Secondary Sources
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Latest revision as of 14:40, 19 January 2021
649 Secondary Sources
First, rejecting all existing forms of Buddhism in Japan as unauthentic, he attempted to introduce and establish what he believed to be the genuine Buddhism, based on his own realization which he attained in Sung China under the guidance of the Zen Master Ju-ching (Nyojō, 1163-1228). He called it "the Buddha Dharma directly transmitted from the Buddha and patriarchs." He emphasized zazen"`UNIQ--ref-00000001-QINU`"'(seated meditation) as being "the right entrance to the Buddha Dharma" in the tradition of the Zen schools in China since Bodhidharma, originating from Śākyamuni Buddha. Yet he strictly refused to speak of a "Zen sect," to say nothing of a "Sōtō sect," that he was later credited with founding. For Dōgen was concerned solely with the "right Dharma," and regarded zazen as its "right entrance." "Who has used the name 'Zen sect'? No buddha or patriarch spoke of a 'Zen sect.' You should realize it is a devil that speaks of 'Zen sect.' Those who pronounce a devil's appellation must be confederates of the devil, not children of the Buddha.",'"`UNIQ--ref-00000002-QINU`"'He called himself "the Dharma transmitter Shamon Dōgen who went to China"'"`UNIQ--ref-00000003-QINU`"'with strong conviction that he had attained the authentic Dharma that is directly transmitted from buddha to buddha, and that he should transplant it on Japanese soil. Thus he rejected the idea of mappo"`UNIQ--ref-00000004-QINU`"', i.e., the last or degenerate Dharma, an idea with wide acceptance in the Japanese Buddhism of his day. It may not be too much to say of Dōgen that just as Bodhidharma transmitted the Buddha Dharma to China, he intended to transmit it to Japan.
Secondly, though Dōgen came to a realization of the right Dharma under the guidance of a Chinese Zen master whom he continued to revere throughout his life, the understanding of the right Dharma is unique to Dogen. With religious awakening and penetrating insight, Dōgen grasped the Buddha Dharma in its deepest and most authentic sense. In doing so, he dared to reinterpret the words of former patriarchs, and even the sutras themselves. As a result, his idea of the right Dharma presents one of the purest forms of Mahayana Buddhism, in which the Dharma that was realized in the Buddha's enlightenment reveals itself most profoundly. All of this, it is noteworthy, is rooted in Dōgen's own existential realization, which he attained in himself through long and intense seeking. Based on this idea of the right Dharma, he not only rejected, as stated above, all existing forms of Buddhism in Japan, but also severely criticized certain forms of Indian and Chinese Buddhism, though, it is true, he generally considered Buddhism in these two countries as more authentic than that in Japan.
The third reason Dōgen is unique in the history of Japanese Buddhism, is because of his speculative and philosophical nature. He was a strict practicer of zazen, who earnestly emphasized shikantaza"`UNIQ--ref-00000005-QINU`"', i.e., just sitting. His whole life was spent in rigorous discipline as a monk. He encouraged his disciples to do the same. Yet he was endowed with keen linguistic sensibility and a philosophical mind. His main work, entitled Shōbōgenzō"`UNIQ--ref-00000006-QINU`"', "A Treasury of the Right Dharma Eye," perhaps unsurpassable in its philosophical speculation, is a monumental document in Japanese intellectual history. In Dōgen, we find a rare combination of religious insight and philosophical ability. In this respect, he may be well compared with Thomas Aquinas, born twenty five years after him.
He wrote his main work, Shōbōgenzō, in Japanese, in spite of the fact that leading Japanese Buddhists until then had usually written their major works in Chinese. Dōgen made penetrating speculations and tried to express the world of the Buddha Dharma in his mother tongue by mixing Chinese Buddhist and colloquial terms freely in his composition. The difficult and unique style of his Japanese writing is derived from the fact that, in expressing his own awakening, he never used conventional terminology, but employed a vivid, personal style grounded in his subjective speculations. Even when he used traditional Buddhist phrases, passages, etc., he interpreted them in unusual ways in order to express the Truth as he understood it. In Dōgen, the process of the search for and realization of the Buddha Dharma and the speculation on and expression of that process are uniquely combined.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000007-QINU`"'
In this paper I shall discuss Dōgen's idea of Buddha nature, which may be regarded as a characteristic example of his realization. (Abe, "Dōgen on Buddha Nature", 28–30)
L’ œuvre met l’accent sur la vérité des phénomènes, non pas une simple vacuité, mais une nature omniprésente, permanente, stable, innée, sans début ni fin et parfaitement pure. La réalisation ultime n’est donc pas la disparition des phénomènes, mais l’expérience sans entraves de leur pureté naturelle, en l’absence d’illusion. (Source: Claire Lumière)
Cette continuité sublime est la trame infinie qui forme le tissu de toutes nos expériences. Elle est la toile de fond commune à tous les êtres, qui claque aux vents de l’esprit et bat à la mesure de l’illusion, où se dessinent au gré des actes et des pensées les histoires personnelles. Base des naissances et des morts, de toutes les destinées et de tous les accomplissements, elle est la dimension spirituelle de chacun, la nature de bouddha que rien n’altère, l’espace infiniment ouvert et clair de l’éveil omniprésent. (Source: Claire Lumière)
Notes
- Following Paul Harrison, I employ the term 'buddhology' (written in lower case) to refer to theories on and conceptions of the nature of a "buddha" (i.e., Buddhahood), while reserving 'Buddhology' (capitalized) for an alternative designation for Buddhist Studies. See Harrison 1995, p. 24, n. 4.
- In the present study I differentiate between a buddha (i.e., written in lower case and italicized), a title referring to any unspecified awakened person, and Buddha (i.e., written in roman and capitalized), a title referring to Śākyamuni Buddha or any other particular awakened person. (The same convention has been employed in the case of other titles: for example, bodhisattva versus Bodhisattva.) This differentiation is particularly important for the discussion of buddhology, or conceptions of Buddhahood, since some such conceptions (particularly the earlier ones) are clearly only associated with the person of the historical Buddha, while others, which commonly represent later developments in which a plurality of buddhas is affirmed, concern all awakened persons. To be sure, often there is no clear-cut borderline. In such cases I have employed both forms as alternatives.
- A considerably revised and enlarged version of the thesis is currently under preparation for publication in the near future.
The debate over the role of the Awakening of Faith in the theory and practice of Chinese Buddhism is one of the central ongoing debates among both Chinese Buddhists and scholars of Buddhism in the modern period. To understand this debate, and the views contained within it, it is necessary to contextualize it within the history of modern East Asian Buddhism. The following review focuses both on a critical assessment of the Awakening of Faith’s authenticity, as well as the role Ouyang played in shifting the course of this debate. This disputation was at the heart of Ouyang’s quest for authenticity. The chapter will not be a comprehensive treatment of all the thinkers involved in these debates; I will deal here only with dimensions of the text that became contentious for Ouyang and with the contribution of other participants who carried forward the debate at that time. (Aviv, introduction, 69)
Notes
- The Awakening of Faith exists in two purported “translations.” One is attributed to Paramārtha, T.32.1666.0575a03–0583b17, in 554 ce; the other, later version is attributed to Śikṣānanda, T.32.1667.0583b21–0591c22, in 695–700 ce. While the title includes the term Mahāyāna, and the text is often translated as the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna or according to the Mahāyāna, I take the term Mahāyāna as part of the customary classificatory term in the canon rather than as part of the actual title, as is common with other texts with the same classificatory term and other texts marked with terms such as Abhidharma (阿毘達磨) or the mothers of the Buddha (佛母).
Depuis la publication de Nanjio, l'étude critique du « Tripiṭaka » chinois se poursuit sans cesse et grâce à Sylvain Lévi, Édouard Chavannes, Paul Pelliot, Henri Maspero et d'autres savants nous possédons aujourd'hui une base solide pour l'étude du « Tripiṭaka » chinois, indispensable pour la connaissance de la littérature bouddhique dans tout son ensemble.
Dans le présent travail, je mé propose de dresser un inventaire complet du « Tripitaka » chinois suivant les époques. Bien des traductions antérieures à l'époque des Souei et des T'ang sont perdues. C'est pourquoi j'ai pensé qu'il ne serait pas inutile de rendre compte, non seulement des textes que nous possédons actuellement, mais aussi de ceux qui ne sont pas parvenus jusqu'à nous, car ce n'est qu'ainsi qu'on peut arriver à comprendre l'activité des missionnaires bouddhiques en Chine. Les diverses missions en Asie centrale, ont déjà rapporté des textes que les éditions officielles de Chine et de Corée n'avaient pas conservés Couvreur, mais les index remédieront peut-être aux difficultés qui pourraient éventuellement s'en suivre.
Je ne veux pas laisser paraitre ce travait sans exprimer ma reconnaissance, à mes mattres et à mes amis qui m'ont prêté leur précieuse assistance. Mes relations avec M. et Mme Sylvain Lévi me sont aussi chères que ma vie. Les jours inoubliables que j'ai passés avec eux dans l'université de Santiniketan, dans la vallée du Nepal, en Extrême-Orient et ensuite en France ont été la plus grande joie de ma vie, une inépuisable source de consolation dans des moments douloureux et m'ont encouragé à pousser ce travail jusqu'au bout. Je ne saurais jamais exprimer suffisamment la reconnaissance que je leur dois. Mme Sylvain Lévi m'a aidé inlassablement pour la rédaction définitive de ce travail.
Je tiens également à remercier M. Paul Pelliot dont les avis m'ont été infiment précieux et M. Henri Maspero qui a bien voulu parcourir les épreuves de ce travail et me donner ses utiles conseils.
Je remercie cordialement mes amis Mme Nadine Stchoupak et M. Jules Bloch, dont l'encouragement sympathique m'a été très précieux.
Je ne saurais jamais remercier suffisamment Rabindranath Tagore qui a toujours pris un intérêt personnel de me mettre pour travail et dont la bienveillance m'a permis de me mettre pour la première fois en contact avec mon maître.
J'ai contracté une grande dette de reconnaissance envers S. A. Mahárájá Chandra Shamsher Jung, premier ministre et maréchal du Royaume Gourkha. Depuis mon séjour au Népal avec M. Sylvain Lévi il n'a pas cessé de témoigner l'intérêt le plus bienveillant et le plus généreux pour mon travail.
Sir Atul C. Chatterjee, High Commissioner for India à Londres a bien voulu m'accorder, une subvention qui m'a permis d'achever la publication du présent ouvrage. Je le prie de trouver ici la faible expression de ma profonde reconnaissance.
L'Université de Calcutta m'a généreusement donné les moyens de continuer mes études en Extrême-Orient et en Europe et m'a fait l'honneur d'accepter mes ouvrages au nombre de ses publications.
Avant de terminer je dois exprimer les sentiments de ma reconnaissance à mon camarade d'études M. R. Yamada de l'Université Impériale de Tokyô et M. Song Kouo-tch'ou qui m'ont beaucoup aidé pour ce travail. (Bagchi, foreword, i–iv)
The Dudjom lineage, based on the terma, or hidden treasures, revealed by Dudjom Lingpa and his immediate rebirth, His Holiness Dudjom Rinpoche (1904–1987), late head of the Nyingma school of Buddhism, is one of the principal modern lineages of Dzogchen transmission.
This new paperback edition includes the Tibetan text as edited by H.H. Dudjom Rinpoche and features an expanded glossary that incorporates equivalent English terms of present-day teachers and translators of Dzogchen. (Source: Back Cover)
Rongtön Sheja Künrig (1376-1449) figures among the greatest teachers of the Sakya tradition. Particularly renowned for his commentaries on the Five Treatises of Maitreya, his vast erudition, and extensive teaching career made him one of the most influential masters for the scholastic lineages of all schools of Tibetan Buddhism. This volume contains an annotated translation of Rongtön Chenpo’s commentary on the central chapter of this treatise (including the relevant stanzas of the root text), along with an extensive introduction to the historical development of this doctrine and an analysis of Rongtön’s position. (Source: Vajra Publications)
This doctrine has played an important role in the history of Buddhism. Although rudimentary elements of this doctrine can be identified already within the Pāli canon,[1] those passages relating to the natural luminosity of the mind, which is said to be temporarily stained by adventitious mental afflictions, required the emergence of the Mahāyāna movement before developing into a fully fledged doctrine in its own right. Since it is supported by a number of sūtras[2] and śāstras (i.e. the Buddhist canon composed of the Buddha’s sermons and the Indian commentarial literature), it can be regarded as a third school of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist thought, the other two being Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. However, the concept of buddha-nature reached its apogee not in India but in East Asia and Tibet where it became a cornerstone for Buddhist philosophy and religious practice. In Tibet, in particular, this concept was treated diversely by many scholars, all of whom were ambitious to fit it into the philosophical framework of their own respective schools. Rong-ston Shes-bya kun-rig (1367–1449) of the Sa-skya tradition of Tibetan Buddhism figures among the most influential of these scholars. In general, his commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga, the main Indian śāstra on buddha-nature, and in particular, a translation of his exposition of the subject by means of ten categories, will be the focus of this work.
In the first chapter I will introduce the doctrine of buddha-nature, giving a brief account of its sources and formation. The second chapter will deal with the main treatise on buddha-nature, the Ratnagotravibhāga. Here, I will present the text itself, discuss the question of its authorship, as well as its transmission in India and early reception in Tibet. This chapter will also include a brief overview of previous studies on the Ratnagotravibhāga and the doctrine of buddha-nature. The third chapter will be devoted to the author of our treatise and his presentation of the subject. The final and main part of the work will consist of an annotated translation of a selected passage of his abovementioned commentary.
Throughout this work I have used the transliteration system of Turrell Wylie for the Tibetan. (Bernert, introduction, 5–6 )
Notes
- For example in AN I.v, 9: “This mind, O monks, is luminous! But it is defiled by adventitious defilements.” (After Mathes 2008: ix.) See also Takasaki 1966: 34–35.
- A prevalent doxographical classification of Buddhist sūtras distinguishes between the so called “three turnings of the Dharma-wheel” (a concept introduced in the Sandhinirmocanasūtra). Scriptures of the first turning fundamentally discuss the four noble truths as expounded in Nikāya Buddhism which represents the common ground for all traditions and the basic framework for all Buddhist teachings. Sūtras from second turning emphasise the doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā) as expounded in the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras, and those of the third teach the about the three natures (trisvabhāva), the latter two being classified as belonging to the Mahāyāna corpus. The sūtras on buddha-nature are generally regarded as belonging to the third turning.
- As Seyfort Ruegg (1969: 2) remarks, the language used in the tathāgatagarbha treatises differs noticeably from that of the other two schools, and even comes suspiciously close to that of the Vedānta. Indeed, a number of modern scholars have accused this doctrine to be alien to Buddhist thought, an accusion refuted by others. For a collection of articles on this topic see Hubbard and Swanson 1997.
- Cf. Wylie 1959.
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the multivariant levels of interpretation within selected Caryās. The Caryās selected depict Buddha Nature as it was understood in tāntric Buddhism in the area of Bengal. There are three levels of interpretation. The first level is the blatant meaning, and is outlined in the translation section of the songs. The second level is the anuyoga/Mother tāntra meaning. A comparison is made between the interpretations of selected scholars. The final level is the Mahāmudra meaning. This level is inferred from various textual sources.
Given the disregard many lamas and yogis have had towards the soteriological efficacy of epistemology, one may come to the false conclusion that epistemology is only relevant to the context of debate, without any application to meditation practice and the path to liberation. However, one can clearly see that this is not completely true, since Dharmakīrti (c. 600 CE), who is arguably Buddhism’s most influential epistemologist, provides an account of how a practitioner may attain the liberative cognition known as yogic direct valid means of cognition (rnal ’byor mngon sum tshad ma, hereafter referred to as yogic perception). In Tibet, the dGe lugs pa-s are particularly known for their soteriological use of epistemology, which is unsurprising given their emphasis on scholarship, but there are even thinkers in the meditation- oriented bKa’ brgyud school who have a soteriologically-oriented take on epistemology.
The aim in thesis is to show how bKa’ brgyud epistemologists’ (most notably, the Seventh Karma pa’s (1454-1506)) view on yogic perception differs from that of Dharmakīrti and the dGe lugs pa-s, since most western scholarship on Buddhist epistemology has focused on them. Like Dharmakīrti and the dGe lugs pa-s, the Seventh Karma pa describes the gradual path to attaining yogic perception through inference and familiarization, although there are striking differences in their understandings of the nature of what is observed in this type of perception. His epistemology is not only relevant to the scholarly path of inference, as one finds with most epistemologists, however. His view on reflexive awareness represents a common ground between the theory attached to Mahāmudrā, and pramāṇa, which allows for an epistemological explanation of the Mahāmudrā method of “taking direct perception as the path.” Through showing first, how his view of yogic perception differs from Dharmakīrti and the dGe lugs pa-s,and secondly, how his view concerning reflexive awareness is connected to Mahāmudrā, I wish to show the unique characteristics of the Seventh Karma pa’s brand of soteriological epistemology.
Volume 12
The Nirvana Sutra deals with the teachings given by Śākyamuni shortly before his death (mahāparinirvāṇa). Nirvāṇa means "extinguishing the flames of passion and attaining the state of enlightenment." Since Śākyamuni attained enlightenment at the age of 35, he did in fact already enter nirvāṇa at this time. But because it was considered impossible to completely extinguish the passions while retaining a physical body, Śākyamuni’s death came to be called mahāparinirvāṇa, i.e. "the state of great serenity in which the flames of passion have been completely extinguished." The sūtra gives the teachings expounded by Śākyamuni immediately before his death. As it contains episodes relating to events before and after his death, it also has value as historical source material.
Source
Skt. Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, translated into the Chinese by Dharmakṣema as Da banniepan jing (大般涅槃經). 40 fascicles. (Source: BDK America)
This recognition of our essential human goodness may be the most radical act of healing we can take. “The gold of our true nature can never be tarnished,” says Tara Brach. “In the moments of remembering and trusting this basic goodness of our Being, we open to happiness, peace, and freedom.”
In Trusting the Gold, Tara draws from more than four decades of experience as a meditation teacher and psychologist to share her most valuable practices for reconnecting with the beauty of our humanity―from timeless Buddhist wisdom to techniques adapted to the specific challenges of our modern age. Here you’ll explore three pathways of remembering and living from your full aliveness:
• Opening to the Truth of the present moment
• Turning toward Love in any situation
• Resting in the Freedom of our natural, radiant awareness (Source Accessed Jan 19, 2022)
The present dissertation identifies the ontological presuppositions and the corresponding soteriological-epistemological principles that sustain and define the Mahāyāna Buddhist belief in the inherent potentiality of all animate beings to attain the supreme and perfect enlightenment of Buddhahood. More specifically, the study establishes a coherent metaphysic of Absolute Suchness (Tathatā), synthesizing the variant traditions of the Tathāgata-embryo (Tathāgatagarbha) and the Storehouse Consciousness (Ālayavijñāna).
The dissertation interprets the Buddhist enlightenment as the salvific-transformational moment in which Tathatā "awakens" to itself,
comes to perfect self-realization as the Absolute Suchness of reality, in and through phenomenal human consciousness. It is an interpretation of the Buddhist Path as the spontaneous self-emergence of "embryonic" absolute knowledge as it comes to free itself from the concealments of adventitious defilements, and possess itself in fully self-explicitated self-consciousness as the "Highest Truth" and unconditional nature of all existence; it does so only in the form of omniscient wisdom.
Aside from Ruegg's La Theorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra and Verdu's study of the Ālayavijñāna in Dialectical Aspects in Buddhist Thought, Western scholarship treating of the subject is negligible. And while both sources are excellent technical treatises, they fail to integrate in any detailed analysis the dual concepts as complementary modes of each other. Thus, the dissertation, while adopting the
methodology of textual analysis, has as its emphasis a thematic-interpretive study of its sources. Conducting a detailed analysis into the structure of the texts, the dissertation delineates and appropriates the inherent ontological, soteriological and epistemological foci which they themselves assume as their natural form.
Structurally, the dissertation is divided into three major parts. The first focuses on the Tathāgatagarbha, the second on the Ālayavijñāna, the third on their relation and deeper significance in the human thought tradition. The first two parts are sub-divided into seven and four chapters respectively. The former seven chapters establish the ontological identity of the Tathāgata-embryo (Tathagātagarbha) through a critical examination of the major sūtral authority for the concept, i.e., the Śrī-Mālā-Sūtra, and the primary śāstral elaboration inspired by it, viz., the Ratnagotravlbhāga.
Following the same pattern, the four chapters of part 2 note the role of the Laṅk¯āvatāra Sūtra as a principal scriptural advocate for the theory of the Storehouse Consciousness (Ālayavijñāna), while detailing the scholastic amplification of it in Hsüan Tsang's Ch'eng Wei-Shih Lun. Part 3 concludes the study by recapitulating the principal developments in the emergent complementarity of the two concepts, arguing that any adequate
discussion of the Buddha Nature must be informed on the one hand by the theory of the Tathāgatagarbha which grounds and authenticates its ontological status, and on the other by the Ālayavijñāna, its noetic-cognitive determination. While the former tends to elucidate the
process towards, and experience of enlightenment as a function of Absolute Suchness (Tathatā), the latter adopts the reciprocal perspective and examines the subject in the light and function of phenomenal consciousness.
By way of comparison with Western thought, the chapter likewise demonstrates the analogous dynamic in the bilateral theory of the Tathāgatagarbha-Ālayavijñāna and the Hegelian Absolute Spirit in-and-for-itself. Focusing upon The Phenomenology of Spirit, the chapter notes that the self-becoming process in and through which consciousness realizes its own plenitude is strikingly homologous to the theory of Buddhist enlightenment presented through the concept of the Tathāgatagarbha-Ālayavijñāna. It suggests that these two representative thought systems
mutually illumine each other, and together illustrate a correspondent framework within which the relationship of the Absolute and relative may gain a more universal conception and therefore, a more comprehensive resolution.
The book's contribution to the broader field of the History of Religions rests in its presentation and analysis of the Buddhist Enlightenment as the salvific-transformational moment in which Tathatā 'awakens' to itself, comes to perfect self-realization as the Absolute suchness of reality, in and through phenomenal human consciousness. The book is an interpretation of the Buddhist Path as the spontaneous self-emergence of 'embryonic' absolute knowledge as it comes to free itself from the concealments of adventitious defilements, and possess itself in fully self-explicitated self-consciousness as the 'Highest Truth' and unconditional nature of all existence; it does so only in the form of omniscient wisdom.
(Source: Book jacket inside cover)
The introduction of the book discusses these two topics (fundamental change and nonconceptual wisdom) at length and shows how they are treated in a number of other Buddhist scriptures. The three translated commentaries, by Vasubandhu, the Third Karmapa, Rangjung Dorje, and Gö Lotsāwa, as well as excerpts from all other available commentaries on Maitreya’s text, put it in the larger context of the Indian Yogācāra School and further clarify its main themes. They also show how this text is not a mere scholarly document, but an essential foundation for practicing both the sūtrayāna and the vajrayāna and thus making what it describes a living experience. The book also discusses the remaining four of the five works of Maitreya, their transmission from India to Tibet, and various views about them in the Tibetan tradition. (Source: Shambhala Publications)
The book follows the original Indian sources as well as the standard commentaries on Madhyamaka in the Kagyü School of Tibetan Buddhism. At the same time, these materials are adapted for a contemporary audience, combining the familiar sharpness of Madhyamaka reasonings (launching a massive assault on our cherished belief systems) with exploring the practical relevance of the Madhyamaka way of mind training.
Part One of the book, "The General Presentation of Madhyamaka in the Kagyü Tradition," provides an overview of the transmission of Madhyamaka from India to Tibet and its relation to Vajrayāna and Mahāmudrā, followed by a general presentation of Madhyamaka in terms of ground, path, and fruition. Further chapters are devoted to the Autonomist-Consequentialist distinction, the controversial issue of "Shentong-Madhyamaka," the distinction between expedient and definitive meaning, and a penetrating presentation of the major differences between the Eight Karmapa's and Tsongkhapa's interpretations of Madhyamaka.
Part Two consists of a brief introduction to the Bodhicaryāvatāra and a translation of the Second Pawo Rinpoche's commentary on its ninth chapter (on knowledge).
(Source: book jacket)
Buddha Nature or Tathāgatagarbha is a complex phenomenon that has been the subject of discussion in Buddhist cultures for centuries. This study presents for the first time a survey of the extent of Tibetan commentarial literature based upon the Indian Tathāgatagarbha Śāstra, the Ratnagotravibhāga, as well as a comparison of passages of Tibetan interpretations upon The Three Reasons given for the presence of Tathāgatagarbha in the Ratnagotravibhāga. Furthermore, attention is drawn to the inconsistencies regarding the dating, authorship, structure and content of this source text within the Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan traditions.
Thereby the present study addresses primarily the need for an overview of the Tibetan commentarial literature upon this important Śāstra, by surveying more than forty Tibetan commentaries. This survey will facilitate contextualization of future studies of the individual commentaries. Secondarily it addresses the need for documentation and interpretation of precise concepts and arguments, by presenting line for line comparison of passages of interpretations by four different authors, Rngog Blo ldan shes rab (1059-1109), Dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan (1292-1361), Rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen (1364-1432) and Mi pham phyogs las rnam rgyal (1846-1912). This comparison will trace divergent traditions of Tathāgatagarbha interpretation based on the Ratnagotravibhāga in Tibet.
It becomes apparent that the main divergence in these four authors' Tathāgatagarbha exegesis hinges on their interpretation of Dharmakāya and the role it plays as the first supporting reason for the presence of Tathāgatagarbha. Where some interpret Tathāgatagarbha as being "empty", others maintain that it is "full of qualities", apparent contradictions that however, are based upon the same scriptural passages of the source text, the Ratnagotravibhāga. That the ambiguous nature of the source text accommodates such seemingly contradictory interpretations should be kept in mind when studying Tibetan interpretations so as to avoid dismissal of certain interpretations in favour of others.
