Luminous Heart

From Buddha-Nature

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<blockquote>While the stream of the Narmadā<ref>The image here alludes to this river being considered as very holy by Hindus—even its mere sight is said to wash away all one’s negative deeds. (It rises on the summit of Mount Amarakaṇṭaka in Madhya Pradesh in central India, and after a westerly course of about eight hundred miles ends in the Gulf of Cambay below the city of Bharuch.)</ref> river of virtue<br>Washes away the stains of the mind,<br>With the waves of the virtues of the two accumulations rolling high,<br>May it merge with the ocean of the qualities of the victorious ones.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>While the stream of the Narmadā<ref>The image here alludes to this river being considered as very holy by Hindus—even its mere sight is said to wash away all one’s negative deeds. (It rises on the summit of Mount Amarakaṇṭaka in Madhya Pradesh in central India, and after a westerly course of about eight hundred miles ends in the Gulf of Cambay below the city of Bharuch.)</ref> river of virtue<br>Washes away the stains of the mind,<br>With the waves of the virtues of the two accumulations rolling high,<br>May it merge with the ocean of the qualities of the victorious ones.</blockquote>
  
This was composed by Karmapa Ogyen Trinley Dorje as an auspicious aspiration for the publication of the precious teachings called ''The Eight Great Texts of Sūtra and Tantra'' by the supreme Dzogchen Ponlop Karma Sungrap Ngedön Tenpe Gyaltsen on April 18, 2004 (Buddhist Era 2548). May it be auspicious.
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''This was composed by Karmapa Ogyen Trinley Dorje as an auspicious aspiration for the publication of the precious teachings called'' The Eight Great Texts of Sūtra and Tantra ''by the supreme Dzogchen Ponlop Karma Sungrap Ngedön Tenpe Gyaltsen on April 18, 2004 (Buddhist Era 2548). May it be auspicious.''
  
 
   
 
   
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''Karmapa Ogyen Trinley Dorje<br>Gyütö Ramoche Temple<br>July 19, 2002 (Buddhist Era 2547)''
 
''Karmapa Ogyen Trinley Dorje<br>Gyütö Ramoche Temple<br>July 19, 2002 (Buddhist Era 2547)''
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===Foreword by The Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche===
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The Third Karmapa, Rangjung Dorje, is regarded as the architect of the
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Karma Kagyü interpretations of the view on buddha nature and other key
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topics that later became central to the philosophical school known as ''Shentong'' (“empty of other”). His writings became the authoritative basis for the standard Karma Kagyü position on buddha nature and the touchstone for the writings of subsequent lineage authors on the subject of buddha nature and ''shentong'', such as the eighth Karmapa, Mikyö Dorje. Rangjung Dorje’s three most renowned treatises are ''The Profound Inner Reality'' (Tib. zab mo nang don), ''The Distinction between Consciousness and Wisdom'' (Tib. rnam shes ye shes ’byed pa), and ''Pointing Out the Tathāgata Heart'' (Tib. snying po bstan pa). His main work, ''The Profound Inner Reality'', is one of the most complete elucidations of the Buddhist teachings on the completion stage practices of the Anuttarayogatantra. ''The Distinction between Consciousness and Wisdom'' explains the mahāyāna theory of eight consciousnesses and their transformation into the five wisdoms. ''Pointing Out the Tathāgata Heart'' clarifies the Buddha’s teachings on ''tathāgathagarbha''. The latter two texts are known as "the two lesser treatises of Rangjung Dorje."<br>
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{{6nbsp}}The teachings from these three treatises play an essential role for practitioners of vajrayāna Buddhism by providing an overview which enriches the meditator's understanding of the complete transformative path of vajrayāna. The Karma Kagyü lineage is heir to both of the great mahāyāna traditions of emptiness—''Rangtong'' Madhyamaka ("Empty-of-self Middle Way”) and ''Shentong'' Madhyamaka ("Empty-of-other Middle Way"). It is commonly understood in this lineage that the ''rangtong'' approach is needed to determine and gain certainty in the right view, while ''shentong'' is required for the practice of meditation. This combination of the right view of emptiness and the meditative experience of luminous buddha nature is considered to be jointly
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necessary for complete awakening.<br>
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{{6nbsp}}While the Eighth Karmapa, Mikyö Dorje, and his followers emphasized the view of genuine emptiness that comes from the Madhyamaka teachings of the great Indian master Nāgārjuna, Rangjung Dorje and, later, Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé emphasized the luminous empty mind of buddha nature, which is mainly presented in the treatises of the great Indian masters Maitreya and Asaṅga. Thus, the Karma Kagyü lineage inherits the great treasure of the complete teachings of both mahāyāna lineages.<br>
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{{6nbsp}}It is my great delight that Dr. Brunnhölzl has translated the crucial passages on the view in ''The Profound Reality'' as well as the two lesser treatises with their commentaries. Karl has been studying and practicing Buddhism for many decades under the guidance of great Buddhist masters, such as the Venerable Khenchen Tsültrim Gyatso Rinpoche. An accomplished translator, Karl is also skilled in presenting the most complicated and intricate subjects in a clear and direct manner, as well as in leading meditation trainings. This work is an invaluable gift and great contribution to Western Buddhism. I trust that this book will bring great insight and genuine benefit for all readers.
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Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche<br>
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Nalanda West<br>
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Seattle, Washington<br>
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September 22, 2008<br>
  
  
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===Introduction===
 
===Introduction===
  
====The Indian Yogācāra background====
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====The Indian Yogācāra Background====
  
 
In certain parts of the Eastern as well as the Western academic traditions, the Yogācāra School has often been neglected or misrepresented, usually in favor of assigning the "pole position" among Buddhist schools to Madhyamaka (in particular, to its Prāsaṅgika brand). There are many reasons for this, but two of the main ones are (1) making superficial and out-of-context judgments based on a unidimensional understanding and discussion of what seem to be stereotypical "buzz words" (such as ''cittamātra'') and (2) not treating the concepts and explanations of Yogācāra in their own terms, but looking at them through the lenses of other philosophical systems. As Nguyen says:
 
In certain parts of the Eastern as well as the Western academic traditions, the Yogācāra School has often been neglected or misrepresented, usually in favor of assigning the "pole position" among Buddhist schools to Madhyamaka (in particular, to its Prāsaṅgika brand). There are many reasons for this, but two of the main ones are (1) making superficial and out-of-context judgments based on a unidimensional understanding and discussion of what seem to be stereotypical "buzz words" (such as ''cittamātra'') and (2) not treating the concepts and explanations of Yogācāra in their own terms, but looking at them through the lenses of other philosophical systems. As Nguyen says:
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<blockquote>Neither the eye, the ear, nor the nose is valid cognition,<br>Nor is the tongue, the body, or mentation valid cognition.<br>If these sense faculties were valid cognition,<br>Whom would the path of noble ones do any good?<ref>This is ''Samādhirājasūtra'' IX.23. </ref></blockquote>
 
<blockquote>Neither the eye, the ear, nor the nose is valid cognition,<br>Nor is the tongue, the body, or mentation valid cognition.<br>If these sense faculties were valid cognition,<br>Whom would the path of noble ones do any good?<ref>This is ''Samādhirājasūtra'' IX.23. </ref></blockquote>
  
<blockquote>. . . If one speaks about "the seeming" and states that "what accords with afflicted phenomena is explained as flaws" and "what accords with purified phenomena is explained to be excellent" [and yet claims that] these are nothing but mere verbiage, how could one explain anything to be excellent, explain anything as a flaw, or actually accept any seeming phenomena without doubt? In other words, if these too were [utterly] nonexistent, how could [the Buddha] speak of existence on the level of the seeming? Through denying all afflicted and purified phenomena, one could not express anything, since one would not abide in [knowing] what is the case and what is not the case and moreover refute one's own statements.</blockquote>
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<blockquote>. . . If one speaks about "the seeming" and states that "what accords with afflicted phenomena is explained as flaws" and "what accords with purified phenomena is explained to be excellent" [and yet claims that] these are nothing but mere verbiage, how could one explain anything to be excellent, explain anything as a flaw, or actually accept any seeming phenomena without doubt? In other words, if these too were [utterly] nonexistent, how could [the Buddha] speak of existence on the level of the seeming? Through denying all afflicted and purified phenomena, one could not express anything, since one would not abide in [knowing] what is the case and what is not the case and moreover refute one's own statements.<ref>P5562, fols. 127b.6–128a.5. That the general characteristic of all phenomena is suchness is explained by both Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva in their commentaries on ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' II.26 (P5551, fol. 180a.6–7 and D4051, fols. 230b.7–231a.1; for details, see below).</ref></blockquote>
  
 
This points to two of the main misconceptions that explain why the Yogācāras saw a need to interpret the message of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras in terms of the three natures. Obviously, since these sūtras themselves teach one to reject what is afflicted and practice or adopt what is pure, in terms of the path, it makes no sense to simply take emptiness as meaning that nothing whatsoever exists on any level of reality, because then there is nothing to adopt or to reject. Thus, given the emptiness of all phenomena on the ultimate level, the existence of skandhas, karmic actions, a person, adopting, rejecting, and so on can only be, and must be accepted on, the level of seeming reality. However, within that level, one needs to further distinguish clearly between mere imaginary labels (such as the person) and the functional phenomena (such as skandhas and actions) that are taken as the bases for such labeling and perform the functions to be worked with on the path, even though both do not exist ultimately (neither does the path that nevertheless leads to the realization of the ultimate). Thus, verses 23–24 of Vasubandhu's ''Triṃśikā'' state:
 
This points to two of the main misconceptions that explain why the Yogācāras saw a need to interpret the message of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras in terms of the three natures. Obviously, since these sūtras themselves teach one to reject what is afflicted and practice or adopt what is pure, in terms of the path, it makes no sense to simply take emptiness as meaning that nothing whatsoever exists on any level of reality, because then there is nothing to adopt or to reject. Thus, given the emptiness of all phenomena on the ultimate level, the existence of skandhas, karmic actions, a person, adopting, rejecting, and so on can only be, and must be accepted on, the level of seeming reality. However, within that level, one needs to further distinguish clearly between mere imaginary labels (such as the person) and the functional phenomena (such as skandhas and actions) that are taken as the bases for such labeling and perform the functions to be worked with on the path, even though both do not exist ultimately (neither does the path that nevertheless leads to the realization of the ultimate). Thus, verses 23–24 of Vasubandhu's ''Triṃśikā'' state:
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<blockquote>The first one lacks a nature<br>In terms of characteristics; the next one<br>Lacks existence on its own,<br>And the following is the lack of nature as such.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>The first one lacks a nature<br>In terms of characteristics; the next one<br>Lacks existence on its own,<br>And the following is the lack of nature as such.</blockquote>
 
Sthiramati's commentary explains:
 
Sthiramati's commentary explains:
<blockquote>"The first one" is the imaginary nature. It "lacks a nature in terms of characteristics," because its characteristics are imputed. [For example,] form has the characteristic of form, feeling has the characteristic of experience, and so on. Thus, since [the imaginary nature] has no character of its own (''svarūpa''), just as a sky-flower, it is the lack of nature of any character of its own. "The next one" refers to the other-dependent nature. It does not exist by itself (''na svayaṃbhāva''), because it arises through other conditions, just as an illusion. Thus, as shown, there is no arising of it, which is why it is referred to as "the lack of nature in terms of arising." Because the perfect nature is the ultimate of all phenomena, which are other-dependent in nature, it is referred to as their true nature (''dharmatā''). Therefore, the perfect nature is the ultimate lack of nature, because the nature of the perfect [nature] is to not be any entity (''abhāvasvabhāvatvāt'').</blockquote>
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<blockquote>"The first one" is the imaginary nature. It "lacks a nature in terms of characteristics," because its characteristics are imputed. [For example,] form has the characteristic of form, feeling has the characteristic of experience, and so on. Thus, since [the imaginary nature] has no character of its own (''svarūpa''), just as a sky-flower, it is the lack of nature of any character of its own. "The next one" refers to the other-dependent nature. It does not exist by itself (''na svayaṃbhāva''), because it arises through other conditions, just as an illusion. Thus, as shown, there is no arising of it, which is why it is referred to as "the lack of nature in terms of arising." Because the perfect nature is the ultimate of all phenomena, which are other-dependent in nature, it is referred to as their true nature (''dharmatā''). Therefore, the perfect nature is the ultimate lack of nature, because the nature of the perfect [nature] is to not be any entity (''abhāvasvabhāvatvāt'').<ref>Sanskrit edition by Lévi, p. 41.</ref></blockquote>
  
 
In brief, just as when mistaking the moving colors and shapes in a movie for a story line with actual persons with all their emotions and so on, the imaginary nature stands for the illusory display of dualistic appearances that actually do not exist in the first place, let alone having any characteristics of their own. Therefore, it is called "the lack of nature in terms of characteristics." Just as the mere movement of said shapes and colors on the screen, the other-dependent nature consists of dependently originating appearances which means that they appear in an illusionlike manner, but are without any nature of their own and do not "really" arise. Thus, the other-dependent nature is called "the lack of nature in terms of arising." The perfect nature is "the ultimate lack of nature," which has two aspects. First, although there is no personal identity, the perfect nature is what functions as the path that remedies the notion of a personal identity. Just as an illusory ship can be used to cross an illusory ocean, it serves as the means to cross the ocean of saṃsāra to the other shore of nirvāṇa. In terms of dependent origination, this remedial or path aspect is actually contained within the other-dependent nature, but since it is the cause for realizing the ultimate, it is included in the category of "the ultimate lack of nature." The second aspect of the perfect nature is the one by virtue of which enlightenment is attained through actively engaging in it and is undifferentiable from phenomenal identitylessness. Like space, it is omnipresent and not established as anything whatsoever (just as the colors and shapes in a movie are nothing but the display of photons, which are ultimately unfindable). This aspect is "the ultimate lack of nature" per se. Note, however, that, while the Madhyamaka system greatly tends to speak only about the objective side of this "ultimate lack of nature," the Yogācāra tradition also emphasizes its subjective side. In other words, the lack of nature or emptiness is not just limited to being something like the bare fact of said photons being unfindable, but there is an awareness or experience of this very fact. Needless to say, for Yogācāras too, the true realization of the ultimate lack of nature also entails the emptiness or unfindability of that very experience, but any realization of this has to happen in the mind―it is not just an abstract fact like a mathematical equation at which no one looks. Fundamentally, all phenomena, including one's mind, have always been, are, and will be empty, but this fact alone makes nobody a buddha, unless it is made into an incontrovertible, all-pervasive, and personal experience of boundless freedom and compassion and is as natural an outlook informing all one's actions as it is for ordinary beings to experience themselves and the world as real, dualistic, and suffering.
 
In brief, just as when mistaking the moving colors and shapes in a movie for a story line with actual persons with all their emotions and so on, the imaginary nature stands for the illusory display of dualistic appearances that actually do not exist in the first place, let alone having any characteristics of their own. Therefore, it is called "the lack of nature in terms of characteristics." Just as the mere movement of said shapes and colors on the screen, the other-dependent nature consists of dependently originating appearances which means that they appear in an illusionlike manner, but are without any nature of their own and do not "really" arise. Thus, the other-dependent nature is called "the lack of nature in terms of arising." The perfect nature is "the ultimate lack of nature," which has two aspects. First, although there is no personal identity, the perfect nature is what functions as the path that remedies the notion of a personal identity. Just as an illusory ship can be used to cross an illusory ocean, it serves as the means to cross the ocean of saṃsāra to the other shore of nirvāṇa. In terms of dependent origination, this remedial or path aspect is actually contained within the other-dependent nature, but since it is the cause for realizing the ultimate, it is included in the category of "the ultimate lack of nature." The second aspect of the perfect nature is the one by virtue of which enlightenment is attained through actively engaging in it and is undifferentiable from phenomenal identitylessness. Like space, it is omnipresent and not established as anything whatsoever (just as the colors and shapes in a movie are nothing but the display of photons, which are ultimately unfindable). This aspect is "the ultimate lack of nature" per se. Note, however, that, while the Madhyamaka system greatly tends to speak only about the objective side of this "ultimate lack of nature," the Yogācāra tradition also emphasizes its subjective side. In other words, the lack of nature or emptiness is not just limited to being something like the bare fact of said photons being unfindable, but there is an awareness or experience of this very fact. Needless to say, for Yogācāras too, the true realization of the ultimate lack of nature also entails the emptiness or unfindability of that very experience, but any realization of this has to happen in the mind―it is not just an abstract fact like a mathematical equation at which no one looks. Fundamentally, all phenomena, including one's mind, have always been, are, and will be empty, but this fact alone makes nobody a buddha, unless it is made into an incontrovertible, all-pervasive, and personal experience of boundless freedom and compassion and is as natural an outlook informing all one's actions as it is for ordinary beings to experience themselves and the world as real, dualistic, and suffering.
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On the level of seeming reality, the imaginary nature is just nominally existent, while the other-dependent nature is substantially existent in the sense of what conventionally performs functions. The perfect nature does not exist in any of these two ways, but is the ultimate incontrovertible state of mind experiencing its own true nature. Again, by definition, this personally experienced wisdom is in itself completely without any reference points, such as it existing or not existing. For these reasons, the imaginary nature is also called "the emptiness of the nonexistent”; the other-dependent nature, "the emptiness of the existent”; and the perfect nature, "the ultimate or natural emptiness." Thus, as mentioned above, the three natures not only accord with the prajñāpāramitā notions of emptiness and the lack of nature, but moreover serve as progressive stages of the transition from utter delusion to the undeluded wisdom of a buddha with all its qualities. Nguyen says:
 
On the level of seeming reality, the imaginary nature is just nominally existent, while the other-dependent nature is substantially existent in the sense of what conventionally performs functions. The perfect nature does not exist in any of these two ways, but is the ultimate incontrovertible state of mind experiencing its own true nature. Again, by definition, this personally experienced wisdom is in itself completely without any reference points, such as it existing or not existing. For these reasons, the imaginary nature is also called "the emptiness of the nonexistent”; the other-dependent nature, "the emptiness of the existent”; and the perfect nature, "the ultimate or natural emptiness." Thus, as mentioned above, the three natures not only accord with the prajñāpāramitā notions of emptiness and the lack of nature, but moreover serve as progressive stages of the transition from utter delusion to the undeluded wisdom of a buddha with all its qualities. Nguyen says:
  
<blockquote>As an elaboration of the teaching of the Middle Path, the concept of the three identities may be compared to the Madhyamaka School's concept of Emptiness (''śūnyatā''). Śūnyatā is a hermeneutic concept used to deconstruct the reification of all the constituent factors and processes that are thought to make up the reality of persons and phenomena. The three identities concept not only accomplishes a deconstruction of these factors, but also reveals a realization of their true nature (''tathatā'') replete with positive implications from the perspectives of both epistemology and soteriology.</blockquote>
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<blockquote>As an elaboration of the teaching of the Middle Path, the concept of the three identities may be compared to the Madhyamaka School's concept of Emptiness (''śūnyatā''). Śūnyatā is a hermeneutic concept used to deconstruct the reification of all the constituent factors and processes that are thought to make up the reality of persons and phenomena. The three identities concept not only accomplishes a deconstruction of these factors, but also reveals a realization of their true nature (''tathatā'') replete with positive implications from the perspectives of both epistemology and soteriology.<ref>Ibid., 110–11.</ref></blockquote>
  
 
Thus, just as in the case of the notion of ''cittamātra'' above, the three natures are to be practically and progressively engaged as the bodhisattva path, with each one to be transcended by the following one. As the ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' says:
 
Thus, just as in the case of the notion of ''cittamātra'' above, the three natures are to be practically and progressively engaged as the bodhisattva path, with each one to be transcended by the following one. As the ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' says:
  
<blockquote>How should one engage in [appearances as being mere cognizance]? . . . One engages in this just like in the case of a rope appearing as a snake in a dark house. Since a snake does not exist, [to see it] in the rope is mistaken. Those who realize [that the rope] is its referent have turned away from the cognition of [seeing] a snake where there is none and dwell in the cognition of [apprehending] a rope. [However,] when regarded in a subtle way, such is also mistaken, since [a rope] consists of [nothing but] the characteristics of color, smell, taste, and what can be touched. [Thus,] based on the cognition of [seeing color] and so on, the cognition of [apprehending] a rope has to be discarded too. Likewise, based on the cognition of [seeing] the perfect nature, . . . also the cognition of mere cognizance is to be dissolved. . . . Through engaging in mere cognizance, one engages in the other-dependent nature.<br>How does one engage in the perfect nature? One engages in it by dissolving the notion of mere cognizance too. . . . Therefore, there is not even an appearance of [phenomena] as mere cognizance. When bodhisattvas . . . dwell in the dharmadhātu in an immediate way, what is observed and what observes are equal in these bodhisattvas. In consequence, what springs forth [in them] is equal nonconceptual wisdom. In this way, such bodhisattvas engage in the perfect nature.</blockquote>
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<blockquote>How should one engage in [appearances as being mere cognizance]? . . . One engages in this just like in the case of a rope appearing as a snake in a dark house. Since a snake does not exist, [to see it] in the rope is mistaken. Those who realize [that the rope] is its referent have turned away from the cognition of [seeing] a snake where there is none and dwell in the cognition of [apprehending] a rope. [However,] when regarded in a subtle way, such is also mistaken, since [a rope] consists of [nothing but] the characteristics of color, smell, taste, and what can be touched. [Thus,] based on the cognition of [seeing color] and so on, the cognition of [apprehending] a rope has to be discarded too. Likewise, based on the cognition of [seeing] the perfect nature, . . . also the cognition of mere cognizance is to be dissolved. . . . Through engaging in mere cognizance, one engages in the other-dependent nature.<br>How does one engage in the perfect nature? One engages in it by dissolving the notion of mere cognizance too. . . . Therefore, there is not even an appearance of [phenomena] as mere cognizance. When bodhisattvas . . . dwell in the dharmadhātu in an immediate way, what is observed and what observes are equal in these bodhisattvas. In consequence, what springs forth [in them] is equal nonconceptual wisdom. In this way, such bodhisattvas engage in the perfect nature.<ref>III. 8–9, fols. 28a.5–29a.7.</ref></blockquote>
 
The path quality of the three natures is also taught in ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' III.9cd–10a:
 
The path quality of the three natures is also taught in ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' III.9cd–10a:
 
<blockquote>In full understanding, relinquishing,<br>And attaining and revealing,<br>The reality of the path is fully explained.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>In full understanding, relinquishing,<br>And attaining and revealing,<br>The reality of the path is fully explained.</blockquote>
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<blockquote>The imaginary [nature] is what is to be fully understood through the path, that is, it is to be understood that it does not exist as any entity. Therefore, it is taught [through the term "path" here] by way of designating the object through the name of the subject―the path. The other-dependent [nature] is what is to be relinquished through the path. This means that enlightenment is attained by virtue of false imagination, which entails dualistic appearances, becoming extinguished. Therefore, this corresponds to [line I.4d] in the chapter on the characteristics of afflicted phenomena above:</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>The imaginary [nature] is what is to be fully understood through the path, that is, it is to be understood that it does not exist as any entity. Therefore, it is taught [through the term "path" here] by way of designating the object through the name of the subject―the path. The other-dependent [nature] is what is to be relinquished through the path. This means that enlightenment is attained by virtue of false imagination, which entails dualistic appearances, becoming extinguished. Therefore, this corresponds to [line I.4d] in the chapter on the characteristics of afflicted phenomena above:</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>Its extinction is held to be liberation.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>Its extinction is held to be liberation.</blockquote>
<blockquote>Therefore, to designate [the other-dependent nature] through the name "path" is a designation of what is to be relinquished through the name of the remedy. The perfect [nature] is explained as the path, because it is that which is to be attained and revealed. [In this case,] the cause is designated through the name of the result.</blockquote>
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<blockquote>Therefore, to designate [the other-dependent nature] through the name "path" is a designation of what is to be relinquished through the name of the remedy. The perfect [nature] is explained as the path, because it is that which is to be attained and revealed. [In this case,] the cause is designated through the name of the result.<ref>'Ju mi pham rgya mtsho c. 1990c, 705–6.</ref></blockquote>
  
 
A similar statement is found in the opening lines of the ''Dharmadharmatāvibhāga'':
 
A similar statement is found in the opening lines of the ''Dharmadharmatāvibhāga'':
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<blockquote>True reality is always free from duality, the basis of mistakenness,<br>And inexpressible in every respect, having the nature of being free from reference points.<br>It is held to be what is to be understood, relinquished, and purified, though it is naturally stainless.<br>Its purity of afflictions is asserted to be like space, gold, or water.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>True reality is always free from duality, the basis of mistakenness,<br>And inexpressible in every respect, having the nature of being free from reference points.<br>It is held to be what is to be understood, relinquished, and purified, though it is naturally stainless.<br>Its purity of afflictions is asserted to be like space, gold, or water.</blockquote>
  
The true reality being always free from duality refers to the imaginary nature, because it absolutely never exists as the characteristics of apprehender and apprehended. [True reality serving as] the basis of mistakenness refers to the other-dependent [nature], because it is what imagines this [duality of apprehender and apprehended]. The inexpressible [true reality], having the nature of being free from reference points, is the perfect nature. Here, the first true reality is what is to be fully understood; the second one is what is to be relinquished; and the third one is both what is to be purified from adventitious stains and naturally pure. In its natural purity, like space, gold, or water, it is pure of afflictions. Space and so on are neither naturally impure, nor is their purity not asserted [as being revealed] by virtue of adventitious stains disappearing.
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The true reality being always free from duality refers to the imaginary nature, because it absolutely never exists as the characteristics of apprehender and apprehended. [True reality serving as] the basis of mistakenness refers to the other-dependent [nature], because it is what imagines this [duality of apprehender and apprehended]. The inexpressible [true reality], having the nature of being free from reference points, is the perfect nature. Here, the first true reality is what is to be fully understood; the second one is what is to be relinquished; and the third one is both what is to be purified from adventitious stains and naturally pure. In its natural purity, like space, gold, or water, it is pure of afflictions. Space and so on are neither naturally impure, nor is their purity not asserted [as being revealed] by virtue of adventitious stains disappearing.<ref>Limaye 1992, 172.</ref>
  
 
Thus, one of the main reasons for speaking about the three natures and the other-dependent nature in particular is to account for the process of mind progressing from its mistaken state to freedom, which―as far as the Buddhist path is concerned―takes place within the dependently originating structure of the other-dependent nature, realizing the nonexistence of the imaginary nature and revealing or becoming immersed in the perfect nature instead. Thus, from the perspective of the path, the imaginary nature is to be known for what it is―utterly nonexistent; the other-dependent nature is to be relinquished in the sense of mind ceasing to create dualistic appearances; and the perfect nature is that which is to be manifested or realized, which is just the true nature of the first two natures, once the other-dependent nature ceases to project the imaginary nature. In other words, in terms of the Buddhist path, the delusive complexities of the ontologically and epistemologically more fragile structures of the imaginary nature and the other-dependent nature can be reduced to, or collapsed into, the underlying single ontologically and epistemologically stable structure of the perfect nature, which is simply uncovered. This is what is called "fundamental change of state" (see below). As should be clear, "stable" does not mean static or being established as some kind of intrinsically existing absolute entity, but refers to the basic unmistakenness and irreversibility of this change of state.
 
Thus, one of the main reasons for speaking about the three natures and the other-dependent nature in particular is to account for the process of mind progressing from its mistaken state to freedom, which―as far as the Buddhist path is concerned―takes place within the dependently originating structure of the other-dependent nature, realizing the nonexistence of the imaginary nature and revealing or becoming immersed in the perfect nature instead. Thus, from the perspective of the path, the imaginary nature is to be known for what it is―utterly nonexistent; the other-dependent nature is to be relinquished in the sense of mind ceasing to create dualistic appearances; and the perfect nature is that which is to be manifested or realized, which is just the true nature of the first two natures, once the other-dependent nature ceases to project the imaginary nature. In other words, in terms of the Buddhist path, the delusive complexities of the ontologically and epistemologically more fragile structures of the imaginary nature and the other-dependent nature can be reduced to, or collapsed into, the underlying single ontologically and epistemologically stable structure of the perfect nature, which is simply uncovered. This is what is called "fundamental change of state" (see below). As should be clear, "stable" does not mean static or being established as some kind of intrinsically existing absolute entity, but refers to the basic unmistakenness and irreversibility of this change of state.
  
