Luminous Heart

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For more details on buddhahood as the change of state of the eight consciousnesses to the four wisdoms as well as the descriptions, divisions, and relations of the kāyas (whether presented as two, three, four, or more), see the translations below and appendix 6.
 
For more details on buddhahood as the change of state of the eight consciousnesses to the four wisdoms as well as the descriptions, divisions, and relations of the kāyas (whether presented as two, three, four, or more), see the translations below and appendix 6.
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== Notes ==
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*1  The image here alludes to this river being considered as very holy by Hindus—even its mere sight is said to wash away all one’s negative deeds. (It rises on the summit of Mount Amarakaṇṭaka in Madhya Pradesh in central India, and after a westerly course of about eight hundred miles ends in the Gulf of Cambay below the city of Bharuch.)
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*2  Tib. rang byung rdo rje.
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*3  Tib. 'jam mgon kong sprul blo gros mtha' yas.
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*4  Tib. karma phrin las pa phyogs las rnam rgyal.
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*5  Tib. dpa' bo gtsug lag phreng ba.
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*6  Tib. mi bskyod rdo rje.
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*7  Nguyen 1990, 317 and 336.
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*8  Hall 1986, 18–19.
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*9  The only Yogācāras who could be―and often are―read as asserting such a consciousness are Paramārtha and Dharmapāla.  However, without going into the details here, Paramārtha explains that what he calls "stainless consciousness"  (''amalavijñāna'') is nothing other than the stainless nondual ''dharmadhātu'', or mind's ultimate nature of luminosity,  which is the same as buddha nature. He also says that "mere cognizance" (''vijñaptimātra'') means that both objects  and consciousness do not exist (see below). As evidenced by Dharmapāla's commentaries on Āryadeva's ''Catuḥśataka'' and  ''Śataśāstra'', his position is rather complex and subtle. He indeed says that the other-dependent nature really exists  (in the sense of not being totally nonexistent like the horns of a rabbit), but he adds that it is not itself the ultimate.  Furthermore, he says, "One should be convinced of the voidness of all dharmas"; "The principle of voidness is free from  all characters of dharmas, such as existence, [nonexistence,] etc." (Tillemans 1990, 93); and "Thus all dharmas are  likened to illusions: in them not the slightest substance whatsoever can be found. . . . Thus, dharmas are produced by  causes and conditions; their natures are all void, like an illusion" (ibid., 171). Indeed, though Dharmapāla uses  Yogācāra templates, many passages of his commentary could as well have been written by a Mādhyamika. In general,  he emphasizes the framework of the two realities, with existence and nonexistence pertaining only to seeming reality,  while ultimate reality lies beyond these as well as any other kinds of duality.
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*10  King 1994, 663.
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*11  Lusthaus 2002, 178.
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*12  King 1994, 662.
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*13  Note that, in pre-Christian Greek etymology, ''soter'' means "healer"―which matches well with the frequent description of the Buddha as the great physician for mental afflictions.
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*14  "The invincible" (an epithet of Maitreya).
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*15  Tāranātha 1980, 203.
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*16  King 1994, 670.
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*17  ''Tshad ma'i bstan bcos kyi shing rta'i srol rnams ji ltar 'byung ba'i tshul gtam du bya ba nyin mor byed pa'i snang bas dpyod ldan mtha' dag dga' bar byed pa'' (Śākya mchog ldan 1988a, vol. dza, p. 95).
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*18  ''Sngags la ’jug pa’i mun pa sel bar byed pa’i chos kyi sgron me gzhung tshan bcu bdun pa'' (ibid., vol. pa, p. 230).
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*19  Nguyen 1990, 320..
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*20  In the following, I will not deal with all the many questions of whether the authors listed here were actual historical persons, whether they actually authored these texts, and when exactly they lived. Also, the texts listed include only the typical Yogācāra works by these authors, though many of them also wrote on other Buddhist topics or composed commentaries on several sūtras (such as the prajñāpāramitā sūtras). The main point here is to roughly identify the basic scriptural corpus of Yogācāra treatises, no matter by whom they were composed or when.
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*21  Though this text is primarily a summary of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, as has been pointed out repeatedly by modern scholars, it does so by mapping a number of classical Yogācāra templates onto these sūtras (see my forthcoming translation of the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' and several of its Tibetan commentaries).
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*22  Note that the structure (though not always the contents) of the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' corresponds to the  ''Bodhisattvabhūmi'' in the ''Yogācārabhūmi'' and that its ninth chapter on buddhahood is largely based on the ''Buddhabhūmisūtra''  (verses IX.56–59 and 82–85 are directly from this sūtra). Both Sthiramati's and Asvabhāva's commentaries on the  ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' extensively quote and refer to the ''Buddhabhūmisūtra'' (also Pawo Rinpoché's discussion of buddhahood  in appendix 1 relies primarily on these two texts).
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*23  Certain Western and Japanese scholars attempt to draw a sharp distinction between the Yogācāra tradition and any  scriptures on buddha nature, such as the ''Uttaratantra'', even speaking of different schools. Indeed, the ''Uttaratantra''  is exclusively devoted to, and gives the most detailed presentation of, buddha nature, while not mentioning typical  Yogācāra notions such as the three natures or the eight consciousnesses. On the other hand, there is only one verse  in the other four works attributed to Maitreya (''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.37) that mentions ''tathāgatagarbha'', and  it is absent in most of the works of Asaṅga (except for the ''Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā''), Vasubandhu, and other major  Yogācāras (for the consistent comments of Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, and Asvabhāva on ''tathāgatagarbha'' as suchness or  identitylessness being the same in all phenomena/beings, see below). However, the equivalent notions such as mind's  natural luminosity being obscured only by adventitious stains are rather common themes in Yogācāra texts (for the  related topic of ''agotraka''―"those who lack the disposition"―see below). As Keenan (1982, 15) remarks, "This does not mean  that ''tathāgatagarbha'' is to be reckoned as a defined academic school in contrast to Mādhyamika and Yogācāra. As Takasaki  has pointed out, such an evaluation was a peculiarity of Chinese Buddhism and is not found in either India or Tibet.  This is further borne out by the complete lack of polemic against ''tathāgatagarbha'' teachings in Yogācāra works. . . .  The foregoing textual data seem to suggest that the initial pre-Asaṅgan Yogācāra thinkers represent a theoretical  development from within the same circles that produced the ''tathāgatagarbha'' teachings. They appear to have taken their  initial insights from the notion of the pure mind, as in the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra''" (see its verses IX.37 and  XIII.18–19 below).
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*24  Besides this text, the only other two known Indian "commentaries" on the ''Uttaratantra'' are Vairocanarakṣita's (eleventh century) very brief ''Mahāyānottaratantraṭippaṇī'' (eight folios) and Sajjana's (eleventh/twelfth century) ''Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa'' (a summary in thirty-seven verses).
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*25  The ''Tengyur'' also contains an anonymous commentary on the first chapter of the ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'', called ''Vivṛtagūḍhārthapiṇḍavyākhyā'' (attributed by some to Vasubandhu).
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*26  As for the meaning of the Sanskrit compound ''tathāgatagarbha'', its first part (''tathā'') can be taken as either the adverb "thus" or the noun "thusness/suchness" (as a term for ultimate reality; several texts gloss ''tathāgatagarbha'' as "suchness"). The second part can be read either as ''gata'' ("gone"), or ''āgata'' ("come, arrived”; the Tibetan ''gshegs pa'' can also mean both). However, in the term ''tathāgata'', both meanings more or less come down to the same. Thus, the main difference lies in whether one understands a ''Tathāgata'' as (a) a "Thus-Gone/Thus-Come One" or (b) "One Gone/Come to Thusness," with the former emphasizing the aspect of the path and the latter the result. The final part of the compound—''garbha''— literally and originally means embryo, germ, womb, the interior or middle of anything, any interior chamber or sanctuary  of a temple, calyx (as of a lotus), having in the interior, containing, or being filled with. At some point, the term  also assumed the meaning of "core," "heart," and "pith" (which is also the meaning of its usual Tibetan translation  ''snying po''). Technically speaking, the compound ''tathāgatagarbha'' can be understood as either a ''bahuvrīhi'' or a  ''tatpuruṣa'' compound, meaning "containing a Tathāgata (as core)" or "the core of a Tathāgata," respectively. The first  is the most natural reading and is also supported by numerous passages in the scriptures. As for the term ''sugata'', it  means "one who has fared well," "one who goes well," or "one who lives in bliss." The compound ''sugatagarbha'' is to be  understood in an analogous way as above.
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*27  The ''Tengyur'' attributes the Hastavālanāmaprakaraṇa and its ''Vṛtti'' to Āryadeva, while the Chinese canon has Dignāga as its author. Given the use of typical Yogācāra terms and notions in these texts, the latter seems more likely.
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*28  D4054 (attributed to Jinaputra in the ''Tengyur''). The attribution to Sthiramati stems from the Chinese tradition and is supported by many Western scholars.
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*29  In due order, Taishō 1584, 1593, 1599, 1595, 1589, and 1587.
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*30  Taishō 1666.
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*31  Taishō 1610. The Chinese canon attributes the text to Vasubandhu (which is highly unlikely) and gives Paramārtha as the translator.
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*32  Taishō 1587.
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*33  Further sources of the ''amalavijñāna'' are his ''Shih pa k'ung lun'' (Taishō 1616) and ''San wu-hsing lun'' (Taishō 1617).
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*34  Other Indians involved in transmitting and translating mahāyāna and Yogācāra materials in China include Guṇavarman (367–431), Dharmarakṣa (385–433), Dharmagupta, and Prabhākaramitra (both sixth/seventh century).
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*35  The ''Buddhabhūmyupadeśa'' is only extant in Chinese (Taishō 1530). It is attributed to Bandhuprabha and others, and  translated by Hsüan-tsang. As Keenan 1980 and 2002 points out, about half of the text is identical to Śīlabhadra's  commentary and the other half is almost exclusively added from Hsüan-tsang's ''Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi''. Thus, the text was  obviously compiled in the seventh century, either by Hsüan-tsang himself, or, much more unlikely, by Bandhuprabha in  India, drawing from no-longer-extant Sanskrit materials used in the ''Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi''. Interestingly, the text  contains a passage about mind being self-illuminating that refutes precisely the arguments that ''Bodhicaryāvatāra''  IX.18–19ab adduces against self-illuminating mind. It also explains all four buddha wisdoms (such as mirrorlike wisdom)  to be self-awareness and gives a detailed presentation of the relationships between the four aspects of consciousness  that manifest as the apprehended, the apprehender, the self-awareness of the apprehending of the apprehended, and the  self-awareness of the very act of being self-aware (see Keenan 2002, 86–89).
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*36  See ''The Life of Hsüan-tsang'' (Taishō 2053.244a–246b), translated by Li Yung-hsi, 149–65. Peking: The Chinese Buddhist Association, 1959.
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*37  Both Bu ston rin chen grub 1931, II.133 and Tāranātha 1980, 207 attribute a ''Kāyatrayāvatāra'' to Candragomī.
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*38  The attribution of the ''Durbodhālokā'' commentary on the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' to him is even disputed within the Tibetan tradition.
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*39  As for the developments of Yogācāra after Vasubandhu, there are several ways to distinguish various schools or  lineages. In ''The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy'' (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1947), 83–84,  Junjirō Takakusu identifies three main streams―(1) the line of Dignāga, Agotra, and Dharmapāla at Nālandā; (2)  the line of Guṇamati and Sthiramati at Valabhi; and (3) the line of Nanda, whose tenets were later followed by  Paramārtha. Not much is known of further Yogācāras such as Guṇaśrī, Nanda, Śrīsena, Candrapāla (he is referred to  as an early commentator on the ''Madhyāntavibhāga''), Śuddhacandra, Citrabhānu, and Bandhuśrī (except for Guṇaśrī,  the others and some of their positions are mentioned throughout the ''Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi''). There are also a  number of later commentators on Dharmakīrti's texts, primarily on his ''Pramāṇavārttika'', whose primary focus is,  of course, on valid cognition, but who also sometimes discuss the more specific Yogācāra topics in this context  (these commentators include Dharmottara, Prajñākaragupta, Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi, Yāmāri, Ravigupta, and Jina).  In general, except for most of the works by Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu, the majority of the above texts  (in both the Tibetan and Chinese canons) still remain to be studied in detail.
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*40  Limaye 1992, 69 and D4034, fol. 75b.1ff.
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*41  ''Webster's Third New International Dictionary'' says that "concept" comes from Latin ''conceptus'' (collection,  gathering, fetus) and is "something conceived in the mind : THOUGHT, IDEA, NOTION: as a ''philos'' : a general or abstract  idea : a universal notion: (1) : the resultant of a generalizing mental operation : a generic mental image abstracted  from percepts; ''also'' : a directly intuited object of thought (2) : a theoretical construct . . ." About "conceive,"  ''Webster's'' says, "to take into one's mind . . . to form in the mind . . . evolve mentally . . . IMAGINE, VISUALIZE . . ."  Thus, somewhat differing from "concept," when "conceive" is understood in these latter senses in a very general way,  it comes closer to the above meanings of ''kalpana'' and its related terms.
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*42  In the following translations, depending on the context, I use either "conception" or "imagination" for the above terms.
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*43  When I speak of "classical Yogācāra terms," this refers to these terms being predominantly used by Yogācāra masters, but does not mean that they invented them, since almost all of them are to be found in the sūtras (a notable exception is Vasubandhu's notion of "modulations" of consciousness [''pariṇāma'']).  Even the term "false imagination," which is primarily known from the texts by Maitreya, is already found in early  mahāyāna sūtras such as the ''Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra'' and the ''Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra''.
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*44  Pandeya 1999, 9.13.
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*45  Ibid., 11.30–12.3 (D4032, fol. 135b.1–3).
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*46  Tib. rong ston shes bya kun gzigs.
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*47  ''Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi 'grel pa'i rnam bshad tshig don rab tu gsal ba'', edited by ''David P. Jackson'' and ''S. Onoda'', 1988, fol. 40b.3–5.
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*48  Skt. asatkalpa, Tib. yod min rtog pa. This term is equivalent to "false imagination."
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*49  When used in terms of ultimate reality, ''dharmadhātu''―or just ''dhātu''―is understood in two main ways, which are  reflected by two different Tibetan words that translate the latter term. In its most general way, ''dhātu'' in  ''dharmadhātu'' refers to the ultimate nature of all phenomena—being equivalent to emptiness—which is usually translated  into Tibetan as ''dbyings'' ("open expanse," "space," or "vastness"). If dhātu signifies specifically the nature of the  mind of sentient beings in the sense of buddha nature as the most basic element of their entire being, it is typically  rendered as ''khams'' (lit. "element"). To be sure, these two meanings and their Tibetan renderings are not necessarily  regarded or employed in a mutually exclusive way. Still, generally speaking, they represent the understanding  of (dharma)dhātu in Madhyamaka texts and the texts on buddha nature, respectively. In Yogācāra texts, the term is  used and understood in both ways, depending on the context, but it is always clear that the direct realization of  the ''dharmadhātu'' by nonconceptual wisdom does not just refer to a nonimplicative negation or blank voidness, but to  mind's ultimate nature.
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*50  For more details on the characteristics of nonconceptual wisdom, see also the translation of OED below.
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*51  For "the supreme self that is the lack of self" realized by the buddhas, see ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.23 below.
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*52  Sanskrit in Anacker 1986, 416. For mere cognizance being by definition without a referent, see also verse 27 of the ''Triṃśikā'' below.
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*53  Hall 1986, 13–18.
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*54  D4051, fol. 221a.4–221b.2.
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*55  These four steps are also found in ''Laṅkāvatārasūtra'' X.256–57, ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' XIV.23–28,  ''Dharmadharmatāvibhāga'' (lines 182–185, 264–275), ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' I.6–7ab, as well as in ''Triṃśikākārikā'' 28–30 and  ''Trisvabhāvanirdeśa'' 36–37ab. Śāntarakṣita's autocommentary on his ''Madhyamakālaṃkāra'' (D3885, fol. 79a–b) as well  as Kamalaśīla's ''Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā'' (P5286, fols. 137a–138a) and first ''Bhāvanākrama'' (D3915, fol. 33a–b)  also quote ''Laṅkāvatārasūtra'' X.256–257 and refer to these four stages, commenting on the last one from a Madhyamaka  perspective (see Brunnhölzl 2004, 300–302). See also AC (p. 246) and NYC on NY lines 60–61.
