-Within' and the Buddhist 'Buddha-Womb'." Journal of East-West Thought 9, no. 1 (2019): 1–14. http://broncoscholar.library.cpp.edu/bitstream/handle/10211.3/209333/Takanashi1-14.pdf?sequence=1.
Article
Emptiness–Buddhanature
The Buddhist schools are rich and varied in their perspectives, but these many points of view all advance the Buddhist concept of the middle view (madhya-drshti in Sanskrit and ume tawa in Tibetan).
Kyabgon, Traleg. “Emptiness/Buddhanature.” Lion's Roar, September 1, 2003. https://www.lionsroar.com/emptiness-buddhanature/.
Article
Everything Is Buddhanature
Original sin vs. original goodness: Mahayana Buddhism offers a more hopeful view of human nature. Zen teacher Melissa Myozen Blacker reveals how nondual practice frees us from our temporary obscurations and reveals our true, awakened nature.
Blacker, Melissa Myozen. “Everything Is Buddhanature” Lion's Roar, November 28, 2018. https://www.lionsroar.com/everything-is-buddhanature/.
Article
Everything’s Made of Mind
All that we are and experience is mind, explains Zen teacher Norman Fischer. That mind is original enlightenment itself.
Fischer, Norman. “Everything's Made of Mind” Lion's Roar, February 27, 2019. https://www.lionsroar.com/everythings-made-of-mind/.
Article
Evidence of Our Buddhanature
Gyatrul Rinpoche is a famed modern Tibetan teacher of the Nyingmapa school and holder of the Dudjom Tersar Lineage. This short teaching is a clear and pithy presentation of the Tibetan Buddhist view of buddha-nature from the Nyingma viewpoint that reminds us not only that it is obvious that all sentient beings have buddha-nature, but also that recognizing our buddha-nature depends upon learning in a deep way. We must "chew" on what we have learned and really take it to heart: "If you don’t know your buddhanature, learn about it! Don’t just complain that you don’t understand, or say it is too difficult. How can you see it? How can you recognize it? By learning."
Gyatrul Rinpoche. "Evidence of Our Buddhanature". Vimala. 2018 Online Teaching Series by Venerable Gyatrul Rinpoche. Winter, February 26th, 2018. https://vimala.org/downloads/VGR-SR-02252018-EvidenceOfBuddhanature.pdf.
Article
Exegeses of the Ratnagotravibhāga in Kashmir in the 11th and 12th Century
The Ratnagotravibhāga (abbr. RGV) was very likely composed around the 4th or 5th century in India. But traces of the RGV fell into obscurity after the late 6th century, and again begin to appear after the early 11th century. The teaching relating to the RGV was transmitted from India to Tibet mainly via two routes: one from Vikramaśīla through Atiśa (ca. 982–1054) and the other from Kashmir through Sajjana, rNgog Blo-ldan-shes-rab (ca. 1059–1109) and others. rNgog is one of the most influential masters who established exegetical traditions of the RGV in Tibet, and his understanding of the RGV is strongly influenced by the Kashmiri tradition, for he studied it in Kashmir. In this regard, the Kashmiri tradition of the RGV is crucial to learn the foundation of the Tibetan development of the RGV's exegesis. Fortunately, we have some materials to learn about how Kashmiri Buddhists understood the RGV, but they have not been systematically studied in this regard. I have focused on Sajjana's Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa in my previous paper in 2015, and in the present paper, I shall extend the range of target to wider context in Kashmir tradition in 11th to 12th century focusing on works by Sajjana, Mahājana, Amṛtākara, and Jayānanda. (Kano, "Exegeses", 1)
Kano, Kazuo. "Exegeses of the Ratnagotravibhāga in Kashmir in the 11th and 12th Century." Kōyasandaigaku daigakuin kiyō 15 (2016): 1–23.
Article
Existence and Nonexistence: Teachings on Dzogchen
“If you believe there is a thing called mind, it is just a thought. If you believe there is no thing called mind, it’s just another thought. Your natural state, free of any kind of thought is buddhanature.” Tulku Urgyen Rinpoche gives a teaching on the existence and nonexistence of mind.
Urgyen Rinpoche, Tulku. "Existence and Nonexistence: Teachings on Dzogchen." Lion's Roar, March 1, 2000. https://www.lionsroar.com/existence-nonexistence-teachings-on-dzogchen/.
Article
Flowers of Sentience, Roots of Consciousness: The Buddhahood of Plants in the Nō Theater
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

For over thirty years I have been encountering a motif or set of motifs in Japanese culture that is, outside of folklore and the children's story, virtually unheard of in European literature. Japanese literature and theater are rife with stories in which the protagonists are not human but are, rather, plants, trees, animals, or supernatural beings. For many Westerners, such tales seem indicative of some kind of arrested development in the Japanese psyche, as if their culture had failed to become modern or, worse, "grow up."
      When I ask my Japanese colleagues about this, most see no problem at all: both Shinto and Buddhism acknowledge that sentience can exist across a broad spectrum of life, from the simplest organic structures to supernatural entities that, though invisible, may direct our lives in ways we still don’t understand. Arguably, the Japanese themselves feel a kinship with these other entities to a degree that many people in Europe or North America do not, though such a sensibility is common among indigenous peoples around the world. As unique as they are, human beings do not occupy any God-given, privileged place in this scheme. Th e word animism is brought out to explain much of this, though the term itself is vaguely used.
      I began to realize that a radically different metaphysical construct of the world gives rise to a distinctive poetics and dramaturgy, and that typical EuroAmerican critical tools fail to adequately interpret even Japanese discursive texts, to say nothing of many of their greatest works of poetry, fiction, and drama. (Poulton, "Flowers of Sentience," 20) (Read the entire article here)
Poulton, M. Cody. "Flowers of Sentience, Roots of Consciousness: The Buddhahood of Plants in the Nō Theater." Dharma World 45 (2018): 20–23. https://rk-world.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/DW18_7-12.pdf.
Article
Founding Human Rights within Buddhism: Exploring Buddha-Nature as an Ethical Foundation
In this article, I hope to suggest (1) a fertile ground for human rights and social ethics within Japanese intellectual history and (2) a possible angle for connecting Dōgen's ethical views with his views on private religious practice. I begin with a review of the attempts to found the notion of rights within Buddhism. I focus on two well-argued attempts: Damien Keown's foundation of rights on the Four Noble Truths and individual soteriology and Jay Garfield's foundation of rights on the compassionate drive to liberate others. I then fuse these two approaches in a single concept: Buddha-nature. I analyze Dōgen's own view on the practice-realization of Buddha-nature, and the equation of Buddha-nature with being, time, emptiness, and impermanence. I end with tentative suggestions concerning how Dōgen's particular view on Buddha-nature might affect any social ethics or view of rights that is founded on it.
Sevilla, Anton Luis. "Founding Human Rights within Buddhism: Exploring Buddha-Nature as an Ethical Foundation." Journal of Buddhist Ethics 17 (2010): 213–52. http://blogs.dickinson.edu/buddhistethics/files/2010/05/Sevilla3.pdf
Article
Four Steps to Magical Powers
Before you fully embark on the path of the bodhisattvas and buddhas, says Chan master Sheng Yen, you must first practice the four steps to magical powers. What are these steps and what are the magical powers you need?
Sheng Yen. "Four Steps to Magical Powers." Buddhadharma: The Practitioner's Quarterly. July 13, 2018. https://www.lionsroar.com/four-steps-to-magical-powers/.
Article
Fragments of a Commentary on the Tattvasaṅgraha, Part 1
Kazuo Kano, an assistant professor at Koyasan University in Japan, joins forces with Kengo Harimoto, of the NGMCP in Hamburg, to present an early manuscript fragment of an otherwise unknown commentary on the Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita. Identified some twenty years [ago] by Prof. Kazunobu Matsuda, the well-known ‘manuscript-hunter’, this fragment has never before been studied in detail or published. Here Harimoto and Kano edit and translate the first of two surviving folios, with material which they show to be important for our understanding of the history of the Sāṃkhya system. (Isaacson, editorial, 1)
Kano, Kazuo, and Kengo Harimoto. "Fragments of a Commentary on the Tattvasaṅgraha, Part 1." Newsletter of the NGMCP 6 (2008): 15–24.
Article
Fragments of a Commentary on the Tattvasaṅgraha, Part 2
This is part 2 of a report on the fragments of hitherto unknown commentary on the Tattvasańgraha.1 The folio we report on here, photographed in frames 32 (recto) and 33 top (verso), constitutes a part of the commentary on Tattvasańgraha stanzas 177–181. Tis is where various arguments for the existence of ātman is presented.
      Here, we give the tex of the Tattvasańgraha along with the Tattvasańgrahapañjikā in full. Unlike in the previous fragment, our commentary is brief, and due to its fragmentary nature, it is hard to understand. Having the Tattvasańgrahapañjikā next to our text greatly helps in reconstructing and understanding our text. (Harimoto and Kano, introduction, 5)

Notes:

1. For general introduction to the fragments, see Harimoto & Kano 2008.
Harimoto, Kengo, and Kazuo Kano. "Fragments of a Commentary on the Tattvasaṅgraha, Part 2." Journal of the Nepal Research Centre 14 (2012) 5–17.
Article
Freedom from Buddha Nature
An argument against buddha-nature by a prominent contemporary American Theravada teacher
Thanissaro Bhikkhu. "Freedom from Buddha Nature." In Head & Heart Together: Essays on the Buddhist Path. Dhammatalks.org, Talks, Writings & Translations of Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Revised December 15, 2018. https://www.dhammatalks.org/books/Head&HeartTogether/Section0016.html
Article
From the Three Natures to the Two Natures: On a Fluid Approach to the Two Versions of Other-Emptiness from Fifteenth-Century Tibet
In recent years there has been a surge of scholarly interest in diverse systems of Buddhist thought and practice that Tibetan thinkers characterize as “other-emptiness” (gzhan stong), contrasting them with systems of “self-emptiness” (rang stong). While the theories of such exponents of other emptiness as Dölpopa Sherap Gyeltsen (dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan, 1292–1361)1 are relatively well known, those of other Tibetan thinkers are only beginning to receive scholarly attention. This paper addresses one such lesser-known other-emptiness theory that was developed by the seminal Tibetan thinker Serdok Penchen Shakya Chokden (gser mdog paṇ chen shākya mchog ldan, 1428–1507).
      Shakya Chokden articulated his position on other-emptiness in works written during the last thirty years of his life. In those works he advocated both Alīkākāravāda Yogācāra and Niḥsvabhāvavāda Madhyamaka systems as equally valid forms of Madhyamaka, regarding the former as a system of other-emptiness and the latter as a system of self-emptiness. Instead of approaching the two systems as irreconcilable, he presented them as equally valid and effective, emphasized their respective strengths, and promoted one or the other depending on context and audience. Partly for these reasons, his own philosophical outlook does not neatly fall into the categories of other-emptiness or self-emptiness, and placing him squarely into the camp of “followers of other-emptiness” (gzhan stong pa)—as some advocates of later sectarian traditions did—does not do justice to him as a thinker. (Source: DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln)
Komarovski, Yaroslav. "From the Three Natures to the Two Natures: On a Fluid Approach to the Two Versions of Other-Emptiness from Fifteenth-Century Tibet." Journal of Buddhist Philosophy 2 (2016): 78–113. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1133&context=classicsfacpub
Article
Further Folios from the Set of Miscellaneous Texts in Śāradā Palm-leaves from Zha lu Ri phug
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

The present report overviews further findings from the set of miscellaneous texts in Śāradā palm-leaves from Zha lu ri phug. The palm-leaf set was first reported by Kano Kazuo (2008), who utilized nine folios in two photographic images (Sferra Cat. MT 42 II/1& 2) preserved at the Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente (IsIAO) in Rome with the help of Francesco Sferra. We have known on the basis of catalogue descriptions that there are further folio images from the same set preserved in other institutes, viz. the China Tibetology Research Center (中国藏学研究中心, CTRC) and the China Ethnic Library (中国民族图书馆, CEL). In other words, the photographic images of the set have been scattered and separately preserved in the three institutes. Ye Shaoyong and Li Xuezhu have independently paid special attention to these materials and researched them.[1]
      It was during a lunch break on 2 August 2012 on the occasion of the 5th Beijing International Seminar on Tibetan Studies at CTRC that the present authors (Ye, Li, Kano) met together and became aware of the fact that we were studying folios from one and the same collection. We quickly decided collaboration by unifying each one’s results and sharing all related materials (As for the CTRC material, we share transcription prepared by Li). After collecting the folios together, we have come to know the number of folios of the set as 87 in total, in which 46 folios are found in CTRC images (Sang De Cat. No. 100, [3], [5] = Luo Cat., 136ff., No. 44, [3], [5]) and 41 are found in CEL images (Wang Cat. No.10, 15, 16, 17). The nine leaves in IsIAO images as reported by Kano (2008) overlap with those in CEL (Wang Cat. 10, 16). These folios contain more than fifteen works, most of which are, unfortunately, incomplete, and the remaining folios are yet to be found. There are also folios yet to be identified among the available ones. In the present report, we shall provide a preliminary survey on the Śāradā folios and an update of the report of Kano (2008) by supplying further identifications. (Ye, Li, and Kano, introduction, 30–31)

Notes

1. See Ye 2012 and Li 2011.
Ye, Shaoyong, Xuezhu Li, and Kazuo Kano. "Further Folios from the Set of Miscellaneous Texts in Śāradā Palm-leaves from Zha lu Ri phug: A Preliminary Report Based on Photographs Preserved in the CTRC, CEL and IsIAO." China Tibetology 1 (2013): 30–47. https://fh.pku.edu.cn/docs/2018-11/20181119234907464597.pdf
Article
Grounds of Buddha-Nature in Tibet
This paper discusses syntheses forged in Tibet among the doctrines of Madhyamaka, Yogācāra, and buddha-nature (tathāgatagarbha). Buddha-nature is a distinctively Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrine, taking a place along side of the Yogācāra doctrine of the basic consciousness (ālayavijñāna) and the universal emptiness (śūnyatā) of Madhyamaka. As a fundamental ground of reality, buddha-nature comes to be identified with a positive side of emptiness (in the case of Madhyamaka) and is assimilated with the basic consciousness (in the case of Yogācāra) as well. As the intrinsic purity of mind, buddha-nature also plays a causal role as the potential for complete awakening.

Buddha-nature comes to shape a Madhyamaka interpretation of emptiness in a positive light in a way that parallels its place in a Yogācāra interpretation (as a positive foundation of mind and reality). Buddha-nature supplements a Yogācāra theory of mind and reality by offering a positive alternative to a theory of consciousness that otherwise functions simply as the distorted cognitive structure of suffering. It thus is not only the potential for an awakened mind, but the cognitive content of awakening, too.

In Tibet we see the interpretation of buddha-nature converge with Mahāyāna doctrines in structurally parallel ways. Paired with buddha-nature, the doctrine of emptiness in Madhyamaka pivots from a “self-empty” lack of intrinsic nature to an “other-empty,” pure ground that remains. In narratives of disclosure characteristic of the doctrine of buddha-nature, we also see parallel shifts in the foundations of Yogācāra, as grounds of distortion like the basic consciousness, the dependent nature, and self-awareness are reinscribed into a causal story that takes place within a pure, gnostic ground.
Duckworth, Douglas S. "Grounds of Buddha-Nature in Tibet." Critical Review for Buddhist Studies 21 (2017): 109–36. https://sites.temple.edu/duckworth/files/2019/01/Duckworth_Buddha-Nature-in-Tibet.pdf.
Article
Guru Yoga in the Foundational Practices
Rinpoche asks that we listen to today’s teachings with two motivations in mind. First, for the benefit of all beings, our mothers, whose numbers fill the infinity of space, we will attain full and complete enlightenment so that we can bring all these beings to the same level. Secondly, having received these teachings, we will

cultivate their experience by practicing the two phases of meditation, and in this way, achieve our own enlightenment.

Today’s teachings are based on the mind treasure of His Holiness Dudjom Rinpoche, Jigdral Yeshe Dorje, one of the great masters of the Nyingma, the Ancient Ones. They are called The Dakini Heart Essence (Khandro Thuk Thik) and within this cycle, the particular text he is teaching is the foundational practices or ngondro. The text is entitled Restoring Benefit and Happiness: Liturgy of the Foundational Practices of the Profound Path of The Dakini Heart Essence. In Boise, Idaho, last year, Rinpoche taught this text up to the point of receiving the four empowerments in the guru yoga section. Now he will start from there and pick up the thread.
Tharchin Rinpoche. "Guru Yoga in the Foundational Practices." Translated by Lama Ngawang Zangpo (Hugh Leslie Thompson). Austin, Texas, 2009.
Article
Gyaltsap Je's Interpretation and the Trichiliocosmic Painting
Although Tsongkhapa did not author a commentary on the Ultimate Continuum, his main student and successor at his main seat of Ganden, Gyaltsap Je Darma Rinchen, composed an elaborate commentary on the Ultimate Continuum.
Phuntsho, Karma. "Gyaltsap Je's Interpretation and the Trichiliocosmic Painting." Recent Essays. Buddha-Nature: A Tsadra Foundation Initiative, January 21, 2022. https://buddhanature.tsadra.org/index.php/Articles/Gyaltsap_Je%27s_Interpretation_and_the_Trichiliocosmic_Painting
Article
Göttingen shozō no Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana satsuei bonbon shahon Xc14.1, Xcl4.57 ni tsuite
Kano, Kazuo. "Göttingen shozō no Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana satsuei bonbon shahon Xc14/1, Xcl4/57 ni tsuite" (The Photocopies of Manuscripts Photographed by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtāyana Preserved in Göttingen, Xc14/1 and Xc14/57). Mikkyō Bunka (Journal of Esoteric Buddhism) 212 (2004) 35–54.
Kano, Kazuo. "Göttingen shozō no Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana satsuei bonbon shahon Xc14/1, Xcl4/57 ni tsuite" (The Photocopies of Manuscripts Photographed by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtāyana Preserved in Göttingen, Xc14/1 and Xc14/57). Mikkyō Bunka (Journal of Esoteric Buddhism) 212 (2004) 35–54.
Article
How Can a Momentary and Conditioned Mind Be Integral to Gzhan Stong?
The question of ever-present change must be as old as the discipline of philosophy itself. The notion of constant flux attributed to Heraclitus (c. 535–c. 475 BC) and known as “panta rhei” was largely forgotten in the later development of Greek thought, but in India the notion of universal flux developed from around the sixth century BCE onward and inspired different philosophical systems, among them the Buddhist philosophy.

The Buddha’s statement “all that is conditioned'"`UNIQ--ref-0000150C-QINU`"' is impermanent!”'"`UNIQ--ref-0000150D-QINU`"' is known as one of The “Four Seals,” the cornerstone of all Buddhist traditions. In Buddhist logic this seal became the basis for the equation: “Whatever is conditioned is impermanent and whatever is impermanent is conditioned. Whatever is not conditioned is not impermanent and whatever is not impermanent is not conditioned.”

In Buddhism, the doctrine of the impermanence of conditioned entities is interwoven with the doctrine of causality. The fact that an entity is conditioned by previous causes and moments makes it subject to impermanence. The doctrine of impermanence was further refined into the doctrine of momentariness. This doctrine postulates a process of momentary arising and cessation on the micro level that happens so fast that it is perceived as a continuity.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000150E-QINU`"'

The following presentation will highlight different definitions and classifications of what the terms conditioned and impermanent might mean for a number of selected Tibetan Buddhist masters in their interpretations of the true nature of the mind. Their literary works are invariably based, directly or indirectly, upon Indian Buddhist śāstras translated into Tibetan.

The point of the exploration in general is to facilitate access to the insights of Tibetan Buddhist masters as they are formulated within the framework of a philosophical discussion. A characteristic feature of their statements is that they are not based on intellectual speculation, but on meditative experience.

Here, we will be concerned mainly with the interpretation of statements pertaining to this issue in two Indian śāstras, the Ratnagotravibhāga and the Madhyāntavibhāga, both attributed to Maitreya. However, as we will see, some of our Tibetan authors also draw on Indian works on Buddhist logic, epistemology, and ontology such as Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika, Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa, and Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya. The latter texts were studied in the monastic colleges of Tibet in the form of simplified manuals that constitute their own literary genre known as “Collected Topics” (Bsdus grwa) and “Classifications of Mind” (blo rigs).'"`UNIQ--ref-0000150F-QINU`"'

In Buddhism, a mind conditioned by “actions” (karmasaṃkleśa) and “defilements” (kleśasaṃkleśa) is by definition a changeable mind—or one could even say—an unstable mind. As different mental factors make their appearance in our minds, our mental states change. Over the course of a day, an ordinary mind experiences many different mental states or factors caused by various defilements. But what should we think about the ultimate nature of the mind?

The mind or mental state in which the ultimate nature of mind is experienced, is considered the goal of the Buddhist path. It is called the enlightened mind, the true nature that is revealed when kleśa (“defilements”) and karma have subsided. This observation leaves us with two fundamental questions: Is this ultimate nature also described as conditioned and impermanent? Second, if this is the case, why is ultimate nature described in such a way? I will return to these questions below.

In order to introduce the selected Tibetan authors and their works, it may be helpful to reiterate that the so-called “Empty in itself'"`UNIQ--ref-00001510-QINU`"'-Empty of other”'"`UNIQ--ref-00001511-QINU`"' distinction that arose in Tibet is based on different interpretations of the nature of the mind or the so called “buddha-nature.” These interpretations stem from different readings of the seminal text for the presentation of the buddha-nature, the Ratnagotravibhāga (hereafter abbreviated as RGV). The Buddha nature teachings are traditionally associated with the so-called third turning of the wheel of the Dharma, which the “Empty of other” proponents as well as other thinkers assert to be the highest level of the Buddhist teachings, following the division of the Buddha’s teachings provided in the seventh chapter of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra into three stages or wheels of doctrine, the first two being classified as provisional and the third and final stage as definitive.'"`UNIQ--ref-00001512-QINU`"'

In the RGV the nature of the mind is described in a way that lends itself to various interpretations. More than fifty commentaries'"`UNIQ--ref-00001513-QINU`"' were written in Tibet based on this śāstra. Some were composed by authors classified as proponents of the “Empty in itself” philosophy and others by proponents of the “Empty of other” philosophy. The latter were often accused of interpreting the RGV’s statements too literally, taking the true nature of the mind to be a truly existent entity which was anathema to the Madhyamaka teachings based on the so-called second turning of the wheel of the Dharma. There was also the question of the qualities attributed to buddha-nature. If it contains qualities (as the RGV says it does) how can it be empty at the same time? The ontological status of the nature of the mind vis-à-vis the nature of emptiness is a central topic much discussed in the Tibetan tradition.

In this article, I will focus on explanations by selected authors, some of which have been classified as proponents of the “empty of other” philosophy. It is by now generally accepted that their works have been underrepresented, if not misrepresented, within the Tibetan scholastic tradition, partly as a consequence of the political persecution of the Jonang school. (Burchardi, "How Can a Momentary and Conditioned Mind Be Integral to Gzhan Stong?, 55–57)
Burchardi, Anne. "How Can a Momentary and Conditioned Mind Be Integral to Gzhan Stong?" Journal of Buddhist Philosophy 2 (2016): 55–77.
Article
How Do We Respect the Buddha-Nature of Nature?
According to traditional biographies, Gautama Buddha had a special relationship with trees. He was born among trees in Lumbini Grove, when his mother went into premature labor. As a child, while sitting under a tree and watching his father plow a field as part of a religious ceremony, he naturally fell into a meditative trance. Later, when he left home on his spiritual quest, he went into the forest, where he studied with two teachers, later engaged in ascetic practices, and then meditated by himself under a tree, where he awakened. Afterward he continued to spend most of his time outdoors, often teaching under trees and eventually dying between two trees.
      Unsurprisingly, the Buddha often expressed his appreciation of trees and other plants. According to one story in the Vinaya monastic code, a tree spirit appeared to him and complained that a monk had chopped down its tree. In response, the Buddha prohibited monastics from damaging trees or bushes, including cutting off limbs, picking flowers, or even plucking green leaves. One wonders what he would say about our casual destruction of whole ecosystems today.
      We may also wonder about the larger pattern: why religious founders so often experience their spiritual transformation by leaving human society and going into the wilderness by themselves. Following his baptism, Jesus went into the desert, where he fasted for forty days and nights. Mohammed's revelations occurred when he retreated into a cave, where the archangel Gabriel appeared to him. The Khaggavisana Sutta (Rhinoceros Horn Sutra), one of the earliest in the Pali canon, encourages monks to wander alone in the forest, like a rhinoceros. Milarepa lived and practiced in a cave by himself for many years, as did many Tibetan yogis after him. Today, in contrast, most of us meditate inside buildings with screened windows, which insulate us from insects, the hot sun, and chilling winds. There are many advantages to this, of course, but is something significant also lost?
      Although we normally relate to nature in a utilitarian way, the natural world is an interdependent community of living beings that invites us into a different kind of relationship. The implication is that withdrawing into it, especially by oneself, can disrupt our usual ways of seeing and open us up to an alternative experience. Does that also point to why we enjoy being in nature so much? We find it healing, even when we don't understand why or how, but clearly it has something to do with the fact that the natural world offers us a temporary escape from our instrumentalized lives. (Read the entire article here.)
Loy, David R. "How Do We Respect the Buddha-Nature of Nature?" Dharma World 45 (2018): 16–19. https://rk-world.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/DW18_7-12.pdf.
Article
How to Think with Chan Gong'an
No abstract given. Below are the first relevant paragraphs:

A monk asked Zhaozhou: ‘‘Does a dog have buddha-nature?’’ Zhaozhou replied: ‘‘No.’’

This pithy exchange between an unidentified Buddhist monk and the Tang dynasty Chan master Zhaozhou Congshen (778–897) is perhaps the best-known example of a Chan gong’an, or ‘"public case." Although the passage occurs in a collection of Zhaozhou's sayings supposedly compiled by his disciples, its notoriety is due to a Song dynasty master, Wumen Huikai (1183–1260), who placed this exchange at the beginning of his famous gong’an collection, Gateless Barrier of the Chan Tradition (Chanzong wumen guan, 1228).[1] Wumen’s compilation, consisting of forty-four such exchanges and anecdotes accompanied by Wumen’s comments, is one of the most important works of Chan literature. And as the first case in Wumen’s collection, "Zhaozhou’s dog" became the single most influential gong’an in the Chinese Chan, Korean Son, and Japanese Zen traditions. It is often the first and sometimes the only gong’an assigned to monks, and many traditional commentators claim, following Wumen’s lead, that this single gong’an holds the key to all others.
      Wumen’s work was neither the earliest nor the most comprehensive compilation of Chan cases. Indeed, the Gateless Barrier is relatively short and straightforward in comparison to two earlier collections, the Blue Cliff Record of Chan Master Foguo Yuanwu (Foguo Yuanwu Chanshi Biyan lu), published in 1128, and the Congrong Hermitage Record of the Commentaries by Old Wansong on the Case and Verse [Collection] by Reverend Jue of Tiantong [Mountain] (Wansong laoren pingzhang Tiantong Jue heshang songgu Congrongan lu), published in 1224. The cases that make up these texts are each based on an individual anecdote, verbal exchange, or quandary known as the benze (original edict), to which has been added comments in prose and verse brushed by later masters. Whereas the Gateless Barrier contains forty-four such anecdotes accompanied by a brief comment and verse by Wumen, the Blue Cliff Record and Congrong Hermitage Record each contain one hundred cases including several layers of appended judgments, verses, and interlinear glosses. (The same "original edict" may appear in two or more collections, but the exegesis will invariably differ. More will be said about the structure of these collections below.) Many more gong’an collections gained currency in China, and the Chan tradition would come to speak of seventeen hundred authoritative cases (although this number was probably not meant to be taken literally). By the end of the Song the gong’an had assumed a central role in the ideological, literary, and institutional identity of the Chan school.
      Popular books on Chan and Zen Buddhism present gong’an as intentionally incoherent or meaningless. They are, it is claimed, illogical paradoxes or unsolvable riddles intended to frustrate and short-circuit the intellect in order to quell thought and bring the practitioner to enlightenment. This understanding of gong’an is allied with a view of Chan as an iconoclastic and anti-intellectual tradition that rejects scripture, doctrine, philosophy, and indeed all forms of conceptual understanding in favor of unmediated or "pure" experience. Gong’an are intended, according to this view, not to communicate ideas so much as to induce a transformative experience. To grasp at the literal meaning of a Chan case is to miss its point.
      Recently scholars have begun to question the instrumental view of Chan that underlies this approach to Chan cases, arguing that it is based on a misreading of the historical and ethnographic record.[2] Chan ranks among the most ritualistic forms of Buddhist monasticism, and a master’s enlightenment is constituted within a prescribed set of institutional and ritual forms.[3] Moreover, the notion that Chan is designed to induce a nonconceptual or pure experience can be traced in part to late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Japanese intellectuals such as D. T. Suzuki and Nishida Kitarō, who were culling from Western sources, notably William James.[4] The notion that Chan is anti-intellectual and repudiates "words and letters" is belied by the fact that the Chan tradition produced the largest literary corpus of any Buddhist school in East Asia.[5] This corpus consists in large part of "recorded sayings" (yulu) and "records of the transmission of the flame" (chuandenglu) texts—texts recounting the careers and teachings of past patriarchs from which the original edicts were drawn.
      Scholars now appreciate that Chan is more complex than early apologists and enthusiasts cared to admit; it is no longer possible to reduce Chan practice and Chan literature to a mere means intended to engender a singular and ineffable spiritual experience. Accordingly, scholars of Chan gong’an have begun to attend to the institutional context and literary history of the genre,[6] and one scholar has devoted an entire monograph to the folkloric themes that appear in a single case.[7] Be that as it may, little progress has been made in deciphering the doctrinal and exegetical intent of Chan gong’an; it would appear that scholars remain reluctant to treat gong’an as a form of exegesis at all. This reluctance may be due to the enduring legacy of an earlier apologetic mystification of the gong’an literature. The primary objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that such reluctance is misguided and that it is indeed possible to recover the original meaning and doctrinal purport of at least some of the cases. The task is not easy, however, as the cases are philosophically subtle and hermeneutically sophisticated, and the authors of the collections delighted in obscure allusions, clever puns, and deft wordplay. (Sharf, "How to Think with Chan Gong’an," 205–7)

Notes

My thanks to Charlotte Furth and Elizabeth Horton Sharf for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this chapter and to Ling Hon Lam for his meticulous editorial attention.

  1. T 2005:48.292c20–24. The exchange is also featured in case no. 18 of the Wansong Laoren pingzhang Tiantong Jue heshang songgu Congrongan lu, T 2004:48.238b21–39a28. Textual details concerning Zhaozhou’s recorded sayings (Zhaozhou Zhenji Chanshi yulu) will be found below.
  2. Faure, The Rhetoric of Immediacy and Chan Insights and Oversights; Foulk, "Myth, Ritual, and Monastic Practice"; Sharf, "The Zen of Japanese Nationalism," "Whose Zen?" and "Experience."
  3. Foulk and Sharf, "On the Ritual Use"; Sharf, "Ritual."
  4. Sharf, "Whose Zen?"
  5. On the sometimes controversial place of literary endeavors in the Song monastic institution, see esp. Gimello, "Mārga and Culture"; and Keyworth, "Transmitting the Lamp," 281–324.
  6. See esp. Heine and Wright, eds., The Kōan.
  7. Heine, Shifting Shape.
Sharf, Robert H. "How to Think with Chan Gong'an." In Thinking with Cases: Specialized Knowledge in Chinese Cultural History, edited by Charlotte Furth, Judith Zeitlin, and Hsiung Ping-chen, 205–43. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007.
Article
Hu-Jan Nien-Ch'i (Suddenly a Thought Rose): Chinese Understanding of Mind and Consciousness
The Issue: In the Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna (Ta-ch'eng ch'i-hsin lun,b henceforth abbreviated as AFM), is found a unique explanation of the origin of avidyā, ignorance:
Hu-jan nien-ch'i, ming wei wu-mingc
Suddenly a thought rose; this is called ignorance

     This idea has baffled many modern scholars as it has traditionally charmed many a Far Eastern Buddhist. What is meant by "suddenly"? What constitutes "thought"? The most recent translator of the AFM, Yoshito Hakeda, has appended this remark to the passage:

There has been much discussion on the meaning of hu-jan in connection with the origin of ignorance, mainly on the basis of interpretations proposed by Fa-tsang,d (1) that ignorance alone becomes the source of defiled states of being. It is the subtlest; no other state of being can be the origin of this. It is therefore said in the text that ignorance emerges suddenly. (2) Commenting on a quotation from a sūtra, he says "suddenly" means "beginninglessly," since the passage quoted makes clear that there is no other state of being prior to the state of ignorance. (3) The word "suddenly" is not used from the stand point of time, but is used to account for the emergence of ignorance without any instance of inception.
. . . A monk of Minge China, glosses "suddenly" as pu-chüeh,f which may mean "unconsciously" or "without being aware of the reason."
. . . If hu-jan is a translation of a Sanskrit word, the original word asasmāt may be posited. Akasmāt means "without reason" or "accidentally."'"`UNIQ--ref-00000022-QINU`"'
The above remark does not actually answer the question of the origin of the concept, hu-jan (suddenly) or the identity of nieng (thought). We become only more aware that hu-jan is one crucial justification for ch'anh (zen) "sudden enlightenment," itself a unique idea. Concerning the meaning of nien and wu-nieni (no-thought), I have shown in a related article that (a) Hakeda is not the first repeatedly to read nien as wang-nien,j vikalpa; Śikṣānanda's AFM was bothered by the same term; (b) but both managed to distort the original meaning; for (c) nien is rooted in a peculiar understanding in pre-Buddhist Han China.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000023-QINU`"' Nien is the incipient thought, associated with yink that disrupts the (otherwise passive, yang,l mind. In this present article, I will cite more evidences—this time focusing upon the concepts of shih,m consciousness, and hu-jan, suddenness—to show again why the AFM cannot be fully understood without reference to the native mode of thought. (Lai, "Hu-Jan Nien Ch'i (Suddenly a Thought Rose)," 42–43)
Lai, Whalen. "Hu-Jan Nien-Ch'i (Suddenly a Thought Rose): Chinese Understanding of Mind and Consciousness." Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 3, no. 2 (1980): 42–59. https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jiabs/article/view/8520/2427.
Article
Hōshōron miroku chosaku setsu no kagen nendai saikō: Tonkō bonbun dankan IOL Khot S 5 to Pelliot 2740 no setsugō fukugen to nendai suitei
It was reported by H. W. Bailey that a Khotanese-hybrid Sanskrit manuscript fragment from Dunhuang, IOL Khot S5 (abbr. S5) verso side, quotes verses from the Ratnagotravibhāga (abbr. RGV) and attributes them to Maitreya. S5 is the earliest text hitherto known that ascribes the authorship of the RGV to Maitreya. While Bailey dates the S5 verso side to the period between the end of the 8th century and the 11th century, we can now further specify the date of composition as some time between the first half of the 9th century and the 11th century. Our rationale for this more specific terminus post quem is that the Chinese version of the Aparimitāyurjñānadhāraṇī (無量寿宗要経) written on the recto side of S5 is likely one of the numerous copies of the sūtra produced during (or shortly after) the reign of king Khri gtsug lde btsan, that is, during the first half of the 9th century. This fact is attested by two witnesses: Pelliot Tibétain 999 and the colophon of S5 recto side. There is also another Dunhuang Sanskrit fragment (Pelliot Chinois 2740) which quotes the RGV, and it is identified as the missing part of S5: the text of Pelliot 2740 recto precisely supplies the missing portion of S5 recto, and the two fragments are very similar in terms of size, material, and scripts. (Source: Academia.edu)
Kano, Kazuo. "Hōshōron miroku chosaku setsu no kagen nendai saikō: Tonkō bonbun dankan IOL Khot S 5 to Pelliot 2740 no setsugō fukugen to nendai suitei" (Dating the Earliest Source That Attributes the Ratnagotravibhāga to Maitreya: Sanskrit Fragments IOL Khot S 5 and Pelliot 2740 from Dunhuang). Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies) 60, no. 2 (2012): 168–74.
Article
Hōshōron no bonnōshōkisetsu
Sasaki, Shizuka. "Hōshōron no bonnōshōkisetsu" (The Explanation of the Origination of kleśa in the Ratnagotravibhāga). Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies) 40, no. 1 (1991): 128–34.
Sasaki, Shizuka. "Hōshōron no bonnōshōkisetsu" (The Explanation of the Origination of kleśa in the Ratnagotravibhāga). Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies) 40, no. 1 (1991): 128–34.
Article
Hōshōron no tenkai
Kano, Kazuo. "Hōshōron no tenkai" (Development of Interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhāga). In Nyoraizō to Busshō (Tathāgatagarbha and Buddha Nature), edited by Masahiro Shimoda, 205–47. Vol. 8 of Shirīzu Daijō Bukkyō (Series on Mahāyāna Buddhism). Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 2014.
Kano, Kazuo. "Hōshōron no tenkai" (Development of Interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhāga). In Nyoraizō to Busshō (Tathāgatagarbha and Buddha Nature), edited by Masahiro Shimoda, 205–47. Vol. 8 of Shirīzu Daijō Bukkyō (Series on Mahāyāna Buddhism). Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 2014.
Article
Hōshōronchū kenkyū (I): Phywa pa niyoru hōshōron I.26 kaishaku
Kano, Kazuo. "Hōshōronchū kenkyū (I): Phywa pa niyoru hōshōron I.26 kaishaku" (A Study of Commentaries on the Ratnagotravibhāga (I): Phywa pa's Interpretation of Verse I.26). Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies) 51, no. 2 (2003): 109-11.
Kano, Kazuo. "Hōshōronchū kenkyū (I): Phywa pa niyoru hōshōron I.26 kaishaku" (A Study of Commentaries on the Ratnagotravibhāga (I): Phywa pa's Interpretation of Verse I.26). Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies) 51, no. 2 (2003): 109-11.
Article
Identification of a Quotation in the Ratnagotravibhāgavṛtti
No abstract given. Here is the first relevant paragraph:

I have been able to trace a hitherto unidentified quotation in the Ratnagotravibhāga(vrtti) (RGV(V)) to the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra (TGS). The sentence in question occurs in the RGV(V) in the context of the explanation of the three svabhāvas of the dhātu, viz., dharmakāya, tathatā and gotra, the three key terms of verses 1.27-28, which constitute the central section of the RGVV. The quotation is part of the commentary on the third aspect, i.e., gotra, and is placed after the last of the three interpretations of the compound tathāgatagarbha. In this context the dhātu of living beings, i.e., their buddha essence, has just been declared to mean "cause" (hetu).

Read the rest of this article in Vol. 3 of the Annual Report of the International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology . . .
Zimmermann, Michael. "Identification of a Quotation in the Ratnagotravibhāgavṛtti." In Vol. 3, Annual Report of the International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology at Soka University for the Academic Year 1999, 215–16. Tokyo: International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology, Soka University, 2000.
Article
Image-likeness and the Tathāgatagarbha: A Reading of William of St. Thierry's Golden Epistle and the Ratnagotravibhāga
In Book 10 of his Confessions Augustine marvels as he meditates on the qualities of the memoria in human beings:

Great is the power of memory, exceeding great, O my God—an inner chamber large and boundless (penetrale amplum et infinitum)! Who has plumbed its depths? Yet it is a poer of mine, and apertains unto my nature; nor do I myself grasp all that I am (nec ego ipse capio totum, quod sum). . . . A great admiration rises upon me; astonishment seizes me. And men go forth to wonder at the heights of mountains, the huge waves of the sea, the broad flow of the rivers, the extent of the ocean, and the courses of the stars, and omit to wonder at themselves (et reliquunt se ipsos).

This concern with the memoria, and its function in the human mind, was to be one of the most important spiritual legacies Augustine would leave to the Latin, and especially monastic, Middle Ages. In fact, it would be possible to say without much exaggeration that the entire history of monastic spirituality in the Latin Middle Ages (at least until approximately A.D. 1200) is the record of the development of understanding of the power of memoria. A central reason for this is that memoria was described as a faculty that worked by recalling the human person to the knowledge and intuition that they were created in the image and likeness of God. Thus the words of Genesis 1:26–27 stand at the beginning of an entire spiritual tradition: "God said let us make man in our own image, in the likeness of ourselves. . . . God created man in the image of himself, in the image of God he created him, male and female he created them." Augustine frequently exhorts himself, as in Confessions 7.10, to "return to myself" (redite ad memet ipsum). This was also the continual refrain of the Cistercian author of the twelfth century, William of St. Thierry, in his Golden Epistle, and it serves as one of the themes on which he builds this work. William's treatise, folloing in the path of Augustine, is a call to discover the image and likeness of God in the individual person.

      In the presentation to follow I would like to set out two spiritual traditions for us to consider: the image-likeness tradition based on Genesis 1:26 and developed by the Latin and Greek Fathers of the Church until approximately A.D. 1200, and the tathāgatagarbha teachings on Buddha-nature in Mahayana Buddhism, which flourished in India and then spread to Tibet and other parts of the Far East in the first six centuries C.E. I shall do this bby presenting two texts: the Golden Epistle of William of St, Thierry, and the Ratnagotravibhāga (third to fifth centuries A.D.), variously attributed to Saramati or Maitreya. My thesis here is that while the language and concepts used in these two treatises are different, and the two worldviews of which they are representative also vary widely, we can find nonetheless underlying themes that express central concerns of each tradition, especially concerning the brith of a basic nature in the person, and the inability of either sin or defilements (kleśa) to cover over that nature that is coming to birth. (Groves, "Image-likeness and Tathāgatagarbha," 97–98)
Groves, Nicholas. "Image-likeness and Tathāgatagarbha: A Reading of William of St. Thierry’s Golden Epistle and the Ratnagotravibhāga." Buddhist-Christian Studies 10 (1990): 97–117.
Article
Impermanence is Buddha Nature
Change isn’t just a fact of life we have to accept and work with, says Norman Fischer. Practitioners have always understood impermanence as the cornerstone of Buddhist teachings and practice. All that exists is impermanent; nothing lasts. Therefore nothing can be grasped or held onto. When we don’t fully appreciate this simple but profound truth we suffer, as did the monks who descended into misery and despair at the Buddha’s passing. When we do, we have real peace and understanding, as did the monks who remained fully mindful and calm...
Fischer, Norman. "Impermanence is Buddha Nature." Lion's Roar, April 8, 2019.
Article
In Defense of His Guru: Dratsepa's Rebuttal to the Challenges Articulated by the Proponents of the Other-Emptiness Doctrine
The buddha-nature literature has a significant place within the Indian Mahāyāna tradition and Tibetan Buddhism. While it is usually included in the so-called Last Wheel of the Buddha’s teachings, many Tibetan thinkers began to cast doubts about the textual significance of buddha-nature discourse in fourteenth century Tibet. In this article, I will examine one particular case where there is apparent tension between multiple Tibetan masters over the importance of buddhanature teachings. This paper primarily analyzes Dratsepa’s commentary to the Ornament (mdzes rgyan) written by his teacher, Buton. Dratsepa construes the Ornament as a work critiquing Dolpopa’s interpretation of the buddha-nature literature. He levels a barrage of criticisms against Dolpopa by referring to Indian śāstras and sūtras that are equally important to both of them, and also by tracing his own assessment of the tathāgata-essence teachings to early Tibetan scholars. In contradistinction to Dolpopa’s claims, Dratsepa offers several nuanced readings of the buddha-nature literature and complicates the notion of what it means to have tathāgata-essence, what a definitive or provisional meaning entails, and the relationship between the Middle Wheel and the Last Wheel teachings. In brief, Dratsepa’s text sheds light on one of the earliest discourses on the tension between self-emptiness and other-emptiness presentations.
Wangchuk, Tsering. "In Defense of His Guru: Dratsepa's Rebuttal to the Challenges Articulated by the Proponents of the Other-Emptiness Doctrine." Journal of Indian Philosophy 39, no. 2 (2011): 147–65.
Article
Indian Materials on the Doctrine Of Sudden Enlightenment
Any steps to be taken in the direction of investigating the Indian roots of Ch'an are hindered by the thicket of legends in which the tradition shrouded itself. The Ch'annists must also be blamed for the fact that the question of what was the original form of this peculiarly Chinese version of Buddhism remains open, still obscured by the fallacious assumption that Ch'an was a monolithic, clearly defined school or tradition. Progress in this area is further hampered by the fact that in both India and China the early history of the movements that gave rise to Ch'an belongs to mystical traditions existing on the margins of the scholarly establishment of Buddhism. On the other hand, the broader question of contacts, connections, agreements and disagreements between Ch'an and Indian Buddhism can now be the object of documented study thanks to the indefatigable efforts of Buddhist scholars in Russia, France and Japan, who have attempted to verify the facts and meaning of an incident known as the "Council of Lhasa." (Gomez, "Indian Materials," 393)
Gómez, Luis. "Indian Materials on the Doctrine of Sudden Enlightenment." In Early Ch’an in China and Tibet, edited by Lewis Lancaster and Whalen Lai, 393–434. Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press, 1983.
Article
Indo kōki mikkyō ni okeru nyoraizō eno genkyū to sono kaishaku: Tantra chūshakusho wo chūshin to shite
Kano, Kazuo. "Indo kōki mikkyō ni okeru nyoraizō eno genkyū to sono kaishaku: Tantra chūshakusho wo chūshin to shite" (References to Tathāgatagarbha in Later Tantric Commentaries). Mikkyōgaku Kenkyū 44 (2012): 125–37.
Kano, Kazuo. "Indo kōki mikkyō ni okeru nyoraizō eno genkyū to sono kaishaku: Tantra chūshakusho wo chūshin to shite" (References to Tathāgatagarbha in Later Tantric Commentaries). Mikkyōgaku Kenkyū 44 (2012): 125–37.
Article
Introduction to Dzogchen and Buddha-Nature
With roots stretching back to the eighth century, the notion of tathāgatagarbha was initially introduced into the lexicon of what would become the Nyingma tradition through scholastic works that sought to reconcile the philosophy of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, as well as through tantric literature that presented advanced paradigms for the path and the immediacy of enlightenment. Over the centuries these two streams of influence wove themselves together to help form the basis of a unique synthesis of sūtra-based philosophical inquiry and tantric theories of praxis that would come to define the Nyingma approach. At the pinnacle of this system are the teachings of Dzogchen, the Great Perfection, the supreme vantage to which all these intertwined approaches aspire. As such, this lofty perspective has a tendency to draw everything it encounters into its fold and reimagine it in its own image. The relationship between Dzogchen and buddha-nature is one example of this trend, though one which is deeply intertwined with the development of the Nyingma view. Read more here.
Ostensen, Morten. "Introduction to Dzogchen and Buddha-Nature." Buddha-Nature: A Tsadra Foundation Initiative, July 11, 2019. https://buddhanature.tsadra.org/index.php/Articles/Introduction_to_Dzogchen_and_Buddha-nature.
Article
Introduction to Mahāmudrā and Buddha-Nature
Ostensen, Morten. "Introduction to Mahāmudrā and Buddha-Nature." Buddha-Nature: A Tsadra Foundation Initiative, August 23, 2019. https://buddhanature.tsadra.org/index.php/Articles/Introduction_to_Mah%C4%81mudr%C4%81_and_Buddha-Nature.
Ostensen, Morten. "Introduction to Mahāmudrā and Buddha-Nature." Buddha-Nature: A Tsadra Foundation Initiative, August 23, 2019. https://buddhanature.tsadra.org/index.php/Articles/Introduction_to_Mah%C4%81mudr%C4%81_and_Buddha-Nature.
Article
Introduction to Other-Emptiness and the Great Middle Way
Ostensen, Mort. "Introduction to Other-Emptiness and the Great Middle Way." Buddha-Nature: A Tsadra Foundation Initiative, August 23rd, 2019. https://buddhanature.tsadra.org/index.php/Articles/Introduction_to_Other-Emptiness_and_the_Great_Middle_Way.
Ostensen, Mort. "Introduction to Other-Emptiness and the Great Middle Way." Buddha-Nature: A Tsadra Foundation Initiative, August 23rd, 2019. https://buddhanature.tsadra.org/index.php/Articles/Introduction_to_Other-Emptiness_and_the_Great_Middle_Way.
Article
Introduction to the Traditions of Ngok and Tsen
The Tibetan traditions generally divide the primary modes of exegesis on the Ratnagotravibhāga into two lines of transmission known as the analytic tradition (thos bsam gyi lugs) and the meditative tradition (sgom lugs). These two traditions originated with the Tibetan disciples of the Kashmiri master Sajjana—namely, Ngok Lotsāwa and Tsen Khawoche, respectively. Therefore, these two are also commonly referred to as the Ngok tradition (rngog lugs), representing the scholarly or analytic approach, and the Tsen tradition (btsan lugs), representing the more practice-oriented meditative approach. Alternatively, Jamgön Kongtrul, in his encyclopedic work commonly known as the Treasury of Knowledge, refers to Ngok's tradition as "the oral transmission of exposition" (bshad pa'i bka' babs) and Tsen’s tradition as "the oral transmission of practice" (sgrub pa'i bka' babs). Though it is likely the diverging motivations of these two figures in requesting these teachings from their mutual teacher that would set these traditions on their respective trajectories. Read more here.
Ostensen, Morten. "Introduction to the Traditions of Ngok and Tsen." Buddha-Nature: A Tsadra Foundation Initiative, February 28, 2020. https://buddhanature.tsadra.org/index.php/Articles/Introduction_to_the_Traditions_of_Ngok_and_Tsen.
Article
Introduction: The History of the Rang stong-Gzhan stong Distinction from Its Beginning through the Ris-med Movement
By the time Tibetans inherited Indian Buddhism, it had already witnessed two major doctrinal developments, namely, the notion elucidated in the "Discourses on the Perfection of Insight" (Prajñāpāramitāsūtras) that all factors of existence (dharmas) lack an own-being (emptiness), and the Yogācāra interpretation of this emptiness based on the imagined (parikalpita-), dependent (paratantra-) and perfect natures (pariniṣpannasvabhāva). Closely related to this threefold distinction was the Tathāgatagarbha restriction of emptiness to adventitious stains that cover an ultimate nature, that of buddha-qualities. Throughout Tibetan intellectual history it has been a controversial issue whether these teachings require a distinction between two modes of emptiness: being "empty of an own-being" (rang stong), and "empty of other" (gzhan stong). While a follower of the rang-stong view insists that everything (and that includes the Buddha and his qualities) shares the same mode of emptiness (i.e., the absence of an independent existence), some followers of gzhan stong claim that the ultimate nature of mind and its inherent buddha qualities do have an independent existence, since they are only empty of everything else ("the other") that does not belong to them. This must be distinguished from a more moderate form of gzhan stong, which admits the rang stong mode of emptiness for both the adventitious stains of relative truth as well as the ultimate nature of mind, but insists that for a practitioner with an immediate experience of the ultimate nature, it is essential to distinguish the latter from the adventitious states of mind that do not reflect how the nature of mind truly is. While forerunners of rang stong/gzhan stong distinctions can be already identified in a variety of Indian texts and early bKa'-gdams-pa manuscripts,[1] their most influential proponents doubtlessly were Dol-po-pa Shes-rab rgyal-mtshan (1292–1361) and Gser-mdog paṇ-chen Shākya mchog-ldan (1427–1507). At the other end of our time frame, new insights into the development of gzhan stong at the very end of the ris-med movement can now be gained from the collected works of Zhe-chen Mkhan-chen Gang-shar dbang-po (1925–1958/59?).
      The contributions to this volume were presented at the gzhan stong panel organized by Klaus-Dieter Mathes (University of Vienna) at the Twelfth Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies in Vancouver, Canada, in August 2010. Its full name was "The History of the Rang stong/Gzhan stong Distinction from its Beginning through the Ris-med Movement." The contributors were, besides the organizer, Karl Brunnhölzl (Tsadra Foundation), Anne Burchardi (The University of Copenhagen and The Royal Library of Denmark), Douglas Duckworth (Temple University), David Higgins (University of Vienna), Yaroslav Komarovski (University of Nebraska-Lincoln), and Tsering Wangchuk (University of San Francisco). It is regretted that Karl Brunnhölzl and Douglas Duckworth were unable to include their work in the present publication. (Mathes, introduction, 4–5)

Notes:
  1. See Brunnhölzl’s Prajñāpāramitā, Indian "gzhan stong pas," and the Beginning of Tibetan gzhan stong; and Mathes’s "Tāranātha's ‘Twenty-One Differences with Regard to the Profound Meaning’—Comparing the Views of the Two gŹan stoṅ Masters Dol po pa and Śākya mchog ldan," and "The gzhan stong Model of Reality. Some More Material on Its Origin, Transmission, and Interpretation."
Mathes, Klaus-Dieter. "Introduction: The History of the Rang stong/Gzhan stong Distinction from Its Beginning through the Ris-med Movement." Journal of Buddhist Philosophy 2, no. 1 (2016): 4–8.
Article
Is "Buddha-Nature" Buddhist? Doctrinal Tensions in the Srimala Sutra: An Early Tathagatagarbha Text
Recent controversies in Japanese Buddhist scholarship have focused upon the Mahayana notion of a "Buddha nature" within all sentient beings and whether or not the concept is compatible with traditional Buddhist teachings such as anātman (no-abiding-self). This controversy is not only relevant to Far Eastern Buddhism, for which the notion of a Buddha-nature is a central doctrinal theme, but also for the roots of this tradition in those Indian Mahāyāna sūtras which utilised the notion of tathāgatagarbha (Buddha-embryo or Buddha womb). One of the earliest Buddhist texts to discuss this notion is the Queen Śrīmālā Sūtra (Śrīmālādevīsūtra), which appears to display a transitional and revisionist attitude towards traditional Mahāyāna doctrines such as emptiness (śūnyatā) and no-abiding-self (anātman). These and related issues are examined as they occur in the Śrīmālā Sūtra and as they might relate to the issue of the place of Buddha-nature thought within the Buddhist tradition. Finally some concluding remarks are made about the quest for "true" Buddhism.
King, Richard. "Is 'Buddha-Nature' Buddhist? Doctrinal Tensions in the Śrīmālā Sūtra: An Early Tathāgatagarbha Text." Numen 42, no. 1 (1995): 1–20.
Article
Is Critical Buddhism Really Critical?
Peter Gregory’s essay, "Is Critical Buddhism Really Critical?," takes the thought of Tsung-mi as a case study in order to ask whether the pursuit of "true Buddhism" is not in turn positing some sort of dhātu-vāda-like essence of Buddhism, hence mirroring the object of its own criticism. Preferring to see Buddhism as a "product of a complex set of interdependent and ever-changing conditions (pratītyasamutpāda),” he looks at Tsung-mi's thought not to determine whether or not it is "truly Buddhist" but in order to discover the causes and conditions that brought it into existence. In a manner similar to Sallie King's argument that Buddha-nature can be understood as a catalyst for positive social change, Gregory argues that for Tsung-mi the doctrine of original enlightenment was tied not to a linguistic transcendentalism but rather to an affirmation of language in response to the more radical critiques of the prajñā-pāramitā tradition. (Hubbard, introduction to Pruning the Bodhi Tree, xvii)
Gregory, Peter N. "Is Critical Buddhism Really Critical?" In Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism, edited by Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson, 286–97. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997.
Article
Is Mindfulness Buddhist? (and Why It Matters)
Modern exponents of mindfulness meditation promote the therapeutic effects of “bare attention”—a sort of non-judgmental, non-discursive attending to the moment-to-moment flow of consciousness. This approach to Buddhist meditation can be traced to Burmese Buddhist reform movements of the first half of the 20th century, and is arguably at odds with more traditional Theravāda Buddhist doctrine and meditative practices. But the cultivation of present-centered awareness is not without precedent in Buddhist history; similar innovations arose in medieval Chinese Zen (Chan) and Tibetan Dzogchen. These movements have several things in common. In each case the reforms were, in part, attempts to render Buddhist practice and insight accessible to laypersons unfamiliar with Buddhist philosophy and/or unwilling to adopt a renunciatory lifestyle. In addition, these movements all promised astonishingly quick results. And finally, the innovations in practice were met with suspicion and criticism from traditional Buddhist quarters. Those interested in the therapeutic effects of mindfulness and bare attention are often not aware of the existence, much less the content, of the controversies surrounding these practices in Asian Buddhist history.
Sharf, Robert H. "Is Mindfulness Buddhist? (and Why It Matters)." Transcultural Psychiatry 52, no. 4 (2014): 470–84. https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8gm9g5ss
Article
Is Nirvāṇa the Same as Insentience? Chinese Struggles with an Indian Buddhist Ideal
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