To conclude this discussion of the three natures and to get a glimpse of the variety of explanations on the three natures, let's look at the four models that are presented in Sthiramati's ''Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā'' on I.1.D
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To conclude this discussion of the three natures and to get a glimpse of the variety of explanations on the three natures, let's look at the four models that are presented in Sthiramati's ''Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā'' on I.1.<ref>Following the words of I.1, Sthiramati does not explicitly state the names of the three natures here, but only speaks about false imagination, duality, and emptiness. However, as his commentary on I.5 (which introduces the three natures by name) makes clear, in due order, these correspond to the other-dependent, imaginary, and perfect natures.</ref>
  
 
<blockquote>False imagination exists.<br>
 
<blockquote>False imagination exists.<br>
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<blockquote>[Model 3] Or, in order to refute the denial of everything, [line I.1a] says, "False imagination exists." It is neither that all [phenomena] do not exist, nor is it that they have a real nature of their own―they exist as the nature of the modulations of consciousness. Some think, "Form and so on appear in just the way they appear, that is, through a nature of their own and as something separate from false imagination." In order to refute such superimpositions onto what is unreal, [Maitreya] retorts with [line I.1b], "Duality is not present in it." The intention here is that what is present is mere false imagination. Some apprehend the nonexistence of duality as having the nature of total extinction (''chedarūpa''), just as the son of a barren woman. Others say, "The freedom from an internal person as the agent (''antarvyāpārapuruṣa'') is the emptiness of phenomena." Therefore, in order to refute denials of emptiness and in order to teach true identitylessness (''bhūtanairātmya''), [line I.1c] says, "But emptiness is present in it." "But if emptiness exists in false imagination, it consequently follows that all living beings would be liberated without any effort." This is not so, for [line I.1d] says, "And it is also present in this [emptiness]." As long as emptiness is not purified, there is no liberation, and its being afflicted needs to be purified through great efforts. Thus, it is not that there is liberation without effort.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>[Model 3] Or, in order to refute the denial of everything, [line I.1a] says, "False imagination exists." It is neither that all [phenomena] do not exist, nor is it that they have a real nature of their own―they exist as the nature of the modulations of consciousness. Some think, "Form and so on appear in just the way they appear, that is, through a nature of their own and as something separate from false imagination." In order to refute such superimpositions onto what is unreal, [Maitreya] retorts with [line I.1b], "Duality is not present in it." The intention here is that what is present is mere false imagination. Some apprehend the nonexistence of duality as having the nature of total extinction (''chedarūpa''), just as the son of a barren woman. Others say, "The freedom from an internal person as the agent (''antarvyāpārapuruṣa'') is the emptiness of phenomena." Therefore, in order to refute denials of emptiness and in order to teach true identitylessness (''bhūtanairātmya''), [line I.1c] says, "But emptiness is present in it." "But if emptiness exists in false imagination, it consequently follows that all living beings would be liberated without any effort." This is not so, for [line I.1d] says, "And it is also present in this [emptiness]." As long as emptiness is not purified, there is no liberation, and its being afflicted needs to be purified through great efforts. Thus, it is not that there is liberation without effort.</blockquote>
  
<blockquote>[Model 4] Or, in terms of characteristics,D D there is nothing other than the description of what is afflicted and what is purified. Therefore, in order to investigate what is afflicted and what is purified, [line I.1a], "False imagination exists," represents the details [of what is afflicted]. The nature of false imagination is afflicted, because it has the characteristic of mistakenness. "How is this characteristic of mistakenness to be understood?" It is through [line I.1b], "Duality is not present in it." It is to be understood as the very nature of mistakenness, because it appears in the form of the aspects of apprehender and apprehended, which are not present in its own nature. Now, in order to investigate the very nature of what is purified, [line I.1c] says, "But emptiness is present in it." The nature of emptiness is what is purified, because it is the nature of the nonexistence of duality. You should know that also the path and cessation are included in this, because they are characterized by emptiness. The domain of what is purified is to be searched from right within the domain of what is afflicted―it does not exist as something separate from it. In order to teach this, [line I.1c] says "[emptiness is present] in it." You may ask, "If duality does not exist, given the presence of this [emptiness], why is the world mistaken?" Therefore, [line I.1d] says, "And it is also present in this [emptiness]." This refers to the imagination of apprehender and apprehended, just as an illusion is empty of the aspects of elephants and so on, yet the aspects of elephants appear.</blockquote>
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<blockquote>[Model 4] Or, in terms of characteristics,<ref>The topic of the first chapter of the ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' is the characteristics of afflicted and purified phenomena, or false imagination and emptiness.</ref> there is nothing other than the description of what is afflicted and what is purified. Therefore, in order to investigate what is afflicted and what is purified, [line I.1a], "False imagination exists," represents the details [of what is afflicted]. The nature of false imagination is afflicted, because it has the characteristic of mistakenness. "How is this characteristic of mistakenness to be understood?" It is through [line I.1b], "Duality is not present in it." It is to be understood as the very nature of mistakenness, because it appears in the form of the aspects of apprehender and apprehended, which are not present in its own nature. Now, in order to investigate the very nature of what is purified, [line I.1c] says, "But emptiness is present in it." The nature of emptiness is what is purified, because it is the nature of the nonexistence of duality. You should know that also the path and cessation are included in this, because they are characterized by emptiness. The domain of what is purified is to be searched from right within the domain of what is afflicted―it does not exist as something separate from it. In order to teach this, [line I.1c] says "[emptiness is present] in it." You may ask, "If duality does not exist, given the presence of this [emptiness], why is the world mistaken?" Therefore, [line I.1d] says, "And it is also present in this [emptiness]." This refers to the imagination of apprehender and apprehended, just as an illusion is empty of the aspects of elephants and so on, yet the aspects of elephants appear.<ref>Pandeya ed., pp.  9.25–11.30.</ref></blockquote>
  
From Sthiramati's approach here, it is clear that he does not primarily speak about ontological models of the three natures, but treats them as pedagogical means to counteract particular wrong ideas. Thus, both false imagination and emptiness are described in several different ways. False imagination is said to be "existent by a nature of its own" (model 1); "substantially existent" (model 2); "of the nature of modulations of consciousness" (model 3); and "having the nature of being afflicted" (model 4). Emptiness is described as "the fact of false imagination being free from apprehender and apprehended" (models 1 and 2); "the pure object" (model 2); "true identitylessness" (model 3); and "having the nature of what is purified" and "being the nature of the nonexistence of duality" (model 4). The first two models sound rather realist and substantialist, but that does not necessarily mean that false imagination is held to be ultimately existent, which is in fact not affirmed anywhere. Also, though Sthiramati describes the above four models, it does not mean that he fully subscribes to all of them. In fact, commenting on ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' I.5, Sthiramati explicitly states that false imagination is the other-dependent nature, which arises under the power of causes and conditions, but does not exist or come into being on its own. He also quotes two verses, which add that the other-dependent nature is the sphere of correct mundane cognition, while the perfect nature is the sphere of nonconceptual (supramundane) wisdom.
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From Sthiramati's approach here, it is clear that he does not primarily speak about ontological models of the three natures, but treats them as pedagogical means to counteract particular wrong ideas. Thus, both false imagination and emptiness are described in several different ways. False imagination is said to be "existent by a nature of its own" (model 1); "substantially existent" (model 2); "of the nature of modulations of consciousness" (model 3); and "having the nature of being afflicted" (model 4). Emptiness is described as "the fact of false imagination being free from apprehender and apprehended" (models 1 and 2); "the pure object" (model 2); "true identitylessness" (model 3); and "having the nature of what is purified" and "being the nature of the nonexistence of duality" (model 4). The first two models sound rather realist and substantialist, but that does not necessarily mean that false imagination is held to be ultimately existent, which is in fact not affirmed anywhere.<ref>Neither Vasubandhu's nor Sthiramati's commentaries state anywhere that false imagination exists ultimately. They do say several times that both false imagination and emptiness exist, but it is very obvious that this does not refer to the same level of existence.</ref> Also, though Sthiramati describes the above four models, it does not mean that he fully subscribes to all of them. In fact, commenting on ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' I.5, Sthiramati explicitly states that false imagination is the other-dependent nature, which arises under the power of causes and conditions, but does not exist or come into being on its own. He also quotes two verses, which add that the other-dependent nature is the sphere of correct mundane cognition, while the perfect nature is the sphere of nonconceptual (supramundane) wisdom.<ref>Ibid., 19.</ref>
  
Given the explicit objectives of Sthiramati's commentary to redress strong kinds of clinging to utter nonexistence or absolute existence and so on, from a pedagogical point of view, equally strong statements on relative existence (or relatively having a nature of its own) and emptiness, respectively, are suitable to counteract wrong ideas and guide disciples on the middle path between these two extremes, but this does not necessarily mean that those who make such statements accept everything in them as their own position. Such a middle path is clearly explained in Vasubandhu's and Sthiramati's commentaries on ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' I.2, following the statement in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras that all phenomena are neither absolutely empty nor absolutely nonempty. Sthiramati further clarifies that false imagination is conditioned, because it depends on causes and conditions, while emptiness is not. False imagination is present in emptiness in the form of phenomena, and emptiness is present in false imagination in the form of the nature of phenomena. This is further clarified in Sthiramati's comments on I.13, where the being of the nonbeing of duality is described as the characteristic of emptiness, which is neither existent nor nonexistent. Emptiness is not existent because of the nonexistence of duality. Nor is it nonexistent, since the nonexistence of duality exists. In other words, emptiness is not just the sheer absence of apprehender and apprehended, but constitutes the true mode of being of all phenomena. Emptiness is also neither the same as, nor different from, false imagination. If it were different from false imagination, it would not be its nature, and if it were the same, it would not be the sole pure object that is conducive to liberation.
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Given the explicit objectives of Sthiramati's commentary to redress strong kinds of clinging to utter nonexistence or absolute existence and so on, from a pedagogical point of view, equally strong statements on relative existence (or relatively having a nature of its own) and emptiness, respectively, are suitable to counteract wrong ideas and guide disciples on the middle path between these two extremes, but this does not necessarily mean that those who make such statements accept everything in them as their own position. Such a middle path is clearly explained in Vasubandhu's and Sthiramati's commentaries on ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' I.2, following the statement in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras that all phenomena are neither absolutely empty nor absolutely nonempty. Sthiramati further clarifies that false imagination is conditioned, because it depends on causes and conditions, while emptiness is not. False imagination is present in emptiness in the form of phenomena, and emptiness is present in false imagination in the form of the nature of phenomena.<ref>Ibid., 13.16–21.</ref> This is further clarified in Sthiramati's comments on I.13, where the being of the nonbeing of duality is described as the characteristic of emptiness, which is neither existent nor nonexistent. Emptiness is not existent because of the nonexistence of duality. Nor is it nonexistent, since the nonexistence of duality exists. In other words, emptiness is not just the sheer absence of apprehender and apprehended, but constitutes the true mode of being of all phenomena. Emptiness is also neither the same as, nor different from, false imagination. If it were different from false imagination, it would not be its nature, and if it were the same, it would not be the sole pure object that is conducive to liberation.<ref>Ibid., 36–38.</ref>
  
To summarize, in the first two models, emptiness (or the perfect nature) is described more as an abstract property of false imagination (the other-dependent nature), which is said to not be without nature in every respect. Thus, duality (the imaginary nature) and emptiness are just the two poles of false imagination―the way it mistakenly appears and the way it actually is. Vasubandhu and Sthiramati both say that ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' I.5 is taught in order to include all three natures in false imagination, ''if''―or as long as―mere false imagination exists. Since the immediately preceding line I.4d explicitly says that liberation is nothing but the extinction of false imagination, this can only mean that the three natures are only included in, and applicable to, false imagination as long as it exists as the display of saṃsāra. Within this saṃsāric framework, the imaginary nature is the mistakenly imagined duality of which false imagination is actually empty; the other-dependent nature is false imagination itself; and the perfect nature is the very absence of duality in false imagination. This seems to indicate that the first two models above revolve around false imagination as primarily describing the deluded saṃsāric mind. By contrast, the latter two models seem to discuss the three natures more from the perspective of the ultimate. Thus, false imagination is not said to have a nature of its own or to exist substantially, but to exist just as modulations of consciousness and as being afflicted. Emptiness is described as being more than just the mere absence of duality in false imagination―it is the very nature of the absence of duality, that is, true identitylessness, which is the pure object conducive to liberation and even includes the path that leads to this liberation (at the same time, it is not to be looked for outside of what appears as afflicted phenomena). Thus, emptiness (or the perfect nature) is only taken as the mere absence of duality in false imagination, when the latter is described in more ontological or saṃsāric terms (models 1 and 2). But in the more epistemological or path-oriented explanations of false imagination, emptiness is described in more encompassing, positive, and ultimate terms (models 3 and 4). In other words, in the former approach, emptiness is basically just a property of false imagination, but in the latter approach, it is the true ultimate nature of false imagination. The latter accords with ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' I.20, in which the last one of the sixteen emptinesses―the emptiness that is the nature of nonbeing―is said to be different from the other fifteen, which all refer to the nonexistence of persons and phenomena. Together, these emptinesses serve to remove all superimpositions and denials―if persons and phenomena were not empty and nonexistent, they would truly exist, but if emptiness itself were nonexistent too, persons and phenomena would not be empty and thus again be truly existent. ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' I.21 is explained as "the establishing of emptiness," making it clear that this emptiness (and not false imagination) is the final word here―without it, there would be no path and no liberation.
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To summarize, in the first two models, emptiness (or the perfect nature) is described more as an abstract property of false imagination (the other-dependent nature), which is said to not be without nature in every respect. Thus, duality (the imaginary nature) and emptiness are just the two poles of false imagination―the way it mistakenly appears and the way it actually is. Vasubandhu and Sthiramati both say that ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' I.5 is taught in order to include all three natures in false imagination, ''if''―or as long as―mere false imagination exists. Since the immediately preceding line I.4d explicitly says that liberation is nothing but the extinction of false imagination, this can only mean that the three natures are only included in, and applicable to, false imagination as long as it exists as the display of saṃsāra. Within this saṃsāric framework, the imaginary nature is the mistakenly imagined duality of which false imagination is actually empty; the other-dependent nature is false imagination itself; and the perfect nature is the very absence of duality in false imagination. This seems to indicate that the first two models above revolve around false imagination as primarily describing the deluded saṃsāric mind. By contrast, the latter two models seem to discuss the three natures more from the perspective of the ultimate. Thus, false imagination is not said to have a nature of its own or to exist substantially, but to exist just as modulations of consciousness and as being afflicted. Emptiness is described as being more than just the mere absence of duality in false imagination―it is the very nature of the absence of duality, that is, true identitylessness, which is the pure object conducive to liberation and even includes the path that leads to this liberation (at the same time, it is not to be looked for outside of what appears as afflicted phenomena). Thus, emptiness (or the perfect nature) is only taken as the mere absence of duality in false imagination, when the latter is described in more ontological or saṃsāric terms (models 1 and 2). But in the more epistemological or path-oriented explanations of false imagination, emptiness is described in more encompassing, positive, and ultimate terms (models 3 and 4). In other words, in the former approach, emptiness is basically just a property of false imagination, but in the latter approach, it is the true ultimate nature of false imagination. The latter accords with ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' I.20, in which the last one of the sixteen emptinesses―the emptiness that is the nature of nonbeing―is said to be different from the other fifteen, which all refer to the nonexistence of persons and phenomena. Together, these emptinesses serve to remove all superimpositions and denials―if persons and phenomena were not empty and nonexistent, they would truly exist, but if emptiness itself were nonexistent too, persons and phenomena would not be empty and thus again be truly existent.<ref>Ibid., 46.</ref> ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' I.21 is explained as "the establishing of emptiness," making it clear that this emptiness (and not false imagination) is the final word here―without it, there would be no path and no liberation.
  
 
<blockquote>If this [emptiness] were not afflicted,<br>All beings would be liberated.<br>If it were not pure,<br>Efforts would be fruitless.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>If this [emptiness] were not afflicted,<br>All beings would be liberated.<br>If it were not pure,<br>Efforts would be fruitless.</blockquote>
Line 489: Line 505:
 
<blockquote>It is neither afflicted nor nonafflicted,<br>Neither pure nor impure.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>It is neither afflicted nor nonafflicted,<br>Neither pure nor impure.</blockquote>
  
As for emptiness being neither afflicted nor impure, Sthiramati comments that what is described here is purity per se, and that the dual terminology just serves to emphasize this. He refers to Vasubandhu's quote from the scriptures, which says that it is pure "because of mind's natural luminosity," and says that "mind" here refers to the true nature of the mind (''cittadharmatā''). As for its being neither nonafflicted nor pure, this indicates that it is only afflicted through adventitious stains, but not afflicted by nature. The scriptural support is, "because of being afflicted by adventitious afflictions."D D In this way, emptiness is far beyond being just the mere absence of duality in false imagination―it is the ultimate, luminous and pure nature of the mind.
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As for emptiness being neither afflicted nor impure, Sthiramati comments that what is described here is purity per se, and that the dual terminology just serves to emphasize this. He refers to Vasubandhu's quote from the scriptures, which says that it is pure "because of mind's natural luminosity," and says that "mind" here refers to the true nature of the mind (''cittadharmatā''). As for its being neither nonafflicted nor pure, this indicates that it is only afflicted through adventitious stains, but not afflicted by nature. The scriptural support is, "because of being afflicted by adventitious afflictions."<ref>Such statements are not only found in the mahāyāna scriptures, but also in the Pāli canon (from which Vasubandhu most probably quotes), such as ''Aṅguttara Nikāya'' I.10, "O monks, the mind is luminosity, and yet it is afflicted by adventitious afflictions." Also the ''Saṃyutta Nikāya'' (III.151.22–23; 31–32; and 152.8–9) states, "O monks, sentient beings are afflicted because of the afflictions of the mind. Because of the purity of the mind, sentient beings are purified." The Tibetan tradition considers the two lines, "because of mind's natural luminosity" and "because of being afflicted by adventitious afflictions" not as parts of Vasubandhu's commentary, but as two additional lines in ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' I.22.</ref> In this way, emptiness is far beyond being just the mere absence of duality in false imagination―it is the ultimate, luminous and pure nature of the mind.<ref>The above four models also show that quite different interpretations of the three natures obviously existed already at the time of Sthiramati, and that at least some of them may have been interpreted in more or less reifying ways by certain people.</ref>
  
 
In brief, all these different models can be summarized in two, which Sponberg (1981, pp. 99ff) calls (a) the pivotal and (b) the progressive models. The "pivot" in (a) is the other-dependent nature (just as in models 1 and 2 above), with the imaginary and perfect natures just being its two "extreme" poles of how it mistakenly appears and actually is. Model (b) refers to the three natures as three levels of reality, progressing from dualistic delusion to nondual freedom from delusion, as well as the realizations of these levels as outlined in the four yogic practices above.
 
In brief, all these different models can be summarized in two, which Sponberg (1981, pp. 99ff) calls (a) the pivotal and (b) the progressive models. The "pivot" in (a) is the other-dependent nature (just as in models 1 and 2 above), with the imaginary and perfect natures just being its two "extreme" poles of how it mistakenly appears and actually is. Model (b) refers to the three natures as three levels of reality, progressing from dualistic delusion to nondual freedom from delusion, as well as the realizations of these levels as outlined in the four yogic practices above.
  
  
====Mind's fundamentally different outlook on itself====
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====Mind's Fundamentally Different Outlook on Itself====
  
 
As for the Sanskrit term ''āśrayaparivṛtti'' (change of state), there are a great number of Buddhist scriptures (from the Pāli canon up through the tantras) in which this term is used with reference to a variety of different states or processes (for an overview, see Davidson 1985). For some of these processes, the term "transformation," which is mostly used in translations, may be appropriate, but as far as the dharmadhātu, natural purity, buddha nature, or the luminous nature of the mind are concerned, the whole point of this notion of "change of state" is that there is absolutely no transformation of anything into anything else. Rather, the revelation of mind's primordially pure nature, which from the perspective of the path appears as fruitional enlightenment, only manifests as a change from the perspective of deluded mind—mind seeming to be obscured before and then unobscured later. But this does not refer to any change in nature, just as the sun first being covered by clouds and then being free from clouds would not be called a transformation of the clouds into the sun, or even any transformation of the sun itself. It is solely from the perspective of those who watch the sun that its state seems to have changed (being with and without clouds, respectively). Even children know that the presence or absence of clouds does not affect the sun itself in any way, but just our perception of it. In fact, for the sun itself, there is not even a question of whether it has changed, let alone how. ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.22 says:
 
As for the Sanskrit term ''āśrayaparivṛtti'' (change of state), there are a great number of Buddhist scriptures (from the Pāli canon up through the tantras) in which this term is used with reference to a variety of different states or processes (for an overview, see Davidson 1985). For some of these processes, the term "transformation," which is mostly used in translations, may be appropriate, but as far as the dharmadhātu, natural purity, buddha nature, or the luminous nature of the mind are concerned, the whole point of this notion of "change of state" is that there is absolutely no transformation of anything into anything else. Rather, the revelation of mind's primordially pure nature, which from the perspective of the path appears as fruitional enlightenment, only manifests as a change from the perspective of deluded mind—mind seeming to be obscured before and then unobscured later. But this does not refer to any change in nature, just as the sun first being covered by clouds and then being free from clouds would not be called a transformation of the clouds into the sun, or even any transformation of the sun itself. It is solely from the perspective of those who watch the sun that its state seems to have changed (being with and without clouds, respectively). Even children know that the presence or absence of clouds does not affect the sun itself in any way, but just our perception of it. In fact, for the sun itself, there is not even a question of whether it has changed, let alone how. ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.22 says:
 
<blockquote>Though without difference between before and after,<br>It is immaculateness in terms of all obscurations.<br>Being neither pure nor impure,<br>Suchness is held to be buddhahood.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>Though without difference between before and after,<br>It is immaculateness in terms of all obscurations.<br>Being neither pure nor impure,<br>Suchness is held to be buddhahood.</blockquote>
 
Sthiramati's commentary on this explains:
 
Sthiramati's commentary on this explains:
<blockquote>"Purity" is said to mean having the nature of being afflicted before, and then the stains having become nonexistent later through having cultivated the path, with "before" referring to the time of an ordinary being, and "later" to the time of full buddhahood. But the dharmakāya of a buddha is held to be of the nature of suchness, emptiness. Emptiness has the nature of being empty and naturally luminous even at the time of ordinary beings. Also later, at the time of full buddhahood, it has the nature of being empty and naturally luminous. Therefore, in its nature of purity, there is no difference.</blockquote>
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<blockquote>"Purity" is said to mean having the nature of being afflicted before, and then the stains having become nonexistent later through having cultivated the path, with "before" referring to the time of an ordinary being, and "later" to the time of full buddhahood. But the dharmakāya of a buddha is held to be of the nature of suchness, emptiness. Emptiness has the nature of being empty and naturally luminous even at the time of ordinary beings. Also later, at the time of full buddhahood, it has the nature of being empty and naturally luminous. Therefore, in its nature of purity, there is no difference.<ref>P5531, fol. 138b.2–4.</ref></blockquote>
 
''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' XIII.18–19 says:
 
''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' XIII.18–19 says:
 
<blockquote>When murky water becomes clear,<br>[Its] transparency does not arise from elsewhere,<br>But is just its becoming free from pollution.<br>The same goes for the purity of your own mind.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>When murky water becomes clear,<br>[Its] transparency does not arise from elsewhere,<br>But is just its becoming free from pollution.<br>The same goes for the purity of your own mind.</blockquote>
<blockquote>It is held that mind, which is always naturally luminous,<br>Is [only] blemished by adventitious flaws.<br>It is stated that there is no other mind apart from<br>The naturally luminous mind of dharmatā.</blockquote>
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<blockquote>It is held that mind, which is always naturally luminous,<br>Is [only] blemished by adventitious flaws.<br>It is stated that there is no other mind apart from<br>The naturally luminous mind of dharmatā.<ref>XIII.18–19.</ref></blockquote>
 
The most detailed presentation of the Yogācāra notion of change of state is given in the ''Dharmadharmatāvibhāga'' (covering two-thirds of its contents), which describes the nature of the change of state as follows.
 
The most detailed presentation of the Yogācāra notion of change of state is given in the ''Dharmadharmatāvibhāga'' (covering two-thirds of its contents), which describes the nature of the change of state as follows.
<blockquote>As for apprehending its nature,<br>It is stainless suchness<br>In the sense of adventitious stains<br>Not appearing and<br>Suchness appearing.</blockquote>
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<blockquote>As for apprehending its nature,<br>It is stainless suchness<br>In the sense of adventitious stains<br>Not appearing and<br>Suchness appearing.<ref>Mathes 1996, lines 128–132.</ref></blockquote>
In the following, the text mainly speaks about the foundation of this change of state (lines 159–60), which is nonconceptual wisdom. In terms of the path, bodhisattvas cultivate and engage in this wisdom through (a) relinquishing the four progressively more subtle mistaken conceptions about factors to be relinquished, their remedies, suchness, and realization (lines 171–79);D D (b) understanding that, by virtue of being ignorant about suchness, the delusive appearance of actually nonexistent false imagination and duality out of the ālaya-consciousness prevents the appearance of the nature of phenomena, and that the latter appears, once the former two cease to appear (lines 252–63); and (c) cultivating the above-mentioned four yogic practices (lines 180–85 and 264–75). The basic characteristics of nonconceptual wisdom are described as threefold (lines 186–204). Its characteristic of being grounded in the nature of phenomena means that it is nondual and inexpressible. Its characteristic of nonappearance means that duality, designations, sense faculties, objects, cognitions, and the outer world do not appear for it. Its characteristic of appearance means that, during meditative equipoise, all phenomena appear equal to space, while, during subsequent attainment, all conditioned phenomena appear like illusions. Nonconceptual wisdom is further characterized through excluding its being mistaken for five other states, such as its being nothing but the sheer absence of any mental engagement (such as deep sleep); its possessing five excellencies; and its five functions (223–46). Finally, the text presents four disadvantages, if there were no such change of state; four advantages, since it exists; and three examples of the fleeting nature of the adventitious stains and the unchanging basis of the change of state―the nature of phenomena (lines 293–307). The Third Karmapa's commentary on these examples explains:
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In the following, the text mainly speaks about the foundation of this change of state (lines 159–60), which is nonconceptual wisdom. In terms of the path, bodhisattvas cultivate and engage in this wisdom through (a) relinquishing the four progressively more subtle mistaken conceptions about factors to be relinquished, their remedies, suchness, and realization (lines 171–79);<ref>These four are found in the ''Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇī'' (D142), which says that bodhisattvas have to gradually relinquish all four of these conceptions in order to enter the sphere of nonconceptuality. Rangjung Dorje seemed to consider the ''Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇī'' as important, since he composed a (now lost) synopsis of it and also refers to these four conceptions in his OED and DSC (for details, see there as well as NTC and NYC).</ref> (b) understanding that, by virtue of being ignorant about suchness, the delusive appearance of actually nonexistent false imagination and duality out of the ālaya-consciousness prevents the appearance of the nature of phenomena, and that the latter appears, once the former two cease to appear (lines 252–63); and (c) cultivating the above-mentioned four yogic practices (lines 180–85 and 264–75). The basic characteristics of nonconceptual wisdom are described as threefold (lines 186–204). Its characteristic of being grounded in the nature of phenomena means that it is nondual and inexpressible. Its characteristic of nonappearance means that duality, designations, sense faculties, objects, cognitions, and the outer world do not appear for it. Its characteristic of appearance means that, during meditative equipoise, all phenomena appear equal to space, while, during subsequent attainment, all conditioned phenomena appear like illusions. Nonconceptual wisdom is further characterized through excluding its being mistaken for five other states, such as its being nothing but the sheer absence of any mental engagement (such as deep sleep); its possessing five excellencies; and its five functions (223–46). Finally, the text presents four disadvantages, if there were no such change of state; four advantages, since it exists; and three examples of the fleeting nature of the adventitious stains and the unchanging basis of the change of state―the nature of phenomena (lines 293–307). The Third Karmapa's commentary on these examples explains:
<blockquote>For example, space is nothing but pure by nature. Therefore, by virtue of certain conditions (such as fog or mist) in the world, one can observe statements such as, "The sky is not pure" and, "It is pure," [when] it is clear and free [from these conditions]. However, it is not suitable to claim such because of a change of the nature of space. Its own nature being pure, empty, and unconditioned, it is indeed not suitable that it either becomes pure by virtue of itself or becomes pure by virtue of something else. Still, mistaken minds that connect mere conventional terms to it cling to space as being pure and impure, [but] this is nothing but an error. Likewise, though it may appear as if the naturally pure nature of phenomena―the perfect [nature]―has become free from the fog and mist of conceptions, it is not asserted that this perfect [nature] has changed―it is absolutely without any arising or ceasing in terms of itself, others, both, or neither. In the same way, the fact of gold remaining in its excellent state is not changed by stains, and the fact of water remaining clear and moist is not changed in its nature, even if it becomes associated with sullying factors, such as silt. Likewise, all that happens to the unmistaken path and the pure dharmas is that they just become associated with stains and sullying factors through the conceptions of ignorance, but it is not asserted that these uncontaminated dharmas [―the path and the pure dharmas entailed by cessation―] change. Therefore, naturally luminous stainlessness is unconditioned and changeless. Thus, though the nature of phenomena is referred to by this term "fundamental change of state," it is also called "permanent."</blockquote>
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<blockquote>For example, space is nothing but pure by nature. Therefore, by virtue of certain conditions (such as fog or mist) in the world, one can observe statements such as, "The sky is not pure" and, "It is pure," [when] it is clear and free [from these conditions]. However, it is not suitable to claim such because of a change of the nature of space. Its own nature being pure, empty, and unconditioned, it is indeed not suitable that it either becomes pure by virtue of itself or becomes pure by virtue of something else. Still, mistaken minds that connect mere conventional terms to it cling to space as being pure and impure, [but] this is nothing but an error. Likewise, though it may appear as if the naturally pure nature of phenomena―the perfect [nature]―has become free from the fog and mist of conceptions, it is not asserted that this perfect [nature] has changed―it is absolutely without any arising or ceasing in terms of itself, others, both, or neither. In the same way, the fact of gold remaining in its excellent state is not changed by stains, and the fact of water remaining clear and moist is not changed in its nature, even if it becomes associated with sullying factors, such as silt. Likewise, all that happens to the unmistaken path and the pure dharmas is that they just become associated with stains and sullying factors through the conceptions of ignorance, but it is not asserted that these uncontaminated dharmas [―the path and the pure dharmas entailed by cessation―] change. Therefore, naturally luminous stainlessness is unconditioned and changeless. Thus, though the nature of phenomena is referred to by this term "fundamental change of state," it is also called "permanent."<ref>OED, pp. 610–11. For more details, see the translation of the excerpts from OED below.</ref></blockquote>
  