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*56  Limaye 1992, 73.
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*57  III.13 (P5549, fol. 29b.2).
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*58  III.12 (ibid., fol. 29a.3–7; the phrases in “[ ]” are from the commentaries by Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva).
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*59  Pandeya 1999, 23.11ff. (P5534, fols. 35b–36b).
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*60  Lines 264–275. The same is also expressed in lines 182–185, which treat "the four yogic practices."
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*61  This refers to the mastery over a wealth of qualities that result from the change of state of the five skandhas, particularly from the eight consciousnesses becoming the four wisdoms (see below).
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*62  Sthiramati (''Madhyāntavibhāga''ṭīkā, Sanskrit edition by Lévi, p. 43) comments that this is equivalent to supramundane nonconceptual wisdom without subject and object (''anālambyālambakaṃ''). With the propensities of the clinging to apprehender and apprehended being eliminated, mind as such is resting in its own true nature (''svacittadharmatāyāṃ ca cittam eva sthitaṃ bhavati'').
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*63  Ibid., 15ff.
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*64  This term refers to mental factors, such as feeling and discrimination.
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*65  Quoted and translated in Lusthaus 2002, 465 (Taisho 1585.6c; chap.2:4B).
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*66  As translated in Paul 1984, 159–60.
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*67  Ibid., 163–64 and 167. The ''Yogācārabhūmi'', one of the major Yogācāra texts (and definitely the longest one), only mentions the term ''cittamātra'' twice (P5536–8, zi, fols. 70b.2 and 80b.2f), but both times explicitly not as a denial of outer objects (for details, see Schmithausen 1973a, 165–66 and addendum after p. 186). However, given the consistent abhidharmic foundation of this text, this is not as surprising as one may think at first.
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*68  Paul 1984, 166.
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*69  I.9ab.
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*70  Verses 1–2, 5bd, 6ab, and 8ac.
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*71  Note that, unlike the works by Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and so on, the five Maitreya works do not mention the terms ''ālaya''-consciousness and afflicted mind.
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*72  ''Manas'' has a wide semantic range, primarily being one of the many Sanskrit words for "mind" in general, also  meaning "conceptual mind," "thought," and "imagination" (it can also refer to "intellect," "intelligence," "perception,"  "spirit," "opinion," "intention," "inclination," and more). There is a definite lack of proper equivalents for most of  the rich Sanskrit and Tibetan terminologies used for mind and its many facets, but there is also a need for distinctive  terms when going into the subtleties of mapping out mind in Buddhist texts, especially in the context of the eight  consciousnesses. This is why ''manas'' is rendered throughout by the English technical term "mentation" (coming from the  Latin ''mens'' ["mind," "thinking"] and ''mentare'' [to "think"], which are cognate with Skt. ''manas''). The ''Oxford English  Dictionary'' defines “mentation”  as "mental action or a mental state," with the former suggesting mind being in some  kind of operational mode, which is also one of the primary meanings of the Sanskrit and Tibetan terms (its other  meanings referring specifically to the sixth consciousness or the afflicted mind).
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*73  To wit, when just the term ''ālaya'' appears, depending on the context, it can either refer to the ''ālaya''-consciousness or, especially in the tantras, to the fundamental ground of all being, equivalent to the luminous nature of mind or the Tathāgata heart.
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*74  Literally, ''kliṣṭamanas'' means "defiled mind," but here I rather follow the Tibetan (lit. "plagued or plaguing mind"), since it is not just a question of mind being defiled like a dusty but insentient mirror. Rather, as the above process shows, mind experiences mental and physical suffering through such defilement.
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*75  In general, the eight consciousnesses (primary minds) and their accompanying mental factors are said to be always congruent in five respects. They are congruent in terms of (1) the support, in that they depend on the same sense faculty; (2) the focal object, in that they observe the same object; (3) the aspect, in that they have the same apprehended aspect triggered by the object; (4) time, in that they occur at the same time; and (5) substance, in that at any given time, each primary mind is only accompanied by one single kind within each of its accompanying mental factors (for example, one cannot have a pleasant and unpleasant feeling at the same moment).
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*76  I.6 (D4048, fols. 3b.5–4a.1). Mentation being associated with the above four afflictions is also mentioned in Vasubandhu's ''Triṃśikā'' (verse 6) and his ''Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa'' (D4059, fol. 15b.5).
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*77  In general, there are two neutral actions―those that obscure liberation and those that do not (such as walking or sitting).
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*78  D4066, fols. 231b.5 and 232b.2.
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*79  D4067, fol. 25a.2–4. The beginning of chapter 5 of Hsüan-tsang's ''Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi'' (La Vallée Poussin 1928–1948, 289–90) explains that the six collections of consciousnesses all rely on mentation as their immediate condition. However, it is only the sixth one that receives the name of "mentation consciousness"  (''manovijñāna''), because it is named after its specific support―the seventh consciousness or mentation―just as the  five sense consciousnesses, despite also relying on mentation, are named after their specific supports, such as the  eye sense faculty. Or, the mental consciousness is so called, because it depends only on mentation, whereas the other  five depend in addition on their respective material sense factulties. The six consciousnesses are therefore named in  this way because of their supports and in relation to one another―"eye consciousness" up through "mentation  consciousness." This is unlike the case of the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, which are named in accordance  with their natures―mentation (''manas'') by virtue of the activity of egoistic thinking/conceit (''manyanā''), and mind (''citta'') due to "accumulating/variety" (''citra'').
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*80  Note though that the explicit term "immediate mind" seems to be a later Tibetan term―it does not appear in any of the texts by Maitreya, Asaṅga, or Vasubandhu (or any other Yogācāra texts I have consulted). For more details on this specific topic, see the introduction to the Third Karmapa's view below; he further divides "mentation" into the afflicted mind, the immediate mind, and "pure or stainless mentation."
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*81  D4066, fol. 239a.7–239b.3.
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*82  This meditative absorption represents the cessation of all primary minds and mental factors with an unstable continuum (the first six consciousnesses) as well as one of the two consciousnesses with a stable continuum (the afflicted mind with its mental factors, but not the ''ālaya''-consciousness). This absorption is used as the culminating meditative absorption in the process of "ninefold progressive abiding" (which includes various alternating ways of training in entering and rising from the four samādhis of the form realm and the four formless absorptions).
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*83  D4049, fol. 53a.7–b.1.
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*84  Guṇaprabha's ''Pañcaskandhavivaraṇa'' (D4067, fol. 27a.1–2) explains that, during the meditative absorption of cessation and the path of the noble ones, the afflicted mind ceases insofar as its latent tendencies do not manifest. However, once one rises from these states, it rearises from its seeds.
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*85  Note that, as Paul (1984, 139) remarks, "this consciousness is never enumerated specifically as a ninth consciousness, though this is the implication from the assertion that the ''amala-vijñāna'' is separate from all defilement and emerges only after the cessation of the ''ālaya''."
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*86  Taishō 1584, 1616 (esp. pp. 863b20f and 864a28), 1617 (esp. p. 872a1f). Apparently, there are no Indian, but only Chinese scriptural sources for this ninth consciousness, so the Tibetan tradition seems to have obtained its information on it from the latter, including the Chinese commentary on the ''Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra'' (translated into Tibetan as P5517) by the Korean master Wonch'uk (aka Yüan-ts'e; 613–96). According to Hsüan-tsang's ''Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi'' (La Vallée Poussin 1928–1948, 109–11), the notion of ''amalavijñāna'' was originally a teaching of the Vibhajyavādins (more precisely, the Mahāsāṃghika-Ekavyāvahārika-Lokottaravādin-Kaukkuṭikas), who speak about the natural purity of the mind being merely obscured by adventitious stains. Paul (1984, 240–41) points out the following: "The Tunhuang manuscript, ''She ta-sheng lun chang'' {a text on the ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha''}, attributes the following to the WHL {a ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha''-related threefold anthology attributed to Paramārtha}: ‘The characterless and unproduced state is the ''amala[-vijñāna''], the ultimately pure consciousness’ (T.2807.85.1013c20–21). ‘The nature of discrimination (''parikalpita-svabhāva'') is forever nonexistent. The nature of dependence (''paratantra-svabhāva'') also does not exist. As for these two, they have no existence and this is identical to the ''amala-vijñāna''. Thus, it is ultimately the only pure consciousness. Furthermore, it is a foreign tradition that states in the ''Shih-ch'i ti-lun'', “Chapter on the Bodhisattva,” {another text by ''Paramārtha''} that the ''amala-vijñāna'' is explained as the ninth consciousness’ (T.2807.85.1016c19-22)."
 +
*87  As for the last term, most translations that come purely from the Tibetan ''yongs grub'' (instead of the Sanskrit ''pariniṣpanna'') say "thoroughly established nature" or the like. This is usually based on too literal an understanding of the Tibetan (while disregarding its underlying Sanskrit, which simply means "perfect" or "perfected") and on certain Tibetan doxographical hierarchies, which consider this term as an exclusive feature of so-called "Mere Mentalism" with its alleged assertion of some ultimately existing or "thoroughly established" consciousness. However, neither the Sanskrit term nor its understanding by all major Yogācāra masters justify any such wrongly reifying rendering. Also, it seems somewhat misleading to say "perfected nature," since there is nothing to be changed, let alone perfected, in this nature, its whole point being rather to signify primordial perfection and completeness.
 +
*88  A detailed study of all these different models would cover a large volume on its own (for an overview, see Boquist 1993).
 +
*89  II.17 (P5549, fol. 18b.5–8).
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*90  II.28 (ibid., fol. 22a.6–7).
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*91  II.26 (P5549, fol. 21a.5–21b.4). Note that Vasubandhu (P5551, fol. 180b.4–5) comments on the pure object (4) that, if it were the imaginary nature, it would have arisen from the cause of afflicted phenomena; and if it were the other-dependent nature, it would be something that is unreal.
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*92  See also below for Sthiramati's comments on verses 23–24 of Vasubandhu's ''Triṃśikā'' and his equating the other-dependent nature with the ''ālaya''-consciousness, which is eventually eliminated in its fundamental change of state.
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*93  II.27 (ibid., fols. 21b.5–22a.4).
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*94  Nguyen 1990, 84–85.
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*95  II. 132 (verse 198; D107, fol. 172a.5–6).
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*96  P5481, fols. 8b.7–9a.3.
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*97  For example, P5562, fols. 116b.7–117b.7 and 122a.7–123a.1.
 +
*98  Ibid., fol. 123b.2–6 (from D106, fol. 34a.7–34b.3).
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*99  This quote is also found in the ''Abhidharmakośabhāṣya'' (Pradhan ed., p. 468.20–21).
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*100  This is the second from among three ways to understand ''paramārtha'' (for details, see below). In Yogācāra, usually, "mundane" and "supramundane" cognition or wisdom are understood as the perceptive modes during a bodhisattva's subsequent attainment and meditative equipoise, respectively.
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*101  This is ''Samādhirājasūtra'' IX.23.
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*102  P5562, fols. 127b.6–128a.5. That the general characteristic of all phenomena is suchness is explained by both Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva in their commentaries on ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' II.26 (P5551, fol. 180a.6–7 and D4051, fols. 230b.7–231a.1; for details, see below).
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*103  Sanskrit edition by Lévi, p. 41.
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*104  Ibid., 110–11.
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*105  III. 8–9, fols. 28a.5–29a.7.
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*106  'Ju mi pham rgya mtsho c. 1990c, 705–6.
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*107  Limaye 1992, 172.
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*108  Following the words of I.1, Sthiramati does not explicitly state the names of the three natures here, but only speaks about false imagination, duality, and emptiness. However, as his commentary on I.5 (which introduces the three natures by name) makes clear, in due order, these correspond to the other-dependent, imaginary, and perfect natures.
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*109  The topic of the first chapter of the ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' is the characteristics of afflicted and purified phenomena, or false imagination and emptiness.
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*110  Pandeya ed., pp.  9.25–11.30.
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*111  Neither Vasubandhu's nor Sthiramati's commentaries state anywhere that false imagination exists ultimately. They do say several times that both false imagination and emptiness exist, but it is very obvious that this does not refer to the same level of existence.
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*112  Ibid., 19.
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*113  Ibid., 13.16–21.
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*114  Ibid., 36–38.
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*115  Ibid., 46.
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*116  Such statements are not only found in the mahāyāna scriptures, but also in the Pāli canon (from which Vasubandhu most probably quotes), such as ''Aṅguttara Nikāya'' I.10, "O monks, the mind is luminosity, and yet it is afflicted by adventitious afflictions." Also the ''Saṃyutta Nikāya'' (III.151.22–23; 31–32; and 152.8–9) states, "O monks, sentient beings are afflicted because of the afflictions of the mind. Because of the purity of the mind, sentient beings are purified." The Tibetan tradition considers the two lines, "because of mind's natural luminosity" and "because of being afflicted by adventitious afflictions" not as parts of Vasubandhu's commentary, but as two additional lines in ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' I.22.
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*117  The above four models also show that quite different interpretations of the three natures obviously existed already at the time of Sthiramati, and that at least some of them may have been interpreted in more or less reifying ways by certain people.
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*118  P5531, fol. 138b.2–4.
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*119  XIII.18–19.
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*120  Mathes 1996, lines 128–132.
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*121  These four are found in the ''Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇī'' (D142), which says that bodhisattvas have to gradually relinquish all four of these conceptions in order to enter the sphere of nonconceptuality. Rangjung Dorje seemed to consider the ''Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇī'' as important, since he composed a (now lost) synopsis of it and also refers to these four conceptions in his OED and DSC (for details, see there as well as NTC and NYC).
 +
*122  OED, pp. 610–11. For more details, see the translation of the excerpts from OED below.
 +
*123  That means being actual effective causes and results, and not just nominal ones.
 +
*124  JNS, vol. 1, p. 210.
 +
*125  D4049, fol. 100a.7–100b.1.
 +
*126  D4054, fol. 231a.6–231b.2. See also Sthiramati's comments on ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.56 below.
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*127  X.5 (D4048, fol. 38a.4–8).
 +
*128  D4034, fol. 113b.1–2.
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*129  Note that the Yogācāra literature in fact sometimes employs two terms―''āśrayapāravṛtti'' (lit. "change of state into something else") versus ''āṣrayaparivṛtti''―as referring to the former and the latter aspects above, respectively. However, the use of these two terms in the texts is not consistent in this way. Ultimately, both come down to the same, basically indicating two sides of the same process.
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*130  Limaye 1992, 116–17.