In this chapter I examine some medieval Buddhist doctrines that, at least on the surface, seem similarly strange and implausible. Indeed, some of the Buddhist notions to be examined below were perplexing to audiences in their own day, much as discussions of brain transplants are perplexing to us today. On the Indian side, I will begin with the notion of nirodha-samāpatti, a meditative state akin to a vegetative coma in which all consciousness has ceased. I will then turn to a class of beings known as “beings without conception” (asaṃjñika-sattvāḥ), denizens of a celestial realm who are devoid of sentience, thought, and consciousness. In both cases, an insentient state seems to be followed by (or gives rise to) a sentient state, which poses serious challenges to the classical Buddhist understanding of karma. On the Chinese side, we will consider the debate over the buddha-nature of insentient objects—can an insentient thing such as a wall or roof tile attain buddhahood and preach the dharma? This doctrine too could be (and was) seen as a threat to the coherence of Buddhist teachings.
      Modern scholars tend to approach such doctrines as the products of intelligent but misguided scholastics struggling to make sense of the universe, all the while hobbled by the dictates of tradition, scripture, and a prescientific understanding of the cosmos. They are the proverbial schoolmen calculating how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. But I would suggest another perspective. Such theories, I argue, serve as frames of reference for pondering issues of personal identity, ethical responsibility, sentience, and death. Given that we ourselves are still far from clarity on these issues, and given that we too devise fanciful thought experiments to help gain a conceptual toehold, perhaps it is time to look afresh at what the Buddhists might have been up to.[11] (Sharf, preamble, 144–45)
Notes
11. For an articulate defense of Buddhist scholasticism, along different lines, see Paul John Griffiths, “Scholasticism: The Possible Recovery of an Intellectual Practice,” in Scholasticism: Cross-Cultural and Comparative Perspectives, ed. José Ignacio Cabezón (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 201–35.
Sharf, Robert H. "Is Nirvāṇa the Same as Insentience? Chinese Struggles with an Indian Buddhist Ideal." In India in the Chinese Imagination: Myth, Religion, and Thought, edited by John Kieschnick and Meir Shahar, 141–70. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014.
Article
Is Yogācāra Phenomenology? Some Evidence from the Cheng weishi lun
There have been several attempts of late to read Yogācāra through the lens of Western phenomenology. I approach the issue through a reading of the Cheng weishi lun (Treatise on the Perfection of Consciousness Only), a seventh-century Chinese compilation that preserves the voices of multiple Indian commentators on Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikāvijñaptikārikā (Thirty Verses on Consciousness). Specifically, I focus on the "five omnipresent mental factors" (pañcasarvatraga, Chin. wu bianxing xinsuo) and the “four aspects” (Chin. sifen) of cognition. These two topics seem ripe, at least on the surface, for phenomenological analysis, particularly as the latter topic includes a discussion of “self-awareness” (svasaṃvedana, svasaṃvitti, Chin. zizheng). Yet we find that the Cheng weishi lun account has little in common with the tradition associated with Husserl and his heirs. The categories and modes of analysis in the Cheng weishi lun do not emerge from or aver to a systematic reflection on the nature of “lived experience” so much as they are focused on subliminal processes and metaphysical entities that belong to the domain of the noumenal. In my conclusion I suggest that the later pramāṇa tradition associated with Dignāga and Dharmakīrti—a tradition that profoundly influenced later Yogācāra exegesis in Tibet—did indeed take a “phenomenological turn.” But my comparison shows that both traditions falter when it comes to relating conceptual content to non-conceptual experience, and thus there is reason to be skeptical about claims that phenomenology is epistemologically grounded in how the world presents itself first-personally.
Sharf, Robert H. "Is Yogācāra Phenomenology? Some Evidence from the Cheng weishi lun." Journal of Indian Philosophy 44, no. 4 (2016): 777–807. https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8tt564hz
Article
Is the Dharma-kāya the Real "Phantom Body" of the Buddha?
The Trikāya doctrine of Buddhism, i.e., the doctrine that the Buddha has three "bodies," is notorious for its complexities. Attributed to the Yogācāra, but regarded as typical of the Mahāyāna in general, it is customarily cited in books on Buddhism in terms of the triad dharma-kāya, saṃbhoga-kāya (or saṃbhogika-kāya) and nirmāṇa-kāya (or nairmāṇika-kāya). Taking these in ascending order of abstraction, the nirmāṇa-kāya, usually translated "apparitional body," "phantom body," "transformation body," etc., is the physical manifestation of Buddhahood, the ordinary perishable human form, as exemplified by the "historical Buddha," Siddhartha Gautama. The saṃbhoga-kāya ("body of bliss," "reward body," "enjoyment body," etc.) is a more exalted and splendid manifestation of the enlightened personality, still in the realm of form, but visible only to bodhisattvas, those of advanced spiritual capabilities. By contrast, the dharma-kāya ("Dharma-body," "Body of Truth," "Cosmic Body," "Absolute Body," etc.) is both formless and imperishable, representing the identification of the Buddha with the truth which he revealed, or with reality itself. As such the dharma-kāya is often linked with various terms for reality, such as dharmatā, dharma-dhātu, and so on, and has even been regarded as a kind of Buddhist absolute, or at least at one with it.'"`UNIQ--ref-000035D5-QINU`"' In this light the dharma-kāya is understood as the primal "source" or "ground" from which the other two types of bodies emanate.'"`UNIQ--ref-000035D6-QINU`"' While many scholars are content to describe this in purely abstract terms, others impute personal characteristics to it;'"`UNIQ--ref-000035D7-QINU`"' and at least one writer has gone so far as to compare it to the Christian idea of Godhead.'"`UNIQ--ref-000035D8-QINU`"'
      As a summary of the Trikāya doctrine this is, of course, oversimplified. We are dealing here with a complex theory which underwent many accretions and refinements, as Buddhists continued down through the centuries to speculate on the nature of Buddhahood, on the nature of reality, and on the relationship between them.'"`UNIQ--ref-000035D9-QINU`"' It is hardly surprising, then, that attempts to plot the course of such arcane speculations have not always been entirely successful in reaching a clear consensus, although the arguments advanced, even in recent writing on the subject, do tend to follow similar lines. A good example of this is the authoritative treatment by Nagao, "On the Theory of Buddha-body (Buddha-kāya)," first published in English in 1973.'"`UNIQ--ref-000035DA-QINU`"' Generally Nagao distinguishes three phases: an initial one-body theory, a two-body theory, and the three-body theory elaborated by the Yogācāras. According to him (p. 104), the two-body theory (i.e., rūpa-kāya and dharma-kāya) "became stabilized in a variety of earlier sūtras,'"`UNIQ--ref-000035DB-QINU`"' and in early Mahāyāna sūtras, the Prajñāpāramitā, the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, and so forth. The rūpa-kāya is the Buddha seen in a human body, while the dharma-kāya is the Buddha's personality seen in the dharma or dharma-nature." Elsewhere (pp. 106–7) Nagao states that the two-body theory was the one held "until the time of the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra and the time of Nāgārjuna," even though the raw materials for the third body, the saṃbhoga-kāya, were also to hand before the time of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, as a consequence of the bodhisattva-conccpt and the idea that a bodhisattva's performance of meritorious actions produced a body which was their manifest "reward." Nagao's article contains many valuable observations, but, as we shall see, some of its assertions are rather too imprecise, both chronologically and philosophically, to be of much use in unravelling the early development of the doctrine at issue. Another recent treatment of the subject by Makransky (1989) also describes certain features of the putative earlier two-body theory before the Yogācāras remodelled it (see esp. pp. 51–53), and distinguishes it sharply from the previous Mainstream'"`UNIQ--ref-000035DC-QINU`"' (in this case, Sarvāstivādin) formulations. This analysis, too, is open to question in certain respects, as I shall show. In these and other articles on the subject'"`UNIQ--ref-000035DD-QINU`"' there is a general tendency to postulate a one-body/two-body/three-body progression, in terms of which a single personality is divided into a physical and a "spiritual" body, and then the physical body is further split in two, yielding the final complement of three. Some writers, however, point to the existence of three bodies even in the Pali sources, what one scholar has called the "primitive triad," i.e., pūti- or cātur-mahābhūtika-kāya, mano-maya-kāya, and dhamma-kāya.'"`UNIQ--ref-000035DE-QINU`"' The first is the corruptible physical body formed out of the four elements, while the second is the mind-made body with which the Buddha visits the celestial realms (believed by some to be a forerunner of the saṃbhoga-kāya); the third is the so-called "Dhamma-body." Now, although both these ways of approaching the subject—the assumption of a linear process, and the belief that the Pāli Canon contains an embryonic Trikāya schema—raise certain difficulties, I do not propose in this paper to discuss the evolution of the Trikāya theory in its entirety, since that would be a mammoth undertaking. What I wish to do is address one aspect of it only, viz., the early development of the idea of dharma-kāya, in the hope that clarifying this will open the way to a better understanding of Mahāyāna buddhology as a whole. (Harrison, introduction, 44–46)

Read more here . . .
Harrison, Paul. "Is the Dharma-kāya the Real 'Phantom Body' of the Buddha?" Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 15, no. 1 (1992): 44–94. https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jiabs/article/view/8792/2699.
Article
Jñānaśrīmitra on the Ratnagotravibhāga
Jñānaśrīmitra (ca. 980–1030)'"`UNIQ--ref-00004003-QINU`"' contributed significantly not only to developing Nirākārajñānavāda theories but also to the resurrection of the Ratnagotravibhāga (abbr. RGV) in early-11th-century India. The Ratnagotravibhāga was very likely composed sometime around the 4th or 5th century in India. The work fell into obscurity towards the late 6th century, only to slowly regain recognition starting from the early 11th century (see Appendix A).
      The earliest masters of this period who quote or refer to the RGV are Maitrīpa (1007/1010-?), Jñānaśrīmitra (ca. 980–1030), and Ratnākaraśānti (late 10th to early 11th century).'"`UNIQ--ref-00004004-QINU`"' Maitrīpa was the common disciple of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnākaraśānti, and, according to a story in Tibetan documents, rediscovered a Sanskrit manuscript of the RGV in a stūpa in Magadha.
      If this rediscovery story is a historical event, Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnākaraśānti would have received the teaching of the RGV from their common disciple Maitrīpa; but we have no concrete witness to corroborate it.
      Maitrīpa’s knowledge of the RGV is attested by a quotation of RGV II. 61b in his Pañcatathāgatamudrāvivaraṇa; he introduces a Nirākāravijñānavādin’s propounding the arising of the Dharmakāya from the Saṃbhogakāya and Nirmāṇakāya, but does not discuss Buddha-nature.'"`UNIQ--ref-00004005-QINU`"'     In contrast to Maitrīpa, who does not discuss Buddha-nature, we find extensive discussions of the topic in compositions of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnākaraśānti.'"`UNIQ--ref-00004006-QINU`"'     In the present paper, I shall focus on quotations from the RGV in Jñānaśrīmitra’s Sākārasiddhiśāstra and Sākārasaṃgrahasūtra, and on his understanding of the RGV, so as to shed light on the reception of the RGV in the early 11th century. (Kano, introductory remarks, 7–8)
Kano, Kazuo. "Jñānaśrīmitra on the Ratnagotravibhāga." In "Relationship between Tantric and Non-Tantric Doctrines in Late Indian Buddhism," edited by Norihisa Baba. Special issue, Oriental Culture 96 (2016): 7–48.
Article
Kaḥ thog Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita's Doxographical Position: The Great Madhyamaka of Other-Emptiness (gzhan stong dbu ma chen po)
This paper cxplores the doctrinal position of Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita ’Gyur med tshe dbang mchog grub'"`UNIQ--ref-0000340D-QINU`"' (1761-1829) namely, the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness (gzhan stong dbu ma chen po). Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita was the first of the Dge rtse reincarnation lineage, and served as an abbot of the Kah thog monastery of the Rnying ma school of Tibetan Buddhism in Khams, in eastem Tibet.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000340E-QINU`"' Apart from the fact that Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita edited the Sde dge edition of the Rnying ma rgyud ’bum,'"`UNIQ--ref-0000340F-QINU`"' little is known of him or his own works.'"`UNIQ--ref-00003410-QINU`"'
      This paper will examine Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita’s doxography, considering the way in which he attempts to demonstrate that the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness is ultimate within the Buddhist doctrinal history originating from India. According to Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita, the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness is said to have been the intent of the Last Tuming of the Wheel of the Dharma which is of definitive meaning, teaches the Buddha-nature (tathāgatagarbha), and, as pointed out by Duckworth, "accords with the Great Perfection"'"`UNIQ--ref-00003411-QINU`"' (rdzogs chen). Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita’s gzhang stong view is explicitly taught in the following doxographical texts: the Bde gshegs snying po'i rgyan, the Grub mtha'i rnam gzhag nges don dgongs gsal, the Rton pa bzhi ldan gyi gtam, the first chapter of the Rnying ma rgyud 'bum dkar chag lha'i rnga bo che,'"`UNIQ--ref-00003412-QINU`"' and the Sangs rgyas gnyis pa'i dgongs pa'i rgyan,'"`UNIQ--ref-00003413-QINU`"' which is Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita's commentary on the Gsang sngags lam gyi rim pa sal ba'i sgron me, a gter ma of Nyang ral Nyi ma 'od zer (1124/1136-1192/1204).
      This paper will also suggest that Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita should be recognized as a forerunner of the ris med movement in Khams, as supported by the following facts: his view on the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness embraces the major practice lineages (sgrub brgyud)—Jo nang pa, Bka' brgyud pa, Sa skya pa, early Dge lugs pa, Rnying ma pa, and Zhi byed—within a single overriding intent of the Buddha’s teachings;'"`UNIQ--ref-00003414-QINU`"' Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita as the teacher of Zhe chen dbon sprul ’Gyur med mthu stobs rnam rgyal, also known as Zhe chen Mahāpaṇḍita (b. 1787), who was a gzhan stong pa,'"`UNIQ--ref-00003415-QINU`"' and who in tum was the teacher of the three masters Kong sprul (1813-99), Mkhyen brtse'i dbang po (1820–2), and Dpal sprul (1808-87).'"`UNIQ--ref-00003416-QINU`"' Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita’s Legs bshad gser gyi thur ma, which is his response to the Lta ba'i gsung mgur by Lcang skya Rol pa'i rdo rje (1717-86),'"`UNIQ--ref-00003417-QINU`"' would hint at the seeds of the ris med movement which grew up among the three schools, the Sa skya, Bka' brgyud, and Rnying ma.'"`UNIQ--ref-00003418-QINU`"' With this paper, then, I hope to add to our understanding of the practice lineages of Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka. (Makidono, introduction, 77–80)
Makidono, Tomoko. "Kaḥ thog Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita's Doxographical Position: The Great Madhyamaka of Other-Emptiness (gzhan stong dbu ma chen po)." Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies 12 (2011): 77–119.
Article
Kong sprul on the Great Madhyamaka of Other-Emptiness: Theory and Practice
This article examines an exposition of the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness by 'Jam mgon Kong sprul Bio gros mtha' yas (1813-99)'"`UNIQ--ref-00000552-QINU`"' of the Bka' brgyud school of Tibetan Buddhism, in his Stainless Ray of Light of the Adamantine Moon: An Instruction on the View of the Great Madhyamaka of Other-Emptiness (Gzhan stong dbu ma chen po'i Ita khrid rdo rje zla ba dri ma med pa'i 'od zer zhes bya ba, henceforth Instruction on the View). In it, Kong sprul sets forth the theory and practice of the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness, centered upon the doctrine of Buddha-nature. The Instruction on the View largely consists of three main outlines: (1) the origin of the doctrine of the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness (gang nas byung ba'i khung); (2) the main part of the Instruction on the View (Jta khrid dngos); and (3) an explanation of the benefits (phan yon bshad pa). In this article, I will first summarize the contents of the Instruction on the View, according to its topical outlines,'"`UNIQ--ref-00000553-QINU`"' and then discuss a hermeneutical issue related to textual interpretations of authoritative scriptures, comparing Kong sprul's approach with that of Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita (1761-1829) and Mi pham rgya mtsho (1846-1912). (Makidono, introduction, 151–52)
Makidono, Tomoko. "Kong sprul on the Great Madhyamaka of Other-Emptiness: Theory and Practice." Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies 16 (2015): 151–191.
Article
La philosophie bouddhique idéaliste
No abstract given. Here is the first relevant paragraph:

Du III au VII siècle de notre ère, selon la chronologie la plus souvent admise, la pensée bouddhique en Inde a trouvé une expression particulièrement brillante dans l'école dite du Vijñānavāda «doctrine de la connaissance». Les premiers ouvrages ressortissant à cette école en tant que telle peuvent être datés du début du Ill siècle. Au cours de ce siècle et du suivant, elle constitue peu à peu ses thèses, notamment à travers les ouvrages de Maitreya-nātha, d'Asaṅga et de Vasubandhu l'ancien. Je désignerai les développements de cette période sous le nom de Vijñānavāda ancien. Au V siècle, Vasubandhu le jeune cherche à fixer et à synthétiser la doctrine; ses travaux ouvrent la période de ce que j'ai appelé le Vijñānavāda classique, caractérisée par une abondante littérature de commentaires qu'illustrent en particulier les noms de Sthiramati, Dharmapāla et Hiuan-tsang. Le present exposé s'attachera à retracer brièvement l'histoire du Vijñānavāda, puis à exposer la doctrine classique. (May, "La philosophie bouddhique idéaliste," 265)

English Translation:

From the third to the seventh century AD, according to the most commonly accepted chronology, Buddhist thought in India found a particularly brilliant expression in the school known as the Vijñānavāda "doctrine of knowledge". The first works coming out of this school as such can be dated to the beginning of the 11th century. During this century and the following, it gradually built up its theses, notably through the works of Maitreya-nātha, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu the Elder. I will designate the developments of this period under the name of ancient Vijñānavāda. In the fifth century, Vasubandhu the Younger sought to fix and synthesize the doctrine; his works open the period of what I have called the classical Vijñānavāda, characterized by an abundant literature of commentaries that illustrate in particular the names of Sthiramati, Dharmapāla and Hiuan-tsang. This presentation will focus on briefly recounting the history of Vijñānavāda, then explaining classical doctrine.
May, Jacques. "La philosophie bouddhique idéaliste." Asiatische Studien 25 (1971): 265–323.
Article
Lasting Happiness
It’s surprisingly easy to achieve lasting happiness — we just have to understand our own basic nature. The hard part, says Mingyur Rinpoche, is getting over our bad habit of seeking happiness in transient experiences.
Mingyur, Yongey, 7th. "Lasting Happiness." Lion's Roar, January 19, 2012.
Article
Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (Vidyābhūṣaṇa)
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra consists of ten chapters, named respectively —(1) Rāvaṇādhyeṣaṇā parivarta, (2) Sarvadharmasamuccaya parivarta, (3) Anityatā parivarta, (4) Abhisamaya parivarta, (5) Tathāgata - nityānityatva, (6) Kṣaṇika parivarta, (7) Nairmāṇika parivarta, (8) Māṃsabhakṣaṇa parivarta, (9) Dhāraṇīparivarta, and (10) the Parisamāpti parivarta, which bears no special name.
      Throughout the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra the speaker is Buddha himself. The first chapter of the book is addressed to Rāvaṇa, while the person spoken to in the remaining nine chapters is Mahāmati. Rāvaṇa prayed to Buddha for the solution of two questions, viz. : (1) what is the distinction between dharma and adharma, and (2) how could one pass beyond both dharma and adharma? Buddha’s answers to these questions form the subject-matter of the first chapter. Thereafter 108 questions were asked by Mahāmati, and Buddha’s answers to these questions form the topics of the remaining nine chapters. (Vidyābhūṣaṇa, para 10–11, 833)

Read more here . . .
Vidyābhūṣaṇa, Satis Chandra. "Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra." Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland 37, no. 4 (1905): 831–37. https://archive.org/details/journalroyalasi09irelgoog/page/n853/mode/2up.
Article
Lhodrak Dharma Senge's Commentary on the Ultimate Continuum
An original essay on Lhodrak Dharma Senge's Commentary on the Ultimate Continuum by Tsadra Foundation's writer-in-digital-residence, Lopen Dr. Karma Phuntsho.
Phuntsho, Karma. "Lhodrak Dharma Senge's Commentary on the Ultimate Continuum." Recent Essays on Buddha-Nature. Buddha-Nature: A Tsadra Foundation Initiative. May 11, 2022. https://buddhanature.tsadra.org/index.php/Recent_Essays.
Article
Lost in Translation? The Treatise on the Mahāyāna Awakening of Faith (Dasheng qixin lun) and Its Modern Readings
The Treatise on the Mahāyāna Awakening of Faith, an indigenous Chinese composition written in the guise of an Indian Buddhist treatise, is one of the most influential texts in the history of East Asian Buddhism. Its outline of the doctrines of buddha nature (foxing), buddha bodies (foshen), and one mind (yixin), among others, served from the medieval period onwards as one of the main foundations of East Asian Buddhist thought and practice. The Treatise is putatively attributed to the Indian writer Aśvaghoṣa, and its current Chinese version was traditionally conceived of as a translation from an original Sanskrit text. In the course of the twentieth century, however, many important scholars of Buddhism have called into question the textual history of the Treatise. Even if the specific circumstances of its creation are still largely unknown, the view that the Treatise is an original Chinese composition (not necessarily written by a native Chinese) is now prevalent among scholars. Meanwhile, and for more than one hundred years, the text has also become a source of knowledge of Buddhism in the West thanks to a number of English translations. After examining the early textual history of the two existing versions of the text, this article will offer some examples of its modern appropriation by a novel group of readers and interpreters, an appropriation that took place during the first decades of the twentieth century amidst efforts to re-envision Chinese and East Asian Buddhist history and the place of Buddhism in modern society.
Tarocco, Francesca. "Lost in Translation? The Treatise on the Mahāyāna Awakening of Faith (Dasheng qixin lun) and Its Modern Readings." Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 71, no. 2 (2008): 323–43. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/622d/9645525a5977419cda965769f846f2324b0f.pdf?_ga=2.4629619.1346501928.1596826751-417447241.1584722923.
Article
Luminous Clarity and the Completion Phase of Union
Chapter 12 of The Treasury of Knowledge Book Eight, Part Three: The Elements of Tantric Practice, by Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé
Guarisco, Elio, and Ingrid McLeod (Kalu Rinpoché Translation Group), trans. "Luminous Clarity and the Completion Phase of Union." Chapt. 12 in The Elements of Tantric Practice: A General Exposition of the Process of Meditation in the Indestructible Way of Secret Mantra, edited by Ingrid McLeod. Book Eight, Part Three of The Treasury of Knowledge. By Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé ('jam mgon kong sprul blo gros mtha’ yas). Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2008.
Article
Luminous Mind among the Logicians—An Analysis of Pramāṇavārttika II.205–211
Roger R. Jackson, in his essay "Luminous Mind Among the Logicians", treats the Indo-Tibetan commentarial discussions of the affirmation of the mind's natural luminosity (prabhāsvaratā) found in Pramāṇavārttika II.208. Such an affIrmation, as he shows, has deep roots in the Buddhist tradition, and is usually connected with tathāgatagarbha thought. That it is also affirmed by Dharmakīrti and discussed extensively by his commentators in India and Tibet shows that it is not without significance for the logicoepistemological tradition represented by Dignāga and his successors. The idea that the mind is naturally luminous or radiant and that its defIlements have only an adventitious status is of obvious relevance to Buddhist soteriology; it affirms that, in some important sense, the goal of Buddhist religious practice has already been attained or is already present. The importance of Jackson's study is that it shows the same idea to be relevant also to Buddhist epistemological theory: it is precisely the mind's natural radiance that makes apprehension of things as they really are a possibility. It is this metaphysical and epistemological fact which leads Jackson to categorize Dharmakīrti and his school as epistemological optimists. (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to Buddha Nature, 5)
Jackson, Roger R. "Luminous Mind among the Logicians—An Analysis of Pramāṇavārttika II.205–211." In Buddha Nature: A Festschrift in Honor of Minoru Kiyota, edited by Paul J. Griffiths and John P. Keenan, 95–123. Tokyo: Buddhist Books International, 1990.
Article
Lying to Tell the Truth—Upāya in Mahāyāna Buddhism and Oikonomia in Alexandrian Christianity
Roger Gregory-Tashi Corless, in his essay "Lying to Tell the Truth", explores the use of intentional vagueness and obscurity in the texts of Clement of Alexandria and Origen, and relates this to the intentional use of falsehood (or, perhaps better, nontruth) in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra. Both in second century Alexandria and in third century India, he suggests, one finds a self-conscious use of graded, hierarchically ordered sets of "false truths" as pedagogical devices. For the Lotus, Corless suggests, the "true truth" is that all living beings are in fact possessors of Buddha Nature; it is this toward which the pedagogically useful though partial truths (upāya) found in other assertions point. This position is illustrated with extensive quotations from Kūkai, and is compared with positions taken by a series of Christian thinkers from Nicholas of Cusa to John Henry Newman. (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to Buddha Nature, 3–4)
Corless, Roger Gregory-Tashi. "Lying to Tell the Truth—Upāya in Mahāyāna Buddhism and Oikonomia in Alexandrian Christianity." In Buddha Nature: A Festschrift in Honor of Minoru Kiyota, edited by Paul J. Griffiths and John P. Keenan, 27–40. Tokyo: Buddhist Books International, 1990.
Article
Mahāyānottaratantraparicaya: Kashumīru yurai no shinshutsu no Hōshōron chū bonbun danpen
Kano, Kazuo. "Mahāyānottaratantraparicaya: Kashumīru yurai no shinshutsu no Hōshōron chū bonbun danpen" (Mahāyānottaratantraparicaya: Sanskrit Fragments from a Newly Available Ratnagotravibhāga Commentary from Kashmir). Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies) 62, no. 2 (2014): 152–58.
Kano, Kazuo. "Mahāyānottaratantraparicaya: Kashumīru yurai no shinshutsu no Hōshōron chū bonbun danpen" (Mahāyānottaratantraparicaya: Sanskrit Fragments from a Newly Available Ratnagotravibhāga Commentary from Kashmir). Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies) 62, no. 2 (2014): 152–58.
Article
Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa of Sajjana: An Annotated Translation with a Reading Text
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

The present paper provides an annotated translation of Sajjana’s Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa along with a reading text of this Sanskrit work (a critical edition of which is under preparation for publication). I started to work on this text in 2005 when I received a copy of a photographic image of a manuscript containing it from Professor Jikidō Takasaki. I published a study dealing with this manuscript in 2006 (Kano 2006b) and provided a critical edition of the Sanskrit text in my doctoral thesis, submitted to Hamburg University in 2006 (Kano 2006a). I also prepared a preliminary annotated translation of this text in 2006 and gave the draft to Karl Brunnhölzl together with my unpublished doctoral thesis.
      It came as a surprise for me to learn that Brunnhölzl copied and published the draft of my translation under his name in his book When the Clouds Part: The Uttaratantra and Its Meditative Tradition as a Bridge between Sūtra and Tantra (Boston/London: Snow Lion, 2014), pp. 461–472. Brunnhölzl (p. 1121, n. 1718) says in his book: “All topical headings are inserted by the translator (corresponding to my outline above). Though my translation sometimes differs from Kano’s, I am indebted to both his translation and his Sanskrit edition of the text with critical apparatus (Kano 2006, 513–35), which in turn owe much to Profs. Schmithausen and Isaacson as well as Dr. Diwakar Acharya.” The fact is, however, that he has in many cases simply copied my earlier work.
      Since the translation used by Brunnhölzl was an unpublished draft, my earlier mistakes found their way into his book, inasmuch as that draft was based in turn on an early draft of my Sanskrit edition, which itself contains serious misreadings, especially in verses 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 15, along with a number of errors in the interlinear glosses. All his striving to make sense of my misreadings of the Sanskrit have been to no avail; his interpretations and analysis (Brunnhölzl, ibid. pp. 288–300 ) based on these errors need to be fundamentally revised. I have since made improvements to the Sanskrit edition and translation, and this is reflected in the differences between his published translation and the one I offer here.[1] (Kano, preface, 1–2)

Notes

1. I am grateful for a number of suggestions and improvements of my critical edition of Sajjana's Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa to Prof. Harunaga Isaacson, Prof. Diwakar Acharya, Prof. Lambert Schmithausen, Dr. Pascale Hugon, and all participants of a workshop “From Kashmir to Tibet: A set of proto-Śāradā palm leaves and two works on the Ratnagotravibhāga” held on 21. April 2015 at Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften Institut für Kultur-und Geistesgeschichte Asiens. I would like to thank to Dr. David Reigle and Mr. Philip Pierce for much valuable information regarding difficult points of the text and English proof-reading of my translation.
Kano, Kazuo. "Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa of Sajjana: An Annotated Translation with a Reading Text." Kōyasan daigaku daigakuin kiyō (Bulletin of the Graduate School: Graduate Program of Liberal Arts, Kōyasan University) 14 (2015) 1–49.
Article
Merging Ignorance and Luminosity in Early Bka’ brgyud Bsre ba Literature
The Bka’ brgyud lineage tradition of Nā ro pa (c.956-1040), Mar pa lo tsā ba chos kyi blo gros (1002/1012-1097), and Sgam po pa rin chen dpal (1079-1153) is broadly characterized by the transmission tradition of tantric teachings and practices outlined in Nā ro pa’s six doctrines (nā ro’i chos drug). This tantric framework along with direct pointing-out instructions (ngo sprod kyi gdams pa) to the nature of one’s mind (sems kyi rang bzhin) within the context of Mahāmudrā teachings are the primary methods to liberation employed by Bka’ brgyud practitioners. The doctrine of luminosity (’od gsal ba) is fundamental to both methods since the nature of one’s mind is pointed out as luminosity and the yogic practice of inducing meditative states where one is able to recognize luminosity is a central doctrine for Nā ro pa’s tantric system, especially during the time of sleep (gnyid kyi ’od gsal). These methods eventually become synthesized into a cohesive soteriological program, as exemplified by instructions on merging ignorance (gti mug) and luminosity as found within Bka’ brgyud merging (bsre ba) literature, the focus of this study. (Source: Academia.edu)
Kemp, Casey Alexandra. "Merging Ignorance and Luminosity in Early Bka’ brgyud Bsre Ba Literature." Zentralasiatische Studien 44 (2015): 35–50.
Article
Mind Is Buddha
A simple three-word koan. Or just a one-word koan: buddhanature. So deceptively simple, so easy to leave in the realm of concept, yet it penetrates to the very heart of the matter. Here’s Geoffery Shugen Arnold, Sensei, on Case 30 of the Gateless Gate, “Mazu’s ‘Mind is buddha.'”
Arnold, Geoffrey Shugen. "Mind Is Buddha." Buddhadharma: The Practitioner's Quarterly, March 1, 2005.
Article
Mind Is Empty and Lucid, Its Nature Is Great Bliss
The Tibetan teacher Khenchen Thrangu Rinpoche offers instruction on key verses from one of the Mahamudra’s seminal texts, A Song for the King by the Indian sage Saraha.
Thrangu Rinpoche. "Mind Is Empty and Lucid, Its Nature Is Great Bliss." Lion's Roar, July 1, 2007.
Article
Mindfulness and Mindlessness in Early Chan
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

The Chan tradition is renowned as the “meditation” school of East Asia. Indeed, the Chinese term chan 禪 (Jpn: zen) is an abbreviated transliteration of dhyāna, the Sanskrit term arguably closest to the modern English word “meditation.” Scholars typically date the emergence of this tradition to the early Tang dynasty (618–907), although Chan did not reach institutional maturity until the Song period (960–1279). In time, Chinese Chan spread throughout East Asia, giving birth to the various Zen, Sŏn, and Thiê`n lineages of Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, respectively. Today these traditions continue to promote, at least in theory, meditation practices, and these have been the subject of considerable scholarly interest.[1]
      It may then come as a surprise to learn just how little is known about the meditation techniques associated with the “founders” of this tradition—the masters associated with the nascent (or proto-) Chan lineages of the seventh and eighth centuries. It was during this fertile period—which, following scholarly convention, I will call “early Chan”—that the lineage myths, doctrinal innovations, and distinctive rhetorical voice of the Chan, Zen, Sŏn, and Thiê`n schools first emerged. Although hundreds of books and articles have appeared on the textual and doctrinal developments associated with early Chan, relatively little has been written on the distinctive meditation practices, if any, of this movement.
      This essay emerged from an attempt to answer a seemingly straightforward question: what kinds of meditation techniques were promulgated in early Chan circles? The answer, it turned out, involved historical and philosophical forays into the notion of “mindfulness”—a style of meditation practice that has become popular among Buddhists (and non-Buddhists) around the globe. Accordingly, I will digress briefly to consider the roots of the modern mindfulness movement, and will suggest possible sociological parallels between the rise of the Buddhist mindfulness movement in the twentieth century and the emergence of Chan in the medieval period. (Sharf, "Mindfulness and Mindlessness in Early Chan," 933)

Notes
  1. The literature is vast; on modern Japanese Zen and Korean Sŏn meditation practice in English see, for example, Buswell 1992, Hori 2000, and Hori 2003. On the history of these practices see Bielefeldt 1988, Buswell 1987, Collcutt 1981, Foulk 1993, and Schlütter 2008.
Sharf, Robert H. "Mindfulness and Mindlessness in Early Chan." Philosophy East and West 64, no. 4 (2014): 933–64.
Article
Nehangyō kyōtengun ni okeru kū to jitsuzai
Thanks to several previous studies, the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra (MPNS) has been proved to shift its central thought from the buddhakāya idea to the tathāgatagarbha/buddhadhātu idea. The present author has shown in another paper (Suzuki [1999]) that the movement between the buddhakāya idea and the tathāgatagarbha/buddhadhātu idea appears in the larger context including the MPNS, and has extracted this context from the various Mahāyāna sūtras under the name of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra-Group (MPNS-G), which consists of the Mahāmeghasūtra (MMS), the MPNS, the Aṅgulimālīyasūtra (AMS) and the Mahābherisūtra (MBhS). While the AMS is a direct successor of the MPNS, the MBhS succeeds the MPNS critically and shifts back its central thought from the tathāgatagarbha/buddhadhātu idea to the buddhakāya idea again.
      The MPNS-G declares or suggests the non-emptiness of the tathāgata. This is reinterpretation of the pratītyasamutpāda and the śūnyatā idea, and follows the rule of the historical Buddhist hermeneutics. It is especially worthwhile to note that the MBhS, like the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra in the Vijñāptimātra idea, devaluates the śūnyatā idea as imperfect. This quite negative attitude toward the śūnyatā idea does not appear in any other Indian texts on the tathāgatagarbha idea including the MPNS and the AMS. Aiming at establishing the theory that every sentient being is able to perform religious efforts and become buddha on account of the nonemptiness and the eternalness of the tathāgata, the MBhS must reject any sūtra concerning the śūnyatā idea as imperfect. Though the MPNS is a pioneer in reinterpretation of the the śúnyatā idea, the MPNS cannot devaluate it perfectly because the śūnyatā idea is one of the main backgrounds to the MPNS. The MBhS's decisive attitude toward the śūnyatā idea devaluation becomes possible by having the MPNS as its basis. (Source: UTokyo Repository)
Suzuki, Takayasu. "Nehangyō kyōtengun ni okeru kū to jitsuzai" (The Non-emptiness of the Tathāgata in the Mahāparinirvānasūtra-Group). Tōyō bunka kenkyūsho kiyō (Bulletin of Institute of Oriental Culture) 139 (2000): 109–46.
Article
New Light on the Mahāyāna-Śraddhotpāda Śāstra
The study of the Mahāyāna-śraddhotpāda Śāstra[1] has a long history. French, Chinese and Japanese scholars have participated in the discussion, some of them great authorities in the field of Sino-Indian Studies, as P. Demieville, Ui Hakuju, Tokiwa Daijō, and Mochizuki Shinkō.[2] That I dare to add my grain to the store of knowledge already collected, though not even fully acquainted with the earlier efforts , demands an explanation. When studying Chinese Buddhism and slowly progressing through the centuries I came before the stumbling block of this text and found that without more definite knowledge about the Mahāyāna-śraddhotpāda Śāstra a clear picture of Medieval Buddhism could not be attained. As no answer has yet been given to this problem acceptable to all the debaters I had to look into it myself. Unfortunately, the Indian libraries in my reach are very incomplete with respect to Japanese and Chinese books and periodicals. So I was confronted with a dilemma which worries many scholars to-day, namely, whether I should continue my studies in spite of this handicap or stop altogether. Finally I decided that I would try to get a result by using what was available to me and adding material which I collected myself. This led to what I consider as a result worth while to be submitted as a basis of discussion. The professors Matsunami Seiren and Hayashi Kemmyō kindly sent me reprints of their papers.
      The present state of the discussion may in short be characterized as follows. The traditional view that (1) the Śāstra is a translation of a Sanskrit original and (2) that the translator is Paramārtha, is now generally abandoned.[3] It is also known that the lntroduction is forged.[4] It is further known that the Sanskrit text translated by Śikṣānanda was itself a translation from the extant Chinese version.[5] If so much is accepted, early doubts of Chinese Buddhists concerning the Śāstra gain weight.[6]
      Hui-chün, an early seventh century witness, in the passage quoted above p. 156 note 4, speaks of "former" Dāśabhūmikas who forged the Śraddhotpāda. Chi-tsang (549-623) blames Dāśabhūmikas "of a former generation"

that they mistook the eighth vijñāna for Buddha-nature (T. vol. 34 380 b 20 f.). In another place he speaks of "old" Dāśabhūmikas (T. vol. 42 104 c 7). This implies that we have to distinguish between late Dāśabhūmikas (after the arrival of the Mahāyāna-saṁgraha) and early ones (the first and second generations after the translators of the Daśabhūmika Śāstra).[7] Among them, those who belonged to the early generation are said to have forged the Śraddhotpāda Śāstra.[8]
      Tokiwa believes in a Chinese author who mainly relied on the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra both translations of which (Sung and Wei) he amalgamated. This may be correct though I could not find allusions peculiar to Guṇabhadra's (Sung) translation.
      Mochizuki has proved that the Chinese author was acquainted not only with the Laṅkāvatāra but with several other texts. He proposes as author T'an-tsun, a disciple of Fa-shang who dictated the Śāstra to his disciple T'an -ch'ien. See below p. 160.
      Hayashi Kemmyō, has traced material in Liang Wu-ti's writings and the Pao-tsang lun. Liang Wu-ti believed in immortal souls.[9] The Śraddhotpāda Śāstra contains nothing of that sort. Though influence from that side cannot be excluded, I do not feel this material to be significant enough to permit us to place the author in the South.
      Matsunami Seiren believes in Aśvaghoṣa if not as author yet as the spiritual father of the Śraddhotpāda. I have compared his quotations from the Sauṇdarānanda Kāvya etc . which are interesting. But I think we might consider as established that the author of the Śraddhotpāda Śāstra was a Chinese and work upon that assumption.[10] Besides, the main tenets of the Śāstra have not been found in the Kāvya.
      I pass by other theories of which I have only heard . Scholars are searching in all directions and undoubtedly will find material unknown to me which will throw even more light on the intricate problem of our text. Meanwhile I shall consider as established that the Śāstra was composed by an early Dāśabhūmika and limit my investigation to the question who this person was. (Liebenthal, "New Light on the Mahāyāna-Śraddhotpāda Śāstra," 155–58)

Notes
  1. T. 1666. I have compared the photos of manuscripts mentioned in Giles, Chinese Manuscripts from Tunhuang, nos. 4318-20, 5771-84. But I found no interesting versions. (No. 5783 seems to be a commentary of the Samyuktābhidharma-sāra!)
  2. Of this literature I had at my disposal : P. Demiéville: Sur l'authenlicité du Ta Tch'eng K'i Sin Louen. Bulletin de la Maison Franco-Japonaise, tome II, no. 2 , Tokyo 1929, reprint pp. 1-78 (Demiéville, Authenticité).
          Mochizuki Shinkō: Bukkyo daijüen (1935} (Mochizuki, Dictionary).
          Same : Daijo Kishinron no Kenkyū (1922) (Mochizuki , Study) .
          Same: Kōjutsu Daijō Kishinron (1938} (Mochizuki, Kishinron).
          Same : Kokuyaku Issaikyō, Ronshu-bu 5 (1953}. A translation with a detailed outline.
          Same : Bukkyō kyōten. seiritsu shiron (1949}, pp. 532–624.
          Ui Hakuju: Daijō Kishinron. Tokyo 1936.
          Matsunami Seiren: Yugagyoha no taikei lo nendai (Nippon bukkyō gakkai nempō, No. 22) . 1957.
          Same: Yugagyoha. no so lo shite no Memyō (Taishō Daigaku kenkyū kiyō, No. 39). 1954
          Same: Kishinron-shisō no taikei to nendai {Nippon bukkyō gakkai nempō, No. 22) . 1957.
          Same: Tensei naru Nanda (Taishō Daigaku kenkyū kiyō, No. 42). 1957.
          Hayashi Kemmyō: Kishinron no shin Kenkyū. 1945.
          Suzuki D. Teitarō: Awakening of Faith. Chicago 1900.
  3. Also by Demiéville, see Le Concile de Lhasa (Bibliothèque de l'lnstitut des Hautes Études Chinoises, t. vii, Paris 1952), part 1 p. 57.
  4. Though old.
  5. Tao-hsüan's note following upon the biography of Hsüan-tsang in Hsü kao-seng chuan T. vol. 50 428 b 27.
  6. Cf. Mochizuki, Dictionary 3256b, also Ching-lu T. vol. 55 142a; Chinkai, Sanron gensho Mongiyō [Chinese characters not available] ch. ii (T . 2299 vol. 70 228c) quotes two passages from the Ta-ch'eng ssu-lun hsüan-i [Chinese characters not available] ch. 5 and 10 which, however, are not found in the extant fragmentary version (Hsü-tsang ching I. 74/I). It looks as if ch. 10 of that edition should more correctly be labelled ch. 12. I am translating these quotations: Ch. 5. '"The Śraddotpāda is made by a prisoner-of-war who borrowed the name of Aśvaghoṣa." Ch. 10. "Śraddotpāda. Some say that it is made by Dāśabhūmikas of the North . . . It is not by Aśvaghoṣa Bodhisattva. Former [Chinese characters not available] Dāśabhumikas made it. They borrowed the name (of Aśvaghoṣa) for the headline". The "prisoner -of-war" is perhaps imagination. The "former" Dāśabhūmikas seem to be correct.
  7. Cf. my "Notes on the Vajrasamādhi." T'oung Pao vol. xliv, 4-5, pp, 378-382 . I have in this paper discussed several allusions which l had found in the Vajrasamādhi and wish to add one more which I had overlooked. It is the famous half gāthā for which the rākṣasa gives away his body. Cf. T. vol. 9, 733b, c and Nirvāṇa Sūtra, Sheng -hsing p'in [Chinese not available], T. vol. 12 xiv 450a-451b.
  8. To say that the Śraddhotpāda Śāstra was forged is perhaps not correct. Aśvaghoṣa may appear in the title as spiritual author as he appears in the biography of T'an-yen dictating, in the shape of a horse, a commentary on the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. He and Nāgārjuna were worshipped as bodhisattvas under the Wei (Daśabhūmika, Introduction). He seems to have a function of inspirator similar to Maitreya. See Demiéville, La Yogācārabhūmi de Saṅgharakṣa, B.E.F.E.O. XLIV, 2. {1954) pp. 377-387, anti cf. T. vol. 50 334c 10 and vol. 8 530b 25 seq.
  9. Cf. Mon. nipponica Vlll I–2 pp. 376 seq.
  10. Cf. Mon. nipponica Vlll I–2 pp. 376 seq.
Liebenthal, Walter. "New Light on the Mahāyāna-Śraddhotpāda Śāstra." T'oung Pao 46, no. 3/5 (1958): 155–216.
Article
Non-representational Language in Mipam's Re-presentation of Other-emptiness
Buddhist traditions understand emptiness in various ways, and two streams of interpretation, “self-emptiness” (rang stong) and “other-emptiness” (gzhan stong), have emerged in Tibet that help bring into focus the extent to which interpretations diverge.1 In contrast to self-emptiness, other-emptiness does not refer to a phenomenon’s lack of its own essence;it refers to the ultimate reality’s lack of all that it is not. Rather than claiming the universality of self-emptiness (emptiness as lack of own essence), proponents of other-emptiness assert another way to understand emptiness with regard to the ultimate (emptiness as ultimate ground). These two interpretations of emptiness—as ground and as groundless abyss—reveal a rift at the foundation of Buddhist metaphysics.

      This essay probes the discourses of other-emptiness in the Jonang (jo nang) and Nyingma (rnying ma) traditions. After briefly introducing other-emptiness in the Jonang tradition, the locus classicus for other-emptiness in Tibet, I will contrast the way Mipam (‘ju mi pham rgya mtsho) (1846–1912) positions the discourse of other-emptiness in his interpretative system. I will then demonstrate how Mipam’s portrayal of other-emptiness highlights the way he uses a perspectival means to incorporate a diversity of seemingly contradictory claims that he uses to support his view of ultimate reality as indeterminate. I will argue that an implication of his view is a

non-representational account of language about the ultimate. (Duckworth, introduction, 920)
Duckworth, Douglas S. "Non-representational Language in Mipam's Re-presentation of Other-emptiness." Philosophy East and West 64, no. 4 (2014): 920–32. https://sites.temple.edu/duckworth/files/2013/07/NonRepresentational_duckworth.pdf.
Article
Nonorigination and Nirvāṇa in the Early Tathāgatagarbha Literature
One of the most interesting notions found in the early tathāgatagarbha literature is the idea that nirvāṇa should be understood as nonorigination (anutpāda). This idea is explicitly formulated in two texts, the Ratnagotravibhāga, the only śāstra extant in Sanskrit which is completely devoted to the tathāgatagarbha and Buddha-nature teachings, and the Jñānālokālaṅkārasūtra, the sūtra upon which the Ratnagotravibhāga bases its exposition of nonorigination. The Jñānālokālaṅkārasūtra itself does not speak of the tathāgatagarbha or Buddha-nature doctrines, but the Ratnagotravibhāga takes the Jñānālokālaṅkārasūtra explanation of nonorigination and links it to the view of nirvāṇa found in two of the important early sūtras that do speak of the tathāgatagarbha, the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa and the Śrīmālādevīsūtra. This interpretation of nirvāṇa in terms of nonorigination is of considerable importance in understanding the early tathāgatagarbha teaching, for it clarifies certain notions frequently associated with the tathāgatagarbha like the "natural purity of mind" (cittaprakṛtiviśuddhi)—notions which have been hotly debated ever since the doctrine's inception. It may also tell us something about the conceptual issues which divided the schools of early Buddhism and so hold clues for understanding the origin of Mahāyāna Buddhism. (Grosnick, "Nonorigination and Nirvāṇa," 33)
Grosnick, William. "Nonorigination and Nirvāṇa in the Early Tathāgatagarbha Literature." Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 4, no. 2 (1981): 33–43. https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jiabs/article/view/8547/2454.
Article
Notes on the "Vajrasamādhi"
Interest in the Vajrasamādhi has been roused by a paper of Lin Tai-yün published in 1932[1]). In the Vajrasamādhi Lin had found a quotation from what is generally supposed to be a Bodhidharma text[2]), and thus the problem was set of the relation between these bits of material and the bearing which an investigation into this matter might have on the riddle of Bodhidharma. Suzuki Daisetsu has dealt with this problem in 1936[3]), Paul Demiéville in 1952[4]) and Dr. Mizuno in I955 [5]). I shall in this note confine myself to the text itself.
       The texts in question are:
1. Chin-kang san-mei ching (Vajrasamādhi) T. 273 vol. 9. (Quoted in the following as Samādhi.) It has three commentaries:
  a. The Chin-kang san-mei ching lun, T. 1730 vol. 37 composed by Yüan-hsiao, a Korean, in the second half of the seventh century. This is the only commentary which I have used for this paper in order to correct the original. A very good modern edition has been published by Chou Shu-chia in Peking 1936.
  b. Zokuzōkyō A 55/2-3. Ming.
  c. Zokuzōkyō A 55/3. Ch'ing.
2. Chin-kang shang-wei t'o-lo-ni ching, T. 1344 vol. 21. Transl. Buddhaśānta (?). Yüan Wei.
3. Chin-kang ch'ang t'o-lo-ni ching, T. 1345 vol. 21. Transl. Jinagupta (?) (527-604). A second translation of the preceding. These two texts have no relation to the Samādhi.
4. Chin-kang san-nei pen-hsing ch'ing-ching pu-huai pu-mieh ching, T. 644 vol. 15. A probably genuine text, containing 100 samādhis . . . (Liebenthal, opening remarks, 347–48)

[ . . . ]

      It seems to me established that
      The Samādhi is an agglomeration of several texts, of which we have distinguished:
      1. A frame (Text A), probably derived from a sūtra translated in the fifth century or earlier in the North, perhaps in Liang-chou. This seems to have been a Hīnayāna text.
      2. A text (B), which contains the verses and part of the prose, composed between 565 and 590 by a teacher of the North, Yeh or P'eng-ch'eng. The author might have been Ching-sung.
      It is difficult to say how Text B originally looked. Was it a pamphlet or a collection of gleanings from other texts? Was it written to counteract the propaganda of Hui-ssu?
      In order to further clarify these points I propose for study: (1) a careful investigation of the northern tradition from Bodhiruci and Buddhaśānta on to about 590 A.D., (2) searching the Tun-huang fragments for parts of the original Text B, (3) further search for quotations in the texts studied by the teachers of the Northern Ch'i. (Liebenthal, conclusion, 383–86).

(*Chinese characters in the original text and notes unavailable)

Notes
  1. Hayashi Taiun: "Bodaidaruma-den no kenkyū", Shūkyō kenkyū IX.iii, Tokyo, May 1932, pp. 62-76.
  2. (Chinese text unavailable) A number of versions exist. See below.
  3. Daruma no zen-bo to shisō oyobi sono ta, Tokyo 1936 (Suzuki II), a complement to the same author's Shōshitsu isho, Osaka 1935 (Suzuki I).
  4. Le Concile de Lhasa (Bibl. de l'Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises vol. VII), Paris 1952, p. 54 n. 2 (Demiéville).
  5. Mizuno Kōgen: "On the Relation between Bodhidharma's Two Entrances and Four Practices and the Vairasamādhi Sūtra" (Bodaidaruma no ninyū shigyō setsu to Kongōzanmai-kyō, Indogaku Bukkyōgaku kenkyū, III.2, Tokyo, March 1955, pp. 621-626 (Mizuno I). Same: same title, Komazawa daigaku kenkyū kiyō No. I3, Tokyo 1955 (Mizuno II). Cf. also Ono Hōdō: Daijō kaikyō no kenkyū, Tokyo 1954, p. I25/6.
Liebenthal, Walter. "Notes on the 'Vajrasamādhi'." T'oung Pao 44, no. 4/5 (1956): 347–86.
Article
Notes on the Laṅkāvatāra
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

Prof. Hauer has started a series of studies, chiefly dedicated to the critical investigation of Indian religion.[1] We cannot help being very greateful to him for this, because we must acknowledge that the various aspects of Indian religion are not yet studied as they deserve.
      I do not need to insist on proving the great importance of this research, which is likely to throw much light on many a problem; chiefly on that of the extent of the influences exercised by the aboriginal element on the evolution of Indian religious thought and Indian civilization in general. The Vedas have a great importance, no doubt, but it is also true that Indian gods, mythology, practices, theories about sacrifice, etc., are, on the whole, very different from the religious ideas expounded in that famous book. The study of the last phases of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and of its relation with the Hindu systems proper, will prove of the greatest importance for this kind of research; because it is just in the literature of that period that we find the most important documents of these new conceptions and meet the names of a host of gods, demons and goblins of whom we did not hear before that time.
      For this reason I think that Prof. Hauer is quite justified in having started his Series with the study of such an important Mahāyāna text as the Laṅkāvatāra, which contains some very interesting allu- sions to the relation between the Buddha and the gods of Hinduism (cf. e.g., p. 192).
      The first of the papers dedicated to our text is chiefly concerned with the refutation of the Sāṅkhya system contained in the Laṅk., X, 546 ff. This section has been translated by the author, as he thinks that it represents the reply of the Mahāyāna to the new claim of the Sāṅkhya to be the doctrine of salvation (p. 5.). This Sāṅkhya is, according to the A., the new exposition of the system as contained in the Sāṅkhyakārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇna. The chronology of either text seems to support this view. In fact, this refutation is contained in the tenth Chapter of the Laṅk., which is wanting in the first Chinese translation by Guṇabhadra (443 A.D.), while it is found in the second translation, made by Bodhiruci in the year 513 A.D. On the other hand, we may suppose that the kārikā was composed about 450 A.D. That is true, but I do not think we are allowed to infer from this, that there is any interdependence of this kind between the kārikā and the Xth Chapter of the Laṅk. First of all, the history of the various redactions of this text, represents a very difficult and complex problem. I have compared the three Chinese translations with the Sanskrit original and I already had the opportunity to point out that the text of the Laṅkāvatāra underwent many changes,[1] so that we may safely assume that different redactions of the Laṅk, circulated not only at different times, but also in different places. It is true that the allusion to the Huns, which is found in X, 785, must go back to the first decade of the 7th century A.D., but the fact remains that the Sanskrit text of the Xth Chapter, as it has been handed down to us in the Nepalese manuscripts, looks like a compilation from various sources. Thus it has been enlarged by the insertion of various ślokas already quoted in the preceding chapters in prose.[2] As a rule, all these double verses cannot be found in the translation of Śikṣānanda. This I say in order to show that the problem of the various strata composing the vulgata of the Laṅk, as well as the other concerning the age to which they must be attributed is a very complex one. They can only be solved by the comparative study of the Tibetan and Chinese translations. Therefore it is evident that the chronology based upon any passage of the present text cannot be relied upon as definitive, until the history of the text has been reconstructed. On the other hand, the refutation of the Sāṅkhya system, as contained in X, 558 ff, is neither one of the earliest, nor one of the best. The refutation of the satkāryavāda (Sāṅkhya) as well as of the asatkāryavāda (Vaiśeṣika) forms one of the chief contents of the dogmatical works of Mahāyāna Buddhism. It can be found in the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-Śāstra of Nāgārjuna, in the Śataśāstra of Āryadeva, in the Buddhagotraśāstra attributed to Vasubandhu etc.[1] Nor shall we forget that Vasubandhu and Diṅnāga refuted at length the Sāṅkhya theories in their Paramārthasaptati and Pramāṇasamuccaya respectively. Moreover, as Diṅnāga himself tells us in his commentary upon the Nyāyamukha, he wrote a book exclusively devoted to refuting the Sāṅkhya system. Shen T'ai, a disciple of Yuan Chwang, who commented upon the Nyāyamukha, tells us that this work was a very large one, as it contained six thousand ślokas.
      Therefore I do not think that this criticism of the Sāṅkhya as contained in the Laṅkāvatāra can really throw much light on the history of the controversy between the two systems. In fact, we must acknowledge that the value of the Laṅkāvatāra, as a philosophical hook, is rather limited, although it is of the highest importance for the history of the evolution of the Mahāyāna Buddhologie and "Erlosungslehre."
      But I can hardly believe that the passage in question is expressly directed against the Sāṅkhya system. It is only meant to assert the idealistic view which is expounded throughout the book. Kapila, it is true, is referred to by name in the verse X, 558 and in three other places; but Kaṇāda also is quoted in X, 548. . . .
      But to which school did the Laṅkāvatāra originally belong? It is in general believed that it represents Yogācāra ideas. But, of course, we cannot learn very much from this mere name, because Yogācāra has certainly a very wide meaning. It is also considered as a synonym of Vijñānavāda, and therefore even the vijñaptimātratā theory of Vasubandhu is put under that same item.
      In fact, according to the Chinese tradition the book is considered as one of the six sūtras of the Lakṣaṇa school. But if we read these volumes it will be easy to recognize that, though there are some fundamental notions that can be found all throughout, each text or group of texts presents its own peculiarities.