 
All of this underlines that there is no change of state in nature or substance, but only a revelation of the way things actually have always been, once the delusion of what is projected onto this is seen through. Also, nonconceptual wisdom as both the underlying basis and the result of this change of state is clearly described in terms of the dynamics of an enlightened mind, and not as sheer emptiness or an inert state. Thus, as far as the notion of "change of state" refers to this process of uncovering mind's fundamental nature, even when it is sometimes described in Buddhist texts as if there were a transformation of one "thing" into another "thing," or of something impure (such as the skandhas or mental afflictions) into something pure (such as the pure skandhas or wisdoms), this is just a conventional or expedient way of teaching. The Eighth Karmapa's commentary on the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' says:
 
All of this underlines that there is no change of state in nature or substance, but only a revelation of the way things actually have always been, once the delusion of what is projected onto this is seen through. Also, nonconceptual wisdom as both the underlying basis and the result of this change of state is clearly described in terms of the dynamics of an enlightened mind, and not as sheer emptiness or an inert state. Thus, as far as the notion of "change of state" refers to this process of uncovering mind's fundamental nature, even when it is sometimes described in Buddhist texts as if there were a transformation of one "thing" into another "thing," or of something impure (such as the skandhas or mental afflictions) into something pure (such as the pure skandhas or wisdoms), this is just a conventional or expedient way of teaching. The Eighth Karmapa's commentary on the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' says:
  
<blockquote>Those present-day followers of [Mahā]mudrā whose confusion is even a hundred thousand times bigger than this exclaim, "Through refining the ālaya-consciousness into something pure, it turns into the result of mirrorlike wisdom." This is not justified for the following reasons. Something like this does not appear in any of the traditions of the mahāyāna, and what does not appear [there also] does not appear in the sense of something that is obtained through reasoning. A presentation of the ālaya-consciousness as the cause and mirrorlike wisdom as its result is not something that is obtained through reasoning. Rather, with respect to the mode of being of causes and results in terms of [such] causes and results in the abhidharma that actually fulfill these functionsD D (that is, what produces and what is produced), the ālaya-consciousness and mirrorlike wisdom are not adequate as a cause and a result that fully qualify as such. Also, since the very nature of the ālaya-consciousness is [nothing but] the adventitious stains, it is presented as impure. No matter how it may be refined by something else, it will not turn into something pure. It is not possible within the sphere of knowable objects that something impure turns into something pure, or that something pure turns into something impure.</blockquote>
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<blockquote>Those present-day followers of [Mahā]mudrā whose confusion is even a hundred thousand times bigger than this exclaim, "Through refining the ālaya-consciousness into something pure, it turns into the result of mirrorlike wisdom." This is not justified for the following reasons. Something like this does not appear in any of the traditions of the mahāyāna, and what does not appear [there also] does not appear in the sense of something that is obtained through reasoning. A presentation of the ālaya-consciousness as the cause and mirrorlike wisdom as its result is not something that is obtained through reasoning. Rather, with respect to the mode of being of causes and results in terms of [such] causes and results in the abhidharma that actually fulfill these functions<ref>That means being actual effective causes and results, and not just nominal ones.</ref> (that is, what produces and what is produced), the ālaya-consciousness and mirrorlike wisdom are not adequate as a cause and a result that fully qualify as such. Also, since the very nature of the ālaya-consciousness is [nothing but] the adventitious stains, it is presented as impure. No matter how it may be refined by something else, it will not turn into something pure. It is not possible within the sphere of knowable objects that something impure turns into something pure, or that something pure turns into something impure.<ref>JNS, vol. 1, p. 210.</ref></blockquote>
  
To highlight the different perspectives of the notion of change of state, Asaṅga's ''Abhidharmasamucchaya'' speaks of three kinds of change of state―(1) the change of state of mind upon the attainment of the path of nonlearning; (2) the change of state of the path; and (3) the change of state of the impregnations of negative tendencies. Sthiramati's commentaryD D explains that (1) refers to the naturally luminous mind that is the nature of phenomena having become free from all adventitious afflictions without exception. This is also called "the change of state of suchness." (2) means that, once clear realization occurs on the mundane path, it has become the supramundane path. The latter is also called "the path of learning" because there still remain tasks to be accomplished. Once all antagonistic factors are eliminated through being free from attachment to the three realms, this is presented as the perfectly complete change of the state that is the nature of this path. (3) means the ālaya-consciousness being free from even the most subtle latent tendencies of all afflictions.
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To highlight the different perspectives of the notion of change of state, Asaṅga's ''Abhidharmasamucchaya''<ref>D4049, fol. 100a.7–100b.1.</ref> speaks of three kinds of change of state―(1) the change of state of mind upon the attainment of the path of nonlearning; (2) the change of state of the path; and (3) the change of state of the impregnations of negative tendencies. Sthiramati's commentary<ref>D4054, fol. 231a.6–231b.2. See also Sthiramati's comments on ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.56 below.</ref> explains that (1) refers to the naturally luminous mind that is the nature of phenomena having become free from all adventitious afflictions without exception. This is also called "the change of state of suchness." (2) means that, once clear realization occurs on the mundane path, it has become the supramundane path. The latter is also called "the path of learning" because there still remain tasks to be accomplished. Once all antagonistic factors are eliminated through being free from attachment to the three realms, this is presented as the perfectly complete change of the state that is the nature of this path. (3) means the ālaya-consciousness being free from even the most subtle latent tendencies of all afflictions.
  
 
The tenth chapter of the ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' explains the change of state of the five skandhas as follows:
 
The tenth chapter of the ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' explains the change of state of the five skandhas as follows:
  
<blockquote>Through how many kinds of masteries is the mastery of the dharmakāya attained? In brief, mastery is attained through five kinds: (1) Through the change of state of the skandha of form, mastery over [pure buddha] realms, kāyas, the excellent major and minor marks, infinite voices, and the invisible mark on the crown of the head [is attained]. (2) Through the change of state of the skandha of feeling, mastery over infinite and vast blissful states without wrongdoing [is attained]. (3) Through the change of state of the skandha of discrimination, mastery over the teachings [is attained] through all groups of words, groups of phrases, and groups of letters. (4) Through the change of state of the skandha of formation, mastery over creation, transformation, gathering retinues, and gathering the immaculate dharmas [is attained]. (5) Through the change of state of the skandha of consciousness, mastery over mirrorlike [wisdom], [the wisdom of] equality, discriminating [wisdom], and all-accomplishing [wisdom] is attained.</blockquote>
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<blockquote>Through how many kinds of masteries is the mastery of the dharmakāya attained? In brief, mastery is attained through five kinds: (1) Through the change of state of the skandha of form, mastery over [pure buddha] realms, kāyas, the excellent major and minor marks, infinite voices, and the invisible mark on the crown of the head [is attained]. (2) Through the change of state of the skandha of feeling, mastery over infinite and vast blissful states without wrongdoing [is attained]. (3) Through the change of state of the skandha of discrimination, mastery over the teachings [is attained] through all groups of words, groups of phrases, and groups of letters. (4) Through the change of state of the skandha of formation, mastery over creation, transformation, gathering retinues, and gathering the immaculate dharmas [is attained]. (5) Through the change of state of the skandha of consciousness, mastery over mirrorlike [wisdom], [the wisdom of] equality, discriminating [wisdom], and all-accomplishing [wisdom] is attained.<ref>X.5 (D4048, fol. 38a.4–8).</ref></blockquote>
  
In his commentary on ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.12–17, SthiramatiD D says that "state" in this context refers to the five skandhas, while "change" means that the dharmadhātu has become pure and has also become nonconceptual wisdom by virtue of the relinquishment of the afflictive and cognitive obscurations contained in these skandhas (for details, see below). In slightly different terms, ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.41–47 also describes the various changes of state of the skandhas (primarily that of consciousness). Verse IX.48 concludes that the facets of such changes are in fact innumerable, but that all of them occur within the changeless and ever-pure dharmadhātu.
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In his commentary on ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.12–17, Sthiramati<ref>D4034, fol. 113b.1–2.</ref> says that "state" in this context refers to the five skandhas, while "change" means that the dharmadhātu has become pure and has also become nonconceptual wisdom by virtue of the relinquishment of the afflictive and cognitive obscurations contained in these skandhas (for details, see below). In slightly different terms, ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.41–47 also describes the various changes of state of the skandhas (primarily that of consciousness). Verse IX.48 concludes that the facets of such changes are in fact innumerable, but that all of them occur within the changeless and ever-pure dharmadhātu.
  
 
<blockquote>Thus, infinite masteries are asserted<br>In infinite changes of state<br>By virtue of the inconceivable all-accomplishment<br>Within the stainless foundation of the buddhas.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>Thus, infinite masteries are asserted<br>In infinite changes of state<br>By virtue of the inconceivable all-accomplishment<br>Within the stainless foundation of the buddhas.</blockquote>
  
Thus, all these changes of state entail both a negative (relinquishment) and a positive aspect (attainment, purity), thus usually designating both a process and its result (cause and effect). By keeping in mind that the term "change of state" is used in Yogācāra texts sometimes to refer to the first and sometimes to the second aspect, seeming contradictions in differing ways of describing or applying this term are resolved. In other words, "state" may either refer to the ālaya-consciousness (or all eight consciousnesses, or adventitious stains) as that which changes from the perspective of the path. Or, it may be understood as nonconceptual wisdom, the Tathāgata heart, or the dharmadhātu as the very state within which any of the above "changes" take place, but which remains changeless itself. As for "change," again, even in terms of the eight consciousnesses or adventitious stains, there is no real change, since all of them are always explained to be delusive and illusionlike, and thus actually nonexistent in the first place―the only "change" being the realization of exactly this fact. Thus, there is no change in terms of the object, but in terms of the realizing subject, which again happens only from the perspective of the (seemingly) evolving wisdom of the path, but not in terms of the fundamentally unchanging nature of nonconceptual wisdom. Thus, at any given time on the path, there is never any change in substance or nature (both on the side of what is to be relinquished and the side of what is to be attained)―all that happens is a cognitive change, or a change in one's outlook on oneself and the world.
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In sum, all these changes of state entail both a negative (relinquishment) and a positive aspect (attainment, purity), thus usually designating both a process and its result (cause and effect). By keeping in mind that the term "change of state" is used in Yogācāra texts sometimes to refer to the first and sometimes to the second aspect, seeming contradictions in differing ways of describing or applying this term are resolved. In other words, "state" may either refer to the ālaya-consciousness (or all eight consciousnesses, or adventitious stains) as that which changes from the perspective of the path. Or, it may be understood as nonconceptual wisdom, the Tathāgata heart, or the dharmadhātu as the very state within which any of the above "changes" take place, but which remains changeless itself.<ref>Note that the Yogācāra literature in fact sometimes employs two terms―''āśrayapāravṛtti'' (lit. "change of state into something else") versus ''āṣrayaparivṛtti''―as referring to the former and the latter aspects above, respectively. However, the use of these two terms in the texts is not consistent in this way. Ultimately, both come down to the same, basically indicating two sides of the same process.</ref> As for "change," again, even in terms of the eight consciousnesses or adventitious stains, there is no real change, since all of them are always explained to be delusive and illusionlike, and thus actually nonexistent in the first place―the only "change" being the realization of exactly this fact. Thus, there is no change in terms of the object, but in terms of the realizing subject, which again happens only from the perspective of the (seemingly) evolving wisdom of the path, but not in terms of the fundamentally unchanging nature of nonconceptual wisdom. Thus, at any given time on the path, there is never any change in substance or nature (both on the side of what is to be relinquished and the side of what is to be attained)―all that happens is a cognitive change, or a change in one's outlook on oneself and the world.
  
 
These two aspects also represent the two reasons why, from the perspective of the path, any change of state is possible at all. First, what seems to "change" (the adventitious stains) can appear so precisely because it is merely an unreal and deceiving mental construct in the first place. Secondly, these fictitious mental projections are only superimposed onto, and occur nowhere else than within, the undeceiving ground of true reality, which is their actual nature, just to be revealed. In other words, though sentient beings' delusional seeming reality in the form of the imaginary and other-dependent natures has no beginning, for individual beings, it can end. On the other hand, ultimate reality―the perfect nature―has neither beginning nor end.
 
These two aspects also represent the two reasons why, from the perspective of the path, any change of state is possible at all. First, what seems to "change" (the adventitious stains) can appear so precisely because it is merely an unreal and deceiving mental construct in the first place. Secondly, these fictitious mental projections are only superimposed onto, and occur nowhere else than within, the undeceiving ground of true reality, which is their actual nature, just to be revealed. In other words, though sentient beings' delusional seeming reality in the form of the imaginary and other-dependent natures has no beginning, for individual beings, it can end. On the other hand, ultimate reality―the perfect nature―has neither beginning nor end.
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The ''Bhāṣya'' comments:
 
The ''Bhāṣya'' comments:
  
<blockquote>Therefore, buddhahood is not said to be existent, because its characteristic is the nonexistence of persons and phenomena, and that is its nature. Nor is buddhahood said to be nonexistent, because its characteristic of being suchness exists. . . . The subsiding of heat and blurred vision is not existent, because its characteristic is the nonexistence of heat and blurred vision. Nor is it nonexistent, because it exists through the characteristic of having subsided. Likewise, the subsiding of attachment and ignorance (which resemble heat and blurred vision) in the mind and wisdom of buddhas is not said to be existent, since it consists of their nonexistence. Nor is it nonexistent, since the liberations of mind and prajñā exist through their respective characteristics of being liberated.</blockquote>
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<blockquote>Therefore, buddhahood is not said to be existent, because its characteristic is the nonexistence of persons and phenomena, and that is its nature. Nor is buddhahood said to be nonexistent, because its characteristic of being suchness exists. . . . The subsiding of heat and blurred vision is not existent, because its characteristic is the nonexistence of heat and blurred vision. Nor is it nonexistent, because it exists through the characteristic of having subsided. Likewise, the subsiding of attachment and ignorance (which resemble heat and blurred vision) in the mind and wisdom of buddhas is not said to be existent, since it consists of their nonexistence. Nor is it nonexistent, since the liberations of mind and prajñā exist through their respective characteristics of being liberated.<ref>Limaye 1992, 116–17.</ref></blockquote>
  
In other words, heat and blurred vision do not exist any more, but the iron (characterized by its natural temperature and hardness) and clear eyesight still exist and function accordingly. Likewise, in buddhahood, ordinary states of mind (the eight collections of consciousness) have subsided, while the five wisdoms operate freely. Sthiramati adds that if the state of the visual disorder of blurred vision having subsided were absolutely nonexistent, then also the eye would not exist and could thus not perform the function of seeing clearly (the same goes for cool iron and a body free from illness functioning properly). Thus, the function of clear eyesight arises by virtue of blurred vision not existing. Likewise, in buddhahood, the afflictions and ignorance do not exist, but the liberation of mind (freedom from the afflictions―nirvāṇa) and prajñā (freedom from ignorance―omniscient wisdom) exist. The first liberation refers to being liberated from the afflictions to be relinquished through the paths of seeing and familiarization, which arises from the lack of attachment. The liberation of prajñā means realizing, just as it is, that the liberation of mind actually is liberation, which arises from the lack of ignorance. In addition, the characteristic of the joy of being free from attachment and ignorance is not nonexistent either. In brief, buddhahood is not just some indifferent state of lacking some things and seeing others, but it is the most fundamental freedom and insight that can possibly be experienced, which is naturally immensely joyful.
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In other words, heat and blurred vision do not exist any more, but the iron (characterized by its natural temperature and hardness) and clear eyesight still exist and function accordingly. Likewise, in buddhahood, ordinary states of mind (the eight collections of consciousness) have subsided, while the five wisdoms operate freely. Sthiramati adds that if the state of the visual disorder of blurred vision having subsided were absolutely nonexistent, then also the eye would not exist and could thus not perform the function of seeing clearly (the same goes for cool iron and a body free from illness functioning properly). Thus, the function of clear eyesight arises by virtue of blurred vision not existing. Likewise, in buddhahood, the afflictions and ignorance do not exist, but the liberation of mind (freedom from the afflictions―nirvāṇa) and prajñā (freedom from ignorance―omniscient wisdom) exist. The first liberation refers to being liberated from the afflictions to be relinquished through the paths of seeing and familiarization,<ref>Throughout, the reason for using "familiarization" instead of the―at least in popular western Buddhist literature―more familiar word "meditation" is that, in Buddhism, both the Sanskrit ''bhāvanā'' and the Tibetan ''sgom pa'' mostly mean "familiarizing with," mentally "cultivating," or "enhancing" something, either some certainty gained through prior reflection or a direct insight into true reality. Thus, this process can be either conceptual or nonconceptual. However, it should be noted that the original meaning of "meditation" is just "reflection" (Lat. meditatio, meditare), which is clearly conceptual, while the original meaning of the term "contemplation" (Lat. contemplatio, contemplare) is "viewing" or "looking" at something in a settled state of mind (possibly being either conceptual or nonconceptual). Also, as for compassion and other virtuous mental states, the point is not really to meditate on them as some more or less abstract object or in a conceptual way, but to cultivate and familiarize with them as integral constituents of one's mind. Of course, this is even more obvious in the case of mind's ultimate true nature (of which it is invariably said that it cannot be meditated on anyway, but one can definitely familiarize oneself with it). Likewise, the texts often speak about cultivating or familiarizing with a path, ''śamatha'', or ''vipaśyanā'', and it obviously makes no sense to say "meditating on a path," and even less to say "meditating on ''śamatha'' or ''vipaśyanā''." As for the Sanskrit term bhāvanā, it generally refers to an act of producing, manifesting, or promoting. Specifically, it means imagining, forming in the mind, occupying one's imagination with or directing one's thoughts to something. In this sense, the word can also refer to reflection, meditation, or contemplation (thus, depending on the context and to follow common consensus, I sometimes use "meditation" too). The term can also mean the application of perfumes and the like, or saturating or steeping any powder with fluid. Thus, similar to the process of a scent fully pervading a cloth or the like and actually becoming inseparable from it, "cultivation" or "familarization" in this sense may be seen as "perfuming" the mind stream with liberating insights.</ref> which arises from the lack of attachment. The liberation of prajñā means realizing, just as it is, that the liberation of mind actually is liberation, which arises from the lack of ignorance. In addition, the characteristic of the joy of being free from attachment and ignorance is not nonexistent either.<ref>D4034, fol. 120b.1–121a.1</ref> In brief, buddhahood is not just some indifferent state of lacking some things and seeing others, but it is the most fundamental freedom and insight that can possibly be experienced, which is naturally immensely joyful.
  
 
Thus, realizing buddhahood means nothing but to recognize the true nature of the mind, which can never be altered through its opposites, such as mistakenness and afflictions. Once the latter are seen through and recognized as adventitious illusory phenomena, mind will not revert to them. In other words, unlike water being reheatable over and again, once the nature of the mind is known for what it is, it is impossible to unknow it. As Dharmakīrti says in ''Pramāṇavārttika'' II.210cd–211ab:
 
Thus, realizing buddhahood means nothing but to recognize the true nature of the mind, which can never be altered through its opposites, such as mistakenness and afflictions. Once the latter are seen through and recognized as adventitious illusory phenomena, mind will not revert to them. In other words, unlike water being reheatable over and again, once the nature of the mind is known for what it is, it is impossible to unknow it. As Dharmakīrti says in ''Pramāṇavārttika'' II.210cd–211ab:
  
 
<blockquote>Having the nature of being free from harm<br>And being actual reality, it is not reversed</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>Having the nature of being free from harm<br>And being actual reality, it is not reversed</blockquote>
<blockquote>Through its opposites, even with effort,<br>Since mind adheres to this side that is its [nature].</blockquote>
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<blockquote>Through its opposites, even with effort,<br>Since mind adheres to this side that is its [nature].<ref>For more details on "change of state," see the translation of OED below.</ref></blockquote>
  
  
====Mind's awakening====
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====Mind's Awakening====
  
 
It should be noted at the outset that, fundamentally, both Yogācāras and Mādhyamikas agree that all descriptions of buddhahood (subject) or ultimate reality (object) are by definition incomplete, relative, and ultimately false, since it lies completely beyond the scope of words, thoughts, and dualistic perceptions. As ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.36 says:
 
It should be noted at the outset that, fundamentally, both Yogācāras and Mādhyamikas agree that all descriptions of buddhahood (subject) or ultimate reality (object) are by definition incomplete, relative, and ultimately false, since it lies completely beyond the scope of words, thoughts, and dualistic perceptions. As ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.36 says:
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<blockquote>The profundity of the buddhas<br>In terms of their characteristics, state, and activity<br>Within the stainless dharmadhātu<br>Is said to be but a colorful painting in the sky.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>The profundity of the buddhas<br>In terms of their characteristics, state, and activity<br>Within the stainless dharmadhātu<br>Is said to be but a colorful painting in the sky.</blockquote>
  
Thus, Mādhyamikas usually refrain from saying much, if anything, about this topic. On the other hand, the Yogācāra approach is twofold. Just like the Mādhyamikas, the Yogācāras point out, as Vasubandhu and Sthiramati comment here, that the uncontaminated dharmadhātu is completely free from reference points, so that any teachings by the Buddha on the varieties of its profundity resemble painting space with colors. However, the Yogācāras also acknowledge the pedagogical need for painting this colorful picture anyway, to be inspired by it, and also to inspire others, thus using it as an expedient means to facilitate progressing on the path, until what is painted in an illusory manner is nevertheless directly experienced. Accordingly, Sthiramati comments that, of course, it is difficult to paint space with colors, but if some very skilled person actually manages to do so, it is quite amazing. Similarly, the uncontaminated dhātu is the dharma that is to be personally experienced by the wisdom of the noble ones. As it is inexpressible in words, the Tathāgata's putting it in words by way of the threefold profundity in terms of characteristics, state, and activity is indeed a difficult task and something quite amazing to do. Still, it can be accomplished by virtue of the Buddha's skill and the dharmadhātu’s existing in all beings. Thus, the next verse says:
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Thus, Mādhyamikas usually refrain from saying much, if anything, about this topic. On the other hand, the Yogācāra approach is twofold. Just like the Mādhyamikas, the Yogācāras point out, as Vasubandhu and Sthiramati comment here, that the uncontaminated dharmadhātu is completely free from reference points, so that any teachings by the Buddha on the varieties of its profundity resemble painting space with colors.<ref>Limaye ed. p. 121; D4034, fol. 124a.2–5.</ref> However, the Yogācāras also acknowledge the pedagogical need for painting this colorful picture anyway, to be inspired by it, and also to inspire others, thus using it as an expedient means to facilitate progressing on the path, until what is painted in an illusory manner is nevertheless directly experienced. Accordingly, Sthiramati comments that, of course, it is difficult to paint space with colors, but if some very skilled person actually manages to do so, it is quite amazing. Similarly, the uncontaminated dhātu is the dharma that is to be personally experienced by the wisdom of the noble ones. As it is inexpressible in words, the Tathāgata's putting it in words by way of the threefold profundity in terms of characteristics, state, and activity is indeed a difficult task and something quite amazing to do. Still, it can be accomplished by virtue of the Buddha's skill and the dharmadhātu’s existing in all beings. Thus, the next verse says:
 
<blockquote>Though not being different in all of them,<br>Suchness has become pure.<br>Therefore, it is the Tathāgata,<br>And all beings possess its Heart.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>Though not being different in all of them,<br>Suchness has become pure.<br>Therefore, it is the Tathāgata,<br>And all beings possess its Heart.</blockquote>
  
Sthiramati says that suchness refers to the nature of the two kinds of identitylessness in terms of persons and phenomena, which pervade all entities. The personal and phenomenal identitylessness that exists in ordinary beings and the personal and phenomenal identitylessness that exists in the noble ones are not different. It is only by virtue of this suchness having become pure that it is called "Tathāgata." Though suchness exists in everything, once the two kinds of identitylessness have become free from the adventitious afflictive and cognitive obstructions, they are pure, which is called "Tathāgata." Thus, because suchness exists in sentient beings, they are all said to have the Tathāgata heart.
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Sthiramati says that suchness refers to the nature of the two kinds of identitylessness in terms of persons and phenomena, which pervade all entities. The personal and phenomenal identitylessness that exists in ordinary beings and the personal and phenomenal identitylessness that exists in the noble ones are not different. It is only by virtue of this suchness having become pure that it is called "Tathāgata." Though suchness exists in everything, once the two kinds of identitylessness have become free from the adventitious afflictive and cognitive obstructions, they are pure, which is called "Tathāgata." Thus, because suchness exists in sentient beings, they are all said to have the Tathāgata heart.<ref>D4034, fol. 124a.5–124b.2. Vasubandhu's very brief comment on this agrees, saying that, since suchness is the same in all beings and a Tathāgata has the nature of pure suchness, all beings are said to have the Tathāgata heart (Limaye 1992, 122). This conforms to his ''Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya'' (P5551, fol. 180a.6–7) on "natural purity" in ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' II.26 above, which says that, inasmuch as this natural purity exists as suchness, it exists in all sentient beings as their general characteristic. Therefore, it is said that all phenomena (!) are endowed with the Tathāgata heart. Asvabhāva's ''Ṭīkā'' is silent on ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.37, but his ''Mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana'' (D4051, fols. 230b.7–231a.1) on II.26 follows Vasubandhu, saying that natural purity is the actual true nature of ordinary beings, which means that suchness never changes into anything else, and therefore is the general characteristic of all phenomena. Thus, it is said that all sentient beings possess the Tathāgata heart. Later (D4051, fol. 246b.4), Asvabhāva's text comments on bodhisattvas on the first bhūmi attaining an equal mind with regard to all beings (III.11) by saying that they see all beings as equality in the sense of their identitylessness, which is why the scriptures say that all beings have the Tathāgata heart. Also, Bandhuprabha's ''Buddhabhūmyupadeśa'' (Keenan 2002, 48 and 103) says that the teachings on buddha nature refer to the pure dharmadhātu being present in the mind streams of all sentient beings. However, these teachings only refer to those beings who (among the five kinds of disposition) possess the buddha disposition. They were given only as skillful means, referring only to a small part of sentient beings, and in order to guide those of indeterminate disposition to swiftly enter the mahāyāna. Note that most of this is remarkably identical with certain Madhyamaka explanations (particularly the one found in the Tibetan Gelugpa school) of what buddha nature is. Coming from several Yogācāras, this evidences that at least some followers of this tradition did not explain ''tathāgatagarbha'' as the ''Uttaratantra'' and its commentaries do, but simply as "natural purity" in the sense of suchness being the same in all beings. One reason may be that the above commentators, in line with the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra's'' many verses on buddhahood, ''dharmadhātu'', and suchness being free from reference points (such as IX.36 above; for more, see below), did not want to provide any ground for reification on the level of ultimate reality. Another reason may lie in certain Yogācāras explaining that being "one who lacks the disposition" (''agotraka'') means to absolutely never attain nirvāṇa (see below). However, as evidenced in some of the passages quoted earlier, the same masters also refer to mind's luminous nature being obscured only by adventitious stains, and emptiness being both empty and naturally luminous at the time of sentient beings as well as at the time of the noble ones. Also, later in his commentary (D4034, fol. 196a.5–196b.1), Sthiramati states that it is untenable to say that only one among all the innumerable sentient beings who are endowed with the disposition to become a buddha will become a buddha, while the others will not. In fact, everybody who has gathered the two accumulations of merit and wisdom will become a buddha. Interestingly, ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.37 is also quoted in Asaṅga's ''Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā'' (J 71.16–17) in the context of saying that the suchness of the Tathāgatas is the ''tathāgatagarbha'' of sentient beings, which is typically and explicitly equated with the natural purity and luminosity of mind being obscured only by adventitious stains.</ref>
  
In general, buddhahood is described as both excellent relinquishment and realization (wisdom). Thus, in terms of the path, there is not only something to be relinquished (all reference points as per the Mādhyamikas, or the duality of apprehender and apprehended as per the Yogācāras), but also something to be cultivated (the yogic valid perceptions of meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment), which eventually results in the culmination of the nondual nonconceptual wisdom of a buddha. It is precisely because this nonconceptual wisdom (or dharmadhātu, or buddha nature) is the fundamental ground for all activities on the Buddhist path toward its (re-)discovery that the sūtras, tantras, and the Yogācāras describe it not only in purely negative terms.
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In general, buddhahood is described as both excellent relinquishment and realization (wisdom). Thus, in terms of the path, there is not only something to be relinquished (all reference points as per the Mādhyamikas, or the duality of apprehender and apprehended as per the Yogācāras),<ref>Some people say that the freedom from apprehender and apprehended is less encompassing and profound than twofold identitylessness. However, the freedom from apprehender and apprehended corresponds exactly to twofold identitylessness, since all possible objects and subjects in terms of both persons and phenomena are included in the former as well. Moreover, the relinquishment of obscurations in terms of apprehender and apprehended is also extensively discussed in both the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra''. Technically speaking, in the latter's detailed descriptions of many different levels of progressively more subtle mistaken conceptions about apprehender and apprehended to be relinquished on the paths of preparation, seeing, and familiarization, respectively, these levels comprise all cognitive obscurations, but implicitly include the afflictive obscurations too.</ref> but also something to be cultivated (the yogic valid perceptions of meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment), which eventually results in the culmination of the nondual nonconceptual wisdom of a buddha. It is precisely because this nonconceptual wisdom (or dharmadhātu, or buddha nature) is the fundamental ground for all activities on the Buddhist path toward its (re-)discovery that the sūtras, tantras, and the Yogācāras describe it not only in purely negative terms.
  