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*131  Throughout, the reason for using "familiarization" instead of the―at least in popular western Buddhist literature―more familiar word "meditation" is that, in Buddhism, both the Sanskrit ''bhāvanā'' and the Tibetan ''sgom pa'' mostly mean "familiarizing with," mentally "cultivating," or "enhancing" something, either some certainty gained through prior reflection or a direct insight into true reality. Thus, this process can be either conceptual or nonconceptual. However, it should be noted that the original meaning of "meditation" is just "reflection" (Lat. meditatio, meditare), which is clearly conceptual, while the original meaning of the term "contemplation" (Lat. contemplatio, contemplare) is "viewing" or "looking" at something in a settled state of mind (possibly being either conceptual or nonconceptual). Also, as for compassion and other virtuous mental states, the point is not really to meditate on them as some more or less abstract object or in a conceptual way, but to cultivate and familiarize with them as integral constituents of one's mind. Of course, this is even more obvious in the case of mind's ultimate true nature (of which it is invariably said that it cannot be meditated on anyway, but one can definitely familiarize oneself with it). Likewise, the texts often speak about cultivating or familiarizing with a path, ''śamatha'', or ''vipaśyanā'', and it obviously makes no sense to say "meditating on a path," and even less to say "meditating on ''śamatha'' or ''vipaśyanā''." As for the Sanskrit term bhāvanā, it generally refers to an act of producing, manifesting, or promoting. Specifically, it means imagining, forming in the mind, occupying one's imagination with or directing one's thoughts to something. In this sense, the word can also refer to reflection, meditation, or contemplation (thus, depending on the context and to follow common consensus, I sometimes use "meditation" too). The term can also mean the application of perfumes and the like, or saturating or steeping any powder with fluid. Thus, similar to the process of a scent fully pervading a cloth or the like and actually becoming inseparable from it, "cultivation" or "familarization" in this sense may be seen as "perfuming" the mind stream with liberating insights.
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*132  D4034, fol. 120b.1–121a.1
 +
*133  For more details on "change of state," see the translation of OED below.
 +
*134  Limaye ed. p. 121; D4034, fol. 124a.2–5.
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*135  D4034, fol. 124a.5–124b.2. Vasubandhu's very brief comment on this agrees, saying that, since suchness is the same in all beings and a Tathāgata has the nature of pure suchness, all beings are said to have the Tathāgata heart (Limaye 1992, 122). This conforms to his ''Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya'' (P5551, fol. 180a.6–7) on "natural purity" in ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' II.26 above, which says that, inasmuch as this natural purity exists as suchness, it exists in all sentient beings as their general characteristic. Therefore, it is said that all phenomena (!) are endowed with the Tathāgata heart. Asvabhāva's ''Ṭīkā'' is silent on ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.37, but his ''Mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana'' (D4051, fols. 230b.7–231a.1) on II.26 follows Vasubandhu, saying that natural purity is the actual true nature of ordinary beings, which means that suchness never changes into anything else, and therefore is the general characteristic of all phenomena. Thus, it is said that all sentient beings possess the Tathāgata heart. Later (D4051, fol. 246b.4), Asvabhāva's text comments on bodhisattvas on the first bhūmi attaining an equal mind with regard to all beings (III.11) by saying that they see all beings as equality in the sense of their identitylessness, which is why the scriptures say that all beings have the Tathāgata heart. Also, Bandhuprabha's ''Buddhabhūmyupadeśa'' (Keenan 2002, 48 and 103) says that the teachings on buddha nature refer to the pure dharmadhātu being present in the mind streams of all sentient beings. However, these teachings only refer to those beings who (among the five kinds of disposition) possess the buddha disposition. They were given only as skillful means, referring only to a small part of sentient beings, and in order to guide those of indeterminate disposition to swiftly enter the mahāyāna. Note that most of this is remarkably identical with certain Madhyamaka explanations (particularly the one found in the Tibetan Gelugpa school) of what buddha nature is. Coming from several Yogācāras, this evidences that at least some followers of this tradition did not explain ''tathāgatagarbha'' as the ''Uttaratantra'' and its commentaries do, but simply as "natural purity" in the sense of suchness being the same in all beings. One reason may be that the above commentators, in line with the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra's'' many verses on buddhahood, ''dharmadhātu'', and suchness being free from reference points (such as IX.36 above; for more, see below), did not want to provide any ground for reification on the level of ultimate reality. Another reason may lie in certain Yogācāras explaining that being "one who lacks the disposition" (''agotraka'') means to absolutely never attain nirvāṇa (see below). However, as evidenced in some of the passages quoted earlier, the same masters also refer to mind's luminous nature being obscured only by adventitious stains, and emptiness being both empty and naturally luminous at the time of sentient beings as well as at the time of the noble ones. Also, later in his commentary (D4034, fol. 196a.5–196b.1), Sthiramati states that it is untenable to say that only one among all the innumerable sentient beings who are endowed with the disposition to become a buddha will become a buddha, while the others will not. In fact, everybody who has gathered the two accumulations of merit and wisdom will become a buddha. Interestingly, ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.37 is also quoted in Asaṅga's ''Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā'' (J 71.16–17) in the context of saying that the suchness of the Tathāgatas is the ''tathāgatagarbha'' of sentient beings, which is typically and explicitly equated with the natural purity and luminosity of mind being obscured only by adventitious stains.
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*136  Some people say that the freedom from apprehender and apprehended is less encompassing and profound than twofold identitylessness. However, the freedom from apprehender and apprehended corresponds exactly to twofold identitylessness, since all possible objects and subjects in terms of both persons and phenomena are included in the former as well. Moreover, the relinquishment of obscurations in terms of apprehender and apprehended is also extensively discussed in both the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra''. Technically speaking, in the latter's detailed descriptions of many different levels of progressively more subtle mistaken conceptions about apprehender and apprehended to be relinquished on the paths of preparation, seeing, and familiarization, respectively, these levels comprise all cognitive obscurations, but implicitly include the afflictive obscurations too.
 +
*137  If not noted otherwise, the following comments on the select verses from the ninth chapter of the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' are all excerpts from Sthiramati's commentary (D4034, fols. 106a.6–144b.7), which usually follows, but often greatly elaborates on, Vasubandhu's ''Bhāṣya''.
 +
*138  These consist of seven sets of practices: (1) the four applications of mindfulness (Skt. catuḥ smṛtyupasthāna, Tib. dran pa nye bar bzhag pa bzhi), (2) the four correct exertions (Skt. catvāri samyakprahāṇāni, Tib. yang dag spong ba bzhi), (3) the four limbs of miraculous powers (Skt. catvāra ṛddhipādāḥ, Tib. rdzu 'phrul gyi rkang pa bzhi), (4) the five faculties (Skt. pañcendriyāṇi, Tib. dbang po lnga), (5) the five powers (Skt. pañcabalāni, Tib. stobs lnga), (6) the seven branches of enlightenment (Skt. saptasaṃbodhyaṅgāni, Tib. byang chub kyi yan lag bdun), and (7) the eightfold path of the noble ones (Skt. āryāṣṭāṅgamārga, Tib. 'phags pa'i lam yan lag brgyad). In the mahāyāna, sets (1)–(3) make up the lesser, medium, and greater levels of the path of accumulation; (4)–(5) respectively correspond to the first two (heat and peak) and the second two (poised readiness and supreme dharma) of the four levels of the path of preparation; (6) is equivalent to the path of seeing; and (7) represents the path of familiarization.
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*139  These two kinds of knowing represent the two buddha wisdoms of knowing suchness and variety. Elsewhere (D4034, tsi, fol. 231a.7–231b.2), Sthiramati comments that "omniscience" refers to knowing the imaginary nature, that is, knowing that all phenomena that are imagined as apprehender and apprehended are like horns of a rabbit and lack characteristics. "Knowing all referents without exception" means to know the entire seeming reality―knowable objects such as skandhas, dhātus, āyatanas, contaminated phenomena, and uncontaminated phenomena.
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*140  The Bhāṣya says that the pāramitās and so on are not perfect (''apariniṣpanna'') in the sense of there being any intrinsic being of them.
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*141  Besides "change," ''vṛtti'' in itself has many meanings (such as "operation," "activity," "function," "mode of life or conduct," "nature," "state," "practice," and "mood") which are modulated here by the ten prefixes ''pra-, ud-, a-, ni-, ā-, dvaya-, advaya-, samā-, viśiṣṭā''-, and ''sarvagā''-.
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*142  Note that ''Uttaratantra'' I.27a gives the fact that "buddha wisdom enters into the hosts of beings" as one of the three reasons why all sentient beings are said to have the Tathāgata heart. For a detailed discussion of these three reasons in ''Uttaratantra'' I.27–28, see Brunnhölzl 2007b, n. 280.
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*143  Note that this is similar to "the pāramitā of ultimate self" in ''Uttaratantra'' I.37cd. Also, the use of "self" in the double sense of what is to be relinquished and the ultimate nature of phenomena resembles the use of "nature" (''svabhāva'') in Madhyamaka, which says that phenomena lack any nature and that precisely this is the nature of phenomena.
 +
*144  This corresponds to the above-mentioned threefold change of state as in the ''Abhidharmasamucchaya''.
 +
*145  Vasubandhu's ''Bhāṣya'' does not comment on the last two lines of this verse, while Asvabhāva's ''Ṭīkā'' (D4029, fol. 72b.5–73a.1) agrees in identifying "the wisdom of the real" (''vastujñāna'') as the wisdom of subsequent attainment, and "that" in the last line as the ''dharmadhātu''. However, it says that "the real" (''vastu'') refers to the ''ālaya''-consciousness―the other-dependent nature. Still, this describes the change of state of the impregnations of negative tendencies―when the other-dependent nature has changed state, it becomes the sphere of the wisdom that is attained subsequently to nonconceptual wisdom, but not the sphere of other wisdoms. Nonconceptual wisdom attains mastery over suchness, because it rests in meditative equipoise at will, while the wisdom that is attained subsequently to this meditative equipoise attains mastery over the other-dependent nature in the sense of being unmistaken about it. Sthiramati's comments are literally confirmed by Ngülchu Togmé's commentary on this verse (Dngul chu thogs med 1979, 174–75), which concludes, "Thus, the nature of phenomena is realized through meditative equipoise, and meditative equipoise is realized through subsequent attainment. Since this is uninterrupted, it is the characteristic of inexhaustible mastery." Note that in Asaṅga 2004, 93–94, the translators Jamspal et al. present a greatly abbreviated, but partly mistaken form of Sthiramati's above explanation (misidentifying "the real" as the ''ālaya''-consciousness). Against Sthiramati and Asvabhāva, Jamspal et al. also prefer to follow the Gelugpa scholar dBal Mang, who takes "the wisdom of the real" as referring to the wisdom of meditative equipoise, thus, as Jamspal et al. put it, "tacitly correcting Sthiramati's (or the translator's) equation of ''vastujñāna'' with mundane, aftermath intuition."
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*146  D4034, fols. 74a.3–75b.1.
 +
*147  That even the Madhyamaka understanding of the ultimate is not limited to its being solely an object is shown by Bhāvaviveka's ''Tarkajvālā'' (D3856, fol. 59a.7–59b.2). He explains that, in ''paramārtha, artha'' ("object," "purpose," or "actuality") refers to what is to be understood, realized, or examined. ''Parama'' means "supreme." Thus, (1) since ''paramārtha'' is an object and ultimate (or supreme), it is the ultimate object. (2) Or, it may be read as "the object of the ultimate." Since it is the object of ultimate nonconceptual wisdom, it is the object of the ultimate. (3) Or, it can be understood as "that which is in accordance with the ultimate object." Since the ultimate object exists in the prajñā that is in approximate accordance with the realization of this ultimate object, it is what is in accordance with the ultimate object. In other words, in (1), both ''parama'' and ''artha'' refer only to the object as opposed to the subject that realizes it, (2) means that ''parama'' refers to the subject (wisdom) and ''artha'' to the object (emptiness), and (3) indicates a reasoning consciousness that cognizes ultimate reality not directly but inferentially.
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*148  The Yogācāra system does not present the ''dharmadhātu'' as a fifth wisdom (''dharmadhātu'' wisdom), which has its origin in the Buddhist tantras. Later however, especially in Tibet, listing five wisdoms became the predominant general presentation (see also Pawo Rinpoché's discussion of the ''Buddhabhūmisūtra'' in appendix 1). When the ''dharmadhātu'' wisdom is added, it is usually matched with the svābhāvikakāya. Some explanations (for example, TOK vol. 3, p. 607) also say that ''dharmadhātu'' wisdom is the change of state of the empty aspect of the ''ālaya''-consciousness, while mirrorlike wisdom is the change of state of its lucid aspect.
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*149  P5833, fol. 6a–b.
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*150  D4034, fol. 113b.1–5.
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*151  As mentioned before, verses IX.56–59 are literally found in the ''Buddhabhūmisūtra''.
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*152  Vasubandhu's ''Bhāṣya'' agrees, adding that the dharmakāya's characteristic is the fundamental change of state. The dharmakāya is often referred to as "svābhāvika-dharmatākāya" or "dharmatākaya," with dharmakāya being explained as an abbreviation of these two terms. For example, see ''Mahāyānasaṃgrāhabhāṣya ''on X.1, ''Buddhabhūmyupadeśa'' (Taishō 1530, 325c5–7), ''Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna'' (D3997, fol. 272b.5), Jñānacandra's ''Kāyatrayavṛtti'' (D3891, fol. 8b.2), and Ārya Vimuktisena's ''Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛtti'' (D3787, fol. 192a.7–8).
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*153  Note that the Sanskrit grammatical forms svābhāvikakāya, sāmbhogikakāya, and nairmāṇikakāya (as opposed to svabhāvakāya, sambhogakāya, and nirmāṇakāya) are quite standard (being not only used in the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' and its commentaries, but also throughout the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'', the ''Uttaratantra'', their commentaries, and other texts). These forms indicate these kāyas are related to the dharmakāya as its features and not as three separate entities on their own. Thus, in terms of its nature, the dharmakāya is referred to as svābhāvikakāya (this is why these two are usually said to be equivalent); in terms of its bringing the enjoyment of the mahāyāna dharma to bodhisattvas, it is the sāmbhogikakāya; and in terms of its manifesting in all kinds of forms for all kinds of beings, it is the nairmāṇikakāya.
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*154  Most of these verses as well as the related IX.41–48 are quoted and explained in the translations below.
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*155  Note that Haribhadra's commentaries on the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' say the same.
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*156  Nishio 1982, esp. 59, 84–92, 125–26.
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*157  Literally, Skt. ''pratyavekṣā'' is "looking back" and also means "paying attention," "looking after," or "care."
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*158  On this, compare DSC on ''Dharmadhātustava'' verses 38–45 on Mahāmudrā meditation related to sense perceptions and the mental consciousness (see Brunnhölzl 2007b, 245–51).
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*159  AC, fol. 163b.
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*160  Dpa' bo gtsug lag phreng ba n.d., 764.
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*161  For further details on the Yogācāra system in general as well as the notions of naturally luminous mind and the Tathāgata heart, see the bibliography in general as well as Brunnhölzl 2004, 457–95 and 2007b, 57–109.
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*162  Tib. dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan.
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*163  Tāranātha even wrote two commentaries on the ''Heart Sūtra'' from the perspective of ''shentong''. Tāranātha n.d., vol. 17, pp. 571–759 and 759–83.
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*164  Śākya mchog ldan 1988b, 13–15.
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*165  Tib. ldog pa gzhan sel gyi cha. An "elimination-of-other" is a conceptual phenomenon arrived at through excluding everything it is not.
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*166  The same is said by Karma Trinlépa below.
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*167  Śākya mchog ldan 1988c, 40ff.
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*168  Lit. "proponents of the lack of a nature." This is another term for the Mādhyamikas.
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*169  This accords with Śākya Chogden's repeated statements that the view of ''rangtong'' is the best one for cutting through all reference points, while the view of ''shentong'' is more helpful for describing and facilitating meditative experience and realization.
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*170  Śākya mchog ldan 1975, 225–27.
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*171  'Ju mi pham rgya mtsho c. 1990b, 3–6.
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*172  Skt. ''gotra'' is sometimes still translated as "family" or "lineage" (two of the word's ordinary literal meanings), when it refers to buddha nature. Of course, by virtue of having buddha nature, all beings could be said to ''belong'' to the family or lineage of the buddhas, but one cannot help but wonder what it should mean that buddha nature itself is a "family" or "lineage."