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Notes
1. J. W. Hauer, Das Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra und das Sāṅkhya (eine vorläufige Skizzeo, Stuttgart, 1927.
   Id, Die Dhāraṇī im nördlichen Buddhismus und ihre parallelen in der sogennannten Mithrasliturgie. Ibid.
    Beitrage zur Indischen Sprachwissenschaft und Religionsgeschichte.
1. See. my Studio comparative fra le tre versioni cinesi ed il testo sanskrito del i capitolo del Laṅkāvatāra, Memorie della R. Accademia dei Lincei, serie v, vol xviii, fasc, 5; and Una nuova edizione del Laṅkāvatāra in Studi Mahāyanici, Rivista di studi Orientali, vol. X.
2. In Studi Mahāyanici, pp. 574 ff., I have given a list of the verses inserted in the text, which have been repeated in the tenth chapter. This fact makes me rather doubtful whether many of the other verses collected there are not taken from some Mahāyāna text belonging to the same current of thought. Prof. Hauer thinks that the first Chapter belongs to the most ancient redaction of the book. I can hardly believe that; in fact, it cannot be found in the translation of Gunabhadra, and it has but very little relation with the rest of the book. On the other hand, I think that the gāthās represent the most ancient nucleus of the book, as it is shown by the numerous Prakritisms that have survived and that the redactors of the present vulgata could not avoid: e.g., desemi, pp. 76, 176, 181; vibhāvento, p. 95 ; vikalpenti, pp. 185 186; nāśenti, p. 190 ; deśyante for deśyamāne, p. 201.
1. For other references see Ui’s, Vaiśeṣika philosophy.
2. See my English translation of the Nyāyamukha in "Materiailen zur Kunde des Buddhismus" edited by Prof. Walleser, Heidelberg, to be published shortly.
Tucci, Giuseppe. "Notes on the Laṅkāvatāra." Indian Historical Quarterly 4 (1928): 545–56. https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.501828/page/n607/mode/2up.
Article
Nyraizōkyō saiko: Busshō no kyūyu wo chūshin to shite
Zimmermann, Michael. "Nyraizōkyō saiko: Busshō no kyūyu wo chūshin to shite" (Reconsidering the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra Focusing on the Nine Similes of Buddha-nature). In Nyoraizō to Busshō (Tathāgatagarbha and Buddha Nature), edited by Masahiro Shimoda, 97–139. Vol. 8 of Shirīzu Daijō Bukkyō (Series on Mahāyāna Buddhism). Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 2014.
Zimmermann, Michael. "Nyraizōkyō saiko: Busshō no kyūyu wo chūshin to shite" (Reconsidering the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra Focusing on the Nine Similes of Buddha-nature). In Nyoraizō to Busshō (Tathāgatagarbha and Buddha Nature), edited by Masahiro Shimoda, 97–139. Vol. 8 of Shirīzu Daijō Bukkyō (Series on Mahāyāna Buddhism). Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 2014.
Article
Nītārtha, Neyārtha, and Tathāgatagarbha in Tibet
D. S. Ruegg, in his La Théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra and other works,[1] has mentioned the need for further study of the various Tibetan exegetical traditions involved in the controversies surrounding the tathāgata-garbha doctrine. He has relied extensively on the exegesis developed by dGe lugs-pa scholars. This paper is an initial attempt to address this need voiced by Ruegg, by presenting the views of a bKa'-brgyud-pa and two rNying-ma-pa scholars. In particular, the focus will be on elucidating how they applied the interpretive devices of nītārtha (nges-don, certain, definitive meaning) and neyārtha (drang-don, indirect meaning which is to be established) to texts dealing with the tathāgatagarbha.[2] One of the basic philosophical problems the Tibetans faced in this regard was the relationship between the concepts of sûnyatā and tathāgatagarbha emphasized in the second and third "turnings of the wheel of Dharma" (dharmacakra-pravartana) respectively.
Lipman, Kennard. "Nītārtha, Neyārtha, and Tathāgatagarbha in Tibet." Journal of Indian Philosophy 8, no. 1 (1980): 87–95.
Article
On Buddhanature—and What It Is Not
Khandro Rinpoche. "On Buddhanature—and What It Is Not." Adapted from a teaching given by Jetsün Khandro Rinpoche in Amsterdam, June 19, 2008. Transcription edited by Lopön Helen Berliner. Her Eminence Mindrolling Jetsün Khandro Rinpoche (website). Accessed Oct. 14, 2020. https://www.khandrorinpoche.org/teachings/print/jkr-on-buddha-nature-2008-06-19/.
Khandro Rinpoche. "On Buddhanature—and What It Is Not." Adapted from a teaching given by Jetsün Khandro Rinpoche in Amsterdam, June 19, 2008. Transcription edited by Lopön Helen Berliner. Her Eminence Mindrolling Jetsün Khandro Rinpoche (website). Accessed Oct. 14, 2020. https://www.khandrorinpoche.org/teachings/print/jkr-on-buddha-nature-2008-06-19/.
Article
On the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna
An introduction to the Awakening of Faith
Gardner, Alex. "On the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna." Buddha-Nature: A Tsadra Foundation Initiative, October 9, 2019. https://buddhanature.tsadra.org/index.php/Articles/On_the_Awakening_of_Faith_in_the_Mah%C4%81y%C4%81na
Article
On the Commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga by Dol po pa
I refer to the commentary on the Dharmadhātustava by Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan (l292-1361) in the last volume of this Journal'"`UNIQ--ref-00004318-QINU`"' and make it clear that this text is one of the important texts for him to establish the theory of other-emptiness (gzhan stong) or the great Madhyamaka (dbu ma chen po) in the Jo nang pa'"`UNIQ--ref-00004319-QINU`"' Though it is not so cited as the five Treatises of Maitreya, he seems to acknowledge the reason why he must depend on it. Though the authorship of Nāgārjuna is doubted on the ground of reference to the tathāgatagarbha idea, this is convenient for Dol po pa who wants to establish the great Madhyamaka mixed the Madhyamaka idea with the Yogācāra idea or the tathāgatagarbha idea. That is to say, he uses it in order to prove that the idea of tathāgatagarbha is also taught in the Mādhyamika literature of Nāgārjuna.
      Then which text does he depend on to establish his original idea? As the Ratnagotravibhāga is cited most frequently in his bDen gnyis gsal ba'i nyi ma"`UNIQ--ref-0000431A-QINU`"', it seems to be the most important text in his great Madhyamaka. I consider his commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga"`UNIQ--ref-0000431B-QINU`"' attributed to Maitreya here'"`UNIQ--ref-0000431C-QINU`"'. (Mochizuki, introduction, 111)
Mochizuki, Kaie. "On the Commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga by Dol po pa." Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū [Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies] 57, no. 3 (2009): 111–18. https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/ibk/57/3/57_KJ00005488021/_pdf/-char/en
Article
On the Commentary to the Uttaratantraśāstra by Vairocanarakṣita
Nakamura, Zuiryū. "On the Commentary to the Uttaratantraśāstra by Vairocanarakṣita." (In Japanese.) Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies) 28, no. 2 (1980): 509–16.
Nakamura, Zuiryū. "On the Commentary to the Uttaratantraśāstra by Vairocanarakṣita." (In Japanese.) Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies) 28, no. 2 (1980): 509–16.
Article
On the Dge lugs-pa Theory of the Tathāgatagarbha
Ruegg, David Seyfort. "On the Dge lugs-pa Theory of the Tathāgatagarbha." In Pratidanam: Indian, Iranian and Indo-European Studies Presented to Franciscus Bernardus Jacobus Kuiper on His Sixtieth Birthday, edited by J. C. Heesterman, G. H. Schokker, and V. I. Subramoniam, 500–509. The Hague: Mouton, 1968.
Ruegg, David Seyfort. "On the Dge lugs-pa Theory of the Tathāgatagarbha." In Pratidanam: Indian, Iranian and Indo-European Studies Presented to Franciscus Bernardus Jacobus Kuiper on His Sixtieth Birthday, edited by J. C. Heesterman, G. H. Schokker, and V. I. Subramoniam, 500–509. The Hague: Mouton, 1968.
Article
On the Eschatology of the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra and Related Matters
Given that the MPNS is such a complex text, I should like to take up just one theme that runs

through much of this sutra—the way the compilers of this sūtra seem to have perceived the causes and the implications of the decline of the Dharma, that is, what one might, as I have done here, term the "eschatology of the MPNS." I believe this may provide an important key to understanding the entire sūtra, though some of my conclusions are necessarily based on circumstantial evidence. One might also remark here, in passing, that the prominence of the

concept in the MPNS that the scriptural Dharma is, as we shall see, decidedly impermanent stands out in stark contrast to the recurrent idea in the sūtra of the permanence of Buddha. (Hodge, introduction, 1)
Hodge, Stephen. "On the Eschatology of the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra and Related Matters." Lecture delivered on the Tibetan version of the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra at the University of London, SOAS, Spring 2006. http://www.shabkar.org/download/pdf/On_the_Eschatology_of_the_Mahaparinirvana_Sutra_and_Related_Matters.pdf
Article
On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

Everyone who has had at least some glimpses at Buddhism knows that it contains various philosophical theories as well as various spiritual practices. The term ' philosophical theory ' should be understood here in a general sense comprising any attempt to make rational statements about the true nature or the fundamental principles of the totality or some part of the existent, or about those aspects of it of which everyday experience is not aware. In this sense, philosophical theories in Buddhism are, e.g., the doctrine that there is no substantial Self, no ātman; or the doctrine that the whole universe consists of momentary factors, of factors each of which lasts only for the time of an extremely short moment. ' Spiritual practice ', in the case of Buddhism, consists essentially of moral or ethical exercises, and of practices of meditation, deep concentration, or trance. As an example, we may adduce the so-called four 'infinitudes', or 'unlimited ones' (apramāṇa), i.e. the meditative practice of the attitudes of friendliness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and impartiality or equanimity with regard to all living beings. Another example is the 'contemplation of the impure' (aśubhabhāvanā). Here the Yogin, in order to subdue excessive covetousness, contemplates dead bodies in their different stages of decomposition. In this exercise, it is not necessary that the Yogin actually stays at a cemetery for the whole time. He may well continue the exercise at any other place, making use of a special meditative practice in which he is able to visualize those dead bodies he saw previously.
      In this article I want to contribute to the solution of the problem of the historical relation of these two elements — philosophical theory and spiritual practice — in Buddhism. Did Buddhism usually start from philosophical theories and afterwards develop corresponding spiritual practices? Or is it more typical for Buddhism that first there are spiritual practices and that philosophical theories are only the result of a subsequent reflection which leads to a theoretical consolidation and generalization of those spiritual practices? (Schmithausen, "On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism," 235)
Schmithausen, Lambert. "On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism." In Vol. 2, German Scholars on India: Contributions to Indian Studies, edited by the Cultural Department of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, New Delhi, 235–50. Bombay: Nachiketa Publications, 1976.
Article
On the Ratnagotravibhāga
The Ratnagotravibhāga Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra is one of the main sources for buddha-nature theory in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism (in China, the Awakening of Faith was of much greater importance). This article summarizes what is known about the textual tradition, author, and date of its composition and translations.
Gardner, Alex. "On the Ratnagotravibhāga." Buddha-Nature: A Tsadra Foundation Initiative, September 12, 2018. https://buddhanature.tsadra.org/index.php/Articles/On_the_Ratnagotravibh%C4%81ga.
Article
On the Ritual Use of Ch'an Portraiture in Medieval China
L'article traite d'un genre de portraits de moines Zen appelé chinzō, genre qui fleurit sous les Sung et les Yuan, et fut introduit au Japon à l'époque de Kamakura. On connaît au Japon environ soixante-dix chinzō chinois et japonais datant du treizième

au seizième siècle, considérés comme "Trésors nationaux" ou "propriétés culturelles importantes", mais qui ne représentent qu'un dizième du nombre total de portraits connus. Les portraits relevant de ce genre sont assez stéréotypés, et représentent en général un moine assis en sur une chaise haute en position du lotus. Souvent représenté de trois-quarts, mais parfois aussi de face, il est vêtu d'un habit de cérémonie, et tient dans sa main droite un attribut de son autorité, d'ordinaire un bâton, un sceptre ou un chasse-mouches. Certains chinzō représentent aussi le moine assis ou debout dans un paysage. Enfin, ils comportent généralement un "éloge" en vers et une dédicace.
      S'interrogeant sur la fonction religieuse de ces portraits, Griffith Foulk et Robert Sharf sont amenés à remettre en question l'idée que les chinzô servaient à authentifier la transmission de maître à disciple. Une étude approfondie des sources montre que la

définition somme toute moderne des chinzō, visant à définir un genre limité dans le domaine de l'histoire de l'art, a fonctionné dans les faits de façon étroitement normative, alors que le terme désignait à l'origine une catégorie beaucoup plus large de portraits. Conduits de la sorte à étudier la construction moderne du genre des chinzō, les auteurs en arrivent à poser un certain nombre de questions théoriques et méthodologiques qui devraient avoir un certain impact sur l'histoire de l'art asiatique. (Foulk and Sharf, introduction, 149)
Foulk, T. Griffith, and Robert H. Sharf. ‘‘On the Ritual Use of Ch’an Portraiture in Medieval China.’’ (In French.) Cahiers d’Extrême-Asie 7 (1993–1994): 149–219. https://www.persee.fr/doc/asie_0766-1177_1993_num_7_1_1064.
Article
On the rDzogs chen Distinction between Mind (sems) Primordial Knowing (ye shes): Clarifications and Transcendental Arguments
The idea that Buddist teachings ought to be applied to one's life situation in order to discover their true validity and efficacy has been a salient feature of Buddhism since its inception. It is in light of this normative constraint that Buddhism has traditionally called itself a path (mārga) or, more accurately, a series of paths formulated to lead individuals of varying needs, abilities, and aspirations toward spiritual awakening (bodhi). The complex diversity of views and practices that developed from the time of the historical Buddha were based on two presuppositions: (1) that the Buddha's awakening was of the utmost soteriological significance and therefore to be regarded as the ultimate aim of all religio-philosophical inquiry and activity, and (2) that it was to be seen neither as fortuitous nor inexplicable but as a repeatable soteriological process, one that could be personally realized through

particular modes of inquiry and praxis available to most (if not all) humans.
      From this second assumption stemmed the idea that humans are predisposed to spiritual awakening, that they, in other words, have within them some germinal capacity (bīja), spiritual affiliation (gotra), element (dhātu), or quintessence (garbha) that is a condition of possibility of this awakening. Alongside these "buddha-nature" concepts developed a family of systematically related gnoseological ideas referring to an abiding, unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) mode of consciousness—variously termed the Mind of awakening (bodhicitta), naturally luminous Mind (prakṛtiprabhāsvaracitta), the nature of mind (citta-dharmatā)—that was identified with the condition of awakening itself, but also viewed as the tacit background whence dualistic mind, that is, the source of all error and obscuration, emerges. Central to this cluster of related ideas was the view that conditions of awakening and delusion are both located within the complex and heterogeneous structure of lived experience itself. In Indian Buddhism, this paradigm found its most detailed and influential expression in the hybridized Yogācāra-Tathāgatagarbha works of Maitreya, the Indian Buddhist Siddha literature and the Buddhist tantras.
      In light of the foregoing considerations, the doctrinal history of Buddhism may be regarded as an ongoing attempt to work out precisely what it was that made its founder a buddha or "awakened one" so that such knowledge could be systematically pursued by his followers. That this soteriological imperative has been central to Buddhist philosophical and psychological investigations from early on is discernible in the long history of attempts to clarify the defining features of consciousness that can be traced back to the systematic analyses of mind and mental factors (citta-caitta) presented in the Abhidhammapiṭaka of the Pali Canon. For, in investigating the nature and structure of consciousness, Buddhist scholars were above all concerned with articulating the conditions necessary for a sentient being (sems can) to become an awakened one, a being in whom (if we follow the Tibetan rendering of "buddha" as sangs rgyas) all cognitive and affective obscurations have dissipated (sangs) so that inherent capacities for knowing and caring (mkhyen brtse nus ldan) can unfold (rgyas).
      In Tibet, this soteriologically oriented investigation of consciousness was central to the philosophy of mind that developed within the syncretistic rDzogs chen ("Great Perfection") tradition of the rNying ma ("Ancient Ones") school between the eighth and fourteenth centuries. This philosophy developed around a nexus of core soteriological ideas concerning buddha-nature, the nature of reality, and the nature of mind that served to draw attention to a primordial, nondual mode of being and awareness that usually remains hidden behind the mind's own objectifying and subjectivizing reifications.
      A cornerstone of the rDzogs chen philosophy of mind was a basic distinction between dualistic mind (sems) and primordial knowing (ye shes) that was first systematically presented in the seventeen Atiyoga tantras (rgyud bcu bdun) that make up the Heart Essence (snying thig) subclass of the Esoteric Guidance Class (man ngag sde') of rDzogs chen teachings and are traditionally associated with Vimalamitra. rNying ma historical and biographical works trace this distinction to the teachings of early rDzogs chen masters of the Royal Dynastic Period, in particular the oral transmissions of Vimalamitra (bi ma snyan brgyud), an identification that appears at first glance to be supported by the many passages on the two distinctions found scattered among rNying ma collections such as the Bi ma snying thig, Bai ro rgyud 'bum, rNying ma rgyud 'bum, and dGongs pa zang thal. These teachings often take the form of personal instructions advising the practitioner to discern within the flux of adventitious thoughts and sensations that characterize dualistic mind (sems) an invariant prerepresentational structure of awareness known as primordial knowing (ye shes), open awareness (rig pa), or the nature of mind (sems nyid), from which this turmoil arises. The idea is to directly recognize (ngo sprod) and become increasingly familiar with this abiding condition without confusing it with any of its derivative and distortive aspects. In Klong chen pa's view, this distinction provides an indispensable key to understanding the views and practices that are central to the rDzogs chen tradition.
       Although this tradition has attracted increasing interest in recent decades, both popular and academic, there has been little to date in the way of critical study of its philosophical foundations or key doctrinal developments. A noteworthy case in point is the absence of any systematic appraisal of rNying ma ("Ancient Ones") views on the nature of mind that traces their evolution and complex relationships with Indian Cittamātra, Madhyamaka, Pramāṇvāda, and Vajrayāna views. As a step toward at least defining the parameters of this crucial but neglected field of inquiry,

this paper will consider some key arguments in support of the "mind/primordial knowing" (sems/ye shes) distinction adumbrated by rNying ma scholars in the classical period. Of particular interest are arguments that were used to justify and defend this distinction by the renowned fourteenth-century rNying ma thinker Klong chen rab 'byams pa in a number of his treatises, commentaries, and poetic works. In a wide range of doctrinal contexts, Klong chen pa will argue that the entire edifice of Buddhist doctrine becomes incoherent in theory and amiss in practice when one fails to recognize the primacy of a primordial mode of awareness and to unequivocally distinguish it from dualistic mind. This paper first examines in detail some of the arguments he employed to convince his audience of the acceptability of such a distinction in light of theoretical and practical drawbacks of not recognizing it. It then focuses on two types of transcendental argument (of the general form "for y to be possible x must be the case") that Klong chen pa repeatedly invokes to show that the mind/primordial knowing distinction was not only tacitly presupposed in Indian Buddhist soteriology but was, in fact, indispensable for making sense of the Buddhist path and goal-realization according to Buddhist doxastic norms. (Higgins, "On the rDzogs chen Distinction between Mind (sems) and Primordial Knowing (ye shes), 23–26)
Higgins, David. "On the rDzogs chen Distinction between Mind (sems) and Primordial Knowing (ye shes): Clarifications and Transcendental Arguments." Journal of Buddhist Philosophy 2 (2016): 23–54.
Article
On the Ālayavijñāna in the Awakening of Faith: Comparing and Contrasting Wŏnhyo and Fazang’s Views on Tathāgatagarbha and Ālayavijñāna
The Awakening of Faith, one of the most seminal treatises in East Asian Buddhism, is well-known for its synthesis of the two Mahāyāna concepts of tathāgatagarbha and ālayavijñāna. Unlike early Yogācāra texts, such as the Yogācārabhūmi, in which ālayavijñāna is described as a defiled consciousness, the Awakening of Faith explains it as a "synthetic" consciousness, in which tathāgatagarbha and the defiled mind are unified in a neither-identical-nor-different condition. East Asian Buddhist exegetes noted the innovative explanation of the Awakening of Faith and compiled the commentaries, among which Huayan master Fazang’s (643–712) commentary had a profound effect on the process of the establishment of the treatise as one of the most representative tathāgatagarbha texts in East Asia. However, as scholarly perceptions that the commentators’ interpretations do not always represent the Awakening of Faith’s tenets themselves have grown, the propriety of relying on Fazang’s commentary for understanding the treatise has also been questioned. What attracts our attention in this regard is that the Silla scholar-monk Wǒnhyo’s (617–686) commentaries, which are known to have significantly influenced Fazang’s, present very different views. This article demonstrates that two distinct interpretations existed in Wǒnhyo’s days for tathāgatagarbha and ālayavijñāna of the Awakening of Faith by comparing Wǒnhyo and Fazang’s commentaries, and further considers the possibility that the Awakening of Faith’s doctrine of ālayavijñāna is not doctrinally incompatible with that of early Yogācāra on the basis of Wǒnhyo’s view on ālayavijñāna.
Lee, Sumi. "On the Ālayavijñāna in the Awakening of Faith: Comparing and Contrasting Wŏnhyo and Fazang’s Views on Tathāgatagarbha and Ālayavijñāna." Religions 10, no. 9 (2019): 1–15.
Article
Onto-theology and Emptiness: The Nature of Buddha-Nature
In this article, I chart a trajectory from deconstruction to embodiment in the intellectual history of Buddhist traditions in Tibet. I focus on embodiment as a participatory approach to radically deconstructed and unthematized meaning, in contrast to an interpretation of truth as purely an analytic category or an approach to meaning that deals with values, such as emptiness, as simply truth claims or representations. I show how certain Buddhists in Tibet have represented the meaning of emptiness as a uniquely participatory encounter in such a way that its meaning is necessarily embodied. To speak of it otherwise, I argue, is to misrepresent its meaning fundamentally. An important way that the embodiment of emptiness is formulated is through the discourses of buddha-nature (tathāgatagarbha). I show how Tibetan interpretations of Buddha-nature reflect postmodern concerns about metaphysics and onto-theology.
Duckworth, Douglas S. "Onto-theology and Emptiness: The Nature of Buddha-Nature." Journal of the American Academy of Religion 82, no. 4 (2014): 1070–90. https://sites.temple.edu/duckworth/files/2013/07/Duckworth_Ontotheology.pdf.
Article
Original Purity and the Arising of Delusion
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs: The varying answers given to the single question of whether the mind is pure by nature or defiled by nature form a convenient lenses through which to view the development of Yogācāra thought. If the mind is pure, then where do the defilements originate? If it is defiled, where does purity originate? Though the classical formulation of Asaṇga and Vasubandhu sees consciousness as paratantric, the source of defilement yet only the support of purity (an important distinction that necessitates an external source of purity), another view which was taken up by Yogācāran thinkers is that of the originally pure mind (viśuddhi cittaprakṛiti); a third schema brings the structure of consciousness together with that purity as seen, for example, within the *Mahāyāna śraddhotpādaśāstra (The Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith). (Hubbard, introductory remarks, 1)
Hubbard, Jamie. "Original Purity and the Origin of Delusion." Online Publications of Jamie Hubbard, October 31, 2008 (originally written in 1994). https://sophia.smith.edu/~jhubbard/publications/papers/OriginalPurity.pdf
Article
Original Purity and the Focus of Early Yogācāra
In understanding the ongoing process of the development of any doctrinal system, isolated insights into particular texts or particular doctrinal themes are not sufficient. No number of monographs on ālayavijñāna or trisvabhāva suffices, for, although such studies do clarify particular themes, no understanding is gained of the overall purpose for which these themes were developed. What is desired is an overall insight into what the system is trying to achieve. In the case of the Yogācāra system, the question of its basic intent and overall purpose is not easily determined. There are, it would appear, two reasons for this situation. The first is that the complex of questions regarding the dating, authorship, and compilation of the various textual data have not yet received definite answers in many instances, and yet each of these questions bears directly upon the understanding of the lines of doctrinal development. A second reason is that the doctrinal focuses of some of the basic Yogācāra texts appear to differ.
      The intent of this paper is to treat this latter concern. It will attempt to describe the basic doctrinal focus of four early Yogācāra texts, suggest the intent of their authors, and draw a hypothesis concerning the lines of development of early Yogācāra as seen in these texts. The texts selected are the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, the Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra, and the Madyāntavibhāgaśāstra. All four texts were composed before the time of the classical formulation of Yogācāra by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Although it is not possible to determine with any degree of certitude the temporal relationship among these texts, insight into their doctrinal emphases would help to identify the overall problematic that led the early, pre-Asaṅgan Yogācārins to develop their thinking. (Source Accessed Jan 28, 2020)
Keenan, John P. "Original Purity and the Focus of Early Yogācāra." Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 5, no. 1 (1982): 7–18. https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jiabs/article/view/8560/2467.
Article
Other-Emptiness in the Jonang School: The Theo-logic of Buddhist Dualism
In this essay I aim to clarify the meaning of other-emptiness in the Jonang (jo nang) tradition of Buddhism of Tibet. It focuses on the writings of Dölpopa (dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan) (1292–1361), the renowned forefather of this tradition. Dölpopa famously differentiated two types of emptiness, or two ways of being empty—self-emptiness (rang stong) and other-emptiness (gzhan stong)—and proclaimed the superiority of the latter. (Duckworth, introduction, 485)
Duckworth, Douglas S. "Other-Emptiness in the Jonang School: The Theo-logic of Buddhist Dualism." Philosophy East and West 65, no. 2 (2015): 485–97. https://sites.temple.edu/duckworth/files/2013/07/duckworth_other-emptiness-and-theo-logic.pdf.
Article
Outline of Western Scholarship on Buddha-Nature
Scholars of Buddhism writing in European languages have celebrated, derided, and frequently misinterpreted the doctrine of tathāgatagarbha for well over a hundred years. While some have seen it as a crucial theoretical step to explain how deluded, impure sentient beings can become buddhas, others have dismissed the entire idea as non-Buddhist. Following Chinese and Tibetan scholiasts, Western scholars have labeled tathāgatagarbha as either Yogācāra or Madhyamaka, although most now understand that the doctrine arose independently of either of these main Mahāyāna schools. The philosophical question of whether ultimate reality can or should be described in positive terms, and the ethical matters of faith and practice all come to the fore in discussions of tathāgatagarbha, and scholars have for the most part spent the last century explicating the scripture and commentary that have sought to make sense of it all. To the degree that academics have assumed the role of interpreting Buddhist doctrine to Western audiences, tathāgatagarbha—“buddha-nature” to the popular reader—seems now to be the foremost shared interest of the academic and the practitioner. This essay attempts to be exhaustive, referencing all books, articles, and chapters that take buddha-nature as the primary focus. It discusses only scholarship published in European languages.
Gardner, Alex. "Outline of Western Scholarship on Buddha-Nature." Buddha-Nature: A Tsadra Foundation Initiative, July 16, 2019. https://buddhanature.tsadra.org/index.php/Articles/Outline_of_Western_Scholarship_on_Buddha-Nature.
Article
Painting Space with Colors: Tathāgatagarbha in the Mahāyānasūtrâlaṅkāra-Corpus IX.22-37
The early history of Tathagatagarbha thought in India remains obscure. In

attempting to elucidate it much depends upon how one chooses to categorize Tathagatagarbha as a system, upon the decisions one makes as to which terms, concepts, argument-patterns and so forth must be present in order for it to be proper to characterize some text or text-fragment as representing that system. These are large questions, much too large to enter upon in this paper; my purpose here is much more limited. I intend to offer a reasonably detailed exposition of a set of sixteen verses from the ninth chapter of the Mahāyānasūtrâlaṅkāra [MSA] (IX.22- 37). These verses deal, or so the bhāṣya tells us, with the "profundity of the undefiled realm" (anāsravadhātugāmbhīrya), and they conclude (37) with the only use of the term tathāgatagarbha in the entire text There is little doubt that this is one of the few early occurrences of the term in Indian Buddhist texts surviving in Sanskrit; a relatively detailed study of these verses may perhaps shed some light upon the historical and doctrinal questions just mentioned.
          The systematic question underlying my comments upon these verses throughout will be: what is the relation between the ground of awakening, that which makes it possible, and the fact of awakening, its essential properties?

          In what follows I shall provide ftrst a brief introduction to the of the MSA-corpus; I shall then place MSA IX.22-37 in its context within the text as a whole, and shall translate the verses in full and offer expository comments on them, drawing in so doing upon the surviving Indic commentaries. (Griffiths, Painting Space with Colors, 41–42)
Griffiths, Paul J. "Painting Space with Colors: Tathāgatagarbha in the Mahāyānasūtrâlaṅkāra-Corpus IX.22–37." In Buddha Nature: A Festschrift in Honor of Minoru Kiyota, edited by Paul J. Griffiths and John P. Keenan, 41–63. Tokyo: Buddhist Books International, 1990.
Article
Paramārtha's Doctrine of a Ninth Consciousness, as Transmitted in Tibetan Texts: Tsong kha pa's Kun gzhi dka' gter and Its Context
This study aims to elucidate a portion of the reception and evaluation of Paramārtha's doctrines in Tibet, taking as its entry point controversy about Paramārtha's theory of a ninth consciousness as seen in Tsong kha pa's (Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa, 1357-1419) Kun gzhi dka' gter, while simultaneously investigating the background to that text. The development of our argument will incorporate new insights gained through investigation of the texts upon which Tsong kha pa based himself: Wǒnch'ŭk's commentary on the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, and commentaries on the Abhidharmasamuccaya by gZad ring (gZad ring Dar ma tshul khrims, latter half of the 12th century), bCom ldan rig ral (1227-1305), Bu ston (Bu ston Rin chen grub, 1290-1364) and Blo gros brtan pa (dPang Blo gros brtan pa, 1276-1342).
      Wǒnch'ŭk, bCom ldan rig ral and Bu ston understood that ninth consciousness is ultimately the seeds of the eighth consciousness, or else the pure part thereof. In terms of the content of the controversy, gZad ring, bCom ldan rig ral and Bu ston largely follow a common archetype. They introduce the ninth consciousness without mentioning Paramārtha; they refer to tathāgatagarbha doctrine, relying upon a passage from the Samādhirāja-sūtra as their proof-text; and in rejecting the doctrine of ninth consciousness, they propose that ninth consciousness must exist either actually or potentially, and then reject both alternatives. Since these two points cannot be identified in Wǒnch'ŭk's commentary, we can postulate that the controversy between these scholars was an innovative creation and development from within Tibetan Buddhism. Furthermore, it also seems that in the transmission of ninth consciousness doctrine in Tibet, there arose certain distortions (or deviations from Wǒnch'ŭk's theories), such as when gZad ring ascribes the doctrine of ninth consciousness not to Paramārtha, but to Bhavya.
      We also must not neglect the fact that the doctrine of ninth consciousness affirmed in these commentaries to the Abhidharmasamuccaya is not completely identical to that described by Tsong kha pa. Comparison with these texts, which constitute the immediate context for his discussion, highlights the fact that in discussing Paramārtha's doctrine of ninth consciousness as it appears in Wonchuk, Tsong kha pa cites Wonchuk's work directly, rather than second-hand (i.e. rather than relying upon predecessors who utilize Wonchuk's exposition); and in refuting the doctrine of ninth consciousness, he attempts to construct proofs on the basis of his own original viewpoint, rather than recycling the arguments of his predecessors. We are surely justified in judging that it was Tsong kha pa's achievement to absorb Wonchuk's commentary for himself, and to attempt to correct the distortions incidental to the transmission of ninth consciousness doctrine in Tibet. (Source Accessed June 16, 2020)
Kano, Kazuo. "Paramārtha's Doctrine of a Ninth Consciousness, as Transmitted in Tibetan Texts: Tsong kha pa's Kun gzhi dka' gter and Its Context." In Studies of the Works and Influence of Paramārtha, edited by Funayama Tōru, 345–99. (In Japanese.) Kyoto: Institute for Research in Humanities, Kyoto University, 2012.
Article
Philologische Bemerkungen zum Ratnagotravibhāga
The present paper [in German] consists of two sections. The first section is concerned with the structure of the Ratnagotravibhāgaḥ (RGV). The starting point is the analysis given by J. Takasaki in his book "A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga" (Rome 1966). Takasaki's distinction between basic verses, commentary verses and prose commentary certainly has to be accepted. His attempt however to recover an original RGV of only 27 verses by declaring most of the basic verses to be later enlargements of the basic text seems open to doubt, because even this pretended original RGV admits of being split up again. Therefore, to my opinion the original RGV is constituted by the totality of basic verses. But this original RGV seems to have made use of several (perhaps only partly remodelIed) older materials. — The second section of the present paper is dedicated to suggesting corrections of the Sanskrit text and — in some cases — of the translation of single RGV-passages.
Schmithausen, Lambert. "Philologische Bemerkungen zum Ratnagotravibhāga." Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 15 (1971): 123–77.
Article
Philosophy and the Practice of Reflexivity: On Dōgen's Discourse about Buddha-Nature
Is Dōgen a philosopher? Or even an example of what he scolds a "word-counting scholar"?'"`UNIQ--ref-0000019B-QINU`"' Despite the difficulties of classifying Dōgen, many would still agree, at least with regard to his magnum opus, the Shōbōgenzō, that his writings are philosophical.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000019C-QINU`"' This, however, requires some clarification, since there is not much left of this work if one were to exclude all the fascicles that are not explicitly cited for philosophical interpretation. The philosophic scope becomes even smaller if one were to consider the respective passages of the few fascicles pertinent for explicit philosophical reading. At the risk of oversimplifying, the philosophical reception of Dōgen's works is almost entirely grounded in the fascicle "Uji",'"`UNIQ--ref-0000019D-QINU`"' which is distinguished for its thought–provoking discourse on time.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000019E-QINU`"' Furthermore the philosophical reading of other fascicles, including "Genjōkōan" and "Zenki"'"`UNIQ--ref-0000019F-QINU`"' revolves around a related interpretation of "Uji."
      Nevertheless, we can still ask if there might be yet another accessible vantage point from which one could regard Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō as philosophical? This paper will argue that the answer is "yes," there is such a vantage point, so long as one distinguishes what Dōgen writes from how Dōgen writes. For the claim of the paper is that while it remains ambiguous to maintain that his writings exhibit a philosophical system based on content, their form realizes what philosophy is at its core, i.e. reflexivity or philosophy’s inherent self reference.'"`UNIQ--ref-000001A0-QINU`"' (Müller, "Philosophy and the Practice of Reflexivity," 545–46)
Müller, Ralf. "Philosophy and the Practice of Reflexivity: On Dōgen's Discourse about Buddha-Nature." In Concepts of Philosophy in Asia and the Islamic World, Vol. 1: China and Japan, edited by Raji C. Steineck, Ralph Weber, Elena Louisa Lange, and Robert H. Gassmann, 545–76. Leiden: Brill - Rodopi, 2018.
Article
Pointing Out Ordinary Mind
Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche presents the essential teachings of Mahamudra and its three main approaches to practice, each offering effective methods for directly pointing out mind’s true nature.
Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche, (The 7th). "Pointing Out Ordinary Mind." Buddhadharma: The Practitioner's Quarterly, August 15, 2018.
Article
Prajñāpāramitā and the Buddhahood of the Non-Sentient World: The San-Lun Assimilation of Buddha-Nature and Middle Path Doctrine
Prior to the Sui-T'ang period, the concept of Buddha-nature, the fundamental or universal nature of enlightenment in sentient beings, was already a topic of central importance to Chinese Buddhists.
Koseki, Aaron K. "Prajñāpāramitā and the Buddhahood of the Non-Sentient World: The San-Lun Assimilation of Buddha-Nature and Middle Path Doctrine." Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 3, no. 1 (1980): 16–33. https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jiabs/article/view/8505/2412.
Article
Presenting a Controversial Doctrine in a Conciliatory Way: Mkhan chen Gang shar dbang po's (1925–1958-59?) Inclusion of Gzhan stong ("Emptiness of Other") within Prāsaṅgika
In . . . "Presenting a Controversial Doctrine in a Conciliatory Way: Mkhan-chen Gang-shar dbang-po’s (1925-1958/59?) Inclusion of Gzhan-stong ('Emptiness of Other') within Prāsaṅgika," I investigate the gzhan stong position of an influential rNying-ma-pa thinker, a learned master from Zhe-chen Monastery, who was among other things, a highly esteemed teacher of Thrangu Rinpoche, and thus influential in the latter's own understanding of gzhan stong. Unlike Dol-po-pa or Shākya-mchog-ldan, mKhan-po Gang-shar does not present his gzhan stong against the backdrop of the three natures theory, but rather elucidates the distinction he makes between rang stong and gzhan stong within a Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka framework. In a way similar to Klong-chen-pa, Gang-shar insists that everything from material form up to omniscience is rang stong only. This is when the two truths are presented as appearance and emptiness in terms of valid cognition that analyzes for the ultimate abiding nature. In the context of a conventional valid cognition, however, which analyzes for the mode of appearances (i.e., perception), the two truths are defined in terms of the way things appear versus the way they truly are. When the abiding nature is perceived as it truly is, there is still awareness, albeit in a form beyond the duality of ordinary perception. For Gang shar it is only in this phenomenological sense that the rang stong of samsara and gzhan stong of nirvāṇa need to be distinguished. (Mathes, "Introduction: The History of the Rang stong/Gzhan stong Distinction," 7)
Mathes, Klaus-Dieter. "Presenting a Controversial Doctrine in a Conciliatory Way: Mkhan chen Gang shar dbang po's (1925–1958/59?) Inclusion of Gzhan stong ("Emptiness of Other") within Prāsaṅgika." Journal of Buddhist Philosophy 2, no. 1 (2016): 114–31.
Article
Problems on Traditional Bifurcation between Tathāgatagarbha and Yogācāra in East Asia
East Asian Yogācāra Buddhism has been explained through traditional bifurcations, such as “Old” and “New” Yogācāra Buddhism, Tathāgatagarbha and Yogācāra, One Vehicle (一乘, S. eka-yana) and Three Vehicles (三乘, S. tri-yana), or Dharma Nature School (法性宗) and Dharma Characteristics School (法相宗). These conceptual pairs have served as useful tools in explaining the historical development and doctrinal evolvement of East Asian Yogācāra tradition. These simplistic binary frames, however, contain historical and/or doctrinal problems in understanding the complicated aspects of the development of the Yogācāra tradition in East Asia. In this regards, this paper critically reflects on theoretical implications of the traditional bifurcations by analyzing previous studies related to this subject, thereby disclosing fundamental problems of the binary frame. The paper finally discusses the prospect of studies on East Asian Yogācāra Buddhism.
Lee, Sumi. "Problems on Traditional Bifurcation between Tathāgatagarbha and Yogācāra in East Asia." [In Korean.] Korea Journal of Buddhist Studies 45 (2015): 85–108.
Article
Purifying Gold: The Metaphor of Effort and Intuition in Buddhist Thought and Practice
One of the particularly significant points implicitly made by the volume as a whole and explicitly developed in the chapter by Luis O. Gómez is that the sudden-gradual polarity is “soft” at its edges. As we have noted, the polarity enfolds a host of complexly interrelated issues. With insight and erudition, Gómez demonstrates that, when the specific historical instances of the sudden-gradual controversy are examined, it is clear that there is no necessary or even predictable way in which the positions taken by the actual participants can be correlated with the complex of issues contained within the sudden-gradual rubric. Hence the subitist on one occasion may well espouse a number of doctrinal positions held by the gradualist on another. Subitists and gradualists, moreover, often appealed to the same doctrine in support of their position. For example, in the most famous instance of the controversy, the exchange of poems that the Platform Sutra alleges were composed by Shen-hsiu and Hui-neng, both parties based their positions on the notion of an intrinsically enlightened Buddha-nature. (Gregory, introduction, 6)
Gómez, Luis. "Purifying Gold: The Metaphor of Effort and Intuition in Buddhist Thought and Practice." In Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought, edited by Peter N. Gregory, 67–165. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1991. First published 1987 by University of Hawai'i Press.
Article
Putting Buddha Nature into Practice
A central concept within Mahāyāna Buddhism is the doctrine of tathāgatagarbha, or buddha-nature (deshin shekpai nyingpo, deshek nyingpo), the element inherent to every sentient being. Presenting this buddha nature as the absolute in positive terms, as a state of wisdom with inconceivable qualities, is the essence of the so-called shentong view. Mind as such is understood to be shentong or "empty of other," meaning that it is empty of adventitious stains, which are not minds true nature. But mind is not empty of its enlightened qualities. Still, as long as sentient beings' perceptions are obscured by the

temporary stains, they are incapable of directly relating to wisdoms inherent enlightened qualities. According to the relevant texts,1 these stains constitute the only difference between normal beings and the awakened ones who have removed the stains and actualized their inherent buddha nature. From the perspective of both the doctrine of tathāgatagarbha in general and shentong in particular, proper Buddhist philosophy and spiritual training in ethics, view, and meditation have as their goal the removal of the stains of karma and afflictive emotions and their subtle tendencies of ignorance so that the mind's inherent qualities can manifest.
      This chapter deals with the corresponding approach in view and meditation taught by the cleric-scholar Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Thayé (1813–99). As one of the leading figures in the rimé movement in eastern Tibet, he worked to preserve practice traditions from the various Buddhist lineages of Tibet—in particular, practices from the Nyingma, Kadam, Jonang, Kagyü, and Sakya schools. His work exemplifies the idea that implementing philosophical understanding in meditative training is an essential part of all Tibetan Buddhist traditions. His Immaculate Vajra Moonrays: An Instruction for the View of Shentong, the Great Madhyamaka (abbreviated here as Instruction for the View of Shentong) is but one instance of the integral relationship between philosophical understanding and meditative training. The text guides meditators in a gradual practice that aims to achieve a direct realization of the true nature of mind—buddha nature with all of its inherent qualities. (Draszczyk, 251–52, 2017)

Notes
  1. For example, the Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra, the Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanāda Sūtra, and the Ratnagotravibhāga, also referred to as the Uttaratantra Śāstra.
Draszczyk, Tina, trans. "Putting Buddha Nature into Practice." A translation of Immaculate Vajra Moonrays: An Instruction for the View of Shentong, the Great Madhyamaka (Gzhan stong dbu ma chen po'i lta khrid rdo rje zla ba dri ma med pa'i 'od zer). By Jamgön Kongtrul ('jam mgon kong sprul). In A Gathering of Brilliant Moons: Practice Advice from the Rimé Masters of Tibet, edited by Holly Gayley and Joshua Schapiro, 251–84. Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2017.
Article
RNgog blo ldan shes rab's Topical Outline of the Ratnagotravibhāga Discovered at Khara Khoto
1) Among the fifty or so compositions of Rngog lo, most are still unavailable and only nine works have so far been published. To these works we can add our topical outline of the RGV (rgyud bla ma’i bsdus don) preserved in a folio discovered at Khara Khoto, which originally consisted of two folios. Its authorship could be confirmed from its colophon as well as by comparing its contents to another lengthy RGV commentary (the Essential Meaning) ascribed to Rngog lo. Our manuscript is thus the earliest Tibetan text that systematically outlines the RGV, and it has made a fundamental contribution to the development of the Tibetan exegetical tradition of the RGV.

2) Rngog lo seems to have used the term bsdus don (or its equivalents) to refer to two kinds of works, namely “topical outline” and “essential meaning,” for he composed two works on the RGV―a brief topical outline and a lengthy essential meaning―which bear titles containing the term bsdus don and its equivalent don bsdus pa, respectively. Among Rngog lo’s available writings, our Khara Khoto manuscript and the Byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa la ’jug pa’i don bsdus pa offer the only testimony that bsdus don (and its equivalent don bsdus pa) refers to a “topical outline,” as he often uses the term bsdus don to indicate a lengthy “essential meaning” in his other commentarial works. The first usage was common among Tibetan masters during the early and middle phyi dar period, whereas the latter was generally rare. This rare usage is most likely influenced by the piṇḍārtha sub-genre of Indian commentaries.

3) Our manuscript has some serious textual problems, such as missing words, illegible words, syntactic ambiguity, and a missing folio. However, we can solve many of those problems by referring to corresponding sentences in the other two works on the RGV, namely, Rngog lo’s Essential Meaning and Phywa pa’s Topical Outline.

4) The colophon of our manuscript does not tell us when the work was composed or copied. We can only deduce an approximate date of the manuscript to be some time between ca. 1092 (a possible terminus post quem of the composition of the work) and 1374 (the year of the destruction of Khara Khoto). The contents of our manuscript and other relevant works discovered at Khara Khoto show that the Tibetan scholastic tradition of the

Bka’ gdams pa had spread there. (Kano, conclusion, 170)
Kano, Kazuo. "rNgog blo ldan shes rab's Topical Outline of the Ratnagotravibhāga Discovered at Khara Khoto." In Contributions to Tibetan Buddhist Literature. PIATS 2006: Proceedings of the Eleventh Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Königswinter, 2006, edited by Orna Almogi, 127–94. Halle (Saale), Germany: International Institute for Tibetan and Buddhist Studies GmbH, 2008.
Article
RNgog lo-tsā-ba's Commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga: An Early-20th-Century Lhasa Printed Edition
rNgog Io-tsa-ba Blo-ldan-shes-rab (1059-1109) was more than anyone else responsible for the

establishment of Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism.{2} He founded in Tibet not only the main enduring lineages of logic and epistemology (Tshad-ma: Pramāṇa) studies but also of two other major branches of Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy and doctrine—those of the Five Dharmas of Maitreya (Byams chos sde Inga) and of the Svātantrika Yogācāra-Madhyamaka.[3] rNgog-lo furthermore trained virtually the entire next generation of important Tibetan scholastics, his "four chief spiritual sons" being: (1) Zhang Tshe-spong-ba, (2) Gro-lung-pa Blo-gros-'byung gnas, (3) Khyung Rin-chen-grags, and (4) 'Bre Shes-rab-'bar. [4] Yet in spite of rNgog's central position in the history of Tibetan philosophical and doctrinal studies, until recently only a very small number of his works were known to survive, and of these the two most extensive and important have remained for decades largely inaccessible outside of Tibet, existing only as isolated xylographs in private collections.[5] Now, however, with the reprinting of two of his major works by the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, including his very important commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga described here, some of the seminal contributions of rNgog-lo can at last be easily assessed in the original.[6]

      Both of these major works of rNgog-lo were commentaries on fundamental works of the Maitreyanātha tradition within the Yogācāra branch of Mahāyana Buddhism,[7] namely on the Ratnagotravibhāga and Abhisamayālaṃkāra.[8] The works thus reflected another aspect of his illustrious career, for in addition to—and indeed in tandem with—his importance as a great teacher, he was also of crucial significance as a composer of commentaries on the works he expounded. (Jackson, "rNgog lo-tsa-ba's Commentary of the Ratnagotravibhāga," 339–340)
Jackson, David. "rNgog lo-tsā-ba's Commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga: An Early-20th-Century Lhasa Printed Edition." In Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 7th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Graz 1995, Vol. 1, edited by Helmut Krasser, Michael Tortsen Much, Ernst Steinkellner, and Helmut Tauscher, 439–56. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1997.
Article
Ratnākaraśānti no shochosaku ni okeru nyoraizō rikai no niruikei
Ratnākaraśānti (ca. 11th cent.) is one of the most influential figures in the final phase of Indian Buddhism, and more than thirty works are available in Tibetan translations (some of them are also available in Sanskrit originals). However, previous studies have pointed out that some works are of another person with the same namesake, because, among the works attributed to him, we find some serious diversity in their doctrinal systems. The present paper focuses on the diversity in interpretation of the Buddha-nature doctrine.
      We can find two types of interpretation, i.e., (1) that in accord with the yānatraya doctrine (in the Prajñāpāramitopadeśa, Muktāvalī, and Kusumāñjali), and (2) that in accord with the ekayāna doctrine (in the Sūtrasamuccayabhāṣya and Triyānavyavasthāna). The two positions are clearly contradicting each other. The first interpretation (1) is based on traditional Yogācāra doctrine that admits the gotrabheda doctrine ("differences of spiritual potentials"), while the second (2) premises the Madhyamaka doctrine that does not accept the gotrabheda doctrine on the ultimate level and claims all beings equally have the same potential to become a buddha.
      Furthermore, the existence of the diversity between the two interpretations is supported by other doctrinal issues, for instance, two different attitudes toward the understanding of Abhisamayālaṃkāra I.39.
      As a conclusion, the doctrinal position in the Sūtrasamuccayabhāṣya and Triyānavyavasthāna is different from that of the Prajñāpāramitopadeśa etc. The aim of the present paper is to show the clear diversity attested in the works attributed to Ratnākaraśānti, which will, hopefully, contribute to solving the question of the authorship of the works, i.e., whether they are composed by one person or not. (Source: Academia.edu)
Kano, Kazuo. "Ratnākaraśānti no shochosaku ni okeru nyoraizō rikai no niruikei" (Two Different Positions Toward the Buddha-nature Doctrine Found in Ratnākaraśānti's Compositions). Mikkyō Bunka (Journal of Esoteric Buddhism) 226 (2011): 7–35.
Article
Ratnākaraśānti’s Understanding of Buddha-nature
Ratnākaraśānti (ca. 11th cent.) is one of the most influential figures in the final phase of Indian Buddhism, and more than thirty works are available in Tibetan translations (some of them are also available in Sanskrit originals). However, previous studies have pointed out that some works are of another person with the same namesake, because, among the works attributed to him, we find some serious diversity in their doctrinal systems. The present paper focuses on the diversity in interpretation of the Buddha-nature doctrine. We can find two types of interpretation, i.e., (1) that in accord with the yānatraya doctrine (in the Prajñāpāramitopadeśa, Muktāvalī, and Kusumāñjali), and (2) that in accord with the ekayāna doctrine (in the Sūtrasamuccayabhāṣya and Triyānavyavasthāna). The two positions are clearly contradicting each other. The first interpretation (1) is based on traditional Yogācāra doctrine that admits the gotrabheda doctrine (“differences of spiritual potentials”), while the second (2) premises the Madhyamaka doctrine that does not accept the gotrabheda doctrine on the ultimate level and claims all beings equally have the same potential to become a buddha. Furthermore, the existence of the diversity between the two interpretations is supported by other doctrinal issues, for instance, two different attitudes toward the understanding of Abhisamayālaṃkāra I.39. As a conclusion, the doctrinal position in the Sūtrasamuccayabhāṣya and Triyānavyavasthāna is different from that of the Prajñāpāramitopadeśa etc. The aim of the present paper is to show the clear diversity attested in the works attributed to Ratnākaraśānti, which will, hopefully, contribute to solving the question of the authorship of the works, i.e., whether they are composed by one person or not. (Source: Academia.edu)
Kano, Kazuo. "Ratnākaraśānti’s Understanding of Buddha-Nature." China Tibetology 25, no. 2 (2015): 52–77.
Article
Reading the Writing on the Wall: "Sengchou's" Cave at Xiaonanhai, Early Chinese Buddhist Meditation, and Unique Portions of *Dharmakṣema's Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra
The Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra (particularly in the version entitled Da banniepan jing 大般涅槃經 T374, translated by *Dharmakṣema ca. 421-432) features centrally in the textual and iconographic programme of a remarkable cave at Xiaonanhai 小南海 in northern Henan 河南, which was rediscovered in the 1980s. The cave has close connections with Sengchou 僧稠 (480-560), a famous meditator, and one of the leading clerics in Northern China in the sixth century. This paper argues for a new interpretation of the programme of the cave, and considers what it allows us to see about religious life and practice in Sengchou's time. An appendix examines implications of the textual material featured at the cave for the nature and provenance of the bulky portions of Dharmakṣema's version of the Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra that are unparalleled in our other three main independent witnesses. (Source: Peeters Online Journals)
Radich, Michael. "Reading the Writing on the Wall: 'Sengchou's' Cave at Xiaonanhai, Early Chinese Buddhist Meditation, and Unique Portions of *Dharmakṣema's Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra." Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 42 (2019): 515–632.
Article
Reburying the Treasure—Maintaining the Continuity: Two Texts by Śākya Mchog Ldan on the Buddha-Essence
The rich and interconnected universe of Śākya Mchog Ldan’s views, including those on the buddha-essence, cannot be limited to or summarized in a few neat categories. Nevertheless, the following two interrelated ideas are crucial for understanding Śākya Mchog Ldan’s interpretation of the buddha-essence: 1) only Mahāyāna āryas ( ’phags pa) have the buddha-essence characterized by the purity from adventitious stains (glo bur rnam dag); 2) the buddha-essence is inseparable from the positive qualities (yon tan, guṇa) of a buddha; In his writings, Śākya Mchog Ldan argues against identifying the buddha-essence as a mere natural purity (rang bzhin rnam dag), i.e., the state of natural freedom from obscurations as it is taught in the Middle or Second Wheel of Doctrine (chos ’khor, dharmacakra) and its commentaries. The buddha-essence has to be posited as inseparability from positive qualities of a buddha.