The aim of the present study is to provide a structural framework for accessing Tibetan Tathāgatagarbha interpretations based on the Ratnagotravibhāga that surveys their extent and documents their nature. The study may thus contribute to a broader understanding of Tibetan literature in general and of Buddha Nature interpretation in particular.
The Buddha’s statement “all that is conditioned'"`UNIQ--ref-00003ED5-QINU`"' is impermanent!”'"`UNIQ--ref-00003ED6-QINU`"' is known as one of The “Four Seals,” the cornerstone of all Buddhist traditions. In Buddhist logic this seal became the basis for the equation: “Whatever is conditioned is impermanent and whatever is impermanent is conditioned. Whatever is not conditioned is not impermanent and whatever is not impermanent is not conditioned.”
In Buddhism, the doctrine of the impermanence of conditioned entities is interwoven with the doctrine of causality. The fact that an entity is conditioned by previous causes and moments makes it subject to impermanence. The doctrine of impermanence was further refined into the doctrine of momentariness. This doctrine postulates a process of momentary arising and cessation on the micro level that happens so fast that it is perceived as a continuity.'"`UNIQ--ref-00003ED7-QINU`"'
The following presentation will highlight different definitions and classifications of what the terms conditioned and impermanent might mean for a number of selected Tibetan Buddhist masters in their interpretations of the true nature of the mind. Their literary works are invariably based, directly or indirectly, upon Indian Buddhist śāstras translated into Tibetan.
The point of the exploration in general is to facilitate access to the insights of Tibetan Buddhist masters as they are formulated within the framework of a philosophical discussion. A characteristic feature of their statements is that they are not based on intellectual speculation, but on meditative experience.
Here, we will be concerned mainly with the interpretation of statements pertaining to this issue in two Indian śāstras, the Ratnagotravibhāga and the Madhyāntavibhāga, both attributed to Maitreya. However, as we will see, some of our Tibetan authors also draw on Indian works on Buddhist logic, epistemology, and ontology such as Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika, Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa, and Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya. The latter texts were studied in the monastic colleges of Tibet in the form of simplified manuals that constitute their own literary genre known as “Collected Topics” (Bsdus grwa) and “Classifications of Mind” (blo rigs).'"`UNIQ--ref-00003ED8-QINU`"'
In Buddhism, a mind conditioned by “actions” (karmasaṃkleśa) and “defilements” (kleśasaṃkleśa) is by definition a changeable mind—or one could even say—an unstable mind. As different mental factors make their appearance in our minds, our mental states change. Over the course of a day, an ordinary mind experiences many different mental states or factors caused by various defilements. But what should we think about the ultimate nature of the mind?
The mind or mental state in which the ultimate nature of mind is experienced, is considered the goal of the Buddhist path. It is called the enlightened mind, the true nature that is revealed when kleśa (“defilements”) and karma have subsided. This observation leaves us with two fundamental questions: Is this ultimate nature also described as conditioned and impermanent? Second, if this is the case, why is ultimate nature described in such a way? I will return to these questions below.
In order to introduce the selected Tibetan authors and their works, it may be helpful to reiterate that the so-called “Empty in itself'"`UNIQ--ref-00003ED9-QINU`"'-Empty of other”'"`UNIQ--ref-00003EDA-QINU`"' distinction that arose in Tibet is based on different interpretations of the nature of the mind or the so called “buddha-nature.” These interpretations stem from different readings of the seminal text for the presentation of the buddha-nature, the Ratnagotravibhāga (hereafter abbreviated as RGV). The Buddha nature teachings are traditionally associated with the so-called third turning of the wheel of the Dharma, which the “Empty of other” proponents as well as other thinkers assert to be the highest level of the Buddhist teachings, following the division of the Buddha’s teachings provided in the seventh chapter of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra into three stages or wheels of doctrine, the first two being classified as provisional and the third and final stage as definitive.'"`UNIQ--ref-00003EDB-QINU`"'
In the RGV the nature of the mind is described in a way that lends itself to various interpretations. More than fifty commentaries'"`UNIQ--ref-00003EDC-QINU`"' were written in Tibet based on this śāstra. Some were composed by authors classified as proponents of the “Empty in itself” philosophy and others by proponents of the “Empty of other” philosophy. The latter were often accused of interpreting the RGV’s statements too literally, taking the true nature of the mind to be a truly existent entity which was anathema to the Madhyamaka teachings based on the so-called second turning of the wheel of the Dharma. There was also the question of the qualities attributed to buddha-nature. If it contains qualities (as the RGV says it does) how can it be empty at the same time? The ontological status of the nature of the mind vis-à-vis the nature of emptiness is a central topic much discussed in the Tibetan tradition.
In this article, I will focus on explanations by selected authors, some of which have been classified as proponents of the “empty of other” philosophy. It is by now generally accepted that their works have been underrepresented, if not misrepresented, within the Tibetan scholastic tradition, partly as a consequence of the political persecution of the Jonang school. (Burchardi, "How Can a Momentary and Conditioned Mind Be Integral to Gzhan Stong?, 55–57)
The seventh Karma pa also influenced the great Sa skya scholar Shākya mchog Idan's later writings. While the seventh Karma pa is remembered as one of the most outstanding masters of the lineage and the founder of the Karma bka' brgyud bshad grwa at Mtshur phu, Shākya mchog Idan is described as "the most influential advocate of the gzhan stong in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries."'"`UNIQ--ref-00000BF9-QINU`"' Both masters are, in their own ways, still sources of the continued presence of an influential type of modified gzhan stong in the Bka' brgyud tradition,'"`UNIQ--ref-00000BFA-QINU`"' distinct from Dol po pa's position.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000BFB-QINU`"' The seventh Karma pa's Rigs gzhung rgya mtsho was studied at all the bshad grwas of the Karma Bka' brgyud tradition, with special emphasis on the first and the third part of the text,'"`UNIQ--ref-00000BFC-QINU`"' while Shākya mchog ldan's writings have played an important role in the 'Brug pa Bka' rgyud bshad grwa tradition of Bhutan.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000BFD-QINU`"'
The second part will demonstrate the immense value of the preservation of these texts by giving an example of Śākya mchog ldan's writings, in the form of an English translation of his Rgyud bla ma'i rnam bshad sngon med nyi ma,[1] a commentary on The Rgyud Blama- also known as The Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra- in which he outlines his hermeneutical schema for understanding the Buddha nature.
The third part will list the titles contained in Śākya mchog ldan's Collected Works reproduced and published in Bhutan in 1975 according to the copies kept at The National Library, Thimphu, including provisional references of published studies in English that have dealt with them.
Notes
- In Śākya mchog ldan's Collected Works, 'dzam gling sangs rgyas bstan pa'i rgyan mchog yongs rdzogs gnas lngar mkhyen pa'i pandita chen po gser mdog pan chen shākya mchog ldan gyi gsung 'bum legs bshad gser gyi bdud rtsi, vol. 13, Thimphu 1975.
In Cultivating Original Enlightenment, the first volume in The International Association of Wŏnhyo Studies’ Collected Works of Wŏnhyo series, Robert E. Buswell Jr. translates Wŏnhyo’s longest and culminating work, the Exposition of the Vajrasamâdhi-Sûtra (Kŭmgang Sammaegyŏng Non). Wŏnhyo here brings to bear all the tools acquired throughout a lifetime of scholarship and meditation to the explication of a scripture that has a startling connection to the Korean Buddhist tradition. In his treatise, Wŏnhyo examines the crucial question of how enlightenment can be turned from a tantalizing prospect into a palpable reality that manifests itself in all activities. (Source: University of Hawai'i Press)
In East Asia perhaps the most important countercurrent of influence came from Korea, the focus of this volume. Chapters examine the role played by the Paekche kingdom in introducing Buddhist material culture (especially monastic architecture) to Japan and the impact of Korean scholiasts on the creation of several distinctive features that eventually came to characterize Japanese Pure Land Buddhism. The lives and intellectual importance of the monks Sungnang (fl. ca. 490) and Wonch’uk (613–696) are reassessed, bringing to light their role in the development of early intellectual schools within Chinese Buddhism. Later chapters discuss the influential teachings of the semi-legendary master Musang (684–762), the patriarch of two of the earliest schools of Ch’an; the work of a dozen or so Korean monks active in the Chinese T’ient’ai tradition; and the Huiyin monastery. Source: University of Hawai'i Press
The book’s thirty-two chapters help redress the dearth of source materials on Korean religions in Western languages. Coverage includes shamanic rituals for the dead and songs to quiet fussy newborns; Buddhist meditative practices and exorcisms; Confucian geomancy and ancestor rites; contemporary Catholic liturgy; Protestant devotional practices; internal alchemy training in new Korean religions; and North Korean Juche (“self-reliance”) ideology, an amalgam of Marxism and Neo-Confucian filial piety focused on worship of the “father,” Kim Il Sung.
Religions of Korea in Practice provides substantial coverage of contemporary Korean religious practice, especially the various Christian denominations and new indigenous religions. Each chapter includes an extensive translation of original sources on Korean religious practice, accompanied by an introduction that frames the significance of the selections and offers suggestions for further reading. This book will help any reader gain a better appreciation of the rich complexity of Korea’s religious culture. (Source: Princeton University Press)
Gorampa's text is polemical, and his targets are two of Tibet's greatest thinkers: Tsongkhapa, founder of the Gelug school, and Dolpopa, a founding figure of the Jonang school. Distinguishing the Views argues that Dolpopa has fallen into an eternalistic extreme, whereas Tsongkhapa has fallen into nihilism, and that only the mainstream Sakya view—what Gorampa calls "freedom from extremes"—represents the true middle way, the correct view of emptiness. Suppressed for years in Tibet, this seminal work today is widely regarded and is studied in some of Tibet's greatest academic institutions.
Gorampa's treatise has been translated and annotated here by two leading scholars of Tibetan Buddhist philosophy, and a critical edition of the Tibetan text on facing pages gives students and scholars direct access to Gorampa's own words. José Cabezón's extended introduction provides a thorough overview of Tibetan polemical literature and contextualizes the life and work of Gorampa both historically and intellectually. Freedom from Extremes will be indispensable for serious students of Madhyamaka thought. (Source: Wisdom Publications)
For the Madhyamaka theorists, of course, both in India and Tibet, Buddha Nature thinking could not occupy the highest rung of the philosophical ladder. The apparently substantivist claims of Buddha Nature theorists—that there is an eternal, changeless, radiantly pure Buddha Nature—ran counter to the radically non-substantivist dialectical method of the Prāsaṅgikas, and Cabezón's study shows that, as a result of the dominance of the Prāsaṅgika in Tibet, Buddha Nature theory always remained marginal there and gained whatever position it had only by arrogating to itself the rhetoric of Madhyamaka. (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to Buddha Nature, 3)
Moonbeams of Mahāmudrā, along with the Ninth Karmapa Wangchuk Dorje’s Dispelling the Darkness of Ignorance, are to this day some of the most studied texts on Mahāmudrā in the Kagyu monasteries throughout Tibet and the Himalayas. Elizabeth M. Callahan, a renowned translator of classical Kagyu literature, has provided new translations of these two texts along with ancillary materials and annotations, making this a genuine resource for both scholars and students of Tibetan Buddhism. This historic contribution therefore offers the necessary tools to properly study and apply the Mahāmudrā teachings in a modern context. (Source: Shambhala Publications)
This translation includes a commentary by Jamgön Kongtrul with extensive footnotes containing extracts from all the other important commentaries to The Profound Inner Principles; several glossaries with annotations by the translator; a works cited list and a selected bibliography; and an index. (Source: Shambhala Publications)
Négation pure et simple des Idées - platoniciennes, cartésiennes ou «modernes» -, cet idéalisme singulier n'est pas le contraire du matérialisme car, s'il ramène effectivement l'être au concept et les choses à la pensée, il n'admet pas non plus la réalité ultime de la conscience ni de tout ce qui entre dans les catégories du spirituel : il s'agit plutôt, comme l'ensemble de la philosophie bouddhiste, d'une dénonciation rationnelle des limites et dangers du réalisme naïf qui semble dominer la pensée humaine.
Manuel de réalisation intérieure, le Lankâ décrit la vacuité de la matière, où il ne voit que les représentations, et la vacuité du psychique, lequel peut se ramener à autant d'idées fictives, avant de proposer une méthode contemplative radicale, fondée sur la «nature de bouddha» en tant que «claire lumière naturelle de l'esprit», dont le chan/zen et le tantrisme sont les applications les plus abouties.
La présente traduction, réalisée sur la version chinoise de Shikshânanda (702), est agrémentée de quelques indispensables notes que devraient compléter les brillantes remarques de Fazang du Huayan, assistant styliste du traducteur, dans ses Mystères essentiels de l'Entrée à Lankâ, à paraître prochainement. (Source: Fayard)
This volume addresses that need. It contains 22 of the 49 Sūtras of the Mahāratnakūta (or "Treasury") Sūtra, many translated for the first time in a Western language, selected and arranged to give the modern reader a progressive introduction to one of the world's major religious traditions. Subjects covered include Māyā and miracles, the teachings on Consciousness, Emptiness, and monastic discipline, the Mystical Light of the Tathāgata, and the devotional practice of Pure Land, making this a comprehensive source book of Mahāyāna Buddhism hitherto unavailable in English. The book also includes an introduction to provide historical and interpretive guidance, annotations that assist in the comprehension of difficult passages, and an extensive glossary that will be valuable to specialist and layman alike. A team of scholars, working in Taiwan, spent eight years translating the Treasury's million words from Chinese, using Tibetan texts for comparison and checking each Sūtra with an international board of scholars. In the course of translating from the original, special effort was made to retain both the devotional style appropriate for religious reading and the precision required by the scholar, while presenting the material with a clarity and flow that would make it accessible to the Western layman. The editors then selected, arranged, and annotated the 22 Sūtras presented here. (Source Accessed May 20, 2021)
This dissertation begins with definitions of the term "tathāgatagarbha" and some of its synonyms which are followed by a brief review of the historical development of the Tathāgatagarbha theory from India to China. With these as the background knowledge, it is easier to point out the fallacies of the two Japanese scholars' criticism on this theory. A key issue in their criticism is that they viewed the Tathāgatagarbha theory as the ātman of the Upaniṣads in disguise. It is therefore necessary to discuss not only the distinction between the ātman mentioned in the Tathāgatagarbha theory and that in the Upaniṣads but also the controversy over the issue of ātman versus anātman among the Buddhist scholars.
In the discussion to clarify the issue of ātman in the Tathāgatagarbha theory, it is demonstrated that the ātman in the Tathāgatagarbha theory is not only uncontradictory to the doctrine of anātman in Buddhism but very important to the Bodhisattva practices in the Mahāyāna Buddhism. It functions as a unity for the Bodhisattvas to voluntarily return to the world of saṃsāra again and again. Furthermore, the purport of the entire theory, that all sentient beings are endowed with the essence of the Buddha, supports various Bodhisattva practices such as the aspiration to save all beings in the world, the six perfections, etc. In a word, the Tathāgatagarbha theory is an excellent representative of the soteriology of the Mahāyāna Buddhism. Included in the end of this dissertation is an annotated translation of the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra. (Source Accessed May 26, 2020)
This dissertation examines the notion that not only sentient beings but also insentient
ones, e.g., flora, mountains, rivers, and manmade objects, have Buddha-nature. Employing an
exegetical approach, I investigate Jingxi Zhanran’s (711-782) theory of the Buddha-nature of
insentient beings. Emphasizing the all-pervasiveness of Buddha-nature and the nonduality of
mind and material, he eliminates the absolute distinction between sentient and insentient beings
and contends that Buddha-nature includes all beings. Additionally, insisting on the Tiantai notion
of mutual inclusion, which reveals a two-way relationship between sentience and insentience,
Zhanran reverses the positions of the subjective observer and the objective phenomenon,
subjectifying insentient beings.
In addition to examining the theoretical profundity of Zhanran’s theory, my study examines the issues of sentience versus insentience and Buddha-nature that took place before Zhanran and discusses the subsequent Tiantai concerns with the Buddha-nature of insentient beings. Through textual analysis, I reexamine the emergence of the Chinese thought that connects Buddha-nature to insentient things, initially presented by Jingying Huiyuan (523-592) and Jiaxiang Jizang (549-623). I also illustrate that the concept of the Buddha-nature of insentient beings is implied in Zhiyi’s (538-597) thought by interpreting Zhiyi’s teachings that inspired Zhanran’s advocacy. Furthermore, I analyze, on doctrinal grounds, Chinese Tiantai descendants’ endorsement of Zhanran’s theory, contrasting it with their Japanese counterparts’, the latter who found it difficult to conceptualize how insentient beings’ spiritual cultivation might occur.
I ultimately argue that Zhanran, indeed, articulates the Buddhahood of insentient beings, and that the modality of their practice through the nonduality between passivity and activity, and between Buddhahood and “insentienthood” can be explained. By raising questions about the human relation to the insentient world and exploring possibilities for attaining harmony through transcending the duality between selfness and otherness, and subjectivity and objectivity, I hope to contribute to the reexamination of anthropocentric religious liberation.
Venerable Cheng Chien lucidly introduces the reader to the meaning of Buddhahood and explains the origin, transmission, and special features of the Avataṃsaka Sūtra. He presents us with an understanding of the stature of the "Manifestation of the Tathāgata" chapter in the context of the entire sūtra, as well as its relation to other scholastic texts. (Source Accessed Nov 23, 2020)
(self) or anattā (not-self).
Gendun Chopel was a prolific writer during his short life. Yet he considered that manuscript, which he titled Grains of Gold, to be his life’s work, one to delight his compatriots with tales of an ancient Indian and Tibetan past, while alerting them to the wonders and dangers of the strikingly modern land abutting Tibet’s southern border, the British colony of India. Now available for the first time in English, Grains of Gold is a unique compendium of South Asian and Tibetan culture that combines travelogue, drawings, history, and ethnography. Gendun Chopel describes the world he discovered in South Asia, from the ruins of the sacred sites of Buddhism to the Sanskrit classics he learned to read in the original. He is also sharply, often humorously critical of the Tibetan love of the fantastic, bursting one myth after another and finding fault with the accounts of earlier Tibetan pilgrims. Exploring a wide range of cultures and religions central to the history of the region, Gendun Chopel is eager to describe all the new knowledge he gathered in his travels to his Buddhist audience in Tibet.
At once the account of the experiences of a tragic figure in Tibetan history and the work of an extraordinary scholar, Grains of Gold is an accessible, compelling work animated by a sense of discovery of both a distant past and a strange present. (Source: University of Chicago Press)
This one-volume edition contains Thomas Cleary's definitive translation of all thirty-nine books of the sutra, along with an introduction, a glossary, and Cleary's translation of Li Tongxuan's seventh-century guide to the final book, the Gandavyuha, "Entry into the Realm of Reality." (Source: Shambhala Publications)
The essential initiatory experience of Zen, satori is believed to open up the direct perception of things as they are. "Even if you sit until your seat breaks through, even if you persevere mindless of fatigue, even if you are a person of lofty deeds and pure behavior, if you haven't reached this realm of satori, you still can't get out of the prison of the world." Deliberately cultivated and employed to awaken the dormant potency of the mind, satori is said to be accessible to all people, transcending time, history, culture, race, gender, and personality.
Attributed to the thirteenth-century Zen Master Keizan (1268–1325), Transmission of Light (along with The Blue Cliff Record and The Gateless Barrier) is one of three essential koan texts used by Zen students. Techniques for reaching the enlightening experience of satori are revealed through fifty-three short tales about the awakenings of successive generations of masters, beginning with the twelfth-century Zen master Ejo, dharma heir to Dogen.
The translator's introduction establishes the context for Transmission of Light within the Zen canon and elucidates central themes of the work, including the essential idea that genuine satori "is not the end of Zen; it is more properly the true beginning." (Source: Shambhala Publications)
Readers of Zen will also find the introduction and translation by Francis Dojun Cook, the scholar whose insights brought Zen Master Dogen to life in How to Raise an Ox, of great value. (Source: Wisdom Publications)
of graded, hierarchically ordered sets of "false truths" as pedagogical devices. For the Lotus, Corless suggests, the "true truth" is that all living beings are in fact possessors of Buddha Nature; it is this toward which the pedagogically useful though partial truths (upāya) found in other assertions point. This position is illustrated with extensive quotations from Kūkai, and is compared with positions taken by a series of Christian thinkers from Nicholas of Cusa to John Henry Newman. (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to Buddha Nature, 3–4)
Each one of us has this bright, inherent “Buddha-nature” within us, and through it we are connected to all the universe. But it’s up to us to discover this connection. It’s up to us to live in tune with this inherent treasure. We have to figure out how this plays out in our life.
The first step is simply trusting this non-dual nature. Know that you have it, have faith that it’s connected to everything you’re going through, and entrust everything there. Keep doing this and observing. Let go of your opinions like this. Let go of what’s going well like this. Let go of what’s going badly like this, and the whole time, keep paying attention.
Step forward bravely, holding onto your bright, inherent nature, and a new world will begin to reveal itself.
This is a collection of the Dharma talks by Daehaeng Kun Sunim previously published in Korean-English editions, as "Turning Dirt into Gold," and "Dancing on the Whirlwind." (Source: Hanmaum Publications)
In these thirty-three stories, one of Korea’s foremost Seon(Zen) Masters shows us our inherent potential and teaches us how to live with dignity and courage in any circumstances. Appealing to both children and adults, these stories are drawn from the rich Buddhist tradition of Korea and reveal the unseen dimensions of our lives while showing us how to become true human beings. (Source: Hanmaum Publications)
In this sparkling collection from one of the most vital teachers of modern Korean Buddhism, Zen Master Daehaeng shows us that there is no raft to find and, truly, no river to cross. She extends her hand to the Western reader, beckoning each of us into the unfailing wisdom accessible right now, the enlightenment that is always, already, right here.
A Zen (or seon, as Korean Zen is called) master with impeccable credentials, Daehaeng has developed a refreshing approach; No River to Cross is surprisingly personal. It’s disarmingly simple, yet remarkably profound, pointing us again and again to our foundation, our “True Nature”—the perfection of things just as they are. (Source: Wisdom Publications)
This teaching, with its remarkable breadth and richness, was originally given to an audience of ten thousand in France in 2000, and this book perfectly captures the majesty of the occasion. As Sogyal Rinpoche, the Dalai Lama’s host for the occasion, said, "All of us were moved by the depth, relevance, and accessibility of these teachings; there were those who said that they were among the most remarkable they had ever heard him give. To receive these teachings from him was the opportunity of a lifetime." (Source: Wisdom Publications)
This excellent work, throwing a new light on the contacts between Indian and Chinese philosophers and theologians at the court of the Tibetan king, at the peak of his power in the middle of the eighth century, contains the following chapters: l) Translation of the Chinese record of the debate between the representative of the Chinese Buddhist philosophers, a Chinese Ch'an (Zen) master having the pretentious name Ta-ch'êng (Mahāyāna, Great Vehicle), and the representative of the Indian Buddhist philosophers, Śāntarakṣita's disciple Kamalaśīla, who was hostile to Ch'an doctrines and charged the Chinese Ch'an monks with neglect of morality and with graded spiritual exercises and gradual progress on the path to Sainthood (ārya-mārga); 2) Translations of memorials, records, letters, prayers and poems, written by Chinese officials and Buddhist monks in Tibetan-occupied West China during the eighth century; 3) Translations of the first and third chapters of Kamalaśīla's work entitled Bhāvanā-krama ("The Stages and Grades in the Spiritual Exercises," extant in Sanskrit (manuscript discovered by the late E. Obermiller in 1935, Journal of the Greater India Society, II, 1-11), the Tibetan Tanjur, and the Chinese Buddhist Canon (Taishā Daizōkyō, No. 1664). Almost half of Demiéville's book consists of copious notes with references to Chinese and Tibetan historical documents, annals and records, and Tun-huang manuscripts (Pelliot Collection, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris), filling many gaps left by the printed Chinese Buddhist texts. The Tun-huang manuscript (Pelliot Coll., No. 4646) translated in the first chapter of the book under review has been reproduced in facsimile (32 plates) and bears the title Judgment on the True Principles of the Great Vehicle of Sudden Enlightenment. The doctrines of the Chinese opponent of Indian gradualism in this court symposium led by the Tibetan king are largely identical with those of the Chinese Ch'an masters Hui-nêng and his disciple Shên-hui (praised as a "political genius" and the Seventh Patriarch by Hu Shih in Philosophy East and West, III, 6-13), whose Discourses have been translated by J. Gernet (Publications de l'ecole française d'Extrême-Orient, Vol. 31, Hanoi, 1949) and whose more important Sermon delivered on a Platform (T'an-yü)has just been translated by the expert in the history of the Ch'an school, W. Liebenthal (Asia Major, III (1953), 132-155). Demiéville's book is indispensable for those who want to compare Indian and Chinese national traits and attitudes. His documents show a contrast between the Chinese ideal of the conquest of time (totum simul), expressed in the proverb, "He lays down the butcher's cleaver, and immediately becomes a Buddha" (quoted by Hu Shih op. cit., p. 11), and the Indian patient, disciplinarian, and pedestrian stress on training, gradual cultivation, nurture, and educational processes. -Johannes Rahder, Yale University.
(Chinese characters in original unavailable)
Volume 56
This work is a commentary on the Śrīmālā-sūtra (Taisho No.16), and is considered to be the earliest of the "Commentaries on Three Sūtras" (Jp. San-gyō-gi-sho) composed by Prince Shōtoku. The Nihon-shoki ("Chronicles of Japan") records that Prince Shōtoku gave a discourse on the Śrīmālā-sūtra for Empress Suiko. It is considered that Prince Shōtoku chose this particular sūtra as the subject of his discourse to the Empress probably because the protagonist of the Śrīmālā-sūtra is a woman, Śrīmālā, and Empress Suiko was the first Empress in Japanese history. The present work was then put together in book-form in Chinese at a later date. Be that as it may, there is no changing the fact that this was the first written work composed by a Japanese.