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*173  In Tibet, there have been long-standing and complex debates about the questions of whether the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra''―as well as the ''Madhyāntavibhāga'' and ''Dharmadharmatāvibhāga''―belongs to what Tibetans call "Mere Mentalism" (thus being inferior to Madhyamaka); whether it and the Yogācāra School teach that some beings have no disposition to attain enlightenment at all (and what exactly "disposition" means in this context); and whether they assert three yānas ultimately, and so forth. The Gelugpa School in particular answers these questions in the affirmative and many modern scholars do so too. There is no room here to address these issues in details (such as the complex treatment of ''gotra'' in different Yogācāra texts), but as can be seen from the above, there are Tibetan teachers (as well as some modern scholars) who disagree with the Gelugpa answers. In particular, as for the term "disposition" (''gotra''), it should first be noted that, differing from this term's primary meaning in the ''Uttaratantra'', in the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'', it is not synonymous with buddha nature. Like the ''Laṅkāvatārasūtra'', the text speaks about five categories of ''gotra'' (those of bodhisattvas, pratyekabuddhas, śrāvakas, those with uncertain ''gotra'', and those without ''gotra''). The ''Laṅkāvatārasūtra'' identifies the last category with those who just follow their great desire (''icchantika'') and reject the dharma, thus having eliminated all their roots of virtue and not attaining parinirvāṇa. The ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' follows this very common definition of gotra in general, which is "roots of virtue" (see also Sthiramati's ''Madhyāntavibhāga''ṭīkā, ed. Yamaguchi, 188). The ''Bhāṣyā ''on ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' III.4 explains that gotra is that from which qualities arise and increase. Also the distinction between the naturally abiding (''prakṛtistha'') and the accomplished (''samudānīta'') or unfolding dispositions in this verse differs from how these terms are understood in the ''Uttaratantra'', with the former defined as what has the nature of being a support for further virtue (''prakṛti'' can also mean "cause") and the latter as what is thus supported. On ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' III.9 and III.11, the ''Bhāṣya'' comments that accumulating roots of virtue is indispensable for acquiring a disposition, but once the bodhisattva disposition is acquired, it serves as the source of an infinite number of further roots of virtue. Thus, ''gotra'' in this sense refers to conditioned and multiple phenomena, whereas ''gotra'' in the sense of buddha nature is clearly unconditioned and single. The former sense is also evident from Sthiramati's commentary (D4034, fols. 41b.6–43a.2), which says that beings have infinite ''gotras'', all of which refer to some (conventional) nature of theirs, such as being an angry or passionate person, or liking sweet versus other tastes. Just as the possession of the gotra of desire functions as the cause for giving rise to desire, but not for hatred, the three different gotras of the three yānas are indispensable for there being three yānas. As for ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' III.11, the ''Bhāṣya'' explains that to be without disposition means to possess the property of not attaining parinirvāṇa―either for a certain time (the first four kinds of beings in the verse) or forever (the last one). According to Sthiramati's commentary (D4034, fols. 48a.4–49b.1) this refers to those with the property of not attaining parinirvāṇa (that is, buddhahood) for a certain time and those who have the property of not attaining ''any'' kind of nirvāṇa for a certain time. He says that the first four pertain to those who ''do'' possess the bodhisattva disposition, but, by virtue of certain conditions, will temporarily (for many eons) not attain parinirvāṇa (that is, buddhahood). Among these, "those who are solely devoted to wrongdoing" are engaged in the five negative actions without interval. "Those who have completely destroyed the immaculate dharmas" are those who, under the influence of wrong spiritual teachers, have fallen into the wrong view of nihilism, thus denying karma, the three jewels, and so on. "Those who lack the virtue conducive to liberation" have not gathered the complete accumulations of merit and virtue necessary to attain parinirvāṇa, but only the virtues for higher rebirths as gods and humans within saṃsāra. "Those who have inferior immaculate dharmas" have only gathered a fraction of the merit and wisdom necessary to attain parinirvāṇa. Thus, as long as these four do not fully remove their negative actions and wrong views, and accumulate the complete accumulations of merit and virtue necessary to attain parinirvāṇa, they will not attain this state. As for those who will not attain any nirvāṇā, "lacking the cause" refers to lacking the virtuous roots and the disposition for any of the nirvāṇas of the three yānas, because without such a disposition, they do not attain any of these three nirvāṇas. They do lack the property of attaining nirvāṇa, just as the natures of stones and trees do not turn into something that has the nature of consciousness, such as minds and mental factors. Thus, in the first four cases, Sthiramati says, "lack of disposition" has only a pejorative sense, while "lacking the cause" means utter nonexistence, because they absolutely do not attain nirvāṇa. However, considering the text's (and the commentators') understanding of "disposition" (virtuous roots), its explicit stance that all beings possess ''tathāgatagarbha'' (IX.37), and its statement that mind is natural luminosity, which is merely obscured by adventitious stains (XIII.18–19), being without ''gotra'' (''agotraka''; the text does not use ''icchantika'') forever is not equivalent to saying that some beings have no buddha nature or absolutely can never attain enlightenment. Rather, there are some beings who simply never acquire a "disposition" for any of the yānas in the sense of never acquiring any—or at least a significant—amount of virtue that qualifies as such a disposition. In other words, all beings have the potential for buddhahood, but some just never actualize this potential even remotely, which is exactly why saṃsāra in general is said to be endless. This is basically also what Asaṅga's ''Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā'' on I.40–41 (J 36–37; P5526, fols. 96b.8–97b.6) explains, using the term gotra in both the above way and also for buddha nature. Without ''tathāgatagarbha'', the text says, beings would neither be weary of suffering nor wish and strive for being free of it (nirvāṇa). These are the two functions that the pure buddha disposition exhibits, which dwells even in beings who are fixated on their wrong ways. However, to be aware of the shortcomings of saṃsāric suffering and the advantages of nirvāṇic happiness is not without any cause or condition, but due to the existence of the ''gotra'' of persons with virtuous dharmas. If this kind of ''gotra'' were without any cause or condition and not brought about through terminating wrongdoing, it would also have to exist in those who just follow their great desire, having the ''gotra'' of not passing into parinirvāṇa (''icchantikānām apy aparinirvāṇagotrānām''; clearly, here, ''gotra'' does not refer to buddha nature, but to virtuous roots as above). The ''gotra'' being pure of adventitious stains does not happen as long as one does not aspire for the dharma of one of the three yānas through connecting with the four conditions of relying on a genuine spiritual friend and so on (that is, dwelling in a conducive place, accumulating merit, and making aspiration prayers). The ''Jñānālokālaṃkārasūtra'' says that the light rays of sunlike buddha wisdom touch even those who are fixated on wrongdoing, thus benefiting them and enhancing the arising of future causes for happiness through virtuous dharmas. In other sūtras, we find the statement that those who just follow their great desire possess the property of not attaining parinirvāṇa forever. But this refers to having aversion toward the mahāyāna dharma as being the cause for not attaining parinirvāṇa. Therefore, this statement was made for the sake of turning such people away from their aversion, with the intention of referring to another time (that is, their actually attaining nirvāṇa at some point in the future). By virtue of the existence of the naturally pure ''gotra'', it is impossible for there to be any beings who can never become pure, which is said with the intention that, by virtue of essentially not being different from the Bhagavat, it is possible for all sentient beings to become pure. Sthiramati's ''Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā'' (ed.Yamaguchi, 55.19–56.6) on I.19a ("the emptiness of the primordial nature" among the sixteen emptinesses) juxtaposes the positions on there being three versus a single ''gotra'', but takes all of them to be primordial: "As for [I.19a] 'In order to purify the ''gotra'',' its emptiness is the emptiness of the primordial nature. The reason for this is that, [according to the ''Bhāṣya'',] '' 'gotra'' is the primordial nature.' How so? 'Because of having a nature of its own,' which means to have a nature of its own from beginningless time that is not adventitious. Just as some [phenomena] in beginningless saṃsāra are sentient and some are insentient, here too, some [sets of] the six āyatanas represent the buddhagotra and some the ''śrāvakagotra'' and so on. The ''gotra'' is not accidental, because it has been continuing since beginningless time [up through the present], just as the distinction between what is sentient and insentient. Others say that, since all sentient beings are endowed with the ''tathāgatagotra'', ''gotra'' should be understood here in this way" (depending on how the Sanskrit here is reconstructed, "in this way" could also be read as "as suchness," which would conform to the above-mentioned comments by Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, and Asvabhāva on ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' IX.37). As for the issue of there being only a single yāna, ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' XI.53–54 gives seven reasons for why the Buddha spoke about there being only one yāna. The commentaries by Vasubandhu (Limaye 1992, 199–200), Sthiramati (D4034, fols. 196a.5–199b.2), and Asvabhāva (D4029, fols. 93b.6–95a.2) elaborate on these reasons as (1) the ''dharmadhātu'' not being different in śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas; (2) all those who progress through the yānas up through a buddha equally lacking a self; (3) the state of being liberated from the afflictions being the same in all of them; (4) śrāvakas with uncertain disposition being led into and liberated through the mahāyāna; (5) a buddha's mind of equality toward all beings and the attainment by certain śrāvakas who remember that they have been bodhisattvas before being partially similar; (6) the Buddha having emanated as śrāvakas and attained parinirvāṇa through the śrāvakayāna; and (7) there being nothing more supreme to go to than the buddhahood to be reached through the mahāyāna. With buddhahood having only a single yāna, the respective statements in various sūtras that there is a single yāna should be understood through these seven intentions (''abhiprāya''). However, it is not the case that the three yānas do not exist. The reason why the buddhas teach a single yāna is to attract śrāvakas with uncertain disposition to the mahāyāna and to prevent bodhisattvas with uncertain disposition from falling away from this yāna. Sthiramati says explicitly that those sūtras that speak of a single yāna and three yānas are of expedient and definitive meaning, respectively. ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' X.32 quotes the very same two verses from the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' as the answer to the question, "If this dharmakāya of the buddhas, which is endowed with such excellent qualities, is not in common with śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, with what intention was a single yāna taught?" The commentaries by Vasubandhu (D4050, fol. 187a.1–187b.6) and Asvabhāva (D4051, fol. 292b.6–293b.3) repeat that the teachings on the single yāna entail the above seven intentions (however, Asvabhāva also says that there is a single yāna because, ultimately, the yānas of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are the mahāyāna). Many Tibetan and most Western scholars follow this, holding that the Yogācāras in general, as in the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'', assert the ultimate existence of three yānas. In large part, this is due to the common hermeneutical approach of taking the Sanskrit ''abhiprāya'' (Tib. dgongs pa) by default to mean "intention," and this by default meaning that anything with an intention is necessarily of expedient meaning. However, it is very hard to defend the position that the Yogācāras in general assert three yānas, let alone ultimately, and said hermeneutical approach entails a number of problems too. First of all, there is no text by Maitreya or Asaṅga that says that there are three vehicles ultimately, or that the teachings that there is a single yāna are of expedient meaning or entail some intention. On the contrary, at least as far as the presentations in the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' and the ''Uttaratantra'' go, they are both clearly from the perspective of a single yāna. Among the works of Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, and Asvabhāva, the stance that the single yāna was taught with certain intentions is only found in their above-mentioned commentaries on the same two verses in the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' and the ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha''. Among these commentaries, it is only the one by Sthiramati which says that these teachings are of expedient meaning. However, in several other places in the same commentaries and other texts by these masters, there are passages that suggest only a single yāna, which eventually is entered by all śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha arhats as well. I am not going to provide a new commentary here on verses IX.53–54 of the ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'', but on their own, they could very well be read as giving the reasons for why there in fact is only a single yāna (see also Yamabe 1997, 200–203). In particular, the first reason in XI.53 is literally the same as in ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' I.40ab and verse 21 of Nāgārjuna's ''Niraupamyastava'', which, however, is taken by these texts as the reason for why there in fact is, respectively, only a single gotra or yāna ultimately. In addition, these latter two verses are usually quoted by the very same scholars above as two of the classical scriptural supports for there being only a single gotra and yāna. Also, one cannot but wonder how this reason (1) of the ''dharmadhātu''’s being the same in śrāvakas and all others is supposed to establish the ''ultimate'' existence of three yānas, or how it could serve as a proof for the expediency of the single yāna (if anything, it only proves the opposite). In fact, it would then absurdly follow that these ultimately existing three yānas have three ultimately different fruitions, which could consequently only come from three ultimately different kinds of ''dharmadhātu''. In the same vein, reasons (2)–(3) also speak about a single yāna by virtue of certain features from an ultimate point of view (lack of a self and irreversible liberation from afflictions) being the same for the three yānas, and (7) speaks about a single yāna by virtue of there being no higher destination than the one arrived at through the mahāyāna, so how can there be three different yānas ultimately? In fact, looking at Vasubandhu's above-concluding remarks in his commentary on IX.53, one could easily read them as stating that there is only a single yāna from the perspective of buddhahood, but, relatively speaking, from the perspective of those in the śrāvakayāna and the pratyekabuddhayāna, it is not that their yānas do not exist at all. Padma Karpo's commentary on the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' (''mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi 'grel pa rje btsun byams pa'i gzhal lung'', fol. 107a.4–107b.3) says that Asaṅga and his followers, for the sake of guiding different beings, taught, for those whose dispositions are individually certain, that the yānas are real as different ones and, for those whose dispositions are not certain, that there is a single yāna. Statements such as those in ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' XI.54 and teachings about the single yāna taught in the ''Daśabhūmikasūtra'', the ''Ratnameghasūtras'', and so on being of expedient meaning are given only in order to dispel the fear of certain people, while Asaṅga's ''Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā'' establishes a single yāna. As for the sometimes chameleonlike notion of "intention" (Skt. abhiprāya/saṃdhi, Tib. dgongs pa), in general, as Ngülchu Togmé's commentary on ''Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra'' XII.16–18 (Dngul chu thogs med bzang po dpal 1979, fol. 133b.5–6) points out, "expedient meaning" on the one hand and the two categories of "intention" and "indirect intention" (Tib. ldem dgongs) on the other hand are not coextensive, since ''Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' II.31 states that all teachings of the Buddha (and not just the portions of expedient meaning) have to be understood in terms of the four intentions and also says that the indirect intention of a remedy teaches all the remedies that consist of the eighty-four thousand teachings of the Buddha. Also, as is often pointed out, if everything with an intention is necessarily of expedient meaning, then all Buddhist teachings would be of expedient meaning, because they were all given with certain intentions, including the ones with regard to emptiness. To conclude, the ''Laṅkāvatārasūtra'' (II, vv. 131–32 and 204–5; D107, fols. 127b.2–3 and 173b.7–174a.1) says that even the teachings on a single yāna are just for those of weak insight, but are not the definitive meaning. Rather, in ultimate reality, any presentations of any yānas are obsolete.
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<blockquote>On account of the differences between childish beings,<br>Those of weak insight, and the noble ones,<br>I speak of three yānas,<br>One yāna, and no yāna.<br>This is the door to the ultimate―<br>Freedom from the duality of cognizance.<br>Within the state of nonappearance, how could there be<br>A presentation of three yānas?<br>. . . <br>As long as sentient beings are to be engaged,<br>There is no limit for yānas.<br>But once mind as such fundamentally changes state,<br>There are no yānas and no one to progress.<br>There is no presentation of yānas,<br>But in order to guide childish beings,<br>I explained different yānas,<br>Being taught as a single yāna.</blockquote>
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For further details, see the bibliography, especially Ruegg 1969, 73–86, 97–100, and 185–88; Kunst 1977; Hakamaya 1980; Prasad 1991,1–45; Lopez 1992, 16–70; Yamabe 1997; and D'Amato 2003.
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*174  D107, fol. 292a.
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*175  These are (1) causal features (''nimitta''), (2) names (''nāma''), (3) conception/imagination (''vikalpa/parikalpa''), (4) suchness (''tathatā''), and (5) perfect wisdom (''samyagjñāna''). For more details, see the translation of OED.
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*176  These are the five chapter headings of the ''Madhyāntavibhāga''.
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*177  These are the five chapter headings of the ''Uttaratantra''.
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*178  Pp. 490.2–491.2; 492.1–3; and 494.1–495.2.
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*179  Tib. sangs rgyas mnyan pa bkra shis dpal 'byor. The Sangyé Nyenpas are regarded as incarnations of the Indian paṇḍita Smṛtijñānakīrti (eleventh century), who stayed in Tibet for many years as a teacher and translator, being instrumental in initiating the later spread of the dharma there. According to Krang dbyi sun 1985, 3249 and 3255, the First Sangyé Nyenpa was born in 1457 and his next incarnation appeared in 1520. This fits with the biography of the Eighth Karmapa in Chos kyi 'byung gnas and 'Be lo tshe dbang kun khyab 1972 (vol. 2, 20.7), which says that Dashi Baljor passed away in 1519. However, the latter's biography in Dpa' bo gtsug lag phreng ba 2003, 1200–1206 gives his year of birth as 1445 and says that he passed away at sixty-five. In the table of contents of Chos kyi 'byung gnas and 'Be lo tshe dbang kun khyab 1972, the editors Gyaltsan and Legshay say, "The work in hand gives the dates for this teacher as 1445–1509. These seem not to be in accordance with his relationship with the 7th and 8th Zhwanag Karma-pa." TBRC gives 1145/1457–1510/1525.