Śākya Mchog Ldan approaches the buddha-essence inseparable from positive qualities of a buddha in two ways. In some texts, such as the Essence of Sūtras and Tantras, he argues that it has to be identified only as purity from adventitious stains, i.e., the removal of all or some negative qualities that prevent one from directly seeing the buddha-essence. In other texts, such as The Sun Unseen Before, he interprets it as the purity from adventitious stains and the natural purity as it is taught in some sūtras of the Third Wheel of Doctrine and their commentaries. That type of natural purity is understood as the state of natural freedom from all obscurations inseparable from positive qualities of a buddha. Thereby, in this second type of texts, Śākya Mchog Ldan arrives at positing two types of the buddha-essence: relative (kun rdzob, saṃvṛti) and ultimate (don dam, paramārtha). Despite different interpretations of the natural purity, the identification of the buddha-essence as the purity from adventitious stains is present in both.

In his interpretation of the buddha-essence, Śākya Mchog Ldan utilizes the categories of the three levels found in the Sublime Continuum: the impure (ma dag, aśuddha), impure-pure (ma dag dag pa, aśuddhaśuddha, i.e. partially pure) and very pure (shin tu rnam dag, suviśuddha) levels that correspond respectively to the categories of sentient beings, bodhisattvas (understood as ārya bodhisattvas in this context), and tathāgatas.

Śākya Mchog Ldan argues that one becomes a possessor of the buddha-essence free from adventitious stains only on the impure-pure level. In other words, when bodhisattvas enter the Mahāyāna Path of Seeing (mthong lam, darśanamārga) simultaneously with the attainment of the first boddhisattva [sic] ground (byang chub sems pa’i sa, bodhisattavabhūmi) of Utmost Joy (rab tu dga’ ba, pramuditā), they become āryas, i.e. ‘exalted’ or ‘superior’, bodhisattvas, directly realize the ultimate truth (don dam bden pa, paramārthasatya), and thereby for the first time generate an antidote to obscurations of knowables (shes bya’i sgrib pa, jñeyāvaraṇa). They start gradually removing them, and thereby actually see at least a partial purification of stains ‘covering’ the buddha-essence, and its inseparability from at least some positive qualities. Such is not possible for anyone below that level, even for the non-Mahāyāna arhats (i.e., śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas). Thus, only Mahāyāna āryas have the buddha-essence characterized by the purity from adventitious stains; ārya bodhisattvas have only a part of it, while buddhas have it completely.

This article contains the complete text (in English translation) of The Essence of Sūtras and Tantras: Explanation of the Buddha-essence and The Sun Unseen Before: Definitive Meaning of the “Sublime Continuum” Treatise. (Source: DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln)
Komarovski, Yaroslav. "Reburying the Treasure—Maintaining the Continuity: Two Texts by Śākya Mchog Ldan on the Buddha-Essence." Journal of Indian Philosophy 34, no. 6 (2006): 521–70. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1078&context=classicsfacpub.
Article
Reclaiming Faith: An Interview with Vipassana Teacher Sharon Salzberg and An Excerpt from Her New Book, Faith
An interview on faith and buddha-nature by a contemporary American teacher.
Salzberg, Sharon. "Reclaiming Faith: An interview with Vipassana teacher Sharon Salzberg and an excerpt from her new book, Faith." Tricycle: The Buddhist Review, Fall, 2002.
Article
Reconsidering the "Essence" of Indian Buddha-Nature Literature
This paper is published in Acta Asiatica no.118, which concerns recent scholarship on tathāgatagarbha, or Buddha-nature thought, in Indian literature. In light of recent reassessments of the development of tathāgatagarbha thought in India, this paper considers instances in which tathāgatagarbha is unpacked to refer to some "essence" (dhātu) of a Buddha present in all sentient beings. My observation is that this articulation of Buddha-nature teaching is found throughout Indian tathāgatagarbha literature, from the Nirvāṇa Sūtra through to supposedly "basic" materials of the Ratnagotravibhāga, but is conspicuously absent where Buddhist authors are invested in (re)interpreting Buddha-nature in terms of the basic nature of the mind: an influential innovation that I believe is first evident in the Śrīmālā Sūtra. (Source Accessed April 3, 2020)
Jones, Christopher V. "Reconsidering the 'Essence' of Indian Buddha-Nature Literature." In "What is Tathāgatagarbha: Buddha-Nature or Buddha Within?" Edited by Saitō Akira. Special issue, Acta Asiatica 118 (2020): 57–78.
Article
Reification and Deconstruction of Buddha Nature in Chinese Chan
Although much has been said about deconstruction in Madhyamika Buddhism, very little has been done in the study of deconstructive strategy in Chan Buddhism. In his study of deconstruction in Nāgārjuna's thought, Robert Magliola adds several passages that discuss the same topic in Chan/Zen Buddhism. Magliola's major contribution is his distinction between logocentric and differential trends in Chan/Zen Buddhism (Magliola: 96-7). This distinction allows us to take a fresh look at, and to re-examine, those inner struggles in the evolution of Chan Buddhist thought. However, Magliola's study of deconstruction in Chan is not systematic, despite its insights. He uses only a few cases to show the deconstructive tendency in Chan, without applying his distinction to a closer examination of the different schools of Chan thought. Thus, his study leaves only the impression that the deconstructive or differential trend is connected with the Southern School of Chan. He does not justify this thesis through a closer doctrinal and textual-contextual investigation.

      Bernard Faure, on the other hand, touches upon the same issue of logocentric and differential trends in Chan in his comprehensive critique of the Chan tradition. Faure's study of this issue has two main problems. First, since his study is a criticism, he shows only what he thinks is the logocentric side of Chan, without providing a constructive study of deconstruction in Chan. Second, he criticizes Magliola for relating his logocentric/differential distinction to the historically well-defined distinction between Northern and Southern Chan. Faure believes that this hasty connection is "counterproductive" (Faure 1993: 225). His own approach, as opposed to Magliola's, is to suggest that it is impossible to identify one school or one figure in the Chan tradition as either logocentric or deconstructive. He asserts that there are "only combinations" of these two types in the Chan tradition (Faure 1993: 225). It appears that this position of "combination only" avoids a one-sided view and the error of jumping to a conclusion. However, by concluding that there are only combinations, Faure turns away from the necessity and possibility of analyzing and identifying individual deconstructive trends in Chan Buddhism, and from the necessity and even the possibility of a coherent reinterpretation and reconstruction of Chan thought. The coherent reinterpretation and reconstruction of Chan thought obviously demands more than a mere criticism. It is true that the thought of one school or one figure may involve elements of two trends; but this fact does not preclude the possibility of its being coherently interpreted as representative of one trend.

      This paper, therefore, will attempt to investigate a major deconstructive trend in Chan Buddhism, namely, that of the Huineng 惠能 and the Hongzhou 洪州 Chan, and its target—certain reifying tendencies in Chan. (Wang, preliminary remarks, 63–64)
Wang, Youru. "Reification and Deconstruction of Buddha Nature." Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 3, no. 1 (2003): 63–84. https://terebess.hu/zen/Buddha-Nature-in-Chan.pdf.
Article
Rest in the Sky of Natural Mind
The tantric path of Buddhism is complex and arduous, but its surprising culmination is the practice of spaciousness, ease, and simplicity known as Dzogchen, the Great Perfection.
Mingyur, Yongey, 7th. “Rest in the Sky of Natural Mind.” Lion's Roar, July 1, 2007. https://www.lionsroar.com/rest-in-the-sky-of-natural-mind/.
Article
Rong-zom-pa’s Ontological Abyss
With an intention to contribute a little to gaining a fuller and more accurate picture of the intellectual agenda and philosophical edifice of Rong-zom Chos-kyi-bzang-po (henceforth: Rong-zom-pa), an eleventh-century Tibetan scholar, I wish to address in this article merely one question, namely, how Rong-zom-pa interprets what we shall call the positivistic ontology of the Tathāgatagarbha school'"`UNIQ--ref-00003CC4-QINU`"' while he himself undoubtedly proposes a radically negativistic ontology of a Madhyamaka sub-school called Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda. To be sure, the word ontology is used here in the sense of the philosophical theory about the true or ultimate reality of phenomena (according to any given Buddhist system).'"`UNIQ--ref-00003CC5-QINU`"' In particular, the idea that the "root-less-ness" of the mind (or, the rootless mind) is the "root" of all phenomena, or ideas similar to it, is explicit in a number of textual sources that are de-facto considered the literature of the Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda by Rong-zom-pa.'"`UNIQ--ref-00003CC6-QINU`"' (Wangchuk, prologue, 87–89)
Wangchuk, Dorji. "Rong-zom-pa’s Ontological Abyss: Where the Positivistic Ontology of the Tathāgatagarbha School and the Negativistic Ontology of the Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda School Meet." Critical Review for Buddhist Studies 21 (2017): 85–107.
Article
RṄog Blo ldan śes rab's Position on the Buddha-nature Doctrine and its Influence on the Early gSaṅ phu Tradition
The teaching that all sentient beings have Buddha-nature (tathāgatagarbha) was first proclaimed in the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra. Developed in a series of Mahāyāna sūtras, such as the Śrīmālādevīsūtra and Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśasūtra, it was then systematized in the Ratnagotravibhāga (abbr. RGV), alias Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra. The core idea of the RGV’s teaching is that everyone possesses Buddha-nature. The latter does not change throughout the progression from the level of ordinary beings to that of a Buddha, it is merely purified through the separation from adventitious defilements. Once this purification is complete, awakening is accomplished.

      Both Indian and Tibetan traditions struggled with the question of the ontological status of Buddha-nature. One finds indeed in some sūtras descriptions of Buddha-nature as permanent and pervading every sentient being, which are also characteristics ascribed by non-Buddhists to the Self (ātman). But if Buddha-nature were to be understood as a permanent entity akin to a Self, how could this teaching be compatible with the standard Buddhist doctrine that everything is impermanent and selfless?
      Some Mahāyāna sūtras, such as the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, would offer support for the assimilation of Buddha-nature with a Self. The Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra is quite explicit in associating the two notions, characterizing in particular the dharmakāya in terms of “perfection of Self” (ātmapāramitā), but warns about the confusion of the “correct” ātman, which is Buddha-nature, with ātman taken in its ordinary sense.1
      RGV I.37 and RGVV also speak of the “perfection of Self” as an epithet of the dharmakāya, interpreting however this notion of “Self” (ātman) in the sense of selflessness (nairātmya) or quiescence of conceptual proliferations (prapañca), thus distinguishing Buddha-nature from the notion of a personal, permanent Self (ātman).2
      Nevertheless, the RGV does not promote the doctrine of emptiness in the sense that everything is ultimately empty of intrinsic nature. Quite on the contrary, the RGV stresses the real existence of Buddha-nature, and proclaims the superiority of the Buddha-nature doctrine to the emptiness doctrine of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras.3
      The RGV thus on the one hand distinguishes Buddha-nature from the disapproved view of a Self, while on the other hand it admits Buddha-nature as ultimately existent4—an ambiguous viewpoint, and a challenging one for its interpreters. . . .
      The present paper deals with a selection of rṄog’s most significant views on the doctrine of Buddha-nature and considers some reactions to his interpretations in the works of his followers. Since the RGV commentaries attributed to two of rṄog’s "four main [spiritual] sons" (sras kyi thu bo bźi), Źaṅ Tshes spoṅ ba Chos kyi bla ma and Gro luṅ pa Blo gros byuṅ gnas,19 as yet remain to be found,20 we will concentrate on the next-earliest available work, a commentary by Phywa pa Chos kyi seṅ ge (1109–1169).21 (Kano, introduction, 249–55)

Notes:

1. The Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra equates ātman with Buddha-nature (see P 788 tu 105b5 [≈T vol. 12, 407b; 883b]: bdag ces bya ba ni de bźin gśegs paʼi sñiṅ poʼi don to //) and characterizes the dharmakāya (that is, the resultant aspect of Buddha-nature; see below [i]) in terms of “perfection of permanence” (nityapāramitā), “perfection of bliss” (sukhapāramitā), “perfection of Self (ātmapāramitā), and “perfection of purity” (śubhapāramitā) (see P 788 tu 33b3–34a2 [≈T vol. 12, 377c-378a; 862b]).
2. RGVV 31, 13–16: tathāgatas tua punar yathābhūtajñānena sarvadharmanairātmyaparapāramiprāptaḥb / tac cāsya nairātmyam anātmalakṣaṇena yathādarśanam avisaṃvāditatvātc sarvakālam ātmābhipreto nairātmyam evātmetid kṛtvā / yathoktaṃ sthito ʼsthānayogeneti /
(a Schmithausen [1971: 143] corrected tathāgataḥ to tathāgatas tu; b Johnston xvi; c Schmithausen [1971: 143] corrected avisaṃvāditvāt to avisaṃvāditatvāt;d Schmithausen [1971: 143] corrected evātmani to evātmeti)
RGVV 32,9–10: prajñāpāramitābhāvanayākāśopamasattvabhājanalokanairātmya- niṣṭhāgamanād.
See also RGVV 33,8–10: tām eva cāvidyāvāsabhūmiṃ pratītya sūkṣmanimittaprapañca- samudācārayogād atyantam anabhisaṃskārām ātmapāramitāṃ nādhigacchanti.
Schmithausen (1971: 143–144 and 1973: 135) links this sentence to the Madhyamaka view. For instance, the Madhyamakahṛdaya (III.284cd) similarly defines dharmakāya as quiescence of conceptual proliferations (buddhānāṃ dharmakāyo ʼyaṃ prapañcopaśamaḥ śivaḥ).
3. The alternative title of the RGV, mahāyānottaratantra “supreme doctrine of the Mahāyāna," hints to the superiority of the Buddha-nature doctrine to the emptiness doctrine. Cf. RGV I.160: pūrvam evaṃ vyavasthāpya tantre punar ihottare / pañcadoṣaprahāṇāya dhātvastitvaṃ prakāśitam /
4. Cf. RGV I.53, I.165; RGVV 2,11–13.
19. The other two are Khyuṅ rin chen grags and ʼBre śes rab ʼbar. Cf. bKaʼ gdams chos ʼbyuṅ gsal baʼi sgron me, 151.
20. Both A khu Chiṅ Śes rab rgya mtsho and gŹon nu dpal ascribe RGV commentaries to these two authors. (Cf. respectively Tho yig, nos. 11333 and 11339, and rGyud bla me loṅ, 4,23, 574,5.) gŹon nu dpal also lists RGV commentaries by Chos kyi bla ma’s disciple Ñaṅ braṅ pa Chos kyi ye śes (12th century); Phywa pa’s disciple gTsaṅ nag pa brTson ʼgrus seṅ ge (12th century); and Dan ʼbag sMra baʼi seṅ ge (12th century). See gŹon nu dpal, rGyud bla me loṅ, 4,23–24. A khu Chiṅ Śes rab rgya mtsho most likely copied gŹon nu dpal’s references (see Tho yig nos. 11331, 11334, 11335).

21. Phywa pa authored a RGV commentary and a topical outline of RGV (based on rṄog’s topical outline), both of which were found recently at gNas bcu lha khaṅ of ʼBras spuṅs Monastery and published in 2006 in the bKaʼ gdams gsuṅ ʼbum. See Theg pa chen po rgyud bla maʼi bstan bcos kyi tshig daṅ don gyi cha rgya cher bsñad pa phra baʼi don gsal ba (abbr. rGyud bla don gsal), vol. 7, pp. 163–345; Theg pa chen po rgyud bla maʼi bsdus paʼi don, vol. 7, pp. 145–156. The authorship of the rGyud bla don gsal is confirmed on the basis of (a) the colophon of the manuscript that states “composed by the monk Chos kyi seṅ ge” (see Phywa pa, rGyud bla don gsal, 93a3: theg pa chen po rgyud bla maʼi bstan bcos kyi tshig daṅ don gyi cha rgya cher bsñad pa phra baʼi don gsal ba źes bya ba / / śa kyaʼi dge sloṅ chos kyi bla maʼi źabs kyi rdul phyi bos nod pa dge sloṅ chos kyi seṅ ges ñe bar sbyar ba rdzogs s.hyō / /) and (b) a citation nominally attributed to Phywa pa in Blo gros mtshuṅs med’s RGV commentary (see Kano 2007: 109, n. 75).
Kano, Kazuo. "rṄog Blo ldan śes rab's Position on the Buddha-Nature Doctrine and Its Influence on the Early gSaṅ phu Tradition." Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 32, no. 1-2 (2010): 249–83.
Article
Saigyō and the Buddhist Value of Nature, Part 1
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

With in the history of Buddhism in East Asia the world of nature gained and retained a high position —something seen as having inherent religious value. This two-part essay reviews aspects of the history of this upward valuation of nature in Chinese and Japanese Buddhism and analyzes the interpretative shifts and changes made necessary by this impulse toward the attribution of increasingly great religious significance to nature. The development is carried as far as the twelfth century in Japan and the poetry of the Buddhist monk Saigyō (1118- 90), poetry which not only itself moved the valorization of nature beyond the point where earlier writers had brought it, but also, since as poetry it gained a position in the public mind and a place in the popular imagination of the Japanese people, historically "fixed" a lasting nexus between Buddhism and nature in the popular consciousness of the Japanese people. Saigyō, therefore, is of great significance in the history of Japanese religion, a fact that has always been implicitly recognized in the Japanese regard for him as Japan's greatest "medieval Buddhist nature poet." His poetry is important not only as literature but also as a document in the history of Japanese religion.
      Although in what follows I am more interested in an analysis of Saigyō's verse—in relationship to the Buddhist view of nature—than in details of his life, it is of importance to note here that Saigyō, whose name before he became a monk was Satō Norikiyo, saw his Buddhist vocation as something to be carried out in the mountains rather than in temples and monasteries. Before becoming a monk he had been a military guard in the service of Emperor Toba and a member of an elite corps of palace guards known as the Hokumen no Bushi or "North-facing warriors." But at age twenty-three he relinquished his career in court and became a Buddhist monk . He was at first loosely attached to Shingon and Tendai temples in the vicinity of Heian-kyō or Kyoto and seems to have retained a lifelong attachment to the memory of Kūkai (774-835), the Japanese founder of the Shingon school. But Saigyō's forte lay in his composition of waka or thirty-one-syllable verse and it is in the context of his writing of these verses that we gain an understanding of his vision of nature, Buddhism, and the correlation of these two. For Saigyō the world of nature was the primary world of Buddhist values, and it is this that I wish to investigate in what follows. (LaFleur, "Saigyō and the Buddhist Value of Nature," 93–94)
LaFleur, William. "Saigyō and the Buddhist Value of Nature, Part 1." History of Religions 13, no. 2 (1973): 93–128.
Article
Sajjana and Mahājana: Yogācāra Exegeses in the Eleventh Century Kashmir
The present paper aims to clarify work-titles of writings of Sajjana and his son Mahājana, the 11th and 12th century lay Buddhists of Kashmir; especially Sajjana is sometimes regarded as a crucial individual for Yogācāra exegesis tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. Although, until recently, their writings had not been known except for works available in Tibetan canon, further works that are not included in Tibetan canon have gradually been found in a Sanskrit manuscript, which we call here Sajjana-Mahājana codex. As for Sajjana, in addition to his Putralekha, that is, an epistile addressed to his son Mahājana (only in Tib.), two further works, i.e., Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa and Sūtrālaṃkārapiṇḍārtha, have been available (both only in Skt.). With regard to Mahājana, (1) Sūtrālaṃkārādhikārasaṅgati (only in Skt.) has become newly available found in the Sajjana-Mahājana codex, in addition to (2) his Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya commentary (only in Tib.). In (2), Mahājana refers to two of his own writings, i.e., (3) ’Brel pa grub pa chung ngu’i yongs su shes pa and (4) rNam par nges pa’i yongs su shes pa. We can identify (3) as the Pratibandhasiddhiparicaya which is available only as a Sanskrit fragment in the Sajjana-Mahājana codex. On the baisis of this identification, we can assume the Sanskrit title of (4) as *Viniścayaparicaya (yet to be found). Accordingly, the Sanskrit title of (1) can be known as Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayaparicaya as attested in the Peking Tanjur (Derge's reading -arthaparijñāna does not seem to reflect the original). Furthermore, there are two other works with the word paricaya in their titles, i.e., Sūtrālaṃkāraparicaya and *Mahāyānottaratantraparicaya, included in the Sajjana-Mahājana codex. Although their colophons that refer to the author's name are yet to be found, these two are most prabably Mahājana's compositions as this particular title paricaya and this particular situation (being included in the same codex) suggests.
Kano, Kazuo. "Sajjana and Mahājana: Yogācāra Exegeses in the Eleventh Century Kashmir." Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies) 69, no. 2 (2021): 118–124.
Article
Sanskrit Manuscript of Sajjana's Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa
Kano, Kazuo. "Sanskrit Manuscript of Sajjana's Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa." (In Japanese.) Kōyasan daigaku mikkyō bunka kenkyūjo kiyō (Bulletin of the Research Institute of Esoteric Buddhist Culture, Kōyasan University) 19 (2006): 29–51.
Kano, Kazuo. "Sanskrit Manuscript of Sajjana's Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa." (In Japanese.) Kōyasan daigaku mikkyō bunka kenkyūjo kiyō (Bulletin of the Research Institute of Esoteric Buddhist Culture, Kōyasan University) 19 (2006): 29–51.
Article
Sanskrit Manuscripts and Photographs of Sanskrit Manuscripts in Giuseppe Tucci’s Collection
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

During his scientific expeditions to India, Nepal, Tibet and Pakistan in the nineteen thirties, forties and fifties, Giuseppe Tucci (1894-1984) had the opportunity of photographing, and in many cases of having someone copy, several important Buddhist works.[1] Subsequently, most of the manuscripts that he photographed or copied entered the collections in Nepalese, Chinese and Pakistani libraries, but others were lost. At present Tucci’s reproductions of some of these manuscripts are the only documentation at our disposal.
      The study and cataloguing of the photographs and manuscripts now held in Rome in the Library of the Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente (IsIAO) was begun in 1997 (officially on 12th June 1998) by Claudio Cicuzza and myself. The first results of our work have been published as an appendix to the first version of this paper published in Warsaw in 2000. At that time the scanning of the negatives was still underway, so our list was highly provisional, based mainly on the short titles written on the envelopes of the negatives and on the photographs already printed.
      During the last few years, not only it has been possible to correct this list here and there, sometimes with the help of other scholars, as we shall see below, but also to find further manuscripts and photographs of Sanskrit manuscripts that belonged to the Italian scholar –in the IsIAO Library, in the Museo Nazionale d’Arte Orientale ‘Giuseppe Tucci’ (MNAOr) and in a small but important private collection near Rome–and eventually to gather more information regarding the history of Tucci’s expeditions and of the formation of his collection.[2] (Sferra, introduction, 15)

Read more here . . .

Notes
  1. Certainly Tucci did not photograph the MSS personally, for he declares his complete unfamiliarity with any kind of device, including the camera (“[F]ra me e quale che sia macchina, anche la macchina fotografica, resta un’assoluta incapacità di intesa”, 1996b: 17). Among his companions on the expeditions there was always a person responsible for the photographic reproductions.
  2. This aspect of Tucci’s work has been studied by Oscar Nalesini; see below, pp. 79-112.
Sferra, Francesco. "Sanskrit Manuscripts and Photographs of Sanskrit Manuscripts in Giuseppe Tucci’s Collection." In Part 1 of Sanskrit Texts from Giuseppe Tucci's Collection, edited by Francesco Sferra, 15–78. Manuscripta Buddhica 1. Serie Orientale Roma 104. Rome: Instituto Italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente (IsIAO), 2008. https://archive.org/details/sanskrittextsfromgiuseppetuccicollectionfrancescosferrapart1seeotherbooks_664_J/page/n5/mode/2up.
Article
Sanskrit Palm-Leaf Mss. in Tibet
An early mention of the existence of a Sanskrit manuscript of the Ratnagotravibhāga.
Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Rāhula. "Sanskrit Palm-Leaf Mss. in Tibet." Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 21 (1935): 21–43. https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.282236/page/n37/mode/2up.
Article
Sanskrit Verses from Candrakīrti's Triśaraṇasaptati Cited in the Munimatālaṃkāra
The present paper provides newly available Sanskrit fragments (11½ verses) from the Triśaraṇasaptati attributed to Candrakīrti '"`UNIQ--ref-00003FDF-QINU`"' These verses are found in the Sanskrit manuscript of Abhayākaraguptaʼs Munimatālaṃkāra.'"`UNIQ--ref-00003FE0-QINU`"'
      The Triśaraṇasaptati is a small versified work consisting 68 ślokas, the full text of which is preserved only in Tibetan translation. We find two versions (i.e. recensions) of the Triśaraṇasaptati in all the Tanjurs. The two versions are almost the same, having been translated by the same translation team (Atiśa and Rin chen bzang po).
      Sorensen translated the Tibetan text into English and added to them six verses (12, 13, 33, 45, 46, and 47) in Sanskrit traced in the form of quotations in other works. Sorensenʼs English translation is for the most part faithful to the Tibetan text. The Tibetan translation itself, when compared with the Sanskrit original, is seen on occasion to be imprecise (see below, "Philological Remarks").
      Other quotations from the Triśaraṇasaptati have been found in two passages in the Munimatālaṃkāra: Passage A (Skt. Ms. 7v1-4; Tib. D 82a7-b3; verses 1, 34, 51, 54, 55, 67) in Munimatālaṃkāra chapter 1 (the Bodhicittāloka chapter)'"`UNIQ--ref-00003FE1-QINU`"' and Passage B (Skt. 132r1-3; Tib. D 219a5-b1; 7-9ab, 22-23) in chapter 3 (the Aṣṭābhisamayāloka chapter). When we collate these 11½ verses with the 6 verses independently collected by Sorensen, the total number becomes 17½, which is about 26% of the whole text of the Triśaraṇasaptati. (Kano and Xuezhu, introductory remarks, 4)
Kano, Kazuo, and Xuezhu Li. "Sanskrit Verses from Candrakīrtiʼs Triśaraṇasaptati Cited in the Munimatālaṃkāra." China Tibetology 22, no. 1 (2014) 4–11.
Article
Search for Sanskrit Mss. in Tibet
An early announcement about the existence in Tibet of a Sanskrit manuscript of the Ratnagotravibhāga..
Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Rāhula. "Search for Sanskrit Mss. in Tibet." Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 24 (1938): 137–63. https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.280582/page/n377/mode/2up.
Article
Second Search of Sanskrit Palm-Leaf Mss. in Tibet
An early announcement about the existence in Tibet of a complete Sanskrit manuscript of the Ratnagotravibhāga.
Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Rāhula. "Second Search of Sanskrit Palm-Leaf Mss. in Tibet." Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 23 (1937): 1–57. https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.280581/page/n9/mode/2up.
Article
See the True Nature, Then Let Go and Relax in That
An interview with Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche that turned into a Mahamudra teaching on the spot.
McLeod, Melvin. "See the True Nature, Then Let Go and Relax in That." Buddhadharma: The Practitioner's Quarterly, March 1, 2004.
Article
Self-Awareness (Svasaṃvitti) and Related Doctrines of Buddhists Following Dignāga
Framed as a consideration of the other contributions to the present volume of the Journal of Indian Philosophy, this essay attempts to scout and characterize several of the interrelated doctrines and issues that come into play in thinking philosophically about the doctrine of svasaṃvitti, particularly as that was elaborated by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Among the issues thus considered are the question of how mānasapratyakṣa (which is akin to manovijñāna) might relate to svasaṃvitti; how those related doctrines might be brought to bear with respect to some problems addressed with reference to the further doctrine (also closely related to svasaṃvitti) concerning pramāṇaphala; and the distinctiveness of Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyama argument for svasaṃvitti. A question recurrently considered throughout the essay has to do with whether (following Akeel Bilgrami) svasaṃvitti reflects a perceptual or a constitutive understanding of self-awareness.
Arnold, Dan. "Self-Awareness (Svasaṃvitti) and Related Doctrines of Buddhists Following Dignāga." Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (2010): 323–78.
Article
Self-Awareness (svasaṃvedana) in Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya and -vṛtti: A Close Reading
The concept of "self-awareness" (svasaṃvedana) enters Buddhist epistemological discourse in the Pramāṇasamuccaya and -vṛtti by Dignāga (ca. 480–540), the founder of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition. Though some of the key passages have already been dealt with in various publications, no attempt has been made to comprehensively examine all of them as a whole. A close reading is here proposed to make up for this deficit. In connection with a particularly difficult passage (PS(V) 1.8cd-10) that presents the means of valid cognition and its result (pramāṇa/pramāṇaphala), a new interpretation is suggested, inspired by the commentary of Jinendrabuddhi. This interpretation highlights an aspect of self-awareness that has hitherto not been claimed for Dignāga: self-awareness offers essentially subjective access to one’s own mental states and factors.
Kellner, Birgit. "Self-Awareness (svasaṃvedana) in Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya and -vṛtti: A Close Reading." In "Buddhist Theories of Self-awareness (svasamvedana): Reception and Critique." Special issue, Journal of Indian Philosophy 38, no. 3 (2010): 203–31.
Article
Shakya Chokden's Interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhāga: "Contemplative" or "Dialectical"?
This reconciliation of the dialectical and contemplative approaches to the buddha-essence is related to and closely resembles Shakchok’s reconciliation of the two approaches to ultimate reality advocated respectively by Niḥsvabhāvavāda (ngo bo nyid med par smra ba, “Proponents of Entitylessness”) system of Madhyamaka and Alīkākāravāda (rnam rdzun pa, “False Aspectarians”) system of Yogācāra. These approaches in turn are connected respectively to the explicit teachings (dngos bstan) of the second dharmacakra (chos ’khor, “Wheel of Dharma”) and the definitive teachings (nges don, nītārtha) of the third dharmacakra that he also presents in a reconciliatory manner. In the same way as the teachings of the last two dharmacakras, as well as the Niḥsvabhāvavāda and Alīkākāravāda systems that derive from them, come to the same point, the dialectical and contemplative traditions also come to the same point. This point is the above-mentioned naturally pure primordial mind luminous by nature, the ultimate reality. In Shakchok’s opinion, application of non-affirming negations is a powerful tool for accessing direct realization of that reality, while its identification as primordial mind (ye shes, jñāna) is important for maintaining that realization and turning it into the basis of unfolding positive qualities on the path to buddhahood. When in the passage above Shakchok says that the two traditions are not contradictory, and when he reconciles the two last dharmacakras together with Alīkākāravāda and Niḥsvabhāvavāda, he is not arguing that their words are non-contradictory. They obviously are! Nevertheless, those systems are non-contradictory in terms of complementing each other in getting access to and maintaining realization of the ultimate reality of primordial mind. (Source: DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln)
Komarovski, Yaroslav. "Shakya Chokden's Interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhāga: 'Contemplative' or 'Dialectical'?" Journal of Indian Philosophy 38, no. 4 (2010): 441–52. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1114&context=classicsfacpub.
Article
Shakya Chokden’s History of Madhyamaka Thought in Tibet
Serdok Paṇchen Shakya Chokden (1428-1507) stands out as one of the most remarkable thinkers of Tibet. The enormous body of his collected works is notable for the diversity and originality of the writings it contains, and for their exceptional rigor. One of the few Tibetan intellectuals affiliated with both the Sakyapa and Kagyüpa orders, which were often doctrinal and political rivals (see chapters 7 and 11), he was also among the sharpest critics of Jé Tsongkhapa (chapter 16), the founder of the Gelukpa order that would come to dominate Tibet under the Dalai Lamas. For this reason Shakya Chok- dens works were eventually banned by the Central Tibetan government. They are known to us today primarily thanks to a beautifully produced eighteenth-century man- uscript from Bhutan, where the Central Tibetan ban did not extend and the religious leadership was congenial to the blend of Sakyapa and Kagyüpa perspectives that lent Shakya Chokden s texts much of their unique flavor.
      Among the distinctive aspects of Shakya Chokden s oeuvre are his several contributions to the history of Buddhist thought. Historical writing in Tibet (chapter 11) was interested above all in important political or religious events, and the lives of the major actors. Doctrinal or intellectual history was generally ignored, no doubt in part be- cause the outlook fostered in the monastic colleges was one of perennialism: the truths revealed in the Buddha s teaching were eternal, and thus exempt from the process of historical change. Knowledgeable scholars were, of course, aware that commentarial and interpretive traditions did have a history of sorts, but this awareness tended to be expressed in their own commentarial notes, not in dedicated doctrinal histories. In Shakya Chokden's writings, however, we find sustained historical essays on Indian and Tibetan traditions of logic and epistemology, and of the Madhyamaka philosophy inspired by Nāgārjuna. The selections given here are drawn from his work on the latter, and may serve as an introductory guide to the philosophical writings included in the remainder of this chapter.
      Shakya Chokden's discussion turns on the distinction made by Tibetan thinkers between two types of argument, termed in the present translation "autonomous reason” and "consequence.” The first refers to the method of using positive proof to demonstrate the truth or falsehood of a given proposition. The second, by contrast, only seeks to undermine the propositions advanced by a (real or presumed) opponent by drawing out their untenable consequences, and so is similar to reductio ad absurdum, or “indirect Proof,” in Western systems of logic. This distinction was often considered by Tibetans to he the basis for designating two distinct schools of Madhyamaka philosophy, Svātantrika (Autonomous Reasoning) and Prāsańgika (Consequentialist). MTK (Komarovski, Sources of Tibetan Tradition, 373)
Komarovski, Yaroslav. "Shakya Chokden’s History of Madhyamaka Thought in Tibet." In Sources of Tibetan Tradition, edited by Kurtis R. Schaeffer, Matthew T. Kapstein, and Gray Tuttle, 373–80. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013.
Article
Shen-hui and the Teaching of Sudden Enlightenment in Early Ch'an Buddhism
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

The field of Ch'an studies has seen some very lively disputes over the course of the twentieth century, but there has been general agreement on the proposition that the doctrine of sudden enlightenment represents the highest expression of the doctrinal mainstream of early Chinese Ch’an Buddhism. Although there is some quibbling regarding details and specific interpretations, scholars working in this field often describe the history of the doctrine of sudden enlightenment within Ch’an in terms of three subjects: (1) Hui-neng’s doctrine of sudden enlightenment as shown in his "mind verse" (hsin-chieh) in the Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch (Liu-tsu t'an-ching); (2) Shen-hui’s campaign in opposition to the gradual teaching of the Northern school and in support of the public recognition of Hui-neng as sixth patriarch; and (3) the continuation of the spirit of Hui-neng in the teachings and religious practice of Ma-tsu, Shih-t'ou, and the later Ch’an tradition
      Research done in recent years has shown that the traditional interpretations of these three subjects are all substantially incorrect, although the implications of these findings have not yet been fully realized. The history of early Ch'an is in the process o f being thoroughly rewritten, but it is already clear that the doctrine of sudden enlightenment and the dispute between the sudden and gradual teachings should no longer be used as yardsticks by which the religious message of Ch'an and its widespread acceptance in T'ang dynasty China are understood. (McRae, "Shen-hui and the Teaching of Sudden Enlightenment in Early Ch'an Buddhism," 227)
McRae, John R. "Shen-hui and the Teaching of Sudden Enlightenment in Early Ch'an Buddhism." In Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Buddhist Thought, edited by Peter N. Gregory, 227–78. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1991. First published 1987 by University of Hawai'i Press.
Article
Shentong – An Introduction
Khenpo Tsultrim Gyatso Rinpoche gives a brief explanation of the way relative appearances and experiences are empty of self, rang-stong, and the way true reality is empty of other, gzhan-stong.
Gyamtso, Khenpo Tsultrim. "Shentong – An Introduction." Instructions presented at Vajra Vidya Thrangu House in Oxford. Translated by Ari Goldfield and transcribed and edited by Gaby Hollmann, 2000. http://www.dharmadownload.net/pages/english/Natsok/0010_Teaching_English/Teaching_English_0010.htm.
Article
Shōbōgenzō Buddha-Nature: Part 1
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

"Buddha-nature" (Japanese, Bussho) has been regarded in the Sōtō sect as one of the three central fascicles of the Shōbōgenzō, together with Genjōkōan and Bendōwa. Dōgen delivered it the tenth month of 1241 to the followers gathered around him at the Kōshō-ji south of Kyoto. The work as we now have it, however, is a considerably revised form of that original text. Although neither the original or revised manuscript exists in Dōgen's holograph, a copy by his disciple Ejō (1198-1280), including Dōgen's later revisions, is preserved in the Eihei-ji. In most editions, Shōbōgenzō Buddha-nature is the third fascicle in the collection, following Genjōkōan and Makahannya-haramitsu.
      The idea that sentient beings all possess the Buddha-nature and the possibility of attaining Buddhahood is central to most of the schools of the Mahayana. Yet Dōgen's treatment, reflecting his own unique Zen standpoint, can be said to be apart from all the rest. Strictly adhering to a nondualistic interpretation, he comments on passages from Zen and other Buddhist writings that have some bearing on this theme. What is most striking about this commentary is the manner in which it gives clear priority to religious meaning over normal grammatical syntax. In more than a few cases Dōgen chooses to read these passages in ways which are dubious, and sometimes even impossible, from a grammatical point of view. But he does it for a definite purpose. It focuses attention on what he feels to be inadequacies in the traditional ways the texts are read, and at the same time it clearly sets forth his own understanding and rectification of those inadequacies based on his religious awakening.
       For example, at the very beginning of the work he quotes a passage from the Nirvana Sutra ("Northern" version) well-known to all Buddhists: "All sentient beings without exception have the Buddha-nature". This is the general Mahayana statement, which is emphasized in particular in the Nirvana Sutra. Dōgen goes beyond it, by reading the passage as, "All sentient beings-whole being is the Buddha-nature." This he does by reading the characters shitsuu normally "without exception have, as "whole being (he is aided by the fact that the character u means both "to be," or "being," and "to have"). This changes the traditional emphasis of sentient beings having a Buddha-nature, to stress a standpoint more in keeping with the basic nondualistic Mahayana position: whole being is the Buddha-nature, in which "whole being" means not only sentient beings but all beings. This avoids the duality of subject (sentient beings) and object (the Buddha-nature possessed by them), the duality which regards the Buddha-nature as a potentiality to be actualized in the future, and the duality of means and end, where practice is taken as a means and realization of Buddha-nature the end. Dōgen's reading "whole being is the Buddha-nature" thus indicates the nondualistic oneness of the realizer (whole being) and the realized (Buddha-nature), the simultaneity of Buddha-nature and enlightenment (Buddha), and the identity of practice and attainment. It is the key to his understanding of the Buddha-nature as it is developed in various aspects throughout the rest of the work*
      Buddha-nature is the eighth fascicle to appear in this series of translations from Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō which began in May 1971 with Bendōwa. As in the past, we have provided rather extensive footnotes. Their aim is to provide the English language reader a means of better arriving at some understanding of this extremely difficult work, much of which would be incomprehensible without them. We of course do not pretend that they are in any way definitive. They could not be, given the profoundly complicated and suggestive nature of the text. We have attempted, however, to have them exemplify a consistent view of the work as a whole. The edition followed is that of Õkubo Dōshū: Shōbōgenzō (Tokyo: Chikuma, 1971), pp. 14–35. We would like to express our gratitude to Professor Nishitani Keiji for his valuable suggestions.
       N.B. In the text, Dōgen quotes passages from Zen and other Buddhist writings at the heads of the various sections. In order to make clear both the way they are normally read and Dōgen's own sometimes peculiar interpretative reading, we have translated them according to the normal reading when the italicized quotation first appears en bloc at the beginning of the sections; then, when Dōgen's different reading makes it necessary, we have generally retranslated the same words as close to his meaning as the English will allow in the following phrase by phrase discussion of the quotation. When this is done the discrepancy between the two renderings is detailed in the footnotes. (Waddell and Abe, introduction, 94–96)

Notes
  • See Abe Masao, "Dōgen on Buddha-nature," Eastern Buddhist, IV, I.
Waddell, Norman, and Masao Abe, trans. "Shōbōgenzō Buddha-Nature: Part 1." The Eastern Buddhist 8, no. 2 (1975): 94–112.
Article
Shōbōgenzō Buddha-Nature: Part 2
This is the second part of Waddell and Abe's translation of Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō Busshō ("Buddha-nature"). Part 1 appears in The Eastern Buddhist vol. 8, no. 2 (1975); Part 3 appears in vol. 9, no. 2 (1976). For the authors' complete introductory remarks, see Shōbōgenzō Buddha-Nature: Part 1.
Waddell, Norman, and Masao Abe, trans. "Shōbōgenzō Buddha-Nature: Part 2." The Eastern Buddhist 9, no. 1 (1976): 87–105.
Article
Shōbōgenzō Buddha-Nature: Part 3
This is the final part of a translation of Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō Busshō ("Buddha-nature") by Norman Waddell and Masao Abe. Parts 1 and 2 appeared in The Eastern Buddhist vols, 8, no. 2 (1975) and 9, no. 1 (1976). For the translators' complete introductory remarks, see Shōbōgenzō Buddha-Nature: Part 1
Waddell, Norman, and Masao Abe, trans. "Shōbōgenzō Buddha-nature: Part 3." The Eastern Buddhist 9, no. 2 (1976): 71–87.
Article
Sinitic Speculations on Buddha-Nature: The Nirvāṇa School (420–589)
The universality of Buddha-nature is a doctrine accepted by all Chinese schools of Buddhism. The Wei-shih (Fa-hsiang, Vijñaptimātratā) school of Hsüan-tsang, for reviving the notion that the icchantika is agotra, devoid of this seed of enlightenment, had been summarily dismissed as "Hīnayānist" for that reason. The idea of "the enlightenability of the icchantika" is associated with the later-named "Nirvāṇa School," a group of scholars in the Southern Dynasties (420–589) that chose to specialize on the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, the Mahāyāna scripture narrating the last day and teaching of Śākyamuni on earth. The person credited with discovering this doctrine, before even the full sūtra was available to vindicate his stand, is Chu Tao-sheng (375?–434), perhaps better known for his stand on "sudden enlightenment." The school as such flourished best in the Liang dynasty (502–557); but because it was then aligned with scholarship focusing on the Ch'eng-shih-lun (Satyasiddhi?) by Harivarman, it came under criticism when the latter was denounced as Hīnayānist in the Sui dynasty. It is usually said that the T'ien-t'ai school, based on the Lotus Sūtra, superseded the Nirvāṇa school by incorporating many of its ideas, while the Ch'eng-shih school suffered irredeemably under the attack of Chi-tsang of the San-lun (Three Treatise or Mādhyamika) school at the same time. Henceforth, the Nirvāṇa school faded away while its old association with the Ch'eng-shih tradition was judged an unnecessary mistake.'"`UNIQ--ref-000041F1-QINU`"' This article will introduce three moments from the history of this Nirvana school, showing the main trends of development and, somewhat contrary to traditional opinion, justifying the necessity for the detour into Harivarman's scholarship. Emphasis will also be put on the interaction between Buddhist reflections and the native traditions. (Lai, "Sinitic Speculations," 135)
Lai, Whalen. "Sinitic Speculations on Buddha-Nature: The Nirvāṇa School (420–589)." Philosophy East and West 32, no. 2 (1982), 135–49.
Article
Six Tibetan Translations of the Ratnagotravibhāga
No translation of the Ratnagotravibhāga seems to have existed in Tibet before the 11th century, inasmuch as no catalogue of the imperial period (the 9th century) shows any record of one. Although only a single Tibetan translation is extant (that of rNgog Blo ldan shes rab [1069-1109] and Sajjana), ’Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal (1392-1481) reports that up to his time six translations had already been made. In the present paper, I will examine what can be learned about the six translations, those of: (1) Atiśa and Nag tsho Tshul khrims rgyal ba, (2) rNgog Blo ldan shes rab and Sajjana (late 11th cent.), (3) Pa tshab Nyi ma grags, (4) Mar pa Do pa Chos kyi dbang phyug (1042–1136), (5) Jo nang Lo tsā ba Blo gros dpal (1299–1353 or 1300–1364), and (6) Yar klungs Lo tsā ba.
Kano, Kazuo. "Six Tibetan Translations of the Ratnagotravibhāga." China Tibetology 23, no. 2 (2014), 76–101.
Article
Some Remarks on the Sanskrit Titles of Sthiramati’s Works
In this paper, I shall discuss the titles of Sthiramati's works available in Sanskrit: Tattvārthā Abhidharmakośaṭīkā, Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā, and Abhidharmasamuccaya. I will first clarify the meaning of the title of the Tattvārthā, and then reconsider the titles of the Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā and Abhidharmasamuccaya, reexamining their colophons in Sanskrit manuscripts. Additionally , I will discuss the Sanskrit title of Sthiramati's Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra commentary. Finally, I will examine the reliability of titles found in colophons.
Kano, Kazuo. "Some Remarks on the Sanskrit Titles of Sthiramati’s Works." In Śrāvakabhūmi and Buddhist Manuscripts, edited by Seongcheol Kim and Jundo Nagashima, 191–208. Tokyo: Nombre, 2017.
Article
Spotless from the Start
In order to overcome the five main obstacles facing a bodhisattva, says Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche, we must realize that all beings are primordially pure. He presents the essential teachings on buddhanature from Maitreya’s Uttaratantra Shastra.
Khyentse, Dzongsar. "Spotless from the Start." Buddhadharma: The Practitioner's Quarterly, December 1, 2008.
Article
Sur l'authenticité du Ta tch'eng k'i sin louen
Demiéville, Paul. "Sur l’authenticité du Ta tch'eng k'i sin louen" (On the Authenticity of the Da cheng qi xin lun). Bulletin de la Maison Franco-Japonaise 2, no. 2 (1929): 1–78.
Demiéville, Paul. "Sur l’authenticité du Ta tch'eng k'i sin louen" (On the Authenticity of the Da cheng qi xin lun). Bulletin de la Maison Franco-Japonaise 2, no. 2 (1929): 1–78.
Article
T'ien-T'ai Chih-I's Theory of Buddha Nature—A Realistic and Humanistic Understanding of the Buddha
Heng-ching Shih, in her contribution, explores in some detail the T'ien-t'ai view of Buddha Nature, with a special focus on the question of evil. This is clearly a difficult issue for any philosophical school whose basic affirmation is that all living beings are naturally and originally pure and radiant: how, if this is true, can one account for the apparent existence of evil, the opposite or absence of this purity and radiance? Shih's chronological review of the development of the theory of "inherent evil" in T'ien-t'ai begins with the Ta ch'eng chih-kuan fa men which, in accord with the tradition, she judges to predate Chih-i himself, and then proceeds to an analysis of the Kuan-yin hsüan-i, a work that, again following tradition, she attributes to Chih-i. It is probably fair to say that the weight of contemporary historical-critical scholarship in both Japan and the West is against both this chronology and this attribution; Shih is, of course, aware of this, but judges the arguments against the traditional position to be inconclusive. The matter is complex, and the importance of Shih's paper lies not in this but rather in the substantive doctrinal analysis she provides of "inherent evil". (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to Buddha Nature, 6)
Shih, Heng-Ching. "T'ien-T'ai Chih-I's Theory of Buddha Nature—A Realistic and Humanistic Understanding of the Buddha." In Buddha Nature: A Festschrift in Honor of Minoru Kiyota, edited by Paul J. Griffiths and John P. Keenan, 153–70. Tokyo: Buddhist Books International, 1990.
Article
T'ien-t'ai Chih'i's Concept of Threefold Buddha Nature-A Synergy of Reality, Wisdom, and Practice
Paul L. Swanson's contribution, on Chih-i's threefold concept of Buddha Nature, places T'ien-t'ai thought on this matter in a broader conceptual context. He presents it as one more application of the fundamental T'ien-t' ai idea of synergy—that there is a deeply symbiotic relationship between the way things really are (reality), the awareness of the way things really are (wisdom), and the religious practice that produces such an awareness (practice). Swanson bases his exposition on the Fa-hua hsüan-i, in which Buddha Nature, along with nine other Buddhist concepts, is interpreted through the threefold pattern already adverted to. Swanson shows how Chih-i, drawing upon both the Nirvāṇa Sūtra and the Lotus Sūtra, accommodates Buddha Nature terminology and concepts into the structure of his own thought. (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to Buddha Nature, 6)
Swanson, Paul L. "T'ien-t'ai Chih'i's Concept of Threefold Buddha Nature—A Synergy of Reality, Wisdom, and Practice." In Buddha Nature: A Festschrift in Honor of Minoru Kiyota, edited by Paul J. Griffiths and John P. Keenan, 171–80. Tokyo: Buddhist Books International, 1997. https://nirc.nanzan-u.ac.jp/en/files/2012/11/Chih-i-on-Buddha-nature.pdf.
Article
Tathāgatagarbaḥ Sarvasattvānāṃ: A Hypothetical Interpretation of a Declarative Formula in the Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra
In this paper, I shall propose a hypothetical interpretation of the phrase tathāgatagarbhaḥ sarvasattvānāṃ, which is a declarative formula of the Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra (abbr. MPMS) and is preserved as original Sanskrit. This phrase confirms that the word tathāgatagarbha—if this is a bahuvrīhi compound—cannot grammatically go with the word sattvānāṃ unlike the case of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, in which tathāgatagarbha, being a bahuvrīhi, qualifies the noun sattva (sarvasattvās tathāgatagarbhāḥ). Previous studies have mostly interpreted tathāgatagarbhaḥ of the MPMS, as a tatpuruṣa, whereas I shall keep this as a bahuvrīhi and take it to be an adjective which qualifies some undescribed noun—that is, stūpa, omitted in the phrase, based on the following reasons: (1) The word tathāgatagarbha in the formula is probably premising such expressions like tathāgatadhātugarbhān stūpān, dhātugarbhe caitye (which is paraphrased by the expression sadhātuke caitye "a caitya that contains relics"), etc., as found in other Mahāyāna scriptures, where tathāgatadhātugarbha, as a bahuvrīhi, qualifies the noun stūpa "a stūpa that contains tathāgata 's relics”; (2) the omission of the noun stūpa in the formula might reflect the same omission found in expressions, such as dhātudhṛk or dhātudharaḥ (both omitting stūpaḥ), as found in Buddhist inscriptions; (3) The declarative formula of the MPMS should naturally be relevant to the main topic of the MPMS, which deals with tathāgata's nirvāṇa and his relics that were found in stūpas (which, in turn, are reinterpreted in the MPMS from the viewpoint of the dharmakāya and tathāgatagarbha); (4) The MPMS precisely declares that all beings are real stūpa/caitya, and this declaration fits well with the phrase tathāgatagarbhaḥ sarvasattvānāṃ “all beings have tathāgatagarbha (i.e. stūpa)”; (5) We find yet another expression (asmākam upari tathāgatagarbho 'sti "there is tathāgatagarbha above us") in the Sanskrit fragment of the MPMS; however, the word tathāgatagarbha, in this expression, does not disturb the abovementioned interpretation. Instead, this reminds us of the famous scene taught in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka—the stūpa arising in the sky above the audience: saptaratnamayaḥ stūpo ’bhyudgataḥ ... parṣanmaṇḍalasyopari vaihāyasaṃ tiṣṭhet. Accordingly, I shall tentatively propose to interpret the word tathāgatagarbhaḥ in the formula as a bahuvrīhi which qualifies the noun stūpa. I think, however, it is possible to apprehend tathāgatagarbha as a tatpuruṣa, to be the secondary meaning of the word because the MPMS most probably utilizes the word with double or triple meaning in order to preserve the semantic richness of the word garbha, which has already been pointed out by Masahiro Shimoda and Michael Radich.
Kano, Kazuo. "Tathāgatagarbaḥ Sarvasattvānāṃ: A Hypothetical Interpretation of a Declarative Formula in the Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra." (In Japanese.) Critical Review for Buddhist Studies 22 (2017): 9–61.
Article
Tathāgatagarbha Influences in the Three Nature (Trisvabhāva) Theory of the Maitreya Works
Retaining the Abhidharma distinction between the "real" (dravyasat) factors of existence (dharma) and the mere nominal existence (prajñaptisat) of false projections, the Yogācāras restricted the emptiness of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras to the imagined nature (parikalpitasvabhāva). The latter is taken to be a product of dependently arising dharmas, i.e., the dependent nature, which is admitted a higher degree of reality than the one of the imagined nature. Together with the perfect nature (pariniṣpannasvabhāva), defined as the absence of the fictive from the real, the imagined and dependent natures constitute the Yogācāra model of reality. Besides this Yogācāra type of ontological distinction between real and nominal existence there are also, throughout the Maitreya Works, influences of the Ratnagotravibhāga model of an ultimate tathāgatagarbha (once even referred to as such in one of the Yogācāra texts of the Maitreya Works, namely in MSABh on IX.37) that is devoid of adventitious stains. In the present paper it is argued that the integration of the tathāgatagarbha model of reality contributes to remedying the flaws Yogācāra has in the eyes of Mādhyamikas, namely that a considerable group of sentient beings is completely cut off from liberation or that a dependently arising mind exists on the level of ultimate truth.
Mathes, Klaus-Dieter. "Tathāgatagarbha Influences in the Three Nature (Trisvabhāva) Theory of the Maitreya Works." Journal of Tibetology 20 (2019): 222–44.
Article
Tathāgatagarbha Scriptures
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

There is no traditional rubric of tathāgatagarbha scriptures, though modem scholars (e.g. Takasaki, 1974) have treated several scriptures as belonging to a thematic class, namely the ;;Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta, the Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanādasūtra, the (Mahāyāna) Mahaaparinirvāṇamahāsūtra, the Mahāmeghasūtra, the *Mahābherīhārakasūtra, and the Mahāyāna Aṅgulimālīya (or Aṅgulimālīyasūtra). This classification is based in the first instance on the use of these and related works as proof texts in the Indian treatise Ratnagotravibhāga (Mahāyānottaratantra). The category is thus in some sense conceptually coherent even in an Indian context. Moreover, many of these texts take on a very significant role in East Asia where, again, they are often appealed to in various groupings.