 
The classical Yogācāra "sky painting" of buddhahood (which greatly accords with the ''Buddhabhūmisūtra'') is chapter 9 of the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'', which begins with two verses on buddhahood being omniscience:
 
The classical Yogācāra "sky painting" of buddhahood (which greatly accords with the ''Buddhabhūmisūtra'') is chapter 9 of the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'', which begins with two verses on buddhahood being omniscience:
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<blockquote>The knowledge of all aspects is attained―<br>Immaculateness in terms of all obscurations.<br>Buddhahood is illustrated<br>By an opened jewel casket.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>The knowledge of all aspects is attained―<br>Immaculateness in terms of all obscurations.<br>Buddhahood is illustrated<br>By an opened jewel casket.</blockquote>
  
Sthiramati's commentary says that it is the four wisdoms (such as mirrorlike wisdom) and the dharmadhātu that are called "buddhahood," and buddhahood is in turn referred to as "omniscience." Following Vasubandhu, Sthiramati continues by saying that buddhahood is taught here through three points: (1) Full realization is illustrated by the innumerable hardships undergone by bodhisattvas for the sake of other beings (such as giving away their possessions and even their bodies); their infinite accumulations of virtue (such as the six pāramitās, the ten bhūmis, and the thirty-seven dharmas concordant with enlightenment); the innumerable eons (three or more) of practicing bodhisattva conduct; and the innumerable afflictive and cognitive obscurations that are overcome in this process. (2) The nature of buddhahood is the attainment of excellent relinquishment (being immaculate in terms of being free from all obscurations) and the attainment of excellent wisdom. The latter is called "knowledge of all aspects" by virtue of unmistakenly knowing [all phenomena] to be impermanent, suffering, empty, and identityless, just as they are. It is "omniscience" by virtue of knowing all phenomena, such as skandhas and dhātus, without exception. (3) The example for buddhahood is an opened casket of very powerful and variegated wish-fulfilling jewels―once the covers of the afflictive and cognitive obscurations have been removed, the unique qualities of buddhahood (such as the ten powers and the four fearlessnesses) manifest. Thus, verses IX.4–5 speak about buddhahood being characterized by nonduality and power.
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Sthiramati's commentary<ref>If not noted otherwise, the following comments on the select verses from the ninth chapter of the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' are all excerpts from Sthiramati's commentary (D4034, fols. 106a.6–144b.7), which usually follows, but often greatly elaborates on, Vasubandhu's ''Bhāṣya''.</ref> says that it is the four wisdoms (such as mirrorlike wisdom) and the dharmadhātu that are called "buddhahood," and buddhahood is in turn referred to as "omniscience." Following Vasubandhu, Sthiramati continues by saying that buddhahood is taught here through three points: (1) Full realization is illustrated by the innumerable hardships undergone by bodhisattvas for the sake of other beings (such as giving away their possessions and even their bodies); their infinite accumulations of virtue (such as the six pāramitās, the ten bhūmis, and the thirty-seven dharmas concordant with enlightenment);<ref>These consist of seven sets of practices: (1) the four applications of mindfulness (Skt. catuḥ smṛtyupasthāna, Tib. dran pa nye bar bzhag pa bzhi), (2) the four correct exertions (Skt. catvāri samyakprahāṇāni, Tib. yang dag spong ba bzhi), (3) the four limbs of miraculous powers (Skt. catvāra ṛddhipādāḥ, Tib. rdzu 'phrul gyi rkang pa bzhi), (4) the five faculties (Skt. pañcendriyāṇi, Tib. dbang po lnga), (5) the five powers (Skt. pañcabalāni, Tib. stobs lnga), (6) the seven branches of enlightenment (Skt. saptasaṃbodhyaṅgāni, Tib. byang chub kyi yan lag bdun), and (7) the eightfold path of the noble ones (Skt. āryāṣṭāṅgamārga, Tib. 'phags pa'i lam yan lag brgyad). In the mahāyāna, sets (1)–(3) make up the lesser, medium, and greater levels of the path of accumulation; (4)–(5) respectively correspond to the first two (heat and peak) and the second two (poised readiness and supreme dharma) of the four levels of the path of preparation; (6) is equivalent to the path of seeing; and (7) represents the path of familiarization.</ref> the innumerable eons (three or more) of practicing bodhisattva conduct; and the innumerable afflictive and cognitive obscurations that are overcome in this process. (2) The nature of buddhahood is the attainment of excellent relinquishment (being immaculate in terms of being free from all obscurations) and the attainment of excellent wisdom. The latter is called "knowledge of all aspects" by virtue of unmistakenly knowing [all phenomena] to be impermanent, suffering, empty, and identityless, just as they are. It is "omniscience" by virtue of knowing all phenomena, such as skandhas and dhātus, without exception.<ref>These two kinds of knowing represent the two buddha wisdoms of knowing suchness and variety. Elsewhere (D4034, tsi, fol. 231a.7–231b.2), Sthiramati comments that "omniscience" refers to knowing the imaginary nature, that is, knowing that all phenomena that are imagined as apprehender and apprehended are like horns of a rabbit and lack characteristics. "Knowing all referents without exception" means to know the entire seeming reality―knowable objects such as skandhas, dhātus, āyatanas, contaminated phenomena, and uncontaminated phenomena.</ref> (3) The example for buddhahood is an opened casket of very powerful and variegated wish-fulfilling jewels―once the covers of the afflictive and cognitive obscurations have been removed, the unique qualities of buddhahood (such as the ten powers and the four fearlessnesses) manifest. Thus, verses IX.4–5 speak about buddhahood being characterized by nonduality and power.
  
 
<blockquote>Buddhahood is all dharmas,<br>But itself is no dharma whatsoever.<br>It consists of pure dharmas,<br>But is not portrayed by them.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>Buddhahood is all dharmas,<br>But itself is no dharma whatsoever.<br>It consists of pure dharmas,<br>But is not portrayed by them.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>By virtue of its being the cause of the jewel of the dharma,<br>It resembles a jewel mine.<br>By virtue of being the cause of the harvest of virtue,<br>It is held to resemble a cloud.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>By virtue of its being the cause of the jewel of the dharma,<br>It resembles a jewel mine.<br>By virtue of being the cause of the harvest of virtue,<br>It is held to resemble a cloud.</blockquote>
  
Sthiramati comments that buddhahood is nondual in terms of apprehender and apprehended (any subject-object duality has been relinquished) as well as existence and nonexistence. As for the latter, at the time of buddhahood, what does not exist is the imaginary characteristic of imagined apprehender and apprehended, and what does exist is the characteristic of the existence of the perfect nature. What is called "buddhahood" is the dharma that consists of personal identitylessness, phenomenal identitylessness, nonarising, and nonceasing. There are no phenomena that are not pervaded by these two kinds of identitylessness and the fact of nonarising and nonceasing. The nature of twofold identitylessness, nonarising, and nonceasing of the dharmakāya of the buddhas and the nature of these in all phenomena is in no way different. But in buddhahood, no phenomena that are characterized as being imagined by childish beings (such as apprehender, apprehended, pots, or clothes) exist. Yet buddhahood consists of pure dharmas, because (a) it is accomplished through practicing virtues such as the pāramitās, bhūmis, and the thirty-seven dharmas concordant with enlightenment, and (b) upon being accomplished, it abides as fully embodying these virtues as well as the unique buddha qualities of the ten powers and so on. Nevertheless, buddhahood is not portrayed by these pāramitās and so on, because the pāramitās that are characterized by being imagined and are observable as the three aspects of giver, recipient, and what is given do not exist by a nature of their own. These imaginary pāramitās and so on cannot be said to portray the nature of buddhahood, because buddhahood is not an imaginary phenomenon. As for buddhahood's power, it resembles a jewel mine, because it is the cause, the condition, and the foundation for the innumerable jewels of the dharma (the teachings) as well as its qualities (such as the ten powers). It resembles a cloud, since its vast, wellspoken, and inexhaustible rain of dharma brings forth the harvests of the pāramitās and such in the fields of the mind streams of those to be guided.
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Sthiramati comments that buddhahood is nondual in terms of apprehender and apprehended (any subject-object duality has been relinquished) as well as existence and nonexistence. As for the latter, at the time of buddhahood, what does not exist is the imaginary characteristic of imagined apprehender and apprehended, and what does exist is the characteristic of the existence of the perfect nature. What is called "buddhahood" is the dharma that consists of personal identitylessness, phenomenal identitylessness, nonarising, and nonceasing. There are no phenomena that are not pervaded by these two kinds of identitylessness and the fact of nonarising and nonceasing. The nature of twofold identitylessness, nonarising, and nonceasing of the dharmakāya of the buddhas and the nature of these in all phenomena is in no way different. But in buddhahood, no phenomena that are characterized as being imagined by childish beings (such as apprehender, apprehended, pots, or clothes) exist. Yet buddhahood consists of pure dharmas, because (a) it is accomplished through practicing virtues such as the pāramitās, bhūmis, and the thirty-seven dharmas concordant with enlightenment, and (b) upon being accomplished, it abides as fully embodying these virtues as well as the unique buddha qualities of the ten powers and so on. Nevertheless, buddhahood is not portrayed by these pāramitās and so on, because the pāramitās that are characterized by being imagined and are observable as the three aspects of giver, recipient, and what is given do not exist by a nature of their own. These imaginary pāramitās and so on cannot be said to portray the nature of buddhahood, because buddhahood is not an imaginary phenomenon.<ref>The Bhāṣya says that the pāramitās and so on are not perfect (''apariniṣpanna'') in the sense of there being any intrinsic being of them.</ref> As for buddhahood's power, it resembles a jewel mine, because it is the cause, the condition, and the foundation for the innumerable jewels of the dharma (the teachings) as well as its qualities (such as the ten powers). It resembles a cloud, since its vast, wellspoken, and inexhaustible rain of dharma brings forth the harvests of the pāramitās and such in the fields of the mind streams of those to be guided.
  
 
Verses IX.7–11 explain how, based on all this, buddhahood is the supreme refuge for all beings, and the following six verses speak about buddhahood being the "fundamental change of state." Verse IX.12 says:
 
Verses IX.7–11 explain how, based on all this, buddhahood is the supreme refuge for all beings, and the following six verses speak about buddhahood being the "fundamental change of state." Verse IX.12 says:
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This describes the removal of the antagonistic factors of buddhahood and the remedies through which it is attained. The relinquishment of the latent tendencies of the two obscurations being "very extensive" refers to the path of supramundane wisdom from the first to the tenth bhūmi. "All kinds" means that the wisdoms on each one of these bhūmis have nine degrees in terms of lesser, medium, and great. "Wherever" refers to someone's mind in which the two obstructions have been purified through applying these remedial wisdoms, which is the meaning of "attaining the change of state." Once the two obstructions are relinquished in this way, this change of state consists of the attainment of the five dharmas (the four wisdoms and the pure dharmadhātu) as well as the unique qualities of a buddha (such as the ten powers), all of which are supreme, since śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do not possess them. The path of supramundane wisdom is twofold―utterly pure nonconceptual wisdom and the pure mundane wisdom of subsequent attainment, whose scope consists of all knowable objects. Utterly pure nonconceptual wisdom sees all phenomena to be empty, just as space. The pure mundane wisdom of subsequent attainment sees all entities of worldly realms in the three times as illusions and mirages.
 
This describes the removal of the antagonistic factors of buddhahood and the remedies through which it is attained. The relinquishment of the latent tendencies of the two obscurations being "very extensive" refers to the path of supramundane wisdom from the first to the tenth bhūmi. "All kinds" means that the wisdoms on each one of these bhūmis have nine degrees in terms of lesser, medium, and great. "Wherever" refers to someone's mind in which the two obstructions have been purified through applying these remedial wisdoms, which is the meaning of "attaining the change of state." Once the two obstructions are relinquished in this way, this change of state consists of the attainment of the five dharmas (the four wisdoms and the pure dharmadhātu) as well as the unique qualities of a buddha (such as the ten powers), all of which are supreme, since śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do not possess them. The path of supramundane wisdom is twofold―utterly pure nonconceptual wisdom and the pure mundane wisdom of subsequent attainment, whose scope consists of all knowable objects. Utterly pure nonconceptual wisdom sees all phenomena to be empty, just as space. The pure mundane wisdom of subsequent attainment sees all entities of worldly realms in the three times as illusions and mirages.
 
 
Verse IX.14 plays on the word "change of state" by adding ten different prefixes to the Sanskrit word ''vṛtti'' in ''āśrayaparivṛtti'', most of which highlight the dynamic character of this change of state called "buddhahood." Thus, it is a "pro-change," because it is always engaged in the welfare of others―all sentient beings. It is a "super-change," since it is the best of all phenomena, superior to any mundane phenomena, and even superior to the change of state of supramundane śrāvakas. In the term "non-change-state," "state" refers to the state that is the result of change, which is a state of nonchange in the sense of the inactivity of the three causes of afflictions (that is, the presence of objects, improper mental engagement, and not having relinquished the latencies of both). It is a "counter-change," since it does not engage in afflictions or nonvirtue, and counteracts selfish actions. It is an "ongoing change," since it functions all the time (once this change of state has occurred, its operation will never decline until the end of saṃsāra) and engages in all the remedies for afflicted phenomena. It is a "dual change," because it first engages in demonstrating becoming fully enlightened and finally engages in demonstrating nirvāṇa. It is a "nondual change," because, ultimately, it neither engages in saṃsāra nor in nirvāṇā. For, by virtue of being endowed with prajñā, what is conditioned is relinquished, and by virtue of possessing compassion, what is unconditioned is relinquished. It is an "equal change," because as far as being liberated from all afflictions goes, it is equal in śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and buddhas. It is a "special change," because it is superior to the change of state of the śrāvakas by virtue of the relinquishment of the cognitive obstructions and the qualities of the powers, the fearlessnesses, and so on. It is an "omnipresent change," because the three yānas engage all sentient beings in an omnipresent way. This change of state of the Tathāgata is endowed with all these supreme qualities, which are the uncontaminated dharmas, or the remedies for all afflictions. Therefore, it operates in a very vast manner. Verse IX.15 says:
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Verse IX.14 plays on the word "change of state" by adding ten different prefixes to the Sanskrit word ''vṛtti'' in ''āśrayaparivṛtti'',<ref>Besides "change," ''vṛtti'' in itself has many meanings (such as "operation," "activity," "function," "mode of life or conduct," "nature," "state," "practice," and "mood") which are modulated here by the ten prefixes ''pra-, ud-, a-, ni-, ā-, dvaya-, advaya-, samā-, viśiṣṭā''-, and ''sarvagā''-.</ref> most of which highlight the dynamic character of this change of state called "buddhahood." Thus, it is a "pro-change," because it is always engaged in the welfare of others―all sentient beings. It is a "super-change," since it is the best of all phenomena, superior to any mundane phenomena, and even superior to the change of state of supramundane śrāvakas. In the term "non-change-state," "state" refers to the state that is the result of change, which is a state of nonchange in the sense of the inactivity of the three causes of afflictions (that is, the presence of objects, improper mental engagement, and not having relinquished the latencies of both). It is a "counter-change," since it does not engage in afflictions or nonvirtue, and counteracts selfish actions. It is an "ongoing change," since it functions all the time (once this change of state has occurred, its operation will never decline until the end of saṃsāra) and engages in all the remedies for afflicted phenomena. It is a "dual change," because it first engages in demonstrating becoming fully enlightened and finally engages in demonstrating nirvāṇa. It is a "nondual change," because, ultimately, it neither engages in saṃsāra nor in nirvāṇā. For, by virtue of being endowed with prajñā, what is conditioned is relinquished, and by virtue of possessing compassion, what is unconditioned is relinquished. It is an "equal change," because as far as being liberated from all afflictions goes, it is equal in śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and buddhas. It is a "special change," because it is superior to the change of state of the śrāvakas by virtue of the relinquishment of the cognitive obstructions and the qualities of the powers, the fearlessnesses, and so on. It is an "omnipresent change," because the three yānas engage all sentient beings in an omnipresent way. This change of state of the Tathāgata is endowed with all these supreme qualities, which are the uncontaminated dharmas, or the remedies for all afflictions. Therefore, it operates in a very vast manner. Verse IX.15 says:
  
 
<blockquote>Just as space is held to be always omnipresent,<br>Also this [buddhahood] is held to be always omnipresent.<br>Just as space is omnipresent in what has form,<br>Also this [buddhahood] is omnipresent in the hosts of beings.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>Just as space is held to be always omnipresent,<br>Also this [buddhahood] is held to be always omnipresent.<br>Just as space is omnipresent in what has form,<br>Also this [buddhahood] is omnipresent in the hosts of beings.</blockquote>
  
Just as space is omnipresent in all entities in the three times, the uncontaminated dharmadhātu exists and is omnipresent in the mind streams of all sentient beings. This is to be understood here in terms of buddhas experiencing and accepting all beings as not being different from themselves in a perfect manner. Buddhahood has the nature of the dharmadhātu, and once the characteristic of the omnipresence of the dharmadhātu is realized on the first bhūmi, a state of mind of perceiving oneself and all beings as equal is attained. Through further cultivating this throughout the remaining bhūmis, at the time of buddhahood, this all-encompassing experience is perfected. This is what is called "being omnipresent in the hosts of beings."
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Just as space is omnipresent in all entities in the three times, the uncontaminated dharmadhātu exists and is omnipresent in the mind streams of all sentient beings. This is to be understood here in terms of buddhas experiencing and accepting all beings as not being different from themselves in a perfect manner. Buddhahood has the nature of the dharmadhātu, and once the characteristic of the omnipresence of the dharmadhātu is realized on the first bhūmi, a state of mind of perceiving oneself and all beings as equal is attained. Through further cultivating this throughout the remaining bhūmis, at the time of buddhahood, this all-encompassing experience is perfected. This is what is called "being omnipresent in the hosts of beings."<ref>Note that ''Uttaratantra'' I.27a gives the fact that "buddha wisdom enters into the hosts of beings" as one of the three reasons why all sentient beings are said to have the Tathāgata heart. For a detailed discussion of these three reasons in ''Uttaratantra'' I.27–28, see Brunnhölzl 2007b, n. 280.</ref>
  
 
As for why sentient beings do not realize the dharmadhātu and do not see buddhas, though the dharmadhātu always exists and is omnipresent in them, verse IX.16 says:
 
As for why sentient beings do not realize the dharmadhātu and do not see buddhas, though the dharmadhātu always exists and is omnipresent in them, verse IX.16 says:
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<blockquote>In pure emptiness, buddhas attain<br>The supreme self of the lack of self.<br>Through attaining the pure self,<br>They have gone to the great self of the self.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>In pure emptiness, buddhas attain<br>The supreme self of the lack of self.<br>Through attaining the pure self,<br>They have gone to the great self of the self.</blockquote>
  
To attain the supreme self means to attain the supreme lack of self. The supreme lack of self consists of personal identitylessness and phenomenal identitylessness. Since the buddhas have this twofold lack of a self as their self and nature within the uncontaminated dhātu, they are presented as being the supreme self. As for the word "self" (''ātman''), on the one hand, it means the imaginary self of the tīrthikas, referring to "self," "sentient being," "life-force," and so on. But on the other hand, it can also refer to the nature of a phenomenon, such as saying that the defining characteristic or nature of fire is to be hot. In these cases, the word "self" is used in the sense of "nature" (''svabhāva''). Thus, because the buddhas have the nature of the lack of self, it is said that they have attained the supreme self. So, what is the supreme lack of self? It means pure emptiness. Once the emptiness that is personal identitylessness and the emptiness that is phenomenal identitylessness have become pure of the stains of apprehender and apprehended, emptiness is pure. Having attained this purity is called "having attained the supreme lack of self." "The great self of the self" (''ātmamahātmatā'') designates the incomparable nature of this supreme self that is the supreme lack of self, which consists of the twofold identitylessness of persons and phenomena. In terms of exactly this being the very nature of buddhas, it is called "the self of the buddhas." Consequently, verse IX.24 points out that buddhahood cannot be pinpointed.
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To attain the supreme self means to attain the supreme lack of self. The supreme lack of self consists of personal identitylessness and phenomenal identitylessness. Since the buddhas have this twofold lack of a self as their self and nature within the uncontaminated dhātu, they are presented as being the supreme self. As for the word "self" (''ātman''), on the one hand, it means the imaginary self of the tīrthikas, referring to "self," "sentient being," "life-force," and so on. But on the other hand, it can also refer to the nature of a phenomenon, such as saying that the defining characteristic or nature of fire is to be hot. In these cases, the word "self" is used in the sense of "nature" (''svabhāva''). Thus, because the buddhas have the nature of the lack of self, it is said that they have attained the supreme self. So, what is the supreme lack of self? It means pure emptiness. Once the emptiness that is personal identitylessness and the emptiness that is phenomenal identitylessness have become pure of the stains of apprehender and apprehended, emptiness is pure. Having attained this purity is called "having attained the supreme lack of self." "The great self of the self" (''ātmamahātmatā'') designates the incomparable nature of this supreme self that is the supreme lack of self, which consists of the twofold identitylessness of persons and phenomena. In terms of exactly this being the very nature of buddhas, it is called "the self of the buddhas."<ref>Note that this is similar to "the pāramitā of ultimate self" in ''Uttaratantra'' I.37cd. Also, the use of "self" in the double sense of what is to be relinquished and the ultimate nature of phenomena resembles the use of "nature" (''svabhāva'') in Madhyamaka, which says that phenomena lack any nature and that precisely this is the nature of phenomena.</ref> Consequently, verse IX.24 points out that buddhahood cannot be pinpointed.
  
 
<blockquote>Therefore, buddhahood is said to be<br>Neither existent nor nonexistent.<br>So, upon such questions about the Buddha,<br>The principle of being undecidable is held.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>Therefore, buddhahood is said to be<br>Neither existent nor nonexistent.<br>So, upon such questions about the Buddha,<br>The principle of being undecidable is held.</blockquote>
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<blockquote>It has the characteristic of the suchness of all phenomena<br>Being pure of the two obscurations.<br>It [also] has the characteristic of the inexhaustible mastery<br>Over the wisdom of the real and [the wisdom] whose object that is.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>It has the characteristic of the suchness of all phenomena<br>Being pure of the two obscurations.<br>It [also] has the characteristic of the inexhaustible mastery<br>Over the wisdom of the real and [the wisdom] whose object that is.</blockquote>
  
The suchness of all conditioned, unconditioned, contaminated, and uncontaminated phenomena refers to emptiness. The suchness that is the emptiness of the buddhabhūmi has the characteristic and nature of being free from the afflictive and cognitive obstructions. This is the change of state of suchness. "The wisdom of the real" refers to the pure mundane wisdom that is attained subsequently to this change of state, while "the real" refers to the nonconceptual wisdom that is the characteristic of the change of state of the ālaya-consciousness, which is the other-dependent nature. This nonconceptual wisdom (of meditative equipoise) is known in an unmistaken manner through the pure mundane wisdom of subsequent attainment, but not through any other kind of wisdom. This describes the change of state of the ālaya-consciousness, which is the support for the impregnations of negative tendencies. The word "that" in the last line refers to the dharmadhātu, which means that nonconceptual wisdom focuses on the dharmadhātu. This describes the change of state of the path. Through the pure mundane wisdom of subsequent attainment focusing on nonconceptual wisdom, inexhaustible mastery is attained, because this pure mundane wisdom realizes the nature of nonconceptual wisdom in an unmistaken manner. Also, nonconceptual wisdom attains inexhaustible mastery over suchness―the dharmadhātu―because nonconceptual wisdom settles one-pointedly on the dharmadhātu. This describes the nature of the dharmadhātu.
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The suchness of all conditioned, unconditioned, contaminated, and uncontaminated phenomena refers to emptiness. The suchness that is the emptiness of the buddhabhūmi has the characteristic and nature of being free from the afflictive and cognitive obstructions. This is the change of state of suchness. "The wisdom of the real" refers to the pure mundane wisdom that is attained subsequently to this change of state, while "the real" refers to the nonconceptual wisdom that is the characteristic of the change of state of the ālaya-consciousness, which is the other-dependent nature. This nonconceptual wisdom (of meditative equipoise) is known in an unmistaken manner through the pure mundane wisdom of subsequent attainment, but not through any other kind of wisdom. This describes the change of state of the ālaya-consciousness, which is the support for the impregnations of negative tendencies. The word "that" in the last line refers to the dharmadhātu, which means that nonconceptual wisdom focuses on the dharmadhātu. This describes the change of state of the path.<ref>This corresponds to the above-mentioned threefold change of state as in the ''Abhidharmasamucchaya''.</ref> Through the pure mundane wisdom of subsequent attainment focusing on nonconceptual wisdom, inexhaustible mastery is attained, because this pure mundane wisdom realizes the nature of nonconceptual wisdom in an unmistaken manner. Also, nonconceptual wisdom attains inexhaustible mastery over suchness―the dharmadhātu―because nonconceptual wisdom settles one-pointedly on the dharmadhātu. This describes the nature of the dharmadhātu.<ref>Vasubandhu's ''Bhāṣya'' does not comment on the last two lines of this verse, while Asvabhāva's ''Ṭīkā'' (D4029, fol. 72b.5–73a.1) agrees in identifying "the wisdom of the real" (''vastujñāna'') as the wisdom of subsequent attainment, and "that" in the last line as the ''dharmadhātu''. However, it says that "the real" (''vastu'') refers to the ''ālaya''-consciousness―the other-dependent nature. Still, this describes the change of state of the impregnations of negative tendencies―when the other-dependent nature has changed state, it becomes the sphere of the wisdom that is attained subsequently to nonconceptual wisdom, but not the sphere of other wisdoms. Nonconceptual wisdom attains mastery over suchness, because it rests in meditative equipoise at will, while the wisdom that is attained subsequently to this meditative equipoise attains mastery over the other-dependent nature in the sense of being unmistaken about it. Sthiramati's comments are literally confirmed by Ngülchu Togmé's commentary on this verse (Dngul chu thogs med 1979, 174–75), which concludes, "Thus, the nature of phenomena is realized through meditative equipoise, and meditative equipoise is realized through subsequent attainment. Since this is uninterrupted, it is the characteristic of inexhaustible mastery." Note that in Asaṅga 2004, 93–94, the translators Jamspal et al. present a greatly abbreviated, but partly mistaken form of Sthiramati's above explanation (misidentifying "the real" as the ''ālaya''-consciousness). Against Sthiramati and Asvabhāva, Jamspal et al. also prefer to follow the Gelugpa scholar dBal Mang, who takes "the wisdom of the real" as referring to the wisdom of meditative equipoise, thus, as Jamspal et al. put it, "tacitly correcting Sthiramati's (or the translator's) equation of ''vastujñāna'' with mundane, aftermath intuition."</ref>
  
 
As was said before, the realization of ultimate reality equals buddhahood―in fact buddhahood ''is'' nothing but ultimate reality, since there is no subject-object duality at that point. So to further highlight the close connection between the planes of ontology, epistemology, and soteriology, the above characteristics of buddhahood in Yogācāra (neither existent nor nonexistent, neither pure nor impure, being changeless suchness, like space, yet consisting of pure dharmas, and so on) may be compared with the characteristics of ultimate reality as presented in ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' VI.1:
 
As was said before, the realization of ultimate reality equals buddhahood―in fact buddhahood ''is'' nothing but ultimate reality, since there is no subject-object duality at that point. So to further highlight the close connection between the planes of ontology, epistemology, and soteriology, the above characteristics of buddhahood in Yogācāra (neither existent nor nonexistent, neither pure nor impure, being changeless suchness, like space, yet consisting of pure dharmas, and so on) may be compared with the characteristics of ultimate reality as presented in ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' VI.1:
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<blockquote>Neither existent nor nonexistent, neither such nor other,<br>Neither arisen nor perished, neither decreasing nor increasing,<br>Not purified and yet purified again—<br>These are the characteristics of the ultimate.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>Neither existent nor nonexistent, neither such nor other,<br>Neither arisen nor perished, neither decreasing nor increasing,<br>Not purified and yet purified again—<br>These are the characteristics of the ultimate.</blockquote>
  
Sthiramati comments that the ultimate is twofold―suchness (the pure dharmadhātu) and nondual nonconceptual wisdom. Suchness is called the ultimate, since it is the fruition of having cultivated the path of the noble ones and represents all phenomena. Or, in terms of its being an object, it is the ultimate, because it is the object of ultimate nonconceptual wisdom. Here, the above fivefold characteristic of the nonduality of the ultimate primarily refers to suchness (nonconceptual wisdom being explained later in chapter 9 and so on). (1) The ultimate―the perfect nature―is not existent, because it does not exist like the imaginary and the other-dependent natures. However, the essence of the ultimate―the perfect nature―is not nonexistent either. (2) The perfect nature is not the same as the imaginary nature, because the latter does not exist and appears in a mistaken way, while the former is the true reality and unmistaken. Nor is the perfect nature the same as the other-dependent nature, because the latter is the support for imaginary phenomena, with its nature being dependently originated and afflicted, while the former does not serve as a support for imaginary phenomena―it is not dependently originated and represents purified phenomenon. The perfect nature is also not different from the imaginary and the other-dependent natures, because what is referred to as "the perfect nature" is the fact of the other-dependent nature being free from the imaginary nature, but there is no extra perfect nature apart from that. (3) The perfect nature is not arisen, since it is not produced by karma and afflictions. It does not perish, since unarisen phenomena do not cease―it has the nature of being unconditioned. (4) The perfect nature is without decrease and increase, just as space. Even when clouds in space decrease, there is no decrease in space. Even when previously nonexistent clouds appear in it, space does not arise newly. Likewise, though saṃsāric afflictions decrease during the time of cultivating the path of the noble ones, there is no decrease in emptiness, and even though purified phenomena―the factors concordant with enlightenment―increase, there is no increase in emptiness. (5) The ultimate is emptiness. Just as space, gold, water, and a crystal are naturally pure, it is pure in that it is of the nature of emptiness. Just as the natural purity of space cannot be purified by washing it with water or the like, in the nature of emptiness, there are no stains to be purified. Therefore, it is said to be "not purified." Though there are no stains to be removed in this nature, it is not that the afflictive and cognitive obscurations that exist in emptiness in an adventitious manner are not to be removed―indeed they must be removed and purified, a process like removing adventitious clouds from space, or adventitious earth and stones from gold. This is called "the ultimate becoming pure." In brief, the ultimate refers to the emptiness that is personal identitylessness and the emptiness that is phenomenal identitylessness.
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Sthiramati<ref>D4034, fols. 74a.3–75b.1.</ref> comments that the ultimate is twofold―suchness (the pure dharmadhātu) and nondual nonconceptual wisdom. Suchness is called the ultimate, since it is the fruition of having cultivated the path of the noble ones and represents all phenomena. Or, in terms of its being an object, it is the ultimate, because it is the object of ultimate nonconceptual wisdom.<ref>That even the Madhyamaka understanding of the ultimate is not limited to its being solely an object is shown by Bhāvaviveka's ''Tarkajvālā'' (D3856, fol. 59a.7–59b.2). He explains that, in ''paramārtha, artha'' ("object," "purpose," or "actuality") refers to what is to be understood, realized, or examined. ''Parama'' means "supreme." Thus, (1) since ''paramārtha'' is an object and ultimate (or supreme), it is the ultimate object. (2) Or, it may be read as "the object of the ultimate." Since it is the object of ultimate nonconceptual wisdom, it is the object of the ultimate. (3) Or, it can be understood as "that which is in accordance with the ultimate object." Since the ultimate object exists in the prajñā that is in approximate accordance with the realization of this ultimate object, it is what is in accordance with the ultimate object. In other words, in (1), both ''parama'' and ''artha'' refer only to the object as opposed to the subject that realizes it, (2) means that ''parama'' refers to the subject (wisdom) and ''artha'' to the object (emptiness), and (3) indicates a reasoning consciousness that cognizes ultimate reality not directly but inferentially.</ref> Here, the above fivefold characteristic of the nonduality of the ultimate primarily refers to suchness (nonconceptual wisdom being explained later in chapter 9 and so on). (1) The ultimate―the perfect nature―is not existent, because it does not exist like the imaginary and the other-dependent natures. However, the essence of the ultimate―the perfect nature―is not nonexistent either. (2) The perfect nature is not the same as the imaginary nature, because the latter does not exist and appears in a mistaken way, while the former is the true reality and unmistaken. Nor is the perfect nature the same as the other-dependent nature, because the latter is the support for imaginary phenomena, with its nature being dependently originated and afflicted, while the former does not serve as a support for imaginary phenomena―it is not dependently originated and represents purified phenomenon. The perfect nature is also not different from the imaginary and the other-dependent natures, because what is referred to as "the perfect nature" is the fact of the other-dependent nature being free from the imaginary nature, but there is no extra perfect nature apart from that. (3) The perfect nature is not arisen, since it is not produced by karma and afflictions. It does not perish, since unarisen phenomena do not cease―it has the nature of being unconditioned. (4) The perfect nature is without decrease and increase, just as space. Even when clouds in space decrease, there is no decrease in space. Even when previously nonexistent clouds appear in it, space does not arise newly. Likewise, though saṃsāric afflictions decrease during the time of cultivating the path of the noble ones, there is no decrease in emptiness, and even though purified phenomena―the factors concordant with enlightenment―increase, there is no increase in emptiness. (5) The ultimate is emptiness. Just as space, gold, water, and a crystal are naturally pure, it is pure in that it is of the nature of emptiness. Just as the natural purity of space cannot be purified by washing it with water or the like, in the nature of emptiness, there are no stains to be purified. Therefore, it is said to be "not purified." Though there are no stains to be removed in this nature, it is not that the afflictive and cognitive obscurations that exist in emptiness in an adventitious manner are not to be removed―indeed they must be removed and purified, a process like removing adventitious clouds from space, or adventitious earth and stones from gold. This is called "the ultimate becoming pure." In brief, the ultimate refers to the emptiness that is personal identitylessness and the emptiness that is phenomenal identitylessness.
  