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*180  Literally, the Tibetan says ''sems tsam'' ("Mere Mentalism"), which is ever so often used in Tibetan texts to refer to the Yogācāra school in general or a specific part of it. What is meant in this context is clearly the classical Yogācāra system as presented by Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu, and not "Mere Mentalism" in its somewhat pejorative sense as what is refuted, and subordinated to, Madhyamaka in the default Tibetan doxographical hierarchies.
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*181  Mi bskyod rdo rje 1996, 40.
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*182  Kong sprul blo gros mtha' yas 2005b, fol. 6b.5–7a.1.
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*183  What follows is partly based on and confirms the preliminary remarks on Rangjung Dorje's view and his DSC in Brunnhölzl 2007b (see also for a number of different presentations of what ''shentong'' is).
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*184  1308 and 1332 were other Monkey Years, but the first one seems too early, while during the latter one, Rangjung Dorje was on his long journey to, and stay at, the Chinese court and not in Upper Dechen.
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*185  In the ''Blue Annals'' ('Gos lo tsā ba gzhon nu dpal. 1996, 492), Chos kyi 'byung gnas and 'Be lo tshe dbang kun khyab 1972, 210.7, and Tshal pa kun dga' rdo rje 1981, 100, the entry of the year 1326 is followed by a number of events, the last one being the composition of DSC. The next explicit dates are 1328 in the first two texts and 1329 in the latter.
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*186  There is some unclarity here, since both the commentaries by Jamgön Kongtrul and the Fifteenth Karmapa gloss this as the Pig Year of the sixth sixty-year cycle of the Tibetan calendar, which would make it 1335, since this is the only Pig Year within that cycle during Rangjung Dorje's lifetime. However, as this date is contradicted by NY’s being explicitly referred to in AC, 1323 is the only Pig Year before AC's indubitable composition in 1325 and after ZMND's in 1322, which fits well with the overall chronology. Of course, there are still earlier Pig Years in Rangjung Dorje's life (1311 and 1299), but it seems highly unlikely that he composed NY eleven or even twenty-three years (at age fifteen) before ZMND. Also, while NY says itself that it was composed at Upper Dechen in Tsurpu (Central Tibet), all sources agree that, upon his return from the Chinese court, Rangjung Dorje went through Minyag and other areas of Kham in eastern Tibet in 1335, teaching the dharma extensively. Tshal pa kun dga' rdo rje 1981, 103; Dpa' bo gtsug lag phreng ba 2003 (vol. 2, 941); and Chos kyi 'byung gnas and 'Be lo tshe dbang kun khyab 1972 (fol. 111a) all say that he returned to Tsurpu only during the ninth month of that Pig Year (November/December) and then stayed at Chimpu in Samyé during that winter for six months.
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*187  Except for the two texts on the ''Abhisamayālaṃkāra'' and OED, all of these other texts are unfortunately lost. However, there is a commentary preserved on the ''Uttaratantra'' (Rang byung rdo rje 2006a, vol. ja, pp. 126–262) by Tülmo Dashi Öser (Tib. dul mo bkra shis 'od zer; born 1474), a close disciple of the Seventh Karmapa and teacher of the Eighth. This text is basically Rangjung Dorje's own summary of the text with a few added clarifications and also exhibits many of the typical traits of his view as presented below.
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*188  See bibliography.
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*189  The last line in OED's colophon is not only remarkable because of this, but because the term "freedom from extremes" also stands for the view of "the earlier Mādhyamikas" in Tibet (meaning what was understood as the correct Madhyamaka view before Tsongkhapa). This view was proclaimed by masters such as Patsab Lotsāwa and his four main disciples; the Sakya masters Rendawa, Gorampa Sönam Senge, and Dagtsang Lotsāwa; the Eighth Karmapa Mikyö Dorjé; Pawo Rinpoche, and others. Said approach uses Madhyamaka analysis that results in an unqualified negation of all four positions of the typical Madhyamaka tetralemma without asserting anything instead, in order to completely overcome all conceptualizations and reference points. In this way, it is certainly an accurate characterization of the Indian Madhyamaka approach. However, "the later Mādhyamikas"—the Gelugpa school—criticized this view by saying that "lack of real existence" is the correct Madhyamaka view and thus not to be negated. At the same time, there were attempts to discredit "the Madhyamaka of freedom from extremes" through associating it with the notorious stereotype of the Chinese Hvashang Mahāyāna.
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*190  At times, NTC and NYC also pick up this approach. The contemporary eminent Kagyü scholar and meditation master Thrangu Rinpoche says on NT and NY that they combine scholasticism and reasoning within the ''shentong'' approach with the Mahāmudrā tradition of directly familiarizing with the nature of the mind. Thus, in terms of the more theoretical instructions, they present the definitive meaning, and in terms of practice, they correspond to the Mahāmudrā approach to meditation.
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*191  The Eighth Situpa's commentary (Chos kyi 'byung gnas n.d., 24–31) on this verse says that the ground for everything in saṃsāra and nirvāṇa is the purity of mind, that is, the Tathāgata heart. This is the basis of purification but not what is to be purified, since in its own essence, there is nothing whatsover to be purified. Also, mind's nature is the unity of being lucid and empty, since there is no being lucid apart from being empty and no being empty apart from being lucid. Those who explain lucidity and emptiness as two separate things and their union as these two things becoming associated stand outside the teachings of the Tathāgata. In terms of Mahāmudrā, this commentary justifies the Kagyü approach of pointing out instructions with or without tantric empowerment and clarifies that it is in full accord with Madhyamaka. Adventitious stains are identified as the dualistic phenomena of apprehender and apprehended produced by the adventitious mistakenness of mind about itself. The dharmakāya is the manifestation of the fundamental nature of the basis of purification in which all such adventitious dualistic phenomena are relinquished.
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*192  In the translated sections of AC, a few tantras are quoted too, but Rangjung Dorje's predominant reliance on Indian sūtrayāna treatises is remarkable for a text that is a commentary on the tantras, further underlining his stance that the fundamental view of the mahāyāna is the same in the sūtras and the tantras.
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*193  Rang byung rdo rje 2006c.
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*194  DSC, fol. 50b.
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*195  Even in Jamgön Kongtrul's NTC and NYC, the terms "Mere Mentalists" and "Mere Mentalism" do not appear at all (while he constantly uses these terms in his other works), but he too uses "Yogācāra."
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*196  Rang byung rdo rje 2006a, vol. ja, p. 128.
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*197  See Brunnhölzl 2007b, 159–93.
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*198  Tib.chos grags rgya mtsho.
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*199  ZDKT, pp. 396–97.
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*200  Ka rma 'phrin las pa 1975, vol. cha, pp. 90–92.
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*201  The sixty-four qualities are the thirty-two qualities of freedom of the dharmakāya (the ten powers, four fearlessnesses, and eighteen unique qualities of a buddha) and the thirty-two qualities of maturation of the rūpakāyas (the major marks). ZDKT (pp. 46.1–47.3) explains the above further: “Others say, ‘If this Heart had the sixty-four qualities from the very beginning, the qualities of perfect buddhahood would exist in the mind streams of sentient beings, and in that case, does the buddha wisdom in the mind stream of a hell being experience the sufferings of hell?’ Such is indeed said, but it is precisely for this reason that we speak about [wisdom or luminous mind] by making the distinction that it is stained during the phase of sentient beings and stainless in the state of a buddha. In other words, perfect buddhahood and its powers and so on do not exist in the mind streams of sentient beings. This is definitely how it is, but it will be understood through saying again and again, '' 'Stained'' buddhahood and its powers and so on exist [in their mind streams].’”
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*202  These are Kalkin Puṇḍarīka's commentary on the ''Kālacakratantra'', called ''Vimalaprabhā'' (Tib. 'grel chen dri med 'od); Vajragarbha's commentary on the Hevajratantra, called ''Hevajrapiṇḍārthaṭīkā'' (Tib. rdo rje'i snying 'grel); and Vajrapāṇi's commentary on the ''Cakrasaṃvaratantra'', called ''Lakṣābhidānāduddhṛtalaghutantrapiṇḍārthavivaraṇa'' (Tib. phyag rdor stod 'grel). Note that Mipham Rinpoche's ''Lion's Roar Proclaiming Other-Emptiness'' starts by listing the sources of the shentong view as the sūtras of the third turning of the wheel of dharma, which teach the definitive meaning; Maitreya's ''Uttaratantra''; the profound teachings by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu; the commentaries on the definitive meaning by Nāgārjuna, such as his collection of praises; the tantras, such as the ''Kālacakratantra''; and the commentaries on their intention, such as the trilogy of bodhisattva commentaries.
 +
*203  These four lines list the key terms at the beginning of the first chapter of ZMND and AC (see the translations below).
 +
*204  The Tibetan has ''stong byed'', but following the standard pair of "the basis of being empty" (''stong gzhi'') and "what it is empty/to be emptied of" (''stong bya''), this should be the latter.
 +
*205  Tib. gar dbang chos kyi dbang phyug.
 +
*206  Tib. rtogs brjod lta sgom spyod 'bras kyi glu (lines 132–35).
 +
*207  Tib. bdud 'dul rdo rje.
 +
*208  Tib. go nyams lta ba'i glu (lines 73–90). For complete translations of these two songs and more details, see Brunnhölzl 2007a.
 +
*209  Chos grags rgya mtsho 1985, vol. I, pp. 196–97.
 +
*210  Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 516–19.
 +
*211  Dpa' bo gtsug lag phreng ba 2003, 1109.
 +
*212  JNS, vol. 1, pp. 221 and 223.
 +
*213  Ibid., p. 210.
 +
*214  Ibid., pp. 33–34.
 +
*215  Kong sprul blo gros mtha' yas 1982, vol. III, p. 24.
 +
*216  JNS (vol. 2, pp. 297) identifies those who only realize the lack of nature of the apprehended as the Real Aspectarian Mere Mentalists, while the False Aspectarians are said to realize the lack of nature of both apprehender and apprehended. Thus, though there is no explicit division here into Real and False Aspectarians and the latter's doxographical place is not spelled out, the latter thus seem not to be included under the label Mere Mentalists. Also, though Mikyö Dorje does not explicitly call Maitreya and Asaṅga “Mādhyamikas” (or label them "False Aspectarians") here, he seems to suggest below that they (at least de facto) are. JNS explicitly refers to them as Mādhyamikas several times.
 +
*217  "The sevenfold collection" refers to Dharmakīrti's texts on valid cognition (such as the ''Pramāṇavārttika'') and "the sūtra" refers to Dignāga's ''Pramāṇasamucchaya''.
 +
*218  These are the ''Madhyāntavibhāga'', the ''Dharmadharmatāvibhāga'', and the ''Uttaratantra''.
 +
*219  This is quite a remarkable early analysis of Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's approach, since it already outlines the model called "ascending/sliding scales of analysis," with which the contemporary Western scholars Dreyfus and McClintock describe Dharmakīrti's system. I do not at all mean to diminish their merits in conducting excellent and detailed analyses of said approach (in fact, I greatly admire it), but—as the above passage shows—the principle obviously has been recognized before.
 +
*220  Chos grags rgya mtsho 1985, vol. 4, pp. 406–8.
 +
*221  JNS, pp. 22–26.
 +
*222  Ruegg 2000, 80–81.
 +
*223  This refers to the tantras.
 +
*224  As quoted in TOK vol. 2, p. 553.
 +
*225  Audio recording of an oral commentary on the ''Dharmadharmatāvibhāga'' in Samye Ling, Scotland (April 1990).
 +
*226  See my forthcoming translation of the major portions of this text.
 +
*227  ''Dbu ma sogs gzhung spyi'i dka' gnad'' (in 'Ju mi pham rgya mtsho 1990a, vol. 22, p. 450.3) and ''Dam chos dogs sel'' (in 'Ju mi pham rgya mtsho 1992, 521).
 +
*228  JNS, 218 says that what is called "uncontaminated consciousness" is the unconditioned naturally abiding disposition (the very nature of the mind associated with stains), which is definitely the cause for perfect buddhahood and primordially exists in all beings.
 +
*229  In Buddhism, by definition, only conditioned phenomena can be causes since unconditioned phenomena are permanent and cannot perform any active function. Cessation refers to the  absence of a previously existent conditioned phenomenon, but in itself, an absence cannot be a cause for anything (the most famous counterexamples to this pan-Buddhist position are Tsongkhapa and his followers, who hold that cessation is a functional entity that serves as the operational agent that links karmic causes and effects).
 +
*230  ZDC ( p. 29) adds that the immediate mind, once it becomes associated with the immaculate dharmas of the path, is also the cause for a buddha's qualities of freedom. The afflicted mind does not represent valid cognition since it is the root of all saṃsāric mistakenness and of producing all mental states of noncognition, wrong cognition, and doubt.
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*231  Hsüan-tsang's ''Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi'' (La Vallée Poussin 1928–1948, 442) speaks about uncontaminated and contaminated mentation as referring to the minds of bodhisattvas when being engaged in, and rising from, meditative equipoise, respectively, with pure mentation being related to the wisdom of equality.
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*232  As explained above, the sixth consciousness is said to have two functions―the conceptual mind and mental perception, which perceives outer objects just like the five sense consciousnesses.
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*233  ZDKT calls this "the internally oriented aspect" of the mental consciousness as opposed to its externally oriented aspects―mental perception and thoughts.
 +
*234  No early biography of either Rangjung Dorje or Dölpopa records any such meeting. Three considerably later sources by Mangtö Ludrub Gyatso (1523–1596), Tāranātha, and the Eighth Situpa (Chos kyi 'byung gnas and 'Be lo tshe dbang kun khyab 1972, 208.1–2) report a single meeting of the two, saying that the former made a prophesy about the latter coming to realize a particularly sublime view unlike his present one (for details, see Stearns 1999, 47–48). However, there is no mention of Dölpopa being a student of Rangjung Dorje.
 +
*235  I am not attempting to make any judgments as to whose view is better or "higher"―both being undoubtedly highly erudite scholars and realized meditation masters.
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*236  All these terms come from several sūtras on buddha nature, and some are also found in the ''Uttaratantra''. Dölpopa also often qualifies his descriptions, such as by saying that, when making distinctions between what is permanent and impermanent in the context of giving explanations, buddha nature, nondual wisdom, and so on are permanent, enduring etc., whereas all seeming phenomena are impermanent. However, within profound meditative equipoise, all reference points need to be let go of. As for the above terms, given his overall explanations on buddha nature, it seems that Rangjung Dorje wishes to avoid expressions that bear strong absolutist connotations.
 +
*237  Dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan 1998, 128, 430, and 454.
 +
*238  Though Rangjung Dorje never mentions the specific term "''ālaya''-wisdom," one could read certain passages in his texts as implying the above distinction, such as OED (pp. 501.4–502.2) describing "''ālaya''" as a general label for the three natures, while referring to the imaginary and other-dependent natures as "''ālaya''-consciousness." The eight consciousnesses are the obscurations, while the four wisdoms are the stainlessness of these consciousnesses, thus being the perfect nature, with ''dharmadhātu'' wisdom being the matrix of all of these (see also AC, pp. 26ff.). Note, however, that some later Kagyü commentators on Rangjung Dorje's texts use this terminology (such as Tagramba and Jamgön Kongtrul).
 +
*239  Dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan 1998, 97, lines 15–17.
 +
*240  Just as an aside, the fact that JNS refutes this position (which is no doubt still maintained by many Kagyüpas today and is regarded as the epitome of the ''shentong'' view) twice and also negates the claim that the ālaya-consciousness transforms into mirrorlike wisdom (as mentioned above) is quite remarkable (to say the least) for a text that is supposedly written to uphold the ''shentong'' view.
 +
*241  JNS, vol. 1, p. 223 (interestingly and unlike with other opponents, the Eighth Karmapa uses honorific terms when he quotes Dölpopa). What Dölpopa is reported here as saying is a paraphrase of a passage in his ''Mountain Dharma'' (Dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan 1998, 121), which concludes, "If [existence] were to establish being [something], since excrement exists in humans, are humans then excrement or what?" Note that Hopkins (2006, 188), probably due to his Tibetan original reading ''bshad pa'' instead of ''bshang ba'', has "explanations" instead of “excrement,” which, of course, makes the argument much less poignant.
 +
*242  See, for example, DSC, fols. 14a, 16b, 25b–26a; NT lines 89–90 and 94; A Song on the Ālaya.
 +
*243  See his ''Fourth Council'' (Tib. bka' bsdus bzhi pa) in ''Collected Works'', vol. 1. Paro, Bhutan: 1984, 404–5.
 +
*244  For further details, see Schaeffer 1995, 25–36; Stearns 1995 and 1999; Hopkins 2002, 273–315 and 2006, 8–39; Mathes 1998 and 2004; and Burchardi 2007.
 +
*245  Tib. khrims khang lo tsā ba, aka bsod nams rgya mtsho.
 +
*246  Tib. bya bral rin chen bzang po.
 +
*247  Tib. dvags po rab 'byams pa chos rgyal bstan pa.
 +
*248  Tib. ngo khro rab 'byams pa dbang phyug dpal (also known as ngo khro rab 'byams bshes gnyen rnam rgyal).
 +
*249  Tib. dkon mchog yan lag.
 +
*250  Tib. mkha' khyab rdo rje.
 +
*251  The most extensive commentaries among these are those by Tagbo Rabjampa (353 folios) and Ngotro Rabjampa (337 folios). For a complete list of these commentaries on ZMND (including their size and short biographies of their authors), see Rang byung rdo rje 2006a, vol. ka, pp. 22–39.
 +
*252  Tib. chos kyi ‘byung gnas (also known as bstan pa'i nyin byed).
 +
*253  TOK, vol. 1, p. 461; vol. 2, p. 544.
 +
*254  Chos kyi 'byung gnas n.d., 20–22 (trans. Sherab Dorje 1995, 48–49).
 +
*255  Ibid., 24–26, and 30–31 (trans. 52–54 and 59–60).
 +
*256  Ibid., 32–39 (trans. 62–70).
 +
*257  Against common usage in Western translations, as indicated by Peter Roberts, Cyrus Streans, Elizabeth Callahan, and others, the above (and not ''nādī'', ''vāyu'', and ''tilaka'') are the Sanskrit equivalents for the Tibetan ''rtsa rlung thig le'' in the Buddhist tantras and their Indian commentaries. This is also confirmed by the Sanskrit dictionary by Monier-Williams and the Tibetan-Sanskrit dictionary by J. S. Negi.
 +
*258  Ibid., 92 (trans. 127–28).
 +
*259  Thrangu Rinpoche 1990, 2–7.
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*260  Thrangu Rinpoche 2002, 20–51.
 