The notion of tathāgatagarbha (embryo of the tathāgatas), a Mahāyāna innovation, signifies the presence in every sentient being of the innate capacity for buddhahood. Although different traditions interpret it variously, the basic idea is either that all beings are already awakened, but simply do not recognize it, or that all beings possess the capacity, and for some the certainty, of attaining buddhahood, but adventitious defilements (āgantukakleśa) for the moment prevent the realization of this potential. (Radich, "Tathāgatagarbha Sūtras," 261)
Radich, Michael. "Tathāgatagarbha Scriptures." In Vol. 1 of Brill's Encyclopedia of Buddhism: Literature and Languages, edited by Jonathan A. Silk, Oskar von Hinüber, and Vincent Eltschinger 261–73. Leiden: Brill, 2015.
Article
Tathāgatagarbha Thought: A Basis of Buddhist Devotionalism in East Asia
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

The historical approach to Zen in Heinrich Dumoulin's major work, A History of Zen, published over twenty years ago, broke new ground in Western Zen studies. Up to that time Zen publication in the West dealt primarily with interpretive accounts of Zen and translations of Zen or Zen-related texts. I follow here an alternate approach to Zen and seek to place it in the context of one or another aspect of Mahāyāna tradition. One might read Zen in the perspective of Indian Mādhyamika or Yogācāra, or in terms of the Chinese prajñic or Hua-yen doctrinal development. But I would like to place it within the perspective of Tathāgatagarbha thought. (Kiyota, "Tathāgatagarbha Thought," 207)

Read more here . . .
Kiyota, Minoru. "Tathāgatagarbha Thought: A Basis of Buddhist Devotionalism in East Asia." Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 12, no. 2/3 (1985): 207–31. https://nirc.nanzan-u.ac.jp/nfile/2311.
Article
Tathāgatagarbha and Ātman: Self Where There Is No-Self
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

Humans have long grappled with the question of the nature of our Self, defined here as the ultimate reality inherent to our individual being. Religious traditions can be a great place to look when attempting to understand this aspect of our humanity. Broadly speaking, when contemplating ideas of Self in Buddhism and Hinduism, the relationship between the Buddhist notion of Buddha-nature (tathāgatagarbha) and the Hindu notion of Self (ātman), is an intriguing one: How can we understand them to be similar or different? How do the Buddhist concepts of emptiness (śūnyatā) and mind-only (cittamātra) relate to the concepts of tathāgatagarbha and ātman? Is emptiness contrary to these ideas? Are tathāgatagarbha and the Hindu teaching that ātman is equal to brahman (ultimate reality), both expressions of a non-dualistic state of mind? Although it is commonly taught that Hinduism and Buddhism differ in their understanding of Self, one thing that becomes apparent is that these are not simple questions, perhaps mainly because their answers are contextual. There are many answers that come from many different types of Hindus and Buddhists in various places. For this paper, I will be looking at commentary on the Buddhist text the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra and its use of the concept of a permanent Self and how this relates to emptiness (śūnyatā) and skillful means (upāya). This paper seeks to support my claim that, through skillful means, ātman and anātman (no-Self) are both saying something quite similar—despite the apparent paradoxical nature of this statement—and will look at Buddha-nature in the Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra as a way to understand and help articulate this thought. (Laughlin, "Tathāgatagarbha and Ātman," 57)
Laughlin, Aaron Alexander. "Tathāgatagarbha and Ātman: Self Where There Is No-Self." IdeaFest: Interdisciplinary Journal of Creative Works and Research from Humboldt State University 3 (2019): 57–61. https://digitalcommons.humboldt.edu/ideafest/vol3/iss1/11
Article
Tathāgatagarbha et Ālayavijñāna
La traduction anglaise, par T. Suzuki, du Mahāyānaçraddhotpāda (Chicago, Open Court, 1900), ainsi que la version française, par S. Lévi, du Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (Paris, Champion, 1911), ont attiré l'attention sur duex notions mahayaniques—Tathāgathagarbha et Ālayavijñāna—qui parurent abstruses, faute de termes correspondants en la philosophie européenne. Leur valeur exacte, distincte déjà dans ces deux textes, apparaìtra peu-être sous un jour autre quand nous aurons accès a un plus grand nombre de documents, après explorartion du canon bouddhique dans les diverses langues où il s'est exprimé. Dès à présent toutefois il semble possible de redresser certaines erreurs et d'entrevoir la portée des deux notions. (Masson-Oursel, "Tathāgatagarbha et Ālayavijñāna," 295)

Read more here . . .
Masson-Oursel, Paul. "Tathāgatagarbha et Ālayavijñāna." (In French.) Journal Asiatique 210 (1927): 295–302. https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k93310p/f299.image.
Article
Tathāgatagarbha from the Perspective of Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje as Presented in His Lamp that Eloquently Highlights the Tradition of the Gzhan stong Madhyamaka Proponents
ln his Lamp, Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje equates tathāgatagarbha with the dharmadhātu which is realized through self-aware, self-luminous wisdom. He maintains that there is no dependency on extraneous factors; buddha nature, so to speak, is self-sufficient, bringing about its perfect awakening by means of personally experienced wisdom. Tathāgatagarbha is spontaneously endowed with qualities and activities and is permanent in the specific sense that it remains unchanging throughout the three phases and thus its beneficial activities never come to an end. Therefore, the absolute, tathāgatagarbha, being effective, i.e. of benefit, for itself and for others, is empty of afflictions, but not empty of qualities. lt is from this point of view that the text—despite the fact that the term gzhan stong is nowhere to be found—can well be understood as a way of highlighting the intent of the proponents of gzhan stong Madhyamaka. Mi bskyod rdo rje, following the lead of Maitreya-Asaṅga with their cataphatic appraisal of the absolute, equates tathāgatagarbha with the dharmakāya, with the expanse of nirvāṇa, and with perfect awakening replete with qualities. To him this is the essential meaning of Madhyamaka, and it is for this reason that he frequently refers to Asaṅga as the Great Madhyamika. It is against this background that Mi bskyod rdo rje criticizes those Madhyamaka representatives who do not comprehend the meaning of the third dharma cycle and who therefore view tathāgatagarbha and its associated buddha qualities and activities exclusively from the perspective of a non-affirming negation. (Draszczyk, conclusion, 157)
Draszczyk, Martina. "Tathāgatagarbha from the Perspective of Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje as Presented in His Lamp that Eloquently Highlights the Tradition of the Gzhan stong Madhyamaka Proponents." Hōrin 18 (2015): 141–60.
Article
Tathāgatagarbha, Emptiness, and Monism
The tathāgatagarbha doctrine is one of the most significant Buddhist doctrines to have come under the scrutiny of scholars in recent times.2 One of the more interesting aspects of this doctrine is that it focuses attention on the nature of the Buddhist “absolute” or highest truth in such a way as to make clear many of the problems and concerns of the Buddhist community after the advent of the doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā). This is so because, while on the one hand the tathāgatagarbha is identified with emptiness (“The wisdom of the tathāgatagarbha is nothing but the Tathāgata's wisdom of emptiness”3), on the other hand this emptiness, which for Nāgārjuna and more so for Candrakīrti was a “non-affirming negation,” is redefined in terms of affirmative predications of the highest order (e.g. astitva, mahā-ātman, eternal, etc.). That an investigation of the tathāgatagarbha requires one to ask fundamental questions about the nature of the Buddhist absolute—e.g. is there an “absolute” in Buddhism, and if so, what are its characteristics, how does it differ from the substantialism of the ātmavāda, etc.—is also indicated by the fact that both those who assert tathāgatagarbha to be an absolute or monistic doctrine and those who interpret it in orthodox Buddhist terms do so based on the same line of reasoning, i.e. that tathāgatagarbha is but an expression of pratītyasamutpāda and śūnyatā. The difference is that the former group of scholars see Mahāyāna in general as monistic while the latter do not. This essay is concerned with this question of the equation of pratītyasamutpāda, śūnyatā, and tathāgatagarbha and the related issue of whether or not tathāgatagarbha thought represents a form of Buddhist monism.(Hubbard, introductory remarks, 1–2)

Notes
  1. (In title and not shown) This was originally written in 1994; the publisher seems to have fallen into a black hole, so I am putting it out here myself; I have not changed it (other than fonts and some formatting issues) in order to keep the historical in perspective. I think that I still agree with myself, especially with the idea that tathāgatagarbha represents more of a dualism than a monism and thereby leads to ethical problems with the less-than-real (accidental) kleśa.
  2. Many of the questions considered here have been treated in David Ruegg's recent publication Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective (Delhi: Heritage Publishers 1992); see especially Chapter One.
  3. Jikido Takasaki, A Study of the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttara-tantra), (Rome, 1966), p. 302. Hereafter cited as Ratnagotravibhāga.
Hubbard, Jamie. "Tathāgatagarbha, Emptiness, and Monism.” Online Publications of Jamie Hubbard, May 2009 (originally written in 1994). https://sophia.smith.edu/~jhubbard/publications/papers/TG-Emptiness-Monism.pdf.
Article
Textual History of the Mahāyāna-Mahāparinirvāṇa-Sūtra by Stephen Hodge
A short online article providing an introduction to the "Textual History of the Mahāyāna-Mahāparinirvāṇa-Sūtra" by Stephen Hodge and posted on www.nirvanasutra.net by Tony Page. As of August 2022 I cannot find the content, but it can be found on the WayBackMachine. More detailed treatment by the same author is available here: The Text and Its Transmission.
Page, Tony. "Textual History of the Mahāyāna-Mahāparinirvāṇa-Sūtra by Stephen Hodge." Nirvana Sutra: Appreciation of the "Mahayana Mahaparinirvana Sutra." Updated August 2019. nirvanasutra.net.
Article
Textual and Philosophical Problems in the Translation and Transmission of Tathāgatagarbha Texts
This article examines philological problems relating to descriptions defining the tathāgatagarbha, or "buddha-nature," in Sanskrit sūtras and exegetical literature, together with the variant Tibetan translations of these descriptions in the bKa’ ’gyur and bsTan ’gyur. Attention is called also to some possible philosophical implications of these variant descriptions.
Ruegg, David Seyfort. "Textual and Philosophical Problems in the Translation and Transmission of Tathāgatagarbha Texts: Sanskrit Avinirmuktakleśakośa, Amuktajña/Amuktajñāna, and Tathāgatagarbhaśūnyatārthanaya and Their Tibetan Translations in the bKa' 'gyur and bsTan 'gyur." Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 78, no. 2 (2015): 317–32.
Article
The Ambiguity of the Buddha-Nature Concept in India and China
This paper has three aims. First, to demonstrate the irreducible ambiguity of what we may very generally call the Buddha's real or essential nature (as we find it in certain Mahāyāna texts). Secondly, to give an explanation of how this ambiguity arose within the Mahāyāna. Thirdly, to see how the Chinese handled this ambiguity. Since my argument takes some time to unfold, I give a summary straightaway without supporting evidence
      The concept of the Buddha's real or essential nature is referred to by (or better: rests upon) many different Sanskrit terms - e.g. (tathāgata-)dhātu, (buddha-)gotra, (tathāgata-)garbha, dharmatā, dharma-kāya, buddhatā. Other terms that are closely related are Tathatā, āśraya, prakṛti, prabhāsvara-citta, dharma-dhātu, buddha-jñāna.'"`UNIQ--ref-000001DC-QINU`"' So when we speak of the Buddha-nature (which is how I will abbreviate the more cumbersome 'the Buddha's real or essential nature' from now on), we are tacitly drawing upon some or all of these terms, which have their own ramifications and interrelations, of course. This is a very complex situation and I want to try and clarify it by approaching it from two angles. First, historically, I want to propose that Buddhism in India always had within it three strands which tended to view and understand the Dharma from their own standpoint; these strands are those of śīla, samādhi and prajñā (see p. 262 for details). Secondly, conceptually, I propose a number of what may be called conceptual nets or images (e.g. withinness, foundation, nature/being—see p. 263 for details) that can be applied to the concept of the Buddha-nature, and which (a) tend to hang together as a group, but in addition (b) each of the conceptual nets to a large extent determines the sort of terminology that is used when speaking of the Buddha-nature. Part of my argument is that works like the RGV (and to a lesser degree, the ŚMS) represent a systematization of the different terms (and hence, tacitly, the conceptual nets that give rise to these terms) that were available at the time that the Mahāyāna was growing to maturity.'"`UNIQ--ref-000001DD-QINU`"' This period of the Mahāyāna is usually referred to as the third turning of the Dharma-cakra; it involved a fundamental shift in the axis of Buddhism which led to a bhedābheda philosophy (i.e. the Absolute is both distinct and non-distinct from its attributes). Finally, we look at what the Chinese made of all this. They settled on the term fo hsing to mean 'Buddha-nature', but we find that hsing is used to translate different Sanskrit terms (e.g. prakṛti, gotra, bhāva—see p. 267 for details), and that these Sanskrit terms are themselves translated by other words than hsing (e.g. t'i, shen, chen, shih). In other words, the inherent ambiguities in the Sanskrit terminology are replaced by inherent ambiguities in the Chinese terminology. In addition, because garbha (which nearly always means 'embryo' in Sanskrit) is translated by ts'ang, ( = 'womb'; lit. 'storehouse'), a certain vacuum was created in the Chinese vocabulary which the terms fo hsing and fo hsin ( = buddha-citta) neatly filled. (Rawlinson, introductory remarks, 259–60)
Rawlinson, Andrew. "The Ambiguity of the Buddha-Nature Concept in India and China." In Early Ch’an in China and Tibet, edited by Whalen Lai and Lewis Lancaster, 259-79. Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1983.
Article
The Buddha Lies Hidden Within: Discourse on the Buddha Nature (The Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra)
Zimmermann, Michael. "The Buddha Lies Hidden Within: Discourse on the Buddha Nature (The Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra)." In Vol. 1, The Norton Anthology of World Religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, Daoism, edited by Jack Miles, Wendy Doniger, Donald S. Lopez Jr., and James Robson, 1022–44. New York: W. W. Norton, 2015.
Zimmermann, Michael. "The Buddha Lies Hidden Within: Discourse on the Buddha Nature (The Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra)." In Vol. 1, The Norton Anthology of World Religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, Daoism, edited by Jack Miles, Wendy Doniger, Donald S. Lopez Jr., and James Robson, 1022–44. New York: W. W. Norton, 2015.
Article
The Buddha Nature: True Self as Action
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

Buddhism, and especially early Buddhism, is known for the anātman (no self) teaching. By any account, this teaching is central to both doctrine and practice from the beginning. Zen Buddhism (Chinese Ch'an), in contrast, is known for its teaching that the single most important thing in life is to discover the 'true self'. Is there a real, or only an apparent, conflict between these two versions of Buddhism? Certainly there is at the least a radical change in the linguistic formulation of the teaching. Examining the two teachings on the linguistic level, we note that the use of the term 'true' in the phrase 'true self' may indicate that we have here a conscious reformation of the place of the term 'self' in the tradition, or perhaps that the use of this phrase in Zen is the product of such a conscious formulation. Thus we may expect, upon investigation, to find an evolution from one teaching to the other, rather than a true doctrinal disparity. The apparent, or linguistic, conflict between the two, however, remains; hence we must also expect to find a doctrinal formulation at some point in this evolution in which the apparent conflict is consciously apprehended and resolved.
      That is, Buddhism embraces both the teaching that there is no self and the teaching that the goal of life is to discover the true self. Not only does Buddhism embrace these two formulations, but each in its own context is the central pivot of the teachings of the school or community concerned. Two questions arise here. (1) How can a single tradition affirm both no self and true self? How can the two ideas be reconciled? (This is the philosophical question.) (2) In linking early Buddhism and Zen we are discussing two religious movements separated by approximately 12 centuries and by their development in two vastly different cultures, the Indian and the Chinese. What is there in the course of this development that could account for the transition from talk of no self to talk of true self? (This is the question of intellectual history.) In the present essay I will attempt to show that it is by examining the Buddha nature (fo hsing 佛性) concept and understanding it as a term representing certain actions that these questions may be answered. (King, "The Buddha Nature," 255)
King, Sallie B. "The Buddha Nature: True Self as Action." Religious Studies 20, no. 2 (1984): 255–67. http://www.seattlebetsuin.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/King.Buddha-nature.pdf
Article
The Buddha-Nature in Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō
It has come to be acknowledged in the present century that Dōgen is one of the most seminal thinkers of Japanese Buddhism. For nearly seven centuries, however, he has been buried in oblivion, except within the Sōtō School of Zen that reveres Dōgen as its founder. Even the Sōtō School contributed to the obscurity of their founder by prohibiting the publication of Dōgen’s major work, Shōbōgenzō until the end of the eighteenth century.
       Watsuji Tetsurō (1889-1960) brought Dōgen out of this long period of obscurity with his treatise Shamon Dōgen written between 1919 and 1921.'"`UNIQ--ref-000041AD-QINU`"' Watsuji's contribution, however, is not limited to his introduction of Dōgen to public attention. Instead of treating Dōgen as the founder of the Sōtō School, he presents him as a human being, a person, a man (hito):
...it may be justifiable to assert that I opened a gate to a new interpretation of Dōgen. He thereby becomes not the Dōgen of a sect but of mankind; not the founder Dōgen but rather our Dōgen. The reason why I claim it so daringly is due to my realization that his truth was killed by sheer sectarian treatments (Watsuji 1925，p. 160).

      This realization grew out of Watsuji’s effort to solve the problem of how a layman like himself could attempt to understand Dōgen's "truth" without engaging in the rigorous training prescribed by the Zen tradition (Watsuji 1925, p , 156). A sectarian would claim that the "truth" must be experienced immediately and that any attempt to verbalize or conceptualize it constitutes falsification. If the immediate experience is the only gateway to the "truth," as the sectarian would claim, why did Dōgen himself write so much? Dōgen believed that it was through writing that his truth was to be transmitted to others. For his own religious training, he singlemindedly concentrated on sitting in meditation; yet he saw no intrinsic conflict between sitting and writing. This is why Dōgen started writing Shōbōgenzō in 1231: so that he might be able to "transmit the Buddha’s authentic Dharma to those who are misguided by false teachers" (Watsuji 1925, p. 157). Watsuji further quotes from Dogen: "Although it (Shōbōgenzō) might appear to be a mere 'theory,' it still bears indispensable importance for the sake of Dharma" (1925，p. 157). Thus Watsuji claims that his approach, which relies on words and concepts, is a valid alternative to the monk’s subjective pursuit.
      According to Dōgen, enlightenment is possible only through rigorous sitting in meditation (kufū zazen) and through the study of Dharma under a master (sanshi monpō). One can encounter Dōgen as a master through his writings, for he answers one’s questions in his works. But one still must practice sitting in meditation. Watsuji insists that meditation can be done in an office or a study as well as in a meditation hall; he even goes so far as to say that perhaps a study may be a more congenial place for this purpose than a meditation hall when many monasteries are no longer concerned with the transmission of the truth but are immersed in secular concerns (1925，p. 158). Therefore, for Watsuji, meditation does not necessarily require the act of entering a monastery.
      Of the two prerequisites for the realization of the truth, sitting in meditation is left to the individual. But the other, the pursuit of Dharma under a master, is Watsuji's principle concern. Shamon Dogen is an account of Watsuji's personal encounter with the person of Dōgen as he speaks in his writings, primarily Shōbōgenzō and Shōbōgenzō zuimonki, the latter of which was compiled by Ejō, Dōgen's closest disciple. In Watsuji's treatise, we encounter not only Watsuji as he faced Dōgen but Dōgen himself.
      Watsuji’s new methodology considers it central to discover and encounter the person (hito) of Dōgen in his works.'"`UNIQ--ref-000041AE-QINU`"' Many people have followed Watsuji’s methodology. Professor Tamaki Kōshirō of the University of Tokyo, for instance, remarks that not only was he first exposed to Dōgen through Watsuji, but also that he encountered the living Dōgen in Watsuji’s treatise.'"`UNIQ--ref-000041AF-QINU`"'
      This writer finds Watsuji's methodology to be particularly applicable to the study of Dōgen. Dōgen himself saw the truth fully embodied in the personhood of his Chinese master, Juching. Dōgen's encounter with this individual was the single most decisive experience in his life, as is abundantly attested in his writings. Furthermore, Dōgen repeatedly discouraged his disciples from associating with institutionalized Zen. This paper, therefore, is the result of the writer’s attempt to encounter the personhood of Dōgen.
      While this writer uses Watsuji’s methodology, the main body of literature that is examined in this paper is the chapter of Dōgen’s Shōbōgenzō devoted to the busshō or Buddha-nature. The reasons for this choice are three. The question that tormented the young monk Dōgen concerned the Buddha-nature. Dōgen's search for the answer to this question took him to the eminent monks of his time: Kōen of Mt. Hiei; Kōin of Miidera temple; Yōsai of Kenninji temple; Myōzen, who succeeded Yōsai at this first Rinzai Zen monastery in Japan; Wu-chi Liao-pai and finally T'ien-t'ung Ju-ching in Southern Sung China. This pilgrimage spanned a period of over ten years ending in 1225 when he attained enlightenment under Ju-ching’s instruction and solved his question. Thus it is possible to look at Dōgen's formative years as a continuing struggle with the fundamental question he first raised on Mt. Hiei. Secondly, the Buddha-nature chapter is one of the longest of the ninety-two chapters, in the Shōbōgenzō which may suggest Dōgen's particular concern for the subject matter. Lastly, the original manuscript of this chapter, now preserved in Eiheiji temple, bears witness to the fact that Dōgen laboriously revised the chapter a number of times. Study of the Buddha-nature chapter, therefore, can reasonably be taken as central to understanding Dōgen's life and thought. (Kodera, "The Buddha-nature in Dogen's Shōbōgenzō," 267–70)

Read more here . . .
Kodera, Takashi James. "The Buddha-Nature in Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō." Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 4, no. 4 (1977): 267–92. https://nirc.nanzan-u.ac.jp/nfile/2797.
Article
The Buddhahood of All Insentient Beings
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

So far, no lifeless universe has been discovered. That is, the occurrence of matter without the occurrence of life is, judging by the available empirical evidence viewed globally, something that does not happen. In every case that matter has been there in any universe, life has occurred—eventually.
      I do not mean that there has never been a time, a single snapshot moment or a billion such moments, during which there was only matter but no life. Nor do I mean that there is no part of the universe in which, considered in isolation from all other parts, there is only lifelessness. "In every case that matter has been there in any universe, life has occurred" is true even if there are immense periods of time, considered in isolation, and immense swaths of space, considered in isolation, where there is no life.
      The crux of the problem, however, lies in those three words, "considered in isolation." Everything depends on how we divide things up, where our definition of "one thing" begins and ends.
      For what I mean when I say that "matter without life has never existed" is that, scientifically speaking, there has never appeared even one particle of any kind of matter found in any non-life-producing universe, considering that universe as a whole. For no non-life-producing universe has yet been discovered. Likewise, there is no lifeless matter in any period of time that is not part of at least one sequence of time that produces life.
      All matter that has ever been discovered has existed only in a universe that also contains life, and all lifeless times were part of this sequence of time we are now in, the total sequence of time that produced this life.
      No lifeless universe has ever been discovered. Among all the universes that have been discovered so far, there is not even one that is devoid of life. I challenge you or anyone to show me even one particle of matter, or even one moment of time, from a universe without life.
      At this point we have merely been speaking empirically about what has so far been discovered. There are very few things that we can know with absolute certainty without relying on empirical contingency. But in fact this is one thing we can know with absolute certainty: no universe will ever be discovered devoid of life.
      We can know this for two reasons. The first is perhaps relatively trivial, although some philosophers attach great significance to it. It is that the act of "discovering" itself requires a living being. Ipso facto, wherever any discovering is done, life is also present. Therefore no universe devoid of life can ever be discovered.
      The second reason has to do with how we define universe. Th is is the hidden premise of the claims I am making here: it is because we understand the idea of "universe" in a certain way that we can claim, with absolute certainty, that there is no lifeless universe. If the universe is taken in its broadest meaning, which is also its most commonsensical meaning, it means "all that exists." All that exists certainly includes this planet, this solar system, this period of time. The universe in this broadest sense is what includes any more-narrowly construed universes—for example, all alternate universes. If we call the sum total of all possible universes "the universe," then it is obvious that there is no universe but this one, and since this one contains life, no universe can be discovered that is devoid of life. Whatever might be discovered is by definition part of this totality that includes our lives.
      All of the above is true even if life exists only once, for a few million years, on one small planet. Even if there was no life for billions of years—and in most of the universe there never has been and never will be life—even if the phenomenon "life" is a peculiar flash that occurs only on planet Earth between the Hadean Eon 4,500 million years ago until 2018 CE, and never arises anywhere ever again, it is still true that there is no universe devoid of life and that there can never be any universe devoid of life.
      And yet people often contemplate those vast billions of years and expanses of space and speak of "lifeless matter." This makes sense only if we divide the world in a certain way. That is, it is only because we are in the habit of dividing self and other, or mind and its objects, or—to put it most generally—inside and outside, that it is possible to speak of lifeless matter. Only if any one part of the universe is thought of as an entity truly separate from all other parts can anything be lifeless. The key question is how much of the universe do we consider to be "one thing." Where do we draw the line that divides inside from outside? If "me and that rock" are one thing, that one thing has life, just as "my skin and my fingernails" has life. If me and that rock are separate, then my body has life and the rock has no life.
      Mahāyāna Buddhism, particularly that developed in the Madhyamaka school and further elaborated in Tiantai Buddhism, holds that the separation of "inside and outside" is impossible to sustain in any nonambiguous way. These schools generally develop this idea logically by use of reductio ad absurdum arguments that try to demonstrate that any way of drawing common-sense dividing lines to define one object in distinction to another end up being self-contradictory. (Read the entire article here).
Ziporyn, Brook. "The Buddhahood of All Insentient Beings." Dharma World 45 (2018): 10–12. https://rk-world.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/DW18_7-12.pdf.
Article
The Buddhahood of Plants and the Japanese View of Nature
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

Buddhist doctrine refers to entities possessing mind (Skt., citta) as sentient beings (Skt., sattva) and considers them to undergo rebirth through the six realms of existence (hells, hungry spirits, animals, asuras, human beings, heavenly beings). It is because they possess mind that they give rise to the defilements, accumulating the negative karma that is the cause of rebirth. The purpose of Buddhism therefore is to release beings from the suffering associated with rebirth, a condition called liberation (Skt., vimokśa) and nirvana. Mahayana calls it the attainment of buddhahood (Jpn., jōbutsu). There also exist nonsentient beings (Skt., asattva). Since they do not possess mind, they do not undergo the cycle of rebirth and so cannot attain liberation, nirvana, or buddhahood. In principle, therefore, plants, like inorganic substances not possessing "mind," are not understood to undergo rebirth. It is therefore impossible to discuss their attainment of buddhahood. However, when Buddhism entered China, the potential for buddhahood of nonsentient beings became an important subject for debate. Since China had not previously had any concept of sentient beings, no strict distinction was made between sentient and nonsentient, which was why the question of nonsentient buddhahood was taken up. The Jingangbi lun (Diamond Scalpel Treatise) of the sixth Tiantai patriarch, Zhanran (711–82), confronted the issue directly and asserted that nonsentient beings could attain buddhahood. This did not, however, mean that they could aspire to enlightenment, practice, and achieve buddhahood of themselves. Rather, when a sentient being attains buddhahood, the whole environment becomes the Buddha's realm. A sentient being's subjective existence (Jpn., shōhō) arises from past karmic effects and this causes the realm of the environment (Jpn., ehō) to arise. Environment is thus dependent on subjective existence, and therefore, when a sentient being attains enlightenment, so do nonsentient beings. What is important here is that sentient beings attain enlightenment through their own practice, whereas nonsentient beings can only do so as the environment of sentient beings. This was a solution consonant with Chinese ideas that placed significance on a person's own actions, seen typically in Confucianism. The Japanese did not view human beings in any special way as did the Chinese. Furthermore, they tended to look on nature in terms of plants. The land of Japan was called the "middle land of the reed beds" (ashihara no nakatsu kuni), its landscape being described as a swamp where reeds grew. The fecundity of plants symbolized the evolution of the world. According to the Nihon shoki (Chronicle of Japan, eighth century), before Ninigi, grandson of the sun goddess Amaterasu, descended from the heavenly plain, the land of Japan was where "the standing trees, and even the single blade of grass, uttered words." This is thought to represent the disordered state of nature that existed before the land was civilized. Humankind was referred to as people grass (hitogusa); in other words, the mass of people was understood through the model of grasses and trees.
      In Japan, therefore, nature was thought of in terms of plants, and people were thought to be close to them. Japan's view of nature is often described as animism, but this is not necessarily appropriate. Not all natural phenomena were regarded as spiritual entities, nor were they objects of veneration. Deities (kami) resided in the depths of nature, manifesting themselves in natural objects serving as receptacles (yorishiro). For example, at Ōmiwa Shrine in Nara Prefecture, Mount Miwa is described as the body (shintai) of its kami. Originally, though, the mountain was regarded as sacred because it was the place to which the kami descended: it was not itself the kami. The buddhahood of grasses and trees came to be a concern precisely because human beings and plants were thought of as being of the same quality. Whereas in China tiles and stones were presented as representative of nonsentient existence, in Japan it was grasses and trees. (Read the entire article here)
Sueki, Fumihiko. "The Buddhahood of Plants and the Japanese View of Nature." Dharma World 45 (2018): 3–5. https://rk-world.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/DW18_7-12.pdf.
Article
The Buddhist Notion of an 'Immanent Absolute' (tathāgatagarbha) as a Problem in Hermeneutics
As a religious and philosophical tradition works out its own stock of ideas and encounters fresh ones among its neighbours, it must very often generate responses to developing tensions and oppositions unless it is simply to turn in on itself, both ossifying and isolating itself from its intellectual and human environment. Buddhism has not ossified and isolated itself in this way, and it has met such challenges not only in its spread outside the Indian subcontinent—in Central, East and Southeast Asia, and now also in Europe and

America—but also, and no less importantly, in the course of its development within historical India itself.
      One way in which Buddhism has responded to these intellectual and cultural encounters can be related to hermeneutics: that is, the modes by which a tradition explains its sources and thereby interprets (or reinterprets) itself in a continuing process of reactivation and renewal of its heritage.[1]
      In the case of Buddhism this process—perhaps comparable in part to what in another context is now frequently referred to as aggiornamento—had both endogenous and exogenous causes. It was, in other words, set in train both by internal, systemically generated requirements and tensions within the Buddhist tradition as it evolved in geographical space and historical time, and by external impulses received from its intellectual and social environment, which could be, according to the case, either positive or negative in character.
      The purpose of this paper is to explore this process with respect to the Buddhist hermeneutics of the ideas of non-self (anatman) and of a spiritual matrix or germ (gotra, tathagatagarbha or Buddha-nature) and the relationship of this pair of ideas to Vedantic notions and Brahmanical social groups in classical India. Reference will be made also to certain exegetical developments that either originated in Tibet or were at least fully realized there for the first time. Our analysis will revolve around the fact that, however historically antithetical and structurally contrasting these two ideas are in Buddhism, they in fact have not invariably been treated by Buddhist hermeneuticians as contradictory or even as systematically exclusive of each other.
      Because of its philosophical and religious significance in the fields of soteriology and gnoseology, the Mahāyānist theory of the tathāgatagarbha—the Germ of Buddhahood latent in all sentient beings—occupies a crucial position in Buddhist thought, and indeed in Indian thought as a whole. In virtue of both their extent and their contents, the sūtras treating the tathāgatagarbha—and the systematically related doctrines of the natural luminosity (prakṛtiprabhāsvaratā) of mind (citta) and the spiritual germ existent by nature (prakṛtistha-gotra)[2]—are amongst the most important in the Mahāyāna. The idea that the doctrine of the tathāgatagarbha and Buddha-nature is one of the supreme teachings of the Mahāyāna is explicitly stated in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sutra.[3]

      Mahāyānist doctrine is in large part concerned with the path (marga) of the Bodhisattva and supreme and perfect awakening (bodhi), that is, the state of a Buddha. The terms tathāgatagarbha and gotra are used to denote the base or support for practice of the path, and hence the 'cause' (hetu: dhatu) for attainment of the fruit (phala) of buddhahood. Even when the texts do not employ the term tathāgatagarbha to designate this factor as the one which makes it possible for all living beings ultimately to attain liberation and Buddhahood, the importance of the theme of the tathāgatagarbha is basic to the soteriology and gnoseology of the Mahāyāna. (Ruegg, "The Buddhist Notion of an 'Immanent Absolute'," 229–30)
Ruegg, David Seyfort. "The Buddhist Notion of an 'Immanent Absolute' (tathāgatagarbha) as a Problem in Hermeneutics." In The Buddhist Heritage, edited by Tadeusz Skorupski, 229–45. Tring, UK: The Institute of Buddhist Studies, 1989.
Article
The Canonization of Philosophy and the Rhetoric of Siddhānta in Tibetan Buddhism
José Ignacio Cabezón, in "The Canonization of Philosophy", explores the rhetoric used by Tibetan scholiasts—especially dGe lugs pas—to establish philosophical canonicity. He argues that the construction of hierarchically ordered tenet (siddhānta/grub mtha') systems is precisely an attempt to provide a philosophical canon, and that this can be seen most clearly in the way that the constructors of such systems deal with controverted questions. The question of whether living beings possess an intrinsically pure Buddha Nature is, for Cabezón's scholiasts, just such a question. For some Jo nang pas this could be asserted as philosophically normative, whereas for most dGe lugs pas, if such a claim was made at all it was made only as a preliminary assertion, always of questionable adequacy. Cabezón explores in some detail the interesting case of the eighth Karma pa, Mi bskyod rdo rje, who appears to affirm the normative status of Buddha Nature claims, but who, in so doing, labels them 'Great Madhyamaka' (dBu ma chen po)—a rhetorical move in which a philosophical perspective clearly non-Madhyamaka is called such in an attempt to give it weight and authority. For the Madhyamaka theorists, of course, both in India and Tibet, Buddha Nature thinking could not occupy the highest rung of the philosophical ladder. The apparently substantivist claims of Buddha Nature theorists—that there is an eternal, changeless, radiantly pure Buddha Nature—ran counter to the radically non-substantivist dialectical method of the Prāsaṅgikas, and Cabezón's study shows that, as a result of the dominance of the Prāsaṅgika in Tibet, Buddha Nature theory always remained marginal there and gained whatever position it had only by arrogating to itself the rhetoric of Madhyamaka. (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to Buddha Nature, 3)
Cabezón, José Ignacio. "The Canonization of Philosophy and the Rhetoric of Siddhānta in Tibetan Buddhism." In Buddha Nature: A Festschrift in Honor of Minoru Kiyota, edited by Paul J. Griffiths and John P. Keenan, 7–26. Tokyo: Buddhist Books International, 1990.
Article
The Categories of T'i, Hsiang, and Yung: Evidence that Paramārtha Composed the Awakening of Faith
The question of whether Paramārtha's version of the Awakening of Faith in Mahayana (AFM) may really be a Chinese composition has long intrigued scholars of Buddhism. Because no original Sanskrit manuscript of the AFM has ever been found nor any reference to the AFM discovered in any Buddhist text composed in India, scholars have long suspected that the AFM might not be a Chinese translation of an Indian work. The traditional attribution of the text to Aśvaghoṣa is even more suspect—as Paul Demiéville pointed out, it is almost impossible to believe that the Aśvaghoṣa whom one associates with the Buddhacarita, the Mahāvibhāṣā, and the Sarvāstivadins could have composed any Mahāyāna text, much less a sophisticated Mahāyāna treatise like the AFM. And the discovery at the beginning of this century of Japanese references to the seventh century Buddhist figure Hui-chun, who is quoted as saying that the AFM was composed not by Aśvaghoṣa, but by a "prisoner of war" who belonged to the T'i lun School, prompted many distinguished scholars, including Shinko Mochizuki and Walter Liebenthal, to argue that the work was a Chinese fabrication by a person affiliated with the native Chinese T'i lun School, which devoted itself to the study of Vasubandhu's Daśabhūmivyākhyā. Indeed, as recently as 1958, Liebenthal went so far as to say that one could take it as "established" that a member of the T'i lun School composed the AFM. Few would go so far as actually to name the member of the T'i lun School who wrote the AFM, as Liebenthal did (indeed, as Liebenthal himself remarked, it is difficult to believe that any member of the T'i lun School could have written the AFM, given that the author of the AFM does not even seem to know the ten bodhisattvabhūmis described in the Daśabhūmivyākhya), but for a long time scholarly opinion has leaned in the direction of assigning authorship of the AFM to the Chinese. Just recently Professor Whalen Lai has brought forward some cogent new reasons for regarding the AFM as a Chinese composition.

      In light of all this, it might seem rather daring to suggest that an Indian actually composed the AFM, but that is what I propose to argue. I do not intend to suggest that the Sarvāstivādin Aśvaghoṣa, or even a "Mahāyāna Aśvaghoṣa" composed the AFM. The first place that any Aśvaghoṣa is listed as the author of the text is in Hui-yüan's Ta-ch'êng i chang, a work composed about a half century after Paramārtha was said to have translated the AFM, so the attribution of the text to Aśvaghoṣa probably postdated its composition. But there are a couple of pieces of important philological evidence, heretofore largely overlooked, that seem to point strongly to an Indian Buddhist, most likely Paramārtha himself, as the real author of the text, or at least of major parts of it. The first piece of evidence is the use in the AFM of the three categories of t'i, hsiang, and yung, categories which I will try to show were derived by the author of the AFM from Sanskrit categories used in the Ratnagotravibhāgamahāyānottaratantraśāstra (RGV) and which could not have been formulated by anyone who did not possess a knowledge of Sanskrit. The second piece of evidence is Paramārtha's interpolation of passages from the RGV into the Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya (MSbh), which seems to show not only that Paramārtha was intimately familiar with the RGV and its categories, but also that he was personally concerned about issues

central to the AFM. When examined together with some interesting biographical details from accounts of Paramārtha's life, this evidence seems to suggest the very real possibility that Paramārtha was the author of the AFM. (Grosnick, introduction, 65–66)
Grosnick, William. "The Categories of T'i, Hsiang, and Yung: Evidence that Paramārtha Composed the Awakening of Faith." Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 12, no. 1 (1989): 65–92. https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jiabs/article/view/8748/2655.
Article
The Challenge of Tathāgatagarbha Tradition to Contemporary Political-Economic Discourse
The purpose of this paper is to explore how the tathāgatagarbha tradition might shed light on the current political and economic impasse between the dominant voices in U.S. politics, conservative libertarians and reform liberals. I will begin by describing the two opposing sides and highlighting their implicit anthropologies, their views of human being. I will then lay out the nondual anthropology suggested by a key text in the tathāgatagarbha tradition, the fifth-century CE Ratnagotravibhāga. Finally, I will discuss what guidance this tathāgatagarbha perspective might offer in moving us past the current political and economic impasse.
Brockman, David R. "The Challenge of Tathāgatagarbha Tradition to Contemporary Political-Economic Discourse." Paper presented to the Buddhist Theology Group at the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion, San Francisco, CA, November 2011.
Article
The Clarity Aspect
When the Buddha taught that all beings have buddhanature, says Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche, he wasn’t contradicting the teachings on emptiness—he was clarifying them.
Khyentse, Dzongsar. "The Clarity Aspect." Buddhadharma: The Practitioner's Quarterly, June 17, 2017.
Article
The Collection of ‘Indian Mahāmudrā Works’ (Tib. phyag chen rgya gzhung) Compiled by the Seventh Karma pa Chos grags rgya mtsho
In the thirteenth century certain aspects of the Bka’ brgyud teachings on mahāmudrā became highly controversial, such as the assertion of the possibility of a sudden liberating realisation or of a beginner’s attaining mahāmudrā even without tantric empowerment. Such teachings were propagated by Sgam po pa (1079–1153), but criticised by Sa skya Paṇḍita (1182–1251), who maintained that there is no conventional expression for mahāmudrā in the pāramitā tradition and that the wisdom of mahāmudrā can only be a wisdom that has arisen from empowerment. ’Gos Lo tsā ba Gzhon nu dpal (1392–1481) defended Sgam po pa’s notion of mahāmudrā, however, by pointing out its Indian origins in the persons of Jñānakīrti (tenth/eleventh century)'"`UNIQ--ref-000042C0-QINU`"' and Maitrīpa (ca. 1007–ca. 1085), together with the latter’s disciple Sahajavajra (eleventh century).'"`UNIQ--ref-000042C1-QINU`"' The works of these masters belong to a genre of literature that was eventually called "Indian mahāmudrā works" (phyag chen rgya gzhung). (Mathes, introduction, 89–90)

Read more here . . .
Mathes, Klaus-Dieter. "The Collection of 'Indian Mahāmudrā Works' (Tib. phyag chen rgya gzhung) Compiled by the Seventh Karma pa Chos grags rgya mtsho." In Mahāmudrā and the Bka'-brgyud Tradition, edited by Roger R. Jackson and Matthew T. Kapstein, 89–127. Proceedings of the Eleventh Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Konigswinter 2006. Andiast, Switzerland: International Institute for Tibetan and Buddhist Studies, 2011.
Article
The Concept of Tathāgatagarbha in the Śrīmālādevī Sūtra (Sheng-Man Ching)
"Tathāgatagarbha" refers to a theory in Mahāyāna Buddhism which interprets the nature of the mind as intrinsically pure (unconditioned) yet defiled (conditioned). The objective of this theory is to link living beings with the Buddha, encouraging them to attain enlightenment. In the Śrīmālādevī-sūtra, a major scriptural authority on Tathāgatagarbha, a correlation between the nature of Emptiness and the nature of mind is explicated. The devlopment of ideas first presented in the Śrīmālādevī-sūtra greatly influenced the evolution of the notion of ālayavijñāna, the key concept in the second major Mahāyāna school known as Vijn̄ãnavāda. It will be demonstrated that Tathāgatagarbha accounts for the possibility of change from a defiled to an enlightened state due to the two dimensions of the inherently pure nature of mind as "embryo" and "womb."
Paul, Diana. "The Concept of Tathāgatagarbha in the Śrīmālādevī Sūtra (Sheng-Man Ching)." Journal of the American Oriental Society 99, no. 2 (1979): 191–203.
Article
The Concept of the "Innate Purity of the Mind" in the Agamas and the Nikayas
The concept of the "innate purity of the mind" (cittaprakṛtiprabhasvara) is a very important notion in the Mahayana Buddhism and has a great influence on the Chinese Buddhism. It is often used synonymously with "tathāgatagarbha" in many Mahayana texts. However, the origin of the concept can be traced back to the Āgamas and the Nikāyas. It is quite interesting to find such a concept in these sutras which vey much emphasize the concepts of impermanence and non-ego. The purpose of this study is to clarify the true meaning of this concept of the innately pure mind in the Āgamas and the Nikāyas. This paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, the original statements concerning this concept are discussed within the context of the entire collection of the Buddha's discourses. Since the formula of this concept involves the defilements of the mind, the second part of this study focuses on the types of the defilements which contaminate the mind. The analogies found in the texts discussing the defilements also help to further clarify the meaning and functions of the concept discussed in part one. As there is a lot of debate on this concept in the Abhidharma literature, the third part presents some of the debate to illuminate the issues concerning whether the mind can be truly polluted and the relationship between the mind and the defilements. In the conclusion, in addition to summing up the discussion on the true meaning of the concept of the innately pure mind in the Āgamas and the Nikāyas, the difference between its use in these sutras and that in the Tathāgatagarbha sutras is also briefly mentioned.
Shih, Ru-nien. "The Concept of the 'Innate Purity of the Mind' in the Agamas and the Nikayas." Journal of World Religions 13 (2009): 117–76. https://libap.nhu.edu.tw:8081/Ejournal/4082001304.pdf.
Article
The Dalai Lama on "Uttaratantra" and Buddha-Nature: Day One
"The Furthest Everlasting Continuum" ("Uttaratantra") deals with Buddha-nature, the root from which the stages of realization can arise. It is the source containing all the core factors for becoming a Buddha. On the basis of the everlasting mental continuum of a practitioner, good qualities can be developed and faults can be removed. His Holiness the Dalai Lama focuses here on an in-depth analysis of the various terms referring to Buddha-nature, based on an assortment of Tibetan commentaries. (Source Accessed July 21, 2023)
Dalai Lama, 14th. "The Dalai Lama on 'Uttaratantra' and Buddha-Nature: Day One." 2 pts. Transcription of a Seminar, Bodh Gaya, India, January 1982. Translated by Alexander Berzin. Study Buddhism by Berzin Archives. Revised January 2008. https://studybuddhism.com/en/advanced-studies/lam-rim/buddha-nature/the-dalai-lama-on-uttaratantra-buddha-nature-day-one.
Article
The Debate over the Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna (Aviv 2020)
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

The debate over the role of the Awakening of Faith in the theory and practice of Chinese Buddhism is one of the central ongoing debates among both Chinese Buddhists and scholars of Buddhism in the modern period. To understand this debate, and the views contained within it, it is necessary to contextualize it within the history of modern East Asian Buddhism. The following review focuses both on a critical assessment of the Awakening of Faith’s authenticity, as well as the role Ouyang played in shifting the course of this debate. This disputation was at the heart of Ouyang’s quest for authenticity. The chapter will not be a comprehensive treatment of all the thinkers involved in these debates; I will deal here only with dimensions of the text that became contentious for Ouyang and with the contribution of other participants who carried forward the debate at that time. (Aviv, introduction, 69)

Notes
  1. The Awakening of Faith exists in two purported “translations.” One is attributed to Paramārtha, T.32.1666.0575a03–0583b17, in 554 ce; the other, later version is attributed to Śikṣānanda, T.32.1667.0583b21–0591c22, in 695–700 ce. While the title includes the term Mahāyāna, and the text is often translated as the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna or according to the Mahāyāna, I take the term Mahāyāna as part of the customary classificatory term in the canon rather than as part of the actual title, as is common with other texts with the same classificatory term and other texts marked with terms such as Abhidharma (阿毘達磨) or the mothers of the Buddha (佛母).
Aviv, Eyal. "The Debate over the Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna." In Differentiating the Pearl from the Fish-Eye: Ouyang Jingwu and the Revival of Scholastic Buddhism, 60–106. Leiden: Brill, 2020.
Article
The Dharma of Liberation
An interview with contemporary American teacher Sharon Salzburg
Salzburg, Sharon. The Dharma of Liberation. Interview by Stephen Batchelor. Tricycle: The Buddhist Review, Spring 1993. https://tricycle.org/magazine/dharma-liberation/.
Article
The Direct and Gradual Approaches of Zen Master Mahāyāna: Fragments of the Teachings of Mo-ho-yen
Luis O. Gomez, in "The Direct and the Gradual Approaches of Zen Master Mahayana: Fragments of the Teachings of Mo-ho-yen," edits and translates the sayings and works preserved in Tibetan in scattered fragments of the Ch'an master Mo-ho-yen, who took part in a dispute between Chinese Ch'an teachers and Indian Madhyamika teachers in Tibet in the last half of the eighth century. An attempt is made to reconstruct the original texts and sort them into five genres. Not all the fragments attributed to Mo-ho-yen are included, but this is the most comprehensive work to date.
     In the analysis of the texts, the author suggests that Mo-ho-yen's doctrinal position was that of an extreme non-dualist who thought practice came after enlightenment. Consequently Mo-ho-yen denied the value of means to that enlightenment, yet he still had to allow for a means for people of lesser abilities. This admission probably gave his opponents grounds for criticism.
      There is a glossary of Tibetan terms and their Chinese equivalents based on a comparison of the fragments in Tibetan with the Chinese of the Tun-wu Ta-sheng cheng-li chüeh which depicts Mo-ho-yen's side of the dispute (for which it may have been profitable to consult Hasebe Koichi's edition from the Pelliot and Stein Chinese manuscripts, the "Toban Bukkyō to Zen", Aichigakuin Daigaku bungakubu kiyō no. 1). Gomez in fact suggests that terminological ambiguity was one source of misunderstanding between the Chinese and Indian parties. Recently R.A. Stein has begun work on the Tibetan translations of Chinese and Indian vocabulary ("Tibetica Antiqua", BEFEO 72, 1983) which sheds more light on the subject. For example, lun and mdo (Gomez p. 87, notes 23 and 39), or gzhung and gzhun (Gomez p. 140) are interpreted slightly differently by Stein (pp. 175-6 and p. 179 respectively). (John Jorgensen, "Review of Studies in Ch'an and Hua-yan," JIABS 9, no. 2 (1986): 177–78).
Gómez, Luis. "The Direct and Gradual Approaches of Zen Master Mahāyāna: Fragments of the Teachings of Mo-ho-yen." In Studies in Ch’an and Hua-yen, edited by Robert M. Gimello and Peter N. Gregory, 69–167. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1983.
Article
The Doctrinal Transformation of Twentieth-Century Chinese Buddhism: Master Yinshun's Interpretation of the Tathāgatagarbha Doctrine
In this paper, I examine Yinshun’s interpretation of the tathāgatagarbha (rulaizang) and its relationship to the following concepts: the Buddha’s epithet ‘the thus come one’ (Skt. tathāgata; Chn. rulai) and the theory of ‘the selfhood of the tathāgatagarbha’ (rulaizangwo). Yinshun regards these two ideas as playing substantial roles in the evolution of the tathāgatagarbha theory. His conception of their connection to the theory clarifies what I contend has been and continues to be Yinshun’s doctrinal agenda; namely, re-asserting the doctrine of emptiness (Skt. śūnyatā; Chn. kong) as the definitive expression of Buddhist truth and relegating the tathāgatagarbha teaching to the category of expedient means. I base the following discussion primarily on Yinshun’s text A Study of the Tathāgatagarbha (Rulaizang Zhi Yanjiu), for it serves as his most exhaustive statement about the tathāgatagarbha and related doctrines. Finally, the interpretation of the relationship between the tathāgatagarbha and the doctrine of emptiness has been and continues to be a contested issue in the Buddhist tradition. Therefore, before turning to Yinshun’s explanation of its connection to the aforementioned concepts, I first place his interpretation of the tathāgatagarbha within the context of this on-going dispute. (Hurley, "The Doctrinal Transformation of Twentieth-Century Chinese Buddhism," 30)
Hurley, Scott. "The Doctrinal Transformation of Twentieth-Century Chinese Buddhism: Master Yinshun's Interpretation of the Tathāgatagarbha Doctrine." Contemporary Buddhism 5, no. 1 (2004): 29–46.
Article
The Doctrine of Buddha Nature in Chinese Buddhism—Hui-K'ai on Paramārtha
John P. Keenan, in his essay on Paramārtha and Hui-K'ai, explores the complex process by which Indian Buddhist texts were transmitted into China, and argues for the pervasive influence, both linguistic and conceptual, of pre-Buddhist Taoist ideas upon that process. This influence, he argues, was essentially "centrist" in that Taoist thought then focused upon nonbeing as the source or matrix of being, and upon the importance of the "original nature" of human persons; such ideas were naturally conducive to an emphasis upon Tathāgatagarbha and Buddha Nature terms and concepts, for the interpretive tools for understanding them were already present in China, while this was not the case for Indian ideas about sūnyatā and the dialectic of the two truths.
      To illustrate this general point Keenan considers the case of the translator Paramārtha and his amanuensis Hui-k'ai, and shows that in their work on Indic texts they not infrequently added references to tathtāgatagarbha and Buddha Nature where no such mention was made in the originals; they thus contributed to the centrality of Buddha Nature thought in East Asian Buddhism. (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to Buddha Nature, 5)
Keenan, John P. "The Doctrine of Buddha Nature in Chinese Buddhism—Hui K'ai on Paramārtha." In Buddha Nature: A Festschrift in Honor of Minoru Kiyota, edited by Paul J. Griffiths and John P. Keenan, 125–37. Tokyo: Buddhist Books International, 1990.
Article
The Doctrine of Buddha-Nature Is Impeccably Buddhist
One of the most important arguments made by the exponents of Critical Buddhism is, as Matsumoto Shirõ asserts in the title of one of his papers, that "The Doctrine of Tathāgata-garbha Is Not Buddhist." In brief, the claim made by Matsumoto and Hakamaya Noriaki is that tathāgata-garbha or Buddha-nature thought is dhātu-vāda, an essentialist philosophy closely akin to the monism of the Upaniṣads. In Matsumoto and Hakamaya’s view, only thought that strictly adheres to the anti-essentialist principle of pratītyasamutpāda taught by Śākyamuni should be recognized as Buddhist. Buddha-nature thought, being a dhātu-vāda or essentialist philosophy, is in fundamental violation of this requirement and consequently should not be regarded as Buddhist. On the basis of this reading of Buddha-nature thought, Matsumoto and Hakamaya proceed to make the several subsequent claims documented in this volume. Since the assertion that Buddha-nature thought is dhātu-vāda is such a foundational claim, I will focus my remarks upon this one point in their corpus, though at the end of this chapter I will have a few words to say regarding their charge that Buddha-nature thought is to blame for the weakness of Japanese Buddhist social ethics.
      I propose in this paper to challenge Matsumoto and Hakamaya’s reading of Buddha-nature thought. In my understanding, while Buddha-nature thought uses some of the terminology of essentialist and monistic philosophy, and thus may give the reader the impression that it is essentialist or monistic, a careful study of how those terms are used—how they actually function in the text—leads the reader to a very different conclusion. I will attempt to demonstrate that Buddha-nature thought is by no means dhātu-vāda as charged, but is instead an impeccably Buddhist variety of thought, based firmly on the idea of emptiness, which in turn is a development of the principle of pratītyasamutpāda
      In making my remarks I draw upon the exposition of Buddha-nature thought given in the Buddha-Nature Treatise (Fo hsing lun), attributed to Vasubandhu and translated into Chinese by Paramārtha.'"`UNIQ--ref-00004194-QINU`"' The Buddha-Nature Treatise is a particularly useful text to consult in this matter inasmuch as it constitutes a considered attempt, by an author of great philosophical sophistication, to articulate the Buddha-nature concept per se and to explain both its philosophical meaning and its soteriological function. Indeed, the author is savvy enough to have anticipated the criticisms that this concept would face, including the particular criticisms leveled in our time by Matsumoto and Hakamaya, and to have effectively countered them in the 6th century CE. In this chapter, then, I will consider some of these criticisms in turn and see how the author of the Buddha-Nature Treatise defends as Buddhist the concept of Buddha-nature and the language in which it is expressed.'"`UNIQ--ref-00004195-QINU`"' (King, "The Doctrine of Buddha-Nature Is Impeccably Buddhist," 174–75)
King, Sallie B. "The Doctrine of Buddha-Nature Is Impeccably Buddhist." In Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism, edited by Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson, 174–92. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997.
Article
The Doctrine of Buddha-Nature in Mahāyāna Buddhism
The doctrine of Buddha-Nature (Buddhadhātu) is one of the most important doctrines in Mahayana Buddhism. This doctrine can be found in a number of Mahayana texts that were composed at least by the 3rd to the 5th century C. E., and traces of this doctrine can be found in the development of Chinese, Korean and Japanese Buddhism. The doctrine of Buddha-nature basically teaches that all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature and that they can all attain Buddhahood. The Buddha-nature is described as pure and immaculate, free from emotional and conceptual defilements that plague sentient beings.
See, Tony Sin-Heng. "The Doctrine of Buddha-Nature in Mahāyāna Buddhism." Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Universities 9, no. 1 (2016): 47–56. http://www.ojs.mcu.ac.th/index.php/jiabu/article/view/863.
Article
The Doctrine of the Buddha-Nature in the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-Sūtra
In the Buddhist Canon, there are two main corpuses of texts which go by the name Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra (henceforth abbreviated to MNS) and have as their main concern the recounting of the events and dialogues of the last days of the Buddha. The first, presumably of earlier origin, is a comprehensive compendium of Hīnayāna ideas and precepts. It exists today in its Pali, Sanskrit and Chinese versions, and for its attention to factual details has been resorted to as the principal source of reference in most standard studies of the Buddha's life. As for the second, only its Chinese and Tibetan translations are still extant.[1] While it also relates some of the well-known episodes of the final months of the Buddha Śākyamuni, notably his illness and the last meal offered by Cunda, such narrations are treated in the work merely as convenient spring-boards for the expression of such standard Mahayana ideas as the eternal nature of Buddhahood and expedience as method of instruction. Both in style and content, this corpus exhibits the disregard of historical particulars and the fascination with the supernatural and the ideal which characterize Mahāyāna writings in general. As a Mahāyāna sūtra, it is of rather late date, for it mentions such influential "middle Mahāyāna" works as the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra and the Śūraṃgamasaṃādhi-nirdeśa in its text, and so could not have been compiled before the second century A.D.[2] It is this Mahāyāna version of the MNS which we are going to examine in our present study. (Liu, introduction, 63)
Liu, Ming-Wood. "The Doctrine of the Buddha-Nature in the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-Sūtra." Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 5, no. 2 (1982): 63–94. https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jiabs/article/view/8578/2485.
Article
The Dust Contemplation: A Study and Translation of a Newly Discovered Chinese Yogācāra Meditation Treatise from the Haneda Dunhuang Manuscripts of the Kyo-U Library
In this article I introduce a previously unknown, late seventh-century (as I shall argue) Buddhist text from this collection: Hane[da] manuscript no. 598, a single scroll bearing at its conclusion the title "Method for the Contemplation of Dust4 as Empty" (Chen kong guan men).5 The Dust Contemplation, as I will call it, is a unique and surprisingly concrete set of instructions for the practice of Buddhist meditation based on the doctrines and technical vocabulary of the early Chinese Yogācāra tradition, particularly (but not exclusively) those often linked by modern scholars to the so-called Shelun commentarial tradition (Shelunzong), which drew primary inspiration from the Yogācāra scriptures translated by Paramārtha (Zhendi; 499–569) and which flourished during the late sixth and early seventh centuries.6
Greene, Eric M. "The Dust Contemplation: A Study and Translation of a Newly Discovered Chinese Yogācāra Meditation Treatise from the Haneda Dunhuang Manuscripts of the Kyo-U Library." The Eastern Buddhist 48, no. 2 (2020): 1–50.
Article
The Early Development of the Buddha-Nature Doctrine in China
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

Among the many concepts current among Chinese Buddhists, "Buddha-nature" is undoubtedly the most central and the most widely debated. As is well-known, the idea "Buddha-nature" first became popular in China with the translation of the Mahayana Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra (hence-forth referred to as MNS) in the early fifth century; since then, a variety of theses have been proposed on several aspects of the subject. These are worth examining not only because of the important role they play in the history and development of Chinese Buddhist thought, but also because they reflect more fundamental doctrinal differences. Once these differences have been clarified, a more comprehensive picture of the various dominant philosophical trends in the field of Chinese Buddhism will appear. This paper will unravel the diverse streams of thought which came to be associated with the Buddha-nature concept during the Northern and Southern Dynasties, i.e., in the first two centuries of the propagation of the Buddha-nature doctrine in China. (Liu, foreword, 1)
Liu, Ming-Wood. "The Early Development of the Buddha-Nature Doctrine in China." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 16, no. 1 (1989): 1–36.
Article
The Eighth Karmapa Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507-1554) on the Relation between Buddha Nature and Its Adventitious Stains
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

Accepting the possibility of enlightenment as a fundamental Buddhist axiom, one has to either explain the causal process of its production, or accept its primordial existence, for example in terms of a buddha nature (tathāgatagarbha). The latter also applies, of course, when buddhahood is not taken to be produced from scratch. The way this basic issue is addressed is an ideal touchstone for systematically comparing various masters and their philosophical hermeneutical positions in the complex landscape of Tibetan intellectual history. The diversity of views on buddha nature has its roots in the multilayered structure of the standard Indian treatise on buddha nature, the Ratnagotravibhāga. Depending on whether one follows the original intent of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtras (which can be identified in the earliest layer of the Ratnagotravibhāga), or the Yogācāra interpretation of the latter in the Ratnagotravibhāga, buddha nature can refer to either an already fully developed buddha, or the naturally present potential (prakṛtisthāgotra) or natural luminosity of mind, i.e., sentient beings’ ability to become buddhas. While some saw in such positive descriptions of the ultimate only synonyms for the emptiness of mind,[1] or simply teachings of provisional meaning,[2] the Jo nang pas, and many bKa’ brgyud pas and rNying ma pas as well, took them as statements of definitive meaning.[3] Among the latter, i.e., those for whom buddha nature is more than just emptiness, there was disagreement about the relationship between such a positively described buddha nature and its adventitious stains, which include all ordinary states of mind and the world experienced by the latter.