Source
Jp. Shōmangyō gisho (勝鬘經義疏), attributed to Prince Shōtoku. 1 fascicle. (Source: BDK America)
In pithy verses, Distinguishing the Middle from Extremes employs the principle of the three natures to explain the way things seem to be as well as the way they actually are. Unraveling the subtle processes that condition our thinking and experience, Maitreya’s teaching reveals a powerful path of compassionate vision and spiritual transformation.
Distinguishing the Middle from Extremes is presented here alongside commentaries by two outstanding masters of Tibet’s nonsectarian Rimé movement, Khenpo Shenga and Ju Mipham. (Source: Shambhala Publications)
The Ornament provides a comprehensive description of the bodhisattva’s view, meditation, and enlightened activities. Bodhisattvas are beings who, out of vast love for all sentient beings, have dedicated themselves to the task of becoming fully awakened buddhas, capable of helping all beings in innumerable and vast ways to become enlightened themselves. To fully awaken requires practicing great generosity, patience, energy, discipline, concentration, and wisdom, and Maitreya’s text explains what these enlightened qualities are and how to develop them.
This volume includes commentaries by Khenpo Shenga and Ju Mipham, whose discussions illuminate the subtleties of the root text and provide valuable insight into how to practice the way of the bodhisattva. Drawing on the Indian masters Vasubandhu and, in particular, Sthiramati, Mipham explains the Ornament with eloquence and brilliant clarity. This commentary is among his most treasured works. (Source: Shambhala Publications)
This classic was written by the sixth-century monk and meditation master, Shramana Zhiyi (Chih-i), one of the most illustrious figures in the history of Chinese Buddhism. Master Zhiyi is famous for his role in the founding of the Tiantai teachings lineage and for his authorship of a quartet of meditation manuals of which this is one. The translator of this volume is the American monk, Bhikshu Dharmamitra, a translator of numerous classic works from the Indian and Chinese Buddhist traditions. (Source Accessed July 15, 2021)
In the texts outlined below, we see innovative steps taken away from the philosophical preoccupation with emptiness (sunyata) and not-self (anatman) with which much early Buddhist scholasticism was concerned, with a focus instead on a type of liberative phenomenology that allows us to uncover our “true” nature and realize liberation. (Read more here)
An absolute treasure for students of the tradition, it is also an indispensable reference for anyone with an interest in Buddhism. The book includes chronologies and glossaries that elucidate Buddhist doctrine, and it provides fascinating insights into the Buddhist history of Tibet. Two treatises form the present volume, namely the Fundamentals of the Nyingma School and the History of the Nyingma School. Among the most widely read of all His Holiness Dudjom Rinpoche’s works, these treatises were composed during the years immediately following his arrival in India as a refugee. His intention in writing them was to preserve the precise structure of the Nyingma philosophical view within its own historical and cultural context. (Source: Wisdom Publications)
Books 15 to 17: The Essential Tantras of Mahayoga is presented in two volumes and concerns the first of the three classes of inner tantra. It presents the entire text of the Guhyagarbha Tantra, in Tibetan and English, together with the interlinear sections of one of its most important commentaries, Dispelling the Darkness of the Ten Directions, by the outstanding fourteenth-century master Longchen Rabjam. Also included is Choying Tobden Dorje’s rewriting of Candragomin’s inspirational Extensive Commentary on the Sublime Litany of the Names of Manjushri. (Source: Shambhala Publications)
This paper focuses on his writings on the "hidden meaning of luminosity". According to Chos grags ye shes the nonaffirming negation in the second cycle of the Buddha's teaching is of not fully perfected definitive meaning while the affirming negation of the third wheel, the inseparability of mind's emptiness and luminosity, in other words mahāmudrā, constitutes the fully perfected definitive meaning. (Draszczyk, introduction, 1)
temporary stains, they are incapable of directly relating to wisdoms inherent enlightened qualities. According to the relevant texts,1 these stains constitute the only difference between normal beings and the awakened ones who have removed the stains and actualized their inherent buddha nature. From the perspective of both the doctrine of tathāgatagarbha in general and shentong in particular, proper Buddhist philosophy and spiritual training in ethics, view, and meditation have as their goal the removal of the stains of karma and afflictive emotions and their subtle tendencies of ignorance so that the
mind's inherent qualities can manifest.
This chapter deals with the corresponding approach in view and meditation taught by the cleric-scholar Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Thayé (1813–99). As one of the leading figures in the rimé movement in eastern Tibet, he worked to preserve practice traditions from the various Buddhist lineages of Tibet—in particular, practices from the Nyingma, Kadam, Jonang, Kagyü, and Sakya schools. His work exemplifies the idea that implementing philosophical understanding in meditative training is an essential part of all Tibetan Buddhist traditions. His Immaculate Vajra Moonrays: An Instruction for the View of Shentong, the Great Madhyamaka (abbreviated here as Instruction for the View of Shentong) is but one instance of the integral relationship between philosophical understanding and meditative training. The text guides meditators in a gradual practice that aims to achieve a direct realization of the true nature of mind—buddha nature with all of its inherent qualities. (Draszczyk, 251–52, 2017)
Notes
- For example, the Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra, the Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanāda Sūtra, and the Ratnagotravibhāga, also referred to as the Uttaratantra Śāstra.
looks at us with complete love, we can allow it in and feel the same.
Tonglen, which means taking and sending, is a meditation practice that cultivates unconditional compassion and love. In Tonglen, as we open to our own or others' suffering and allow it to be transformed into compassion, we awaken to the compassion and love that is at the core of who we are. We first bring loving awareness to ourselves, and then we exchange self for others. Taking and sending for ourselves can unearth feelings of self-hatred, low self-worth, deficiency, and unworthiness, among others. As we gradually work through these feelings and open to increased kindness and compassion for ourselves, it helps heal our core wounds and loosens our self-fixation, facilitating a deeper opening into compassion and love. (Read more here)
In this chapter I will look into interpretations of buddha-nature starting with the Sublime Continuum (Uttaratantra, ca. fourth century), the first commentarial treatise focused on this subject. I will then present its role(s) in Mahāyāna Buddhism in general, and in the interpretations of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka in particular. Next I will discuss the role of buddha-nature as a key element in the theory and practice of Buddhist tantra, which will lead into a discussion of this doctrine in light of pantheism ("all is God"). Thinking of buddha-nature in terms of pantheism can help bring to light significant dimensions of this strand of Buddhist thought. (Duckworth, introduction, 235)
Buddha-nature comes to shape a Madhyamaka interpretation of emptiness in a positive light in a way that parallels its place in a Yogācāra interpretation (as a positive foundation of mind and reality). Buddha-nature supplements a Yogācāra theory of mind and reality by offering a positive alternative to a theory of consciousness that otherwise functions simply as the distorted cognitive structure of suffering. It thus is not only the potential for an awakened mind, but the cognitive content of awakening, too.
In Tibet we see the interpretation of buddha-nature converge with Mahāyāna doctrines in structurally parallel ways. Paired with buddha-nature, the doctrine of emptiness in Madhyamaka pivots from a “self-empty” lack of intrinsic nature to an “other-empty,” pure ground that remains. In narratives of disclosure characteristic of the doctrine of buddha-nature, we also see parallel shifts in the foundations of Yogācāra, as grounds of distortion like the basic consciousness, the dependent nature, and self-awareness are reinscribed into a causal story that takes place within a pure, gnostic ground.
This essay probes the discourses of other-emptiness in the Jonang (jo nang) and Nyingma (rnying ma) traditions. After briefly introducing other-emptiness in the Jonang tradition, the locus classicus for other-emptiness in Tibet, I will contrast the way Mipam (‘ju mi pham rgya mtsho) (1846–1912) positions the discourse of other-emptiness in his interpretative system. I will then demonstrate how Mipam’s portrayal of other-emptiness highlights the way he uses a perspectival means to incorporate a diversity of seemingly contradictory claims that he uses to support his view of ultimate reality as indeterminate. I will argue that an implication of his view is a non-representational account of language about the ultimate. (Duckworth, introduction, 920)
Mipam ( 'ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846–1912) is one of the most prolific thinkers in the history of Tibet and is a key figure in the Nyingma tradition of Buddhism. His works continue to be widely studied in the Tibetan cultural region and beyond. This book provides an in-depth account of Mipam’s view, drawing on a wide range of his works and offering several new translations. Douglas S. Duckworth shows how a dialectic of presence and absence permeates Mipam’s writings on the Middle Way and Buddha-nature.
Arguably the most important doctrine in Buddhism, Buddha-nature is, for Mipam, equivalent to the true meaning of emptiness; it is the ground of all and the common ground shared by sentient beings and Buddhas. This ground is the foundation of the path and inseparable from the goal of Buddhahood. Duckworth probes deeply into Mipam’s writings on Buddha-nature to illuminate its central place in a dynamic Buddhist philosophy. (Source: SUNY Press)
The Buddha taught buddha nature in three steps, each more profound than the previous one. The last step is regarded by most Tibetan Buddhist schools as the most profound teaching of the sutras, the very essence of what the Buddha was trying to communicate to his followers. It is the same teaching as found in Mahamudra and Dzogchen, so is important for all Buddhists to understand, but especially for those who are studying the Mahamudra and Dzogchen teachings.
The very learned Nyingma teacher Ju Mipham Namgyal gave a teaching that clearly showed this ultimate non-dual buddha nature. It was recorded and published by his students in a text called The Lion's Roar that is A Great Thousand Doses of Sugatagarbha which forms the basis of this book. The text needs clarification, so a very extensive explanation has been provided by the author of the book, the well known Western Buddhist teacher and translator, Tony Duff. As with all of our books, and an extensive introduction, glossary, and so on are provided to assist the reader.
The book emphasizes the Kagyu approach in particular. The author has received teachings from many Kagyu masters and used his knowledge of the tradition as a basis for making this book. He selected teachings from Gampopa and other early masters to set the basis for explaining meditation. Then he added other, necessary teachings according to the extensive teachings he has received over many years from many different Kagyu masters, such as Chogyam Trungpa Rinpoche, Mingyur Rinpoche, and others. The result is a book that explains how to do a complete session of meditation in the style of the Kagyu and Nyingma traditions.
The book begins with a lengthy introduction by Lama Tony which is a teaching in its own right. He writes a lengthy piece about what can and cannot usefully be obtained from science in terms of dharma practice. Following the introduction, there are two chapters on the buddha nature, the second of which uses a significant portion of Dolpopa Sherab Gyaltsen’s explanation of the ground in his famous Mountain Dharma text. This is the first time that this part of Dolpopa’s text has been fully translated and published. After that are several chapters on the various steps of a complete session of meditation. Anyone who practises meditation will find this book useful in many ways.
The book contains a translation of the following text: “Mountain Dharma, An Ocean of Definitive Meaning” by Dolpopa Sherab Gyaltsan, ground section
(Source: Padma Karpo Translations)
Other emptiness has usually been thought of amongst Westerners who have heard of it as a very complicated and difficult philosophy. It is subtle, that is true, because it describes what it is like to be in wisdom. However, it was not taught as a difficult philosophy. Rather, it was taught as a practical teaching on how to enter non-dual wisdom. The book explores this point at length.
The book was written to be useful for all levels of reader. It starts simply, giving a clear explanation of the Buddha’s non-dual teaching and how the other emptiness teaching is part of that. Then it goes into details about the history and teaching of other emptiness. Finally, it goes in to great technical detail concerning the other emptiness teaching, and supports that with extensive materials from various Tibetan teachers. Unlike many of the books on other emptiness that have appeared, this book does not only present the theory of other emptiness but keeps a proper balance between showing the theory of other emptiness and presenting the practice-based reality of the teaching.
The book is divided into four parts, each one a set of presentations from someone knowledgeable of the subject. The first part is several chapters written by the author in plain English in order to get the reader under way. Following that, there are sections embodying the explanations of Dolpopa Sherab Gyaltsen, Khenpo Tsultrim Gyatso, and Jamgon Kongtrul the great. Ample introductions, glossaries and so on are provided.
Aside from many oral explanations, the book contains translations of the following texts:
- A Brief Discussion of The Rise of the Other Emptiness Middle Way Called "The Music of Talk on the Definitive Meaning" by Khenpo Tsultrim Gyatso (previously not seen in English)
- Introductory Section from A Complete Commentary to the Great Vehicle Treatise The Highest Continuum which Connects to Heart Meaning using the Explanation System of the Path of Direct Perception, Called "The Lion’s Roar of the Non-Regressing" by Jamgon Kongtrul the Great
- The Treasury which is an Encyclopædia of Knowledge on Thorough Ascertainments of Provisional and Definitive Within the Three Wheels, and of the Two Truths by Jamgon Kongtrul the Great
- Instructions for Practising the View of the Other Emptiness Great Middle Way, "Light Rays of Stainless Vajra Moon" by Jamgon Kongtrul the Great (Source: Padma Karpo Translation Committee)
of Buddhism only has access to Buddhist literature through the writings that are available in a Western language. And, at present, this body of writings does not provide anything like a complete and thorough representation of Buddhist literature. Consequently, in addition to those who are well-versed in Buddhist ideology, this dissertation is also intended for individuals who have little familiarity with this subject.
More specifically, my objective has been to make a contribution to the ongoing investigations into the history of Buddhist philosophy by focussing on one Buddhist author's interpretation of a specific topic— the doctrine of anātma— and providing an analysis of it in relation to the views of several other Buddhist schools. I have attempted to demonstrate how Acarya Candrakirti's theory of self is significantly different from the generally accepted Buddhist explanation of this topic. In doing so, several relevant areas of Candrakirti's overall system are also examined. With regard to his Prasangika views on logic, I have introduced new material from the writings of Svatantrika scholars for the purpose of further clarifying the nature of the differences between these two Madhyamika schools of thought.
Part Two consists of a translation of Candrakirti's most comprehensive discussion of his views on the self. This text was not previously available in English. In several instances my translation also corrects misinterpretations that occur in the incomplete French translation of Professor Louis de la Vallée Poussin. The text consists of a section of the sixth chapter from Acarya Candrakirti's Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya. Since the original Sanskrit is not extant, my translation is based on the Tibetan translation. For a manuscript I have used the 1912 edition prepared by Professor Poussin and published by the Russian Imperial Academy of Sciences as Volume IX of the Bibliotheca Buddhica series. In preparing the English translation, Professor Poussin's French translation as well as a partial Sanskrit reconstruction by N. Aiyaswami Sastri were consulted; however the most useful aid proved to be the Tibetan translation of a 12th century Indian commentary to Candrakirti's text composed by a certain Jayānanda and entitled Madhyamakāvatāratīka. This work provides a literal explanation for almost every word of Candrakirti's text and was extremely helpful for understanding numerous obscure passages.
Although several of the texts cited in Part One of the dissertation can be found in translations prepared by other scholars, I have presented my own version for all these quotations in order to maintain a consistency of style and terminology. The one exception occurs in the chapter on Prasangika logic, for which ample explanation is given there. (Engle, preface, iii–v)
Lion of Speech: The Life of Mipham Rinpoche offers a translation of Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche’s biography of Mipham Rinpoche, left behind in Tibet when Khyentse Rinpoche went into exile in 1959 and lost for eighty years before its discovery by an extraordinary stroke of good fortune. The biography is written as a traditional namthar, an account of the “life and liberation” of a man who is widely considered to be among the greatest scholars and accomplished masters in the history of Tibetan Buddhism. One of the striking features of Khyentse Rinpoche’s account is that it downplays the “miraculous” aspects of Mipham’s life and activities—perhaps as a means of bringing into sharper focus the effect that Mipham had on his contemporaries as a spiritual master, scholar, and teacher.
The second half of the book offers selected translations of Mipham Rinpoche’s works that provide readers with a taste of his enormous and extremely varied output. The translations are from his works on Madhyamaka, buddha-nature, tantra, and the Great Perfection. Some are new translations and some are striking passages from works that have already been published, including passages from Guide to the Wheel of Analytical Meditation, The Adornment of the Middle Way, The Wisdom Chapter, The Lion’s Roar, and White Lotus. (Source: Shambhala Publications)
This first part of the Trilogy of Rest sets the foundation for the following two volumes: Finding Rest in Meditation, which focuses on Tibetan Buddhist meditation practice, and Finding Rest in Illusion, which focuses on post-meditation yogic conduct. The Padmakara Translation Group has provided us with a clear and fluid new translation to Finding Rest in the Nature of the Mind along with selections from its autocommentary, The Great Chariot, which will serve as a genuine aid to study and meditation.
Here, we find essential instructions on the need to turn away from materialism, how to find a qualified guide, how to develop boundless compassion for all beings, along with the view of tantra and associated meditation techniques. The work culminates with pointing out the result of practice as presented from the Dzogchen perspective, providing us with all the tools necessary to traverse the Tibetan Buddhist path of finding rest. Shambhala Publications
The present volume lays out the teachings of the sutras in gradual stages according to the traditional three levels, or scopes, of spiritual endeavor. It begins with essential teachings on impermanence, karma, and ethics. Then, from the Hinayana standpoint, it describes the essential Buddhist teachings of the four noble truths and the twelve links of dependent arising. Moving on, finally, to the Mahayana perspective, it expounds fully the teachings on bodhichitta and the path of the six paramitas, and gives an unusually detailed exposition of Buddhist vows. (Source: Shambhala Publications)
au seizième siècle, considérés comme "Trésors nationaux" ou "propriétés culturelles importantes", mais qui ne représentent qu'un dizième du nombre total de portraits connus. Les portraits relevant de ce genre sont assez stéréotypés, et représentent en général un moine assis en sur une chaise haute en position du lotus. Souvent représenté de trois-quarts, mais parfois aussi de face, il est vêtu d'un habit de cérémonie, et tient dans sa main droite un attribut de son autorité, d'ordinaire un bâton, un sceptre ou un chasse-mouches. Certains chinzō représentent aussi le moine assis ou debout dans un
paysage. Enfin, ils comportent généralement un "éloge" en vers et une dédicace.
S'interrogeant sur la fonction religieuse de ces portraits, Griffith Foulk et Robert Sharf sont amenés à remettre en question l'idée que les chinzô servaient à authentifier la transmission de maître à disciple. Une étude approfondie des sources montre que la
définition somme toute moderne des chinzō, visant à définir un genre limité dans le domaine de l'histoire de l'art, a fonctionné dans les faits de façon étroitement normative, alors que le terme désignait à l'origine une catégorie beaucoup plus large de portraits. Conduits de la sorte à étudier la construction moderne du genre des chinzō, les auteurs en arrivent à poser un certain nombre de questions théoriques et méthodologiques qui devraient avoir un certain impact sur l'histoire de l'art asiatique. (Foulk and Sharf, introduction, 149)
Frauwallner's way of translating was straightforward: to remain as close as possible to the original text while presenting it in a clear and readable way in order to convey an accurate impression of its meaning. For technical terms in the source materials he maintained a single translation even when various meanings were suggested. For clarity regarding such variations of meaning he relied on the context and his explanation.
The same approach was taken by the translator of the present book. Although his translation attempts to be faithful to the 1994 edition of Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, he inserted helpful additional headlines into the text and considerably enlarged the index. All other additions by the translator are given within square brackets. Besides this, he created an Appendix, which contains one of Frauwallner's more important articles "Amalavijnana and Alayavijnana" (1951) to complement the long Yogacara section of the book, a bibliography of selective publications after 1969. The URLs for many of the source materials were also conveniently provided. (Source: Motilal Banarsidass)
The rDzogs Chen tradition is an extremely innovative philosophical and contemplative system originating out of Buddhist Tantric mysticism within the 8th-10th centuries, and in many ways is quite unusual in the context of normative Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. While its origins remain controversial, we currently possess only a large body of canonical and exegetical literature in what claim to be Tibetan translations, as well as an extensive secondary literature that developed in Tibet from the 10th-20th centuries. The tradition is especially striking in its implicit development of a model of rigorous philosophical thought that refuses to be reduced to syllogistic reasoning (though utilizing it as a secondary hermeneutical tool) or dismissed as mere "aesthetics" as it treats Buddhist Tantra as a serious philosophical innovation that must be utilized to reinterpret previous traditional scholasticism, in stark contrast to the trend to extend traditional scholastic methodologies into Tantra, and deny the revolution of "poetic thought" they may embody. In addition, its complex evolutionary emphasis and description of a non-reified intelligence operative at every level of the Universe is strikingly similar to recent developments in modern scientific research. Finally, it would seem that the Great Perfection represents the most sophisticated interpretation of the so-called "Buddha nature" tradition within the context of Indo-Tibetan thought, and as such, is of extreme importance for research into classical exoteric philosophic systems such as Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, while also providing fertile grounds for future explorations of the interconnections between Indo-Tibetan and East Asian forms of Buddhism, as well as between Indo-Tibetan Buddhism and contemporary Indian developments such as the tenth century non-dual Shaivism of Abhinavagupta.
Though this tradition is by no means homogenous, one can readily distinguish out a classical system encapsulated by "eleven adamantine topics" (rDo rJe'i gNas bCu gCig), which together constitute a wide ranging journey spanning the early history of the Universe to the climaxing heights of a Buddha's full enlightenment. This system is most brilliantly articulated by the fourteenth century Tibetan scholar kLong Chen Rab 'Byams Pa (1308-1363) in his The Seven Treasuries (mDzod bDun) and The Seminal Heart-Essence in Four Parts (sNying Thig Ya bZhi), which contain some of the world's most profound poetic and philosophic masterpieces. This dissertation thus bases itself on Longchenpa's corpus, and his own textual sources, namely The Seventeen Tantras, The Seminal Heart-Essence of the Sky Dancer (mKha' 'Gro sNying Thig) by Padmasambhava, and The Seminal Heart-Essence of Vimalamitra (Bi Ma sNying Thig) by Vimalamitra and other early non-Tibetan figures in the tradition. In particular, it focuses on kLong Chen Rab 'Byams Pa's The Treasury of Words and Meanings (Tshig Don mDzod) which is directly structured on the aforementioned eleven topics, and is his most succinct yet extensive exposition of the tradition of the Great Perfection in its entirety. Part I is an overview of these eleven topics in general, as well as in the context of The Treasury of Words and Meaning's corresponding eleven chapters; Part II consists of a translation of the first five chapters from The Treasury of Words and Meanings (centering on the primordial
nature of the Universe, the early history of its exteriorization into space and time, the
origination of alienation, evolution, and a subtle analysis of the energetics of human existence);
and Part III provides a very lengthy commentary on those five chapters in the form of running
annotations (the bulk of the thesis thus occurs in Part Ill). In Part Ill, the above texts are
systematically analyzed in relation to Longchenpa's discussions of a given issue, and many lengthy passages extracted from them are translated therein, along with extensive interpretative
comments.
Although some scholars have attempted to marginalize the tradition in relation to Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, in fact the Great Perfection can be understood as its culmination, since in its seamless blend of the exoteric and esoteric it overcomes many of the limitations inherent in the "normative" traditions' sterile division between "philosophy" and the esoteric practices/theory of Tantra. This dissertation clarifies the essential structure, orientation, and content of the tradition, as well as providing a very detailed explication of the first five of the eleven topics
encapsulating its overall range. The larger work from which it is drawn contains a systematic treatment of all eleven topics, along with a comprehensive translation (and independent commentary on) The Treasury of Words and Meanings.
This definitive composition of Mahāyāna teachings was imparted in the fourth century by Maitreya to the famous adept Asanga, one of the most prolific writers of Buddhist treatises in history. Asanga’s work, which is among the famous Five Treatises of Maitreya, has been studied, commented upon, and taught by Buddhists throughout Asia ever since it was composed.
In the early twentieth century, one of Tibet’s greatest scholars and saints, Jamgön Mipham, wrote A Feast of the Nectar of the Supreme Vehicle, which is a detailed explanation of every verse. This commentary has since been used as the primary blueprint for Tibetan Buddhists to illuminate the depth and brilliance of Maitreya’s pith teachings. The Padmakara Translation Group has provided yet another accessible and eloquent translation, ensuring that English-speaking students of Mahāyāna will be able to study this foundational Buddhist text for generations to come. (Source: Shambhala Publications)
There is no doubt excellent reason for such acclaim as this. The clarity, force, and elegance of Nāgārjuna's arguments are undeniable. They can easily overwhelm, and often have. However, the lavish traditional and modern appreciations of Nāgārjuna's thought have not been without untoward consequences for our understanding of other varieties of Mahāyāna. The Mahāyāna is a far more various thing than a reading of the Kārikas, or even of their antecedent Prajñāpāramitā scriptures, would indicate; and the Mādhyamika position has hardly gone unchallenged in Buddhist intellectual history. Indeed, much of the subsequent history of Mahāyāna thought may be read as a cumulative qualification of the Śūnyavāda that one finds in the Perfection of Insight Literature and in Nāgārjuna. Such at least was the case with the Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha traditions; and when Buddhism found its way to China, Chinese Buddhist thinkers often expressed a clear preference for the later qualifications or modulations of Mādhyamika rather than for the severity of an unadulterated Nāgārjunism. It may well be that our enthusiasm for Nāgārjuna along with the comparative complexity and inaccessibility of other traditions have predisposed us to give less attention than deserved to the alternative forms of Mahāyāna. Should this be so, the remarks that follow may be taken as an effort at compensation.
The criticisms, explicit or implicit, that have been leveled against classical Śūnyavāda are many and diverse. One might undertake to examine the question of whether Mādhyamika is normative for the whole of Mahāyāna by investigating, for example, the claim of the Madhyāntavibhāga that an understanding of emptiness is crude and incomplete unless tempered by an understanding of the reality and potency of constructive imagination. For the Yogācāra authors of this text, emptiness is always and ever coincident with the imagination of the unreal (abhūtaparikalpa; hsü-wang fen-pieh) and it is only the coefficiency of the two principles that can wholly account for the way things really are. It is in recognition of this—the essential duplexity of reality—that the Madhyāntavibhāga may say, as one would not expect Nāgārjuna to say:
na śūnyaṁ napi caśūnyam tasmat sarvvam vidhīyate
satvad asatvāt satvāc ca madhyama pratipac ca sā
ku shuo i-ch'ieh fa fei k'ung fei pu-k'ung
yu wu chi yu ku shih ming chung-tao i
Therefore it is said that all dharmas
Are neither empty nor nonempty,
Because they exist, do not exist, and yet again exist.