  
====Mind's three enlightened bodies and four wisdom eyes====
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====Mind's Three Enlightened Bodies and Four Wisdom Eyes====
  
The nature and the functions of buddhahood as the realization of ultimate reality are described as the four wisdoms, which represent the cognitive processes within the all-encompassing dharmadhātu that result in the two rūpakāyas performing enlightened activity within the dharmakāya. This description once again clearly highlights the fact that buddhahood is not an inactive or inert state. These processes are presented in the classical Yogācāra format of a change of state in terms of the eight consciousnesses on the one side and the four wisdoms and the three kāyas on the other side. As explained before, this does not mean any actual transformation of the former into the latter, such as miraculously transforming something really bad into something excellent. Still, conventionally speaking, it is taught that, upon being purified (or realized to be adventitious), the ālaya-consciousness manifests as mirrorlike wisdom, the afflicted mind as the wisdom of equality, the mental consciousness as discriminating wisdom, and the five sense consciousnesses as all-accomplishing wisdom. Most fundamentally, once the emptiness in these consciousnesses has become pure, the dharmadhātu is completely pure. In other words, these changes of state take place within the fundamental space of the dharmadhātu, while always being inseparable from it. The ''Nighaṇṭa'' (a Sanskrit-Tibetan glossary of key Buddhist terms) describes the dharmadhātu and the four wisdoms as follows:
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The nature and the functions of buddhahood as the realization of ultimate reality are described as the four wisdoms, which represent the cognitive processes within the all-encompassing dharmadhātu<ref>The Yogācāra system does not present the ''dharmadhātu'' as a fifth wisdom (''dharmadhātu'' wisdom), which has its origin in the Buddhist tantras. Later however, especially in Tibet, listing five wisdoms became the predominant general presentation (see also Pawo Rinpoché's discussion of the ''Buddhabhūmisūtra'' in appendix 1). When the ''dharmadhātu'' wisdom is added, it is usually matched with the svābhāvikakāya. Some explanations (for example, TOK vol. 3, p. 607) also say that ''dharmadhātu'' wisdom is the change of state of the empty aspect of the ''ālaya''-consciousness, while mirrorlike wisdom is the change of state of its lucid aspect.</ref> that result in the two rūpakāyas performing enlightened activity within the dharmakāya. This description once again clearly highlights the fact that buddhahood is not an inactive or inert state. These processes are presented in the classical Yogācāra format of a change of state in terms of the eight consciousnesses on the one side and the four wisdoms and the three kāyas on the other side. As explained before, this does not mean any actual transformation of the former into the latter, such as miraculously transforming something really bad into something excellent. Still, conventionally speaking, it is taught that, upon being purified (or realized to be adventitious), the ālaya-consciousness manifests as mirrorlike wisdom, the afflicted mind as the wisdom of equality, the mental consciousness as discriminating wisdom, and the five sense consciousnesses as all-accomplishing wisdom. Most fundamentally, once the emptiness in these consciousnesses has become pure, the dharmadhātu is completely pure. In other words, these changes of state take place within the fundamental space of the dharmadhātu, while always being inseparable from it. The ''Nighaṇṭa''<ref>P5833, fol. 6a–b.</ref> (a Sanskrit-Tibetan glossary of key Buddhist terms) describes the dharmadhātu and the four wisdoms as follows:
  
 
<blockquote>''Dharmadhātuviśuddha'' means the completely pure dharmadhātu. It serves as the cause and expanse for the arising and originating of the dharmas of the noble ones (such as the powers and fearlessnesses). Therefore, within the dharmadhātu (that is, suchness), the adventitious afflictive obscurations and cognitive obscurations (which are like clouds) are translucent and purified. Since it is similar to the pure expanse of the sky, it is called "the completely pure expanse of dharmas."</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>''Dharmadhātuviśuddha'' means the completely pure dharmadhātu. It serves as the cause and expanse for the arising and originating of the dharmas of the noble ones (such as the powers and fearlessnesses). Therefore, within the dharmadhātu (that is, suchness), the adventitious afflictive obscurations and cognitive obscurations (which are like clouds) are translucent and purified. Since it is similar to the pure expanse of the sky, it is called "the completely pure expanse of dharmas."</blockquote>
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As the quotes in the translations below show, these formats are already found in the ''Buddhabhūmisūtra'', the ''Trikāyanāmasūtra'', and the ''Suvarṇaprabhāsottamasūtra''. However, the classical source on correlating the eight consciousnesses with the four wisdoms and the dharmadhātu in the Yogācāra tradition is the introduction in Sthiramati's commentary on verses IX.12–17 on the fundamental change of state in the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra''.
 
As the quotes in the translations below show, these formats are already found in the ''Buddhabhūmisūtra'', the ''Trikāyanāmasūtra'', and the ''Suvarṇaprabhāsottamasūtra''. However, the classical source on correlating the eight consciousnesses with the four wisdoms and the dharmadhātu in the Yogācāra tradition is the introduction in Sthiramati's commentary on verses IX.12–17 on the fundamental change of state in the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra''.
  
<blockquote>Here, "state" refers to the five skandhas from the skandha of form up through the skandha of consciousness. After the afflictive and cognitive obscurations that exist in these skandhas have been relinquished, the dharmadhātu has become pure and has become nonconceptual wisdom. This is called "change of state into something else." In this regard, when the four skandhas of form, feeling, discrimination, and formation as well as [everything] in the skandha of consciousness from the eye consciousness up through the afflicted mind have become pure, the dharmadhātu becomes pure. When the ālaya-consciousness has become pure, it becomes nonconceptual wisdom.<br>Or, when the emptiness that exists in form, feeling, discrimination, formation, and the eight consciousnesses has become pure, the dharmadhātu becomes pure. From among the eight consciousnesses, when the ālaya-consciousness has become pure, it becomes mirrorlike wisdom. When the afflicted mind has become pure, it becomes the wisdom of equality. When the mental consciousness has become pure, it becomes discriminating wisdom. When the five [sense] consciousnesses, from the eye [consciousness] up through the body [consciousness] have become pure, they become all-accomplishing wisdom. The attainment of these five―the four wisdoms and the pure dharmadhātu―are called "the five changes of state into something else."</blockquote>
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<blockquote>Here, "state" refers to the five skandhas from the skandha of form up through the skandha of consciousness. After the afflictive and cognitive obscurations that exist in these skandhas have been relinquished, the dharmadhātu has become pure and has become nonconceptual wisdom. This is called "change of state into something else." In this regard, when the four skandhas of form, feeling, discrimination, and formation as well as [everything] in the skandha of consciousness from the eye consciousness up through the afflicted mind have become pure, the dharmadhātu becomes pure. When the ālaya-consciousness has become pure, it becomes nonconceptual wisdom.<br>Or, when the emptiness that exists in form, feeling, discrimination, formation, and the eight consciousnesses has become pure, the dharmadhātu becomes pure. From among the eight consciousnesses, when the ālaya-consciousness has become pure, it becomes mirrorlike wisdom. When the afflicted mind has become pure, it becomes the wisdom of equality. When the mental consciousness has become pure, it becomes discriminating wisdom. When the five [sense] consciousnesses, from the eye [consciousness] up through the body [consciousness] have become pure, they become all-accomplishing wisdom. The attainment of these five―the four wisdoms and the pure dharmadhātu―are called "the five changes of state into something else."<ref>D4034, fol. 113b.1–5.</ref></blockquote>
  
 
As for the three kāyas, ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.59–60 highlights their not being static states, but different functions of the pure dharmadhātu.
 
As for the three kāyas, ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.59–60 highlights their not being static states, but different functions of the pure dharmadhātu.
  
 
<blockquote>The purity of the dharmadhātu<br>Of the buddhas is explained<br>As its function varying in terms of<br>Nature, enjoying the dharma, and emanating.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>The purity of the dharmadhātu<br>Of the buddhas is explained<br>As its function varying in terms of<br>Nature, enjoying the dharma, and emanating.</blockquote>
<blockquote>The svābhāvika[kāya], the sāmbhogikakāya,<br>And the other one, the nairmāṇikakāya,<br>Are the divisions of the kāya of the buddhas.<br>The first one is the foundation of the [other] two.</blockquote>
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<blockquote>The svābhāvika[kāya], the sāmbhogikakāya,<br>And the other one, the nairmāṇikakāya,<br>Are the divisions of the kāya of the buddhas.<br>The first one is the foundation of the [other] two.<ref>As mentioned before, verses IX.56–59 are literally found in the ''Buddhabhūmisūtra''.</ref></blockquote>
  
Sthiramati comments that "nature" (''svābhāvika'') refers to the dharmakāya,D D meaning that the nature of buddhahood as such is the pure dharmadhātu. When the stains of apprehender and apprehended that exist in the ālaya-consciousness have been relinquished, and thus the dharmadhātu has become mirrorlike wisdom, this is called "dharmakāya." The sāmbhogikakāya refers to the afflicted mind having changed state, and thus having become the wisdom of equality, as well as the mental consciousness having changed state, and thus having become discriminating wisdom. It is called "enjoyment body," because it provides the great enjoyment of the dharma for bodhisattvas who have entered the bhūmis. The nairmāṇikakāya represents the change of state of the five sense consciousnesses and all-accomplishing wisdom. It demonstrates the twelve deeds of a buddha and brings sentient beings to maturity. Thus, the Tathāgatas are not limited to a single kāya, but there is a division into three, with the dharmakāya being the foundation or support of the other two.
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Sthiramati comments that "nature" (''svābhāvika'') refers to the dharmakāya,<ref>Vasubandhu's ''Bhāṣya'' agrees, adding that the dharmakāya's characteristic is the fundamental change of state. The dharmakāya is often referred to as "svābhāvika-dharmatākāya" or "dharmatākaya," with dharmakāya being explained as an abbreviation of these two terms. For example, see ''Mahāyānasaṃgrāhabhāṣya ''on X.1, ''Buddhabhūmyupadeśa'' (Taishō 1530, 325c5–7), ''Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna'' (D3997, fol. 272b.5), Jñānacandra's ''Kāyatrayavṛtti'' (D3891, fol. 8b.2), and Ārya Vimuktisena's ''Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛtti'' (D3787, fol. 192a.7–8).</ref> meaning that the nature of buddhahood as such is the pure dharmadhātu. When the stains of apprehender and apprehended that exist in the ālaya-consciousness have been relinquished, and thus the dharmadhātu has become mirrorlike wisdom, this is called "dharmakāya." The sāmbhogikakāya refers to the afflicted mind having changed state, and thus having become the wisdom of equality, as well as the mental consciousness having changed state, and thus having become discriminating wisdom. It is called "enjoyment body," because it provides the great enjoyment of the dharma for bodhisattvas who have entered the bhūmis. The nairmāṇikakāya represents the change of state of the five sense consciousnesses and all-accomplishing wisdom. It demonstrates the twelve deeds of a buddha and brings sentient beings to maturity. Thus, the Tathāgatas are not limited to a single kāya, but there is a division into three, with the dharmakāya being the foundation or support of the other two.<ref>Note that the Sanskrit grammatical forms svābhāvikakāya, sāmbhogikakāya, and nairmāṇikakāya (as opposed to svabhāvakāya, sambhogakāya, and nirmāṇakāya) are quite standard (being not only used in the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' and its commentaries, but also throughout the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'', the ''Uttaratantra'', their commentaries, and other texts). These forms indicate these kāyas are related to the dharmakāya as its features and not as three separate entities on their own. Thus, in terms of its nature, the dharmakāya is referred to as svābhāvikakāya (this is why these two are usually said to be equivalent); in terms of its bringing the enjoyment of the mahāyāna dharma to bodhisattvas, it is the sāmbhogikakāya; and in terms of its manifesting in all kinds of forms for all kinds of beings, it is the nairmāṇikakāya.</ref>
  
The different functions of the three kāyas and four wisdoms are described in detail in ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.61–76.D D Further treatises that deal with the eight consciousnesses, the three kāyas, the four wisdoms, and their changes of state include the ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' (chapter 10) and its commentaries. Also the explanations on the three kāyas in Śīlabhadra's ''Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna'' and Bandhuprabha's ''Buddhabhūmyupadeśa'' (which is largely based on the former) greatly rely on the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya'' on IX.60–66 and chapter 10 of the ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha''. These texts also relate the four wisdoms to the three kāyas and explicitly say that the three kāyas are nothing but a division in terms of the functional aspects of buddhahood, which in itself is the single and indivisible purity of the dharmadhātu (of course, the same goes for the four wisdoms too). These functional aspects appear for different beings―the svābhāvikakāya or dharmakāya (which is equivalent to the pure dharmadhātu) is only realized by buddhas; the sambhogakāya is perceived by bodhisattvas; and the nirmāṇakāya is seen even by impure beings. Both texts furthermore relate the dharmakāya and mirrorlike wisdom to the nonconceptual wisdom in meditative equipoise, and the two rūpakāyas and the remaining three wisdoms to the wisdom that is active during subsequent attainment. In particular, Śīlabhadra explains that all elements of the dualistic structure of the phenomenal world in terms of apprehender and apprehended (all consciousnesses and their objects) appear like reflections in mirrorlike wisdom and are discerned accordingly through the other three wisdoms, for which this mirrorlike wisdom serves as a foundation. Thus, it is primarily through mirrorlike wisdom that all aspects of phenomena appear for a buddha's mind, although without any dualistic discriminations. Rather, they are perceived "in their aspect of self-awareness," which is also referred to as buddha wisdom having the quality of total recall. Buddha is said to be omniscient by virtue of mirrorlike wisdom, which is ever present and ever clear. The discussions of these topics in Nāgamitra's ''Kāyatrayāvatāramukha'' and its commentary by Jñānacandra also relate the three kāyas to the three natures. Buddhaśrījñāna's (eighth/ninth century) ''Saṃcayagāthāpañjikā'' discusses the last chapter of the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' in terms of the change of state of the eight consciousnesses as the five wisdoms (adding dharmadhātu wisdom) and the four kāyas.
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The different functions of the three kāyas and four wisdoms are described in detail in ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.61–76.<ref>Most of these verses as well as the related IX.41–48 are quoted and explained in the translations below.</ref> Further treatises that deal with the eight consciousnesses, the three kāyas, the four wisdoms, and their changes of state include the ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' (chapter 10) and its commentaries. Also the explanations on the three kāyas in Śīlabhadra's ''Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna'' and Bandhuprabha's ''Buddhabhūmyupadeśa'' (which is largely based on the former) greatly rely on the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya'' on IX.60–66 and chapter 10 of the ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha''. These texts also relate the four wisdoms to the three kāyas and explicitly say that the three kāyas are nothing but a division in terms of the functional aspects of buddhahood, which in itself is the single and indivisible purity of the dharmadhātu (of course, the same goes for the four wisdoms too). These functional aspects appear for different beings―the svābhāvikakāya or dharmakāya (which is equivalent to the pure dharmadhātu) is only realized by buddhas; the sambhogakāya is perceived by bodhisattvas; and the nirmāṇakāya is seen even by impure beings.<ref>Note that Haribhadra's commentaries on the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' say the same.</ref> Both texts furthermore relate the dharmakāya and mirrorlike wisdom to the nonconceptual wisdom in meditative equipoise, and the two rūpakāyas and the remaining three wisdoms to the wisdom that is active during subsequent attainment. In particular, Śīlabhadra explains that all elements of the dualistic structure of the phenomenal world in terms of apprehender and apprehended (all consciousnesses and their objects) appear like reflections in mirrorlike wisdom and are discerned accordingly through the other three wisdoms, for which this mirrorlike wisdom serves as a foundation. Thus, it is primarily through mirrorlike wisdom that all aspects of phenomena appear for a buddha's mind, although without any dualistic discriminations. Rather, they are perceived "in their aspect of self-awareness," which is also referred to as buddha wisdom having the quality of total recall. Buddha is said to be omniscient by virtue of mirrorlike wisdom, which is ever present and ever clear.<ref>Nishio 1982, esp. 59, 84–92, 125–26.</ref> The discussions of these topics in Nāgamitra's ''Kāyatrayāvatāramukha'' and its commentary by Jñānacandra also relate the three kāyas to the three natures. Buddhaśrījñāna's (eighth/ninth century) ''Saṃcayagāthāpañjikā'' discusses the last chapter of the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' in terms of the change of state of the eight consciousnesses as the five wisdoms (adding dharmadhātu wisdom) and the four kāyas.
  
As mentioned before, the four wisdoms are not four different entities or static qualities of one entity, but just stand for the processes that represent the main functional activities of the single nonconceptual wisdom of a buddha, which cooperate with and supplement each other. Mirrorlike wisdom is like an all-encompassing TV screen that simply reflects what is there, thus providing the "raw data" to be processed and used. Discriminating wisdom means to intently look at this screen and clearly see all its distinct data without getting confused or mixing them up.D D The wisdom of equality refers to being empathic, but lacking any kind of judgment, about the data seen on the screen, as well as making no difference between seer and seen. All-accomplishing wisdom represents the resultant impulse to altruistically act upon what is seen. Thus, nonconceptual buddha wisdom reflects all sentient beings and phenomena within a buddha's field of activity without any bias and personal concern (mirrorlike wisdom). At the same time, this nonconceptual wisdom perceives and discerns all these beings and phenomena in every minute detail, just as they are, with perfectly clear discernment and without any personal projections or superimpositions (discriminating wisdom). Nonconceptual wisdom is also completely nondual, which not only refers to its perceptual structure (no subject-object duality), but also to its "affective" structure―it neither takes saṃsāra as something bad to be avoided, nor nirvāṇa as something good to dwell in; lacks any attachment and aversion to anybody or anything; and instead sees the buddha nature of all beings, which is not different in essence from a buddha's very own state, thus naturally being loving and compassionate toward all those who do not see this (the wisdom of equality). By virtue of all these features, nonconceptual wisdom is the most efficient mental mode of operation possible, which underlies everything that, from the perspective of those to be benefited, appears as a buddha's helpful activity in an effortless, unpremeditated, and uninterrupted way (all-accomplishing wisdom).
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As mentioned before, the four wisdoms are not four different entities or static qualities of one entity, but just stand for the processes that represent the main functional activities of the single nonconceptual wisdom of a buddha, which cooperate with and supplement each other. Mirrorlike wisdom is like an all-encompassing TV screen that simply reflects what is there, thus providing the "raw data" to be processed and used. Discriminating wisdom means to intently look at this screen and clearly see all its distinct data without getting confused or mixing them up.<ref>Literally, Skt. ''pratyavekṣā'' is "looking back" and also means "paying attention," "looking after," or "care."</ref> The wisdom of equality refers to being empathic, but lacking any kind of judgment, about the data seen on the screen, as well as making no difference between seer and seen. All-accomplishing wisdom represents the resultant impulse to altruistically act upon what is seen. Thus, nonconceptual buddha wisdom reflects all sentient beings and phenomena within a buddha's field of activity without any bias and personal concern (mirrorlike wisdom). At the same time, this nonconceptual wisdom perceives and discerns all these beings and phenomena in every minute detail, just as they are, with perfectly clear discernment and without any personal projections or superimpositions (discriminating wisdom). Nonconceptual wisdom is also completely nondual, which not only refers to its perceptual structure (no subject-object duality), but also to its "affective" structure―it neither takes saṃsāra as something bad to be avoided, nor nirvāṇa as something good to dwell in; lacks any attachment and aversion to anybody or anything; and instead sees the buddha nature of all beings, which is not different in essence from a buddha's very own state, thus naturally being loving and compassionate toward all those who do not see this (the wisdom of equality). By virtue of all these features, nonconceptual wisdom is the most efficient mental mode of operation possible, which underlies everything that, from the perspective of those to be benefited, appears as a buddha's helpful activity in an effortless, unpremeditated, and uninterrupted way (all-accomplishing wisdom).
  
As for the five wisdoms "in action" in realized beings during all situations, the Third Karmapa says that, when embraced by the correct yoga, sense perception, mental direct perception, and self-aware direct perception are all yogic valid perception, which is connate wisdom's own nature. Through all aspects of knowing and what is to be known being embraced by the perfect view, in terms of its functions, this connate wisdom then manifests as the five wisdoms. These are the wisdom that discriminates all causes and results; the wisdom of being empty of a nature of its own (mirrorlike wisdom); the display of wisdom's power by virtue of having gained mastery over it (all-accomplishing wisdom); the wisdom of seeing the equality of all this; and the principle of not moving away from suchness, which pervades all of this (dharmadhātu wisdom).D D Pawo Tsugla Trengwa, one of the main students of the Eighth Karmapa and a teacher of the Ninth, describes the complementary functions of these wisdoms as follows:
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As for the five wisdoms "in action" in realized beings during all situations, the Third Karmapa says that, when embraced by the correct yoga, sense perception, mental direct perception, and self-aware direct perception are all yogic valid perception, which is connate wisdom's own nature.<ref>On this, compare DSC on ''Dharmadhātustava'' verses 38–45 on Mahāmudrā meditation related to sense perceptions and the mental consciousness (see Brunnhölzl 2007b, 245–51).</ref> Through all aspects of knowing and what is to be known being embraced by the perfect view, in terms of its functions, this connate wisdom then manifests as the five wisdoms. These are the wisdom that discriminates all causes and results; the wisdom of being empty of a nature of its own (mirrorlike wisdom); the display of wisdom's power by virtue of having gained mastery over it (all-accomplishing wisdom); the wisdom of seeing the equality of all this; and the principle of not moving away from suchness, which pervades all of this (dharmadhātu wisdom).<ref>AC, fol. 163b.</ref> Pawo Tsugla Trengwa, one of the main students of the Eighth Karmapa and a teacher of the Ninth, describes the complementary functions of these wisdoms as follows:
 
 
<blockquote>[Buddhahood means] to know without exception how all the aspects of each phenomenon are, because it is endowed with discriminating wisdom. In this process, it is not endowed with a seeing [that entails] any subject or object to be seen, any higher or inferior, any same or different, and so on, because it is endowed with the wisdom of equality. This knowledge does not entail any efforts [either], because it is endowed with mirrorlike wisdom. Also, all of these are indescribable as being one or different and so on, and are neither a seeing nor a nonseeing, because they never move away from the dharmadhātu.</blockquote>
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<blockquote>[Buddhahood means] to know without exception how all the aspects of each phenomenon are, because it is endowed with discriminating wisdom. In this process, it is not endowed with a seeing [that entails] any subject or object to be seen, any higher or inferior, any same or different, and so on, because it is endowed with the wisdom of equality. This knowledge does not entail any efforts [either], because it is endowed with mirrorlike wisdom. Also, all of these are indescribable as being one or different and so on, and are neither a seeing nor a nonseeing, because they never move away from the dharmadhātu.<ref>Dpa' bo gtsug lag phreng ba n.d., 764.</ref></blockquote>
  
 
The ninth chapter of the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' concludes with a verse on buddhas being neither one nor many (IX.77), four verses on applying the means to attain buddhahood (IX.78–81), four verses on the unity of the activities of all buddhas (IX.82–85), and one verse on generating enthusiasm for buddhahood (IX.86). Sthiramati says that the means to attain buddhahood are the first five pāramitās. The pāramitā of prajñā is what renders these five pure, and it is taught in IX.78–81 (in themselves, these verses exhibit the typical style of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras).
 
The ninth chapter of the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' concludes with a verse on buddhas being neither one nor many (IX.77), four verses on applying the means to attain buddhahood (IX.78–81), four verses on the unity of the activities of all buddhas (IX.82–85), and one verse on generating enthusiasm for buddhahood (IX.86). Sthiramati says that the means to attain buddhahood are the first five pāramitās. The pāramitā of prajñā is what renders these five pure, and it is taught in IX.78–81 (in themselves, these verses exhibit the typical style of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras).
Line 662: Line 678:
 
On the contrary, those bodhisattvas who see all that has been explained above (one's own grandeur and so on) as being nothing but mere imagination and mere mind, and who do not even conceive of this mere mind have attained the poised readiness for the dharma of nonarising, with their nonconceptual wisdom thus being effortless and spontaneously present. Therefore, attaining this is called "attaining enlightenment."
 
On the contrary, those bodhisattvas who see all that has been explained above (one's own grandeur and so on) as being nothing but mere imagination and mere mind, and who do not even conceive of this mere mind have attained the poised readiness for the dharma of nonarising, with their nonconceptual wisdom thus being effortless and spontaneously present. Therefore, attaining this is called "attaining enlightenment."
 
 
For more details on buddhahood as the change of state of the eight consciousnesses to the four wisdoms as well as the descriptions, divisions, and relations of the kāyas (whether presented as two, three, four, or more), see the translations below and appendix 6.<references/>  
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For more details on buddhahood as the change of state of the eight consciousnesses to the four wisdoms as well as the descriptions, divisions, and relations of the kāyas (whether presented as two, three, four, or more), see the translations below and appendix 6.<ref>For further details on the Yogācāra system in general as well as the notions of naturally luminous mind and the Tathāgata heart, see the bibliography in general as well as Brunnhölzl 2004, 457–95 and 2007b, 57–109.</ref><references/>
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|BookToc=*{{i|Abbreviations|vii}}
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*{{i|An Aspiration by H.H. the Seventeenth Karmapa, Ogyen Trinley Dorje|ix}}
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*{{i|Foreword by H.H. the Seventeenth Karmapa, Ogyen Trinley Dorje|xi}}
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*{{i|Foreword by The Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche|xiii}}
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*{{i|Preface|xv}}
  
== Notes ==
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*{{i|'''Introduction'''|1}}
*1  The image here alludes to this river being considered as very holy by Hindus—even its mere sight is said to wash away all one’s negative deeds. (It rises on the summit of Mount Amarakaṇṭaka in Madhya Pradesh in central India, and after a westerly course of about eight hundred miles ends in the Gulf of Cambay below the city of Bharuch.)
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**{{i|The Indian Yogācāra Background|3}}
*2  Tib. rang byung rdo rje.
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**{{i|The Tibetan Tradition on the Five Maitreya Texts|79}}
*3  Tib. 'jam mgon kong sprul blo gros mtha' yas.
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**{{i|The Third Karmapa's View|85}}
*4  Tib. karma phrin las pa phyogs las rnam rgyal.
 