|BookToc=*{{i |An Aspiration by H.H. the Seventeenth Karmapa, Ogyen Trinley Dorje|8}}
 
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*{{i |Foreword by H.H. the Seventeenth Karmapa, Ogyen Trinley Dorje|10}}
 
*{{i |Foreword by H.H. the Seventeenth Karmapa, Ogyen Trinley Dorje|10}}

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This superb collection of writings on buddha nature by the Third Karmapa Rangjung Dorje (1284–1339) focuses on the transition from ordinary deluded consciousness to enlightened wisdom, the characteristics of buddhahood, and a buddha’s enlightened activity. Most of these materials have never been translated comprehensively. The Third Karmapa’s unique and well-balanced view synthesizes Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, and the classical teachings on buddha nature. Rangjung Dorje not only shows that these teachings do not contradict each other but also that they supplement each other and share the same essential points in terms of the ultimate nature of mind and all phenomena. His fusion is remarkable because it clearly builds on Indian predecessors and precedes the later often highly charged debates in Tibet about the views of Rangtong ("self-empty") and Shentong ("other-empty"). Although Rangjung Dorje is widely regarded as one of the major proponents of the Tibetan Shentong tradition (some even consider him its founder), this book shows how his views differ from the Shentong tradition as understood by Dölpopa, Tāranātha, and the First Jamgön Kongtrul. The Third Karmapa’s view is more accurately described as one in which the two categories of rangtong and shentong are not regarded as mutually exclusive but are combined in a creative synthesis. For those practicing the sūtrayāna and the vajrayāna in the Kagyü tradition, what these texts describe can be transformed into living experience. (Source: Shambhala Publications)

Citation Brunnhölzl, Karl, trans. Luminous Heart: The Third Karmapa on Consciousness, Wisdom, and Buddha Nature. Nitartha Institute Series. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2009.