This is the meaning of the "middle-path."
One might choose also to consider the theory of the "three revolutions of the wheel of the law" found in the Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra:
Formerly, in the second period and for the sake only of those aspiring to practice of the Mahayana-reckoning on the fact that all dharmas lack own-being, neither arise nor perish, and are originally calm and essentially of nirvāṇa—the Lord turned the Wheel of the Law which is characterized by a hidden intent (i yin-mi hsiang). [But] this too (i.e., like the first turning) had [other teachings] superior to it to which it deferred. It was of a sense still to be interpreted (yu wei liao-id; neyartha), and [thus] the subject of much dispute.
In the present third period and for the sake of aspirants to all vehicles—reckoning [again] on the fact that all dharmas lack own-being, neither arise nor perish, are originally calm and essentially of nirvāṇa, and have the lack of own-being as their nature-the Lord has turned the Wheel of the Law which is characterized [this time] by a manifest meaning (i hsien-liao hsiang). This is the most rare and precious [of teachings]. There is nothing superior to this Turning of the Wheel of Law by the Lord and nothing to which it defers. It is of truly explicit meaning (chen liao-i; nīthārtha) and not the subject of disputes.
The third revolution of the dharmacakra here described is, of course, the annunciation of what was to become Yogācāra Buddhism. The second corresponds to the Śunyavāda of the Prajñāpāramitā canon and, proleptically, to its Mādhyamika systematization. The implication of this passage is that although both dispensations of the law teach emptiness (here called "lack of own-being," "nonarising," etc.), the Prajñāpāramitā and Mādhyamika versions of the doctrine are inchoate, eliptical, imprecise and a source of controversy, whereas the Yogācāra version is definitive, explicit, and not liable to conflicting interpretations.
A third approach might be to follow the masterful lead of Ruegg, Takasaki, and Wayman in considering the claims of the Tathāgatagarbha tradition to superiority over classical Śunyavāda. The Tathāgatagarbha, after all, is a tradition which argues forcefully that the reality of all things is as much "nonempty" (aśūnya; pu-k'ung) as it is "empty" (śūnya; k'ung) and which employs such un-Mādhyamika terminology in its locutions about reality as "permanence" (nītya; chang), "purity" (śubha; ching), and even "self" (ātman; wo).
A fourth option, and the one we take here, is to look at the differences among Mādhyamika and the other varieties of Mahāyāna through the eyes of those Chinese Buddhist who, in devising their own systems of thought, were given the opportunity to compare and choose. I refer here to the numerous sixth-and-seventh-century Chinese thinkers who formulated "division of the doctrine" (p'an-chiao) and similar schemes in the course of fashioning new and uniquely sinic schools of Buddhism. Almost without exception these thinkers chose to subordinate Śūnyavāda of the sort one finds in the Perfection of Insight literature and the Kārikās to other kinds of Mahāyāna, often to doctrines and texts of Tathāgatagarbha provenance or association. The Hua-yen p'an-chiao system, for example, relegated Śūnyavāda to the category of "incipient" or "elementary" (shih) Mahāyāna but held the Tathāgatagarbha tradition to be representative of an "advanced" or "final" (chung) Mahāyāna, both of which fell short of the perfection of its own "rounded" or "comprehensive" (yüan) teaching.
A theme that unites all of these challenges to Mādhyamika primacy—the Yoācāra, the Tathāgatagarbha, and the Chinese—is a profound dissatisfaction with the seemingly relentless apophasis of Nāgārjuna and, to a lesser extent, of his sources. All are able to acknowledge Nāgārjuna's caution—that uncritical use of the constructive language of philosophical views is a species of intellectual bondage—but they acknowledge it only as a caution, a corrective to false views. They insist, however, that the way of denial and negation, the unremitting distrust of positive language, is necessary but not sufficient unto enlightenment. It allows one to fend off error but does not actively advance one toward the truth and may even impede the practical religious life by generating more subtle forms of error and by inhibiting compassion. Therefore, the various alternatives to Mādhyamika that we have mentioned took it upon themselves to reassert the salvific value of kataphasis, the spiritual utility of positive and affirmative language. They chose, in short, eloquence over silence.
In what follows we offer for consideration one example of the rejection of an exclusive apophasis in favor of a disciplined kataphasis. We will examine the argument of a brief but important text entitled Discernments of the Dharma-Element of the Avataṁsaka (Hua-yen fa-chieh kuan-men) attributed to Tu-shunq (557-640), the reputed "first patriarch" of China's Hua-yen (Avataṁsaka) school of Buddhism. This very influential text has been put to many uses in the history of East Asian Buddhism, both within and without the Hua-yen tradition. It is, of course, not simply a text "about Buddhist theories of language." But without denying the broader range of its meanings we do suggest that it does serve our particular purpose well; it offers a significant vision of the place of language in the religious life. (Gimello, "Apophatic and Kataphatic Discourse in Mahāyāna," 117–20)
The factors contributing to this change in the nature and place of East Asian Buddhist Studies are too numerous to list in their entirety, and it is likely that not all of them are yet fully understood. No doubt influential are the new definitions of Religious and Intellectual History that have been entertained throughout the academy. New designs of advanced graduate training in the relevant disciplines and areas have surely also had their effects. However, two rather more specific factors deserve special notice, particularly in view of their relevance to the work here at hand. The first of these that needs to be appreciated is the extent to which western scholars of Chinese, Japanese, and Korean Buddhism have put themselves wisely in debt to Japanese scholarship. The Japanese have led the field of East Asian Buddhist Studies for several generations, and in recent decades they have succeeded in adding to the breadth and depth of their traditional learning in the subject a measure of critical sophistication in Philology and History that has set the standard which all others in the field must match. No
serious work on East Asian Buddhism is now being done in Europe or America that has not been deliberately
informed by the Japanese model. The other particular factor to be noted is the importance of the discovery
and exploitation of previously unknown or very little known primary sources of information. Foremost among
these, of course, are the manuscripts and xylographs of the now well known Tun-huang trove. Of a significance for the study of East Asian Buddhism comparable to the significance of the Dead Sea Scrolls for the early history of Judaism and Christianity, these texts have had especially revolutionary effects upon our
knowledge of the origins and early phases of Ch'an (Zen). Again, it has been Japanese scholars who have
taken the lead in editing, analyzing, and interpreting the hundreds of these texts in Chinese and Tibetan that bear on the early history of Ch'an, but now French scholars are also making very important contributions, and for some years yet to come the study of early Ch'an will continue to be one of the most exciting frontiers of advancement in East Asian Buddhist Studies wherever conducted. Also to be considered are the many other primary sources, apart from the Tun-huang materials, that have come to light in the past forty years or so and are now attracting scholarly attention. One thinks particularly of texts discovered in Korean monastic libraries or in hitherto little explored Japanese collections. These too have helped stimulate the growth and redefinition of East Asian Buddhist Studies that is currently underway.
It is the belief of the editors of the present volume that the essays which comprise it exemplify the trends sketched above. They either broach new topics or address older topics from new theoretical and methodological perspectives, and they are based in large measure on primary literature—much of it from the Tun-huang collection—which has been only recently discovered or which has previously eluded extended investigation. Moreover, all five of the essays are written by scholars who owe much to their Japanese teachers and who try to emulate those teachers in philological and historiographical rigor.
Ch'an and Hua-yen (Kegon) Buddhism have been chosen as the dual focus of this group of studies essentially for three reasons: First, because they
are major traditions of East Asian Buddhist thought and practice which were roughly contemporary with each
other in their origins and which influenced each other in important ways during the early centuries of their
development. Second, because they both loom large as examples of the East Asian transformation of Buddhism, i.e., of the remarkable process by which that originally Indian tradition took on the shape and substance first of a Chinese, and later of a Korean and a Japanese, religion; as such they serve as valuable
case studies in one of world history's most fascinating examples of religious change. Third, because they happen to be the subjects of some of the best work now being done, here and abroad, in the field of Buddhist Studies and so can serve well to index the changes underway in that field
The articles by Broughton, Gómez and McRae deal with early Ch'an and are based on texts in Chinese and Tibetan that were found among the Tun-huang manuscripts. All three shed substantively new light on the rise of what was to become one of the most crucial East Asian developments of Buddhism. The articles by Gregory and Gimello treat somewhat of Ch'an but mostly of Hua-yen—the latter especially in its "classical" phase during the eighth and ninth centuries, although they give some attention also to its later influences in other traditions of East Asian Buddhism. The Hua-yen articles are based primarily on materials which have long been available in standard editions of the Chinese Buddhist canon but which have been studied hardly at all in the West and only in the most preliminary way even in Japan. It is hoped that they will show, among other things, that the Hua-yen tradition is something more than its conventional reputation as a purely theoretical and rather cerebral form of Buddhism might lead one to believe.
Four of the five articles are much revised and expanded versions of papers delivered in 1980 at a Conference on East Asian Buddhism held in Los Angeles under the sponsorship of the Kuroda Institute for the Study of Buddhism and Human Values. The fifth, that by Luis Gómez, was especially solicited for the volume well after the conference. All of the articles were designed to comprise a collection that would serve not to introduce, survey, or sum up a field of study but to communicate new and ongoing advanced research. This will be the purpose also of the series, Studies in East Asian Buddhism, which this volume inaugurates. (Gimello, preface, 1983)
The first edition of this Buddhist Bible was published in 1932. When the need of a new edition became evident, it was decided to enlarge it so as to include other Scriptures of like importance so as to make it more comprehensive. This involved making a number of new translations for which we are indebted to Bhikshu Wai-tao. We are also indebted and are very grateful to a number of other Buddhist Scholars for permission to use their translations, as noted in the Appendix.
The compiling of a Buddhist Bible is a very different matter from compiling the Christian Bible. In the first place, there is no Hierarchy or Ecclesiastic Council to pass upon the authenticity of different scriptures, and as to their canonicity. In the second place, Christian Scriptures are a closed system of doctrines and dogmas that have been inspired by the Holy Spirit and are to be accepted in faith. Buddhism, on the contrary, is looked upon as a growing organism whose scriptures are of many kinds as the organism has developed under different racial, temporal and cultural conditions. As disciples follow the Buddha's Noble Path and practice dhyana concentration and intuitive meditation they have an unfolding experience of spiritual insight and grace which any one of them may describe and elucidate. Some of these expediences are of highest value, some of less value. Some are concerned with
the Dharma, some have to do with the rules of the Brotherhoods, some are philosophical, some psychological, some are commentaries and some are commentaries on commentaries. In the third place, there is the difference of quantity. In the Christian Bible there are sixty-six titles; Buddhist scriptures number over ten thousand, only a fraction of which have thus far been translated. In the Sung Dynasty about 972 AD a Chinese version of these scriptures was published consisting of 1521 works, in more than 5000 volumes, covering 130,000 pages.
The nearest approach to canonicity is the Pali Tripitika. That was the earliest collection and was supposed to be limited to the words of Buddha. Southern Buddhists are passionately devoted to these Pali Scriptures and are inclined to disparage and dispute the more philosophical scriptures of the Northern School that developed later after Buddhism had come in contact with other world religions in Persia, Palestine, Egypt and Greece. Under these conditions there developed in Northern India, and Kashgar, a succession of very able minds,
Ashvaghosha, Nargajuna, Vasobandhu and his brother Asangha from whose writings and teachings there developed various important schools of philosophical thought that profoundly changed the understanding of Buddha's Dharma.
Later on as Buddhism spread into China and came under the influence of its immemorial culture and practical good sense, it took on forms of Taoist naturalism and kindly humanism, and there developed forms of "salvation by faith in Amitabha's mercy" and rebirth in his Pure Land. While in Tibet, coming in contact with its ancient Bon religion, and
under the climatic conditions of its high altitudes, it took on forms of strenuousness and magic and tantric conceptions. Later on in Japan owing to political and social conditions incident to the presence of a limited but powerful noble class dominating a suppressed peasantry, which had developed extremes of loyalty and obedience and self-control, it took on forms of concentrative meditation known as Zen, and a still more widely divergent type of the True Pure Land Sect.
Naturally among these diverse conditions Buddhist scriptures vary widely, and the quantity of them being so enormous, they have become segregated into different groups as they are favored by different schools of thought and practice. The Tien-tai favor the more philosophical scriptures, the Shingon, the more esoteric, the Ch’an (Zen), the more intellectual, and the Pure Land, the more emotional. The present editor has been guided in his selection of scriptures for this Buddhist Bible by a sincere purpose to make the selection as comprehensive as possible within its limits and to represent as truly as possible the original teachings of the Blessed One both as understood by the Southern and more primitive school and by the Northern and more philosophical interpreters. He has also humbly tried to have the choice vouched for by his own spiritual experience in his practice of the Noble Path and especially during its Eighth Stage of intuitive Dhyana.
It follows, therefore, that the scriptures thus selected are the generally accepted scriptures of the Dhyana Sects—Ch’an in China, Zen in Japan and Kargyupta in Tibet. Of course among so enormous a collection of scriptures there are others that are favorites also, notably the Saddharma-pundarika (Lotus of the Perfect Law), and the Avatamsaka, said to be the grandest religious document ever written, but these are very large books in themselves. The late W. E. Soothil of London left a very careful translation of the Lotus that still waits a publisher. Dr. Suzuki of Kyoto has made a translation of the Gandhavyuha sections of the Avatamsaka that is now in process of being published. The inclusion of Laotzu’s Tao-teh-king is open to question as it is not strictly a Buddhist
text, but its teaching has such a close affinity to Buddhist teaching and nearly all early Chinese Masters of Buddhism were Taoist scholars who, upon becoming Buddhists, did not give up their Taoist conceptions and terms, and because the Laotzuan teaching in the Tao-teh-king has had such a wholesome
influence on the development of Chinese Buddhism, and, in later years, wherever the Tao-teh-king is held in reverence, it has tended to restrain individual pride of egoism, religious ceremonial, ecclesiasticism, priestcraft and insincerity generally, we make no apology for including it. In fact, it is our earnest wish that the Tao-teh-king may become one of the foundation stones of American and European Buddhism.
Further introductory notes are reserved for the Appendix
under the heads of the individual Scriptures, as are also -grateful appreciation to those who have contributed to the preparation and publication of this Bible, especially to those Buddhist scholars who have courteously granted the Editor permission to use their translations for this purpose
Just a closing word as to the rules that have guided the
Editor in his choice and handling of textual material. He has always kept in mind the spiritual needs of his readers. This Buddhist Bible is not intended to be a source book for critical literary and historical study. It is only intended to be a source of spiritual inspiration designed to awaken faith and to develop faith into aspiration and full realization. The original texts having for centuries been carried in memory and transcribed by hand by scribes who were often more loyal to their Master than to historical exactness, are often overloaded with interpolations and extensions, and in places are confused and obscure. To carry out the design of the Editor, he has omitted a great deal of matter not bearing directly upon the theme of
the particular Scripture, and has interpreted occasionally where it seemed necessary and advisable, in order to provide an easier and more inspiring reading. The need for this course will become apparent to every earnest minded disciple.
In these days when Western civilization and culture is buffeted as never before by foreboding waves of materialism and selfish aggrandisement both individual and national, Buddhism seems to hold out teachings of highest promise. For two thousand years Dhyana Buddhism has powerfully conditioned the cultural, ethical and spiritual life of the great Oriental nations. It well may be the salvation of Western civilization. Its rationality, its discipline, its emphasis on simplicity and sincerity, its thoughtfulness, its cheerful industry not for profit but for service, its love for all animate life, its restraint of desire in all its subtle forms, its actual foretastes of enlightenment and blissful peace, its patient acceptance of karma and rebirth, all mark it out as being competent to meet the problems of this excitement loving, materialistic, acquisitive and thoughtless age.
Its basic principle of an eternal process based on unchanging law and operating in eternal recurrence, leading to mind-control, to highest cognition, to purest conceptions of love and compassion, to ever clearing insight, to highest perfect wisdom, to the self-giving of Bodhisattvas, and Buddhas, to blissful peace, is worthy of confidence; and its Noble Path worthy of
trial.
The theme of this Buddhist Bible is designed to show the unreality of all conceptions of a personal ego. Its purpose is to awaken faith in Buddhahood as being one’s true self-nature; to kindle aspiration to realize one’s true Buddha-nature; to energize effort to follow the Noble Path, to become Buddha. The true response to the appeal of this Buddhist Bible is not in outward activities, but in self-yielding, becoming a clear channel for Buddhahood's indrawing compassion, that all sentient beings may become emancipated, enlightened and brought to Buddhahood. (Goddard, preface, v–viii)
The author’s introductory essay provides an analysis of the historical and intellectual contexts in which the text was composed, including its complex interrelationship with Hindu Śaiva traditions, and investigates the history of its adaptation by Buddhists. The translation was made on the basis of the surviving Sanskrit manuscripts of the Tantra and its commentaries, as well as parallel passages in related explanatory tantras (vyākhyātantra). It is also takes into consideration two different Tibetan translations of the root text, and several Tibetan commentaries. The translation itself is heavily annotated, with extensive translations from the Indian and Tibetan commentaries on the text. Includes a trilingual glossary and index. (Source: The American Institute of Buddhist Studies)
This thesis explores the development of an important Indian Buddhist scripture. the Cakrasaṃvara Tantra, and the tradition of exegesis and practice based upon it. It consists of an edition and translation of the first four chapters of the Cakrasaṃvara Tantra, as well as a translation of the corresponding portion of Tsongkhapa's Total Illumination of the Hidden Meaning, a Tibetan commentary on this scripture. These texts are contextualized via efforts to define "Tantric Buddhism" as it is understood by the tradition itself, and via explorations of both the intellectual and socio-historical contexts within which Tantric Buddhism developed, and the ways in which different subtraditions within it were elaborated and categorized.
It is argued that a common element of Tantric traditions is their resistance to the hegemonic ideology of caste. An exploration of this ideology and Buddhist resistance to it is undertaken. Tantric discourse was deployed as a form of resistance against caste ideology, but also constituted a counter ideology, which centered around the figure of the guru as a nexus of power and authority, and articulated in the model of the maṇḍala.
The Cakrasaṃvara Tantra, is notable for the strong presence of "non-Buddhist elements." The Cakrasaṃvara Tantra, is a composite text drawing from diverse sources, and while it probably reached its final form in a Buddhist monastic context, there is significant textual evidence suggesting that it was the product of a non-monastic, renunciant milieu in which sectarian identification was not particularly relevant. The Cakrasaṃvara Tantra, is, in Levi Strauss' terms, a bricolage. It provides a particularly striking example of the processes of adaptation and reinterpretation which have continually led to the development of religious traditions. The Cakrasaṃvara's identification as a Buddhist tradition was the result of the efforts of commentators in India who constructed it as such, and by Tibetan commentators, who completed this process of adaptation.
case study in order to ask whether the pursuit of "true Buddhism" is not in turn positing some sort of dhātu-vāda-like essence of Buddhism, hence mirroring the object of its own criticism. Preferring to see Buddhism as a "product of a complex set of interdependent and ever-changing conditions (pratītyasamutpāda),” he looks at Tsung-mi's thought not to determine whether or not it is "truly Buddhist" but in order to discover the causes and conditions that brought it into existence. In a manner similar to Sallie King's argument that Buddha-nature can be understood as a catalyst for positive social change, Gregory argues that for Tsung-mi the doctrine of original enlightenment was tied not to a linguistic transcendentalism but rather to an affirmation of language in response to the more radical critiques of the prajñā-pāramitā tradition. (Hubbard, introduction to Pruning the Bodhi Tree, xvii)
Chinese Buddhist thought. Unlike other more technical expositions of Buddhist teachings, Inquiry into the Origin of Humanity (Yuan Jen lun) does not presuppose a detailed knowledge of Buddhist doctrine. In a brief and accessible fashion, it presents a systematic overview of the major teachings within Chinese Buddhism. The organizational framework used by Tsung-mi, moreover, represents one of the primary methods devised by Chinese Buddhists to organize and make sense of the diverse body of teachings they received from India. Finally, Tsung-mi's essay is especially noteworthy in that it sheds light on the interaction of Buddhism with the indigenous intellectual and religious traditions of Confucianism and Taoism. Peter N. Gregory's commentary, which follows a running translation of the work, will help bridge the temporal and cultural gap separating contemporary Western readers from the text's intended medieval Chinese audience. (Source: back cover)
attempting to elucidate it much depends upon how one chooses to categorize
Tathagatagarbha as a system, upon the decisions one makes as to which terms,
concepts, argument-patterns and so forth must be present in order for it to be proper
to characterize some text or text-fragment as representing that system. These are
large questions, much too large to enter upon in this paper; my purpose here is
much more limited. I intend to offer a reasonably detailed exposition of a set of
sixteen verses from the ninth chapter of the Mahāyānasūtrâlaṅkāra [MSA] (IX.22-
37). These verses deal, or so the bhāṣya tells us, with the "profundity of the
undefiled realm" (anāsravadhātugāmbhīrya), and they conclude (37) with the only
use of the term tathāgatagarbha in the entire text There is little doubt that this is one
of the few early occurrences of the term in Indian Buddhist texts surviving in
Sanskrit; a relatively detailed study of these verses may perhaps shed some light
upon the historical and doctrinal questions just mentioned.
The systematic question underlying my comments upon these verses throughout will be: what is the relation between the ground of awakening, that which makes it possible, and the fact of awakening, its essential properties?
In what follows I shall provide ftrst a brief introduction to the of the MSA-corpus; I shall then place MSA IX.22-37 in its context within the text as a whole, and shall translate the verses in full and offer expository comments on them, drawing in so doing upon the surviving Indic commentaries. (Griffiths, Painting Space with Colors, 41–42)
The book shows that Buddhist thinkers were driven, when theorizing about Buddha, by a basic intuition that Buddha must be maximally perfect, and that pursuing the implications of this intuition led them into some conceptual dilemmas that show considerable similarity to some of those treated by western theists. The Indian Buddhist tradition of thought about these matters is presented here as thoroughly systematic, analytical, and doctrinal.
The book's analysis is based almost entirely upon original sources in their original languages. All extracts discussed are translated into English and the book is accessible to nonspecialists, while still treating material that has not been much discussed by western scholars.
(Source: back cover)
Unlike the recluses and eccentrics that have so often attracted Western readers of Buddhism, Ryogen was a consummate politician and builder. Because he lost his major monastic sponsor at an early age, he was forced to find ways to advance his career with little support. His activities reveal much about the path to success for monks during the tenth century. Skill in debate, the performance of Esoteric Buddhist ritual, and strategic alliances with powerful lay and monastic figures were important to his advance. In 966 Ryogen was appointed head of the Tendai School and served until his death nineteen years later. He has been vilified at times for his loyalty to his own faction within Tendai at the expense of other groups. Careful analysis of the political and social factors behind his attitudes, however, places his activities in their appropriate context.
The study concludes with a discussion of the ordinations and roles of nuns during the early Heian period. An examination of Ryogen's close relation with his mother helps define the ambiguities of a school that prohibited women from the precincts of its temple yet performed rituals to insure safe childbirth and frequently attracted their patronage. A number of primary sources are translated in the appendices. (Source: University of Hawai'i Press)
I do not intend here to try to resolve all of the many questions involved in determining the author of the AFM (such an undertaking is well beyond the scope of a short paper), but I would like to address an argument that Professor Lai raised in the first of his articles—namely his contention that the AFM's exposition of the relationship of hsin (mind) and nien (thought, thought-moment) bears such an "unmistakable sinitic stamp" that it must have been authored in China. I will try to show that the AFM's central conception of an "unmoved," pure mind (hsin) existing as the basis of the deluded movement of thoughts (nien) has an important Indian precedent in the cittaprakṛti and ayoniśomanaskāra notions of the Ratnagotravibhāga-mahāyānottaratantraśāstra (hereafter referred to as the RGV), a text with which the AFM's author may well have been familiar. I do not intend this as a criticism of Professor Lai's research—the parallels he finds between Chinese thought regarding hsin and nien prior to the period of the Six Dynasties and the elucidation of these notions in the AFM deserve serious attention. I simply would like to show that similar parallels—if not direct textual influences—exist between the AFM and the Indian-composed RGV, so that there is no compelling reason to conclude that the AFM theory of mind (hsin) and thoughts (nien) demonstrates Chinese authorship. (Grosnick, "Cittaprakṛti and Ayoniśomanaskāra in the Ratnagotravibhāga," 35–36)
Nature" that the practice of the path is possible. (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to Buddha Nature, 4)
The idea of the tathāgatagarbha was later to form the nucleus of the concept of buddha nature (buddhadhātu) in the Sino-Japanese Buddhist tradition. And concepts of both the tathāgatagarbha and the buddha nature underwent extensive doctrinal development in important Mahāyāna sūtras and influential commentaries. But whereas later treatises generally give a highly philosophical interpretation to the tathāgatagarbha, it is doubtful that any such sophisticated understanding was intended by the author(s) of the Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra. In the Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra, the concept of the tathāgatagarbha is promulgated primarily to inspire beings with the confidence to seek buddhahood, and to persuade them that despite their poverty, suffering, and bondage to passion, they still have the capacity to attain the ultimate goal of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the perfect enlightenment of the Tathāgata.