*5  Tib. dpa' bo gtsug lag phreng ba.
 
*6  Tib. mi bskyod rdo rje.
 
*7  Nguyen 1990, 317 and 336.
 
*8  Hall 1986, 18–19.
 
*9  The only Yogācāras who could be―and often are―read as asserting such a consciousness are Paramārtha and Dharmapāla.  However, without going into the details here, Paramārtha explains that what he calls "stainless consciousness"  (''amalavijñāna'') is nothing other than the stainless nondual ''dharmadhātu'', or mind's ultimate nature of luminosity,  which is the same as buddha nature. He also says that "mere cognizance" (''vijñaptimātra'') means that both objects  and consciousness do not exist (see below). As evidenced by Dharmapāla's commentaries on Āryadeva's ''Catuḥśataka'' and  ''Śataśāstra'', his position is rather complex and subtle. He indeed says that the other-dependent nature really exists  (in the sense of not being totally nonexistent like the horns of a rabbit), but he adds that it is not itself the ultimate.  Furthermore, he says, "One should be convinced of the voidness of all dharmas"; "The principle of voidness is free from  all characters of dharmas, such as existence, [nonexistence,] etc." (Tillemans 1990, 93); and "Thus all dharmas are  likened to illusions: in them not the slightest substance whatsoever can be found. . . . Thus, dharmas are produced by  causes and conditions; their natures are all void, like an illusion" (ibid., 171). Indeed, though Dharmapāla uses  Yogācāra templates, many passages of his commentary could as well have been written by a Mādhyamika. In general,  he emphasizes the framework of the two realities, with existence and nonexistence pertaining only to seeming reality,  while ultimate reality lies beyond these as well as any other kinds of duality.
 
*10  King 1994, 663.
 
*11  Lusthaus 2002, 178.
 
*12  King 1994, 662.
 
*13  Note that, in pre-Christian Greek etymology, ''soter'' means "healer"―which matches well with the frequent description of the Buddha as the great physician for mental afflictions.
 
*14  "The invincible" (an epithet of Maitreya).
 
*15  Tāranātha 1980, 203.
 
*16  King 1994, 670.
 
*17  ''Tshad ma'i bstan bcos kyi shing rta'i srol rnams ji ltar 'byung ba'i tshul gtam du bya ba nyin mor byed pa'i snang bas dpyod ldan mtha' dag dga' bar byed pa'' (Śākya mchog ldan 1988a, vol. dza, p. 95).
 
*18  ''Sngags la ’jug pa’i mun pa sel bar byed pa’i chos kyi sgron me gzhung tshan bcu bdun pa'' (ibid., vol. pa, p. 230).
 
*19  Nguyen 1990, 320..
 
*20  In the following, I will not deal with all the many questions of whether the authors listed here were actual historical persons, whether they actually authored these texts, and when exactly they lived. Also, the texts listed include only the typical Yogācāra works by these authors, though many of them also wrote on other Buddhist topics or composed commentaries on several sūtras (such as the prajñāpāramitā sūtras). The main point here is to roughly identify the basic scriptural corpus of Yogācāra treatises, no matter by whom they were composed or when.
 
*21  Though this text is primarily a summary of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, as has been pointed out repeatedly by modern scholars, it does so by mapping a number of classical Yogācāra templates onto these sūtras (see my forthcoming translation of the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' and several of its Tibetan commentaries).
 
*22  Note that the structure (though not always the contents) of the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' corresponds to the  ''Bodhisattvabhūmi'' in the ''Yogācārabhūmi'' and that its ninth chapter on buddhahood is largely based on the ''Buddhabhūmisūtra''  (verses IX.56–59 and 82–85 are directly from this sūtra). Both Sthiramati's and Asvabhāva's commentaries on the  ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' extensively quote and refer to the ''Buddhabhūmisūtra'' (also Pawo Rinpoché's discussion of buddhahood  in appendix 1 relies primarily on these two texts).
 
*23  Certain Western and Japanese scholars attempt to draw a sharp distinction between the Yogācāra tradition and any  scriptures on buddha nature, such as the ''Uttaratantra'', even speaking of different schools. Indeed, the ''Uttaratantra''  is exclusively devoted to, and gives the most detailed presentation of, buddha nature, while not mentioning typical  Yogācāra notions such as the three natures or the eight consciousnesses. On the other hand, there is only one verse  in the other four works attributed to Maitreya (''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.37) that mentions ''tathāgatagarbha'', and  it is absent in most of the works of Asaṅga (except for the ''Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā''), Vasubandhu, and other major  Yogācāras (for the consistent comments of Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, and Asvabhāva on ''tathāgatagarbha'' as suchness or  identitylessness being the same in all phenomena/beings, see below). However, the equivalent notions such as mind's  natural luminosity being obscured only by adventitious stains are rather common themes in Yogācāra texts (for the  related topic of ''agotraka''―"those who lack the disposition"―see below). As Keenan (1982, 15) remarks, "This does not mean  that ''tathāgatagarbha'' is to be reckoned as a defined academic school in contrast to Mādhyamika and Yogācāra. As Takasaki  has pointed out, such an evaluation was a peculiarity of Chinese Buddhism and is not found in either India or Tibet.  This is further borne out by the complete lack of polemic against ''tathāgatagarbha'' teachings in Yogācāra works. . . .  The foregoing textual data seem to suggest that the initial pre-Asaṅgan Yogācāra thinkers represent a theoretical  development from within the same circles that produced the ''tathāgatagarbha'' teachings. They appear to have taken their  initial insights from the notion of the pure mind, as in the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra''" (see its verses IX.37 and  XIII.18–19 below).
 
*24  Besides this text, the only other two known Indian "commentaries" on the ''Uttaratantra'' are Vairocanarakṣita's (eleventh century) very brief ''Mahāyānottaratantraṭippaṇī'' (eight folios) and Sajjana's (eleventh/twelfth century) ''Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa'' (a summary in thirty-seven verses).
 
*25  The ''Tengyur'' also contains an anonymous commentary on the first chapter of the ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'', called ''Vivṛtagūḍhārthapiṇḍavyākhyā'' (attributed by some to Vasubandhu).
 
*26  As for the meaning of the Sanskrit compound ''tathāgatagarbha'', its first part (''tathā'') can be taken as either the adverb "thus" or the noun "thusness/suchness" (as a term for ultimate reality; several texts gloss ''tathāgatagarbha'' as "suchness"). The second part can be read either as ''gata'' ("gone"), or ''āgata'' ("come, arrived”; the Tibetan ''gshegs pa'' can also mean both). However, in the term ''tathāgata'', both meanings more or less come down to the same. Thus, the main difference lies in whether one understands a ''Tathāgata'' as (a) a "Thus-Gone/Thus-Come One" or (b) "One Gone/Come to Thusness," with the former emphasizing the aspect of the path and the latter the result. The final part of the compound—''garbha''— literally and originally means embryo, germ, womb, the interior or middle of anything, any interior chamber or sanctuary  of a temple, calyx (as of a lotus), having in the interior, containing, or being filled with. At some point, the term  also assumed the meaning of "core," "heart," and "pith" (which is also the meaning of its usual Tibetan translation  ''snying po''). Technically speaking, the compound ''tathāgatagarbha'' can be understood as either a ''bahuvrīhi'' or a  ''tatpuruṣa'' compound, meaning "containing a Tathāgata (as core)" or "the core of a Tathāgata," respectively. The first  is the most natural reading and is also supported by numerous passages in the scriptures. As for the term ''sugata'', it  means "one who has fared well," "one who goes well," or "one who lives in bliss." The compound ''sugatagarbha'' is to be  understood in an analogous way as above.
 
*27  The ''Tengyur'' attributes the Hastavālanāmaprakaraṇa and its ''Vṛtti'' to Āryadeva, while the Chinese canon has Dignāga as its author. Given the use of typical Yogācāra terms and notions in these texts, the latter seems more likely.
 
*28  D4054 (attributed to Jinaputra in the ''Tengyur''). The attribution to Sthiramati stems from the Chinese tradition and is supported by many Western scholars.
 
*29  In due order, Taishō 1584, 1593, 1599, 1595, 1589, and 1587.
 
*30  Taishō 1666.
 
*31  Taishō 1610. The Chinese canon attributes the text to Vasubandhu (which is highly unlikely) and gives Paramārtha as the translator.
 
*32  Taishō 1587.
 
*33  Further sources of the ''amalavijñāna'' are his ''Shih pa k'ung lun'' (Taishō 1616) and ''San wu-hsing lun'' (Taishō 1617).
 
*34  Other Indians involved in transmitting and translating mahāyāna and Yogācāra materials in China include Guṇavarman (367–431), Dharmarakṣa (385–433), Dharmagupta, and Prabhākaramitra (both sixth/seventh century).
 
*35  The ''Buddhabhūmyupadeśa'' is only extant in Chinese (Taishō 1530). It is attributed to Bandhuprabha and others, and  translated by Hsüan-tsang. As Keenan 1980 and 2002 points out, about half of the text is identical to Śīlabhadra's  commentary and the other half is almost exclusively added from Hsüan-tsang's ''Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi''. Thus, the text was  obviously compiled in the seventh century, either by Hsüan-tsang himself, or, much more unlikely, by Bandhuprabha in  India, drawing from no-longer-extant Sanskrit materials used in the ''Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi''. Interestingly, the text  contains a passage about mind being self-illuminating that refutes precisely the arguments that ''Bodhicaryāvatāra''  IX.18–19ab adduces against self-illuminating mind. It also explains all four buddha wisdoms (such as mirrorlike wisdom)  to be self-awareness and gives a detailed presentation of the relationships between the four aspects of consciousness  that manifest as the apprehended, the apprehender, the self-awareness of the apprehending of the apprehended, and the  self-awareness of the very act of being self-aware (see Keenan 2002, 86–89).
 
*36  See ''The Life of Hsüan-tsang'' (Taishō 2053.244a–246b), translated by Li Yung-hsi, 149–65. Peking: The Chinese Buddhist Association, 1959.
 
*37  Both Bu ston rin chen grub 1931, II.133 and Tāranātha 1980, 207 attribute a ''Kāyatrayāvatāra'' to Candragomī.
 
*38  The attribution of the ''Durbodhālokā'' commentary on the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' to him is even disputed within the Tibetan tradition.
 
*39  As for the developments of Yogācāra after Vasubandhu, there are several ways to distinguish various schools or  lineages. In ''The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy'' (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1947), 83–84,  Junjirō Takakusu identifies three main streams―(1) the line of Dignāga, Agotra, and Dharmapāla at Nālandā; (2)  the line of Guṇamati and Sthiramati at Valabhi; and (3) the line of Nanda, whose tenets were later followed by  Paramārtha. Not much is known of further Yogācāras such as Guṇaśrī, Nanda, Śrīsena, Candrapāla (he is referred to  as an early commentator on the ''Madhyāntavibhāga''), Śuddhacandra, Citrabhānu, and Bandhuśrī (except for Guṇaśrī,  the others and some of their positions are mentioned throughout the ''Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi''). There are also a  number of later commentators on Dharmakīrti's texts, primarily on his ''Pramāṇavārttika'', whose primary focus is,  of course, on valid cognition, but who also sometimes discuss the more specific Yogācāra topics in this context  (these commentators include Dharmottara, Prajñākaragupta, Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi, Yāmāri, Ravigupta, and Jina).  In general, except for most of the works by Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu, the majority of the above texts  (in both the Tibetan and Chinese canons) still remain to be studied in detail.
 
*40  Limaye 1992, 69 and D4034, fol. 75b.1ff.
 
*41  ''Webster's Third New International Dictionary'' says that "concept" comes from Latin ''conceptus'' (collection,  gathering, fetus) and is "something conceived in the mind : THOUGHT, IDEA, NOTION: as a ''philos'' : a general or abstract  idea : a universal notion: (1) : the resultant of a generalizing mental operation : a generic mental image abstracted  from percepts; ''also'' : a directly intuited object of thought (2) : a theoretical construct . . ." About "conceive,"  ''Webster's'' says, "to take into one's mind . . . to form in the mind . . . evolve mentally . . . IMAGINE, VISUALIZE . . ."  Thus, somewhat differing from "concept," when "conceive" is understood in these latter senses in a very general way,  it comes closer to the above meanings of ''kalpana'' and its related terms.
 
*42  In the following translations, depending on the context, I use either "conception" or "imagination" for the above terms.
 
*43  When I speak of "classical Yogācāra terms," this refers to these terms being predominantly used by Yogācāra masters, but does not mean that they invented them, since almost all of them are to be found in the sūtras (a notable exception is Vasubandhu's notion of "modulations" of consciousness [''pariṇāma'']).  Even the term "false imagination," which is primarily known from the texts by Maitreya, is already found in early  mahāyāna sūtras such as the ''Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra'' and the ''Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra''.
 
*44  Pandeya 1999, 9.13.
 
*45  Ibid., 11.30–12.3 (D4032, fol. 135b.1–3).
 
*46  Tib. rong ston shes bya kun gzigs.
 
*47  ''Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi 'grel pa'i rnam bshad tshig don rab tu gsal ba'', edited by ''David P. Jackson'' and ''S. Onoda'', 1988, fol. 40b.3–5.
 
*48  Skt. asatkalpa, Tib. yod min rtog pa. This term is equivalent to "false imagination."
 
*49  When used in terms of ultimate reality, ''dharmadhātu''―or just ''dhātu''―is understood in two main ways, which are  reflected by two different Tibetan words that translate the latter term. In its most general way, ''dhātu'' in  ''dharmadhātu'' refers to the ultimate nature of all phenomena—being equivalent to emptiness—which is usually translated  into Tibetan as ''dbyings'' ("open expanse," "space," or "vastness"). If dhātu signifies specifically the nature of the  mind of sentient beings in the sense of buddha nature as the most basic element of their entire being, it is typically  rendered as ''khams'' (lit. "element"). To be sure, these two meanings and their Tibetan renderings are not necessarily  regarded or employed in a mutually exclusive way. Still, generally speaking, they represent the understanding  of (dharma)dhātu in Madhyamaka texts and the texts on buddha nature, respectively. In Yogācāra texts, the term is  used and understood in both ways, depending on the context, but it is always clear that the direct realization of  the ''dharmadhātu'' by nonconceptual wisdom does not just refer to a nonimplicative negation or blank voidness, but to  mind's ultimate nature.
 
*50  For more details on the characteristics of nonconceptual wisdom, see also the translation of OED below.
 
*51  For "the supreme self that is the lack of self" realized by the buddhas, see ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.23 below.
 
*52  Sanskrit in Anacker 1986, 416. For mere cognizance being by definition without a referent, see also verse 27 of the ''Triṃśikā'' below.
 
*53  Hall 1986, 13–18.
 
*54  D4051, fol. 221a.4–221b.2.
 
*55  These four steps are also found in ''Laṅkāvatārasūtra'' X.256–57, ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' XIV.23–28,  ''Dharmadharmatāvibhāga'' (lines 182–185, 264–275), ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' I.6–7ab, as well as in ''Triṃśikākārikā'' 28–30 and  ''Trisvabhāvanirdeśa'' 36–37ab. Śāntarakṣita's autocommentary on his ''Madhyamakālaṃkāra'' (D3885, fol. 79a–b) as well  as Kamalaśīla's ''Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā'' (P5286, fols. 137a–138a) and first ''Bhāvanākrama'' (D3915, fol. 33a–b)  also quote ''Laṅkāvatārasūtra'' X.256–257 and refer to these four stages, commenting on the last one from a Madhyamaka  perspective (see Brunnhölzl 2004, 300–302). See also AC (p. 246) and NYC on NY lines 60–61.
 
*56  Limaye 1992, 73.
 
*57  III.13 (P5549, fol. 29b.2).
 
*58  III.12 (ibid., fol. 29a.3–7; the phrases in “[ ]” are from the commentaries by Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva).
 
*59  Pandeya 1999, 23.11ff. (P5534, fols. 35b–36b).
 
*60  Lines 264–275. The same is also expressed in lines 182–185, which treat "the four yogic practices."
 
*61  This refers to the mastery over a wealth of qualities that result from the change of state of the five skandhas, particularly from the eight consciousnesses becoming the four wisdoms (see below).
 
*62  Sthiramati (''Madhyāntavibhāga''ṭīkā, Sanskrit edition by Lévi, p. 43) comments that this is equivalent to supramundane nonconceptual wisdom without subject and object (''anālambyālambakaṃ''). With the propensities of the clinging to apprehender and apprehended being eliminated, mind as such is resting in its own true nature (''svacittadharmatāyāṃ ca cittam eva sthitaṃ bhavati'').
 
*63  Ibid., 15ff.
 
*64  This term refers to mental factors, such as feeling and discrimination.
 
*65  Quoted and translated in Lusthaus 2002, 465 (Taisho 1585.6c; chap.2:4B).
 
*66  As translated in Paul 1984, 159–60.
 
*67  Ibid., 163–64 and 167. The ''Yogācārabhūmi'', one of the major Yogācāra texts (and definitely the longest one), only mentions the term ''cittamātra'' twice (P5536–8, zi, fols. 70b.2 and 80b.2f), but both times explicitly not as a denial of outer objects (for details, see Schmithausen 1973a, 165–66 and addendum after p. 186). However, given the consistent abhidharmic foundation of this text, this is not as surprising as one may think at first.
 
*68  Paul 1984, 166.
 
*69  I.9ab.
 
*70  Verses 1–2, 5bd, 6ab, and 8ac.
 
*71  Note that, unlike the works by Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and so on, the five Maitreya works do not mention the terms ''ālaya''-consciousness and afflicted mind.
 
*72  ''Manas'' has a wide semantic range, primarily being one of the many Sanskrit words for "mind" in general, also  meaning "conceptual mind," "thought," and "imagination" (it can also refer to "intellect," "intelligence," "perception,"  "spirit," "opinion," "intention," "inclination," and more). There is a definite lack of proper equivalents for most of  the rich Sanskrit and Tibetan terminologies used for mind and its many facets, but there is also a need for distinctive  terms when going into the subtleties of mapping out mind in Buddhist texts, especially in the context of the eight  consciousnesses. This is why ''manas'' is rendered throughout by the English technical term "mentation" (coming from the  Latin ''mens'' ["mind," "thinking"] and ''mentare'' [to "think"], which are cognate with Skt. ''manas''). The ''Oxford English  Dictionary'' defines “mentation”  as "mental action or a mental state," with the former suggesting mind being in some  kind of operational mode, which is also one of the primary meanings of the Sanskrit and Tibetan terms (its other  meanings referring specifically to the sixth consciousness or the afflicted mind).
 
*73  To wit, when just the term ''ālaya'' appears, depending on the context, it can either refer to the ''ālaya''-consciousness or, especially in the tantras, to the fundamental ground of all being, equivalent to the luminous nature of mind or the Tathāgata heart.
 
*74  Literally, ''kliṣṭamanas'' means "defiled mind," but here I rather follow the Tibetan (lit. "plagued or plaguing mind"), since it is not just a question of mind being defiled like a dusty but insentient mirror. Rather, as the above process shows, mind experiences mental and physical suffering through such defilement.
 
*75  In general, the eight consciousnesses (primary minds) and their accompanying mental factors are said to be always congruent in five respects. They are congruent in terms of (1) the support, in that they depend on the same sense faculty; (2) the focal object, in that they observe the same object; (3) the aspect, in that they have the same apprehended aspect triggered by the object; (4) time, in that they occur at the same time; and (5) substance, in that at any given time, each primary mind is only accompanied by one single kind within each of its accompanying mental factors (for example, one cannot have a pleasant and unpleasant feeling at the same moment).
 
*76  I.6 (D4048, fols. 3b.5–4a.1). Mentation being associated with the above four afflictions is also mentioned in Vasubandhu's ''Triṃśikā'' (verse 6) and his ''Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa'' (D4059, fol. 15b.5).
 
*77  In general, there are two neutral actions―those that obscure liberation and those that do not (such as walking or sitting).
 
*78  D4066, fols. 231b.5 and 232b.2.
 
*79  D4067, fol. 25a.2–4. The beginning of chapter 5 of Hsüan-tsang's ''Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi'' (La Vallée Poussin 1928–1948, 289–90) explains that the six collections of consciousnesses all rely on mentation as their immediate condition. However, it is only the sixth one that receives the name of "mentation consciousness"  (''manovijñāna''), because it is named after its specific support―the seventh consciousness or mentation―just as the  five sense consciousnesses, despite also relying on mentation, are named after their specific supports, such as the  eye sense faculty. Or, the mental consciousness is so called, because it depends only on mentation, whereas the other  five depend in addition on their respective material sense factulties. The six consciousnesses are therefore named in  this way because of their supports and in relation to one another―"eye consciousness" up through "mentation  consciousness." This is unlike the case of the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, which are named in accordance  with their natures―mentation (''manas'') by virtue of the activity of egoistic thinking/conceit (''manyanā''), and mind (''citta'') due to "accumulating/variety" (''citra'').
 
*80  Note though that the explicit term "immediate mind" seems to be a later Tibetan term―it does not appear in any of the texts by Maitreya, Asaṅga, or Vasubandhu (or any other Yogācāra texts I have consulted). For more details on this specific topic, see the introduction to the Third Karmapa's view below; he further divides "mentation" into the afflicted mind, the immediate mind, and "pure or stainless mentation."
 
*81  D4066, fol. 239a.7–239b.3.
 
*82  This meditative absorption represents the cessation of all primary minds and mental factors with an unstable continuum (the first six consciousnesses) as well as one of the two consciousnesses with a stable continuum (the afflicted mind with its mental factors, but not the ''ālaya''-consciousness). This absorption is used as the culminating meditative absorption in the process of "ninefold progressive abiding" (which includes various alternating ways of training in entering and rising from the four samādhis of the form realm and the four formless absorptions).
 
*83  D4049, fol. 53a.7–b.1.
 
*84  Guṇaprabha's ''Pañcaskandhavivaraṇa'' (D4067, fol. 27a.1–2) explains that, during the meditative absorption of cessation and the path of the noble ones, the afflicted mind ceases insofar as its latent tendencies do not manifest. However, once one rises from these states, it rearises from its seeds.
 
*85 Note that, as Paul (1984, 139) remarks, "this consciousness is never enumerated specifically as a ninth consciousness, though this is the implication from the assertion that the ''amala-vijñāna'' is separate from all defilement and emerges only after the cessation of the ''ālaya''."
 
 
 
*86  Taishō 1584, 1616 (esp. pp. 863b20f and 864a28), 1617 (esp. p. 872a1f). Apparently, there are no Indian, but only Chinese scriptural sources for this ninth consciousness, so the Tibetan tradition seems to have obtained its information on it from the latter, including the Chinese commentary on the ''Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra'' (translated into Tibetan as P5517) by the Korean master Wonch'uk (aka Yüan-ts'e; 613–96). According to Hsüan-tsang's ''Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi'' (La Vallée Poussin 1928–1948, 109–11), the notion of ''amalavijñāna'' was originally a teaching of the Vibhajyavādins (more precisely, the Mahāsāṃghika-Ekavyāvahārika-Lokottaravādin-Kaukkuṭikas), who speak about the natural purity of the mind being merely obscured by adventitious stains. Paul (1984, 240–41) points out the following: "The Tunhuang manuscript, ''She ta-sheng lun chang'' {a text on the ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha''}, attributes the following to the WHL {a ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha''-related threefold anthology attributed to Paramārtha}: ‘The characterless and unproduced state is the ''amala[-vijñāna''], the ultimately pure consciousness’ (T.2807.85.1013c20–21). ‘The nature of discrimination (''parikalpita-svabhāva'') is forever nonexistent. The nature of dependence (''paratantra-svabhāva'') also does not exist. As for these two, they have no existence and this is identical to the ''amala-vijñāna''. Thus, it is ultimately the only pure consciousness. Furthermore, it is a foreign tradition that states in the ''Shih-ch'i ti-lun'', “Chapter on the Bodhisattva,” {another text by ''Paramārtha''} that the ''amala-vijñāna'' is explained as the ninth consciousness’ (T.2807.85.1016c19-22)."
 
*87  As for the last term, most translations that come purely from the Tibetan ''yongs grub'' (instead of the Sanskrit ''pariniṣpanna'') say "thoroughly established nature" or the like. This is usually based on too literal an understanding of the Tibetan (while disregarding its underlying Sanskrit, which simply means "perfect" or "perfected") and on certain Tibetan doxographical hierarchies, which consider this term as an exclusive feature of so-called "Mere Mentalism" with its alleged assertion of some ultimately existing or "thoroughly established" consciousness. However, neither the Sanskrit term nor its understanding by all major Yogācāra masters justify any such wrongly reifying rendering. Also, it seems somewhat misleading to say "perfected nature," since there is nothing to be changed, let alone perfected, in this nature, its whole point being rather to signify primordial perfection and completeness.
 
*88  A detailed study of all these different models would cover a large volume on its own (for an overview, see Boquist 1993).
 
*89  II.17 (P5549, fol. 18b.5–8).
 
*90  II.28 (ibid., fol. 22a.6–7).
 
*91  II.26 (P5549, fol. 21a.5–21b.4). Note that Vasubandhu (P5551, fol. 180b.4–5) comments on the pure object (4) that, if it were the imaginary nature, it would have arisen from the cause of afflicted phenomena; and if it were the other-dependent nature, it would be something that is unreal.
 
*92  See also below for Sthiramati's comments on verses 23–24 of Vasubandhu's ''Triṃśikā'' and his equating the other-dependent nature with the ''ālaya''-consciousness, which is eventually eliminated in its fundamental change of state.
 
*93  II.27 (ibid., fols. 21b.5–22a.4).
 
*94  Nguyen 1990, 84–85.
 
*95  II. 132 (verse 198; D107, fol. 172a.5–6).
 
*96  P5481, fols. 8b.7–9a.3.
 
*97  For example, P5562, fols. 116b.7–117b.7 and 122a.7–123a.1.
 
*98  Ibid., fol. 123b.2–6 (from D106, fol. 34a.7–34b.3).
 
*99  This quote is also found in the ''Abhidharmakośabhāṣya'' (Pradhan ed., p. 468.20–21).
 
*100  This is the second from among three ways to understand ''paramārtha'' (for details, see below). In Yogācāra, usually, "mundane" and "supramundane" cognition or wisdom are understood as the perceptive modes during a bodhisattva's subsequent attainment and meditative equipoise, respectively.
 
*101  This is ''Samādhirājasūtra'' IX.23.
 
*102  P5562, fols. 127b.6–128a.5. That the general characteristic of all phenomena is suchness is explained by both Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva in their commentaries on ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' II.26 (P5551, fol. 180a.6–7 and D4051, fols. 230b.7–231a.1; for details, see below).
 
*103  Sanskrit edition by Lévi, p. 41.
 
*104  Ibid., 110–11.
 
*105  III. 8–9, fols. 28a.5–29a.7.
 
*106  'Ju mi pham rgya mtsho c. 1990c, 705–6.
 
*107  Limaye 1992, 172.
 
*108  Following the words of I.1, Sthiramati does not explicitly state the names of the three natures here, but only speaks about false imagination, duality, and emptiness. However, as his commentary on I.5 (which introduces the three natures by name) makes clear, in due order, these correspond to the other-dependent, imaginary, and perfect natures.
 
*109  The topic of the first chapter of the ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' is the characteristics of afflicted and purified phenomena, or false imagination and emptiness.
 
*110  Pandeya ed., pp.  9.25–11.30.
 
*111  Neither Vasubandhu's nor Sthiramati's commentaries state anywhere that false imagination exists ultimately. They do say several times that both false imagination and emptiness exist, but it is very obvious that this does not refer to the same level of existence.
 
*112  Ibid., 19.
 
*113  Ibid., 13.16–21.
 
*114  Ibid., 36–38.
 
*115  Ibid., 46.
 
*116  Such statements are not only found in the mahāyāna scriptures, but also in the Pāli canon (from which Vasubandhu most probably quotes), such as ''Aṅguttara Nikāya'' I.10, "O monks, the mind is luminosity, and yet it is afflicted by adventitious afflictions." Also the ''Saṃyutta Nikāya'' (III.151.22–23; 31–32; and 152.8–9) states, "O monks, sentient beings are afflicted because of the afflictions of the mind. Because of the purity of the mind, sentient beings are purified." The Tibetan tradition considers the two lines, "because of mind's natural luminosity" and "because of being afflicted by adventitious afflictions" not as parts of Vasubandhu's commentary, but as two additional lines in ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' I.22.
 
*117  The above four models also show that quite different interpretations of the three natures obviously existed already at the time of Sthiramati, and that at least some of them may have been interpreted in more or less reifying ways by certain people.
 
*118  P5531, fol. 138b.2–4.
 
*119  XIII.18–19.
 
*120  Mathes 1996, lines 128–132.
 
*121  These four are found in the ''Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇī'' (D142), which says that bodhisattvas have to gradually relinquish all four of these conceptions in order to enter the sphere of nonconceptuality. Rangjung Dorje seemed to consider the ''Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇī'' as important, since he composed a (now lost) synopsis of it and also refers to these four conceptions in his OED and DSC (for details, see there as well as NTC and NYC).
 
*122  OED, pp. 610–11. For more details, see the translation of the excerpts from OED below.
 
*123  That means being actual effective causes and results, and not just nominal ones.
 
*124  JNS, vol. 1, p. 210.
 
*125  D4049, fol. 100a.7–100b.1.
 
*126  D4054, fol. 231a.6–231b.2. See also Sthiramati's comments on ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.56 below.
 
*127  X.5 (D4048, fol. 38a.4–8).
 
*128  D4034, fol. 113b.1–2.
 