For my analysis of Mi bskyod rdo rje’s view on the relation between buddha nature and its adventitious stains I have chosen his Abhisamayālaṃkāra commentary, the rGan po’i rlung sman,[4] which contains a critical review of ’Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal’s (1392-1481) rGyud gsum gsang ba; the sKu gsum ngo sprod rnam bshad; the Phyag rgya chen po’i sgros ‘bum and Mi bskyod rdo rje’s independent work on gzhan stong, the dBu ma gzhan stong smra ba’i srol legs par phye ba’i sgron me. While these texts have in common that they endorse a robust distinction between buddha nature and the adventitious stains, the respective gzhan stong ("other empty") views underlying this relationship slightly differ, or are not mentioned in explicit terms. The homogeneous clear-cut distinction between impure sentient beings and a pure mind, dharmadhātu, or buddha nature is strikingly similar to what we find in the relevant works of the third Karma pa Rang byung rdo rje (1284-1339).5) Even though Rang byung rdo rje does not explicitly mention the word gzhan stong in his mainly Yogācāra-based presentation of buddha nature, Karma Phrin las pa’s[6] (1456-1539) and Kong sprul Blo gros mtha’ yas’s (1813-1899) description of Rang byung rdo rje as a gzhan stong pa[7] is at least understandable on the grounds that Mi bskyod rdo rje uses this label for a doctrine similar to Rang byung rdo rje’s.[8] In order to further contextualize Mi bskyod rdo rje’s distinction between buddha nature and adventitious stains I have also consulted relevant passages from his commentaries on the Madhyamakāvatāra and the dGongs gcig. (Mathes, introductory remarks, 65–67)

Notes
  1. This mainly is the position of rNgog Blo ldan shes rab (1059-1109), who claims in his Theg chen rgyud bla’i don bsdus pa, 5b3: "The mental continuum, which has emptiness as its nature, is the [buddha] element (i.e., buddha nature)." (... stong pa nyid kyi rang bzhin du gyur pa’i sems kyi rgyud ni khams yin no). A similar line of thought is followed by the dGe lugs pas, for whom emptiness is what is taught in the doctrine of tathāgatagarbha (see Seyfort Ruegg 1969, 402).
  2. This is, for example, the position maintained by Sa skya Paṇḍita (1182-1251) and Bu ston Rin chen ‘grub (1290-1364) (Seyfort Ruegg 1973, 29-33).
  3. For rNgog Blo ldan shes rab and some dGe lugs pas, too, buddha nature has definitive meaning on the grounds that it is a synonym of emptiness (see Mathes 2008:26-27; and Seyfort Ruegg 1969, 402) .
  4. This is how the author originally referred to his work, even though it appears in the Collected Works in the less irreverent title Sublime Fragrance of the Nectar of Analysis (Higgins and Draszczyk 2016, vol. 1, 12).
  5. I.e., the Zab mo nang don and its autocommentary, the sNying po bstan pa, the Dharmadhātustava commentary, and the Rang byung rdo rje’i mgur rnams. See Mathes 2008, 51-75.
  6. See Karma 'Phrin las pa: "Dris lan yid kyi mun sel zhes bya ba lcags mo’i dris lan bzhugs", 91, 1-4. For the Tibetan text and an English translation, see Mathes 2008, 55 & 441.
  7. See Kong sprul Blo gros mtha’ yas: Shes bya kun khyab mdzod, vol. 1, 460, 2-13.
  8. The fact that the relation between buddha nature and its adventitious stains is only occasionally labelled gzhan stong by Mi bskyod rdo rje is not very telling, since in his dBu ma gzhan stong smra ma’i srol the main topic is the said relation, and Mi bskyod rdo rje refers to it as gzhan stong merely in the title.
Mathes, Klaus-Dieter, "The Eighth Karmapa Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507–1554) on the Relation between Buddha Nature and Its Adventitious Stains." Critical Review for Buddhist Studies 22 (2017): 63–104.
Article
The Essence of Zhentong
The following translation is based upon the ‘Dzam thang edition of the Gzhan stong snying po.
Sheehy, Michael R., trans. The Essence of Zhentong. By Jetsun Tāranātha. With Khenpo Kunga Sherab Saljay Rinpoche. JonangFoundation.org, 2008. https://jonangfoundation.org/sites/default/files/jf_snying%20po_final.pdf
Article
The Example of the Buddha: Relating the Life of the Buddha to Our Own
A teaching on buddha-nature by an American Vipassana teacher
Goldstein, Joseph. "The Example of the Buddha: Relating the Life of the Buddha to Our Own." Tricycle: The Buddhist Review, (n.d.), https://tricycle.org/magazine/the-example-of-the-buddha/.
Article
The Funerary Transformation of the Great Perfection (Rdzogs chen)
The Great Perfection (Rdzogs chen) is one of the most important tantric traditions to develop in Tibet, but much of its early history has been obscured by the tradition’s visionary narratives of revelation, concealment, and excavation regarding its core scriptures. In addition, the over-reliance on the rubric “Great Perfection” itself obscures a broad diversity of distinct traditions, each with its own distinct rubric of self-identification and often quite divergent characteristics. This includes at the most general level the Three Series (Sde gsum), Four Cycles (Skor bzhi), Crown Pith (Spyi ti), and Ultra Pith (Yang ti). The present essay utilizes a simple hermeneutic of two trajectories – labeled “pristine” and “funerary,” respectively – to offer a developmental history of these movements in broad strokes from the eighth to fourteenth century. In doing so, it interprets the major variants of the Great Perfection historically in terms of their interrelations via development, influence, and criticism.
Germano, David. "The Funerary Transformation of the Great Perfection (Rdzogs chen)." Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies 1 (2005): 1-54.
Article
The Gotra, Ekayāna and Tathāgatagarbha Theories of the Prajñāpāramitā according to Dharmamitra and Abhayākaragupta
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

In the course of his monumental work on the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras E. Conze has written: 'It is quite a problem how the Dharma-element which is common to all can be regarded as the source of a variety of "lineages" [gotra]'.[1] It has been the endeavour of the present writer in a series of publications starting in 1968 to shed light on this very fundamental and interesting question. An article in the Festschrift dedicated to the late E. Frauwallner was devoted to the interconnexion between the single, unique and undifferentiated dharmadhātu, the naturally existent spiritual element or germ (prakṛtisthaṃ gotram) and the variously conditioned psycho-spiritual categories (gotra)[2] recognized by the Buddhist texts as explained by Ārya Vimuktisena (ca. 500 ?) and his successor Bhadanta Vimuktisena in their commentaries on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra (i. 37-39), which they correlate with the topics of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā.[3] And shortly afterwards there followed a more detailed study of this question as it relates to the notion of the tathāgatagarbha or buddha-nature in La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra: Études sur ta sotériologie et la gnoséologie du bouddhisme (Paris, 1969) and Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub (Paris, 1973). In the last publications Haribhadra's commentaries on the Prajñāpāramitā were discussed, and the importance of the doctrine of the One Vehicle (ekayāna), was taken up at some length not only from the point of view of soteriology but also from that of gnoseology
      Between the two Vimuktisenas and Haribhadra (fl. c. 750-800) on the one side and the Tibetan exegetes on the other there lived a number of important Indian commentators whose work could be only briefly touched on in the Théorie. Amongst the most important of these later Indian masters of the Prajñāpāramitā are Dharmamitra and Abhayākaragupta, both of whom have been reckoned by Buddhist doxographers as being, for certain systematic reasons, close to the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika school, and Ratnākaraśānti (first half of the 11th century), a Vijñānavādin (of the Alīkākāravāda branch) who appears to have undertaken a harmonization of the Vijñānavāda and the Madhyamaka in the manner of the synthesizing movements especially characteristic of later Buddhist thought in India.
      One of Ratnākaraśānti's main works on the Prajñāpāramitā—the Sārottamā (or Sāratamā ?), a Pañjikā on the Aṣṭasāhasrikā, which until recently was known only by its Tibetan version in the Bstan 'gyur—has now been recovered in an incomplete Sanskrit manuscript. Since the promised publication of this text is awaited with keenest interest by students of this literature, his work must be left for another occasion.[4] The present paper will therefore consider the discussions by Dharmamitra and Abhayākaragupta of the relation between the gotra, the dharmadhātu, the ekayāna, and the tathāgatagarbha. (Ruegg, "The Gotra, Ekayāna and Tathāgatagarbha Theories of the Prajñāpāramitā," 283–284)
Notes
  1. E. Conze, The Large Sūtra on Perfect Wisdom (London 1961), p. 105 note 2. References hereunder to the folios of Tibetan translations of Indian texts contained in the Bstan 'gyur relate to the Peking edition as reproduced in the Japanese reprint published by the Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Institute (Tokyo and Kyoto). Prints of other editions of the Bstan 'gyur were unfortunately unavailable during the writing of the present paper.
  2. On the meanings of the term gotra, and in particular on the two meanings '(spiritual) element, germ, capacity' and '(spiritual) lineage, class, category' which might be described respectively as the intensional and extensional meanings of the word when the gotra as germ determines the classification of persons possessing it in a gotra as category, see the present writer's article in BSOAS 39 (1976) p. 341sq.
  3. "Ārya and Bhadanta Vimuktisena on the gotra-theory of the Prajñāpāramitā," Beitriige zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens (Festschrift fur Erich Frauwallner), WZKSO 12-13 (1968/1969), pp. 303–317.
    4. Ratnākaraśānti's other work on the subject, a commentary on the AA entitled Śuddhimatī, (or: Śuddhamatī) will be referred to below.
Ruegg, David Seyfort. "The Gotra, Ekayāna and Tathāgatagarbha Theories of the Prajñāpāramitā according to Dharmamitra and Abhayākaragupta." In Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems, edited by Lewis Lancaster, 283–312. Berkeley: University of California, 1977.
Article
The Gzhan stong Model of Reality: Some More Material on Its Origin, Transmission, and Interpretation
By the time Tibetans inherited Indian Buddhism, it had already witnessed two major doctrinal developments, namely the notion of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras that all factors of existence (dharmas) lack an own-being (emptiness), and the Yogācāra interpretation of this emptiness based on the imagined (parikalpita-), dependent (paratantra-) and perfect natures (pariniṣpanna svabhāva).'"`UNIQ--ref-00000128-QINU`"' Closely related to this threefold distinction was the Tathāgatagarbha restriction of emptiness to adventitious stains which cover over an ultimate nature of buddha-qualities. There can be, of course, only one true reality towards which the Buddha awakened, so that exegetes were eventually forced to explain the canonical sources (i.e., Mahāyāna Sūtras) which contain mutually competing models of reality. This set the stage for the well-known hermeneutic strategies of the Tibetan schools. The main issue at stake was whether or not one needs to distinguish two modes of emptiness: being "empty of an own-being" (Tib. rang stong), and being "empty of other" (Tib. gzhan stong). (Mathes, introductory remarks, 187)

Read more here . . .
Mathes, Klaus-Dieter. "The Gzhan stong Model of Reality: Some More Material on Its Origin, Transmission, and Interpretation." Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 34, no. 1–2 (2011): 187–223. https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jiabs/article/view/10602/4454.
Article
The History and Significance of the Tibetan Concept of the Five Treatises of Maitreya
Tibetans use the concept of the “Five Treatises of Maitreya” (Byams chos sde lnga) to refer to a group of texts that they attribute to Maitreya through Asaṅga, including the Abhisamayālaṃkāra (Mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan, AA), the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (Theg pa chen po’i mdo sde rgyan, MSA), the Madhyāntavibhāga (Dbus dang mtha’ rnam par ’byed pa, MV), the Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga (Chos dang chos nyid rnam par dbye ba, DDV), and the Ratnagotravibhāga (RGV), which Tibetans most often refer to as the Mahāyāna-Uttaratantra (Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma). Some of the Five Treatises were present at the time of the first dissemination of Buddhism in Tibet (snga dar), and some were discovered or brought later to Tibet. The first set comprises the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, the Sūtrālaṃkāra, and the Madhyāntavibhāga, while the texts that were later discovered and translated are the Ratnagotravibhāga and the Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga. Although the Five Treatises cover a variety of topics and seem to defend several philosophical positions about these topics, the Tibetan tradition still takes very seriously the idea that they form a unit, and share to some extent a single intent.
      Modern scholarship on the Five Treatises has so far privileged studying the texts of the Five Treatises individually, not giving much importance to the concept of the Five Treatises per se and its consequences on the interpretation of the texts that form it. In the following pages I argue that, on the contrary, the notion of the Five Treatises and the idea that they form a unit is crucial enough for Tibetan interpreters that we cannot fully understand Tibetan interpretations of those texts without taking this into consideration. If we look at the way Tibetan interpreters define the category and how they form their interpretations around it, we come to the conclusion that a study of Tibetan interpretations of individual treatises cannot represent fully the influence of those texts on Tibetan Buddhist literature and thought
      In order to establish that claim, having explained the concept of the Five Treatises as a unit and where that unit fits among Tibetan Buddhist scriptures, I will trace its origin and development from the recognition of Maitreya’s authorship of the Treatises to the notion that the Five Treatises form a single work. I will conclude by explaining how the study of the Five Treatises as a whole and of that concept itself allows us to understand things that the study of the texts individually cannot provide. (Turenne, introduction, 215–16)
Turenne, Philippe. "The History and Significance of the Tibetan Concept of the Five Treatises of Maitreya." The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies 16 (2015): 215–33.
Article
The Idea of Dhātu-vāda in Yogācāra and Tathāgata-garbha Texts
Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shirõ are convinced that tathāgatagarbha theory and the Yogācāra school share a common framework that they call dhātu-vāda or "locus theory." The word dhātu-vāda itself is a neologism introduced by Matsumoto'"`UNIQ--ref-00004344-QINU`"' and adopted by Hakamaya.'"`UNIQ--ref-00004345-QINU`"' They argue that the dhātu-vāda idea stands in direct contradiction to the authentic Buddhist theory of pratītyasamutpāda or "dependent origination," which in turn leads them to consider tathāgata-garbha and Yogācāra theories to be non-Buddhist. In their opinion, not only these Indian theories but also the whole of "original enlightenment thought" (hongaku shisõ) in East Asia fell under the shadow of the dhātu-vāda idea,'"`UNIQ--ref-00004346-QINU`"' with the result that most of its Buddhism is dismissed as not Buddhist at all.'"`UNIQ--ref-00004347-QINU`"'
      The idea of dhātu-vāda is thus an integral part of the Critical Buddhism critique and as such merits careful examination in any evaluation of the overall standpoint. Since Matsumoto first found the dhātu-vāda structure in Indian tathāgata-garbha and Yogācāra literature, we need to begin with a look at the texts in question. My approach here will be purely philological and will limit itself to the theoretical treatises (śāstras). (Yamabe, introductory remarks, 193)

Read more here:
Yamabe, Nobuyoshi. "The Idea of Dhātu-vāda in Yogācāra and Tathāgata-garbha Texts." In Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism, edited by Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson, 193–204. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997.
Article
The Impact of the Nirvana Sutra in China
Mather, Richard B. "The Impact of the Nirvana Sutra in China." In Literature of Belief: Sacred Scripture and Religious Experience, edited by Neal E. Lambert, 155–74. Provo, UT: Religious Studies Center, Brigham Young University, 1981. https://rsc.byu.edu/archived/literature-belief-sacred-scripture-and-religious-experience/8-impact-nirvana-sutra-china
Mather, Richard B. "The Impact of the Nirvana Sutra in China." In Literature of Belief: Sacred Scripture and Religious Experience, edited by Neal E. Lambert, 155–74. Provo, UT: Religious Studies Center, Brigham Young University, 1981. https://rsc.byu.edu/archived/literature-belief-sacred-scripture-and-religious-experience/8-impact-nirvana-sutra-china
Article
The Lamp of Zazen
The point of zazen, says Shunryu Suzuki Roshi, is to live each moment in complete combustion, like a clean-burning kerosene lamp. In this talk at the Tassajara sesshin in the summer of 1969, the great Zen master explains Dogen’s teaching on practicing within imperfection and warns against the arrogance of the false self.
Suzuki, Shunryu. "The Lamp of Zazen." Buddhadharma: The Practitioner's Quarterly, June, 1, 2006.
Article
The Logic of Liberation: Epistemology as a Path to the Realization of Mahāmudrā
A contribution to the discussion on the place of epistemology in Tibetan Buddhism in relation to the doctrine of Mahāmudrā, drawing on a selection of Tibetan sources from the 16th century as well as Bhutanese sources from the 19th century.
Burchardi, Anne. "The Logic of Liberation: Epistemology as a Path to the Realization of Mahāmudrā." In The Illuminating Mirror: Tibetan Studies in Honour of Per K. Sørensen on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday, edited by Olaf Czaja and Guntram Hazon, 41-56. Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 2015.
Article
The Luminous Mind in Theravāda and Dharmaguptaka Discourses
With this article I examine Pāli discourse references to luminosity of the mind in the light of their parallels, with a view to discerning early stages in the development of a notion that has had a considerable impact on Buddhist thought and practice.
Anālayo, Bhikkhu. "The Luminous Mind in Theravāda and Dharmaguptaka Discourses." Journal of the Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies 13 (2017): 10–51. https://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hamburg.de/pdf/5-personen/analayo/luminousmind.pdf
Article
The Mahāparinirvāṇa-Sūtra and Its Earliest Interpreters in China: Two Prefaces by Tao-lang and Tao-sheng
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

One of the most popular sūtras in China is the Ta-pan nieh-pan ching, the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra translated by Dharmakṣema in 421 A.D. Its doctrine of "universal Buddha-nature" has endeared itself to the Orient so much that it became an axiom of sorts, and any challenge to this doctrine would be seen as a challenge against Mahayana itself. To this day, this sūtra, TPNPC for short, is well received by all major Buddhist schools. The Pali canon preserved its version of the teaching of the Buddha at his parinirvāṇa, great extinction, in the Dighanikaya. The Mahayana tradition's redaction is the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, of which the Chinese translations alone survive. Prior to Dharmakṣema, Fa-hsien the pilgrim and Buddhabhadra translated a shorter Ta-pan ni-yüan ching in six chapters. This version was based on an earlier Sanskrit text that corresponds now to the first ten chapters of the forty-chaptered TPNC. The texts were unknown to Kumārajīva (d. 413) the Kuchan translator who produced the authoritative Miao-fa lien-hua ching, the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka or Lotus-sūtra. When the TPNPC was known to the Chinese, it was almost immediately crowned as the final, ultimate 'positive'—that is affirming the permanence of the Buddha-nature qua Dharmakāya qua mahā-nirvāṇa—teaching of the Buddha. Even the Lotus-sūtra was placed, both in time and in content, second to it. In the Sui dynasty, however, T'ien-t'ai master Chih'i, establishing the Lotus school, reversed the judgement somewhat.[2] It is in part to uncover the glory that once belonged to the TPNPC that the present essay tries to analyze the initial reception of this sūtra. (Lai, "The Mahāparinirvāṇa-Sūtra and Its Earliest Interpreters in China," 99)
Notes
  1. The placement of note #1 in the text is unclear in the original. Nevertheless it reads: On the impact of the TPNPC, see Kenneth Ch'en, Buddhism in China (Princeton: Princeton University, 1964), pp. 112-129 or Fuse Kōgaku, Nehanshū no kenkyū, I, II (Tokyo, Sōbun, 1942) and Tokiwa Daijō, Busshō no kenkyū (Tokyo, Meiji, 1944).
  2. On Chih-i's p'an-chiao, see Leon Hurvitz, "Chih-i," Melanges chinois et Bouddhiques, XII, (Brussells, 1960-62), esp. appendix on p'an-chiao.
Lai, Whalen. "The Mahāparinirvāṇa-Sūtra and Its Earliest Interpreters in China: Two Prefaces by Tao-lang and Tao-sheng." Journal of the American Oriental Society 102, no. 1 (1982): 99–105.
Article
The Mahāsāṃghika and the Tathāgatagarbha (Buddhist Doctrinal History, Study 1)
For the origins of the Mahāyāna we must agree with Hirakawa[1] that while some Mahāyāna doctrines are derived from the Mahāsāṃghika school, some others are derived from the Sarvāstivādin school. I would add that unless some other source can be pointed to, we may conclude that Mahāyāna Buddhism in its various forms, at least leaving out the special development of Tantrism, can be traced to either the Mahāsāṃghika or the Sarvāstivādin schools.
      It is well recognized by Buddhologists that the Mahāsāṃghika sect arose by a schism from the previously undivided Buddhist saṃgha in the second century after the Buddha's Nirvāṇa (A.N.), leaving the other part of the saṃgha to be called Sthavira. As to precisely when the schism occurred, there was a difference of opinion as to whether it happened as a result of the Second Buddhist Council (about 110 A.N.) over a laxity of Vinaya rules by some monks, or happened later in the century (137 A.N.) over the five theses about Arhats and which occasioned a 'Third Buddhist Council' sponsored by the Kings Nanda and Mahāpadma. There were some other possibilities, as summarized by Nattier and Prebish,[2] who conclude that the schism occurred 116 A.N. over Vinaya rules, while the argument over Arhat attainment provoked a further split within the already existing Mahāsāṃghika sect. It is immaterial for our purposes whether the 'five theses of Mahādeva' downgrading the Arhat occasioned the schism between the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Sthaviras, or whether this downgrading was an internal argument within the Mahāsāṃghika. What is important here is that the downgrading of the Arhat continued into a Mahāyāna scripture called the Śrīmālā-sūtra, and that the five theses are a characteristic of the Mahāsāṃghika, to wit: 1. Arhats are tempted by others, 2. they still have ignorance, 3. they still have doubt, 4. they are liberated by others; and 5. the path is accompanied by utterance. The fifth of these seems explainable by other Mahāsāṃghika tenets, in Bareau's listing:[3] No. 58 'morality is not mental'; No. 59 'morality does not follow upon thought'; No. 60 'virtue caused by a vow increases'; No. 61 'candor (vijñapti) is virtue'; No. 62 'reticence (avijñapti) is immoral.'
      Part I of this paper attempts to relate the Śrīmālā-sūtra and the Tathāgatagarbha doctrine to the Mahāsaṃnghika school. Part II discusses the terms dharmatā and svabhāva so as to expose an ancient quarrel. (Wayman, introduction, 35–36)
Notes
  1. Akira Hirakawa, "The Rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relationship to the Worship of Stupas," Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko, No. 22, Tokyo, 1963, p. 57.
  2. Janice J. Nattier and Charles S. Prebish, "Mahāsaṃghika Origins: The Beginnings of Buddhist Sectarianism," History of Religions, 16:3, Feb., 1977, pp. 237, ff.
  3. André Bareau, Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule (École Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1955), Chapitre I 'Les Mahâsânghika', pp. 55–74.
Wayman, A. "The Mahāsāṃghika and the Tathāgatagarbha (Buddhist Doctrinal History, Study 1)." Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 1, no. 1 (1978): 35–50. https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jiabs/article/view/8454/2361.
Article
The Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-Sūtra: The Text and Its Transmission
Although the textual study of Mahāyāna sūtras has made gradual progress over the past few decades, there are a number of major sutras of considerable importance for an understanding of the development of Mahāyāna doctrinally and socially which still remain rather neglected in the West, such as the Tathāgataguhyaka, the Samādhi-rāja, and the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa. Of these, the Mahāyāna Mahā-parinirvāṇa-sūtra (hereafter MPNS), when not casually dismissed as a Hinduizing aberration, until recently has attracted interest almost solely as a source for studies of the so-called “Buddha-nature” or tathāgata-garbha doctrine. Moreover, the value of such studies has often been compromised by an uncritical, synchronic use of the text, completely ignoring the problems of stratification and interpolation which I shall highlight in this paper.
      Yet the significance of the MPNS goes well beyond that restricted topic, despite its interest to many. For example, when utilized to the fullest, the available textual materials for the MPNS allow unique insights into the creation, development & transmission of Mahāyāna texts in general. Additionally, I believe that the composition of the main elements of the MPNS can be reliably dated to a narrow period from the middle decades to the end years of the 1st century CE, when read in conjunction with the small group of associated texts (the Mahāmegha-sūtra, Mahā-bherī-sūtra and the Aṅgulimālīya-sūtra), due to the specific mention in them of the Sātavāhana ruler Gautamīputra Sātakarṇi in conjunction with the timetable of a dire eschatological prophesy. There would also seem to be biographical details of a certain individual who may have been the founder or author of the MPNS “movement”. In sum, this situation seems to be virtually unique among all Mahāyāna sutras and, if properly understood, should have far-reaching ramifications for the study of the early Mahāyāna movements, for the MPNS may now be taken as a fixed reference point for constructing a relative chronology for many other early Mahāyāna sutras, though with the usual caveats concerning interpolated material. (Hodge, introduction, 1)
Hodge, Stephen. "The Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-Sūtra: The Text and Its Transmission." Corrected and revised version of a paper presented in July 2010 at the Second International Workshop on the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra held at Munich University, 2012. https://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hamburg.de/pdf/5-personen/hodge/the-textual-transmisssion-of-the-mpns.pdf
Article
The Meanings of the Term "Gotra" and the Textual History of the "Ratnagotravibhāga"
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

The word gotra is frequently used in the literature of Mahāyāna Buddhism to denote categories of persons classified according to their psychological, intellectual, and spiritual types. The chief types usually mentioned in this kind of classification are the Auditors making up the śrāvaka-gotra, the Individual Buddhas making up the pratyehabuddha-gotra, and the Bodhisattvas making up the bodhisattva-gotra.[2] In the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra these three types constitute altogether different gotras, which thus coincide with the three separate Vehicles (yāna) as recognized by the Yogācārin/Vijñaptimātratā, school.[3] To these three some sources add the further category of the undetermined (aniyatagotra), which is made up of persons not yet definitively attached to one of the three preceding classes; and the non-gotra (agotra), that is the category made up of persons who cannot be assigned to any spiritual class.[4] Each of the first three categories is thus comprised of persons capable of achieving a particular kind of maturity and spiritual perfection in accordance with their specific type or class, the Auditor then attaining the Awakening (bodhi) characteristic of the Śrāvaka and so on.[5] Especially remarkable in this connexion, and somewhat anomalous as a gotra, is the non-gotra, i.e. that category of persons who seem to have been considered, at least by certain Yogācārin authorities, as spiritual ‘outcastes’ lacking the capacity for attaining spiritual perfection or Awakening of any kind; since they therefore achieve neither bodhi nor nirvāṇa, they represent the same type as the icchantikas to the extent that the latter also are considered to lack this capacity.[6]
       The three gotras mentioned first together with the aniyatagotra and the agotra are discussed chiefly in the Śāstras of the Yogācārins[7] and in the commentaries on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra.[8]
      In addition, the gotra functions so to speak as a spiritual or psychological 'gene' determining the classification of living beings into the above-mentioned categories, which may be either absolutely or temporarily different according to whether one accepts the theory that the three Vehicles (yāna) are ultimately and absolutely separate because they lead to the three quite different kinds of Awakening of the Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha, and Bodhisattva—namely the extreme triyāna doctrine-or, on the contrary, the theory that the Vehicles are ultimately one because all sentient beings are finally to attain Awakening and buddhahood which are essentially one—in other words the characterized Mādhyamika version of the ekayāna theory.[9]
Notes
  1. (Note 1 belongs to title): A shortened version of this paper was read before the Indological section of the twenty-ninth International Congress of Orientalists in Paris in July 1973.
           The following abbreviations are used.
         IBK    Indogaku-Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū.
         MSA    Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (ed. Lévi).
         RGV    Ratnagotravibhāga (Sanskrit text ed. E. H. Johnston).
         RGVV    Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā (Sanskrit text ed. E. H. Johnston).
         TGS    Tathāgatagarbhasūtra (Tibetan translation in the lHa-sa ed. of the bKa'-'gyur).
    Théorie    D. Seyfort Ruegg, La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra (Publications de l'École Française d'Extreme-Orient, LXX, Paris, 1969).
  2. v. Laṅkāvatārasūtra, ed. Nanjō, 2, pp. 63-6, and the other sources quoted in Ruegg, Théorie, 74 f.
  3. Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra 7.15, 24; cf. Théorie, 73-4.
  4. Laṅkāvatārasūtra 2, p. 63.
  5. v. Laṅkāvatārasūtra 2, pp. 63-5; MSABh. 3.2.
  6. Laṅkāvatārasūtra 2, pp. 65-6; MSABh. 3.11: aparinirvāṇadharmaka. There are two categories of persons not attaining nirvāṇa, those who do not attain it for a certain length of time (tatkālāparinirvāṇadharman) and those who never do so (atyantāparinirvāṇadharman). The theory that some persons are destined never to attain nirvāṇa and buddhahood is considered characteristic of the Yogācārin school, which does not admit the doctrine of universal buddhahood implied by the usual interpretation of the ekayāna theory (see Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra 7.24) and the theory of the tathāgatagarbha present in all sentient beings. (MSA 9.37 does not, it seems, refer to the fully developed tathāgatagarbha theory which is based on three factors—the irradiation of the dharmakāya, the non-differentiation of the tathatā, and the presence of the gotra [see RGV 1.27 f.]—and concerns only the non-differentiation of the tathatā, and the tathāgatatva, which all beings possess as their embryonic essence. Cf. below, n. 50.)
          The agotra doctrine to the extent that it assumes a class of spiritual 'outcastes' being evidently incompatible with the tathāgatagarbha theory, the question arises as to the significance of the allusion to persons without a gotra in RGV 1.41. The reference there seems to be to a hypothetical case (opposed to the author's own view expressed before in RGV 1.40-41c), which is not, however, admitted by the author; and the revised reading of pāda 1.41d agotrāṇāṃ na tad yataḥ (cf. L. Schmithausen, WZKS, xv, 1971, 145) 'since this is not so for those without gotra ' makes this interpretation easier (see p. 346). Indeed, according to RGVV 1.41, any allusion to an icchantika who does not attain nirvāṇa is to be interpreted as referring to a certain interval of time (kālāntarābhiprāya) only, and not to a permanent incapacity. On the icchantika cf. D. S. Ruegg, Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub, Paris, 1973, p. 12, n. 1. The aparinirvāṇagotra is also mentioned in RGVV 1.32-3, 1.38, and 1.41, and the aparinirvāṇadharman in 1.41.
  7. cf. MSA, ch. 3; Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya and ºṭīkā, 2.1, 4.15-16.
  8. cf. Théorie, 123 f.
  9. v. Théorie, 177 f.; MSA 11.53-9; Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā 3.1a, 22. On the equivalence of nirvāṇa and buddhahood, see RGV 1.87.
Ruegg, David Seyfort. "The Meanings of the Term Gotra and the Textual History of the Ratnagotravibhāga." Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 39, no. 2 (1976): 341–63.
Article
The Mind as the Buddha-Nature: The Concept of the Absolute in Ch'an Buddhism
Although Ch'an Buddhism has a long history, the name of the Ch'an School (ch'an-mena or ch'an-rsungb) was a relatively late development. It was Tsung-mic (780-841), the great Master of Kuei-fung who, for the first time, adopted the term in the ninth century A.D. It is interesting to note that it was the same monk-scholar who used the School of Mind (hsin-tsungd) as a synonym of the Ch'an school. Tsung-mi was a scholar of buddhist thought who had personal experience in the broad-ranging knowledge of Ch'an traditions. He collected relevant materials and wrote extensively in an effort to analyze the doctrine and practices of the tradition. His identification of the Mind with the Ch'an indicates that, in his opinion, the Mind was the central focus of the school. Although Tsung-mi contributed a good deal to the understanding of Ch'an Buddhism, his contributions remained almost unknown for a thousand years; it is only during the last two decades that scholars have gradually come to recognize his contribution. with considerable astonishment and admiration. This article is an attempt to describe, analyze and assess Tsung-mi's thesis that the doctrine of Mind is the central focus of Ch'an Buddhism and that the Mind itself is the absolute. (Jan, "The Mind and the Buddha-Nature," 467)
Notes
  1. CYC pp. 13 and 17 for the term of ch'an-men; pp. 57, 86, 210 and 320 for ch'an-tsung. Compare Sekiguchi Shindaiaa, "Zenshū no hassei." Fukui sensei shōju ki'nen Tōyō shisō ronshü (Tokyo, 1960), pp. 321–338.
  2. Jan Yūn-hua, "Tsung-mi and his Analysis of Ch'an Buddhism", TP 58 (1972): 1–54; for a detailed study of Tsung-mi, see Shigeo Kamata, Shūmitsu kyōgaku no shisōshi teki kenkyū (Tokyo: Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo, 1975).
  3. CYC, pp. 30 and 254.
Jan, Yün-hua. "The Mind as the Buddha-Nature: The Concept of the Absolute in Ch'an Buddhism." Philosophy East and West 31, no. 4 (1981): 467–77.
Article
The Nirvana Debate: Joseph Goldstein Extract
A teaching on buddha-nature by Joseph Goldstein
Wellings, Nigel. "The Nirvana Debate: Joseph Goldstein Extract." Bath and Bristol Mindfulness Courses (blog). An extract from Joseph Goldstein's One Dharma, 158–83. New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 2003, May 28, 2009. https://bath-bristol-mindfulness-courses.co.uk/the-nivana-debate-joseph-goldstein-extract/.
Article
The Original Ratnagotravibhāga and Its Yogāçāra Interpretation as Possible Indian Precedents of Gzhan stong ("Empti-ness of Other")
In his pioneering study of the Ratnagotravibhāga (RGV) TAKASAKI Jikido showed that the standard Indian treatise on tathāgatagarbha consists of different layers and reduced it to what he considered to be the original Ratnagotravibhāga by excluding later strands of the text.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000014C-QINU`"' Schmithausen continued this "textual archaeology," which left us with an original text of fifteen verses only.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000014D-QINU`"' While these Ratnagotravibhāga verses (which in the following I shall refer to as "the original" version) support the idea of an already fully developed "buddha-element" (buddhadhātu}'"`UNIQ--ref-0000014E-QINU`"' in sentient beings, the final (standard) version of the Ratnagotravibhāga and its vyākhyā exhibit a systematic Yogāçāra interpretation of the original tathāgatagarbha theory. The original and final Ratnagotravibhāga represent the prototypes of at least two different gzhan stong interpretations, which mainly differ in whether they restrict or not the basis of emptiness to an unchanging perfect nature. (Mathes, "The Original Ratnagotravibhāga," 119)
Mathes, Klaus-Dieter. "The Original Ratnagotravibhāga and Its Yogāçāra Interpretation as Possible Indian Precedents of Gzhan stong ('Empti[ness] of Other')." Hōrin 18 (2015): 119–40.
Article
The Ornament of the Buddha-Nature: Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita's Exposition of the Great Madhyamaka of Other-Emptiness
The Ornament of the Buddha-Nature[2] (Tib. Bde gshegs snying po'i rgyan) is a Tibetan Buddhist text composed by the Rnying ma scholar Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita (1761-1829). Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita is known for having been a vigorous defender of the doctrine of the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness, which moulds Tantric practices around the teaching of Buddha-nature at the heart of the doctrine. The present text is one of a number of related texts that are key to understanding his thoughts on the doctrine, whose development he follows from its beginnings in India to Tibet, where it culminates in its final form. Throughout, he is intent on affirming the authority of the Rnying ma tantras with both a fine line of argument and a mastery of literary skill in verse form. The experience attained through Tantric practices leading to perfection is beyond expression, but the compositional powers of this highly educated scholar in expounding his doctrine are able to convey some sense of the insights such practices lead to.
      A brief summary of the content of the work in which Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita unfolds his understanding of the history of Buddhism is as follows. After the title, his homage to buddhas, and a statement of the composition’s purpose, he sets out to give an account of the Three Turnings of the Wheel of the Teaching. Doxographically, the First Turning gives rise to the doctrines of the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools of the Lesser Vehicle. The author explains the ultimate truth as conceived by the Vaibhāṣika School, but rejects its atomic theory as being deluded, since it posits the existence of subtlest particles of both matter and cognition. He likewise cannot follow the Sautrāntikas in their assertion of the true existence of external objects. From there, he jumps to the Last Turning, which he deals with until the end of the work, primarily on the basis of quoted scriptures. Among them, those concerning the Mind-Only school focus in on the Three Natures theory, which in turn he disallows, given that a truly existing perceiving subject does not comport with the essencelessness of phenomena. That school, he claims, died out, and their works did not gain entry into Tibet. From there he moves on to the next great figures to arrive on the scene: Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga. He goes on to explain the two modes of Madhyamaka, and contends that though both of them are in fact Mādhyamikas of the Middle Wheel, some biased persons claim Asaṅga for the Mind-Only school. Mādhyamikas, whose doctrine is grounded in the Two Truths, divided into two subschools, the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas. The former, represented in the Indian tradition by Bhāviveka, accepted the existence of phenomena only on the relative level. The latter, by contrast, represented by Buddhapālita, do not accept phenomena even on the relative level. That was the stage to which the Indian Mādhyamikas developed. Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita identifies his own position as that of a true successor of Indian Buddhism’s Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka. In Tibet, Tsong kha pa (1357-1419) initiated a new approach, whereby the truth was subject to confirmation by means of valid cognition, which led to a tradition of rigorous debate. Extensively citing the Ratnapradīpa of Bhavya (clearly distinguished from the Svātantrika Bhāviveka), which expounds the subtle, inner Madhyamaka of practice, he refutes the use of logic when it comes to ultimate reality. He asserts that the doctrine of mind-only as taught in such works associated with the Last Turning of the Wheels as the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra and the Ghanavyūha-sūtra is the subtle, inner Madhyamaka—and Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, and Bhavya also taught it as such. He equates it with the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness, which he also terms the Great Madhyamaka of definitive meaning. He defends Hwa shang's "abandoning mental engagement," as being the tradition of the instruction of Madhyamaka. The practitioners of Rdzogs chen, he notes, label the doctrine of the Last Turning the "king and creator of all" (kun byed rgyal po), and so he regards Rdzogs chen as the same as the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness. Thus, he places Madhyamaka at the summit of the doxographical hierarchy of Buddhist schools as it crystallized in Tibet from its roots in India. He thereby emphasizes that the two modes of emptiness, or two forms of Madhyamaka, that is, self-emptiness and other-emptiness, are in harmony. For Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita, the essence of the Buddhist doctrine, which is the Great Madhyamaka of other¬emptiness, is shared by all Tibetan Buddhist schools, be they Jo nang pas, the early Dge lugs pas, Bka' brgyud pas, Sa skya pas, or Rnying ma pas. He ends by stating that Tantric practice is fundamental to the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness, and that it is predicated on the existence of the Buddha-nature—that is, Buddhahood—in every sentient being. (Makidono, preliminary remarks, 77–79)
Notes
2. Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita. Nges don dbu ma chen po'i tshul rnam par nges pa'i gtam bde gshegs snying po'i rgyan. I have used three editions of the text for my translation; see the References. The section headings in the translation have been added.
Makidono, Tomoko. "The Ornament of the Buddha-Nature: Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita's Exposition of the Great Madhyamaka of Other-Emptiness." Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies 19 (2018): 77–148.
Article
The Path of Gratitude
The goal of Shin Buddhism’s central practice, nembutsu, is not to attain buddhahood for ourselves, says Jeff Wilson, but to express gratitude for all we have received.
Wilson, Jeff. "The Path of Gratitude." Buddhadharma: The Practitioner's Quarterly, November 1, 2019.
Article
The Practical Implications of the Doctrine of Buddha-nature
Contrary to certain currents of widespread opinion both among Eastern and Western scholars, there are two fundamentally different views of the nature of man, the mind and the spiritual path within the Buddhist tradition, each of which has equal claim to orthodoxy.
     In this paper, which is exploratory in nature, I shall briefly outline these two views and then ask the question of what the psychological or social effects of holding one or other of these views might be. The views I have in mind are expressed in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition as the view of self-emptiness and the view of other-emptiness (rangstong and gzhan-stong). (Hookham, "The Practical Implications of the Doctrine of Buddha-nature," 149)
Hookham, S. K. "The Practical Implications of the Doctrine of Buddha-nature." In The Buddhist Forum. Vol 2, Seminar Papers 1988–1990, edited by Tadeusz Skorupski, 149–61. Tring, UK: Institute of Buddhist Studies, 2012. First published 1992 by the School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London). Article PDF from the author here.
Article
The Problem of Theodicy in the "Awakening of Faith"
The present paper tries to trace the particular contours that the problem of theodicy assumes in the Chinese Buddhist text the Awakening of Faith in the Great Vehicle (Ta-sheng ch'i-hsin lun). It analyses the beginning section of the main body of text—the section, that is, that outlines the major theoretical structure of the work—in terms of a problem that has been of particular concern in western theology. I believe that taking such a tack is especially valuable for highlighting the central Problematik around which the text is organized. The paper will thus use the problem of theodicy as a means of exploring some of the philosophical implications of the Awakening of Faith. (Gregory, "The Problem of Theodicy," 63)
Gregory, Peter N. "The Problem of Theodicy in the Awakening of Faith." Religious Studies 22, no. 1 (1986): 63–78.
Article
The Problem of the Icchantika in the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvaṇa Sūtra
In the Chinese Buddhist Canon, there are two corpuses of texts which go by the name of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra (henceforth, MNS). The first corresponds in main to the Mahāparinibbāna-suttanta in the Dīgha-nikāya of the Pāli Canon. Being essentially Hīnayāna in outlook, it has received little attention in China. The second, which exhibits all the features of a Mahāyāna text, generated immediate enthusiasm on its first introduction into China in the early fifth century, and has exerted enormous influence on the development of Chinese Buddhist thought. Especially worth mentioning in this connection is its teaching of Buddha-nature. It is well-known that the idea of Buddha-nature, one of the central concepts in Chinese Buddhism, was first made popular in the country by the Mahāyāna version of the MNS, which remains the principal source of reference as well as the final authority in all subsequent discussions on the subject. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to assert that without a proper understanding of the Buddha-nature doctrine as appears in this Mahāyāna version of the MNS, it would be impossible to grasp the significance of the subsequent evolution of the concept in the Chinese Buddhist tradition.

      It is the orthodox belief that the MNS teaches that all sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature. Since in the MNS "Buddha-nature" refers to "the nature of the Buddha" and "to possess" the Buddha-nature in the case of sentient beings usually indicates "to have in the future,"[1] this belief amounts to the conviction that the MNS maintains that all sentient beings will achieve Buddhahood someday. This conviction is well attested by the text of the MNS. Thus, we find it clearly expressed in the MNS that "all three vehicles will eventually share the same Buddha-nature":

Good sons! The same is true of the śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas, [all of whom will attain] the same Buddha-nature, in the like manner as [cows of different colours produce] milk [looking the same]. Why is it so? For all of them will [sooner or later] put an end to defilements. However, there are various sentient beings who maintain that Buddhas, bodhisattvas, śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are different [with respect to their final destiny. [Thus,] there are various śrāvakas and common people who doubt [the teaching] that the three vehicles are not different. These sentient beings will finally come to understand that all three vehicles [will eventually share] the same Buddha-nature. . . .[2]

Those who refuse to accept the tenet that all sentient beings without exception will possess the Buddha-nature are criticized by the MNS as wanting in faith.[3] In the sūtra, this idea of the universal presence of the Buddha-nature is presented as one of the distinctive themes of Mahāyāna writings[4] as well as among the principal claims to excellence of the MNS itself.[5] It is so highly esteemed that it is described as representing the "essential meaning" (tzu-i) of the Buddha's teaching;[6] and, together with the doctrine of the eternal nature of the Tathāgata, it is said to be definitive (chüeh-ting) and not open to future amendments.[7]
      If this thesis of the eventual enlightenment of all sentient beings does indeed constitute the central theme of the MNS, it is strongly qualified by the presence in the sutra of the concept of the icchantika. The term "icchantika" is derived from the Sanskrit root is meaning "to desire," "to wish" and "to long for." This explains the variant Chinese renderings of the term "icchantika" as "a being of many desires" (to-yü), "a being cherishing desires" (lo-yü) and "a being full of greed" (ta-t'an).[8] But in the MNS, the failings attributed to the icchantikas far exceed those which are usually associated with people of such descriptions. In the sūtra, the icchantika is described as "devoid of good roots" [9] and as "the most wicked being."[10] He is depicted as "having no capacity for the [true] Dharma"[11] such that he can never be rehabilitated by the instruction of the Buddha and so will never attain supreme enlightenment. Taken at its face value, this picture of a being condemned forever to spiritual darkness appears to contradict the proposition of the MNS that all sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature and so are destined for Buddhahood, and commentators of the MNS have been hard pressed to find a viable way out of this apparent dilemma.

      The present article, which is the second of a two-part study on the problem of Buddha-nature in the MNS,[12] is an attempt to unravel the various strands of thought present in the MNS regarding the character and fate of the icchantikas. It is hoped that our discussion, brief and sketchy as it is, will be of help in throwing light on this highly intricate question. (Liu, "The Problem of the Icchantika," 57–59)
Liu, Ming-Wood. "The Problem of the Icchantika in the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra." Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 7, no. 1 (1984): 57–81. https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jiabs/article/view/8619/2526.
Article
The Process of Awakening in Early Texts on Buddha-Nature in India
The aim of this paper is to throw some light on the question of how the authors of early texts on buddha-nature (tathāgatagarbha, buddhadhātu etc.) in India, in the first centuries of the Common Era, perceived the process of awakening, i.e., how they imagined the actual realization of this buddha-nature, and how they described this process in terms of their own underlying vision. As far as I can see, the discussions of the last twenty years or so about the question of whether buddha-nature thought might actually be Buddhist at all[1] have lost their immediate punch and relevance, and might already have become an historical topic to be studied in its own right. New approaches have entered the world of academic Buddhist Studies. They have shown Buddhism to be a multilayered phenomenon to be studied on many diverse levels, and honored it as such, taking into consideration not only doctrinal aspects of the religion, but also the contexts in which these doctrines came into existence, as much as their assumed social ramifications. I have never doubted that the idea that all sentient beings have buddha-nature, alongside other notions, has always been of central interest for the Mahāyāna movement. It is an idea which can be found expressed in many of the sūtras of the Mahāyāna – not only those explicitly dedicated to the elucidation of this issue, but also in texts which in certain passages subscribe to the theory in passing, so to say.[2] (Zimmermann, introduction, 513–14)
Notes
  1. An excellent summary of the positions put forward by the proponents of the idea that buddha-nature is not Buddhist, on the one hand, and criticism of this position, on the other, is found in Hubbard and Swanson, 1997. It is my understanding that the representatives of the so-called Critical Buddhism movement (hihan bukkyō 批判仏教) started out with the aim of reforming certain deplorable states of affairs in Japanese Buddhism, but quickly turned against much of what characterizes the history of Buddhist ideas in India and beyond. Though their immediate aim was thus laudable, the normativity of their approach makes it difficult for a critical scholar of the intellectual history of Buddhism to accept their criticisms.
  2. The most comprehensive discussion of the scriptures on buddha-nature in India is still Takasaki, 1974.
Zimmermann, Michael. "The Process of Awakening in Early Texts on Buddha-Nature in India." In A Distant Mirror: Articulating Indic Ideas in Sixth and Seventh Century Chinese Buddhism, edited by Chen-kuo Lin and Michael Radich, 513–28. Hamburg: Hamburg University Press, 2014. https://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/volltexte/2014/146/chapter/HamburgUP_HWS03_Zimmermann_LinRadich_Mirror.pdf.
Article
The Role of Rang Rig in the Pramāṇa-Based Gzhan Stong of the Seventh Karma pa
In the present chapter I will discuss how the seventh Karma pa, Chos grags rgya mtsho (1454-1506), connects rang rig,'"`UNIQ--ref-0000104A-QINU`"' in the sense of tshad ma'i 'bras bu (San: pramāṇaphala),'"`UNIQ--ref-0000104B-QINU`"' with tathāgatagarbha in his major work, the Rig gzhung rgya mtsho.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000104C-QINU`"' Si tu Paṇ chen Chos kyi 'byung gnas (1699-1776) has pointed out that "there were several different brands of gzhan stong, among which he adhered most closely to that of the Seventh Lord and Zi lung pa, which was somewhat different than that of Dol po pa."'"`UNIQ--ref-0000104D-QINU`"' This statement points to the fact that the kind of gzhan stong ("empty-of-other" doctrine) that Si tu Paṇ chen blended with mahāmudrā and spread throughout the Karma Bka' brgyud pa traditions of Khams was derived from the seventh Karma pa.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000104E-QINU`"'
      The seventh Karma pa also influenced the great Sa skya scholar Shākya mchog Idan's later writings. While the seventh Karma pa is remembered as one of the most outstanding masters of the lineage and the founder of the Karma bka' brgyud bshad grwa at Mtshur phu, Shākya mchog Idan is described as "the most influential advocate of the gzhan stong in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries."'"`UNIQ--ref-0000104F-QINU`"' Both masters are, in their own ways, still sources of the continued presence of an influential type of modified gzhan stong in the Bka' brgyud tradition,'"`UNIQ--ref-00001050-QINU`"' distinct from Dol po pa's position.'"`UNIQ--ref-00001051-QINU`"' The seventh Karma pa's Rigs gzhung rgya mtsho was studied at all the bshad grwas of the Karma Bka' brgyud tradition, with special emphasis on the first and the third part of the text,'"`UNIQ--ref-00001052-QINU`"' while Shākya mchog ldan's writings have played an important role in the 'Brug pa Bka' rgyud bshad grwa tradition of Bhutan.'"`UNIQ--ref-00001053-QINU`"'
Burchardi, Anne. "The Role of Rang Rig in the Pramāṇa-Based Gzhan Stong of the Seventh Karma pa." In Mahāmudrā and the Bka'-brgyud Tradition: PIATS 2006: Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the Eleventh Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Konigswinter 2006, edited by Roger R. Jackson and Matthew T. Kapstein, 317-44. Andiast, Switzerland: International Institute for Tibetan and Buddhist Studies, 2011.
Article
The Sentient Reflexivity of Buddha Nature
Buddha Nature, or tathagatagarbha in Sanskrit, is a core element of Buddhist philosophical discourse and doctrinal debate. Who or what possesses Buddha Nature, how it manifests itself, and what role it plays in Buddhist soteriology have been sustained questions in actual Buddhist practices and in the works of Buddhologists from ancient times to the present. Based on the author’s textual interpretation, this paper attempts to present a threefold argument: Buddha Nature is not separate from its alleged opposite, sentience; it is not a tangible substance but a state of being whose felt meaning is only metaphorically conveyed; and finally it is a heuristic device or a means of provoking a Buddhist or anyone who takes interest in Buddhism, to visualize the inner complexity of his or her sentient mode of being.
Yü, Dan Smyer. "The Sentient Reflexivity of Buddha Nature: Metaphorizing Tathagatagarbha." The Religious Cultures in the World 6 (2012): 13–22.
Article
The Significance of 'Tathagatagarbha': A Positive Expression of 'Sunyata'
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

The well-known motto of Ch'an Buddhism is that "perceiving the true self, one becomes a Buddha." The "true self" signifies the Buddha nature inherent in all sentient beings. The discovering of the "true self" has become the single most important pursuit of the Buddhist, especially in Sino-Japanese Buddhism. On the contrary, early Buddhism teaches that ultimately no substantial self (i.e., 'anatman') can be found, since the self is nothing but the union of the five aggregates. Modern Buddhologists as well as the Buddhists have been intrigued by the inconsistency that one single tradition teaches both that there is no self on the one hand, and that the goal of religious life is to discover the true self, on the other hand.