The term tathāgatagarbha has often been translated by Western scholars as "matrix of the tathāgata," but "matrix" does not exhaust the wide range of meanings of the Sanskrit term garbha. The author of the Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra seems to have been well aware of this, since he employs many of these different meanings of garbha in the various similes with which he illustrates the meaning of the tathāgatagarbha. In its most common usage, garbha means "womb," and the eighth simile of the sūtra likens the tathāgatagarbha to an impoverished, vile, and ugly woman who bears a noble, world-conquering king in her womb. But garbha can also mean "fetus," so the garbha in the eighth simile may also refer to the son who is within her womb. Garbha can also refer to the calyx of a flower, the cuplike leafy structure that enfolds the blossom, and the image in the sūtra's opening scene of conjured buddha forms seated within lotus flowers seems to be predicated on this meaning. Garbha can also mean "inner room," or "hidden chamber," or "sanctuary" (as in the garbhagṛha of a Hindu temple, which houses the image of the deity, or the rounded dome [garbha] of a Buddhist stūpa, which houses the precious relics of the Buddha). It is probably this meaning of garbha that the author of the sūtra intends in the fifth simile of the sūtra, when he speaks of the tathāgatagarbha as being like a hidden chamber or a secret store of treasure hidden beneath the house of a poor man. (The Chinese may have had this simile in mind when they chose the term tsang, "secret store," to translate garbha). Garbha can also refer to the outer husk that covers a fruit or seed or, by extension, to the seed itself. The third and sixth similes of the sūtra, which compare the tathāgatagarbha to the useless husk surrounding an edible kernel of wheat and to the mango pit that can grow into the most regal of trees, make direct use of this sense. Finally, garbha can refer to the inside, middle, or interior of anything, and it is this widest meaning that the author of the sūtra is employing when he likens the tathāgatagarbha to gold hidden inside a pit of waste, to honey hidden inside a swarm of angry bees, or to a golden statue hidden inside a wrapping of dirty rags or within a blackened mold.
The majority of the Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra's similes portray something extremely precious, valuable, or noble (such as buddhas, honey, kernels of wheat, gold, treasure, golden statues, or future princes), contained within something abhorrent and vile (such as rotting petals, angry bees, useless husks, excrement, poor hovels, dirty rags, soot-covered molds, and impoverished, ugly women). So the central meaning of the tathāgatagarbha concept is clear: within each and every person there exists something extremely valuable—the possibility of becoming a tathāgata—but that valuable potential for buddhahood is hidden by something vile—the sufferings and passions and vicissitudes of life. But to carry the interpretation further and to look for a deeper meaning to the tathāgatagarbha concept of this early text would probably be wrong, for when one looks more closely at the various similes used to illustrate the tathāgatagarbha, certain inconsistencies begin to emerge. For example, although most of the similes portray the precious reality within as something already complete in itself, two of the similes clearly indicate that the precious reality will only reach its perfected state in the future. The conjured buddhas within the lotus flowers are already fully enlightened, the honey and the wheat kernel are already edible, the gold in the waste pit is already pure and in no need of refinement, and the golden statues are already fully cast, whereas, by contrast, it will take many years for the embryo in the poor woman's womb to become a world conqueror, and more years still for the mango pit to become a full-grown tree. (Grosnick, "The Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra," 92–93)
In light of all this, it might seem rather daring to suggest that an Indian actually composed the AFM, but that is what I propose to argue. I do not intend to suggest that the Sarvāstivādin Aśvaghoṣa, or even a "Mahāyāna Aśvaghoṣa" composed the AFM. The first place that any Aśvaghoṣa is listed as the author of the text is in Hui-yüan's Ta-ch'êng i chang, a work composed about a half century after Paramārtha was said to have translated the AFM, so the attribution of the text to Aśvaghoṣa probably postdated its composition. But there are a couple of pieces of important philological evidence, heretofore largely overlooked, that seem to point strongly to an Indian Buddhist, most likely Paramārtha himself, as the real author of the text, or at least of major parts of it. The first piece of evidence is the use in the AFM of the three categories of t'i, hsiang, and yung, categories which I will try to show were derived by the author of the AFM from Sanskrit categories used in the Ratnagotravibhāgamahāyānottaratantraśāstra (RGV) and which could not have been formulated by anyone who did not possess a knowledge of Sanskrit. The second piece of evidence is Paramārtha's interpolation of passages from the RGV into the Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya (MSbh), which seems to show not only that Paramārtha was intimately familiar with the RGV and its categories, but also that he was personally concerned about issues central to the AFM. When examined together with some interesting biographical details from accounts of Paramārtha's life, this evidence seems to suggest the very real possibility that Paramārtha was the author of the AFM. (Grosnick, introduction, 65–66)
Great is the power of memory, exceeding great, O my God—an inner chamber large and boundless (penetrale amplum et infinitum)! Who has plumbed its depths? Yet it is a poer of mine, and apertains unto my nature; nor do I myself grasp all that I am (nec ego ipse capio totum, quod sum). . . . A great admiration rises upon me; astonishment seizes me. And men go forth to wonder at the heights of mountains, the huge waves of the sea, the broad flow of the rivers, the extent of the ocean, and the courses of the stars, and omit to wonder at themselves (et reliquunt se ipsos).
This concern with the memoria, and its function in the human mind, was to be one of the most important spiritual legacies Augustine would leave to the Latin, and especially monastic, Middle Ages. In fact, it would be possible to say without much exaggeration that the entire history of monastic spirituality in the Latin Middle Ages (at least until approximately A.D. 1200) is the record of the development of understanding of the power of memoria. A central reason for this is that memoria was described as a faculty that worked by recalling the human person to the knowledge and intuition that they were created in the image and likeness of God. Thus the words of Genesis 1:26–27 stand at the beginning of an entire spiritual tradition: "God said let us make man in our own image, in the likeness of ourselves. . . . God created man in the image of himself, in the image of God he created him, male and female he created them." Augustine frequently exhorts himself, as in Confessions 7.10, to "return to myself" (redite ad memet ipsum). This was also the continual refrain of the Cistercian author of the twelfth century, William of St. Thierry, in his Golden Epistle, and it serves as one of the themes on which he builds this work. William's treatise, folloing in the path of Augustine, is a call to discover the image and likeness of God in the individual person.
In the presentation to follow I would like to set out two spiritual traditions for us to consider: the image-likeness tradition based on Genesis 1:26 and developed by the Latin and Greek Fathers of the Church until approximately A.D. 1200, and the tathāgatagarbha teachings on Buddha-nature in Mahayana Buddhism, which flourished in India and then spread to Tibet and other parts of the Far East in the first six centuries C.E. I shall do this bby presenting two texts: the Golden Epistle of William of St, Thierry, and the Ratnagotravibhāga (third to fifth centuries A.D.), variously attributed to Saramati or Maitreya. My thesis here is that while the language and concepts used in these two treatises are different, and the two worldviews of which they are representative also vary widely, we can find nonetheless underlying themes that express central concerns of each tradition, especially concerning the brith of a basic nature in the person, and the inability of either sin or defilements (kleśa) to cover over that nature that is coming to birth. (Groves, "Image-likeness and Tathāgatagarbha," 97–98)
As Chögyam Trungpa writes in his foreword: "It is in the flow of karma that this book materialized in 1959 on the very eve of the destruction of the spiritual land of Tibet. Professor Guenther was instrumental in making available the only commentary and guide in English to the bodhisattva tradition of Tibet, Japan, and China. The book remains the classic text of all Buddhists."
sGam.po.pa, who lived in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, was the organizer of the Kagyü order of Tibetan Buddhism.
Herbert V. Guenther is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Far Eastern Studies at the University of Saskatchewan.
(Source: back cover)
(Source: back cover)
(Source: back cover)
which the positions taken by the actual participants can be correlated with the complex of issues contained within the sudden-gradual rubric. Hence the subitist on one occasion may well espouse a number of doctrinal positions held by the gradualist on another. Subitists and gradualists, moreover, often appealed to the same doctrine in support of their position. For example, in the most famous instance of the controversy, the exchange of poems that the Platform Sutra alleges were composed by Shen-hsiu and Hui-neng, both parties based their positions on the notion of an intrinsically enlightened Buddha-nature. (Gregory, introduction, 6)
In the analysis of the texts, the author suggests that Mo-ho-yen's doctrinal position was that of an extreme non-dualist who thought practice came after enlightenment. Consequently Mo-ho-yen denied the value of means to that enlightenment, yet he still had to allow for a means for people of lesser abilities. This admission probably gave his opponents grounds for criticism.
There is a glossary of Tibetan terms and their Chinese equivalents based on a comparison of the fragments in Tibetan with the Chinese of the Tun-wu Ta-sheng cheng-li chüeh which depicts Mo-ho-yen's side of the dispute (for which it may have been profitable to consult Hasebe Koichi's edition from the Pelliot and Stein Chinese manuscripts, the "Toban Bukkyō to Zen", Aichigakuin Daigaku bungakubu kiyō no. 1). Gomez in fact suggests that terminological ambiguity was one source of misunderstanding between the Chinese and Indian parties. Recently R.A. Stein has begun work on the Tibetan translations of Chinese and Indian vocabulary ("Tibetica Antiqua", BEFEO 72, 1983) which sheds more light on the subject. For example, lun and mdo (Gomez p. 87, notes 23 and 39), or gzhung and gzhun (Gomez p. 140) are interpreted slightly differently by Stein (pp. 175-6 and p. 179 respectively). (John Jorgensen, "Review of Studies in Ch'an and Hua-yan," JIABS 9, no. 2 (1986): 177–78).
Comparing the Sanskrit fragments and the Ratnagotravibhāga, which quotes the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra (that is the Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra), the original Sanskrit word fóxìng is buddhadhātu, tathāgatadhātu or tathāgatagarbha. Takasaki Jikidō's research on the tathāgatagarbha theory led him to conclude that the Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra is the first known text in which the word buddhadhātu is used in this meaning.
I have been studying the original text of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra for some time, analyzing the Sanskrit fragments in comparison with the Tibetan and Chinese translations. From the viewpoint of the original text, the meaning of the formula "Every living being has the Buddha-nature" reveals nuances slightly different from the interpretations adopted in Chinese and Japanese Buddhism. (Habata, introduction, 176–77)
Volume 32
This treatise, The Awakening of Faith, sometimes known by the longer title of The Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana, presents a concise synopsis of both the theoretical and practical aspects of the central ideas of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and has therefore been widely read as an introduction to this branch. A short work, it remains extremely important in the history of Buddhism, having exerted influence in China and Japan on the schools of Hua-yen (Jp. Kegon), T'ien-t'ai (Jp. Tendai), Chan/Zen, Pure Land (Ch. Jìngtǔzōng; Jp. Jōdo Bukkyō), Chên-yen (Jp. Shingon), and more.
However, many questions remain concerning the author and place of composition, including whether it was composed in India or China, and whether the attributive author Aśvaghoṣa lived before or after Nāgārjuna.
Source Skt. *Mahāyānaśraddhotpāda-śāstra, attributed to Aśvaghoṣa. Brought into the Chinese by Paramārtha as Dasheng qixin lun (大乘起信論). 1 fascicle.
Editor’s Note: This is a reprint of the sutra as translated by the late Dr. Yoshito S. Hakeda and originally published by Columbia University Press. This reprint edition retains Dr. Hakeda's chapter and subdivision headings and his commentaries, which are set in italicized paragraphs within the text itself. (Source: BDK America)
The work is a comprehensive summary of the essentials of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the product of a mind extraordinarily apt at synthesis. It begins with an examination of the nature of the Absolute or enlightenment and of the phenomenal world or nonenlightenment and discusses the relationships that exist between them; from there, it passes on to the question of how man may transcend his finite state and
participate in the life of the infinite while still remaining in the midst of the phenomenal order; it concludes with a discussion of particular practices and techniques that will aid the believer in the awakening and growth of his faith. In spite of its deep concern with philosophical concepts and definitions, therefore, it is essentially a religious work, a map drawn by a man of unshakable faith, which will guide the believer to the peak of understanding. But the map and the peak are only provisional symbols, skillful and expedient ways employed to bring men to enlightenment. The text and all the arguments in it exist not for their own sake but for the sake of this objective alone. The treatise is, indeed, a true classic of Mahāyāna Buddhism. (Hakeda, introduction, 1–2)
Here, we give the tex of the Tattvasańgraha along with the Tattvasańgrahapañjikā in full. Unlike in the previous fragment, our commentary is brief, and due to its fragmentary nature, it is hard to understand. Having the Tattvasańgrahapañjikā next to our text greatly helps in reconstructing and understanding our text. (Harimoto and Kano, introduction, 5)
Notes:
1. For general introduction to the fragments, see Harimoto & Kano 2008.
By down-playing the late commentorial traditions, the author attempts a general reappraisal of the epistemological and ontological writings of Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. He concludes that the overlap in all areas of doctrine is significant, but particularly with respect to the teachings on the levels of truth, the enlightened and unenlightened states, the status of language and the nature of reality
It is hoped that such investigations may provide the basis for a new theory on the proliferation of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism as an organic process of assimilation to new audiences, and specific contemporary problems, rather than in the more schismatic manner favoured by past researchers. (Source: Brill)
As a summary of the Trikāya doctrine this is, of course, oversimplified. We are dealing here with a complex theory which underwent many accretions and refinements, as Buddhists continued down through the centuries to speculate on the nature of Buddhahood, on the nature of reality, and on the relationship
between them.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000196-QINU`"' It is hardly surprising, then, that attempts to plot the course of such arcane speculations have not always been entirely successful in reaching a clear consensus, although the arguments advanced, even in recent writing on the subject, do tend to follow similar lines. A good example of this is the authoritative treatment by Nagao, "On the Theory of Buddha-body (Buddha-kāya)," first published in English in 1973.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000197-QINU`"' Generally Nagao distinguishes three phases: an initial one-body theory, a two-body theory, and the three-body theory elaborated by the Yogācāras. According to him (p. 104), the two-body theory (i.e., rūpa-kāya and dharma-kāya) "became stabilized in a variety of earlier sūtras,'"`UNIQ--ref-00000198-QINU`"' and in early Mahāyāna sūtras, the Prajñāpāramitā, the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, and so forth. The rūpa-kāya is the Buddha seen in a human body, while the dharma-kāya is the Buddha's personality seen in the dharma or dharma-nature." Elsewhere (pp. 106–7) Nagao states that the two-body theory was the one held "until the time of the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra and the time of Nāgārjuna," even though the raw materials for the third body, the saṃbhoga-kāya, were also to hand before the time of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, as a consequence of the bodhisattva-conccpt and the idea that a bodhisattva's performance of meritorious actions produced a body which was their manifest "reward." Nagao's article contains many valuable observations, but, as we shall see, some of its assertions are rather too imprecise, both chronologically and philosophically, to be of much use in unravelling the early development of the doctrine at issue. Another recent treatment of the subject by Makransky (1989) also describes certain features of the putative earlier two-body theory before the Yogācāras remodelled it (see esp. pp. 51–53), and distinguishes it sharply from the previous Mainstream'"`UNIQ--ref-00000199-QINU`"' (in this case, Sarvāstivādin) formulations. This analysis, too, is open to question in certain respects, as I shall show. In these and other articles on the subject'"`UNIQ--ref-0000019A-QINU`"' there is a general tendency to postulate a one-body/two-body/three-body progression, in terms of which a single personality is divided into a physical and a "spiritual" body, and then the physical body is further split in two, yielding the final complement of three. Some writers, however, point to the existence of three bodies even in the Pali sources, what one scholar has called the "primitive triad," i.e., pūti- or cātur-mahābhūtika-kāya, mano-maya-kāya, and dhamma-kāya.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000019B-QINU`"' The first is the corruptible physical body formed out of the four elements, while the second is the mind-made body with which the Buddha visits the celestial realms (believed by some to be a forerunner of the saṃbhoga-kāya); the third is the so-called "Dhamma-body." Now, although both these ways of approaching the subject—the assumption of a linear process, and the belief that the Pāli Canon contains an embryonic Trikāya schema—raise certain difficulties, I do not propose in this paper to discuss the evolution of the Trikāya theory in its entirety, since that would be a mammoth undertaking. What I wish to do is address one aspect of it only, viz., the early development of the idea of dharma-kāya, in the hope that clarifying this will open the way to a better understanding of Mahāyāna buddhology as a whole. (Harrison, introduction, 44–46)
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See especially chapter 10, Bhavaṅga and the Brightly Shining Mind.
In a careful analysis of the historical and rhetorical basis of the literature, Steven Heine demonstrates that the Mu version of the case, preferred by advocates of the key-phrase approach, does not by any means constitute the final word concerning the meaning and significance of the Mu Koan. He shows that another canonical version, which gives both "Yes" and "No" responses, must be taken into account. Like Cats and Dogs offers critical insight and a new theoretical perspective on "the koan of koans." (Source: Oxford University Press)
Pabhassara Sutta
Kevaddha Sutta
Nibbana Sutta
Ashtasahasrika Prajnaparamita Sutra
Samdhinirmochana Sutra
Mahaparinirvana Sutra
Shrimaladevi Sutra
Tathagatagarbha Sutra
Lankavatara Sutra
Bodhidharma’s Breakthrough Sermon
Sengcan’s Song of the Trusting Mind
Hongren’s Treatise on the Supreme Vehicle
Huineng’s Platform Sutra
Yongjia’s Song of Realizing the Way
Shitou’s Record
Shitou’s Song of the Grass-Roof Hermitage
Dongshan’s Song of the Jewel Mirror Samadhi
Caoshan’s Verse
Guishan’s Record
Mazu’s Record
Baizhang’s Record
Huangbo’s Transmission of Mind
Linji’s Record
Nanquan’s Record
Changsha’s Record
Yunmen’s Record
Yuanwu’s Letters
Hongzhi’s Record
Dogen’s Treasury of the True Dharma Eye
Ejo’s Absorption in the Treasury of Light
Keizan’s Transmission of Light
32nd Ancestor Hongren
34th Ancestor Qingyuan
38th Ancestor Dongshan
40th Ancestor Dongan
46th Ancestor Tanxia
49th Ancestor Xuedou
52nd Ancestor Dogen
53rd Ancestor Ejo
Chinul’s Complete Sudden Attainment of Buddhahood
Chinul’s Secrets of Cultivating the Mind
Bassui’s One Mind
Bankei’s Record
Hakuin’s Four Cognitions
Menzan’s Self-Enjoyment Samadhi
Shunryu Suzuki’s Mind Waves (from "Zen Mind, Beginner’s Mind")
Shunryu Suzuki’s Resuming Big Mind (from "Not Always So")
Padmasambhava’s Self-Liberation through Seeing with Naked Awareness
Dakpo Tashi Namgyal’s Clarifying the Natural State
Karma Chagmey’s Union of Mahamudra and Dzogchen
Jamgon Mipham’s Lamp that Dispels Darkness
To understand what is meant by “Buddha Nature,” we can look at the story of the three turnings of the wheel of Dharma taught by Shakyamuni Buddha. The first turning of the Dharma wheel is the four noble truths: that discontent arises from grasping the ever-changing phenomena of body and mind as “me,” and that freedom from this discontent is revealed through the path of not grasping anything as truly me. The four noble truths is a kind of deconstruction method. However, in this first turning, all the different elements that we can deconstruct this person into really do exist. Earth, wind, fire and water, for example: those kind of physical elements, when you break them down into their smallest bits, are indestructible elemental energies or physical matter, atoms. Early Buddhists, who were first turning exponents, had this kind of theory—that the world is made up of atoms—several centuries B.C., long before modern scientists discovered atoms. We don’t really exist as independent “persons”; we are a conglomeration of all this stuff that we think is a real “me,” but if we look closely, we only find atoms. This turning of the Dharma wheel was only the first.
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"This nomenclature tells us much about the central philosophical aims and presuppositions of the Eighth Karma pa and his Karma bka’ brgyud tradition. As a Mahāmudrā proponent, Mi bskyod rdo rje gives primacy to innate modes of being and awareness, such as coemergent wisdom or buddha nature naturally endowed with qualities, that are amenable only to direct yogic perception and revealed through the personal guidance of a qualified teacher. As an exponent of yuganaddha (zung ’jug), i.e., unity (literally, “yoking together”), he espouses the tantric goal of unity beyond extremes, a goal grounded in the inseparability of the two truths or realities (bden gnyis dbyer med), of appearance and emptiness (snang stong dbyer med). In his eyes, this unity is only fully realized when one understands that the conventional has no independent existence apart from the ultimate and that the latter is a condition of possibility of the former. As an advocate of apratiṣṭhāna (rab tu mi gnas pa), i.e., nonfoundationalism, he resolutely maintains that all outer and inner phenomena, including deep features of reality disclosed through meditation, lack any ontic or epistemic essence or foundation that the mind can lay hold of. Finally, as a champion of Madhyamaka, i.e., the Buddhist Middle Way, the author attempts to ply a middle course between the extremes of existence and nonexistence, eternalism and nihilism. These various doxographical strands are deftly interwoven in the Karma pa’s view of buddha nature, which affirms the innate presence of buddha nature and its qualities in all sentient beings as well as their soteriological efficacy while denying either any ontological status." (Higgins and Draszczyk, preface, 14)
Notes
- Wangchuk, "rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations" 179. "Yet even though the [buddha-nature] theory has certainly been present from early times in the rÑiṅ-ma literature, it seems to have played quite an insignificant role and never gained prominence or an independent status, in the way it was conceived, for instance, in the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra" This conclusion is repeated by Almogi, Rong-zom-pa's Discourse on Buddhology 160.
- For a detailed discussion of the term buddha-nature, see Zimmermann 2002, 39-40.
- Although *sugatagarbha is not attested in Sanskrit (see Seyfort Ruegg, Traite du tathagatagarbha 68), Wangchuk, "rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations" 178 and n. 21, points out (on the basis of references provided to him by Kazuo Kano) that "the term bde gśegs sñiṅ po does occur in the Tibetan translations of the Aṅgulimālīyasūtra (P fol. 174a5; D fol. 166b2: bde gśegs sñiṅ po theg pa che las skyes) and Ghanavyūhasūtra (P fol. 62b 1; D fol. 55b 1: bde gśegs sñiṅ po dge ba'aṅ de; cf., however, Taisho 747a7) for which the Sanskrit is not extant." We may add that the term bde [bar] gshegs [pa'i] snying po occurs in a large number of Tibetan translations of Indian works. A search of the Derge Bka' 'gyur and Bstan 'gyur canons using the contraction bde gshegs snying po turned up occurrences in the following sūtras in addition to those mentioned earlier: Bhadrakalpika (D 94), Sūtrasammucayabhāṣtaratnālokālaṃkāra (D 3935), Laṅkāvatāravṛttitathāgatahṛdayālaṃkāra (D 4031), and Sūtrālaṃkārapaṇḍārtha (D4031). It is also found in twenty-two tantric works: D 453, 829, 832, 833, 834, 837 (these last four belong to the Māyājāla-Guhyagarbha cycle), 1202, 1401, 1407, 1414, 1613, 1630, 1644, 2128, 2304, 2626, 2816, 2834, 2837, 3713, 3723, and 4449. The unabbreviated bde bar gshegs pa'i snying po occurs in the following tantric works: Kaṇha's Hevajranāmamahātantrarājadvikalpamāyapañjikāsṃrtinipāda (Rgyud kyi rgyal po dgyes pa'i rdo rje zhes bya ba sgyu ma brtag pa gnyis pa'i dka 'grel dran pa'i 'byung gnas), which, however, does not contain the term buddha-nature, D 1187; Mañjuśrīnāmasaṃgītiṭīkāvimalaprabhā ('Jam dpal gyi mtshan yang dag par brjod pa'i grel pa dri ma med pa'i od), D 1398; Bhagavatsarvadurgatipariśodhanatejorajatathāgatāhatsamyaksaṃbuddhamahātantrarājavyākhyāsundarālaṃkāra (Bcom Idan 'das de bzhin gshegs pa dgra bcom pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas ngan song thams cad yongs su sbyong ba gzi brjid kyi rgyal po chen po'i rnam par bshad pa mdzes pa'i rgyan), D 2626; Vajravidāraṇānāmadhāraṇīpaṭalakramabhāṣyavṛttipradīpa (Rdo rje rnam par 'joms pa'i gzung zhes bya ba'i rim par phye ba'i rgya cher 'grel ba gsal ba'i sgron ma), D 2687; Tantrārthāvatāravyākhyāna (Rgyud kyi don la 'jug pa'i grel bshad), D 2502; Mahābalikarmakramavṛtti (Gtor ma chen po'i las kyi rim pa'i grel pa), D 3773. This is not the place for an analysis of these occurrences. It is hoped that future research may determine whether any of them can be traced to an extant Indian work containing the term *sugatagarbha.
- On problems of Tibetan historical periodization and a useful variant based on existing schemes, see Cuevas, "Some Reflections." For a useful doctrinal-historical periodization scheme based on developments in Tibetan Buddhist epistemology, see van der Kuijp 1989. Loosely following van der Kuijp's proposed periodization, we can distinguish (1) the Ancient (rnying ma) period (8th-9th c.) corresponding to the Early Dissemination (snga dar) and Early Translation (snga gyur) period, which witnessed a massive program of translating Indian works into Tibetan and the growth of early Tibetan monastic communities under the sponsorship of the Tibetan Empire; (2) the Preclassical period (late 10th-12th c.) corresponding to the Late Dissemination (phyi dar) and New Translation (gsar gyur) periods following the collapse of the Tibetan Imperium (and ensuing Period of Fragmentation, ca. 910-1056), which witnessed a campaign of new reformed translations of Indian Buddhist texts and the ascendency of the so-called New (gsar ma) Tibetan Buddhist schools (and their scholastic traditions) that were henceforth distinguished from the Ancients (rnying ma); (3) the Classical period (13th-14th c.), which was characterized by the expansion of the major Tibetan Buddhist schools and the consolidation and systematization of their representative doctrines and practices; and (4) the Postclassical period (15th c. onward) characterized by the intensification of intersectarian dialogue and polemicism fueled by the increasingly fractious sectarian politics as Tibetan orders vied for patronage by foreign powers (Mongols and Chinese) and domestic aristocratic clans.
particular modes of inquiry and praxis available to most (if not all) humans.