*129  Note that the Yogācāra literature in fact sometimes employs two terms―''āśrayapāravṛtti'' (lit. "change of state into something else") versus ''āṣrayaparivṛtti''―as referring to the former and the latter aspects above, respectively. However, the use of these two terms in the texts is not consistent in this way. Ultimately, both come down to the same, basically indicating two sides of the same process.
 
*130  Limaye 1992, 116–17.
 
*131  Throughout, the reason for using "familiarization" instead of the―at least in popular western Buddhist literature―more familiar word "meditation" is that, in Buddhism, both the Sanskrit ''bhāvanā'' and the Tibetan ''sgom pa'' mostly mean "familiarizing with," mentally "cultivating," or "enhancing" something, either some certainty gained through prior reflection or a direct insight into true reality. Thus, this process can be either conceptual or nonconceptual. However, it should be noted that the original meaning of "meditation" is just "reflection" (Lat. meditatio, meditare), which is clearly conceptual, while the original meaning of the term "contemplation" (Lat. contemplatio, contemplare) is "viewing" or "looking" at something in a settled state of mind (possibly being either conceptual or nonconceptual). Also, as for compassion and other virtuous mental states, the point is not really to meditate on them as some more or less abstract object or in a conceptual way, but to cultivate and familiarize with them as integral constituents of one's mind. Of course, this is even more obvious in the case of mind's ultimate true nature (of which it is invariably said that it cannot be meditated on anyway, but one can definitely familiarize oneself with it). Likewise, the texts often speak about cultivating or familiarizing with a path, ''śamatha'', or ''vipaśyanā'', and it obviously makes no sense to say "meditating on a path," and even less to say "meditating on ''śamatha'' or ''vipaśyanā''." As for the Sanskrit term bhāvanā, it generally refers to an act of producing, manifesting, or promoting. Specifically, it means imagining, forming in the mind, occupying one's imagination with or directing one's thoughts to something. In this sense, the word can also refer to reflection, meditation, or contemplation (thus, depending on the context and to follow common consensus, I sometimes use "meditation" too). The term can also mean the application of perfumes and the like, or saturating or steeping any powder with fluid. Thus, similar to the process of a scent fully pervading a cloth or the like and actually becoming inseparable from it, "cultivation" or "familarization" in this sense may be seen as "perfuming" the mind stream with liberating insights.
 
*132  D4034, fol. 120b.1–121a.1
 
*133  For more details on "change of state," see the translation of OED below.
 
*134  Limaye ed. p. 121; D4034, fol. 124a.2–5.
 
*135  D4034, fol. 124a.5–124b.2. Vasubandhu's very brief comment on this agrees, saying that, since suchness is the same in all beings and a Tathāgata has the nature of pure suchness, all beings are said to have the Tathāgata heart (Limaye 1992, 122). This conforms to his ''Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya'' (P5551, fol. 180a.6–7) on "natural purity" in ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' II.26 above, which says that, inasmuch as this natural purity exists as suchness, it exists in all sentient beings as their general characteristic. Therefore, it is said that all phenomena (!) are endowed with the Tathāgata heart. Asvabhāva's ''Ṭīkā'' is silent on ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.37, but his ''Mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana'' (D4051, fols. 230b.7–231a.1) on II.26 follows Vasubandhu, saying that natural purity is the actual true nature of ordinary beings, which means that suchness never changes into anything else, and therefore is the general characteristic of all phenomena. Thus, it is said that all sentient beings possess the Tathāgata heart. Later (D4051, fol. 246b.4), Asvabhāva's text comments on bodhisattvas on the first bhūmi attaining an equal mind with regard to all beings (III.11) by saying that they see all beings as equality in the sense of their identitylessness, which is why the scriptures say that all beings have the Tathāgata heart. Also, Bandhuprabha's ''Buddhabhūmyupadeśa'' (Keenan 2002, 48 and 103) says that the teachings on buddha nature refer to the pure dharmadhātu being present in the mind streams of all sentient beings. However, these teachings only refer to those beings who (among the five kinds of disposition) possess the buddha disposition. They were given only as skillful means, referring only to a small part of sentient beings, and in order to guide those of indeterminate disposition to swiftly enter the mahāyāna. Note that most of this is remarkably identical with certain Madhyamaka explanations (particularly the one found in the Tibetan Gelugpa school) of what buddha nature is. Coming from several Yogācāras, this evidences that at least some followers of this tradition did not explain ''tathāgatagarbha'' as the ''Uttaratantra'' and its commentaries do, but simply as "natural purity" in the sense of suchness being the same in all beings. One reason may be that the above commentators, in line with the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra's'' many verses on buddhahood, ''dharmadhātu'', and suchness being free from reference points (such as IX.36 above; for more, see below), did not want to provide any ground for reification on the level of ultimate reality. Another reason may lie in certain Yogācāras explaining that being "one who lacks the disposition" (''agotraka'') means to absolutely never attain nirvāṇa (see below). However, as evidenced in some of the passages quoted earlier, the same masters also refer to mind's luminous nature being obscured only by adventitious stains, and emptiness being both empty and naturally luminous at the time of sentient beings as well as at the time of the noble ones. Also, later in his commentary (D4034, fol. 196a.5–196b.1), Sthiramati states that it is untenable to say that only one among all the innumerable sentient beings who are endowed with the disposition to become a buddha will become a buddha, while the others will not. In fact, everybody who has gathered the two accumulations of merit and wisdom will become a buddha. Interestingly, ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.37 is also quoted in Asaṅga's ''Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā'' (J 71.16–17) in the context of saying that the suchness of the Tathāgatas is the ''tathāgatagarbha'' of sentient beings, which is typically and explicitly equated with the natural purity and luminosity of mind being obscured only by adventitious stains.
 
*136  Some people say that the freedom from apprehender and apprehended is less encompassing and profound than twofold identitylessness. However, the freedom from apprehender and apprehended corresponds exactly to twofold identitylessness, since all possible objects and subjects in terms of both persons and phenomena are included in the former as well. Moreover, the relinquishment of obscurations in terms of apprehender and apprehended is also extensively discussed in both the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra''. Technically speaking, in the latter's detailed descriptions of many different levels of progressively more subtle mistaken conceptions about apprehender and apprehended to be relinquished on the paths of preparation, seeing, and familiarization, respectively, these levels comprise all cognitive obscurations, but implicitly include the afflictive obscurations too.
 
*137  If not noted otherwise, the following comments on the select verses from the ninth chapter of the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' are all excerpts from Sthiramati's commentary (D4034, fols. 106a.6–144b.7), which usually follows, but often greatly elaborates on, Vasubandhu's ''Bhāṣya''.
 
*138  These consist of seven sets of practices: (1) the four applications of mindfulness (Skt. catuḥ smṛtyupasthāna, Tib. dran pa nye bar bzhag pa bzhi), (2) the four correct exertions (Skt. catvāri samyakprahāṇāni, Tib. yang dag spong ba bzhi), (3) the four limbs of miraculous powers (Skt. catvāra ṛddhipādāḥ, Tib. rdzu 'phrul gyi rkang pa bzhi), (4) the five faculties (Skt. pañcendriyāṇi, Tib. dbang po lnga), (5) the five powers (Skt. pañcabalāni, Tib. stobs lnga), (6) the seven branches of enlightenment (Skt. saptasaṃbodhyaṅgāni, Tib. byang chub kyi yan lag bdun), and (7) the eightfold path of the noble ones (Skt. āryāṣṭāṅgamārga, Tib. 'phags pa'i lam yan lag brgyad). In the mahāyāna, sets (1)–(3) make up the lesser, medium, and greater levels of the path of accumulation; (4)–(5) respectively correspond to the first two (heat and peak) and the second two (poised readiness and supreme dharma) of the four levels of the path of preparation; (6) is equivalent to the path of seeing; and (7) represents the path of familiarization.
 
*139  These two kinds of knowing represent the two buddha wisdoms of knowing suchness and variety. Elsewhere (D4034, tsi, fol. 231a.7–231b.2), Sthiramati comments that "omniscience" refers to knowing the imaginary nature, that is, knowing that all phenomena that are imagined as apprehender and apprehended are like horns of a rabbit and lack characteristics. "Knowing all referents without exception" means to know the entire seeming reality―knowable objects such as skandhas, dhātus, āyatanas, contaminated phenomena, and uncontaminated phenomena.
 
*140  The Bhāṣya says that the pāramitās and so on are not perfect (''apariniṣpanna'') in the sense of there being any intrinsic being of them.
 
*141  Besides "change," ''vṛtti'' in itself has many meanings (such as "operation," "activity," "function," "mode of life or conduct," "nature," "state," "practice," and "mood") which are modulated here by the ten prefixes ''pra-, ud-, a-, ni-, ā-, dvaya-, advaya-, samā-, viśiṣṭā''-, and ''sarvagā''-.
 
*142  Note that ''Uttaratantra'' I.27a gives the fact that "buddha wisdom enters into the hosts of beings" as one of the three reasons why all sentient beings are said to have the Tathāgata heart. For a detailed discussion of these three reasons in ''Uttaratantra'' I.27–28, see Brunnhölzl 2007b, n. 280.
 
*143  Note that this is similar to "the pāramitā of ultimate self" in ''Uttaratantra'' I.37cd. Also, the use of "self" in the double sense of what is to be relinquished and the ultimate nature of phenomena resembles the use of "nature" (''svabhāva'') in Madhyamaka, which says that phenomena lack any nature and that precisely this is the nature of phenomena.
 
*144  This corresponds to the above-mentioned threefold change of state as in the ''Abhidharmasamucchaya''.
 
*145  Vasubandhu's ''Bhāṣya'' does not comment on the last two lines of this verse, while Asvabhāva's ''Ṭīkā'' (D4029, fol. 72b.5–73a.1) agrees in identifying "the wisdom of the real" (''vastujñāna'') as the wisdom of subsequent attainment, and "that" in the last line as the ''dharmadhātu''. However, it says that "the real" (''vastu'') refers to the ''ālaya''-consciousness―the other-dependent nature. Still, this describes the change of state of the impregnations of negative tendencies―when the other-dependent nature has changed state, it becomes the sphere of the wisdom that is attained subsequently to nonconceptual wisdom, but not the sphere of other wisdoms. Nonconceptual wisdom attains mastery over suchness, because it rests in meditative equipoise at will, while the wisdom that is attained subsequently to this meditative equipoise attains mastery over the other-dependent nature in the sense of being unmistaken about it. Sthiramati's comments are literally confirmed by Ngülchu Togmé's commentary on this verse (Dngul chu thogs med 1979, 174–75), which concludes, "Thus, the nature of phenomena is realized through meditative equipoise, and meditative equipoise is realized through subsequent attainment. Since this is uninterrupted, it is the characteristic of inexhaustible mastery." Note that in Asaṅga 2004, 93–94, the translators Jamspal et al. present a greatly abbreviated, but partly mistaken form of Sthiramati's above explanation (misidentifying "the real" as the ''ālaya''-consciousness). Against Sthiramati and Asvabhāva, Jamspal et al. also prefer to follow the Gelugpa scholar dBal Mang, who takes "the wisdom of the real" as referring to the wisdom of meditative equipoise, thus, as Jamspal et al. put it, "tacitly correcting Sthiramati's (or the translator's) equation of ''vastujñāna'' with mundane, aftermath intuition."
 
*146  D4034, fols. 74a.3–75b.1.
 
*147  That even the Madhyamaka understanding of the ultimate is not limited to its being solely an object is shown by Bhāvaviveka's ''Tarkajvālā'' (D3856, fol. 59a.7–59b.2). He explains that, in ''paramārtha, artha'' ("object," "purpose," or "actuality") refers to what is to be understood, realized, or examined. ''Parama'' means "supreme." Thus, (1) since ''paramārtha'' is an object and ultimate (or supreme), it is the ultimate object. (2) Or, it may be read as "the object of the ultimate." Since it is the object of ultimate nonconceptual wisdom, it is the object of the ultimate. (3) Or, it can be understood as "that which is in accordance with the ultimate object." Since the ultimate object exists in the prajñā that is in approximate accordance with the realization of this ultimate object, it is what is in accordance with the ultimate object. In other words, in (1), both ''parama'' and ''artha'' refer only to the object as opposed to the subject that realizes it, (2) means that ''parama'' refers to the subject (wisdom) and ''artha'' to the object (emptiness), and (3) indicates a reasoning consciousness that cognizes ultimate reality not directly but inferentially.
 
*148  The Yogācāra system does not present the ''dharmadhātu'' as a fifth wisdom (''dharmadhātu'' wisdom), which has its origin in the Buddhist tantras. Later however, especially in Tibet, listing five wisdoms became the predominant general presentation (see also Pawo Rinpoché's discussion of the ''Buddhabhūmisūtra'' in appendix 1). When the ''dharmadhātu'' wisdom is added, it is usually matched with the svābhāvikakāya. Some explanations (for example, TOK vol. 3, p. 607) also say that ''dharmadhātu'' wisdom is the change of state of the empty aspect of the ''ālaya''-consciousness, while mirrorlike wisdom is the change of state of its lucid aspect.
 
*149  P5833, fol. 6a–b.
 
*150  D4034, fol. 113b.1–5.
 
*151  As mentioned before, verses IX.56–59 are literally found in the ''Buddhabhūmisūtra''.
 
*152  Vasubandhu's ''Bhāṣya'' agrees, adding that the dharmakāya's characteristic is the fundamental change of state. The dharmakāya is often referred to as "svābhāvika-dharmatākāya" or "dharmatākaya," with dharmakāya being explained as an abbreviation of these two terms. For example, see ''Mahāyānasaṃgrāhabhāṣya ''on X.1, ''Buddhabhūmyupadeśa'' (Taishō 1530, 325c5–7), ''Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna'' (D3997, fol. 272b.5), Jñānacandra's ''Kāyatrayavṛtti'' (D3891, fol. 8b.2), and Ārya Vimuktisena's ''Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛtti'' (D3787, fol. 192a.7–8).
 
*153  Note that the Sanskrit grammatical forms svābhāvikakāya, sāmbhogikakāya, and nairmāṇikakāya (as opposed to svabhāvakāya, sambhogakāya, and nirmāṇakāya) are quite standard (being not only used in the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' and its commentaries, but also throughout the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'', the ''Uttaratantra'', their commentaries, and other texts). These forms indicate these kāyas are related to the dharmakāya as its features and not as three separate entities on their own. Thus, in terms of its nature, the dharmakāya is referred to as svābhāvikakāya (this is why these two are usually said to be equivalent); in terms of its bringing the enjoyment of the mahāyāna dharma to bodhisattvas, it is the sāmbhogikakāya; and in terms of its manifesting in all kinds of forms for all kinds of beings, it is the nairmāṇikakāya.
 
*154  Most of these verses as well as the related IX.41–48 are quoted and explained in the translations below.
 
*155  Note that Haribhadra's commentaries on the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' say the same.
 
*156  Nishio 1982, esp. 59, 84–92, 125–26.
 
*157  Literally, Skt. ''pratyavekṣā'' is "looking back" and also means "paying attention," "looking after," or "care."
 
*158  On this, compare DSC on ''Dharmadhātustava'' verses 38–45 on Mahāmudrā meditation related to sense perceptions and the mental consciousness (see Brunnhölzl 2007b, 245–51).
 
*159  AC, fol. 163b.
 
*160  Dpa' bo gtsug lag phreng ba n.d., 764.
 
*161  For further details on the Yogācāra system in general as well as the notions of naturally luminous mind and the Tathāgata heart, see the bibliography in general as well as Brunnhölzl 2004, 457–95 and 2007b, 57–109.
 
*162  Tib. dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan.
 
*163  Tāranātha even wrote two commentaries on the ''Heart Sūtra'' from the perspective of ''shentong''. Tāranātha n.d., vol. 17, pp. 571–759 and 759–83.
 
*164  Śākya mchog ldan 1988b, 13–15.
 
*165  Tib. ldog pa gzhan sel gyi cha. An "elimination-of-other" is a conceptual phenomenon arrived at through excluding everything it is not.
 
*166  The same is said by Karma Trinlépa below.
 
*167  Śākya mchog ldan 1988c, 40ff.
 
*168  Lit. "proponents of the lack of a nature." This is another term for the Mādhyamikas.
 
*169  This accords with Śākya Chogden's repeated statements that the view of ''rangtong'' is the best one for cutting through all reference points, while the view of ''shentong'' is more helpful for describing and facilitating meditative experience and realization.
 
*170  Śākya mchog ldan 1975, 225–27.
 
*171  'Ju mi pham rgya mtsho c. 1990b, 3–6.
 
*172  Skt. ''gotra'' is sometimes still translated as "family" or "lineage" (two of the word's ordinary literal meanings), when it refers to buddha nature. Of course, by virtue of having buddha nature, all beings could be said to ''belong'' to the family or lineage of the buddhas, but one cannot help but wonder what it should mean that buddha nature itself is a "family" or "lineage."
 
*173  In Tibet, there have been long-standing and complex debates about the questions of whether the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra''―as well as the ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' and ''Dharmadharmatāvibhāga''―belongs to what Tibetans call "Mere Mentalism" (thus being inferior to Madhyamaka); whether it and the Yogācāra School teach that some beings have no disposition to attain enlightenment at all (and what exactly "disposition" means in this context); and whether they assert three yānas ultimately, and so forth. The Gelugpa School in particular answers these questions in the affirmative and many modern scholars do so too. There is no room here to address these issues in details (such as the complex treatment of ''gotra'' in different Yogācāra texts), but as can be seen from the above, there are Tibetan teachers (as well as some modern scholars) who disagree with the Gelugpa answers. In particular, as for the term "disposition" (''gotra''), it should first be noted that, differing from this term's primary meaning in the ''Uttaratantra'', in the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'', it is not synonymous with buddha nature. Like the ''Laṅkāvatārasūtra'', the text speaks about five categories of ''gotra'' (those of bodhisattvas, pratyekabuddhas, śrāvakas, those with uncertain ''gotra'', and those without ''gotra''). The ''Laṅkāvatārasūtra'' identifies the last category with those who just follow their great desire (''icchantika'') and reject the dharma, thus having eliminated all their roots of virtue and not attaining parinirvāṇa. The ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' follows this very common definition of gotra in general, which is "roots of virtue" (see also Sthiramati's ''Madhyāntavibhāga''ṭīkā, ed. Yamaguchi, 188). The ''Bhāṣyā ''on ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' III.4 explains that gotra is that from which qualities arise and increase. Also the distinction between the naturally abiding (''prakṛtistha'') and the accomplished (''samudānīta'') or unfolding dispositions in this verse differs from how these terms are understood in the ''Uttaratantra'', with the former defined as what has the nature of being a support for further virtue (''prakṛti'' can also mean "cause") and the latter as what is thus supported. On ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' III.9 and III.11, the ''Bhāṣya'' comments that accumulating roots of virtue is indispensable for acquiring a disposition, but once the bodhisattva disposition is acquired, it serves as the source of an infinite number of further roots of virtue. Thus, ''gotra'' in this sense refers to conditioned and multiple phenomena, whereas ''gotra'' in the sense of buddha nature is clearly unconditioned and single. The former sense is also evident from Sthiramati's commentary (D4034, fols. 41b.6–43a.2), which says that beings have infinite ''gotras'', all of which refer to some (conventional) nature of theirs, such as being an angry or passionate person, or liking sweet versus other tastes. Just as the possession of the gotra of desire functions as the cause for giving rise to desire, but not for hatred, the three different gotras of the three yānas are indispensable for there being three yānas. As for ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' III.11, the ''Bhāṣya'' explains that to be without disposition means to possess the property of not attaining parinirvāṇa―either for a certain time (the first four kinds of beings in the verse) or forever (the last one). According to Sthiramati's commentary (D4034, fols. 48a.4–49b.1) this refers to those with the property of not attaining parinirvāṇa (that is, buddhahood) for a certain time and those who have the property of not attaining ''any'' kind of nirvāṇa for a certain time. He says that the first four pertain to those who ''do'' possess the bodhisattva disposition, but, by virtue of certain conditions, will temporarily (for many eons) not attain parinirvāṇa (that is, buddhahood). Among these, "those who are solely devoted to wrongdoing" are engaged in the five negative actions without interval. "Those who have completely destroyed the immaculate dharmas" are those who, under the influence of wrong spiritual teachers, have fallen into the wrong view of nihilism, thus denying karma, the three jewels, and so on. "Those who lack the virtue conducive to liberation" have not gathered the complete accumulations of merit and virtue necessary to attain parinirvāṇa, but only the virtues for higher rebirths as gods and humans within saṃsāra. "Those who have inferior immaculate dharmas" have only gathered a fraction of the merit and wisdom necessary to attain parinirvāṇa. Thus, as long as these four do not fully remove their negative actions and wrong views, and accumulate the complete accumulations of merit and virtue necessary to attain parinirvāṇa, they will not attain this state. As for those who will not attain any nirvāṇā, "lacking the cause" refers to lacking the virtuous roots and the disposition for any of the nirvāṇas of the three yānas, because without such a disposition, they do not attain any of these three nirvāṇas. They do lack the property of attaining nirvāṇa, just as the natures of stones and trees do not turn into something that has the nature of consciousness, such as minds and mental factors. Thus, in the first four cases, Sthiramati says, "lack of disposition" has only a pejorative sense, while "lacking the cause" means utter nonexistence, because they absolutely do not attain nirvāṇa. However, considering the text's (and the commentators') understanding of "disposition" (virtuous roots), its explicit stance that all beings possess ''tathāgatagarbha'' (IX.37), and its statement that mind is natural luminosity, which is merely obscured by adventitious stains (XIII.18–19), being without ''gotra'' (''agotraka''; the text does not use ''icchantika'') forever is not equivalent to saying that some beings have no buddha nature or absolutely can never attain enlightenment. Rather, there are some beings who simply never acquire a "disposition" for any of the yānas in the sense of never acquiring any—or at least a significant—amount of virtue that qualifies as such a disposition. In other words, all beings have the potential for buddhahood, but some just never actualize this potential even remotely, which is exactly why saṃsāra in general is said to be endless. This is basically also what Asaṅga's ''Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā'' on I.40–41 (J 36–37; P5526, fols. 96b.8–97b.6) explains, using the term gotra in both the above way and also for buddha nature. Without ''tathāgatagarbha'', the text says, beings would neither be weary of suffering nor wish and strive for being free of it (nirvāṇa). These are the two functions that the pure buddha disposition exhibits, which dwells even in beings who are fixated on their wrong ways. However, to be aware of the shortcomings of saṃsāric suffering and the advantages of nirvāṇic happiness is not without any cause or condition, but due to the existence of the ''gotra'' of persons with virtuous dharmas. If this kind of ''gotra'' were without any cause or condition and not brought about through terminating wrongdoing, it would also have to exist in those who just follow their great desire, having the ''gotra'' of not passing into parinirvāṇa (''icchantikānām apy aparinirvāṇagotrānām''; clearly, here, ''gotra'' does not refer to buddha nature, but to virtuous roots as above). The ''gotra'' being pure of adventitious stains does not happen as long as one does not aspire for the dharma of one of the three yānas through connecting with the four conditions of relying on a genuine spiritual friend and so on (that is, dwelling in a conducive place, accumulating merit, and making aspiration prayers). The ''Jñānālokālaṃkārasūtra'' says that the light rays of sunlike buddha wisdom touch even those who are fixated on wrongdoing, thus benefiting them and enhancing the arising of future causes for happiness through virtuous dharmas. In other sūtras, we find the statement that those who just follow their great desire possess the property of not attaining parinirvāṇa forever. But this refers to having aversion toward the mahāyāna dharma as being the cause for not attaining parinirvāṇa. Therefore, this statement was made for the sake of turning such people away from their aversion, with the intention of referring to another time (that is, their actually attaining nirvāṇa at some point in the future). By virtue of the existence of the naturally pure ''gotra'', it is impossible for there to be any beings who can never become pure, which is said with the intention that, by virtue of essentially not being different from the Bhagavat, it is possible for all sentient beings to become pure. Sthiramati's ''Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā'' (ed.Yamaguchi, 55.19–56.6) on I.19a ("the emptiness of the primordial nature" among the sixteen emptinesses) juxtaposes the positions on there being three versus a single ''gotra'', but takes all of them to be primordial: "As for [I.19a] 'In order to purify the ''gotra'',' its emptiness is the emptiness of the primordial nature. The reason for this is that, [according to the ''Bhāṣya'',] '' 'gotra'' is the primordial nature.' How so? 'Because of having a nature of its own,' which means to have a nature of its own from beginningless time that is not adventitious. Just as some [phenomena] in beginningless saṃsāra are sentient and some are insentient, here too, some [sets of] the six āyatanas represent the buddhagotra and some the ''śrāvakagotra'' and so on. The ''gotra'' is not accidental, because it has been continuing since beginningless time [up through the present], just as the distinction between what is sentient and insentient. Others say that, since all sentient beings are endowed with the ''tathāgatagotra'', ''gotra'' should be understood here in this way" (depending on how the Sanskrit here is reconstructed, "in this way" could also be read as "as suchness," which would conform to the above-mentioned comments by Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, and Asvabhāva on ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.37). As for the issue of there being only a single yāna, ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' XI.53–54 gives seven reasons for why the Buddha spoke about there being only one yāna. The commentaries by Vasubandhu (Limaye 1992, 199–200), Sthiramati (D4034, fols. 196a.5–199b.2), and Asvabhāva (D4029, fols. 93b.6–95a.2) elaborate on these reasons as (1) the ''dharmadhātu'' not being different in śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas; (2) all those who progress through the yānas up through a buddha equally lacking a self; (3) the state of being liberated from the afflictions being the same in all of them; (4) śrāvakas with uncertain disposition being led into and liberated through the mahāyāna; (5) a buddha's mind of equality toward all beings and the attainment by certain śrāvakas who remember that they have been bodhisattvas before being partially similar; (6) the Buddha having emanated as śrāvakas and attained parinirvāṇa through the śrāvakayāna; and (7) there being nothing more supreme to go to than the buddhahood to be reached through the mahāyāna. With buddhahood having only a single yāna, the respective statements in various sūtras that there is a single yāna should be understood through these seven intentions (''abhiprāya''). However, it is not the case that the three yānas do not exist. The reason why the buddhas teach a single yāna is to attract śrāvakas with uncertain disposition to the mahāyāna and to prevent bodhisattvas with uncertain disposition from falling away from this yāna. Sthiramati says explicitly that those sūtras that speak of a single yāna and three yānas are of expedient and definitive meaning, respectively. ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' X.32 quotes the very same two verses from the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' as the answer to the question, "If this dharmakāya of the buddhas, which is endowed with such excellent qualities, is not in common with śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, with what intention was a single yāna taught?" The commentaries by Vasubandhu (D4050, fol. 187a.1–187b.6) and Asvabhāva (D4051, fol. 292b.6–293b.3) repeat that the teachings on the single yāna entail the above seven intentions (however, Asvabhāva also says that there is a single yāna because, ultimately, the yānas of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are the mahāyāna). Many Tibetan and most Western scholars follow this, holding that the Yogācāras in general, as in the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'', assert the ultimate existence of three yānas. In large part, this is due to the common hermeneutical approach of taking the Sanskrit ''abhiprāya'' (Tib. dgongs pa) by default to mean "intention," and this by default meaning that anything with an intention is necessarily of expedient meaning. However, it is very hard to defend the position that the Yogācāras in general assert three yānas, let alone ultimately, and said hermeneutical approach entails a number of problems too. First of all, there is no text by Maitreya or Asaṅga that says that there are three vehicles ultimately, or that the teachings that there is a single yāna are of expedient meaning or entail some intention. On the contrary, at least as far as the presentations in the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' and the ''Uttaratantra'' go, they are both clearly from the perspective of a single yāna. Among the works of Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, and Asvabhāva, the stance that the single yāna was taught with certain intentions is only found in their above-mentioned commentaries on the same two verses in the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' and the ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha''. Among these commentaries, it is only the one by Sthiramati which says that these teachings are of expedient meaning. However, in several other places in the same commentaries and other texts by these masters, there are passages that suggest only a single yāna, which eventually is entered by all śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha arhats as well. I am not going to provide a new commentary here on verses IX.53–54 of the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'', but on their own, they could very well be read as giving the reasons for why there in fact is only a single yāna (see also Yamabe 1997, 200–203). In particular, the first reason in XI.53 is literally the same as in ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' I.40ab and verse 21 of Nāgārjuna's ''Niraupamyastava'', which, however, is taken by these texts as the reason for why there in fact is, respectively, only a single gotra or yāna ultimately. In addition, these latter two verses are usually quoted by the very same scholars above as two of the classical scriptural supports for there being only a single gotra and yāna. Also, one cannot but wonder how this reason (1) of the ''dharmadhātu''’s being the same in śrāvakas and all others is supposed to establish the ''ultimate'' existence of three yānas, or how it could serve as a proof for the expediency of the single yāna (if anything, it only proves the opposite). In fact, it would then absurdly follow that these ultimately existing three yānas have three ultimately different fruitions, which could consequently only come from three ultimately different kinds of ''dharmadhātu''. In the same vein, reasons (2)–(3) also speak about a single yāna by virtue of certain features from an ultimate point of view (lack of a self and irreversible liberation from afflictions) being the same for the three yānas, and (7) speaks about a single yāna by virtue of there being no higher destination than the one arrived at through the mahāyāna, so how can there be three different yānas ultimately? In fact, looking at Vasubandhu's above-concluding remarks in his commentary on IX.53, one could easily read them as stating that there is only a single yāna from the perspective of buddhahood, but, relatively speaking, from the perspective of those in the śrāvakayāna and the pratyekabuddhayāna, it is not that their yānas do not exist at all. Padma Karpo's commentary on the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' (''mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi 'grel pa rje btsun byams pa'i gzhal lung'', fol. 107a.4–107b.3) says that Asaṅga and his followers, for the sake of guiding different beings, taught, for those whose dispositions are individually certain, that the yānas are real as different ones and, for those whose dispositions are not certain, that there is a single yāna. Statements such as those in ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' XI.54 and teachings about the single yāna taught in the ''Daśabhūmikasūtra'', the ''Ratnameghasūtras'', and so on being of expedient meaning are given only in order to dispel the fear of certain people, while Asaṅga's ''Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā'' establishes a single yāna. As for the sometimes chameleonlike notion of "intention" (Skt. abhiprāya/saṃdhi, Tib. dgongs pa), in general, as Ngülchu Togmé's commentary on ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' XII.16–18 (Dngul chu thogs med bzang po dpal 1979, fol. 133b.5–6) points out, "expedient meaning" on the one hand and the two categories of "intention" and "indirect intention" (Tib. ldem dgongs) on the other hand are not coextensive, since ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' II.31 states that all teachings of the Buddha (and not just the portions of expedient meaning) have to be understood in terms of the four intentions and also says that the indirect intention of a remedy teaches all the remedies that consist of the eighty-four thousand teachings of the Buddha. Also, as is often pointed out, if everything with an intention is necessarily of expedient meaning, then all Buddhist teachings would be of expedient meaning, because they were all given with certain intentions, including the ones with regard to emptiness. To conclude, the ''Laṅkāvatārasūtra'' (II, vv. 131–32 and 204–5; D107, fols. 127b.2–3 and 173b.7–174a.1) says that even the teachings on a single yāna are just for those of weak insight, but are not the definitive meaning. Rather, in ultimate reality, any presentations of any yānas are obsolete.
 