Yogācāra - Along with Madhyamaka, it was one of the two major philosophical schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Founded by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu around the fourth century CE, many of its central tenets have roots in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and the so-called third turning of the dharma wheel (see tridharmacakrapravartana). Skt. योगाचार Tib. རྣལ་འབྱོར་སྤྱོད་པ་ Ch. 瑜伽行派

Madhyamaka - Along with Yogācāra, it is one of the two major philosophical schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Founded by Nāgārjuna around the second century CE, it is rooted in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras, though its initial exposition was presented in Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Skt. मध्यमक Tib. དབུ་མ་ Ch. 中觀見

sems nyid - Commonly found in Dzogchen and Mahāmudrā literature, this term denotes the true, natural state of mind as it is. Often used in these traditions as a synonym for buddha-nature. Skt. चित्तत्व Tib. སེམས་ཉིད་

rang stong - The state of being empty of self, which references the lack of inherent existence in relative phenomena. Tib. རང་སྟོང་

gzhan stong - The state of being devoid of that which is wholly different rather than being void of its own nature. The term is generally used to refer to the ultimate, or buddha-nature, being empty of other phenomena such as adventitious defiling emotions but not empty of its true nature. Tib. གཞན་སྟོང་

rang stong - The state of being empty of self, which references the lack of inherent existence in relative phenomena. Tib. རང་སྟོང་

gzhan stong - The state of being devoid of that which is wholly different rather than being void of its own nature. The term is generally used to refer to the ultimate, or buddha-nature, being empty of other phenomena such as adventitious defiling emotions but not empty of its true nature. Tib. གཞན་སྟོང་

Vajrayāna - The esoteric Buddhist tradition which developed as a syncretic system involving deity worship, use of mantras, physical energy, and mystical practices. It is also known as the mantra tradition and the tantric school as a result of being based on texts known as tantras. Skt. वज्रयान Tib. རྡོ་རྗེ་ཐེག་པ། Ch. 金剛乘

Kagyu - The Kagyu school traces its origin to the eleventh-century translator Marpa, who studied in India with Nāropa. Marpa's student Milarepa trained Gampopa, who founded the first monastery of the Kagyu order. As many as twelve subtraditions grew out from there, the best known being the Karma Kagyu, the Drikung, and the Drukpa. Tib. བཀའ་བརྒྱུད་

dharmakāya - "Truth body" or "true being" — One of the three bodies of a buddha. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, it often refers to a kind of fundamental principle or the true nature of reality itself. Skt. धर्मकाय Tib. ཆོས་སྐུ་ Ch. 法身

Dzogchen - Dzogchen is an advanced system of meditation techniques to reveal the innate state of perfection primarily, but not exclusively, espoused by the Nyingma Buddhist tradition and the Tibetan Bön tradition. Skt. महासन्धि Tib. རྫོགས་ཆེན།

sūtra - Sūtras mainly refer to the discourses delivered by the Buddha and his disciples, and the Sūtra corpus is one of the three main sets of teachings which form the Buddhist canon. Skt. सूत्र Tib. མདོ། Ch. 佛经

tantra - Tantra, when juxtaposed with Sūtra, generally refers to the scriptures and texts which discuss esoteric topics. While the term is used to refer to texts on other topics, it is mostly used to refer to the genre of scriptures and texts on themes and topics associated with Vajrayāna Buddhism. Skt. तन्त्र Tib. རྒྱུད། Ch. 密宗

ātman - Though it can simply be used as the expression "I" or "me", in Indian thought the notion of self refers to a permanent, unchanging entity, such as that which passes from life to life in the case of people, or the innate essence (svabhāva) of phenomena. Skt. आत्मन् Tib. བདག་ Ch. 我,灵魂

prajñā - One of the key terms for wisdom or knowledge, most often having the sense of insight, transcendent knowledge, or perhaps gnosis. In some contexts it can also refer to cognition or intellectual understanding. Skt. प्रज्ञा Tib. ཤེས་རབ་ Ch. 般若

advaya - Literally, "without duality," it refers to that which is indivisible, in that it is not divided into two. Skt. अद्वय Tib. གཉིས་མེད་ Ch. 不二

dharmadhātu - The fundamental expanse from which all phenomena emerge. Skt. धर्मधातु Tib. ཆོས་དབྱིངས་ Ch. 法界

Cittamātra - Though it is sometimes used synonymously with Yogācāra, it is in fact one of the more prominent philosophical theories associated with this school. It asserts that the objects in the external world with which we interact are actually mentally created representations appearing as those objects. The character of these perceptions is predetermined by our own karmic conditioning that is stored in the ālayavijñāna. Skt. चित्तमात्र Tib. སེམས་ཙམ་

abhidharma - Abhidharma generally refers to the corpus of Buddhist texts which deals with the typological, phenomenological, metaphysical, and epistemological presentation of Buddhist concepts and teachings. The abhidharma teachings present a meta-knowledge of Buddhist sūtras through analytical and systemic schemas and are said to focus on developing wisdom among the three principles of training. The Abhidharma is presented alongside Sūtra and Vinaya as one of the three baskets of the teachings of the Buddha. Skt. अभिधर्म Tib. ཆོས་མངོན་པ། Ch. 阿毗达磨

śūnyatā - The state of being empty of an innate nature due to a lack of independently existing characteristics. Skt. शून्यता Tib. སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་ Ch. 空,空門

niḥsvabhāva - Lacking inherent existence. Skt. निःस्वभाव Tib. ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་པ་

trisvabhāva - According to the Yogācāra school, all phenomena can be divided into three natures or characteristics: the imaginary nature (parikalpitasvabhāva), the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhāva), and the perfect or absolute nature (pariniṣpannasvabhāva). Skt. त्रिस्वभाव Tib. རང་བཞིན་གསུམ་

Prajñāpāramitā - A class of Mahāyāna sūtras which represents some of the earliest known literature of this genre of Buddhism. There are around forty texts associated with this category, though the most widespread is the exceedingly brief Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayasūtra, popularly known as the Heart Sūtra. This class of literature is typically associated with the second turning of the dharma wheel and especially with the teachings on emptiness (śūnyatā). As such, these texts were the primary scriptural source for the philosophy of the Madhyamaka school. Skt. प्रज्ञापारमिता Tib. ཤེར་ཕྱིན་,ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རོལ་ཏུ་ཕྱིན་པ་ Ch. 般若波羅蜜多

Mahāyāna - Mahāyāna, or the Great Vehicle, refers to the system of Buddhist thought and practice which developed around the beginning of Common Era, focusing on the pursuit of the state of full enlightenment of the Buddha through the realization of the wisdom of emptiness and the cultivation of compassion. Skt. महायान Tib. ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོ། Ch. 大乘

śūnyatā - The state of being empty of an innate nature due to a lack of independently existing characteristics. Skt. शून्यता Tib. སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་ Ch. 空,空門

paramārthasatya - "Ultimate truth" or "absolute truth"; the reality of things as they truly are. Skt. परमार्थसत्य Tib. དོན་དམ་བདེན་པ་ Ch. 第一義諦,眞諦

nītārtha - Refers to a teaching that is literally true. Skt. नीतार्थ Tib. ངེས་དོན་

abhidharma - Abhidharma generally refers to the corpus of Buddhist texts which deals with the typological, phenomenological, metaphysical, and epistemological presentation of Buddhist concepts and teachings. The abhidharma teachings present a meta-knowledge of Buddhist sūtras through analytical and systemic schemas and are said to focus on developing wisdom among the three principles of training. The Abhidharma is presented alongside Sūtra and Vinaya as one of the three baskets of the teachings of the Buddha. Skt. अभिधर्म Tib. ཆོས་མངོན་པ། Ch. 阿毗达磨

Mahāyāna - Mahāyāna, or the Great Vehicle, refers to the system of Buddhist thought and practice which developed around the beginning of Common Era, focusing on the pursuit of the state of full enlightenment of the Buddha through the realization of the wisdom of emptiness and the cultivation of compassion. Skt. महायान Tib. ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོ། Ch. 大乘

These are the root verses of the Uttaratantra attributed to Maitreya by the Tibetan tradition.

Uttaratantra - The Ultimate Continuum, or Gyü Lama, is often used as a short title in the Tibetan tradition for the key source text of buddha-nature teachings called the Ratnagotravibhāga of Maitreya/Asaṅga, also known as the Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra. Skt. उत्तरतन्त्र Tib. རྒྱུད་བླ་མ་ Ch. 寶性論

These are the root verses of the Uttaratantra attributed to Maitreya by the Tibetan tradition.

nirmāṇakāya - An fully enlightened Buddha is said to have the power to manifest in many forms in order to help the sentient beings. The emanation body of a buddha, as the third of the three bodies of a buddha, refers to the many forms in which a buddha can manifest and which are accessible to ordinary sentient beings. Buddhist scholars present four types of emanation bodies: emanation as supreme being, emanation as rebirth, emanation as artisan and emanation in diverse forms. Skt. निर्माणकाय Tib. སྤྲུལ་སྐུ། Ch. 化身

tathāgatagarbha - Buddha-nature, literally the "womb/essence of those who have gone (to suchness)." Skt. तथागतगर्भ Tib. དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པའི་སྙིང་པོ་ Ch. 如来藏

Descent into Laṅka Sūtra, a very influential text in East Asia and Nepal.

The Awakening of Faith is a key source text for buddha-nature theory in East Asian Buddhism.

amalavijñāna - The ninth consciousness, the immaculate pure mind. Ch. 啊摩羅識,無垢識

amalavijñāna - The ninth consciousness, the immaculate pure mind. Ch. 啊摩羅識,無垢識

śrāvaka - The disciples of the Buddha who aspire to attain individual liberation or nirvāṇa. The final goal of the Hearers is to become an arhat, a state in which one has totally eliminated the inner problems of attachment, hatred and ignorance, the main causes for rebirth in this cycle of existence. There are four stages of a śrāvaka path including eight phases. Skt. श्रावक Tib. ཉན་ཐོས། Ch. 聲聞

Bodhisattva - A person who seeks enlightenment for the sake of others. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, a Bodhisattva is a compassionate being who is training on the path to Buddhahood and aspires to eliminate the suffering of all beings and take all sentient beings to the state of enlightenment. The Mahāyāna sūtras including those on buddha-nature generally have Bodhisattvas as the main audience or interlocutors for the Buddha's discourses. Skt. बोधिसत्त्व Tib. བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས་དཔའ། Ch. 菩薩

kleśa - Often referred to as poisons, these are a class of disturbing or disruptive emotional states that when aroused negatively affect or taint the mind. Skt. क्लेश Tib. ཉོན་མོངས་ Ch. 煩惱

ātman - Though it can simply be used as the expression "I" or "me", in Indian thought the notion of self refers to a permanent, unchanging entity, such as that which passes from life to life in the case of people, or the innate essence (svabhāva) of phenomena. Skt. आत्मन् Tib. བདག་ Ch. 我,灵魂

parikalpitasvabhāva - The first of the three natures, according to the Yogācāra school. It is the imaginary nature which is falsely projected onto an object out of confusion. Skt. परिकल्पितस्वभाव Tib. ཀུན་བཏགས་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་

paratantrasvabhāva - The second of the three natures, according to the Yogācāra school. It is the dependent nature that is used to describe the relationship between mind and its objects, though there is a clear emphasis on the latter. Hence, this nature is concerned with the nature of seemingly external objects that arise in dependence upon causes and conditions. Skt. परतन्त्रस्वभाव Tib. གཞན་དབང་གི་རང་བཞིན་

advaya - Literally, "without duality," it refers to that which is indivisible, in that it is not divided into two. Skt. अद्वय Tib. གཉིས་མེད་ Ch. 不二

pratipakṣa - An antidote or remedy that contributes or supports the elimination or pacification of a particular ailment or affliction. Skt. प्रतिपक्ष Tib. གཉེན་པོ་ Ch. 對治

bodhicitta - The altruistic thought to seek enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings. It is said to have two aspects: compassion aimed at sentient beings and their problems and the wisdom of enlightenment as the solution. Skt. बोधिचित्त Tib. བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས། Ch. 菩提心

bhūmi - A plateau of spiritual development. Skt. भूमि Tib. ས་

dharmadhātu - The fundamental expanse from which all phenomena emerge. Skt. धर्मधातु Tib. ཆོས་དབྱིངས་ Ch. 法界

Cittamātra - Though it is sometimes used synonymously with Yogācāra, it is in fact one of the more prominent philosophical theories associated with this school. It asserts that the objects in the external world with which we interact are actually mentally created representations appearing as those objects. The character of these perceptions is predetermined by our own karmic conditioning that is stored in the ālayavijñāna. Skt. चित्तमात्र Tib. སེམས་ཙམ་

tathatā - Suchness itself, absolute reality, or thusness, as in the ultimate state of being of phenomena. Skt. तथता Tib. དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད་

bhūmi - A plateau of spiritual development. Skt. भूमि Tib. ས་

lam rim - Lam rim refers to the stages on the path and, by extension, more commonly to the genre of teachings which contain practical instructions for training on the stages of the path to enlightenment. Related to the blo sbyong practice, it is particularly known among the Kadampa and Geluk schools. Tsongkhapa's Byang chub lam rim chen mo is the most well known in this genre and the term lam rim is often used specifically to refer to this text. Skt. मार्गक्रम Tib. ལམ་རིམ།,ལམ་གྱི་རིམ་པ།

ālayavijñāna - A neutral base consciousness that is posited as the storehouse for the seeds of past karmic actions in which they remain in a latent state until the circumstances arise for them to ripen as karmic consequences. Skt. आलयविज्ञान Tib. ཀུན་གཞིའི་རྣམ་ཤེས་ Ch. 藏識,阿賴耶識

neyārtha - Refers to something that is taught for a specific reason, rather than because it is entirely true. Skt. नेयार्थ Tib. དྲང་དོན་

dhātu - A fundamental component or essential constituent. Skt. धातु Tib. ཁམས་ Ch. 界

pariniṣpannasvabhāva - The third of the three natures, according to the Yogācāra school. It is the perfect nature that represents the most authentic understanding of phenomena, which is classically defined as the complete absence of the imaginary nature within the dependent nature. Skt. परिनिष्पन्नस्वभाव Tib. ཡོངས་སུ་གྲུབ་པའི་རང་བཞིན་

svabhāva - The nature or essence of a thing, which originates only from itself and is not dependent on any external entities, causes, or conditions. Skt. स्वभाव Tib. རང་བཞིན་ Ch. 自性