From this second assumption stemmed the idea that humans are predisposed to spiritual awakening, that they, in other words, have within them some germinal capacity (bīja), spiritual affiliation (gotra), element (dhātu), or quintessence (garbha) that is a condition of possibility of this awakening. Alongside these "buddha-nature" concepts developed a family of systematically related gnoseological ideas referring to an abiding, unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) mode of consciousness—variously termed the Mind of awakening (bodhicitta), naturally luminous Mind (prakṛtiprabhāsvaracitta), the nature of mind (citta-dharmatā)—that was identified with the condition of awakening itself, but also viewed as the tacit background whence dualistic mind, that is, the source of all error and obscuration, emerges. Central to this cluster of related ideas was the view that conditions of awakening and delusion are both located within the complex and heterogeneous structure of lived experience itself. In Indian Buddhism, this paradigm found its most detailed and influential expression in the hybridized Yogācāra-Tathāgatagarbha works of Maitreya, the Indian Buddhist Siddha literature and the Buddhist tantras.
In light of the foregoing considerations, the doctrinal history of Buddhism may be regarded as an ongoing attempt to work out precisely what it was that made its founder a buddha or "awakened one" so that such knowledge could be systematically pursued by his followers. That this soteriological imperative has been central to Buddhist philosophical
and psychological investigations from early on is discernible in the long history of attempts to clarify the defining features of consciousness that can be traced back to the systematic analyses of mind and mental factors (citta-caitta) presented in the Abhidhammapiṭaka of the Pali Canon. For, in investigating the nature and structure of consciousness, Buddhist scholars were above all concerned with articulating the conditions necessary for a sentient being (sems can) to become an awakened one, a being in whom (if we follow the Tibetan rendering of "buddha" as sangs rgyas) all cognitive and affective obscurations have dissipated (sangs) so that inherent capacities for knowing and caring (mkhyen brtse nus ldan) can unfold (rgyas).
In Tibet, this soteriologically oriented investigation of consciousness was central to the philosophy of mind that developed within the syncretistic rDzogs chen ("Great Perfection") tradition of the rNying ma ("Ancient Ones") school between the eighth and fourteenth centuries. This philosophy developed around a nexus of core soteriological ideas concerning buddha-nature, the nature of reality, and the nature of mind that served to draw attention to a primordial, nondual mode of being and awareness that usually remains hidden behind the mind's own objectifying and subjectivizing reifications.
A cornerstone of the rDzogs chen philosophy of mind was a basic distinction between dualistic mind (sems) and primordial knowing (ye shes) that was first systematically presented in the seventeen Atiyoga tantras (rgyud bcu bdun) that make up the Heart Essence (snying thig) subclass of the Esoteric Guidance Class (man ngag sde') of rDzogs chen
teachings and are traditionally associated with Vimalamitra. rNying ma historical and biographical works trace this distinction to the teachings of early rDzogs chen masters of the Royal Dynastic Period, in particular the oral transmissions of Vimalamitra (bi ma snyan brgyud), an identification that appears at first glance to be supported by the many passages on the two distinctions found scattered among rNying ma collections such as the Bi ma snying thig, Bai ro rgyud 'bum, rNying ma rgyud 'bum, and dGongs pa zang thal. These teachings often take the form of personal instructions advising the practitioner to discern within the flux of adventitious thoughts and sensations that characterize dualistic mind (sems) an invariant prerepresentational structure of awareness known as primordial knowing (ye shes), open awareness (rig pa), or the nature of mind (sems nyid), from which this turmoil arises. The idea is to directly recognize (ngo sprod) and become increasingly familiar with this abiding condition without confusing it with any of its derivative and distortive aspects. In Klong chen pa's view, this distinction provides an indispensable key to understanding the views and practices that are central to the rDzogs chen tradition.
Although this tradition has attracted increasing interest in recent decades, both popular and academic, there has been little to date in the way of critical study of its philosophical foundations or key doctrinal developments. A noteworthy case in point is the absence of any systematic appraisal of rNying ma ("Ancient Ones") views on the nature of mind that traces their evolution and complex relationships with Indian Cittamātra, Madhyamaka, Pramāṇvāda, and Vajrayāna views. As a step toward at least defining the parameters of this crucial but neglected field of inquiry,
this paper will consider some key arguments in support of the "mind/primordial knowing" (sems/ye shes) distinction adumbrated by rNying ma scholars in the classical period. Of particular interest are arguments that were used to justify and defend this distinction by the renowned fourteenth-century rNying ma thinker Klong chen rab 'byams pa in a number of his treatises, commentaries, and poetic works. In a wide range of doctrinal contexts, Klong chen pa will argue that the entire edifice of Buddhist doctrine becomes incoherent in theory and amiss in practice when one fails to recognize the primacy of a primordial mode of awareness and to unequivocally distinguish it from dualistic mind. This paper first examines in detail some of the arguments he employed to convince his audience of the acceptability of such a distinction in light of theoretical and practical drawbacks of not recognizing it. It then focuses on two types of transcendental argument (of the general form "for y to be possible x must be the case") that Klong chen pa repeatedly invokes to show that the mind/primordial knowing distinction was not only tacitly presupposed in Indian Buddhist soteriology but was, in fact, indispensable for making sense of the Buddhist path and goal-realization according to Buddhist doxastic norms. (Higgins, "On the rDzogs chen Distinction between Mind (sems) and Primordial Knowing (ye shes), 23–26)
through much of this sutra—the way the compilers of this sūtra seem to have perceived the causes and the implications of the decline of the Dharma, that is, what one might, as I have done here, term the "eschatology of the MPNS." I believe this may provide an important key to understanding the entire sūtra, though some of my conclusions are necessarily based on circumstantial evidence. One might also remark here, in passing, that the prominence of the concept in the MPNS that the scriptural Dharma is, as we shall see, decidedly impermanent stands out in stark contrast to the recurrent idea in the sūtra of the permanence of Buddha. (Hodge, introduction, 1)
Yet the significance of the MPNS goes well beyond that restricted topic, despite its interest to many. For example, when utilized to the fullest, the available textual materials for the MPNS allow unique insights into the creation, development & transmission of Mahāyāna texts in general. Additionally, I believe that the composition of the main elements of the MPNS can be reliably dated to a narrow period from the middle decades to the end years of the 1st century CE, when read in conjunction with the small group of associated texts (the Mahāmegha-sūtra, Mahā-bherī-sūtra and the Aṅgulimālīya-sūtra), due to the specific mention in them of the Sātavāhana ruler Gautamīputra Sātakarṇi in conjunction with the timetable of a dire eschatological prophesy. There would also seem to be biographical details of a certain individual who may have been the founder or author of the MPNS “movement”. In sum, this situation seems to be virtually unique among all Mahāyāna sutras and, if properly understood, should have far-reaching ramifications for the study of the early Mahāyāna movements, for the MPNS may now be taken as a fixed reference point for constructing a relative chronology for many other early Mahāyāna sutras, though with the usual caveats concerning interpolated material. (Hodge, introduction, 1)
The second dharmachakra, also referred to as the 'middle turning' or the 'dharmachakra of no-characteristics', demonstrated the illusory nature of everything and placed the teachings of the first dharmachakra in a much less concrete perspective; suffering was no longer something to be doted with existential reality and the fundamental statements of voidness (śūnyatā) - 'form not existing', 'sound not existing' etc. - were postulated to show the void nature of everything. In the third dharmachakra the 'true nature' of everything was explained - not just voidness, in the sense of complete absence or
negation, but a void nature, resplendent with all qualities, naturally present, which is the essence of all beings; their buddha-nature. Since this is the very nature of all beings then by working on it anyone of them can reveal the enlightened wisdom that is inherent to that
nature.
The subject matter of these three dharmachakras was commented upon and cross-referenced in the many treatises (śāstra) composed by
buddhist scholars after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa. Maitreya composed five encyclopaedic śāstra of which this Mahāyāna Uttara Tantra Śāstra is one. Its teachings are those of the third dharmachakra. Many commentaries have been written for Maitreya's text, transmitted into
this world by Aćarya Asaṅga. and the one chosen for this translation's standpoint is that of Jamgön Kongtrül the Great, whose commentary is in two main parts: an introduction to Maitreya's work and a commentary on the actual text of the original. (Kenneth and Katia Holmes, translator's introduction, 3–4)
This new and refreshingly accessible translation is accompanied by a commentary based on the explanations of the most learned contemporary masters of the Kagy Tradition. It provides an introduction for those new to buddha nature as well as a major and essential reference work, to which one can return again and again for inspiration and guidance.
(Source: back cover)
In this paper, which is exploratory in nature, I shall briefly outline these two views and then ask the question of what the psychological or social effects of holding one or other of these views might be. The views I have in mind are expressed in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition as the view of self-emptiness and the view of other-emptiness (rangstong and gzhan-stong). (Hookham, "The Practical Implications of the Doctrine of Buddha-nature," 149)
In particular she does this with reference to the only surviving Indian commentary on the Tathagatagarbha doctrine, the Ratnagotravibhaga. This text addresses itself directly to the issue of how to relate the doctrine of emptiness (the illusory nature of the world) to that of the truly existing, changeless Absolute (the Buddha Nature).
This is the first work by a Western writer to present an analysis of the Shentong tradition based on previously untranslated sources. The Shentong view rests on meditative experience that is inaccessible to the conceptualizing mind. It is deeply rooted in the sutra tradition of Indian Buddhism and is central to an understanding of the Mahamudra and Dzogchen traditions and Tantric practice among the Kagyupas and Nyingmapas.
(Source: SUNY Press)
This revised work describes the differences between the Great Vehicle and Lesser Vehicle streams in the sutra tradition, and between the sutra tradition and that of tantra generally. It includes highly practical and compassionate explanations from H.H. the Dalai Lama on tantra for spiritual development; the first part of the classic Great Exposition of Secret Mantra text; and a supplement by Jeffrey Hopkins on the difference between the Vehicles, emptiness, psychological transformation, and the purpose of the four tantras. (Source: Shambhala Publications)
drawn primarily from two of the four major orders of Tibetan Buddhism:
- the old order called Nying-ma-ba,[2] which reached its full development in the fourteenth century with the scholar-yogi Long-chen-rap-jam[3]
- a highly scholastic order called Ge-luk-ba,[4] founded by the fourteenth century scholar-yogi Dzongka-ba.[5]
Long-chen-rap-jam was born in 1308 Do-drong[6] in south central Tibet, received ordination at Samyay[7] Monastery, and studied the doctrines of both the old and new schools. A great scholar, he became abbot of Sam-yay Monastery early in his life but retired from that position to live in the mountains. Receiving the full corpus of the teachings of the Old Translation School of Nying-ma, he wrote prolifically, and even when he was exiled for a decade to Bhutan for his closeness with the opponents of the ruling power, he established and restored monasteries.[8]
Dzong-ka-ba was born in 1357 in the northeastern province of Tibet called Am-do,[9] now included by the occupying Chinese Communists not in the Tibetan Autonomous Region but in Ch'ing-hai Province. He studied the new and old schools extensively, and developed his own tradition called Ge-luk-ba. Dzongka- ba and his followers established a system of education centered especially in large universities, eventually in three areas of Tibet but primarily in Hla-sa, the capital, which in some ways was for the Tibet cultural region what Rome is for the Catholic Church. For five centuries, young men came from all over the Tibetan cultural region to these large Tibetan universities to study (I say "men" because women were, for the most part, excluded from the scholastic culture). Until the Communist takeovers, these students usually returned to their own countries after completing their degrees.
My presentation on the mind of clear light is largely from standard Nying-ma-ba and Ge-luk-ba perspectives on the two basic forms of what Tibetan tradition accepts as Shākyamuni Buddha's teaching—the Sūtra Vehicle and the Tantra Vehicle, also called the Vajra Vehicle.[10] (Hopkins, background, 245–46)
Through a close examination on three Sanskrit compounds — i.e., tathāgatanairātmyagarbha, tathāgatagarbhālayavijñāna and pariniṣpannasvabhāvas tathāgatagarbhahṛdayam — in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, this thesis will demonstrate how the tathāgatagarbha thought in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra is significantly enriched by Yogācāric influence.
First, in regard to tathāgata-nairātmya-garbha, a doctrinal review of the term "nairātmya" is necessary, because its definition differs according to different traditions. In primitive Buddhism, the term "nairātmya" is a synonym of the term "anātman" (non-existence of a substantial self), which indicates that in the realm of suffering and the impermanence of life phenomena that arise according to the principle of co-dependent
origination/ pratītyasamutpāda, no eternal and dependent ātman can be found. According to
the Madhyamaka School, the term "nairātmya" is a synonym of the term "niḥsvabhāva" (no
intrinsic-nature) which implies that all beings, whether conditioned or unconditioned, are all devoid of an ever-abiding intrinsic nature. For the Yogācāra School, the reality of nairātmya is said to be grasped under the principle of mind-only. That is to say, the imagined self /kalpitātman that is the presentation of mind is unreal, while the indescribable self/ anabhilāpyātman that is the genuine mind itself is real. Finally, it can be said that the tathāgata-nairātmya-garbha in Laṅkāvatārasūtra accords well with the Yogācāra teaching. In other words, it is the Yogācāric sense of nairātmya that sheds an influence upon the tathāgatagarbha doctrine.
Secondly, in regard to tathāgatagarbhālayavijñāna, a doctrinal development is promoted owing to the identification of tathāgatagarbha with ālayavijñāna, which according to the Yogācāra School is also named "sarvabīljavijñāna" (cognition as the seed of everything). This latter synonym references its function of bringing forth all beings just as a giant tree originates from a seed. As a result of its identification with the ālayavijñāna, the tathāgatagarbha is said to be endowed with the function of bringing forth all forms of existence and thus becomes the "producing cause" of all. This interpretation is not seen in earlier scriptures wherein the tathāgatagarbha is described simply as a static substance supporting all beings.
Thirdly, in regard to pariniṣpannasvabhāvastathāgata-garbhahṛdayam, the implication of the tathāgatagarbha was expanded substantially by declaring that pariniṣpannasvabhāva is the very essence of tathāgatagarbha. The term "pariniṣpannasvabhāva" according to some important Yogācāra texts is defined as tathatā (ultimate realm of suchness). The combining of pariniṣpannasvabhāva with tathāgatagarbha that had formerly focused on the subjective potential of realizing wisdom, shifts the doctrinal emphasis toward the objective realm of realized perfection.
This thesis reveals that, having assimilated the Yogācāric doctrine of dharmanairātmya, ālayavijñāna and pariniṣpannasvabhāva, the tathāgatagarbha thinking in Laṅkāvatārasūtra presents the comprehensive and distinctive features in comparison to the scriptures that preceded it.
challenges the San-chieh-chiao attempted to meet, and it is the burden of Hubbard's careful exegesis to detail the subtle metaphysical and exegetical distinctions they constructed to do so. (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to Buddha Nature, 4–5)
The varying answers given to the single question of whether the mind is pure by nature or defiled by nature form a convenient lenses through which to view the development of Yogācāra thought. If the mind is pure, then where do the defilements originate? If it is defiled, where does purity originate? Though the classical formulation of Asaṇga and Vasubandhu sees consciousness as paratantric, the source of defilement yet only the support of purity (an important distinction that necessitates an external source of purity), another view which was taken up by Yogācāran thinkers is that of the originally pure mind (viśuddhi cittaprakṛiti); a third schema brings the structure of consciousness together with that purity as seen, for example, within the *Mahāyāna śraddhotpādaśāstra (The Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith). (Hubbard, introductory remarks, 1)
Notes
- (In title and not shown) This was originally written in 1994; the publisher seems to have fallen into a black hole, so I am putting it out here myself; I have not changed it (other than fonts and some formatting issues) in order to keep the historical in perspective. I think that I still agree with myself, especially with the idea that tathāgatagarbha represents more of a dualism than a monism and thereby leads to ethical problems with the less-than-real (accidental) kleśa.
- Many of the questions considered here have been treated in David Ruegg's recent publication Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective (Delhi: Heritage Publishers 1992); see especially Chapter One.
- Jikido Takasaki, A Study of the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttara-tantra), (Rome, 1966), p. 302. Hereafter cited as Ratnagotravibhāga.
This study is an examination of Master Yinshun's hermeneutics. It focuses especially on his interpretation of the Buddhist concept known as the tathagatagarbha, which refers to the idea that all sentient beings intrinsically possess the "womb of the Buddha." In some explanations of this teaching, the tathāgatagarbha is symbolic of the practitioner's potential for attaining enlightenment. In others, it functions as a synonym for the Ultimate and becomes the eternalistic substrate for all of existence. It is this latter view to which Yinshun takes exception, seeing it as antithetical to the doctrine of emptiness which espouses the notion that all things, including ideas, material objects, and living beings, lack a permanent and independent nature and thus cannot possess an unchanging, eternalistic form.
I focus particularly on Yinshun's text A Study of the Tathāgatagarbha, for it serves as a concise statement of his interpretation of the tathāgatagarbha and its relationship to emptiness. In this text, Yinshun continually asserts the doctrine of emptiness as the definitive expression of Buddhist truth and relegates the tathāgatagarbha to the category of expedient means. He does this by examining the development of the tathāgatagarbha emphasizing particularly its evolution within pre-Mahāyāna and Mahāyāna textual sources said to have had their genesis in India such as the Āgamas, the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and the Ratnagotravibhāga. For Yinshun, to regard the tathāgatagarbha as the ultimate truth rather than as an expedient means can only result in misguided practice and confusion about how to attain enlightenment.
I conclude by asking a number of general questions about Yinshun's thought and its relationship to the early to mid-twentieth century intellectual milieu in China. I also inquire about how Yinshun's ideas have contributed to the development of contemporary Chinese Buddhist movements flourishing in Taiwan today. (Source: Worldcat Library Materials Online)
establishment of Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism.{2} He founded in Tibet not only the main enduring lineages of logic and epistemology (Tshad-ma: Pramāṇa) studies but also of two other major branches of Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy and doctrine—those of the Five Dharmas of Maitreya (Byams chos sde Inga) and of the Svātantrika Yogācāra-Madhyamaka.[3] rNgog-lo furthermore trained virtually the entire next generation of important Tibetan scholastics, his "four chief spiritual sons" being: (1) Zhang Tshe-spong-ba, (2) Gro-lung-pa Blo-gros-'byung gnas, (3) Khyung Rin-chen-grags, and (4) 'Bre Shes-rab-'bar. [4] Yet in spite of rNgog's central position in the history of Tibetan philosophical and doctrinal studies, until recently only a very small number of his works were known to survive, and of these the two most extensive and important have remained for decades largely inaccessible outside of Tibet, existing only as isolated xylographs in private collections.[5] Now, however, with the reprinting of two of his major works by the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, including his very important commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga described here, some of the seminal contributions of rNgog-lo can at last be easily assessed in the original.[6]
Both of these major works of rNgog-lo were commentaries on fundamental works of the Maitreyanātha tradition within the Yogācāra branch of Mahāyana Buddhism,[7] namely on the Ratnagotravibhāga and Abhisamayālaṃkāra.[8] The works thus reflected another aspect of his illustrious career, for in addition to—and indeed in tandem with—his importance as a great teacher, he was also of crucial significance as a composer of commentaries on the works he expounded. (Jackson, "rNgog lo-tsa-ba's Commentary of the Ratnagotravibhāga," 339–340)
its defIlements have only an adventitious status is of obvious relevance to Buddhist soteriology; it affirms that, in some important sense, the goal of Buddhist religious practice has already been attained or is already present. The importance of Jackson's study is that it shows the same idea to be relevant also to Buddhist epistemological theory: it is precisely the mind's natural radiance that makes apprehension of things as they really are a possibility. It is this metaphysical and epistemological fact which leads Jackson to categorize Dharmakīrti and his school as epistemological optimists. (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to Buddha Nature, 5)
Notes
- CYC pp. 13 and 17 for the term of ch'an-men; pp. 57, 86, 210 and 320 for ch'an-tsung. Compare Sekiguchi Shindaiaa, "Zenshū no hassei." Fukui sensei shōju ki'nen Tōyō shisō ronshü (Tokyo, 1960), pp. 321–338.
- Jan Yūn-hua, "Tsung-mi and his Analysis of Ch'an Buddhism", TP 58 (1972): 1–54; for a detailed study of Tsung-mi, see Shigeo Kamata, Shūmitsu kyōgaku no shisōshi teki kenkyū (Tokyo: Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo, 1975).
- CYC, pp. 30 and 254.
Contemporary scholars have widely mis-understood the Buddhist Centrist teaching of emptiness, or selflessness, as either a form of nihilism or a radical skepticism. Yet Buddhist philosophers from Nāgārjuna on have shown that the negation of intrinsic reality affirms the supreme value of relative realities if accurately understood. Gyaltsap Darma Rinchen, in his Supercommentary, elucidates a highly positive theory of the “buddha-nature,” showing how the wisdom of emptiness empowers the compassionate life of the enlightened, as it is touched by its oneness with the truth body of all buddhas. With his clear study of Gyaltsap’s insight and his original English translation, Bo Jiang, Ph.D. completes his historic project of studying and presenting these works from Sanskrit and Tibetan both in Chinese and, now, English translations, in linked publications.
Marty Bo Jiang is a research fellow at the American Institute of Buddhist Studies at the Columbia University Center for Buddhist Studies. (Source: AIBS)
This doctoral dissertation studies the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra), the only surviving Indian Buddhist treatise on the Buddha-essence doctrine, by way of one of its major Tibetan commentaries, rGyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen (1364-1432)'s Theg pa chen po rGyud bla ma'i ṭīkā. This project consists of three parts: a special edition of the first chapter of the Theg pa chen po rGyud bia ma'i ṭīkā, an English translation of the selected sections of that commentary, and a comparative analysis which follows six distinct lines of inquiry.
The six lines are: rGyal-tshab's doctrinal classification of the text; his critiques of absolutism, skepticism, and quietism in connection with diverse interpretations of the Buddha-essence doctrine in Tibetan traditions as well as a tentative comparison with critiques of the theory of "Original-enlightenment" in modern Chinese Buddhism; his analysis of the title of Tibetan version and the structure of the text; rGyal-tshab's
philosophical positions on reality, Element, and natural luminosity of the mind; his expositions of the tripartite Buddha-essence, its ten aspects, and the eighteen similes; and the notion "spiritual gene" understood by dGe-lugs-pas.
This comparative approach will provide a broader synthetic understanding of the role that Buddha-essence played as a doctrinal genre in Tibetan intellectual history.
This new translation is the work of four leading scholars in the field—John Jorgensen, Dan Lusthaus, John Makeham, and Mark Strange—who have been writing prolifically on Buddhist and East Asian philosophy and are thus ideal translators for the treatise. The translation is the product of a long process of concerted effort, starting as a workshop exercise in 2012, growing over the years to incorporate researches from various perspectives, and eventually appearing in 2019 as the second of the Oxford Chinese Thought series, a series aimed to introduce the riches of Chinese thought to the West.
Read more here.
necessity of obtaining new ones on a later expedition, there was some delay in undertaking the work, and the war has further postponed preparation and publication of the text.
Notes
1. Bull. LSOS, VIII, pp. 77-89. My reconstruction was only partially successful, the transliteration being imperfect and leaving much to guesswork.
2. The full name is shown by the MSS. as well as by the Tibetan and Chinese translations to be Ratnagotravibhāga Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra; the second part is merely descriptive of the scope of the work, and the first, being the proper title, is used throughout hereafter in place of the hitherto accepted Uttaratantra.
1. JBORS, XXI, pp. 31 and 33.
With reference to two of these 'ātmavādin’ tathāgatagarbha works, I present evidence that authors of this tradition used the idea of a Buddhist doctrine of the self to undermine non-Buddhist accounts of liberation: not only describing them as deficient, but as having been created (nirmita) by the Buddha himself. Such claims expand the boundaries of the Buddha’s sphere of influence, after the description of his activities found in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra: a clear influence upon these tathāgatagarbha sources. Other Mahāyānist literature of an ‘ekayānist’ orientation used this strategy also: i.e. that any teaching regarding liberation from saṃsāra finds its origin in the activities of Buddhas and bodhisattvas, but has its definitive expression in the Buddhist dharma. The tathāgatagarbha presented as a Buddhist doctrine of the self can hence be understood as a complement to a certain understanding of the Mahāyāna, here the archetype of all paths that claim to deliver an end to saṃsāra, and to an account of the Buddha as the architect of all ostensibly non-Buddhist accounts of liberation.
The tathāgatagarbha doctrine of Mahāyāna Buddhism affirms the existence of some permanent, significant content of sentient beings that is of the same character as a Buddha. While this alone was an important innovation within Buddhist thought, some of its authors ventured further to deem this significant content an ātman: a ‘self’, in apparent contradiction to the central Buddhist teaching of the absence of self (anātman) in the constitution of all beings.
The aims of this thesis are two. Firstly, to examine usage of the term ātman in the Indian tathāgatagarbha sources which develop use of this expression. This entails a close reading of relevant sources (primarily Mahāyāna sūtra literature), and attention to how this term is used in the context of each. These sources present different perspectives on the tathāgatagarbha and its designation as a self; this study aims to examine significant differences between, and similarities across, these texts and their respective doctrines.
The second aim is to attempt an account of why authors of these texts ventured to designate the tathāgatagarbha with the term ātman, especially when some of our sources suggest that this innovation received some opposition, while others deem it in requirement of strong qualification, or to be simply inappropriate. It is not my objective to account for whether or not the tathāgatagarbha is or is not implicitly what we may deem ‘a self’ on the terms of Buddhist tradition; rather, I am concerned with the manner in which this expression itself was adopted, and – in light of clear difficulties raised by it – what may have motivated those authors responsible.