<blockquote>On account of the differences between childish beings,<br>Those of weak insight, and the noble ones,<br>I speak of three yānas,<br>One yāna, and no yāna.<br>This is the door to the ultimate―<br>Freedom from the duality of cognizance.<br>Within the state of nonappearance, how could there be<br>A presentation of three yānas?<br>. . . <br>As long as sentient beings are to be engaged,<br>There is no limit for yānas.<br>But once mind as such fundamentally changes state,<br>There are no yānas and no one to progress.<br>There is no presentation of yānas,<br>But in order to guide childish beings,<br>I explained different yānas,<br>Being taught as a single yāna.</blockquote>
 
For further details, see the bibliography, especially Ruegg 1969, 73–86, 97–100, and 185–88; Kunst 1977; Hakamaya 1980; Prasad 1991,1–45; Lopez 1992, 16–70; Yamabe 1997; and D'Amato 2003.
 
*174  D107, fol. 292a.
 
*175  These are (1) causal features (''nimitta''), (2) names (''nāma''), (3) conception/imagination (''vikalpa/parikalpa''), (4) suchness (''tathatā''), and (5) perfect wisdom (''samyagjñāna''). For more details, see the translation of OED.
 
*176  These are the five chapter headings of the ''Madhyāntavibhāga''.
 
*177  These are the five chapter headings of the ''Uttaratantra''.
 
*178  Pp. 490.2–491.2; 492.1–3; and 494.1–495.2.
 
*179  Tib. sangs rgyas mnyan pa bkra shis dpal 'byor. The Sangyé Nyenpas are regarded as incarnations of the Indian paṇḍita Smṛtijñānakīrti (eleventh century), who stayed in Tibet for many years as a teacher and translator, being instrumental in initiating the later spread of the dharma there. According to Krang dbyi sun 1985, 3249 and 3255, the First Sangyé Nyenpa was born in 1457 and his next incarnation appeared in 1520. This fits with the biography of the Eighth Karmapa in Chos kyi 'byung gnas and 'Be lo tshe dbang kun khyab 1972 (vol. 2, 20.7), which says that Dashi Baljor passed away in 1519. However, the latter's biography in Dpa' bo gtsug lag phreng ba 2003, 1200–1206 gives his year of birth as 1445 and says that he passed away at sixty-five. In the table of contents of Chos kyi 'byung gnas and 'Be lo tshe dbang kun khyab 1972, the editors Gyaltsan and Legshay say, "The work in hand gives the dates for this teacher as 1445–1509. These seem not to be in accordance with his relationship with the 7th and 8th Zhwanag Karma-pa." TBRC gives 1145/1457–1510/1525.
 
*180  Literally, the Tibetan says ''sems tsam'' ("Mere Mentalism"), which is ever so often used in Tibetan texts to refer to the Yogācāra school in general or a specific part of it. What is meant in this context is clearly the classical Yogācāra system as presented by Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu, and not "Mere Mentalism" in its somewhat pejorative sense as what is refuted, and subordinated to, Madhyamaka in the default Tibetan doxographical hierarchies.
 
*181  Mi bskyod rdo rje 1996, 40.
 
*182  Kong sprul blo gros mtha' yas 2005b, fol. 6b.5–7a.1.
 
*183  What follows is partly based on and confirms the preliminary remarks on Rangjung Dorje's view and his DSC in Brunnhölzl 2007b (see also for a number of different presentations of what ''shentong'' is).
 
*184  1308 and 1332 were other Monkey Years, but the first one seems too early, while during the latter one, Rangjung Dorje was on his long journey to, and stay at, the Chinese court and not in Upper Dechen.
 
*185  In the ''Blue Annals'' ('Gos lo tsā ba gzhon nu dpal. 1996, 492), Chos kyi 'byung gnas and 'Be lo tshe dbang kun khyab 1972, 210.7, and Tshal pa kun dga' rdo rje 1981, 100, the entry of the year 1326 is followed by a number of events, the last one being the composition of DSC. The next explicit dates are 1328 in the first two texts and 1329 in the latter.
 
*186  There is some unclarity here, since both the commentaries by Jamgön Kongtrul and the Fifteenth Karmapa gloss this as the Pig Year of the sixth sixty-year cycle of the Tibetan calendar, which would make it 1335, since this is the only Pig Year within that cycle during Rangjung Dorje's lifetime. However, as this date is contradicted by NY’s being explicitly referred to in AC, 1323 is the only Pig Year before AC's indubitable composition in 1325 and after ZMND's in 1322, which fits well with the overall chronology. Of course, there are still earlier Pig Years in Rangjung Dorje's life (1311 and 1299), but it seems highly unlikely that he composed NY eleven or even twenty-three years (at age fifteen) before ZMND. Also, while NY says itself that it was composed at Upper Dechen in Tsurpu (Central Tibet), all sources agree that, upon his return from the Chinese court, Rangjung Dorje went through Minyag and other areas of Kham in eastern Tibet in 1335, teaching the dharma extensively. Tshal pa kun dga' rdo rje 1981, 103; Dpa' bo gtsug lag phreng ba 2003 (vol. 2, 941); and Chos kyi 'byung gnas and 'Be lo tshe dbang kun khyab 1972 (fol. 111a) all say that he returned to Tsurpu only during the ninth month of that Pig Year (November/December) and then stayed at Chimpu in Samyé during that winter for six months.
 
*187  Except for the two texts on the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' and OED, all of these other texts are unfortunately lost. However, there is a commentary preserved on the ''Uttaratantra'' (Rang byung rdo rje 2006a, vol. ja, pp. 126–262) by Tülmo Dashi Öser (Tib. dul mo bkra shis 'od zer; born 1474), a close disciple of the Seventh Karmapa and teacher of the Eighth. This text is basically Rangjung Dorje's own summary of the text with a few added clarifications and also exhibits many of the typical traits of his view as presented below.
 
*188  See bibliography.
 
*189  The last line in OED's colophon is not only remarkable because of this, but because the term "freedom from extremes" also stands for the view of "the earlier Mādhyamikas" in Tibet (meaning what was understood as the correct Madhyamaka view before Tsongkhapa). This view was proclaimed by masters such as Patsab Lotsāwa and his four main disciples; the Sakya masters Rendawa, Gorampa Sönam Senge, and Dagtsang Lotsāwa; the Eighth Karmapa Mikyö Dorjé; Pawo Rinpoche, and others. Said approach uses Madhyamaka analysis that results in an unqualified negation of all four positions of the typical Madhyamaka tetralemma without asserting anything instead, in order to completely overcome all conceptualizations and reference points. In this way, it is certainly an accurate characterization of the Indian Madhyamaka approach. However, "the later Mādhyamikas"—the Gelugpa school—criticized this view by saying that "lack of real existence" is the correct Madhyamaka view and thus not to be negated. At the same time, there were attempts to discredit "the Madhyamaka of freedom from extremes" through associating it with the notorious stereotype of the Chinese Hvashang Mahāyāna.
 
*190  At times, NTC and NYC also pick up this approach. The contemporary eminent Kagyü scholar and meditation master Thrangu Rinpoche says on NT and NY that they combine scholasticism and reasoning within the ''shentong'' approach with the Mahāmudrā tradition of directly familiarizing with the nature of the mind. Thus, in terms of the more theoretical instructions, they present the definitive meaning, and in terms of practice, they correspond to the Mahāmudrā approach to meditation.
 
*191  The Eighth Situpa's commentary (Chos kyi 'byung gnas n.d., 24–31) on this verse says that the ground for everything in saṃsāra and nirvāṇa is the purity of mind, that is, the Tathāgata heart. This is the basis of purification but not what is to be purified, since in its own essence, there is nothing whatsover to be purified. Also, mind's nature is the unity of being lucid and empty, since there is no being lucid apart from being empty and no being empty apart from being lucid. Those who explain lucidity and emptiness as two separate things and their union as these two things becoming associated stand outside the teachings of the Tathāgata. In terms of Mahāmudrā, this commentary justifies the Kagyü approach of pointing out instructions with or without tantric empowerment and clarifies that it is in full accord with Madhyamaka. Adventitious stains are identified as the dualistic phenomena of apprehender and apprehended produced by the adventitious mistakenness of mind about itself. The dharmakāya is the manifestation of the fundamental nature of the basis of purification in which all such adventitious dualistic phenomena are relinquished.
 
*192  In the translated sections of AC, a few tantras are quoted too, but Rangjung Dorje's predominant reliance on Indian sūtrayāna treatises is remarkable for a text that is a commentary on the tantras, further underlining his stance that the fundamental view of the mahāyāna is the same in the sūtras and the tantras.
 
*193  Rang byung rdo rje 2006c.
 
*194  DSC, fol. 50b.
 
*195  Even in Jamgön Kongtrul's NTC and NYC, the terms "Mere Mentalists" and "Mere Mentalism" do not appear at all (while he constantly uses these terms in his other works), but he too uses "Yogācāra."
 
*196  Rang byung rdo rje 2006a, vol. ja, p. 128.
 
*197  See Brunnhölzl 2007b, 159–93.
 
*198  Tib.chos grags rgya mtsho.
 
*199  ZDKT, pp. 396–97.
 
*200  Ka rma 'phrin las pa 1975, vol. cha, pp. 90–92.
 
*201  The sixty-four qualities are the thirty-two qualities of freedom of the dharmakāya (the ten powers, four fearlessnesses, and eighteen unique qualities of a buddha) and the thirty-two qualities of maturation of the rūpakāyas (the major marks). ZDKT (pp. 46.1–47.3) explains the above further: “Others say, ‘If this Heart had the sixty-four qualities from the very beginning, the qualities of perfect buddhahood would exist in the mind streams of sentient beings, and in that case, does the buddha wisdom in the mind stream of a hell being experience the sufferings of hell?’ Such is indeed said, but it is precisely for this reason that we speak about [wisdom or luminous mind] by making the distinction that it is stained during the phase of sentient beings and stainless in the state of a buddha. In other words, perfect buddhahood and its powers and so on do not exist in the mind streams of sentient beings. This is definitely how it is, but it will be understood through saying again and again, '' 'Stained'' buddhahood and its powers and so on exist [in their mind streams].’”
 
*202  These are Kalkin Puṇḍarīka's commentary on the ''Kālacakratantra'', called ''Vimalaprabhā'' (Tib. 'grel chen dri med 'od); Vajragarbha's commentary on the Hevajratantra, called ''Hevajrapiṇḍārthaṭīkā'' (Tib. rdo rje'i snying 'grel); and Vajrapāṇi's commentary on the ''Cakrasaṃvaratantra'', called ''Lakṣābhidānāduddhṛtalaghutantrapiṇḍārthavivaraṇa'' (Tib. phyag rdor stod 'grel). Note that Mipham Rinpoche's ''Lion's Roar Proclaiming Other-Emptiness'' starts by listing the sources of the shentong view as the sūtras of the third turning of the wheel of dharma, which teach the definitive meaning; Maitreya's ''Uttaratantra''; the profound teachings by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu; the commentaries on the definitive meaning by Nāgārjuna, such as his collection of praises; the tantras, such as the ''Kālacakratantra''; and the commentaries on their intention, such as the trilogy of bodhisattva commentaries.
 
*203  These four lines list the key terms at the beginning of the first chapter of ZMND and AC (see the translations below).
 
*204  The Tibetan has ''stong byed'', but following the standard pair of "the basis of being empty" (''stong gzhi'') and "what it is empty/to be emptied of" (''stong bya''), this should be the latter.
 
*205  Tib. gar dbang chos kyi dbang phyug.
 
*206  Tib. rtogs brjod lta sgom spyod 'bras kyi glu (lines 132–35).
 
*207  Tib. bdud 'dul rdo rje.
 
*208  Tib. go nyams lta ba'i glu (lines 73–90). For complete translations of these two songs and more details, see Brunnhölzl 2007a.
 
*209  Chos grags rgya mtsho 1985, vol. I, pp. 196–97.
 
*210  Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 516–19.
 
*211  Dpa' bo gtsug lag phreng ba 2003, 1109.
 
*212  JNS, vol. 1, pp. 221 and 223.
 
*213  Ibid., p. 210.
 
*214  Ibid., pp. 33–34.
 
*215  Kong sprul blo gros mtha' yas 1982, vol. III, p. 24.
 
*216  JNS (vol. 2, pp. 297) identifies those who only realize the lack of nature of the apprehended as the Real Aspectarian Mere Mentalists, while the False Aspectarians are said to realize the lack of nature of both apprehender and apprehended. Thus, though there is no explicit division here into Real and False Aspectarians and the latter's doxographical place is not spelled out, the latter thus seem not to be included under the label Mere Mentalists. Also, though Mikyö Dorje does not explicitly call Maitreya and Asaṅga “Mādhyamikas” (or label them "False Aspectarians") here, he seems to suggest below that they (at least de facto) are. JNS explicitly refers to them as Mādhyamikas several times.
 
*217  "The sevenfold collection" refers to Dharmakīrti's texts on valid cognition (such as the ''Pramāṇavārttika'') and "the sūtra" refers to Dignāga's ''Pramāṇasamucchaya''.
 
*218  These are the ''Madhyāntavibhāga'', the ''Dharmadharmatāvibhāga'', and the ''Uttaratantra''.
 
*219  This is quite a remarkable early analysis of Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's approach, since it already outlines the model called "ascending/sliding scales of analysis," with which the contemporary Western scholars Dreyfus and McClintock describe Dharmakīrti's system. I do not at all mean to diminish their merits in conducting excellent and detailed analyses of said approach (in fact, I greatly admire it), but—as the above passage shows—the principle obviously has been recognized before.
 
*220  Chos grags rgya mtsho 1985, vol. 4, pp. 406–8.
 
*221  JNS, pp. 22–26.
 
*222  Ruegg 2000, 80–81.
 
*223  This refers to the tantras.
 
*224  As quoted in TOK vol. 2, p. 553.
 
*225  Audio recording of an oral commentary on the ''Dharmadharmatāvibhāga'' in Samye Ling, Scotland (April 1990).
 
*226  See my forthcoming translation of the major portions of this text.
 
*227  ''Dbu ma sogs gzhung spyi'i dka' gnad'' (in 'Ju mi pham rgya mtsho 1990a, vol. 22, p. 450.3) and ''Dam chos dogs sel'' (in 'Ju mi pham rgya mtsho 1992, 521).
 
*228  JNS, 218 says that what is called "uncontaminated consciousness" is the unconditioned naturally abiding disposition (the very nature of the mind associated with stains), which is definitely the cause for perfect buddhahood and primordially exists in all beings.
 
*229  In Buddhism, by definition, only conditioned phenomena can be causes since unconditioned phenomena are permanent and cannot perform any active function. Cessation refers to the  absence of a previously existent conditioned phenomenon, but in itself, an absence cannot be a cause for anything (the most famous counterexamples to this pan-Buddhist position are Tsongkhapa and his followers, who hold that cessation is a functional entity that serves as the operational agent that links karmic causes and effects).
 
*230  ZDC ( p. 29) adds that the immediate mind, once it becomes associated with the immaculate dharmas of the path, is also the cause for a buddha's qualities of freedom. The afflicted mind does not represent valid cognition since it is the root of all saṃsāric mistakenness and of producing all mental states of noncognition, wrong cognition, and doubt.
 
*231  Hsüan-tsang's ''Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi'' (La Vallée Poussin 1928–1948, 442) speaks about uncontaminated and contaminated mentation as referring to the minds of bodhisattvas when being engaged in, and rising from, meditative equipoise, respectively, with pure mentation being related to the wisdom of equality.
 
*232  As explained above, the sixth consciousness is said to have two functions―the conceptual mind and mental perception, which perceives outer objects just like the five sense consciousnesses.
 
*233  ZDKT calls this "the internally oriented aspect" of the mental consciousness as opposed to its externally oriented aspects―mental perception and thoughts.
 
*234  No early biography of either Rangjung Dorje or Dölpopa records any such meeting. Three considerably later sources by Mangtö Ludrub Gyatso (1523–1596), Tāranātha, and the Eighth Situpa (Chos kyi 'byung gnas and 'Be lo tshe dbang kun khyab 1972, 208.1–2) report a single meeting of the two, saying that the former made a prophesy about the latter coming to realize a particularly sublime view unlike his present one (for details, see Stearns 1999, 47–48). However, there is no mention of Dölpopa being a student of Rangjung Dorje.
 
*235  I am not attempting to make any judgments as to whose view is better or "higher"―both being undoubtedly highly erudite scholars and realized meditation masters.
 
*236  All these terms come from several sūtras on buddha nature, and some are also found in the ''Uttaratantra''. Dölpopa also often qualifies his descriptions, such as by saying that, when making distinctions between what is permanent and impermanent in the context of giving explanations, buddha nature, nondual wisdom, and so on are permanent, enduring etc., whereas all seeming phenomena are impermanent. However, within profound meditative equipoise, all reference points need to be let go of. As for the above terms, given his overall explanations on buddha nature, it seems that Rangjung Dorje wishes to avoid expressions that bear strong absolutist connotations.
 
*237  Dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan 1998, 128, 430, and 454.
 
*238  Though Rangjung Dorje never mentions the specific term "''ālaya''-wisdom," one could read certain passages in his texts as implying the above distinction, such as OED (pp. 501.4–502.2) describing "''ālaya''" as a general label for the three natures, while referring to the imaginary and other-dependent natures as "''ālaya''-consciousness." The eight consciousnesses are the obscurations, while the four wisdoms are the stainlessness of these consciousnesses, thus being the perfect nature, with ''dharmadhātu'' wisdom being the matrix of all of these (see also AC, pp. 26ff.). Note, however, that some later Kagyü commentators on Rangjung Dorje's texts use this terminology (such as Tagramba and Jamgön Kongtrul).
 
*239  Dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan 1998, 97, lines 15–17.
 
*240  Just as an aside, the fact that JNS refutes this position (which is no doubt still maintained by many Kagyüpas today and is regarded as the epitome of the ''shentong'' view) twice and also negates the claim that the ālaya-consciousness transforms into mirrorlike wisdom (as mentioned above) is quite remarkable (to say the least) for a text that is supposedly written to uphold the ''shentong'' view.
 
*241  JNS, vol. 1, p. 223 (interestingly and unlike with other opponents, the Eighth Karmapa uses honorific terms when he quotes Dölpopa). What Dölpopa is reported here as saying is a paraphrase of a passage in his ''Mountain Dharma'' (Dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan 1998, 121), which concludes, "If [existence] were to establish being [something], since excrement exists in humans, are humans then excrement or what?" Note that Hopkins (2006, 188), probably due to his Tibetan original reading ''bshad pa'' instead of ''bshang ba'', has "explanations" instead of “excrement,” which, of course, makes the argument much less poignant.
 
*242  See, for example, DSC, fols. 14a, 16b, 25b–26a; NT lines 89–90 and 94; A Song on the Ālaya.
 
*243  See his ''Fourth Council'' (Tib. bka' bsdus bzhi pa) in ''Collected Works'', vol. 1. Paro, Bhutan: 1984, 404–5.
 
*244  For further details, see Schaeffer 1995, 25–36; Stearns 1995 and 1999; Hopkins 2002, 273–315 and 2006, 8–39; Mathes 1998 and 2004; and Burchardi 2007.
 
*245  Tib. khrims khang lo tsā ba, aka bsod nams rgya mtsho.
 
*246  Tib. bya bral rin chen bzang po.
 
*247  Tib. dvags po rab 'byams pa chos rgyal bstan pa.
 
*248  Tib. ngo khro rab 'byams pa dbang phyug dpal (also known as ngo khro rab 'byams bshes gnyen rnam rgyal).
 
*249  Tib. dkon mchog yan lag.
 
*250  Tib. mkha' khyab rdo rje.
 
*251  The most extensive commentaries among these are those by Tagbo Rabjampa (353 folios) and Ngotro Rabjampa (337 folios). For a complete list of these commentaries on ZMND (including their size and short biographies of their authors), see Rang byung rdo rje 2006a, vol. ka, pp. 22–39.
 
*252  Tib. chos kyi ‘byung gnas (also known as bstan pa'i nyin byed).
 
*253  TOK, vol. 1, p. 461; vol. 2, p. 544.
 
*254  Chos kyi 'byung gnas n.d., 20–22 (trans. Sherab Dorje 1995, 48–49).
 
*255  Ibid., 24–26, and 30–31 (trans. 52–54 and 59–60).
 
*256  Ibid., 32–39 (trans. 62–70).
 
*257  Against common usage in Western translations, as indicated by Peter Roberts, Cyrus Streans, Elizabeth Callahan, and others, the above (and not ''nādī'', ''vāyu'', and ''tilaka'') are the Sanskrit equivalents for the Tibetan ''rtsa rlung thig le'' in the Buddhist tantras and their Indian commentaries. This is also confirmed by the Sanskrit dictionary by Monier-Williams and the Tibetan-Sanskrit dictionary by J. S. Negi.
 
*258  Ibid., 92 (trans. 127–28).
 
*259  Thrangu Rinpoche 1990, 2–7.
 
*260  Thrangu Rinpoche 2002, 20–51.
 
  
==Abbreviations==
+
*{{i|'''Translations'''|127}}
 +
**{{i|The Autocommmentary on ''The Profound Inner Reality''|129}}
 +
**{{i|The Ornament That Explains the ''Dharmadharmatāvibhāga''|171}}
 +
**{{i|Four Poems by the Third Karmapa|193}}
 +
**{{i|Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé's Commentary on ''The Treatise on Pointing<br>{{6nbsp}}Out the Tathāgata Heart''|203}}
 +
**{{i|Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé's Commentary on ''The Treatise on the<br>{{6nbsp}}Distinction between Consciousness and Wisdom''|257}}
 +
**{{i|Karma Trinlépa's Explanation of the Sugata Heart|313}}
  
AC - Rangjung Dorje's autocommentary on his Profound Inner Reality
+
*{{i |Appendix I: ''Pawo Tsugla Trengwa's Presentation of Kāyas, Wisdoms, and<br>{{6nbsp}}Enlightened Activity''|325}}
AS - Asiatische Studien
+
*{{i|Appendix II: ''The Treatise on Pointing Out the Tathāgata Heart''|353}}
D - Derge Tibetan Tripiṭaka
+
*{{i|Appendix III: ''The Treatise on the Distinction between Consciousness and<br>{{6nbsp}}Wisdom''|361}}
DSC - Rangjung Dorje's commentary on the Dharmadhātustava
+
*{{i|Appendix IV: ''Outline of NTC''|367}}
J - Johnston's Sanskrit edition of the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā
+
*{{i|Appendix V: ''Outline of NYC''|371}}
JAOS - Journal of the American Oriental Society
+
*{{i|Appendix VI: ''The Change of State of the Eight Consciousnesses into the Four<br>{{6nbsp}}(Five) Wisdoms and the Three (Four) Kāyas''|373}}
JIABS - Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
+
*{{i|Glossary: ''English–Sanskrit–Tibetan''|375}}
JIBS - Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Indogaku Bukkyōgakku Kenkyū)
+
*{{i|Glossary: ''Tibetan–Sanskrit–English''|379}}
JIP - Journal of Indian Philosophy
+
*{{i|Selected Bibliography|383}}
JNS - Mikyö Dorje's commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra
+
*{{i|Endnotes|401}}
LTWA - Library of Tibetan Works and Archives
+
*{{i|Index|475}}
MM - Rangjung Dorje’s Aspiration Prayer of Mahāmudrā
 
NT - Rangjung Dorje's Treatise on Pointing Out the Tathāgata Heart
 
NTC - Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé's commentary on NT
 
NTKD - Kakyab Dorje's commentary on NT
 
NTKY - Göncho Yenla's annotations to NT
 
NY - Rangjung Dorje's Treatise on the Distinction between Consciousness and Wisdom
 
NYC - Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé's commentary on NY
 
NYKD - Kakyab Dorje's commentary on NY
 
OED - Rangjung Dorje's Ornament That Explains the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga
 
P - Peking Tibetan Tripiṭaka
 
PEW - Philosophy East and West
 
T - A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons. Tohoku Imperial University, 1934
 
Taishō - Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō (The Chinese Buddhist Canon). Ed. J. Takakusu, K. Watanabe. Tokyo: Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō Kanko kai, 1970
 
TBRC - The Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center (www.tbrc.org)
 
TOK - Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé's Treasury of Knowledge
 
WZKS - Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens
 
ZDC - Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé's commentary on ZMND
 
ZDKT - Karma Trinlépa's commentary on ZMND
 
ZMND - Rangjung Dorje's Profound Inner Reality
 
ZZB - Trimkang Lotsāwa's commentary on The Profound Inner Reality
 
|BookToc=*{{i |An Aspiration by H.H. the Seventeenth Karmapa, Ogyen Trinley Dorje|8}}
 
*{{i |Foreword by H.H. the Seventeenth Karmapa, Ogyen Trinley Dorje|10}}
 
*{{i |Preface|12}}
 
*{{i | Introduction|15}}
 
*{{i |The Indian Yogācāra Background|15}}
 
*{{i |The Tibetan Tradition on the Five Maitreya Texts|119}}
 
*{{i |The Third Karmapa's View|126}}
 
*{{i |Translations|180}}
 
**{{i |The Autocommmentary on ''The Profound Inner Reality''|181}}
 
**{{i |The Ornament That Explains the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga|241}}
 
**{{i |Four Poems by the Third Karmapa|271}}
 
**{{i |Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé's Commentary on The Treatise on Pointing<br>Out the Tathāgata Heart|288}}
 
**{{i |Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé's Commentary on The Treatise on the<br>Distinction between Consciousness and Wisdom|366}}
 
**{{i |Karma Trinlépa's Explanation of the Sugata Heart|447}}
 
*{{i |Appendix I: Pawo Tsugla Trengwa's Presentation of Kāyas, Wisdoms, and<br>Enlightened Activity|463}}
 
*{{i |Appendix II: The Treatise on Pointing Out the Tathāgata Heart|505}}
 
*{{i |Appendix III: The Treatise on the Distinction between Consciousness and<br>Wisdom|517}}
 
*{{i |Appendix IV: Outline of NTC|527}}
 
*{{i |Appendix V: Outline of NYC|531}}
 
*{{i |Appendix VI: The Change of State of the Eight Consciousnesses into the Four<br>(Five) Wisdoms and the Three (Four) Kāyas|534}}
 
*{{i |Glossary: English–Sanskrit–Tibetan|536}}
 
*{{i |Glossary: Tibetan–Sanskrit–English|542}}
 
*{{i |Bibliography|548}}
 
*{{i |Endnotes|589}}
 
 
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|AddRelatedTab=No
 
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|PostStatus=Needs Copy Editing

Latest revision as of 18:11, 27 October 2020

Book
Book

This superb collection of writings on buddha nature by the Third Karmapa Rangjung Dorje (1284–1339) focuses on the transition from ordinary deluded consciousness to enlightened wisdom, the characteristics of buddhahood, and a buddha’s enlightened activity. Most of these materials have never been translated comprehensively. The Third Karmapa’s unique and well-balanced view synthesizes Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, and the classical teachings on buddha nature. Rangjung Dorje not only shows that these teachings do not contradict each other but also that they supplement each other and share the same essential points in terms of the ultimate nature of mind and all phenomena. His fusion is remarkable because it clearly builds on Indian predecessors and precedes the later often highly charged debates in Tibet about the views of Rangtong ("self-empty") and Shentong ("other-empty"). Although Rangjung Dorje is widely regarded as one of the major proponents of the Tibetan Shentong tradition (some even consider him its founder), this book shows how his views differ from the Shentong tradition as understood by Dölpopa, Tāranātha, and the First Jamgön Kongtrul. The Third Karmapa’s view is more accurately described as one in which the two categories of rangtong and shentong are not regarded as mutually exclusive but are combined in a creative synthesis. For those practicing the sūtrayāna and the vajrayāna in the Kagyü tradition, what these texts describe can be transformed into living experience. (Source: Shambhala Publications)

Citation Brunnhölzl, Karl, trans. Luminous Heart: The Third Karmapa on Consciousness, Wisdom, and Buddha Nature. Nitartha Institute Series. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2009.