āvaraṇa - Literally, that which obscures or conceals. Often listed as a set of two obscurations (sgrib gnyis): the afflictive emotional obscurations (Skt. kleśāvaraṇa, Tib. nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa) and the cognitive obscurations (Skt. jñeyāvaraṇa, Tib. shes bya'i sgrib pa). By removing the first, one becomes free of suffering, and by removing the second, one becomes omniscient. Skt. आवरण Tib. སྒྲིབ་པ་

tattva - The reality or the objective state of things as they are. In the Buddhist context, it refers to the ultimate nature of things although what exactly suchness means would depend on the philosophical position of the specific schools. The Middle Way school, for instance, consider emptiness as the suchness of all things. Skt. तत्त्व Tib. དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད།

tathatā - Suchness itself, absolute reality, or thusness, as in the ultimate state of being of phenomena. Skt. तथता Tib. དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད་

Cittamātra - Though it is sometimes used synonymously with Yogācāra, it is in fact one of the more prominent philosophical theories associated with this school. It asserts that the objects in the external world with which we interact are actually mentally created representations appearing as those objects. The character of these perceptions is predetermined by our own karmic conditioning that is stored in the ālayavijñāna. Skt. चित्तमात्र Tib. སེམས་ཙམ་

Cittamātra - Though it is sometimes used synonymously with Yogācāra, it is in fact one of the more prominent philosophical theories associated with this school. It asserts that the objects in the external world with which we interact are actually mentally created representations appearing as those objects. The character of these perceptions is predetermined by our own karmic conditioning that is stored in the ālayavijñāna. Skt. चित्तमात्र Tib. སེམས་ཙམ་

Cittamātra - Though it is sometimes used synonymously with Yogācāra, it is in fact one of the more prominent philosophical theories associated with this school. It asserts that the objects in the external world with which we interact are actually mentally created representations appearing as those objects. The character of these perceptions is predetermined by our own karmic conditioning that is stored in the ālayavijñāna. Skt. चित्तमात्र Tib. སེམས་ཙམ་

kun gzhi - Although it is commonly used as an abbreviation of ālayavijñāna (kun gzhi'i rnam shes), in later Tibetan traditions, particularly that of the Kagyu and the Nyingma, it came to denote an ultimate or pure basis of mind, as opposed to the ordinary, deluded consciousness represented by the ālayavijñāna. Alternatively, in the Jonang tradition, this pure version is referred to as ālaya-wisdom (kun gzhi'i ye shes). Skt. आलय Tib. ཀུན་གཞི་

pratītyasamutpāda - The notion that all phenomena arise in dependence on causes and conditions. Skt. प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद Tib. རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་བར་འབྱུང་བ་,རྟེན་འབྲེལ་ Ch. 緣起

avidyā - Literally "unknowing," it refers to a lack of knowledge or misunderstanding of the nature of reality. As such, it is considered to be the root cause of suffering and the basis for the arising of all other negative mental factors. Skt. अविद्या Tib. མ་རིག་པ་ Ch. 無明

ātman - Though it can simply be used as the expression "I" or "me", in Indian thought the notion of self refers to a permanent, unchanging entity, such as that which passes from life to life in the case of people, or the innate essence (svabhāva) of phenomena. Skt. आत्मन् Tib. བདག་ Ch. 我,灵魂

svabhāva - The nature or essence of a thing, which originates only from itself and is not dependent on any external entities, causes, or conditions. Skt. स्वभाव Tib. རང་བཞིན་ Ch. 自性

bīja - A seed, commonly used figuratively in the sense of something which has the potential to develop or grow, and likewise as the basic cause for this development or growth. Skt. बीज Tib. ས་བོན་ Ch. 無漏種

Hīnayāna - The mainstream teachings and the early schools of Buddhism which primarily taught individual liberation through practice-focused renunciation and monasticism, considered lesser than the later movement of the Greater Vehicle (Mahāyāna), which professed enlightenment for all sentient beings and promoted compassion. Skt. हीनयान Tib. ཐེག་དམན། Ch. 小乘

āvaraṇa - Literally, that which obscures or conceals. Often listed as a set of two obscurations (sgrib gnyis): the afflictive emotional obscurations (Skt. kleśāvaraṇa, Tib. nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa) and the cognitive obscurations (Skt. jñeyāvaraṇa, Tib. shes bya'i sgrib pa). By removing the first, one becomes free of suffering, and by removing the second, one becomes omniscient. Skt. आवरण Tib. སྒྲིབ་པ་

pramāṇa - In the Buddhist literature on pramāṇa, it refers to cognition that correctly apprehends its object without any deception or mistake. Such correct cognition include direct perception and inferential cognition. Skt. प्रमान Tib. ཚད་མ། Ch. 量

prabhāsvaratā - In a general sense, that which clears away darkness, though it often appears in Buddhist literature in reference to the mind or its nature. It is a particularly salient feature of Tantric literature, especially in regard to the advanced meditation techniques of the completion-stage yogas. Skt. प्रभास्वर Tib. འོད་གསལ་ Ch. 光明

ātman - Though it can simply be used as the expression "I" or "me", in Indian thought the notion of self refers to a permanent, unchanging entity, such as that which passes from life to life in the case of people, or the innate essence (svabhāva) of phenomena. Skt. आत्मन् Tib. བདག་ Ch. 我,灵魂

āgantukamala - Mental stains that are not inherent to the nature of the mind but are temporarily present as the residue of past actions or habitual tendencies. It is sometimes iterated as adventitious defilements (Skt. āgantukakleśa, Tib. glo bur gyi nyon mongs), which references the fickle and temporary nature of disturbing emotions that lack an ultimately established basis for existence. Skt. आगन्तुकमल Tib. གློ་བུར་གྱི་དྲི་མ་

sūtra - Sūtras mainly refer to the discourses delivered by the Buddha and his disciples, and the Sūtra corpus is one of the three main sets of teachings which form the Buddhist canon. Skt. सूत्र Tib. མདོ། Ch. 佛经

dharmatā - The true nature of phenomenal existence. Skt. धर्मता Tib. ཆོས་ཉིད་ Ch. 法性

śūnyatā - The state of being empty of an innate nature due to a lack of independently existing characteristics. Skt. शून्यता Tib. སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་ Ch. 空,空門

prabhāsvaratā - In a general sense, that which clears away darkness, though it often appears in Buddhist literature in reference to the mind or its nature. It is a particularly salient feature of Tantric literature, especially in regard to the advanced meditation techniques of the completion-stage yogas. Skt. प्रभास्वर Tib. འོད་གསལ་ Ch. 光明

prabhāsvaracitta - The luminous aspect of mind that is often contrasted with its empty aspect. It is often used figuratively to reference the cognizant, or knowing, aspect of mind and sometimes more literally as the natural luminosity of mind and luminous wisdom that is experienced in meditation. Skt. प्रभास्वरचित्त Tib. འོད་གསལ་གྱི་སེམས་ Ch. 光明心

svabhāva - The nature or essence of a thing, which originates only from itself and is not dependent on any external entities, causes, or conditions. Skt. स्वभाव Tib. རང་བཞིན་ Ch. 自性

svasaṃvedana - An important term for the Yogācāra that refers to a consciousness of consciousness itself, or how one knows that they know something. It was a hotly debated topic that was disputed by followers of the Madhyamaka. In Tibet it would later become a common Dzogchen term, though with the entirely different meaning of one's own innate awareness (rig pa), a crucial concept in the Dzogchen teachings. Skt. स्वसंवेदन Tib. རང་རིག་ Ch. 自證分

svasaṃvedana - An important term for the Yogācāra that refers to a consciousness of consciousness itself, or how one knows that they know something. It was a hotly debated topic that was disputed by followers of the Madhyamaka. In Tibet it would later become a common Dzogchen term, though with the entirely different meaning of one's own innate awareness (rig pa), a crucial concept in the Dzogchen teachings. Skt. स्वसंवेदन Tib. རང་རིག་ Ch. 自證分

pāramitā - The six or ten types of practices which lead an individual to Buddhahood. The practice of perfections is particularly important in Mahāyāna Buddhism in which the entire path of the Bodhisattva to reach full enlightenment is included in the six or ten perfections. The six perfections are that of giving, of discipline, patience, zeal, meditation, and wisdom. The perfection of skill-in-means, aspirations, power, and pristine wisdom are added to them to make ten perfections. Skt. पारमिता Tib. ཕར་ཕྱིན།,ཕ་རོལ་ཏུ་ཕྱིན་པ། Ch. 波羅蜜

gotra - Disposition, lineage, or class; an individual's gotra determines the type of enlightenment one is destined to attain. Skt. गोत्र Tib. རིགས་ Ch. 鍾姓,種性

sugatagarbha - Literally, the "essence" or "heart of the Bliss Gone One(s)," a synonym for tathāgatagarbha that is likewise often rendered into English by the term buddha-nature. Though it is often back translated into Sanskrit as sugatagarbha, this term is not found in Sanskrit sources. Skt. सुगतगर्भ Tib. བདེ་གཤེགས་སྙིང་པོ་

Taishō - Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō, Chinese Tripiṭaka

pāramitā - The six or ten types of practices which lead an individual to Buddhahood. The practice of perfections is particularly important in Mahāyāna Buddhism in which the entire path of the Bodhisattva to reach full enlightenment is included in the six or ten perfections. The six perfections are that of giving, of discipline, patience, zeal, meditation, and wisdom. The perfection of skill-in-means, aspirations, power, and pristine wisdom are added to them to make ten perfections. Skt. पारमिता Tib. ཕར་ཕྱིན།,ཕ་རོལ་ཏུ་ཕྱིན་པ། Ch. 波羅蜜

dhātu - A fundamental component or essential constituent. Skt. धातु Tib. ཁམས་ Ch. 界

prasajyapratiṣedha - A negation that merely denies the existence of something without implicitly suggesting an alternative. Skt. प्रसज्यप्रतिषेध Tib. མེད་དགག་

sems nyid - Commonly found in Dzogchen and Mahāmudrā literature, this term denotes the true, natural state of mind as it is. Often used in these traditions as a synonym for buddha-nature. Skt. चित्तत्व Tib. སེམས་ཉིད་

Bodhisattva - A person who seeks enlightenment for the sake of others. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, a Bodhisattva is a compassionate being who is training on the path to Buddhahood and aspires to eliminate the suffering of all beings and take all sentient beings to the state of enlightenment. The Mahāyāna sūtras including those on buddha-nature generally have Bodhisattvas as the main audience or interlocutors for the Buddha's discourses. Skt. बोधिसत्त्व Tib. བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས་དཔའ། Ch. 菩薩

pariniṣpannasvabhāva - The third of the three natures, according to the Yogācāra school. It is the perfect nature that represents the most authentic understanding of phenomena, which is classically defined as the complete absence of the imaginary nature within the dependent nature. Skt. परिनिष्पन्नस्वभाव Tib. ཡོངས་སུ་གྲུབ་པའི་རང་བཞིན་

niṣprapañca - Freedom from conceptual elaborations. Skt. निष्प्रपञ्च Tib. སྤྲོས་བྲལ་

Geluk - The Geluk tradition traces its origin to Tsongkhapa, who propagated a modified version of the Kadampa lojong and lamrim teachings. It is the dominant tradition of Tibet, having established its control of the government under the figure of the Dalai Lama. Tib. དགེ་ལུགས་

advaya - Literally, "without duality," it refers to that which is indivisible, in that it is not divided into two. Skt. अद्वय Tib. གཉིས་མེད་ Ch. 不二

Mahāmudrā - Mahāmudrā refers to an advanced meditation tradition in Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna forms of Into-Tibetan Buddhism that is focused on the realization of the empty and luminous nature of the mind. It also refers to the resultant state of buddhahood attained through such meditation practice. In Tibet, this tradition is particularly associated with the Kagyu school, although all other schools also profess this tradition. The term also appears as part of the four seals, alongside dharmamūdra, samayamudrā, and karmamudrā. Skt. महामुद्रा Tib. ཕྱག་རྒྱ་ཆེན་པོ།

gotra - Disposition, lineage, or class; an individual's gotra determines the type of enlightenment one is destined to attain. Skt. गोत्र Tib. རིགས་ Ch. 鍾姓,種性

icchantika - Literally, "those with great desire," icchantikas could be rendered as hedonists or addicts. However, the term is generally used to refer to those who, due to their insatiable desire, are incapable of enlightenment. Skt. इच्छन्तिक Tib. འདོད་ཆེན་,འདོད་ཆེན་པོ་ Ch. 一闡提

triyāna - Commonly seen in a Mahāyāna context, the three vehicles are the Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna, which reference the three different types of Buddhist practitioners. However, these three vehicles can also reference the three types of Buddhist teachings of the Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna (or Pāramitāyāna), and the Vajrayāna. Skt. त्रियान Tib. ཐེག་པ་གསུམ་ Ch. 三乗

śrāvaka - The disciples of the Buddha who aspire to attain individual liberation or nirvāṇa. The final goal of the Hearers is to become an arhat, a state in which one has totally eliminated the inner problems of attachment, hatred and ignorance, the main causes for rebirth in this cycle of existence. There are four stages of a śrāvaka path including eight phases. Skt. श्रावक Tib. ཉན་ཐོས། Ch. 聲聞

Pratyekabuddha - Pratyekabuddhas are saints who, in their last birth in the cycle of existence, are said to become enlightened through solitary practice on the nature of dependent ordination. These saints are said to appear when there is no buddha around and work either alone or in small groups. Skt. प्रत्येकबुद्ध Tib. རང་སངས་རྒྱས།,རང་རྒྱལ། Ch. 緣覺

Sakya - The Sakya tradition developed in the eleventh century in the Khön family of Tsang, which maintained an imperial-era lineage of Vajrakīla and which adopted a new teaching from India known as Lamdre. Tib. ས་སྐྱ་

gzhi - The foundational basis of both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. It is often used as a synonym for tathāgatagarbha and dharmadhātu. Tib. གཞི་

prakṛtisthagotra - The potential for awakening that is inherently present in all beings. Skt. प्रकृतिस्थगोत्र Tib. རང་བཞིན་གནས་རིགས་ Ch. 本性住種性

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