I argue not only that we can trace the development of this designation across the tathāgatagarbha literature, but also that those authors responsible for its earliest usage adopted an attitude towards non-Buddhist discourses on the self that requires special attention. This, I believe, had its roots in an account of the Buddha and his influence that advances our understanding of one tradition of Mahāyāna Buddhology, and its ambition to affirm its superiority over other Indian religious traditions. (Source Accessed October 29, 2019)
This dissertation explores the evolving interpretation and understanding of the Buddha-nature in Fifteenth-Century Tibet, through the eyes of Go rams pa Bsod nams seng ge (1429-1489), a prominent scholar of the Sa skya school of Tibetan Buddhism. The previous work of European and American scholars in this field have led to our general understanding of Buddha-nature as an innate potential for enlightenment that lies within all sentient beings. The concept of Buddha-nature provides the primary answer to a question with which all Mahāyānists have been philosophically concerned, throughout history: are all sentient beings capable of attaining Buddhahood? The Mahāyāna, more specifically, Madhyamaka theory of Buddha-nature answers the question unequivocally: "Since all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature they are guaranteed to achieve the state of Buddhahood." This research has been mostly limited to the interpretations of Indian and Chinese texts and to a study of only certain Tibetan schools. This dissertation seeks to fill the gap in present scholarship by analyzing the systematic thought of Go rams pa, who set out to provide a critical analysis, explain the internal coherence, and map out the organization of diverse Indian and Tibetan interpretations of this complex idea. I demonstrate in two fundamental ways that Go rams pa developed an unique view of Buddha-nature in two ways: First, I explore the facts Go rams pa's interpretation of Buddha-nature that contribute to his unique perspective. Second, I analyze his opponents' views on the subject thereby illuminating its distinctive features in an historical context. Throughout this study, I deploy a comparative apparatus considering the different views that Go rams pa thought was wrong. Given this fifteenth-century debate, we realize that the understanding of Buddha-nature is subtle and complicated; yet this study is vital to explicate its implications. I conclude that according to Go rams pa, Buddha-nature is to be understood as unity of the emptiness of the mind and clarity which is the nature of mind.
Drawing on the historical and intellectual contexts of Treatise's composition and paying sustained attention to its interpretation in early commentaries, this new annotated translation of the classic, makes its ideas available to English readers like never before. The introduction orients readers to the main topics taken up in the Treatise and gives a comprehensive historical and intellectual grounding to the text. This volume marks a major advance in studies of the Treatise, bringing to light new interpretations and themes of the text. (Source: Oxford University Press)
The Triśaraṇasaptati is a small versified work consisting 68 ślokas, the full text of which is preserved only in Tibetan translation. We find two versions (i.e. recensions) of the Triśaraṇasaptati in all the Tanjurs. The two versions are almost the same, having been translated by the same translation team (Atiśa and Rin chen bzang po).
Sorensen translated the Tibetan text into English and added to them six verses (12, 13, 33, 45, 46, and 47) in Sanskrit traced in the form of quotations in other works. Sorensenʼs English translation is for the most part faithful to the Tibetan text. The Tibetan translation itself, when compared with the Sanskrit original, is seen on occasion to be imprecise (see below, "Philological Remarks").
Other quotations from the Triśaraṇasaptati have been found in two passages in the Munimatālaṃkāra: Passage A (Skt. Ms. 7v1-4; Tib. D 82a7-b3; verses 1, 34, 51, 54, 55, 67) in Munimatālaṃkāra chapter 1 (the Bodhicittāloka chapter)'"`UNIQ--ref-00000BDA-QINU`"' and Passage B (Skt. 132r1-3; Tib. D 219a5-b1; 7-9ab, 22-23) in chapter 3 (the Aṣṭābhisamayāloka chapter). When we collate these 11½ verses with the 6 verses independently collected by Sorensen, the total number becomes 17½, which is about 26% of the whole text of the Triśaraṇasaptati. (Kano and Xuezhu, introductory remarks, 4)
The present paper provides an annotated translation of Sajjana’s Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa along with a reading text of this Sanskrit work (a critical edition of which is under preparation for publication). I started to work on this text in 2005 when I received a copy of a photographic image of a manuscript containing it from Professor Jikidō Takasaki. I published a study dealing with this manuscript in 2006 (Kano 2006b) and provided a critical edition of the Sanskrit text in my doctoral thesis, submitted to Hamburg University in 2006 (Kano 2006a). I also prepared a preliminary annotated translation of this text in 2006 and gave the draft to Karl Brunnhölzl together with my unpublished doctoral thesis.
It came as a surprise for me to learn that Brunnhölzl copied and published the draft of my translation under his name in his book When the Clouds Part: The Uttaratantra and Its Meditative Tradition as a Bridge between Sūtra and Tantra (Boston/London: Snow Lion, 2014), pp. 461–472. Brunnhölzl (p. 1121, n. 1718) says in his book: “All topical headings are inserted by the translator (corresponding to my outline above). Though my translation sometimes differs from Kano’s, I am indebted to both his translation and his Sanskrit edition of the text with critical apparatus (Kano 2006, 513–35), which in turn owe much to Profs. Schmithausen and Isaacson as well as Dr. Diwakar Acharya.” The fact is, however, that he has in many cases simply copied my earlier work.
Since the translation used by Brunnhölzl was an unpublished draft, my earlier mistakes found their way into his book, inasmuch as that draft was based in turn on an early draft of my Sanskrit edition, which itself contains serious misreadings, especially in verses 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 15, along with a number of errors in the interlinear glosses. All his striving to make sense of my misreadings of the Sanskrit have been to no avail; his interpretations and analysis (Brunnhölzl, ibid. pp. 288–300 ) based on these errors need to be fundamentally revised. I have since made improvements to the Sanskrit edition and translation, and this is reflected in the differences between his published translation and the one I offer here.[1] (Kano, preface, 1–2)
Notes
1. I am grateful for a number of suggestions and improvements of my critical edition of Sajjana's Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa to Prof. Harunaga Isaacson, Prof. Diwakar Acharya, Prof. Lambert Schmithausen, Dr. Pascale Hugon, and all participants of a workshop “From Kashmir to Tibet: A set of proto-Śāradā palm leaves and two works on the Ratnagotravibhāga” held on 21. April 2015 at Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften Institut für Kultur-und Geistesgeschichte Asiens. I would like to thank to Dr. David Reigle and Mr. Philip Pierce for much valuable information regarding difficult points of the text and English proof-reading of my translation.
Of the nine folios, Tucci photographed both sides of seven of them, while he photographed only one side of the remaining two (here labelled 7.2 and 9.2). The two sides not filmed were probably blank or contained title pages (unfortunately, Tucci did not photograph title pages). Some images are out of focus and barely legible, and thus a complete diplomatic transcription is almost impossible. If Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana photographed the same folios, this would be very helpful in deciphering them; however, I have yet to find evidence that he did. Therefore, I have only been able to go through the folios haltingly, and so identify a limited number of them. (Kano, introductory remarks, 381–82)
Notes
- The reproduction of these folios will appear together with a new critical edition of the Sanskrit text, a new edition of the Tibetan translation and an annotated English translation in a new issue of Manuscripta Buddhica which is being prepared by Francesco Sferra and Iain Sinclair.
- It should be noted that in the introduction of the editio princeps of the First Bhāvanākrama, Tucci states: "The manuscript is preserved in the monastery of sPos k’aṅ on a side valley to the right of the Myań c’u, between Gyantse and Shigatse" (Tucci 1956: 6-7). However, this information is most probably wrong for the following reasons: a) the same manuscript was most likely seen by Sāṅkṛtyāyana in Źwa lu Ri phug in 1936 (1937: 39); b) the envelope itself containing the negatives of Tucci’s photographs are labelled "Zha lu" (see above, p. 46); c) in Źwa lu Ri phug there were other manuscripts in Śāradā script, in particular a manuscript containing Sajjana’s Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa, which might be connected with the Sūtrālaḿkārapiṇḍārtha reproduced together with the first Bhavanākrama.
- Cf. Steinkellner 2004.
Takasaki argued that the first extant text to use the word tathāgatagarbha was the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra. Since Takasaki's research was published, there have been some remarkable advances in research on the Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra, and in recent years scholars such as S. Hodge and M. Radich have begun to argue that it was the Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra that was the first Buddhist text to use the word tathāgatagarbha. The question of which of these two sūtras came first has not yet been definitively resolved, but it may be generally accepted that both belong to the oldest stratum of Buddhist texts dealing with tathāgatagarbha.
On a previous occasion (Kano 2017), focusing on this point, I collected Sanskrit fragments of both texts containing the word tathāgatagarbha and discussed differences in the expressions in which it is used. In particular, taking into account the findings of Shimoda Masahiro, I argued that if the word tathāgatagarbha appearing in the Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra is interpreted as a bahuvrīhi compound qualifying stūpa, this would accord with the word's usage in this sūtra and with the gist of the chapter "Element of the Tathāgata" (Habata 2013: §§ 375–418). This does not mean, however, that this understanding needs to be applied uniformly to every example of its use in the Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra. Because in this earlier article I focused somewhat unduly on the interpretation of tathāgatagarbha as a bahuvrīhi compound, the fact that there are instances of wordplay making use of the multiple meanings of garbha in the Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra needs to be added, together with some concrete examples. (In the passages of this sūtra, it is natural to understand the term tathāgatagarbha as a substantive in the sense of "garbha of tathāgata" or "garbha that is tathāgata," namely, tatpuruṣa or karmadhāraya, and I do not exclude this possibility as discussed in Kano 2017: 39–42.) In addition, there were some redundant aspects in the structure of my earlier article. In this article I rework these aspects so as to sharpen the focus on the points at issue and add some supplementary points. In the first half I clarify some grammatical characteristics to be observed in examples of the use of tathāgatagarbha in Sanskrit fragments of the Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra, while in the second half I ascertain the polysemy of the word garbha on the basis of some concrete examples. (Kano, "A Syntactic Analysis," 17–18)
The present paper offers just such crucial material: eight folios from a Sanskrit manuscript of MSABh from Tibet. This is the first part of a series of studies dealing with the subject.
The earliest masters of this period who quote or refer to the RGV are Maitrīpa (1007/1010-?), Jñānaśrīmitra (ca. 980–1030), and Ratnākaraśānti (late 10th to early 11th century).'"`UNIQ--ref-00000002-QINU`"' Maitrīpa was the common disciple of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnākaraśānti, and, according to a story in Tibetan documents, rediscovered a Sanskrit manuscript of the RGV in a stūpa in Magadha.
If this rediscovery story is a historical event, Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnākaraśānti would have received the teaching of the RGV from their common disciple Maitrīpa; but we have no concrete witness to corroborate it.
Maitrīpa’s knowledge of the RGV is attested by a quotation of RGV II. 61b in his Pañcatathāgatamudrāvivaraṇa; he introduces a Nirākāravijñānavādin’s propounding the arising of the Dharmakāya from the Saṃbhogakāya and Nirmāṇakāya, but does not discuss Buddha-nature.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000003-QINU`"' In contrast to Maitrīpa, who does not discuss Buddha-nature, we find extensive discussions of the topic in compositions of Jñānaśrīmitra and
Ratnākaraśānti.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000004-QINU`"' In the present paper, I shall focus on quotations from the RGV in Jñānaśrīmitra’s Sākārasiddhiśāstra and Sākārasaṃgrahasūtra, and on his understanding of the RGV, so as to shed light on the reception of the RGV in the early 11th century. (Kano, introductory remarks, 7–8)
Wǒnch'ŭk, bCom ldan rig ral and Bu ston understood that ninth consciousness is ultimately the seeds of the eighth consciousness, or else the pure part thereof. In terms of the content of the controversy, gZad ring, bCom ldan rig ral and Bu ston largely follow a common archetype. They introduce the ninth consciousness without mentioning Paramārtha; they refer to tathāgatagarbha doctrine, relying upon a passage from the Samādhirāja-sūtra as their proof-text; and in rejecting the doctrine of ninth consciousness, they propose that ninth consciousness must exist either actually or potentially, and then reject both alternatives. Since these two points cannot be identified in Wǒnch'ŭk's commentary, we can postulate that the controversy between these scholars was an innovative creation and development from within Tibetan Buddhism. Furthermore, it also seems that in the transmission of ninth consciousness doctrine in Tibet, there arose certain distortions (or deviations from Wǒnch'ŭk's theories), such as when gZad ring ascribes the doctrine of ninth consciousness not to Paramārtha, but to Bhavya.
We also must not neglect the fact that the doctrine of ninth consciousness affirmed in these commentaries to the Abhidharmasamuccaya is not completely identical to that described by Tsong kha pa. Comparison with these texts, which constitute the immediate context for his discussion, highlights the fact that in discussing Paramārtha's doctrine of ninth consciousness as it appears in Wonchuk, Tsong kha pa cites Wonchuk's work directly, rather than second-hand (i.e. rather than relying upon predecessors who utilize Wonchuk's exposition); and in refuting the doctrine of ninth consciousness, he attempts to construct proofs on the basis of his own original viewpoint, rather than recycling the arguments of his predecessors. We are surely justified in judging that it was Tsong kha pa's achievement to absorb Wonchuk's commentary for himself, and to attempt to correct the distortions incidental to the transmission of ninth consciousness doctrine in Tibet. (Source Accessed June 16, 2020)
We can find two types of interpretation, i.e., (1) that in accord with the yānatraya doctrine (in the Prajñāpāramitopadeśa, Muktāvalī, and Kusumāñjali), and (2) that in accord with the ekayāna doctrine (in the Sūtrasamuccayabhāṣya and Triyānavyavasthāna). The two positions are clearly contradicting each other. The first interpretation (1) is based on traditional Yogācāra doctrine that admits the gotrabheda doctrine ("differences of spiritual potentials"), while the second (2) premises the Madhyamaka doctrine that does not accept the gotrabheda doctrine on the ultimate level and claims all beings equally have the same potential to become a buddha.
Furthermore, the existence of the diversity between the two interpretations is supported by other doctrinal issues, for instance, two different attitudes toward the understanding of Abhisamayālaṃkāra I.39.
As a conclusion, the doctrinal position in the Sūtrasamuccayabhāṣya and Triyānavyavasthāna is different from that of the Prajñāpāramitopadeśa etc. The aim of the present paper is to show the clear diversity attested in the works attributed to Ratnākaraśānti, which will, hopefully, contribute to solving the question of the authorship of the works, i.e., whether they are composed by one person or not. (Source: Academia.edu)
Hardly any Sanskrit manuscripts of Buddhist scriptures remain in India today, even though such manuscripts have been discovered in surrounding regions. Tibet in particular is one of the richest treasuries of precious Sanskrit manuscripts from as early as the 8th century. These became widely known to the scholarly world in the 1930s thanks to discoveries by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana (1893-1963) in monasteries of Tsang (Tib. gTsang) province, in the Western part of Central Tibet. He had little success, however, in accessing Sanskrit manuscripts in monasteries of Ü (Tib. dBus) province, in the Eastern part of the Central Tibet among which Retreng (Tib. Rwa sgreng) monastery[1] was especially famous for its rare manuscript collection. Retreng, the former centre of the Kadam tradition located about 120 km to the Northwest of Lhasa, was founded by Dromtön Gyalwe jungne (Tib. 'Brom ston rGyal ba'i 'byung gnas, 1008-1064) in 1056. The aim of the present paper is to trace the Sanskrit manuscript collection once preserved at Retreng monastery by focusing on the transmission of individual manuscripts, and in the process to shed light on one historical aspect of Indo-Tibetan cross-cultural exchanges.
In the following, I shall (1) sketch the challenges faced by explorers trying to access the manuscript collection of Retreng monastery in the early 20th century, and then try to (2) trace the origin of the collection in Tibetan historical sources, (3) collect references to the manuscripts belonging to the collection, (4) draw up a title list of scriptural texts contained in it, (5) trace and identify its current location, and finally (6) evaluate the historicity of Atiśa's ownership of the manuscripts. (Kano, preliminary remarks, 82–83)
Notes
- For historical sources on Retreng, see Kano, "Rāhula," 123, n. 1.
In Giuseppe Tucci’s collection of Sanskrit manuscripts and photographed materials, a set of positive prints of texts filmed at Ñor monastery contains a codex unicus of
Vairocanaraksita’s (fl. 11th/12th century) Yogācāra/Tathāgatagarbha commentarial
works:
1. Viṃśikāṭikāvivṛti (glosses on Vasubandhu’s Viṃśikāvṛtti and Vinītadeva’s Viṃśikāṭīkā);
2. Triṃśikāṭīkāvivṛti (glosses on Sthiramati’s Triṃśikābhāṣya and Vinītadeva’s Triṃśikāṭīkā);
3. Madhyāntavibhāgakatipayapadavivṛti (glosses on Vasubandhu’s Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya
and Sthiramati’s Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā);
4. Mahāyānottaratantraṭippaṇī (glosses on the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā);
5. *Sūtrālaṃkāravivṛti (glosses on Vasubandhu’s Sūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya)2 and
6. *Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavivṛti (glosses on Vasubandhu’s Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavṛtti).3
V. Gokhale (1978) was the first to study these works, using Saṅkṛtyāyana’s negatives and the prints made from them, which have been preserved in Patna. He reported titles of the six works, without, however, going into detail because of the poor quality of the images. Subsequently the details of the works remained unknown for a long time, and no complete editions have been published. To be sure, Zuiryū Nakamura edited the text of folios 9v2–14v7 of the Mahāyānottaratantraṭippaṇī (the text of folios 15r1–17r5 remains to be edited);4 and Mathes in his translation of the Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavṛtti referred to some sentences from the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavivṛti.5 I myself also edited a small portion of the *Sūtrālaṃkāravivṛti.6
The present paper contains an editio princeps of the Viṃśikāṭīkāvivṛti and *Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavivṛti. Critical editions of the other three works are under preparation: Francesco Sferra is preparing a critical edition of the Madhyāntavibhāgakatipayapadavivṛti, and I am preparing critical editions of the Mahāyānottaratantraṭippaṇī, the Triṃśikāṭīkāvivṛti and the *Sūtrālaṃkāravivṛti for publication. (Kano, introduction, 343-44)
Notes
- [From title] I am grateful to Prof. Francesco Sferra and Prof. Harunaga Isaacson for a number of text-critical suggestions, and Prof. Lambert Schmithausen for permitting me to use his preliminary handwritten transcription of Vairocanarakṣita’s *Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavivṛti, and also for his very valuable suggestions concerning that text. I am indebted, too, to Mrs. Bärbel Mund of Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen for giving me the permission to use photographic images of the Göttingen Collection, to Dr. Diwakar Acharya for his help with deciphering barely legible letters in the manuscript, to Prof. Toru Yagi for his very valuable suggestions regarding Vairocanarakṣita’s grammatical explanations, to Dr. Martin Delhey, Dr. Kengo Harimoto and Dr. Koichi Takahashi for reading my draft and making many valuable suggestions, and to Prof. Robert Kritzer and Philip Pierce for their English proofreading.
- The title of the work is not ascertainable from the colophon: sūtrālaṃkāraḥ samāptaḥ II II kṛtiḥ paṇḍitavairocanarakṣitapādānaṃ II II. Other possible Sanskrit titles are Sūtrālaṃkāravivṛti, Sūtrālaṃkārakatipayapadavivṛti, or Sūtrālaṃkāraṭippaṇī.
- The title of the work is not ascertainable from the colophon: dharmadharmatāvibhā[gaḥ]. The two illegible akṣaras after °vibhā in the bottom margin are probably gaḥ. Cf. the colophon to the *Sūtrālaṃkāravivṛti. One might expect something like Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavivṛti, Dharmadharmatāvibhāgakatipayapadavivṛti (as suggested by Gokhale 1978: 638), or Dharmadharmatāvibhāgaṭippaṇī. In Kano 2005: 142, I referred to this work under the title “Dharmadharmatāvibhā[gaṭīkā],” supplying the three akṣaras enclosed by square brackets. However, in view of its scope, it can hardly be a ṭīkā, a type of commentary typically more extensive in nature.
- For his edition, see Nakamura 1985. For studies of this text, see Nakamura 1980, 1982, 1992. Unfortunately, Nakamura’s edition contains many errors (around 190). It is remarkable that his edition shares some notable errors with Jagdishwar Pandey’s modern transcription preserved at Göttingen under the shelf-mark Xc14/90 (which contains a transcription of the full text of the Mahāyānottaratantraṭippaṇī); we can deduce that one of the two was made on the basis of the other. In my unpublished dissertation (Kano 2006b), I have critically edited the whole text of the Mahāyānottaratantraṭippaṇī and presented a list of corrections to Nakamura’s edition.
- See Mathes 1996: 37, 115-135.
- The text of folio 17r>sub>7–v6 of this work is edited in Kano 2006a: 92, n. 40.
Part I, the historical and doctrinal background, consists of six chapters: Chapter 1 describes the authorship and the history of the transmission of the RGV in India, using Indian and Tibetan materials. Chapter 2 studies six different Tibetan translations of the RGV, clarifying how the RGV was transmitted from India to Tibet. Chapter 3 outlines rNgog's life and writings. Chapter 4 presents rNgog's philosophical positions taught in his RGV commentary. Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the impact of his interpretations on the later Tibetan doctrinal developments, and reactions to them. Part II is a critical edition of rNgog-lo's RGV commentary, Theg chen rgyud bla ma'i don bsdus pa (1a-46a5 and 65a5-66a4), preceded by an explanation of textual materials and an outline of the whole text. Part III presents an annotated translation of that commentary.
Appendix A presents a diplomatic edition of rNgog-lo's “topical outline” of the RGV, his other work related to the RGV (discovered at Kharakhoto and preserved in the British Library). Appendix B presents a critical edition of a versified summary of the RGV in Sanskrit, the Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa composed by the Kashmiri Paṇḍita Sajjana, a teacher of rNgog-lo. Appendix C provides another Sanskrit commentary on the RGV, Vairocanarakṣita's Mahāyanottaratantraṭippaṇī, while appendix D presents translations of relevant passages from the Sākārasiddhi and Sākarasaṃgraha of Jñānaśrīmitra. Appendix E presents rNgog-lo's identification of the passages of the RGVV that refer to the Nidānaparivarta (“introductory chapter”) of the Dhāraṇīśvararājasūtra, as well as a topical outline of this chapter of the sūtra. Appendix F investigates the dating of Blo-gros-mtshungs-med, who among later Tibetans criticized rNgog-lo's position most severely. Appendix G presents a list of commentaries on the RGV. Appendix H lists records of the RGV's transmission lineage from gsan yigs. (Kano, introduction, 12-13)
2) Rngog lo seems to have used the term bsdus don (or its equivalents) to refer to two kinds of works, namely “topical outline” and “essential meaning,” for he composed two works on the RGV―a brief topical outline and a lengthy essential meaning―which bear titles containing the term bsdus don and its equivalent don bsdus pa, respectively. Among Rngog lo’s available writings, our Khara Khoto manuscript and the Byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa la ’jug pa’i don bsdus pa offer the only testimony that bsdus don (and its equivalent don bsdus pa) refers to a “topical outline,” as he often uses the term bsdus don to indicate a lengthy “essential meaning” in his other commentarial works. The first usage was common among Tibetan masters during the early and middle phyi dar period, whereas the latter was generally rare. This rare usage is most likely influenced by the piṇḍārtha sub-genre of Indian commentaries.
3) Our manuscript has some serious textual problems, such as missing words, illegible words, syntactic ambiguity, and a missing folio. However, we can solve many of those problems by referring to corresponding sentences in the other two works on the RGV, namely, Rngog lo’s Essential Meaning and Phywa pa’s Topical Outline.
4) The colophon of our manuscript does not tell us when the work was composed or copied. We can only deduce an approximate date of the manuscript to be some time between ca. 1092 (a possible terminus post quem of the composition of the work) and 1374 (the year of the destruction of Khara Khoto). The contents of our manuscript and other relevant works discovered at Khara Khoto show that the Tibetan scholastic tradition of the
Bka’ gdams pa had spread there. (Kano, conclusion, 170)
Both Indian and Tibetan traditions struggled with the question of the ontological status of Buddha-nature. One finds indeed in some sūtras descriptions of Buddha-nature as permanent and pervading every sentient being, which are also characteristics ascribed by non-Buddhists to the Self (ātman). But if Buddha-nature were to be understood as a permanent entity akin to a Self, how could this teaching be compatible with the standard Buddhist doctrine that everything is impermanent and selfless?
Some Mahāyāna sūtras, such as the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, would offer support for the assimilation of Buddha-nature with a Self. The Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra is quite explicit in associating the two notions, characterizing in particular the dharmakāya in terms of “perfection of Self” (ātmapāramitā), but warns about the confusion of the “correct” ātman, which is Buddha-nature, with ātman taken in its ordinary sense.1
RGV I.37 and RGVV also speak of the “perfection of Self” as an epithet of the dharmakāya, interpreting however this notion of “Self” (ātman) in the sense of selflessness (nairātmya) or quiescence of conceptual proliferations (prapañca), thus distinguishing Buddha-nature from the notion of a personal, permanent Self (ātman).2
Nevertheless, the RGV does not promote the doctrine of emptiness in the sense that everything is ultimately empty of intrinsic nature. Quite on the contrary, the RGV stresses the real existence of Buddha-nature, and proclaims the superiority of the Buddha-nature doctrine to the emptiness doctrine of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras.3
The RGV thus on the one hand distinguishes Buddha-nature from the disapproved view of a Self, while on the other hand it admits Buddha-nature as ultimately existent4—an ambiguous viewpoint, and a challenging one for its interpreters. . . .
The present paper deals with a selection of rṄog’s most significant views on the doctrine of Buddha-nature and considers some reactions to his interpretations in the works of his followers. Since the RGV commentaries attributed to two of rṄog’s "four main [spiritual] sons" (sras kyi thu bo bźi), Źaṅ Tshes spoṅ ba Chos kyi bla ma and Gro luṅ pa Blo gros byuṅ gnas,19 as yet remain to be found,20 we will concentrate on the next-earliest available work, a commentary by Phywa pa Chos kyi seṅ ge (1109–1169).21 (Kano, introduction, 249–55)
Notes:
1. The Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra equates ātman with Buddha-nature (see P 788 tu 105b5 [≈T vol. 12, 407b; 883b]: bdag ces bya ba ni de bźin gśegs paʼi sñiṅ poʼi don to //) and characterizes the dharmakāya (that is, the resultant aspect of Buddha-nature; see below [i]) in terms of “perfection of permanence” (nityapāramitā), “perfection of bliss” (sukhapāramitā), “perfection of Self (ātmapāramitā), and “perfection of purity” (śubhapāramitā) (see P 788 tu 33b3–34a2 [≈T vol. 12, 377c-378a; 862b]).