The big questions concerning these two contradictory doctrines include:

  • How did they develop during the course of Buddhist history?
  • How can they be reconciled?
  • Are these two ideas actually as contradicting as they appear to be?
  • Is the concept of the Buddha nature an outcome of the influence of other Indian religious thought upon Buddhism?

It is out of the scope of this short paper to answer all these questions. Therefore, this paper will deal with the antecedent and synonymous concept of the Buddha nature, that is, 'tathagata- garbha' ('ju lai tsang'). Specifically, this paper will examine the meaning and significance of the 'tathagatagarbha' (Buddha nature) based on three 'tathagatagarbha' texts and argue that the 'tathagatagarbha'/Buddha nature does not represent a substantial self ('atman'); rather, it is a positive language and expression of 'sunyata' (emptiness) and represents the potentiality to realize Buddhahood through Buddhist practices. In other words, the intention of the teaching of 'tathagatagarbha'/Buddha nature is soteriological rather than theoretical.

Read more here
Shih, Heng-Ching. "The Significance of 'Tathagatagarbha': A Positive Expression of 'Sunyata'." BuddhaSasana: A Buddhist Page by Binh Anson. https://www.budsas.org/ebud/ebdha191.htm.
Article
The Sky Dragon's Profound Roar
This teaching on “The Sky Dragon's Profound Roar,” by Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche was generously given in response to a special request for teachings by the Nalandabodhi Sangha on October 10, 1999, on the campus of Naropa University in Boulder, Colorado. Ari Goldfield served as Rinpoche’s translator. Edited by Cindy Shelton and Amita Gupta, with assistance by Meg Miller.
Gyamtso, Khenpo Tsultrim. "The Sky Dragon's Profound Roar." Teaching given on October 10, 1999 at Naropa University, Boulder, Colorado. Translated by Ari Goldfield. Edited by Cindy Shelton and Amita Gupta, with assistance by Meg Miller. Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamsto: Teachings and Activities (website). Accessed Sept. 24, 2020. http://www.ktgrinpoche.org/teachings/selected-teachings.
Article
The Soul of Chinese Buddhism: Buddha-Nature and Universal Awakening; The Rise of Chinese Buddhist Humanism
4.1 Buddhicizing the Chinese “soul”

      4.1.1 The Nirvāṇa Sūtras. Like many other ancient cultures, the Chinese, too, have a concept of a soul or abiding entity that survives the person‘s death. The Chinese word for such an abiding entity is línghún 靈魂. One of ancient China‘s largest and wealthiest temple, built in 328 (Eastern Jin dynasty) by the Indian monk, Huìlǐ 慧理,[1] is called Língyǐn Sì 靈隐寺, the "Temple of the Soul‘s Retreat," belonging to the Chán school, located north-west of Hangzhou, Zhejiang province. In its heyday, during the kingdom of Wúyuè guó 吳越國 (907-978) [5.1.2.1], the temple boasted of 9 multi-storey buildings, 18 pavilions, 72 halls, more than 1300 dormitory rooms, inhabited by more than 3000 monks. Many of the rich Buddhist carvings in the Fēilái fēng 飛來峰 grottos and surrounding mountains also date from this era.
      The Chinese word for anattā (P) or anātman (Skt) (non-self) is wúwǒ 無我, literally meaning "not-I." There is no Chinese word for not-linghun. As such, although a Chinese Buddhist would intellectually or verbally accept the notion that there is no I (that is, an agent in an action), he would probably unconsciously hold on to the idea of some sort of independent abiding entity or eternal identity, that is, the linghun, which is in effect the equivalent of the brahmanical ātman. The situation becomes more complicated with Mahāyāna discourses, such as the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, that speak of a transcendent Buddhanature as the true self.[2]

Notes
  1. Not to be confused with Huìlì 慧立/惠立 (615 -?), a Táng monk, who respected the works of Xuánzàng Sānzàng 玄奘三藏, and wrote a biography on him entitled Dàcíēnsì sānzàng fǎshī zhuàn 大慈恩寺三藏法師傳. When Huìlǐ 慧理 came to Hángzhōu in 326, he was drawn to the mountainous ambience as a place of "the soul‘s retreat," and founded Língyŭn monastery there. In the Liáng 梁 dynasty, Wǔdì (武帝, emperor 502-550) who generally had a positive attitude toward Buddhism endowed Língyǐn Temple with rich land properties. Emperor Jiǎnwén (簡文, r 550-552) wrote a report on this donation, one which is titled Cì língyǐnsì tián jì (賜靈隱寺田記 Report Concerning the Donation of Land to Língyǐn Temple). See http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?97.xml+id(‗b9748-96b1-5bfa‘).
  2. See Dictionary of Buddhism, sv ātman
Tan, Piya. "The Soul of Chinese Buddhism: Buddha-Nature and Universal Awakening; The Rise of Chinese Buddhist Humanism." 3rd ed. Chapt. 4 in How Buddhism Became Chinese. Vol. 40B of Sutta Discovery. Living Word of the Buddha. Singapore, 2009. http://www.themindingcentre.org/dharmafarer/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/40b.4-The-soul-of-Chinese-Buddhism.pdf.
Article
The Strange Death of Pema the Demon Tamer
[Matthew Kapstein] discusses Tibetan esoteric traditions in which experiences of light and obscuration play prominent roles. The focal point here is the Great Perfection (rdzogs-chen) tradition of meditation, above all its teaching that some adepts who achieve the highest realization attain a "rainbow body" at death. When this takes place, the adept's physical remains dissolve into light and so make manifest the thoroughgoing transformation of the person that had been catalyzed by prior spiritual discipline. (Kapstein, preface, xii)
Kapstein, Matthew T. "The Strange Death of Pema the Demon Tamer." In The Presence of Light: Divine Radiance and Religious Experience, edited by Matthew T. Kapstein, 119–156. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.
Article
The Structure of the Soteriology of Tathāgatagarbha Thought as Seen from the Perspective of Different Modes of Discourse: A Response to Critical Buddhism
Shimoda, Masahiro. "The Structure of the Soteriology of Tathāgatagarbha Thought as Seen from the Perspective of Different Modes of Discourse: A Response to Critical Buddhism." In "What is Tathāgatagarbha: Buddha-Nature or Buddha Within?" Edited by Akira Saitō. Special issue, Acta Asiatica 118 (2020): 79–97.
Shimoda, Masahiro. "The Structure of the Soteriology of Tathāgatagarbha Thought as Seen from the Perspective of Different Modes of Discourse: A Response to Critical Buddhism." In "What is Tathāgatagarbha: Buddha-Nature or Buddha Within?" Edited by Akira Saitō. Special issue, Acta Asiatica 118 (2020): 79–97.
Article
The Sublime Science of the Great Vehicle to Salvation, Being a Manual of Buddhist Monism: The Work of Ārya Maitreya with a Commentary by Āryāsanga
According to the Tibetan tradition, the foundation of all the

exegetical literature connected with the Buddhist Scripture of the latest and, partly, of the intermediate period is contained in the 5 treatises ascribed to the Bodhisattva Maitreya. These are:—

1) The Sūtrālaṁkāra,
2) " Madhyānta-vibhanga,
3) " Dharma-dharmatā-vibhanga
4) " Abhisamayālaṁkāra, and
5) " Uttaratantra

Of these 5 treatises the original Sanskrit text of the Sutrālaṁkāra has been edited by Prof. Sylvain Levi, who has likewise given a French translation of it. The Sanskrit text of the Abhisamayālaṁkāra and its Tibetan translation have been recently edited by Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky and by myself in the Bibliotheca Buddhica and will be followed by an analysis of the 8 subjects and the 70 topics which form its contents. The 3 other works have not, till now, met with the full appreciation of European scholars. The reason perhaps is that we possess only their Tibetan translations in the Tangyur (MDO XLIV), the original Sanskrit texts having not, up to this time, been discovered. An investigation of this branch of Buddhist literature according to the Tibetan sources enables us to ascertain the exclusive importance of the said 3 treatises as containing, in a very pregnant form, the idealistic and monistic teachings of later Buddhism. In particular the Tibetan works draw our attention to the Uttaratantra, the translation and analysis of which forms the subject-matter of the present work. It is indeed the most interesting of the three, if not of all the five, being the exposition of the most developed monistic and pantheistic teachings of the later Buddhists and of the special theory of the Essence of Buddhahood, the fundamental element of the

Absolute, as existing in all living beings. (Obermiller, introduction, 81–82)
Obermiller, Eugène, trans. "The Sublime Science of the Great Vehicle to Salvation, Being a Manual of Buddhist Monism: The Work of Ārya Maitreya with a Commentary by Āryāsanga." Acta Orientalia 9 (1931): 81–306.
Article
The Sutra on the Wisdom Stored in the Ocean of Buddha-Nature
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

The Sutra of Liberation and Breaking the Attributes of the Mind through the Wisdom Stored in the Ocean of Buddha-nature (Foxinghai zang zhihui jietuo po xinxiang jing 佛性海藏智慧解脫破心相經; hereafter: Sutra on the Wisdom Stored in the Ocean of Buddha-nature) is a Chinese apocryphal scripture whose origin is still obscure. For a long time, the sutra was thought to be missing. Following the discovery of the Dunhuang 敦煌 manuscripts and the stone sutras in the Grove of the Reclining Buddha (Wofoyuan 臥佛院; hereafter: the Grove), an overall version of the text can now be restored.
      The sutra, consisting of two scrolls, is included in the Taishō edition in the volume on the “sutras in Dunhuang manuscripts whose origins are in doubt 敦煌寫本類疑似部”. The version in the Grove is an incomplete engraving of the first scroll of the sutra. For reasons that still await clarification, the text on wall e in cave 46 reads from left to right. It is preceded on wall d by scroll 22 of the Nirvana Sutra, and followed on wall f by the Diamond Sutra. Neither the author nor the translator of this scripture is mentioned in the Dunhuang and the Grove versions. (Shih-Chung, introductory remarks, 101)
Shih-Chung, Chen Frederick. "The Sutra on the Wisdom Stored in the Ocean of Buddha-Nature." In Vol. 3, Buddhist Stone Sutras in China: Sichuan Province; (Wofoyuan Section C), edited by Claudia Wenzel and Sun Hua, 101–106. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2016.
Article
The Tabo Fragments and the Stemma of the Tibetan Tathāgatagarbhasūtra
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

Until now several scholars have dealt with Tibetan texts of the manuscript collection of Tabo monastery in Spiti District, Himachal Pradesh, India.[1] With this short contribution I would like to throw light on the Tabo fragments of one of the Tibetan translations of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, in Tibetan De bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po'i mdo. l shall focus on the textual characteristics and the relation of the Tabo fragments to the versions of the sūtra contained in the other main Kanjurs. It is strictly to be kept in mind that all conclusions drawn from the presentation of the material and its evaluation can only claim validity for the De bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po'i mdo. My conclusions are not meant to provide a characterization of the Tabo Kanjur in general. Though, regarding the position of the manuscript in the general, Kanjur stemma, there seem to be certain tendencies common to all the texts of the Kanjur found in Tabo and analysed until now, each work should be seen as an individual case. Only when a sufficient number of studies will have been executed and will repeatedly confirm the results shall we be able to draw conclusions of a more general nature. (Zimmermann, introductory remarks, 177)

Notes
  1. See the studies in East and West 44–1, 1994, and SCHERRER-SCHAUB / STEINKELLNER 1999; further PAGEL 1999: 165–210.
Zimmermann, Michael. "The Tabo Fragments and the Stemma of the Tibetan Tathāgatagarbhasūtra." In The Many Canons of Tibetan Buddhism: Proceedings of the Ninth Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Leiden 2000, edited by Helmut Eimer and David Germano, 177-96. Brill's Tibetan Studies Library 2/10. Leiden: Brill, 2002.
Article
The Tathagata Essence
According to Don Handrick, this is a "rather wordy" translation of the first chapter of the Uttaratantraśāstra, made so due to the heavy use of parenthetical information derived from various commentaries on the text that the translators use to explicate the root verses. The work is a draft compilation and is not for general distribution. Permission has been granted for use in FPMT (Foundation for the Preservation of the Mahayana Tradition) Basic Programs.
Hopkins, Jeffrey, and Joe B. Wilson, trans. "The Tathagata Essence." Chapter 1 of the Great Vehicle Treatise on the Sublime Continuum Differentiating the Lineage of the Three Jewels (mahayanottaratantra-ratnagotravibhanga). 2nd ed. By Maitreya. With amplification by Mipam Gyatso (mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846–1912). Unpublished manuscript, January 2007. Pdf file.
Article
The Tathāgata-Garbha as the Fundamental Subject of the Four Satyas
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

I understand the phrase 'tathagata-garbhaḥ' as the womb that gives birth to tathāgatas, the womb for tathāgatas, which is a conclusion I have arrived by taking into consideration the contents of scriptures down to the Laṅkāvatāra sūtra, as well as the latter's expression, 'garbhas-tathāgatānām' (VI k. la).
      Previously I understood the phrase (t. g.) as tathāgata abiding in the womb, which now I find inappropriate because it does not cover the whole phrase, the key-point of which is that the womb is empty of the thick coverings of kleśas.
      For the understanding of the phrase t. g. I went through Śākyamuni's life-stories like the Mahāvastu (MV) and the Lalitavistara (LV), the Māyā chapter of the Gaṇḍavyūha (GV), the Śūraṃgama-samādhi sūtra (sss), the Tathāgata-garbha sūtra (TG), the Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra of mahāyāna (MPN), the Śrīmālādevi-siṃhanāda sūtra (SM), and the Laṅkāvatāra sūtra (LS). Now I am certain that it constitutes the core of the philosophy of religion of Buddhism. (Tokiwa, preliminary remarks, 13)
Tokiwa, Gishin. "The Tathāgata-Garbha as the Fundamental Subject of the Four Satyas." Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies) 33, no. 1 (1984): 13–18. https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/ibk1952/33/1/33_1_403/_pdf/-char/en.
Article
The Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra
The Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra is a short but extremely influential Mahāyāna Buddhist text that was probably composed sometime around the middle of the third century C.E. It is the sūtra that introduced into the Mahāyāna tradition the notion of the tathāgatagarbha, the idea that all beings have latent within themselves all the virtues of a buddha (tathāgata), but that those virtues are hidden by a covering (garbha) of passion and anguish (the so-called kleśas of greed, anger, lust, confusion, and so on). The central message of the sūtra is that when those kleśas are removed, the buddhahood that is potential in all beings will be revealed.
      The idea of the tathāgatagarbha was later to form the nucleus of the concept of buddha nature (buddhadhātu) in the Sino-Japanese Buddhist tradition. And concepts of both the tathāgatagarbha and the buddha nature underwent extensive doctrinal development in important Mahāyāna sūtras and influential commentaries. But whereas later treatises generally give a highly philosophical interpretation to the tathāgatagarbha, it is doubtful that any such sophisticated understanding was intended by the author(s) of the Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra. In the Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra, the concept of the tathāgatagarbha is promulgated primarily to inspire beings with the confidence to seek buddhahood, and to persuade them that despite their poverty, suffering, and bondage to passion, they still have the capacity to attain the ultimate goal of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the perfect enlightenment of the Tathāgata.
      The term tathāgatagarbha has often been translated by Western scholars as "matrix of the tathāgata," but "matrix" does not exhaust the wide range of meanings of the Sanskrit term garbha. The author of the Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra seems to have been well aware of this, since he employs many of these different meanings of garbha in the various similes with which he illustrates the meaning of the tathāgatagarbha. In its most common usage, garbha means "womb," and the eighth simile of the sūtra likens the tathāgatagarbha to an impoverished, vile, and ugly woman who bears a noble, world-conquering king in her womb. But garbha can also mean "fetus," so the garbha in the eighth simile may also refer to the son who is within her womb. Garbha can also refer to the calyx of a flower, the cuplike leafy structure that enfolds the blossom, and the image in the sūtra's opening scene of conjured buddha forms seated within lotus flowers seems to be predicated on this meaning. Garbha can also mean "inner room," or "hidden chamber," or "sanctuary" (as in the garbhagṛha of a Hindu temple, which houses the image of the deity, or the rounded dome [garbha] of a Buddhist stūpa, which houses the precious relics of the Buddha). It is probably this meaning of garbha that the author of the sūtra intends in the fifth simile of the sūtra, when he speaks of the tathāgatagarbha as being like a hidden chamber or a secret store of treasure hidden beneath the house of a poor man. (The Chinese may have had this simile in mind when they chose the term tsang, "secret store," to translate garbha). Garbha can also refer to the outer husk that covers a fruit or seed or, by extension, to the seed itself. The third and sixth similes of the sūtra, which compare the tathāgatagarbha to the useless husk surrounding an edible kernel of wheat and to the mango pit that can grow into the most regal of trees, make direct use of this sense. Finally, garbha can refer to the inside, middle, or interior of anything, and it is this widest meaning that the author of the sūtra is employing when he likens the tathāgatagarbha to gold hidden inside a pit of waste, to honey hidden inside a swarm of angry bees, or to a golden statue hidden inside a wrapping of dirty rags or within a blackened mold.
      The majority of the Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra's similes portray something extremely precious, valuable, or noble (such as buddhas, honey, kernels of wheat, gold, treasure, golden statues, or future princes), contained within something abhorrent and vile (such as rotting petals, angry bees, useless husks, excrement, poor hovels, dirty rags, soot-covered molds, and impoverished, ugly women). So the central meaning of the tathāgatagarbha concept is clear: within each and every person there exists something extremely valuable—the possibility of becoming a tathāgata—but that valuable potential for buddhahood is hidden by something vile—the sufferings and passions and vicissitudes of life. But to carry the interpretation further and to look for a deeper meaning to the tathāgatagarbha concept of this early text would probably be wrong, for when one looks more closely at the various similes used to illustrate the tathāgatagarbha, certain inconsistencies begin to emerge. For example, although most of the similes portray the precious reality within as something already complete in itself, two of the similes clearly indicate that the precious reality will only reach its perfected state in the future. The conjured buddhas within the lotus flowers are already fully enlightened, the honey and the wheat kernel are already edible, the gold in the waste pit is already pure and in no need of refinement, and the golden statues are already fully cast, whereas, by contrast, it will take many years for the embryo in the poor woman's womb to become a world conqueror, and more years still for the mango pit to become a full-grown tree. (Grosnick, "The Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra," 92–93)
Grosnick, William. "The Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra." In Buddhism in Practice, edited by Donald S. Lopez, Jr., 92–106. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.
Article
The Tathāgatagarbha Theory Reconsidered: Reflections on Some Recent Issues in Japanese Buddhist Studies
The Tathāgatagarbha theory is an influential yet controversial part of the Buddhist tradition. This essay examines some of the issues related to this tradition that have been discussed recently by Buddhist scholars: the dhātu-vāda thesis and the critique of “original enlightenment,” the relationship between the terms tathāgatagarbha and padmagarbha, the interpretation of dependent origination in the Ratnagotravibhāga, the role of relics worship in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, and the Tathāgatagarbha theory in Tibetan Buddhism.
Takasaki, Jikidō. "The Tathāgatagarbha Theory Reconsidered: Reflections on Some Recent Issues in Japanese Buddhist Studies." Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 27, no. 1–2 (2000): 73–83. https://nirc.nanzan-u.ac.jp/nfile/2696.
Article
The Tathāgatagarbha Theory in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

. . . We may conclude the characteristics of the TG [tathāgatagarbha] theory in this sūtra in the following way.

1) The biggest contribution of the MPS [Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra] to the history of the TG theory is the establishment of the concept of buddhadhātu as explaining the nature of tathāgatagarbha. This dhātu concept as showing the essence or nature common to sattvas and the Tathāgata seems to be introduced by the AAN [Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa], but the MPS, succeeding the AAN, utilized it in its full scope, in which are involved various other meanings of the term dhātu developed in Buddhism, such as relic of the Buddha, the 18 component elements, the 4 gross elements, sphere of the dharma, the essence of dharmas (e.g. the tathāgatakāya is not (consisting) of elements of collected materials (bsags paḥi khams), but of the essence of the dharma (chos kyi khams) (L. 110a1–2). It suggests that 'dharmakāya' is 'dharmadhātu-kāya' ), the word root, etc.

2) The most unique expression of this sūtra with respect to the TG is the ātman, which is regarded as a sort of taboo in Buddhism*. Connotation of this term in the text is completely identical with dhātu.

3) Inspite of the use of such an abstract concept, the MPS is far from systematization of the theory, in comparison with the AAN and the ŚMS [Śrītmalasūtra]. Especially the relationship between tathāgatagarbha and dharmakāya, problem of the pure mind and the defilements, etc. are not discussed explicitly as in the SMS. In this respect, I hesitate a bit to suppose the date of the MPS as coming after the ŚMS.

4) Inspite of frequent references to the icchantika, the term agotra is not used. In general, the gotra concept is lacking in the MPS. This point is common to the AAN, and the ŚMS. (Takasaki, section 6, 9–10)

Read more here . . .
Takasaki, Jikidō. "The Tathāgatagarbha Theory in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra." Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies) 19, no. 2 (1971): 1–10. https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/ibk1952/19/2/19_2_1024/_pdf/-char/en.
Article
The Tathāgatagarbhasūtra: Its Basic Structure and Relation to the Lotus Sūtra
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

In his comprehensive study of the development of the tathāgatagarbha teaching, J. Takasaki also deals with the sūtra which bears the name of this Mahāyāna philosophical current.[1] The Tathāgatagarbhasūtra (TGS) has generally been referred to as the earliest expression of this doctrine and the term tathāgatagarbha itself seems to have been coined by this very sūtra. In this paper I intend to introduce the textual history and doctrinal content of the TGS and offer some speculations concerning the possible motivations lying behind its compilation. By pointing out some interesting parallels concerning the structure and formulations in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra (SP), I shall then suggest that the SP and the TGS carry a similar compositional line. Finally, I shall determine the position and role of the TGS in Mahāyāna Buddhism as a sūtra presupposing the doctrine of the SP and providing its metaphysical foundation. (Zimmermann, introductory remarks, 143–44)

Notes
  1. Jikidō Takasaki 高崎直道, Nyoraizō shisō no keisei (Formation of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory), Tokyo 1974 (Shunjū-sha): pp. 40–68.
Zimmermann, Michael. "The Tathāgatagarbhasūtra: Its Basic Structure and Relation to the Lotus Sūtra." Annual Report of the International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology at Soka University 2 (1999): 143–68. http://iriab.soka.ac.jp/content/pdf/aririab/Vol.%202%20(1999)%20[rev.4Aug2010].pdf.
Article
The Tathāgatôtpattisaṃbhava-nirdeśa of the Avataṃsaka and the Ratnagotravibhāga, with Special Reference to the Term Tathāgata-gotra-saṃbhava
No abstract given. Here is the first relevant paragraph:

The point now I am going to express here is the discovery of the use of a compound noun ' tathāgata-gotra-saṃbhava ' in the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra), which seems to be the Sanskrit original for '如來性起', one of the important terms in the philosophy of the Hua-yen (華嚴) Sect of Chinese Buddhism, but is actually not found in the Avataṃsaka, the basic scripture for that sect. (Takasaki, para. 1, 48)

Read more here . . .
Takasaki, Jikido. "The Tathāgatôtpattisaṃbhava-nirdeśa of the Avataṃsaka and the Ratnagotravibhāga: With Special Reference to the Term ' Tathāgata-gotra-saṃbhava ' (如來 性起)." Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies) 7, no. 1 (1958): 48–53. https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/ibk1952/7/1/7_1_348/_pdf/-char/en.
Article
The Transmission of Sanskrit Manuscripts from India to Tibet
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

Hardly any Sanskrit manuscripts of Buddhist scriptures remain in India today, even though such manuscripts have been discovered in surrounding regions. Tibet in particular is one of the richest treasuries of precious Sanskrit manuscripts from as early as the 8th century. These became widely known to the scholarly world in the 1930s thanks to discoveries by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana (1893-1963) in monasteries of Tsang (Tib. gTsang) province, in the Western part of Central Tibet. He had little success, however, in accessing Sanskrit manuscripts in monasteries of Ü (Tib. dBus) province, in the Eastern part of the Central Tibet among which Retreng (Tib. Rwa sgreng) monastery[1] was especially famous for its rare manuscript collection. Retreng, the former centre of the Kadam tradition located about 120 km to the Northwest of Lhasa, was founded by Dromtön Gyalwe jungne (Tib. 'Brom ston rGyal ba'i 'byung gnas, 1008-1064) in 1056. The aim of the present paper is to trace the Sanskrit manuscript collection once preserved at Retreng monastery by focusing on the transmission of individual manuscripts, and in the process to shed light on one historical aspect of Indo-Tibetan cross-cultural exchanges.

In the following, I shall (1) sketch the challenges faced by explorers trying to access the manuscript collection of Retreng monastery in the early 20th century, and then try to (2) trace the origin of the collection in Tibetan historical sources, (3) collect references to the manuscripts belonging to the collection, (4) draw up a title list of scriptural texts contained in it, (5) trace and identify its current location, and finally (6) evaluate the historicity of Atiśa's ownership of the manuscripts. (Kano, preliminary remarks, 82–83)

Notes
  1. For historical sources on Retreng, see Kano, "Rāhula," 123, n. 1.
Kano, Kazuo. "The Transmission of Sanskrit Manuscripts from India to Tibet: The Case of a Manuscript Collection in the Possession of Atiśa Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna (980–1054)." In Transfer of Buddhism Across Central Asian Networks (7th to 13th Centuries), edited by Carmen Meinert, 82–117. Leiden: Brill, 2015.
Article
The Womb of the Tathāgata or Buddhist Monism
The word Tathagata means "he who has come in the manner in which he has come". Primarily, therefore, the word refers to a manifestation of the Buddha-principle. But, since, in the Greater Vehicle generally, phenomena are merely the phenomenalization of the Noumenon, the word refers to the Buddha-principle as well. (Source Accessed Aug 2, 2023)
Ahmad, Zahiruddin. "The Womb of the Tathāgata or Buddhist Monism." Journal of The Oriental Society of Australia 15/16 (1983–84): 27–44.
Article
The Wön Buddhist Practice of the Buddha-Nature
Wǒn Buddhism is a new Buddhism created in Korea by Pak Chungbin (1891-1943) in 1916. In this piece, I offer a short introduction to the Wǒn Buddhist renovation of the traditional Buddhism and a translation of sections of Treatise on the Renovation of Korean Buddhism (韓國佛敎革新論) which emphasized the importance of Buddhism's engagement with the general public. One effort Wǒn Buddhism made for that purpose was to replace the traditional Buddha statue with a symbol of a circle so that people would not idolize the Buddha. Wǒn Buddhism is still active both in and outside of Korea.
Park, Jin. "The Wǒn Buddhist Practice of the Buddha-Nature." In Religions of Korea in Practice, edited by Robert E. Buswell Jr., 476–86. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.
Article
The Yogācāra Doctrine of Buddha-Nature: Paramārtha vs. the Fa-hsiang School
There were two main streams in Yogācāra Buddhism. On the one hand, there was the Old School of Sthiramati and Paramārtha. On the other hand, there was the New School of Dharmapāla and Hsuan Tsang. Due to the work of Yoshifumi Ueda and Gadjin Nagao in Japan, the distinction between Paramārtha and the Fahsiang School has been to a large extent clarified. The difference between their doctrines on Buddha-nature has been, however, relatively neglected by modern scholarship. This paper aims to clarify the distinction between Paramārtha and the Fa-hsiang's doctrines of Buddha-nature. Following Ueda, this paper will also differentiate Paramārtha's doctrine of Buddha-nature from the doctrine of the tathāgatagarbha presented in the Awakening of Faith. Especially, we will see that Buddha-nature in the Awakening of Faith and the Fa-hsiang School are committed to a version of essentialism. Finally, it will discern some interesting parallels between Paramārtha's doctrine and the perfect teachings of T'ien T'ai Buddhism.
Chan, Wing-Cheuk. "The Yogācāra Doctrine of Buddha-Nature: Paramārtha vs. the Fa-hsiang School." Canadian Journal of Buddhist Studies 3 (2007): 35–58.
Article
The Yogācārā and Mādhyamika Interpretations of the Buddha-nature Concept in Chinese Buddhism
The idea of Buddha-nature was first made popular in China in the early fifth century with the translation of the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra (hereafter cited as MNS),'"`UNIQ--ref-00004263-QINU`"' and since then, it has remained one of the central themes of Chinese Buddhist thought. Already in the fifth and early sixth centuries, a wide variety of theories on the Buddha-nature had begun to appear, but extant information about them remains scanty and scattered.'"`UNIQ--ref-00004264-QINU`"' It is in the writings of Ching-ying Hui-yüan (523–592),'"`UNIQ--ref-00004265-QINU`"' the Yogācārin, and in Chi-tsang (549–623), the Mādhyamika, that we find the earliest available full-scale treatments of the subject. Hui-yüan and Chi-tsang hold a number of views in common with respect to the question of Buddha -nature:

'"`UNIQ--poem-00004269-QINU`"'

Nevertheless, given their very different theoretical upbringings and doctrinal affiliations, it is inevitable that they would carry to their explanations of the Buddha-nature concept some of the basic principles and assumptions of their respective philosophical traditions. In examining and comparing the Buddha-nature teachings of Hui-yüan and Chi-tsang our present study attempts to show how the Buddha-nature concept has come to assume divergent significances when read in the context of the two main streams of thought in Mahāyāna Buddhism: Yogācāra and Mādhyamika. (Liu, "The Yogācāra and Mādhyamika Interpretations of the Buddha-nature Concept in Chinese Buddhism," 171)
Liu, Ming-Wood. "The Yogācārā and Mādhyamika Interpretations of the Buddha-nature Concept in Chinese Buddhism." Philosophy East and West 35, no. 2 (1985): 171–93.
Article
The Monistic Absolute of the Uttaratantra and Modern Science
. . . We observe that in the non-dualist philosophy of the Uttaratantra only one ontological entity, that is, the Cosmical Body of the Buddha is recognised. The substratum of everything that exists is this Essence of the Buddha. The phenomenal nature does not really exist. It appears to exist due to the force of Transcendental Illusion. Absolute Monism is also the foundation of Modern Science. What really exists is Consciousness alone which has no plural. The plurality of the cosmos is only apparent, illusory. (Goswami, concluding remarks, 281–82)
Goswami, S. C. "The Monistic Absolute of the Uttaratantra and Modern Science." In Philosophy, Grammar, and Indology: Essays in Honour of Prof. Gustav Roth, edited by Hari Shankar Prasad, 275–82. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1992.
Article
The rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS[1]

The theory of “Buddha Nature” or tathāgatagarbha (henceforth TG)[2] formed an important school of thought in Mahāyāna Buddhism and continues to enjoy popularity in some circles even today, although it has been dismissed by some scholars as non-Buddhist.[3] It has drawn the attention of several scholars. On the Tibetan front, David Seyfort Ruegg has through a series of publications greatly contributed to the understanding of the TG theory, particularly that of the dGe-lugs-pa tradition. A number of studies devoted to the TG theory from the perspective of the exponents of the gźan stoṅ (“extrinsic emptiness”)[4] theory have also appeared in recent years.[5] However, much remains to be explored in the works of various Tibetan authors of different traditions and periods.

One important Tibetan interpretation of TG that has been ignored so far is that of the rÑiṅ-ma school. The little attention it has received is in the context of studies pertaining to the Tibetan Madhyamaka and rDzogs-chen doctrines.[6] Can one, however, speak of a single rÑiṅ-ma interpretation of TG without the risk of oversimplification? Admittedly, not all rÑiṅ-ma scholars interpreted TG in the same way. They may differ in their erudition, style of interpretation and emphasis according to the particular time and place in which they lived. Even one and the same scholar may interpret it differently in different works, or even in different passages of the same work. Nevertheless, despite the differences in details within the various schools of Tibetan Buddhism, each of them, including the rÑiṅ-ma school, has, in my opinion, its own few archetypical intellectual figures who shape, lead and represent their respective traditions, and whose positions agree at least in substance if not always in every detail. And thus later rÑiṅ-ma-pas consider Roṅzom-pa (eleventh century), Kloṅ-chen-pa (1308-1363) and Mi-pham (1846-1912) as their three archetypical intellectual models, and their interpretations of a given doctrine as the “official” rÑiṅ-ma position.[7]

Before examining their views, I would like to briefly discuss how some of the leading rÑiṅ-ma scholars – whose interpretations of the TG doctrine are considered authoritative for the rÑiṅ-ma school – are portrayed in some secondary literature. Of the major rÑiṅ-ma scholars, Roṅ-zom-pa has been presented as clearly preferring Yogācāra–Madhyamaka by Georges Dreyfus,[8] apparently following John Pettit who merely states that Roṅ-zom-pa in his Grub mtha’i brjed byaṅ suggests that the Yogācāra–Madhyamaka is “more important” (don che ba).[9] What the closing phrase of the pertinent statement by Roṅ-zom-pa actually says is: “The treatise [or position] of Yogācāra–Madhyamaka appears (snaṅ) to be more significant.”[10] The statement gives Roṅ-zompa’s personal opinion about the then prevalent two Madhyamaka systems (i.e., Sautrāntika–Madhyamaka and Yogācāra–Madhyamaka) and not his doctrinal affiliation.[11] Kloṅ-chen-pa and Mi-pham have been portrayed as exponents of the gźan stoṅ theory. For example, according to Samten Karmay, Kloṅ-chen-pa’s stance on the TG theory is identical to that of Dol-po-pa’s.[12] Similarly, David Germano (apparently following S.K. Hookham) describes Kloṅ-chen-pa’s comments regarding the doctrine of emptiness and TG as “fairly typical” of the gźan stoṅ concepts in Tibet.[13] These scholars’ impressions are not altogether unjustified because Kloṅ-chen-pa’s evaluation of TG prima facie looks so positive that one might assume it to be identical with that of Dol-popa’s. Even amongst the traditional Tibetan scholars there were figures like Koṅ-sprul who preferred to place Kloṅ-chen-pa and Karma-pa Raṅ-byuṅ-rdo-rje (1284-1339) in the group of gźan stoṅ exponents.[14} This doctrinal agenda is still continued by living Tibetan exponents of the gźan stoṅ doctrine. A few modern scholars have designated Mi-pham as an exponent of the gźan stoṅ theory as well. However, a closer look reveals that in most cases, it is the terminology that has led to this determination; that is, the term gźan stoṅ has not necessarily been used by these scholars in a strict technical sense. One author who seems to consciously seek to prove Mi-pham a gźan stoṅ exponent is Paul Williams.[15] Leading rÑiṅ-ma teachers of more recent times have also been presented as proponents of the gźan stoṅ theory. Cyrus Stearns’ The Buddha from Dolpo, which greatly contributes to the understanding of Dol-po-pa’s life and thoughts, tends to oversimplify the rÑiṅ-ma explanation of the TG theory. For instance, Stearns, relying on verbal communication with sDe-gźung Rin-po-che (1906-1987), maintains that rÑiṅ-ma teachers such as bDud-’joms Rin-po-che (1904-1987) and Dilmgo mKhyen-brtse (1910-1991) were proponents of the gźan stoṅ doctrine.[16] I am not aware of any textual evidence that would suggest that these teachers were proponents of the gźan stoṅ doctrine, at least not in Dol-po-pa’s sense. Both bDud-’joms Rin-po-che and Dil-mgo mKhyenbrtse, in fact, speak about the oneness of emptiness and appearance or the compatibility of the Middle and Last Cycles of Buddha’s teachings.[17]

One notices a general tendency among modern scholars to associate, in addition to the above-mentioned rÑiṅ-ma teachers, rÑiṅ-ma doctrines with gźan stoṅ teachings.[18] These scholars can be grouped into three: (a) those who are obviously predisposed to the gźan stoṅ theory, (b) those who are opposed to the gźan stoṅ doctrine and (c) those who are too generous with the use of the term gźan stoṅ.[19] One of the reasons why the rÑiṅ-ma position on TG has remained somewhat elusive appears to be the complexity of the matter itself which forbids a simplistic expression of it in terms of raṅ stoṅ or gźan stoṅ. In the following passages, I shall present (a) the early Tibetan background of the TG theory, (b) a brief historical sketch and (c) a general profile of the rÑiṅ-ma interpretation of the TG doctrine, and (d) finally my assessment of the rÑiṅ-ma stance on the TG theory in India and Tibet,19 and thereby demonstrate how complex and distinctive the rÑiṅ-ma interpretation of TG actually is. Nonetheless, although I shall strive to describe their interpretation accurately, some of my observations will remain tentative. It is, however, not my intention to discuss here whether the rÑiṅ-ma interpretation is in keeping with the TG theory as originally conceived in India.

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Notes
  1. This article is a revised and enlarged version of the paper presented at the Tenth Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies (6th-12th September 2003) held in Oxford. I owe my gratitude to a number of individuals who contributed in different ways to bringing this article to its present form. I am grateful to my wife Orna Almogi (University of Hamburg) for painstakingly going through this article at its various stages of writing. I also owe my thanks to Prof. Lambert Schmithausen (University of Hamburg), Prof. Karin Preisendanz (University of Vienna) and Dr. Anne MacDonald (University of Vienna) for their valuable suggestions. I would also like to thank Prof. David Jackson (University of Hamburg) for going through an earlier version of this article. My thanks also go to Kazuo Kano (University of Hamburg) for his proof-reading of the final version.I am, of course, solely responsible for the content of the article.
  2. See Michael Zimmermann’s recent study of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, the earliest exposition on Buddha Nature in India, where he presents a detailed discussion of the term tathāgatagarbha (Zimmermann 2002: 39-50). Note that I use Tathāgatagarbhasūtra as a proper noun referring to this particular sūtra and TG sūtra as a common noun referring to a sūtra which deals primarily with the tathāgatagarbha doctrine.
  3. Some modern Japanese scholars have openly dismissed the TG theory as non-Buddhist, an issue which lies outside my present topic. For some details, see Zimmermann 2002: 82-84.
  4. A tradition may for polemical reasons label a rival tradition as a proponent of gźan stoṅ (“extrinsic emptiness”) or raṅ stoṅ (“intrinsic emptiness”). However, as suggested in Kapstein 2000: 121, it would be, from a methodological point of view, sensible to refrain from using labels such as gźan stoṅ and raṅ stoṅ unless a given tradition prefers to use one of these terms to describe its own conception of emptiness. Furthermore, since we tend to be too generous with the use of the terms raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ, I would like to make clear from the very outset how rÑiṅma scholars understand these terms. For them, a given “x” (no matter what) is said to be raṅ stoṅ if it cannot withstand (bzod pa) the logical analysis of Madhyamaka reasoning. A given “x” that can withstand such a scrutiny, which is for them an impossibility, would imply its “true or hypostatic existence” (bden par grub pa). Please note that my translation of the technical term bden par grub pa or bden grub is based on Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 37 where it is explained as “a permanent substantial entity established ‘in truth’, i.e., hypostatically (bden par grub pa).” See also Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 320 and Seyfort Ruegg 2002: 296, Indices, s.v. bden grub. Hence, if the logical analysis of Madhyamaka reasoning is applied, for example, on a cow or TG, neither of them will be able to withstand the force of logical analysis. A single case of “hypostatic existence” would be sufficient to cause the collapse of the entire Madhyamaka system. Thus, from the perspective of such a scrutiny, a given “x” is always raṅ stoṅ. Further, if a given “x” is empty of a numerically different given “y,” then “x” is said to be gźan stoṅ. In this sense, a given “x” is always empty of “y” and hence always gźan stoṅ. For example, a cow is always empty of a bull and so is TG empty of adventitious impure phenomena of saṃsāra. Thus, from this viewpoint, a given “x” can be both raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ. On the other hand, for Dol-po-pa Śes-rab-rgyal-mtshan (1292-1361), the initiator of the gźan stoṅ theory, whether or not “x” is raṅ stoṅ or gźan stoṅ would depend on whether “x” is a conventional phenomenon or absolute reality. If “x” is a conventional phenomenon, it is raṅ stoṅ, and if it is absolute reality, it is gźan stoṅ. Hence, Dol-po-pa uses the expressions kun rdzob raṅ stoṅ or kun rdzob stoṅ ñid and don dam gźan stoṅ or don dam stoṅ ñid (Ri chos, p. 305.8) and states that the banal (tha śal) emptiness (i.e., itaretaraśūnyatā) belittled in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra is neither of the two (ibid., p. 154.15-155.15). In principle, Dol-po-pa could have described this itaretaraśūnyatā (“emptiness of reciprocity”) as kun rdzob gźan stoṅ in opposition to what he called kun rdzob raṅ stoṅ and don dam gźan stoṅ but has apparently, for strategic reasons, refrained from doing so. Designating itaretaraśūnyatā as kun rdzob gźan stoṅ would have been self-defeating because then he would have been forced to concede that there is at least one kind of gźan stoṅ which is unacceptable even by his own standard. Thus, he could consolidate his gźan stoṅ theory by insisting that only the absolute can be gźan stoṅ and only gźan stoṅ can be absolute (ibid., p. 308.12-15).
  5. See, e.g., Seyfort Ruegg 1963; Broido 1989; Hookham 1991 and 1992; Stearns 1999; Mathes 1998, 2000 and 2002. Note, however, that one may have to be careful not to anachronistically presuppose that one homogenous gźan stoṅ theory existed at every place and time in Tibet (e.g., see the Si tu’i raṅ rnam, p. 266.7-267.2; Smith 2001: 265). In fact, the comparing and contrasting of the various gźan stoṅ interpretations would shed important light on the history of the concept and might contribute to a better understanding of the evolution, continuation and reception of such concepts.
  6. Kloṅ-chen-pa’s discussion of TG occurring in the seventh chapter of his Tshig don mdzod is assessed in Germano 1992: 77-82. John Pettit published a translation of Mi-pham’s Ṅes śes sgron me and its commentary by ’Khro-chu ’Jam-dpal-rdo-rje (Pettit 1999a) and also included a translation of Mi-pham’s gŹan stoṅ seṅ ge’i ṅa ro, p. 359-378.4. See “The Lion’s Roar Proclaiming Extrinsic Emptiness,” in Pettit 1999a: 415-427. The recent doctoral dissertation by Karma Phuntsho also discusses Mi-pham’s stance on the TG theory (Phuntsho 2003).
  7. One might ask just how authoritative and representative Roṅ-zom-pa, Kloṅchen-pa and Mi-pham were and are for the rÑiṅ-ma school. Mi-pham himself considered Roṅ-zom-pa and Kloṅ-chen-pa as the most authoritative interpreters of the rÑiṅ-ma doctrine and he saw himself as the follower of the two. See the Dam chos dogs sel, p. 378.5-379.2, the dBu ma rgyan ’grel, p. 42.5, the Ṅes śes sgron me, p. 121.1-2. See also the colophon to his Roṅ zom bla rnal, p. 61.6: mtshuṅs med ma hā paṇḍi ta chen po’i rjes su ’jug par khas ’che ba mi pham rnam par rgyal bas zla tshe bzaṅ po la bris pa dge’o /. The fact that Mi-pham is responsible for the latest systematisation of the rÑiṅ-ma doctrine and that he did so primarily by relying on Roṅ-zom-pa and Kloṅ-chen-pa, is, in my view, sufficient for considering the three as representative and authoritative, as they are indeed perceived by the rÑiṅ-ma tradition today. See also Smith 2001: 16.
  8. See Dreyfus 2003: 331.
  9. Pettit 1999a: 90-91, 485, n. 315.
  10. lTa ba’i brjed byaṅ, p. 11.11-14: dbu ma rnam gñis kun rdzob kyi tshul mi mthun pa la / luṅ daṅ rigs pa gaṅ che ba ni rgyud daṅ mdo sde spyi’i gźuṅ daṅ / rigs pa spyi’i tshul daṅ / dbu ma’i mkhan po gźuṅ phyi mo mdzad pa’i slob dpon klu sgrub daṅ / ārya de ba’i gźuṅ ltar na yaṅ / rnal ’byor spyod pa’i dbu ma’i gźuṅ don che bar snaṅ ṅo /.
  11. If one wishes to speak about Roṅ-zom-pa’s doctrinal affiliation, then one can safely state that he was, in the first place, affiliated with rDzogs-chen doctrines, and that his method of establishing emptiness is closer to that of the Prāsaṅgika– Madhyamaka than to any other Buddhist system, regardless of whether or how much access he had to Prāsaṅgika texts. This becomes particularly evident in his Theg chen tshul ’jug and was also the impression of some traditional Tibetan scholars such as Mi-pham (see, for example, the Ṅes śes sgron me, p. 75.3-4, the dBu ma rgyan ’grel, p. 309.6-310.1 and the Dam chos dogs sel, p. 378.6) and Blobzaṅ-mdo-sṅags Chos-kyi-rgya-mtsho (1903-1957), a dGe-lugs-cum-rÑiṅ-ma scholar from Khams, who even went on to prove that Roṅ-zom-pa’s view is a Prāsaṅgika view (see the lTa ba’i dris lan, p. 70-71). Whether the Prāsaṅgika–Madhyamaka view was in some form present during the early propagation of Buddhism in Tibet may depend, among other things, on whether Śāntideva was indeed a Prāsaṅgika–Mādhyamika as the Tibetan tradition has perceived him to be.
  12. See Karmay 1988: 184-185; cf. Kapstein 1992: 23, n. 1.
  13. See Germano 1992: 78. See also Hookham 1991: 136, 150.
  14. Śes bya rgya mtsho, p. 567.8-10; Smith 2001: 338, n. 888.
  15. See Williams 1998 (particularly, p. 199-216). For reviews of Williams 1998, see Kapstein 2000, Tatz 2001: 78-79. A few words should be said here regarding Paul Williams’ study of “auto-perception” (raṅ rig: svasaṃvedana/svasaṃvitti) and his attempt to connect it with the controversial issue of gźan stoṅ. To agree with Mi-pham’s understanding or interpretation of “auto-perception” is one thing and to understand his position accurately is yet another matter. In my view, Williams seems to have missed the point regarding the controversial issue of “auto perception,” particularly in regard to Mi-pham’s stance on this issue. If he had studied Mi-pham’s interpretation of “means of valid cognition” (pramāṇa), he would have seen why the theory of “auto-perception” was crucial for Mi-pham. According to him, the whole theoretical structure of perception and inference developed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti would collapse without the theory of “auto-perception.” Mi-pham insists that as long as one accepts conventional valid cognition (tha sñad tshad ma), one must accept “auto-perception,” at least on the conventional level, just as one accepts “perception of others” (gźan rig). Thus, without a clear concept of Mi-pham’s background and his view on pramāṇa, any study of Mi-pham’s view on “auto-perception” is destined to be less than successful. A proper assessment of Mi-pham’s understanding of Madhyamaka would have revealed that for Mi-pham, there is no phenomenon that can withstand (bzod) the Madhyamaka logical analysis, and this includes “auto-perception.” The Prāsaṅgika–Mādhyamikas (such as Candrakīrti and Śāntideva) do refute the Yogācāra notion of “auto-perception” but, for Mi-pham, this is done so in the context of establishing absolute reality or “that which is free from manifoldness” (niṣprapañca). However, even Prāsaṅgika–Mādhyamikas should, according to Mi-pham, have no problem in accepting “autoperception” on the conventional level, just as they have no problem accepting “perception of others.” For Mi-pham, anything that can be attested by means of conventional valid cognition is acceptable on the conventional level. If a thing is impossible even on the conventional level, then it should be something like a “permanent sound” (sgra rtag pa) or a “rabbit’s horn” (ri boṅ gi rwa). But, for him, neither is “auto-perception” like a “permanent sound” nor did Candrakīrti and Śāntideva consider it to be so. However, Tsoṅ-kha-pa believed that Candrakīrti and Śāntideva held “auto-perception” to be impossible even on the conventional level. This is the point of departure of the actual issue and the controversy took place within the contextual framework of Pramāṇa and Madhyamaka, which were seen by Mi-pham as complementing and strengthening rather than as excluding or nullifying each other. Hence, bringing in rDzogs-chen and gźan stoṅ issues in this context is unwarranted. If Williams had studied rDzogs-chen or the rÑiṅ-ma interpretation of TG, he would have realised that for the rÑiṅ-ma-pas (including Mi-pham), there is a strict distinction between mind (sems) and gnosis (ye śes). The expression so sor raṅ gis rig par bya ba (pratyātmavedanīya) which actually means “accessible to personal experience only” or “to be known directly and introspectively,” an idea also acceptable to Candrakīrti or Śāntideva, has also been taken out of context by Williams. Unless we understand the methods of interpretation systematized by Mi-pham, we will never fully comprehend the way he conceives Pramāṇa, Madhyamaka, TG and rDzogs-chen or his conception of their intricate relationship with one another. And unless we have a clear picture of how Mi-pham understood raṅ rig in these systems, we shall only have a fragmentary and distorted idea of Mi-pham’s stance on raṅ rig.
  16. See Stearns 1999: 215, n. 137-138.
  17. bDud-’joms Rin-po-che explicitly states: “Thus, by clinging to and postulating one of the positions of appearance and emptiness, one would not be able to avert the erroneous (lit. “bad”) views that hold on to the extremes. Therefore, it is necessary to properly establish the sphere of reality (dharmadhātu), the union of appearance and emptiness [or] the ultimate [and] actual absolute truth, as the equality of [saṃsāric] existence and [nirvāṇic] calmness” (bsTan pa’i rnam gźag, fol. 109b2-4: des na snaṅ stoṅ gaṅ ruṅ re’i phyogs su źen ciṅ bzuṅ bas ni mthar ’dzin gyi lta ba ṅan pa bzlog mi nus pas / chos dbyiṅs snaṅ stoṅ zuṅ ’jug mthar thug rnam graṅs ma yin pa’i don dam srid źi mñam ñid du legs par gtan la ’bebs dgos śiṅ /). Dil-mgo mKhyen-brtse likewise considers the Middle and Last Cycles as complementary, for he explains absolute reality as “the ultimate of what is to be established in a way that the purports of the Middle and the Last Promulgations become entwined as one and is the finale of the ocean-like systems of sūtra and tantra” (bDud rtsi’i snaṅ ba, fol. 71a6: ’khor lo bar mtha’ dgoṅs pa gcig dril gyis gtan la dbab bya mthar thug pa mdo sṅags grub mtha’ rgya mtsho’i skyel so yin la). See also the Zil gnon dgoṅs gsal (fol. 178a6-b2) where Dil-mgo mKhyen-brtse speaks about the union (zuṅ ’jug) of the “primordial purity” (ka dag), which is equated with “freedom from the eight extremes of manifoldness” (spros pa’i mtha’ brgyad las ’das pa), and the “immanently present” (lhun grub) Buddha bodies (sku) and gnosis (ye śes) constituting the TG, and his ’Jam dpal dgoṅs rgyan (fol. 239a2-b5), where TG (among several other terms) is indicated as a synonym of the emptiness of the Middle Promulgation. See also his rDo rje mdud grol (fol. 136a5-b4 & 150a3-4) where he explains the view of Prāsaṅgika–Madhyamaka in the same way Mi-pham does.
  18. According to Karmay, who relied on the Italian edition (1973) of The Religions of Tibet, Tucci maintains that the doctrines of rDzogs-chen and of the Jonaṅ-pas were developed from the Hva-śaṅ’s doctrine of TG (see Karmay 1988: 87). This claim, however, does not appear in the later English translation of the book. S.K. Hookham describes rDzogs-chen as typically gźan stoṅ-type teachings and claims that giving it a raṅ stoṅ gloss is the attempt of the present Dalai Lama “to abate the long standing hostility” towards rDzogs-chen and to protect it “from the ravages of the ‘exclusive Rangtongpa’” (Hookham 1991: 16; see also Hookham 1992: 151-152, n. 4). For reviews of Hookham 1991, see Ehrhard 1993 and Griffiths 1993. See also Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 87.
  19. See, for example, Smith 2001: 231, where it is stated that “Mi pham’s open advocacy of the Gzhan stong was another red cape, and the bulls were not slow to charge,” and ibid., p. 327, n. 788 where both the sToṅ thun seṅ ge’i ṅa ro (p. 563-606.5) and the gŹan stoṅ seṅ ge’i ṅa ro (p. 359-378.4) are said to be works on the gźan stoṅ theory. It is of course true that Mi-pham wrote on the gźan stoṅ theory and even defended it and can be thus called a “gźan stoṅ sympathiser.” He, however, did not consider himself a gźan stoṅ pa (Dam chos dogs sel, p. 378.5-379.1: ñams mtshar tsam du bris pa yin na yaṅ / raṅ bzos bde gśegs dam chos bslad mi ruṅ / ’chal ṅag soṅ na rgyal ba rnams la bśags / raṅ bzos bśad na ci yaṅ zad mtha’ med / bdag la gźan stoṅ sgrub pa’i khur kyaṅ med / roṅ kloṅ rnam gñis klu sgrub gźuṅ daṅ mthun / dman pa bdag kyaṅ rtse gcig der ’dun kyaṅ / ma bris dbaṅ med pha rol tshig gis bskul /). Surprisingly, although the Ṅes śes sgron me is the locus classicus for the rÑiṅ-ma position regarding the issue of raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ, John Pettit, in his study of this work, seems to be uncertain about Mi-pham’s position (Pettit 1999a: 114-124). However, cf. Pettit 1999b.
Wangchuk, Dorji. "The rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory." Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 48 (2004): 171–213.
Article
This Is My Mind, Luminous and Empty
According to Vajrayana Buddhism, the fast track to awakening is to look directly at your own mind and discover its true nature. Tsoknyi Rinpoche shows us how to experience two of mind’s most profound qualities.
Tsoknyi Rinpoche. "This Is My Mind, Luminous and Empty." Lion's Roar, March 20, 2012.
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Towards an Understanding of Tathāgatagarbha Interpretation in Tibet with Special Reference to the Ratnagotravibhāga
This essay seeks to highlight a number of the complexities underlying the hermeneutical process of tathāgatagarbha interpretation in Tibet based on the Ratnagotravibhāga (henceforth: RGV). This is followed by an overview of literature that might help illuminate this field, by providing a provisional list of Tibetan commentaries explicitly based on the Ratnagotravibhāga.
Burchardi, Anne. "Towards an Understanding of Tathāgatagarbha Interpretation in Tibet with Special Reference to the Ratnagotravibhāga." In Religion and Secular Culture in Tibet: Proceedings of the Ninth Seminar of the International Association of Tibetan Studies, Leiden 2000, edited by Henk Blezer with the assistance of Abel Zadoks, 59–77. Brill’s Tibetan Studies Library 2/2. Leiden: Brill, 2002.
Article
Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith-Review by Jin
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

This new translation is the work of four leading scholars in the field—John Jorgensen, Dan Lusthaus, John Makeham, and Mark Strange—who have been writing prolifically on Buddhist and East Asian philosophy and are thus ideal translators for the treatise. The translation is the product of a long process of concerted effort, starting as a workshop exercise in 2012, growing over the years to incorporate researches from various perspectives, and eventually appearing in 2019 as the second of the Oxford Chinese Thought series, a series aimed to introduce the riches of Chinese thought to the West.

Read more here.
Jin, Tao. Review of Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith, edited and translated by John Jorgensen, Dan Lusthaus, John Makeham, and Mark Strange. H-Net Reviews (October, 2020). https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=55295.
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Trust Practice, Practice Trust
When we truly give ourselves over to practice, explains Roko Sherry Chayat, we let go of our dependence on outcomes and begin to trust just being what we are, buddhanature, revealed right here, right now, in this very body and place.
Chayat, Sherry. "Trust Practice, Practice Trust." Buddhadharma: The Practitioner's Quarterly, February 2, 2018.
Article
Two Main Streams of Thought in Yogācāra Philosophy
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

In the tradition of Buddhism which has been transmitted to China and Japan, we can see two basically different streams of thought in the Yogācāra philosophy. Although this fact is well-known among Japanese scholars, it does not seem to be widely known among American, European, and Indian scholars. In order to understand correctly the Yogācāra philosophy, however, the clear understanding of these two streams of thought, their mutual differences, and their relation to the theories of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu is indispensable.
      One of these two streams was introduced into China by Hsuang-tsang. Although the thought of this stream can be known through the works of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu as translated by Hsuang-tsang, it can be known in its most all-inclusive and systematic form in the Ch'eng wei shih lun of Dharmapāla.[1] This stream of thought continued from the time of Hsuang-tsang to the present day. Happily, it did not die out in China and Japan where its study was continued and where present-day scholars are well acquainted with it. There is no unclear point as regards the more important aspects of this stream of thought.
      The other stream of thought, represented by the works of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu as translated by Buddhasānta, Bodhiruci, Paramārtha, Dharmagupta, Prabhākaramitra, and others, was introduced into China before the time of Hsuang-tsang. The translations of these masters, unlike those of the other stream, were not widely studied and the actual nature of its thought is difficult to determine. With the exception of Paramārtha, there are only one or two translated works of each of these masters. And, even in the study of their works, it is not possible to determine the differences from the other stream of Yogācāra thought.
      Paramārtha, however, translated a great many of the important works of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu. And, with the discovery and publication of the Sanskrit texts, eminent scholars of Japan have done comparative studies based on the Sanskrit original and the Chinese and Tibetan translations in order to determine the extent to which the stream of thought introduced into China before the time of Hsuang-tsang differs from that stream which was introduced by Hsuang-tsang. The results of this research clearly show that there is a fundamental difference between the theory introduced by Paramārtha and that of Hsuang-tsang. The importance of this difference lies in the fact that the theories introduced by Paramārtha and Hsuang-tsang are both said to be the theories of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu. If the theories of Paramārtha and Hsuang-tsang are fundamentally different, the problem arises as to which transmission is faithful to the theories of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu; or, if they are both separate traditions, what was the theory of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu? This has been the focus of attention of present-day Japanese scholars doing research in the Yogācāra philosophy. As the studies of the Yogācāra philosophy by Western and Indian scholars have been lacking in knowledge of these two streams of thought, their interpretations of the central problems of the Yogācāra philosophy have been ambiguous and often erroneous and do not show a clear understanding of it. Their understanding of the Yogācāra philosophy is not in accord with the theory of either one of these two streams of thought. And, because the differences between their interpretations and the two streams of thought are not clear, one cannot find a clear-cut understanding of the theories of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu.
       It is my aim in this paper to present the differences of interpretation of these two streams of thought relating to the theories of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu which were transmitted to China and to examine the question of which of the two streams is faithful to the thought of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu. As this paper cannot possibly deal with the whole of the Yogācāra philosophy, it will deal with only a few of the essential points. (Ueda, preparatory remarks, 155–56)

Read more here . . .


Notes
  1. Dharmapāla and others, Ch'eng wei shih lun,P Taishō-Daizōkyō, Vol. 31, No. 1585. French translation: "Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi," by Dharmapāla, translated from Chinese into French by La Vallée Poussin (Paris, 1928-1929).
Ueda, Yoshifumi. "Two Main Streams of Thought in Yogācāra Philosophy". Philosophy East and West 17, no. 1/4 (1967):155–65.
Article
Two Short Glosses on Yogācāra Texts by Vairocanarakṣita
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

In Giuseppe Tucci’s collection of Sanskrit manuscripts and photographed materials, a set of positive prints of texts filmed at Ñor monastery contains a codex unicus of Vairocanaraksita’s (fl. 11th/12th century) Yogācāra/Tathāgatagarbha commentarial works:

   1. Viṃśikāṭikāvivṛti (glosses on Vasubandhu’s Viṃśikāvṛtti and Vinītadeva’s Viṃśikāṭīkā);
   2. Triṃśikāṭīkāvivṛti (glosses on Sthiramati’s Triṃśikābhāṣya and Vinītadeva’s Triṃśikāṭīkā);
   3. Madhyāntavibhāgakatipayapadavivṛti (glosses on Vasubandhu’s Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya
       and Sthiramati’s Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā);
   4. Mahāyānottaratantraṭippaṇī (glosses on the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā);
   5. *Sūtrālaṃkāravivṛti (glosses on Vasubandhu’s Sūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya)2 and
   6. *Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavivṛti (glosses on Vasubandhu’s Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavṛtti).3

      V. Gokhale (1978) was the first to study these works, using Saṅkṛtyāyana’s negatives and the prints made from them, which have been preserved in Patna. He reported titles of the six works, without, however, going into detail because of the poor quality of the images. Subsequently the details of the works remained unknown for a long time, and no complete editions have been published. To be sure, Zuiryū Nakamura edited the text of folios 9v2–14v7 of the Mahāyānottaratantraṭippaṇī (the text of folios 15r1–17r5 remains to be edited);4 and Mathes in his translation of the Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavṛtti referred to some sentences from the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavivṛti.5 I myself also edited a small portion of the *Sūtrālaṃkāravivṛti.6
      The present paper contains an editio princeps of the Viṃśikāṭīkāvivṛti and *Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavivṛti. Critical editions of the other three works are under preparation: Francesco Sferra is preparing a critical edition of the Madhyāntavibhāgakatipayapadavivṛti, and I am preparing critical editions of the Mahāyānottaratantraṭippaṇī, the Triṃśikāṭīkāvivṛti and the *Sūtrālaṃkāravivṛti for publication. (Kano, introduction, 343-44)

Notes
  1. [From title] I am grateful to Prof. Francesco Sferra and Prof. Harunaga Isaacson for a number of text-critical suggestions, and Prof. Lambert Schmithausen for permitting me to use his preliminary handwritten transcription of Vairocanarakṣita’s *Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavivṛti, and also for his very valuable suggestions concerning that text. I am indebted, too, to Mrs. Bärbel Mund of Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen for giving me the permission to use photographic images of the Göttingen Collection, to Dr. Diwakar Acharya for his help with deciphering barely legible letters in the manuscript, to Prof. Toru Yagi for his very valuable suggestions regarding Vairocanarakṣita’s grammatical explanations, to Dr. Martin Delhey, Dr. Kengo Harimoto and Dr. Koichi Takahashi for reading my draft and making many valuable suggestions, and to Prof. Robert Kritzer and Philip Pierce for their English proofreading.
  2. The title of the work is not ascertainable from the colophon: sūtrālaṃkāraḥ samāptaḥ II II kṛtiḥ paṇḍitavairocanarakṣitapādānaṃ II II. Other possible Sanskrit titles are Sūtrālaṃkāravivṛti, Sūtrālaṃkārakatipayapadavivṛti, or Sūtrālaṃkāraṭippaṇī.
  3. The title of the work is not ascertainable from the colophon: dharmadharmatāvibhā[gaḥ]. The two illegible akṣaras after °vibhā in the bottom margin are probably gaḥ. Cf. the colophon to the *Sūtrālaṃkāravivṛti. One might expect something like Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavivṛti, Dharmadharmatāvibhāgakatipayapadavivṛti (as suggested by Gokhale 1978: 638), or Dharmadharmatāvibhāgaṭippaṇī. In Kano 2005: 142, I referred to this work under the title “Dharmadharmatāvibhā[gaṭīkā],” supplying the three akṣaras enclosed by square brackets. However, in view of its scope, it can hardly be a ṭīkā, a type of commentary typically more extensive in nature.
  4. For his edition, see Nakamura 1985. For studies of this text, see Nakamura 1980, 1982, 1992. Unfortunately, Nakamura’s edition contains many errors (around 190). It is remarkable that his edition shares some notable errors with Jagdishwar Pandey’s modern transcription preserved at Göttingen under the shelf-mark Xc14/90 (which contains a transcription of the full text of the Mahāyānottaratantraṭippaṇī); we can deduce that one of the two was made on the basis of the other. In my unpublished dissertation (Kano 2006b), I have critically edited the whole text of the Mahāyānottaratantraṭippaṇī and presented a list of corrections to Nakamura’s edition.
  5. See Mathes 1996: 37, 115-135.
  6. The text of folio 17r>sub>7–v6 of this work is edited in Kano 2006a: 92, n. 40.
Kano, Kazuo. "Two Short Glosses on Yogācāra Texts by Vairocanarakṣita: Viṃśikāṭīkāvivṛti and *Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavivṛti." In Part 1 of Sanskrit Texts from Giuseppe Tucci's Collection, edited by Francesco Sferra, 343–80. Manuscripta Buddhica 1. Rome: Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente (IsIAO), 2008.
Article
Tāranātha's "Twenty-One Differences with Regard to the Profound Meaning"
For a short but brilliant analysis of the positions of Dol po pa and Śākya mchog Idan we are very much indebted to the Jonang master Tāranātha, who is considered to be a follower and proponent of Dol po pa's doctrine. In each of the Twenty-one Differences with regard to the Profound Meaning a fictive initial statement of Śākya mchog Idan is followed by a similarly fictive reply of Dol po pa, Tāranātha being, of course, well aware of the fact that this is all ahistorical.'"`UNIQ--ref-000042D3-QINU`"' To be sure, it is not possible to establish Śākya mchog ldan's or Dol po pa's views on the basis of this short text alone, but it does sharpen our awareness of the subtle aspects of gźan stoṅ when studying the bulky and often not very systematic works of these masters. Furthermore, critically evaluating these doctrinal differences against the background of pertinent Indian texts in such traditions as the Madhyamaka, Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha promises to be a second interesting task. Both are, however, beyond the scope of this paper. Such an evaluation will, however, be undertaken with regard to the different presentations of trisvabhāva as an example of how one might proceed.
      Tāranātha begins his somewhat delicate task of comparing the two masters Dol po pa and Śākya mchog ldan in a conciliating manner, by explaining that both supposedly see what is profound reality and hence should not have different thoughts about it. It is only in order to accommodate the different needs of their disciples that they enunciate variant views. Even though the essential gźan stoṅ view and meditation practices of both masters are the same, there are a lot of minor differences regarding tenets (grub mtha') that arise when formulating the view on the level of apparent truth.'"`UNIQ--ref-000042D4-QINU`"'
      The first four of the twenty-one points address differences in the exegesis of the Madhyamaka and Maitreya texts which are considered to be commentaries on the Buddha's intention underlying the second and third turnings of the "Wheel of the Dharma" (dharmacakra).'"`UNIQ--ref-000042D5-QINU`"' Points 5-8 embody Śākya mchog ldan's and Dol po pa's different understanding of non-dual wisdom. In points 9-16, their views on the trisvabhāva theory are distinguished. In a related topic, Tāranātha also elaborates the different understandings of self-awareness (point 11), entities and non-entities, and conditioned and unconditioned phenonema (all in point 13). Next, our attention is drawn to different ways of relating the four noble truths with the apparent and ultimate (point 17). The last four points deal with the two masters' views on the Buddha-nature. (Mathes, "Tāranātha's 'Twenty-One Differences with Regard to the Profound Meaning'," 294–95)

Read more here . . .
Mathes, Klaus-Dieter. "Tāranātha's 'Twenty-One Differences with Regard to the Profound Meaning': Comparing the Views of the Two Gźan Stoṅ Masters Dol po pa and Śākya mchog ldan." Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 27, no. 2 (2004): 285–328. https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jiabs/article/view/8952/2845.
Article
Vajrasattva Shrine Teaching: On Buddhanature
This teaching contains excerpts from spontaneous teachings Gyatrul Rinpoche gave while sitting in the Vajrasattva shrine at his residence in Half Moon Bay one afternoon during the 2021 Vajrasattva Retreat.
Gyatrul Rinpoche. "Vajrasattva Shrine Teaching: On Buddhanature." Vimala. 2021 Online Teaching Series by Venerable Gyatrul Rinpoche. May 28th, 2021. https://vimala.org/downloads/VGR-SR-05272021-2021VSRetreat2Bnature.pdf.
Article
Vajrayana Explained
Many people find the Vajrayana teachings strange and confusing, but they offer a direct path to enlightenment. In this teaching, the late Karma Kagyu master Khenpo Karthar Rinpoche — who died on October 6, 2019 — presents a clear explanation of Vajrayana and its main practices of generation and completion, based on a song by the great seventeenth-century yogi, Karma Chakme Rinpoche.
Karthar, Khenpo. "Vajrayana Explained." Buddhadharma: The Practitioner's Quarterly, October 21, 2019.
Article
Was Mi-pham a Dialectical Monist? On a Recent Study of Mi-pham's Interpretation of the Buddha-Nature Theory
Douglas S. Duckworth’s Mipam on Buddha-Nature characterises Mi-pham’s (1846–1912) philosophy (or philosophical approach) as "dialectical monism." We should instead characterise it with a neo-Sanskritism, namely, "Yuganaddhavāada" (zung 'jug tu smra ba), lest we get bogged down by the usage of the term "dialectical monism." While Duckworth is absolutely right in identifying Mi-pham as a proponent of "dialectical monism," there is still a need to define and refine our understanding of Mi-pham's position, offer plausible explanations for it, and present various argumentative strategies employed for it by Mi-pham, all based on critically assessed textual sources that engage the idea of "unity" (zung 'jug: yuganaddha).
Wangchuk, Dorji. "Was Mi-pham a Dialectical Monist? On a Recent Study of Mi-pham's Interpretation of the Buddha-Nature Theory." Indo-Iranian Journal 55 (2012): 15–38.
Article
We Always Have Joy
The sun doesn’t stop shining just because there are clouds in the sky. Our buddhanature is always present and available, even when life gets difficult. In his book, Joyful Wisdom, Yongey Mingyur Rinpoche shows us how to discover the joy and awareness that are never affected by life’s ups and downs.
Mingyur, Yongey, 7th. "We Always Have Joy." Lion's Roar, March 26, 2019.
Article
We Are All Gzhan stong pas: Reflections on the Reflexive Nature of Awareness: A Tibetan Madhyamaka Defence by Paul Williams
The present review article discusses aspects of Paul Williams' excellent and highly recommended book, which focuses on the question of "reflexive awareness" (Tib. reng rig), Skt. svasaṃvittiḥ, svasaṃvedana) in Tibetan Mādhyamika thought. In particular, I am concerned with his characterization of so so rang rig ye shes and its relation to Rdzogs-chen teaching, and his notions of the gzhan stong doctrine and its place in the intellectual life of Far-eastern Tibet. My critical remarks on these topics are in many respects tentative, and I would welcome correspondence about them.
Kapstein, Matthew. "We Are All Gzhan stong pas: Reflections on The Reflexive Nature of Awareness: A Tibetan Madhyamaka Defence by Paul Williams." Journal of Buddhist Ethics 7 (2000): 105–25.
Article
Who Were the Icchantikas?
No abstract given. Here are the first relevant paragraphs:

According to the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, an icchantika (Tib. 'dod chen pa), therefore, is a monk who, claiming (or fancies; icchanti, Tib. 'dod pa) himself to be an Arhat, rejects the teaching of the Vaipulya — namely the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra itself— as told by Māra. Judging from the above-cited descriptions: "he ... also looks like a Mahāsattva," "'The Blessed One is impermanent. The Dharma and the Saṅgha will also become extinct. Such signs of the extinction of the Good Dharma are also evident.' — this is explained clearly in the (true) Mahāyāna (scriptures)," we may assume that icchantikas were monks who, following the traditional Mahāyāna teachings, did not approve (icchanti) of the then emerging theory of the eternity of the Tathāgata — which is the main theme of the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra.
      The word icchantika is either formed from the present active participle icchant- with the suffix -ka, as Edgerton suggested, or derived from icchā + anta. As we have seen above, the word icchant-( 'dod pa) has the meanings "fancying; claiming, maintaining; admitting, approving of" in addition to its usual definition "desiring." Accordingly, the noun icchā has the meaning "assertion, claim" in addition to "desire." What is meant by icchantika is, then, probably "one who claims." When a monk—who claimed (icchati) to be an "Arhat" also was revered as an "Arhat" or a "Mahasattva" by his followers and thus, was an authority and spiritual leader of the Buddhist community—did not recognise (nêchanti) new ideas such as the eternity of the Tathāgata and the tathāgatagarbha theory as the Buddha's teachings, then the newly-risen, would-be "Vaipulya teachings" (probably the older stratum of the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra) may have been branded as unorthodox. That is what was meant by the word "rejection" (pratikṣepa; Tib. spong ba). If a simple, common monk rejects a new theory, his voice may not reach anybody. Being rejected and condemned by none other than the authorities of the Buddhist communities, those who advocated new ideas and their followers must have faced a crisis. Then, they may have condemned the authoritative monks repeatedly as being "arrogant," "evil" and "irredeemable," as well as calling them, in a derogatory term, icchantika ("one who claims [to be an authority]") in the newly-added chapters of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra. However, if one looks at the descriptions cited above from a different point of view, those monks, who were condemned as icchantikas in the "Sutra," might have been respected conservative monks who stayed with the traditional (Mahāyāna) Buddhist teachings, while opposing new ideas concerning Buddhahood. They might have been so-called "fundamentalists" but never "evil monks."
      Those, who composed the later stratum of the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, were probably the first to label those monks, who did not approve of the eternity of the Tathāgata and the tathāgatagarbha theory, as icchantikas. Following in the wake of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, the composers of later Buddhist texts, putting forth the same tathāgatagarbha theory, continued to condemn those who did not approve of their theory, regarding them as icchantika. Claiming that their texts were part of the "true Mahāyāna" tradition, the former condemned the latter as rejecters of the "Mahāyāna" teachings.
      However, much later, the word icchantika seems to have come to be interpreted, not as meaning "one who claims" but "one who desires (transmigration)." This is clearly seen in the Ratnagotravibhāga:
   p. 28, l. 14f. ye nâpi saṃsāram icchanti yathêcchantikā ( "They are not seeking for the
      Phenomenal Life as the Icchantikas do, ... ")
   p. 29, l. 1f. tatra ye sattvā bhavâbhilāṣiṇa icchantikās tanniyatipatitā ihadhārmikā evôcyante
      mithyātvaniyataḥ satttvarāśir iti ("And here, those people who cling to this worldly life,
      i.e. the Icchantikas and those who, though belonging to this Our Religion, have
      definitely fallen into the former's way are called the group of people who confirm in
      the wrong way.")
   p. 31, l. 8f. tatra mahāyānadharmapratihatānām icchantikānām aśucisamsārâbhirati-
      viparyayeṇa bodhisattvānāṃ mahāyānadharmâdhimuktibhāvanāyāḥ śubhapāramitâdhigamaḥ
      phalaṃ draṣṭavyam ("Here, being opposite to the taking of delight in the 'impure'
      Phenomenal Life by the Icchantikas who have hatred against the Doctrine of Great
      Vehicle, it should be understood that the acquisition of the Supreme Purity is the
      result of 'Practice of the Faith in the Doctrine of Great Vehicle' by the Bodhisattvas.")
The shift in meanings of the word icchantika from "one who claims" to "one who desires (transmigration)," may indicate the actual disappearance of those, who had disapproved of the tathāgatagarbha theory, at least from the vicinity. It may further suggest that followers of the theory might have increased in number, making them much more self-confident of their theory; or that the theory itself might have come to be fully recognised as a genuine Mahāyāna teaching. (Karashima, "Who Were the Icchantikas?", 76–79)


  • Author's notes have been omitted

To read this whole article, see Vol. X of The Annual Report of The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology at Soka University
Karashima, Seishi. "Who Were the Icchantikas?" In Vol. 10, Annual Report of the International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology at Soka University for the Academic Year 2006, 67–80. Tokyo: International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology, Soka University, 2007. http://iriab.soka.ac.jp/en/publication/aririab.html
Article
Wszechprzenikliwa podstawa oświecenia, czyli o formowaniu się koncepcji tathagatagarbhy
This article aims at providing an outlook on the possible origin of tathāgatagarbha theory with a special reference to its relation to the soteriological and formal solutions found in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra and Avataṃsaka-sūtra. Through comparative textual analysis, the first work of this tradition, Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra, is shown as a text providing a metaphysical foundation for the postulate of universal Buddhahood posited by the Lotus Sutra. The realization of this postulate was possible through the implementation of 'Buddha-wisdom' (tathāgatajñāna) — a quality intrinsic to all living beings, which comes from the Tathāgata's all-encompassing compassion — taken from the "Manifestation of the Tathāgata" chapter of Avataṃsaka. By combining these influences the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra is presented as a culmination of an important soteriological trend of the early Mahāyāna, and at the same time the starting point for an influential 'buddha-nature' tradition. (Source accessed June 26, 2020)
Zapart, Jarosław. "Wszechprzenikliwa podstawa oświecenia, czyli o formowaniu się koncepcji tathagatagarbhy" (The All-Pervading Foundation of Enlightenment: Early Developments of Tathāgatagarbha Teachings). Polish Journal of the Arts and Culture 1, no. 1 (2012): 127–48. https://depot.ceon.pl/bitstream/handle/123456789/2724/JZ_-_O_formowaniu_tg.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
Article
Wŏnch'ŭk's Place in the East Asian Buddhist Tradition
Wǒnch'ǔk (613–696) was an influential Korean expatriate scholar-monk active during the seventh century in T'ang dynasty China. Considering his impact on contemporary Chinese Buddhist thought as well as on later Tibetan and Japanese Buddhist developments, it is surprising that Wǒnch'ǔk has yet to receive the attention he deserves from the academic world, including Korean scholarship. Possible explanations for this neglect are the complexity of his philosophy and the fact that one of his major works, Haesimmilgyǒng so, a commentary on the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra (The Sūtra of the Explanation of Profound Mysteries), has not been preserved in its entirety.[1] Moreover, Ch'eng wei-shih lun shu, or Sǒngyusingnon so in Korean, his commentary on the Ch'eng wei-shih lun (Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra; Treatise on the Completion of Consciousness-Only)[2]—probably his most representative work—has been lost. Despite this dearth of extant materials, what does remain unequivocally demonstrates Wǒnch'ǔk's impact on Chinese interpretations of Indian Yogācāra theories, an area of doctrine that was the subject of fervent contention among noted Sinitic scholiasts. Wǒnch'ǔk stands at the juncture between the period dominated by the translation of Indian and Central Asian Buddhist texts and the era when "Chinese Buddhism" coalesced into a distinct tradition. Given the diverse notions of "Chinese" identity evident during the cosmopolitan T'ang dynasty, during which China subsumed many different cultures and territories, I am also interested in exploring how a figure like Wǒnch'ǔk can be viewed as representing a more abstract notion of "Sinitic" identity. (Cho, introductory remarks, 173)
Cho, Eun-su. "Wŏnch'ŭk's Place in the East Asian Buddhist Tradition." In Currents and Countercurrents: Korean Influences on East Asian Buddhist Traditions, edited by Robert E. Buswell Jr., 173–216. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005.
Article
Wǒnhyo's Conception of Buddha-Nature in the Thematic Essential of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra
Wǒnhyo interprets Buddha-nature as nature of One Mind (一心). He insists that the essence of Buddha-nature is precisely the same as essence of One Mind. The essence of One Mind is only realized by the Buddha. Hence it is explained that this Mind is Buddha-nature. Wǒnhyo himself considers Buddha-nature to be the One Mind, since the essence of One Mind leaves all extremes far off, has no corresponding place and thus corresponds to every place. The essence of One Mind transcends and embraces cause and effect. Wǒnhyo interprets Buddha-nature as having the same meaning i.e. One Mind, in all Buddhist scriptures. His unique Hoe'tong (會通, harmonization) theory is focused on harmonizing different doctrines and sects within the same Buddhist Teaching. He combined all the different Buddhist theories into One Flavor (一味). Wǒnhyo did not reject the existing assertions on Buddha-nature but integrated them in a system elucidating the process of One Mind.
Kim, Young-suk. "Wǒnhyo's Conception of Buddha-Nature in the Thematic Essential of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra." International Journal of Buddhist Thought and Culture 2 (2003): 195–213. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.592.7690&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
Article
You Already Have What You’re Looking For
Yongey Mingyur Rinpoche writes that our own buddha-nature is the solution to the problems we face in contemporary times.
Mingyur, Yongey, 7th. "You Already Have What You’re Looking For." Lion's Roar, July 9, 2019.
Article
Zhanran's Arguments in Support of His Buddha-Nature Theory, as Presented in His Diamond Scalpel Treatise
The Sinicised schools of Buddhism – such as Tiantai 天台 – are deeply rooted in the Indian Buddhist teachings, but at the same time, their masters reinterpreted the inherited teachings, and attributed new meanings to the translated texts, by shifting the emphasis, changing the point of views, etc. Through the process of interpreting and reinterpreting, some new theories emerged having diametrically different ideas from those of the original Buddhist teachings. All of them are original and intriguing examples of a Chinese way of thinking and worth of being subjects of a more detailed examination. When creating commentaries to the Indian sūtras and treatises, the Chinese masters elaborated their own theories. Rather than the word by word, sentence by sentence type of commentaries, these commentaries attempting to explain and expand the 'subtle' meaning of a parable, a symbol or certain characters, proved to be more adequate to the purpose of elaborating original, ingenious ideas, reaching far beyond the original textual meaning, and the presupposed intention of the author or translator.'"`UNIQ--ref-000001C5-QINU`"' A typical example of such approach is the magnum opus of the de facto founder of the Tiantai school, Zhiyi 智顗 (538–597), The Subtle Meaning of the Lotus Sūtra (Miaofa lianhua jing xuanyi 妙法蓮華經玄義; T33: 1716), where the author presents the basic tenets of the Tiantai school, in the form of explaining the character 'miao' 妙 (meaning 'subtle' or 'wonderful'), the very first character of the most well-known Chinese translation of the Lotus Sūtra.'"`UNIQ--ref-000001C6-QINU`"' In the eyes of the author (and his followers), this single character offers sufficient basis to expound his novel insights, in a way that, despite their novelty, are at the same time linked to the Buddhist tradition. A substantial part of the lengthy commentary is centered on the 'explanation' of the term 'subtle'. According to Zhiyi, this notion is the best expression of ultimate reality. 'For Chih-i the word 'subtle' symbolizes and summarizes that which is beyond conceptual understanding, and thus it is the word most appropriate to describe reality, which is ultimately indescribable."`UNIQ--ref-000001C7-QINU`"'
      From this, we can draw the conclusions that for a Tang Dynasty (618–907) monk, trained on the teachings and traditions of a Sinitic school of Buddhism, the title of a Buddhist writing is highly important, for mainly two reasons: (1.) it can bear the very essence, the 'subtle' meaning of the whole work, and (2.) it can serve as an anchor, that bounds it to the 'original' Buddhist teachings, serving as a means of legitimatisation, at the same time. These two aims can be detected in Zhanran's'"`UNIQ--ref-000001C8-QINU`"' 湛然 (711−782) choice of the title for his Diamond Scalpel (Jin’gang bei 金剛錍; T46:1932) treatise. The Diamond Scalpel treatise, in one fascicle, written in his old age, is a relatively short work, compared to his lengthy commentaries, yet well deserves to be considered his most creative, genuine work. The main theme of the treatise is the Tiantai interpretation of the teaching of Buddha-nature, as inherently including insentient realm, as well as all sentient beings. While expounding the topic, and presenting his arguments, the main tenets of the Tiantai school emerge one after the another, offering the reader a complete picture of the self and the world, suffering and the ways to liberation, etc. – i.e. problems of utmost importance for a Buddhist practitioner –, as seen by a Tang Dynasty Buddhist monk. At a first reading, the title of the treatise does not seem to tell us a lot about its content, but taking a closer look, and applying a more careful, meticulous examination, we find that Zhanran's choice of title must have been the result of a thoughtful consideration, for it perfectly suites the above mentioned two criteria. Following Zhiyi’s legacy, Zhanran chooses a title, which 'symbolizes and summarizes' the main issues to be discussed in his treatise. More precisely, first of all, it hides an allusion to a simile from a mahāyāna sūtra (thought to render the words of the Buddha), and thus anchors, bounds the whole work to the 'original' teachings of the Buddha, and secondly, after decoding the symbols and references, and interpreting them in the light of Tiantai philosophy, we find that these three characters can truly be regarded the quintessence of the work, the very argument in support of the theory of Buddha-nature of the insentient. Zhanran, following the example of his great predecessor, Zhiyi, expounds and argues based on the most important texts and tenets of mahāyāna Buddhism, while interpreting, reinterpreting, and often furnishing these with new, ingenious meanings.
      First, we are going to examine the provenance and possible interpretations of the title – i.e. the context in which the basic notions appear, before Zhanran's time –, Zhanran's own explanation of the title, i.e. the very first paragraph of his work, and further interpretations of the title (and its explanation) found in later commentaries, written to the treatise, by Tang and Song Dynasty monks. Through this one, particular example we can get a glimpse into the complex process of how Chinese monks interpreted and reinterpreted the texts inherited from India, the way in which through focusing on, and/or consciously selecting certain motifs, similes or even terms, embellished these with new meanings, which were further used as tools to prove their own ideas and theories, as if these were identical with the original teachings of Buddha Śākyamuni. Secondly, we are going to examine the most important arguments Zhanran is using to prove his theory about the Buddha-nature of the insentient. I will argue that these arguments can be grouped around two key concepts, already concealed within the title. (Pap, "Zhanran’s Arguments in Support of his Buddha-Nature Theory," 129–130)
Pap, Melinda. "Zhanran's Arguments in Support of His Buddha-Nature Theory, as Presented in His Diamond Scalpel Treatise: Starting from an Analysis of the Title." Paper presented at the International Symposium of Tiantai Studies: From Tiantai to Hiei; Transborder and Transcultural Spread of Tiantai/Chontae/Tendai/ Buddhism and East Asian Societies, Peking University, Beijing, China, Dec. 6–8, 2019.
Article
Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanādanirdeśa
The Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanādanirdeśa (ŚSN; The Lion's Roar Teaching of Queen Śrīmālā) is one of the most famous Mahāyāna sūtras representative of the Tathāgatagarbha theory. In this sūtra, Queen Śrīmāla, who is the daughter of King Prasenajit of Śrāvasti and is married to King Yaśomitra of Ayodhyā, relates her understanding of the true doctrine (saddharma) to which the Lord Buddha listens and gives his affirmation. This sūtra employs the narrative of Queen Śrīmālā to express the Tathāgatagarbha theory that "although all beings are enmired in afflictions (kleśa), in essence they are the same as the Buddha, that is, all living beings dwell within the womb (garbha) of the Tathāgata (i.e., Buddha)." Since this sūtra, like the Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra, is being expounded by a layperson instead of the Buddha, it is representative of the non-monastic form of religion typical of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and historically enjoyed immense popularity in China and Japan.
      There are two Chinese translations of the sūtra: the Guṇabhadra (求那跋陀羅) version translated in A. D. 436 called the Shengman shizihou yicheng dafangbian fangguang jing 勝鬘師子吼一乘大方便方廣經, T. 353, vol. 12 <ŚSN (Ch.1)>); and the Bodhiruci (菩提流支) version of A. D. 710 called the Shengman furen hui (勝鬘夫人會, T. 310(48), vol. 11 <ŚSN(Ch.2)> ), which is the 48th sūtra of the Ratnakūṭa collection (Da bao ji jing 大寶積經) There is also a ninth century Tibetan translation called the 'Phags pa Iha mo dpal 'phren gi seṅ ge'i sgra śes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo <ŚSN(Tib.)>. The English translation by Alex and Hideko Wayman is based on the Chinese translation.'"`UNIQ--ref-000042F1-QINU`"' Readers are referred to this work for more detailed information. There is also a great deal of research that has been done on this sūtra by Japanese scholars, which we will not touch upon here.
      The original version of this sūtra has been lost, and there are only a few fragmentary quotations in Sanskrit in the Ratnagotravibhāga and the Śikṣāsamuccaya. In The Schøyen Collection, however, I was able to discover three virtually complete folios that cover the final portion of the sūtra as well as another two fragments related to other sections. As the sūtra ends on the recto side of folio no. 392,'"`UNIQ--ref-000042F2-QINU`"' the verso side of the same folio begins another sūtra which is the subject of the next report in this volume. In the following, I will introduce the above mentioned three folios and two fragments related to the ŚSN. (Matsuda, "Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanādanirdeśa," 65)
Matsuda, Kazunobu. "Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanādanirdeśa." In Vol. 1 of Buddhist Manuscripts, edited by Jens Braarvig, Jens-Uwe Hartmann, Kazunobu Matsuda, and Lore Sander, 65–76. Manuscripts in the Schøyen Collection 1. Oslo: Hermes Publishing, 2000. https://www.hermesbooks.no/bmsc-i
Article
Śākya mchog ldan's Literary Heritage in Bhutan
The first part of this article will shed light on the unique role played by the 9th Je khenpo Śākya Rin chen (1709/10-1759) of Bhutan in the preservation of Śākya mchog ldan's texts in Bhutan. Not only did Śākya Rin chen effectuate the physical preservation of the actual texts, but he also promoted their study in the monastic colleges, thereby enfusing vitality into the tradition of understanding their meaning and ensuring the continuity of this transmission of knowledge.
      The second part will demonstrate the immense value of the preservation of these texts by giving an example of Śākya mchog ldan's writings, in the form of an English translation of his Rgyud bla ma'i rnam bshad sngon med nyi ma,[1] a commentary on The Rgyud Blama- also known as The Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra- in which he outlines his hermeneutical schema for understanding the Buddha nature.
      The third part will list the titles contained in Śākya mchog ldan's Collected Works reproduced and published in Bhutan in 1975 according to the copies kept at The National Library, Thimphu, including provisional references of published studies in English that have dealt with them.


Notes
  1. In Śākya mchog ldan's Collected Works, 'dzam gling sangs rgyas bstan pa'i rgyan mchog yongs rdzogs gnas lngar mkhyen pa'i pandita chen po gser mdog pan chen shākya mchog ldan gyi gsung 'bum legs bshad gser gyi bdud rtsi, vol. 13, Thimphu 1975.
Burchardi, Anne. "Śākya mchog ldan's Literary Heritage in Bhutan." In Vol. 2 of Written Treasures of Bhutan: Mirror of the Past and Bridge to the Future; Proceedings of the First International Conference on the Rich Scriptural Heritage of Bhutan, edited by John A. Ardussi and Sonam Tobgay, 25–74. Thimphu: National Library and Archives of Bhutan, 2008.
Article
Śākya mchog-ldan on gotra in Yogācāra and Madhyamaka
This paper is being presented as part of a panel on the topic of Reformulations of Yogācāra in Tibet. Particularly, it relates to Tibetan commentary on Abhisamayālaṃkāra (AA) I:39, in which it is taught that the foundation (pratiṣṭhā) for religious practice is the dharmadhātu and that since the dharmadhātu is undifferentiated (asaṃbhedā), there are ultimately no distinct gotras corresponding to the three vehicles. This teaching is usually interpreted as a Mādhyamaka justification for one final vehicle, as opposed to the three-vehicle theory, attributed to Cittamātra/Vijñaptimātratā, and which is closely related to the doctrine of three gotras found in sutras such as Saṃdhinirmocana and Laṅkāvatāra and śāstras such as Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra. However, there are some Tibetan writers outside the influential Gelug tradition who see the equation of gotra with dharmadhātu as an essentially Yogācāra doctrine. This alternative viewpoint implies that Yogācāra and Cittamātra are not, as is commonly held to be the case, the same thing and brings to the fore the question of whether Yogācāra is better understood as a tradition that transcends traditional doxographic categories. Through an analysis of Śākya-mchog-ldan’s explanation of AA I:39, which includes a differentiation of two other terms that are also often held to be synonymous, namely gotra and buddha-essense (or tathāgatagarbha), I aim to highlight some of the ways in which his ‘reformulation’ of Yogācāra implies a reformulation of certain Cittamātra doctrines. Finally, I conclude the paper with a brief discussion on the extent to which doxographical discourse both restricts and allows for the formulation of an individual point of view. (Gilks, introduction, 1)
Gilks, Peter. "Śākya mchog-ldan on gotra in Yogācāra and Madhyamaka." Paper presented at the 17th Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Vienna, August 2014.

anātman - The nonexistence of the self as a permanent, unchanging entity. Skt. अनात्मन् Tib. བདག་མེད་པ་ Ch. 无我

bodhi - Enlightenment or awakening. In Tibetan it is translated as "purified" (byang) and "perfected" (chub), which corresponds to Siddhartha Gautama's achievement of purifying all obscurations and perfecting or attaining all qualities associated with a buddha. Skt. बोधि Tib. བྱང་ཆུབ་ Ch. 菩提,悟,覺

prabhāsvaratā - In a general sense, that which clears away darkness, though it often appears in Buddhist literature in reference to the mind or its nature. It is a particularly salient feature of Tantric literature, especially in regard to the advanced meditation techniques of the completion-stage yogas. Skt. प्रभास्वर Tib. འོད་གསལ་ Ch. 光明

Bodhisattva - A person who seeks enlightenment for the sake of others. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, a Bodhisattva is a compassionate being who is training on the path to Buddhahood and aspires to eliminate the suffering of all beings and take all sentient beings to the state of enlightenment. The Mahāyāna sūtras including those on buddha-nature generally have Bodhisattvas as the main audience or interlocutors for the Buddha's discourses. Skt. बोधिसत्त्व Tib. བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས་དཔའ། Ch. 菩薩

The Awakening of Faith is a key source text for buddha-nature theory in East Asian Buddhism.

The Awakening of Faith is a key source text for buddha-nature theory in East Asian Buddhism.

prabhāsvaratā - In a general sense, that which clears away darkness, though it often appears in Buddhist literature in reference to the mind or its nature. It is a particularly salient feature of Tantric literature, especially in regard to the advanced meditation techniques of the completion-stage yogas. Skt. प्रभास्वर Tib. འོད་གསལ་ Ch. 光明

bīja - A seed, commonly used figuratively in the sense of something which has the potential to develop or grow, and likewise as the basic cause for this development or growth. Skt. बीज Tib. ས་བོན་ Ch. 無漏種

An important sūtra source for the Ratnagotravibhāga, particularly for its discussion of the nine examples that illustrate how all sentient beings possess buddha-nature.

abhidharma - Abhidharma generally refers to the corpus of Buddhist texts which deals with the typological, phenomenological, metaphysical, and epistemological presentation of Buddhist concepts and teachings. The abhidharma teachings present a meta-knowledge of Buddhist sūtras through analytical and systemic schemas and are said to focus on developing wisdom among the three principles of training. The Abhidharma is presented alongside Sūtra and Vinaya as one of the three baskets of the teachings of the Buddha. Skt. अभिधर्म Tib. ཆོས་མངོན་པ། Ch. 阿毗达磨

buddhadhātu - A synonym for tathāgatagarbha widely used throughout the East Asian Buddhist traditions, as found in its translations as the Chinese term fó xìng and Japanese term busshō. Skt. बुद्धधातु Tib. སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་ཁམས་ Ch. 佛性

"This sūtra became an important scriptural source for the discussion of buddha-nature in China and is famous for associating the term buddhadhātu with tathāgatagarbha.

BEFEO - Bulletin d'École Française d'Extrême-Orient

Descent into Laṅka Sūtra, a very influential text in East Asia and Nepal.

One of the sūtra sources for the Ratnagotravibhāga, which is only extant in its Chinese translation.

bodhigarbha - An alternative term for tathāgatagarbha found in early Nyingma sources. Though it is back-translated as bodhigarbha, this term does not seem to be found in Sanskrit sources. However, in other contexts, the Tibetan byang chub snying po is often used to translate the Sanskrit term bodhimaṇḍa, which is often translated as the "seat of enlightenment." Skt. बोधिगर्भ Tib. བྱང་ཆུབ་སྙིང་པོ་

bodhigarbha - An alternative term for tathāgatagarbha found in early Nyingma sources. Though it is back-translated as bodhigarbha, this term does not seem to be found in Sanskrit sources. However, in other contexts, the Tibetan byang chub snying po is often used to translate the Sanskrit term bodhimaṇḍa, which is often translated as the "seat of enlightenment." Skt. बोधिगर्भ Tib. བྱང་ཆུབ་སྙིང་པོ་

sugatagarbha - Literally, the "essence" or "heart of the Bliss Gone One(s)," a synonym for tathāgatagarbha that is likewise often rendered into English by the term buddha-nature. Though it is often back translated into Sanskrit as sugatagarbha, this term is not found in Sanskrit sources. Skt. सुगतगर्भ Tib. བདེ་གཤེགས་སྙིང་པོ་

One of the tathāgatagarbha sūtras.

sugatagarbha - Literally, the "essence" or "heart of the Bliss Gone One(s)," a synonym for tathāgatagarbha that is likewise often rendered into English by the term buddha-nature. Though it is often back translated into Sanskrit as sugatagarbha, this term is not found in Sanskrit sources. Skt. सुगतगर्भ Tib. བདེ་གཤེགས་སྙིང་པོ་

amalavijñāna - The ninth consciousness, the immaculate pure mind. Ch. 啊摩羅識,無垢識

advaya - Literally, "without duality," it refers to that which is indivisible, in that it is not divided into two. Skt. अद्वय Tib. གཉིས་མེད་ Ch. 不二

buddhadhātu - A synonym for tathāgatagarbha widely used throughout the East Asian Buddhist traditions, as found in its translations as the Chinese term fó xìng and Japanese term busshō. Skt. बुद्धधातु Tib. སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་ཁམས་ Ch. 佛性

"This sūtra became an important scriptural source for the discussion of buddha-nature in China and is famous for associating the term buddhadhātu with tathāgatagarbha.

prabhāsvaratā - In a general sense, that which clears away darkness, though it often appears in Buddhist literature in reference to the mind or its nature. It is a particularly salient feature of Tantric literature, especially in regard to the advanced meditation techniques of the completion-stage yogas. Skt. प्रभास्वर Tib. འོད་གསལ་ Ch. 光明

Bodhisattva - A person who seeks enlightenment for the sake of others. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, a Bodhisattva is a compassionate being who is training on the path to Buddhahood and aspires to eliminate the suffering of all beings and take all sentient beings to the state of enlightenment. The Mahāyāna sūtras including those on buddha-nature generally have Bodhisattvas as the main audience or interlocutors for the Buddha's discourses. Skt. बोधिसत्त्व Tib. བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས་དཔའ། Ch. 菩薩

bodhicitta - The altruistic thought to seek enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings. It is said to have two aspects: compassion aimed at sentient beings and their problems and the wisdom of enlightenment as the solution. Skt. बोधिचित्त Tib. བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས། Ch. 菩提心

bodhi - Enlightenment or awakening. In Tibetan it is translated as "purified" (byang) and "perfected" (chub), which corresponds to Siddhartha Gautama's achievement of purifying all obscurations and perfecting or attaining all qualities associated with a buddha. Skt. बोधि Tib. བྱང་ཆུབ་ Ch. 菩提,悟,覺

prabhāsvaratā - In a general sense, that which clears away darkness, though it often appears in Buddhist literature in reference to the mind or its nature. It is a particularly salient feature of Tantric literature, especially in regard to the advanced meditation techniques of the completion-stage yogas. Skt. प्रभास्वर Tib. འོད་གསལ་ Ch. 光明

avidyā - Literally "unknowing," it refers to a lack of knowledge or misunderstanding of the nature of reality. As such, it is considered to be the root cause of suffering and the basis for the arising of all other negative mental factors. Skt. अविद्या Tib. མ་རིག་པ་ Ch. 無明

advaya - Literally, "without duality," it refers to that which is indivisible, in that it is not divided into two. Skt. अद्वय Tib. གཉིས་མེད་ Ch. 不二

vinaya - Vinaya refers to the corpus of Buddhist teachings on moral discipline and precepts and is one of the three canonical sets of teachings alongside Sūtra and Abhidharma. It also refers to the monastic tradition which has been passed down since the Buddha's time until our time. Skt. विनय Tib. འདུལ་བ། Ch. 毘奈耶

avidyā - Literally "unknowing," it refers to a lack of knowledge or misunderstanding of the nature of reality. As such, it is considered to be the root cause of suffering and the basis for the arising of all other negative mental factors. Skt. अविद्या Tib. མ་རིག་པ་ Ch. 無明

Ngok Tradition - Ngok Lotsāwa Loden Sherab's "analytic tradition" of exegesis of the Uttaratantra; one of two major Tibetan traditions of exegesis, both stemming from students of Sajjana. Tib. རྔོག་ལུགས་

Ngok Tradition - Ngok Lotsāwa Loden Sherab's "analytic tradition" of exegesis of the Uttaratantra; one of two major Tibetan traditions of exegesis, both stemming from students of Sajjana. Tib. རྔོག་ལུགས་

Tsen Tradition - Tsen Khawoche's "meditative tradition" of exegesis of the Uttaratantra; it is one of two major Tibetan traditions of exegesis, both stemming from students of Sajjana. Tib. བཙན་ལུགས་

Tsen Tradition - Tsen Khawoche's "meditative tradition" of exegesis of the Uttaratantra; it is one of two major Tibetan traditions of exegesis, both stemming from students of Sajjana. Tib. བཙན་ལུགས་

Ngok Tradition - Ngok Lotsāwa Loden Sherab's "analytic tradition" of exegesis of the Uttaratantra; one of two major Tibetan traditions of exegesis, both stemming from students of Sajjana. Tib. རྔོག་ལུགས་

Ngok Tradition - Ngok Lotsāwa Loden Sherab's "analytic tradition" of exegesis of the Uttaratantra; one of two major Tibetan traditions of exegesis, both stemming from students of Sajjana. Tib. རྔོག་ལུགས་

Tsen Tradition - Tsen Khawoche's "meditative tradition" of exegesis of the Uttaratantra; it is one of two major Tibetan traditions of exegesis, both stemming from students of Sajjana. Tib. བཙན་ལུགས་

Cittamātra - Though it is sometimes used synonymously with Yogācāra, it is in fact one of the more prominent philosophical theories associated with this school. It asserts that the objects in the external world with which we interact are actually mentally created representations appearing as those objects. The character of these perceptions is predetermined by our own karmic conditioning that is stored in the ālayavijñāna. Skt. चित्तमात्र Tib. སེམས་ཙམ་

prabhāsvaratā - In a general sense, that which clears away darkness, though it often appears in Buddhist literature in reference to the mind or its nature. It is a particularly salient feature of Tantric literature, especially in regard to the advanced meditation techniques of the completion-stage yogas. Skt. प्रभास्वर Tib. འོད་གསལ་ Ch. 光明

Tsen Tradition - Tsen Khawoche's "meditative tradition" of exegesis of the Uttaratantra; it is one of two major Tibetan traditions of exegesis, both stemming from students of Sajjana. Tib. བཙན་ལུགས་

AMS - Aṅgulimālīyasūtra

bīja - A seed, commonly used figuratively in the sense of something which has the potential to develop or grow, and likewise as the basic cause for this development or growth. Skt. बीज Tib. ས་བོན་ Ch. 無漏種

bodhicitta - The altruistic thought to seek enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings. It is said to have two aspects: compassion aimed at sentient beings and their problems and the wisdom of enlightenment as the solution. Skt. बोधिचित्त Tib. བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས། Ch. 菩提心

Atiyoga - A system of esoteric thought and practice associated with the Nyingma tradition and equivalent to Great Perfection, it is considered as the pinnacle of the nine vehicles or paths one can follow to reach Buddhahood. The system focusses on the pure, luminous and empty nature of the mind as the ground reality which must be realised through the path of trekchö and thögal practice. Skt. अतियोग Tib. ཨ་ཏི་ཡོ་ག,ཤིན་ཏུ་རྣལ་འབྱོར།

Cittamātra - Though it is sometimes used synonymously with Yogācāra, it is in fact one of the more prominent philosophical theories associated with this school. It asserts that the objects in the external world with which we interact are actually mentally created representations appearing as those objects. The character of these perceptions is predetermined by our own karmic conditioning that is stored in the ālayavijñāna. Skt. चित्तमात्र Tib. སེམས་ཙམ་

A lost Yogācāra sūtra, which is preserved only in a few quotes in other Yogācāra texts.

amalavijñāna - The ninth consciousness, the immaculate pure mind. Ch. 啊摩羅識,無垢識

amalavijñāna - The ninth consciousness, the immaculate pure mind. Ch. 啊摩羅識,無垢識

sugatagarbha - Literally, the "essence" or "heart of the Bliss Gone One(s)," a synonym for tathāgatagarbha that is likewise often rendered into English by the term buddha-nature. Though it is often back translated into Sanskrit as sugatagarbha, this term is not found in Sanskrit sources. Skt. सुगतगर्भ Tib. བདེ་གཤེགས་སྙིང་པོ་

An important sūtra source for the Ratnagotravibhāga, particularly for its discussion of the nine examples that illustrate how all sentient beings possess buddha-nature.

byams chos sde lnga - This refers to a series of five texts that, according to the Tibetan tradition, Asaṅga received directly from Maitreya in the pure realm of Tuṣita. Tib. བྱམས་ཆོས་སྡེ་ལྔ་

anātman - The nonexistence of the self as a permanent, unchanging entity. Skt. अनात्मन् Tib. བདག་མེད་པ་ Ch. 无我

abhidharma - Abhidharma generally refers to the corpus of Buddhist texts which deals with the typological, phenomenological, metaphysical, and epistemological presentation of Buddhist concepts and teachings. The abhidharma teachings present a meta-knowledge of Buddhist sūtras through analytical and systemic schemas and are said to focus on developing wisdom among the three principles of training. The Abhidharma is presented alongside Sūtra and Vinaya as one of the three baskets of the teachings of the Buddha. Skt. अभिधर्म Tib. ཆོས་མངོན་པ། Ch. 阿毗达磨

byams chos sde lnga - This refers to a series of five texts that, according to the Tibetan tradition, Asaṅga received directly from Maitreya in the pure realm of Tuṣita. Tib. བྱམས་ཆོས་སྡེ་ལྔ་

Cittamātra - Though it is sometimes used synonymously with Yogācāra, it is in fact one of the more prominent philosophical theories associated with this school. It asserts that the objects in the external world with which we interact are actually mentally created representations appearing as those objects. The character of these perceptions is predetermined by our own karmic conditioning that is stored in the ālayavijñāna. Skt. चित्तमात्र Tib. སེམས་ཙམ་

Brahman - Brahman is the universal principle, supreme truth or ultimate reality in the Hindu religion considered to be absolute, eternal and blissful. A metaphysical concept, it is described as the single binding unity behind the diversity of all that exists. In Buddhism, while this metaphysical principle is not presented, one finds frequent mention of the deity named Brahmā, who is the personification of this principle. Skt. ब्रह्मन् Tib. ཚངས་པ།

BSOAS - Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies

AA - Abhisamayālaṃkāra

byams chos sde lnga - This refers to a series of five texts that, according to the Tibetan tradition, Asaṅga received directly from Maitreya in the pure realm of Tuṣita. Tib. བྱམས་ཆོས་སྡེ་ལྔ་

arhat - A person who has reached nirvāṇa by eliminating the three poisons of attachment, hatred and ignorance having followed the path of seeking individual liberation as a Śrāvaka or a Pratyekabuddha. An arhat, thus, is a person who has overcome the cause of rebirth in the cycle of existence and will not take an ordinary birth again. Skt. अर्हत् Tib. དགྲ་བཅོམ་པ། Ch. 阿羅漢

Cittamātra - Though it is sometimes used synonymously with Yogācāra, it is in fact one of the more prominent philosophical theories associated with this school. It asserts that the objects in the external world with which we interact are actually mentally created representations appearing as those objects. The character of these perceptions is predetermined by our own karmic conditioning that is stored in the ālayavijñāna. Skt. चित्तमात्र Tib. སེམས་ཙམ་

One of the more prominent sūtra sources for the Uttaratantra, this text tells of the story of Śrīmālādevī taking up the Buddhist path at the behest of her royal parents based on a prophecy of the Buddha.

One of the more prominent sūtra sources for the Uttaratantra, this text tells of the story of Śrīmālādevī taking up the Buddhist path at the behest of her royal parents based on a prophecy of the Buddha.

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