2. RGVV 31, 13–16: tathāgatas tua punar yathābhūtajñānena sarvadharmanairātmyaparapāramiprāptaḥb / tac cāsya nairātmyam anātmalakṣaṇena yathādarśanam avisaṃvāditatvātc sarvakālam ātmābhipreto nairātmyam evātmetid kṛtvā / yathoktaṃ sthito ʼsthānayogeneti /
(a Schmithausen [1971: 143] corrected tathāgataḥ to tathāgatas tu; b Johnston xvi; c Schmithausen [1971: 143] corrected avisaṃvāditvāt to avisaṃvāditatvāt;d Schmithausen [1971: 143] corrected evātmani to evātmeti)
RGVV 32,9–10: prajñāpāramitābhāvanayākāśopamasattvabhājanalokanairātmya- niṣṭhāgamanād.
See also RGVV 33,8–10: tām eva cāvidyāvāsabhūmiṃ pratītya sūkṣmanimittaprapañca- samudācārayogād atyantam anabhisaṃskārām ātmapāramitāṃ nādhigacchanti.
Schmithausen (1971: 143–144 and 1973: 135) links this sentence to the Madhyamaka view. For instance, the Madhyamakahṛdaya (III.284cd) similarly defines dharmakāya as quiescence of conceptual proliferations (buddhānāṃ dharmakāyo ʼyaṃ prapañcopaśamaḥ śivaḥ).
3. The alternative title of the RGV, mahāyānottaratantra “supreme doctrine of the Mahāyāna," hints to the superiority of the Buddha-nature doctrine to the emptiness doctrine. Cf. RGV I.160: pūrvam evaṃ vyavasthāpya tantre punar ihottare / pañcadoṣaprahāṇāya dhātvastitvaṃ prakāśitam /
4. Cf. RGV I.53, I.165; RGVV 2,11–13.
19. The other two are Khyuṅ rin chen grags and ʼBre śes rab ʼbar. Cf. bKaʼ gdams chos ʼbyuṅ gsal baʼi sgron me, 151.
20. Both A khu Chiṅ Śes rab rgya mtsho and gŹon nu dpal ascribe RGV commentaries to these two authors. (Cf. respectively Tho yig, nos. 11333 and 11339, and rGyud bla me loṅ, 4,23, 574,5.) gŹon nu dpal also lists RGV commentaries by Chos kyi bla ma’s disciple Ñaṅ braṅ pa Chos kyi ye śes (12th century); Phywa pa’s disciple gTsaṅ nag pa brTson ʼgrus seṅ ge (12th century); and Dan ʼbag sMra baʼi seṅ ge (12th century). See gŹon nu dpal, rGyud bla me loṅ, 4,23–24. A khu Chiṅ Śes rab rgya mtsho most
likely copied gŹon nu dpal’s references (see Tho yig nos. 11331, 11334, 11335).
21. Phywa pa authored a RGV commentary and a topical outline of RGV (based on rṄog’s topical outline), both of which were found recently at gNas bcu lha khaṅ of ʼBras spuṅs Monastery and published in 2006 in the bKaʼ gdams gsuṅ ʼbum. See Theg pa chen po rgyud bla maʼi bstan bcos kyi tshig daṅ don gyi cha rgya cher bsñad pa phra baʼi don gsal ba (abbr. rGyud bla don gsal), vol. 7, pp. 163–345; Theg pa chen po rgyud bla maʼi bsdus paʼi don, vol. 7, pp. 145–156. The authorship of the rGyud bla don gsal is confirmed on the basis of (a) the colophon of the manuscript that states “composed by the monk Chos kyi seṅ ge” (see Phywa pa, rGyud bla don gsal, 93a3: theg pa chen po rgyud bla maʼi bstan bcos kyi tshig daṅ don gyi cha rgya cher bsñad pa phra baʼi don gsal ba źes bya ba / / śa kyaʼi dge sloṅ chos kyi bla maʼi źabs kyi rdul phyi bos nod pa dge sloṅ chos kyi seṅ ges ñe bar sbyar ba rdzogs s.hyō / /) and (b) a citation nominally attributed to Phywa pa in Blo gros mtshuṅs med’s RGV commentary (see Kano 2007: 109, n. 75).
According to the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, an icchantika (Tib. 'dod chen pa), therefore, is a monk who, claiming (or fancies; icchanti, Tib. 'dod pa) himself to be an Arhat, rejects the teaching of the Vaipulya — namely the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra itself— as told by Māra. Judging from the above-cited descriptions: "he ... also looks like a Mahāsattva," "'The Blessed One is impermanent. The Dharma and the Saṅgha will also become extinct. Such signs of the extinction of the Good Dharma are also evident.' — this is explained clearly in the (true) Mahāyāna (scriptures)," we may assume that icchantikas were monks who, following the traditional Mahāyāna teachings, did not approve (icchanti) of the then emerging theory of the eternity of the Tathāgata — which is the main theme of the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra.
The word icchantika is either formed from the present active participle icchant- with the suffix -ka, as Edgerton suggested, or derived from icchā + anta. As we have seen above, the word icchant-( 'dod pa) has the meanings "fancying; claiming, maintaining; admitting, approving of" in addition to its usual definition "desiring." Accordingly, the noun icchā has the meaning "assertion, claim" in addition to "desire." What is meant by icchantika is, then, probably "one who claims." When a monk—who claimed (icchati) to be an "Arhat" also was revered as an "Arhat" or a "Mahasattva" by his followers and thus, was an authority and spiritual leader of the Buddhist community—did not recognise (nêchanti) new ideas such as the eternity of the Tathāgata and the tathāgatagarbha theory as the Buddha's teachings, then the newly-risen, would-be "Vaipulya teachings" (probably the older stratum of the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra) may have been branded as unorthodox. That is what was meant by the word "rejection" (pratikṣepa; Tib. spong ba). If a simple, common monk rejects a new theory, his voice may not reach anybody. Being rejected and condemned by none other than the authorities of the Buddhist communities, those who advocated new ideas and their followers must have faced a crisis. Then, they may have condemned the authoritative monks repeatedly as being "arrogant," "evil" and "irredeemable," as well as calling them, in a derogatory term, icchantika ("one who claims [to be an authority]") in the newly-added chapters of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra. However, if one looks at the descriptions cited above from a different point of view, those monks, who were condemned as icchantikas in the "Sutra," might have been respected conservative monks who stayed with the traditional (Mahāyāna) Buddhist teachings, while opposing new ideas concerning Buddhahood. They might have been so-called "fundamentalists" but never "evil monks."
Those, who composed the later stratum of the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, were probably the first to label those monks, who did not approve of the eternity of the Tathāgata and the tathāgatagarbha theory, as icchantikas. Following in the wake of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, the composers of later Buddhist texts, putting forth the same tathāgatagarbha theory, continued to condemn those who did not approve of their theory, regarding them as icchantika. Claiming that their texts were part of the "true Mahāyāna" tradition, the former condemned the latter as rejecters of the "Mahāyāna" teachings.
However, much later, the word icchantika seems to have come to be interpreted, not as meaning "one who claims" but "one who desires (transmigration)." This is clearly seen in the Ratnagotravibhāga:
p. 28, l. 14f. ye nâpi saṃsāram icchanti yathêcchantikā ( "They are not seeking for the
Phenomenal Life as the Icchantikas do, ... ")
p. 29, l. 1f. tatra ye sattvā bhavâbhilāṣiṇa icchantikās tanniyatipatitā ihadhārmikā evôcyante
mithyātvaniyataḥ satttvarāśir iti ("And here, those people who cling to this worldly life,
i.e. the Icchantikas and those who, though belonging to this Our Religion, have
definitely fallen into the former's way are called the group of people who confirm in
the wrong way.")
p. 31, l. 8f. tatra mahāyānadharmapratihatānām icchantikānām aśucisamsārâbhirati-
viparyayeṇa bodhisattvānāṃ mahāyānadharmâdhimuktibhāvanāyāḥ śubhapāramitâdhigamaḥ
phalaṃ draṣṭavyam ("Here, being opposite to the taking of delight in the 'impure'
Phenomenal Life by the Icchantikas who have hatred against the Doctrine of Great
Vehicle, it should be understood that the acquisition of the Supreme Purity is the
result of 'Practice of the Faith in the Doctrine of Great Vehicle' by the Bodhisattvas.")
The shift in meanings of the word icchantika from "one who claims" to "one who desires (transmigration)," may indicate the actual disappearance of those, who had disapproved of the tathāgatagarbha theory, at least from the vicinity. It may further suggest that followers of the theory might have increased in number, making them much more self-confident of their theory; or that the theory itself might have come to be fully recognised as a genuine Mahāyāna teaching. (Karashima, "Who Were the Icchantikas?", 76–79)
- Author's notes have been omitted
To read this whole article, see Vol. X of The Annual Report of The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology at Soka University
The intent of this paper is to treat this latter concern. It will attempt to describe the basic doctrinal focus of four early Yogācāra texts, suggest the intent of their authors, and draw a hypothesis concerning the lines of development of early Yogācāra as seen in these texts. The texts selected are the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, the Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra, and the Madyāntavibhāgaśāstra. All four texts were composed before the time of the classical formulation of Yogācāra by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Although it is not possible to determine with any degree of certitude the temporal relationship among these texts, insight into their doctrinal emphases would help to identify the overall problematic that led the early, pre-Asaṅgan Yogācārins to develop their thinking. (Source Accessed Jan 28, 2020)
To illustrate this general point Keenan considers the case of the translator Paramārtha and his amanuensis Hui-k'ai, and shows that in their work on Indic texts they not infrequently added references to tathtāgatagarbha and Buddha Nature where no such mention was made in the originals; they thus contributed to the centrality of Buddha Nature thought in East Asian Buddhism. (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to Buddha Nature, 5)
Volume 16
The basic sūtra of the Faxiang School, The Scripture on the Explication of Underlying Meaning expounds the thought of the Yogācāra or Mind-Only School (Vijñānavāda), stating that all phenomena are manifestations of the mind. It belongs to the middle period of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism and is considered to have been composed at the start of the fourth century A.D. It is divided into eight chapters, and gives a detailed exposition of the philosophy of the Yogācāra School. Judging from the fact that the greater part of this sūtra is quoted in the Yogācārabhūmi (Taishō 53), and that numerous citations from it are to be found in such works as the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Taishō 57) and Jō-yui-shiki-ron (Taishō 54), it is clear that it exerted considerable influence in later times.
Source
Skt. Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra. Translated into the Chinese by Xuan Cang as Jie shenmi jing (解深密經). 5 fascicles.
(Source: BDK America)
This dissertation argues that the Yogâcāra Buddhism transmitted by the Indian translator Paramârtha (Ch. Zhendi 真諦) underwent a significant transformation due to the influence of his later Chinese interpreters, a phenomenon to which previous scholars failed to paid enough attention.
I begin with showing two contrary interpretations of Paramârtha's notion of jiexing 解性. The traditional interpretation glosses jiexing in terms of "original awakening" (benjue 本覺) in the Awakening of Faith and hence betrays its strong tie to that text. In contrast, a contrary interpretation of jiexing is preserved in a Dunhuang fragment Taishō No. 2805 (henceforth abbreviated as T2805).
The crucial part of this dissertation consists in demonstrating that T2805 and the Awakening of Faith represent two competing lineages of the interpreters of Paramârtha. The first clue is that modern scholars have voiced objection to the traditional attribution of the Awakening of Faith to Paramârtha. In addition, I discovered that striking similarities exist between T2805 and Paramârtha's corpus with respect to terminology, style of phrasing, and doctrine. I further draw attention to the historical testimonies about two different doctrinal views held by Paramârtha's interpreters. Therefore, I argue that there were two lineages in the name of Paramârtha's disciples around 590 CE: the indirect lineage interpreted Paramârtha through the lens of the Awakening of Faith; and the direct lineage—represented by T2805—preserved Paramârtha's original teachings but died out prematurely. Later Chinese Buddhist tradition mistakenly regards the indirect lineage as Paramârtha's true heir and attributes the Awakening of Faith to Paramârtha.
This implies that Paramârtha may have agreed with Xuanzang 2T5c (600–664) much more than scholars used to assume. For example, Xuanzang's characterization of the notion of "aboriginal uncontaminated seeds" looks very similar to how Paramârtha depicts jiexing. It also implies that we should distinguish the strong sense of the notion of "tathāgatagarbha" in the Awakening of Faith from its weak sense. The fact that even Vasubandhu endorses the weak sense of "tathāgatagarbha" strongly challenges the received wisdom that Yogâcāra and Tathāgatagarbha were two distinct and antagonistic trends of thought in India.
Engaging with the digitalized Chinese Buddhist canon, Ching Keng draws on clues from a long-lost Dunhuang fragment [T2805] and considers its striking similarities with Paramārtha's corpus with respect to terminology, style of phrasing, and doctrines. In this cutting-edge interpretation of the concept of jiexing, Keng demystifies the image of Paramārtha and makes the case that the fragment holds the key to recover his original teachings. (Source: H-Net)
Link to T2805 on CBETA: https://cbetaonline.dila.edu.tw/zh/T2805
The tathāgatagarbha is an intrinsically luminous consciousness naturally inscribed with the complete knowledge of the Buddha along with infinite Buddha-virtues and the potential to attain them. Studies in the past have focused on its potential aspect and negated it as an ontological entity. In this dissertation I examine it as a true self of sentient beings arguing that being beginningless, unborn, unconditioned, eternally unchanging, enduring and imperishable, it qualifies as true self. Also, the Mahāyāna-Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra unhesitatingly acknowledges it as true self, and its features conform to the definition of the true self of this sūtra and of Bhāvaviveka. I find ample support for its interpretation as true self in the sūtras on this doctrine. Besides, its features correspond with the features of the Brahmanic, Sāṅkhya and Jaina true selves. The Tathāgatagarbha Doctrine is recognized as a provisional teaching. The centrality of the doctrines of śūnyatā, tathatā, darmadhātu, dharmakāya and nirvāṇa suggest that it is truly Mahāyāna in spirit. According to the Ratnagotravibhāga, without realizing the emptiness of own being, nirvāṇa is not attained. This “Ultimate Doctrine”, it adds, is taught to remove the five defects. The defects, I find, are connected with not knowing emptiness or understanding the dharmakāya of the Tathāgata nihilistically. As a corrective to the nihilistic understanding of the Mahāyāna Doctrine, it qualifies as an ultimate teaching.
I study the Tathāgatagarbha Doctrine from the following perspectives: the tathāgatagarbha as true self; the all-pervading, undifferentiated Essence of Buddhahood as Cosmic Self; and the concept of liberation. I also compare this doctrine to the doctrines of the above-mentioned three traditions and study their concepts of true self, the concepts of Cosmic Self of the Brahmanic and Early Sāṅkhya doctrines; and the concepts of liberation of these three doctrines. I follow the trajectory of thought of the Ratnagotravibhāga and the Tathāgatagarbha group of texts.
Rinpoche gave these teachings on the Uttaratantra at the Centre d’Etudes de Chanteloube in Dordogne, France during the summers of 2003 and 2004, after completing a four-year teaching cycle on Chandrakirti’s Madhyamakavatara. He has often emphasised the value of a grounding in the Madhyamika or ‘Middle Way’ philosophy of emptiness, as without this foundation beginners can easily misunderstand Buddha’s teaching that all sentient beings have buddhanature. For example, many of us who have grown up in a Western cultural context can easily confuse buddhanature with ideas like God or a personal soul or essence. These teachings allow us to dispel these kinds of misunderstanding. And despite their very different presentations, both the Madhyamika and Uttaratantra are teachings on the buddhist view of emptiness. As Rinpoche says, “You could say that when Nagarjuna explains the Prajñaparamita, he concentrates more on its ‘empty’ aspect (“form is emptiness” in the Heart Sutra), whereas when Maitreya explains the same thing, he concentrates more on the ‘ness’ aspect (emptiness is form).” In showing us how emptiness and buddhanature are different ways of talking about the same thing, this text gives us the grounding we need to understand buddhanature.
In this way, the Uttaratantra gives us another way to understand the Four Seals that comprise the buddhist view, which Rinpoche teaches in his book “What Makes You Not a Buddhist.” It also offers a way to make sense of what modern physics has discovered about the magically “full” quality of “empty” space (e.g. vacuum particles and quantum optics). But like all buddhist philosophy, it is not intended simply to provoke an academic discussion that we leave behind as we return to our everyday lives. It is taught as a path for us to attain liberation. For practitioners, the Uttaratantra clearly explains what it means to accumulate merit and purify defilements, and it offers a safety net to protect our path from falling into all-too-common eternalist or nihilist extremes. It also tackles many of the basic questions that practitioners ask as they consider the nature of the path, questions like: What is the ultimate destination of this path? Who is this person travelling on the path? What are the defilements that are eliminated on the path? What is experience of enlightenment like? Rinpoche answers these questions and many others in this commentary on the Uttaratantra-Shastra. (Source: Siddhartha's Intent)
The Kālacakra, or “wheel of time,” tantra likely entered Indian Mahayana Buddhism around the tenth century. In expounding the root tantra, the Indian master Puṇḍarīka, one of the legendary Kalkī kings of the land of Shambhala, wrote his influential Stainless Light. Ornament of Stainless Light is an authoritative Tibetan exposition of this important text, composed in the fifteenth century by Khedrup Norsang Gyatso, tutor to the Second Dalai Lama.
One of the central projects of Kālacakra literature is a detailed correlation between the human body and the external universe. In working out this complex correspondence, the Kālacakra texts present an amazingly detailed theory of cosmology and astronomy, especially about the movements of the various celestial bodies. The Kālacakra tantra is also a highly complex system of Buddhist theory and practice that employs vital bodily energies, deep meditative mental states, and a penetrative focus on subtle points within the body’s key energy conduits known as channels. Ornament of Stainless Light addresses all these topics, elaborating on the external universe, the inner world of the individual, the Kālacakra initiation rites, and the tantric stages of generation and completion, all in a highly readable English translation. (Source: Wisdom Publications)
This dissertation provides a comprehensive study and complete translation of Tao-sheng's Commentary on the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra (CSPS). This document occupies an important place in Chinese Buddhist literature. Its significance in the study of Chinese Buddhism can be described in two ways. Firstly, the CSPS was the first commentary ever written on the Lotus Sūtra, which was to become a scripture of fundamental importance on the Far Eastern Buddhist scene, especially for the later Chinese Buddhist schools. Furthermore, it was the first commentary on any Buddhist scripture that was written in Chinese and structured in fully developed commentarial form. The CSPS set a pattern in many ways for later Buddhists to follow in terms of both structure and ideology.
Secondly, the CSPS is a rich source of Tao-sheng's seminal ideas. Tao-sheng (ca. 360-434) has been regarded, both in his time and subsequently, as a uniquely creative and prophetic thinker. The CSPS, the only writing of Tao-sheng preserved in complete form, is essential to any study of Tao-sheng's own original thought. Most of his theses and arguments, which were controversial in his day, were originally propounded in his other writings, but the commentary may provide at least the general structure of Tao-sheng's thought.
The thesis is composed of two main portions: "Study" (Part I-IV) and "Translation" (Part V). Part I sets out and clarifies the problems involved in the study of Tao-sheng, the aims and method of the present study. Part II as the introductory step to the main task involving the CSPS extensively examines Tao-sheng as a whole as reflected in other sources, in terms of his background, historical and biographical, his works, his doctrines, and his influence. Part III is devoted to a critical examination of the CSPS proper. Here I undertake an in-depth analysis in several different ways in respect with both form and content, or language and ideology. The analysis focuses on how Tao-sheng renders, successfully or otherwise, the ancient Indian system of religious thought into the current Chinese language, which was already laden with indigenous philosophical connotations. Here I also trace and reconstruct Tao-sheng's thought incorporated in the commentary in accordance with his distinct themes. Part IV reviews the findings and significance of the study conducted. In brief, the thesis is the first full-scale study of Tao-sheng and the commentary.
Finally, a complete translation of the text is presented along with detailed annotations including the classical sources of Chinese philosophical terms used and numerous corruptions of the text. In light of the significance of Tao-sheng and the CSPS, the translation answers the need for a complete translation of the text into a modern language and will serve as a basis for further study.
as having the same meaning i.e. One Mind, in all Buddhist scriptures. His unique Hoe'tong (會通, harmonization) theory is focused on harmonizing different doctrines and sects within the same Buddhist Teaching. He combined all the different Buddhist theories into One Flavor (一味). Wǒnhyo did not reject the existing assertions on Buddha-nature but integrated them in a system elucidating the process of One Mind.
Buddhism has a profound and thoroughly developed set of teachings on human being. One might well argue that the question of human being is the question par excellence with which the Buddhist tradition as a whole struggles. According to the traditional account, for example, the point of departure for the Buddha's own search, discoveries, and teachings was the dilemma of the human condition. Moreover, vast numbers of Buddhist texts speak out of or address human experience as such, consciously focusing upon it as the source of both question and answer. Nonetheless, many questions a modern Westerner asks as a matter of course about human being are not directly addressed in the Buddhist texts. There are of course important reasons for this. Our concept of and assumptions about human individuality are profoundly different from Buddhist views of the same. Our two worlds of discourse about the value and meaning of finite bodily existence, the course of history, the meaning of suffering, and the nature of possible human greatness are set up on entirely different foundations. Thus, for a contemporary Westerner to ask the question "What is a person? What is a human being?" of a Buddhist text is to set oneself up to receive an answer that does not satisfy the intent of the question. Yet, while Buddhist views and assumptions differ so markedly from our own, Buddhist texts reveal in their own way a preoccupation with the human condition as intent as that of our own hyperindividualistic, anthropocentric culture.
With such a shared fixation, it is inevitable that persons on both sides of the cultural boundaries will attempt to gain light from the other side on this subject, despite the incommensurability of each other's questions and answers. The present essay is one such attempt: not an East-West comparison, but an effort to address a Buddhist text from the perspective of cross-cultural philosophy (still, despite the name, a thoroughly Western enterprise) . Herein I will engage in dialogue the Buddha Nature Treatise (Chinese: Fo Hsing Luna; hereafter, BNT), a text representative of the Buddha nature tradition that contains an extensive discussion of the concept of Buddha nature, a crucial component, if not the most crucial component, of the East Asian Buddhist concept of human being. I will attempt to wrest from the text answers to two categories of questions-it s view of the ontological nature of human being and its view of the existential status of human beings. In the course of the discussion I will ask such questions as: What roles do individuality and freedom play in the view of human being portrayed in this text? What value, if any, does an individual human personality possess? Is there anything of value in human history? Clearly, the text itself does not speak in these terms; these are the questions of a twentieth-century, philosophically inclined American. In order to bridge the cultural gap, I will first give a summary account of the text's concept of Buddha nature in its own terms and in its own format. Then, acknowledging that the text itself neither speaks this language nor shares my concerns, I will put my questions to the text and attempt to extract from the text its implications for the subject of my concern. In other words, I cannot claim that the author of the BNT does make the statements I will give as responses to my questions about human being, but I do claim that these views are implicit in and follow from the statements he does make about Buddha nature. Granting that human freedom requires us to expect the unexpected, nonetheless, I believe that if the author of the BNT were here today and could engage in dialogue with me, as long as my interlocutor remained consistent, something close to the views I will articulate in the course of this essay would emerge. (King, "Buddha Nature and the Concept of Person," 151–52)
Buddhism, and especially early Buddhism, is known for the anātman (no self) teaching. By any account, this teaching is central to both doctrine and practice from the beginning. Zen Buddhism (Chinese Ch'an), in contrast, is known for its teaching that the single most important thing in life is to discover the 'true self'. Is there a real, or only an apparent, conflict between these two versions of Buddhism? Certainly there is at the least a radical change in the linguistic formulation of the teaching. Examining the two teachings on the linguistic level, we note that the use of the term 'true' in the phrase 'true self' may indicate that we have here a conscious reformation of the place of the term 'self' in the tradition, or perhaps that the use of this phrase in Zen is the product of such a conscious formulation. Thus we may expect, upon investigation, to find an evolution from one teaching to the other, rather than a true doctrinal disparity. The apparent, or linguistic, conflict between the two, however, remains; hence we must also expect to find a doctrinal formulation at some point in this evolution in which the apparent conflict is consciously apprehended and resolved.
That is, Buddhism embraces both the teaching that there is no self and the teaching that the goal of life is to discover the true self. Not only does Buddhism embrace these two formulations, but each in its own context is the central pivot of the teachings of the school or community concerned. Two questions arise here. (1) How can a single tradition affirm both no self and true self? How can the two ideas be reconciled? (This is the philosophical question.) (2) In linking early Buddhism and Zen we are discussing two religious movements separated by approximately 12 centuries and by their development in two vastly different cultures, the Indian and the Chinese. What is there in the course of this development that could account for the transition from talk of no self to talk of true self? (This is the question of intellectual history.) In the present essay I will attempt to show that it is by examining the Buddha nature (fo hsing 佛性) concept and understanding it as a term representing certain actions that these questions may be answered. (King, "The Buddha Nature," 255)
I propose in this paper to challenge Matsumoto and Hakamaya’s reading of Buddha-nature thought. In my understanding, while Buddha-nature thought uses some of the terminology of essentialist and monistic philosophy, and thus may give the reader the impression that it is essentialist or monistic, a careful study of how those terms are used—how they actually function in the text—leads the reader to a very different conclusion. I will attempt to demonstrate that Buddha-nature thought is by no means dhātu-vāda as charged, but is instead an impeccably Buddhist variety of thought, based firmly on the idea of emptiness, which in turn is a development of the principle of pratītyasamutpāda
In making my remarks I draw upon the exposition of Buddha-nature thought given in the Buddha-Nature Treatise (Fo hsing lun), attributed to Vasubandhu and translated into Chinese by Paramārtha.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000D45-QINU`"' The Buddha-Nature Treatise is a particularly useful text to consult in this matter inasmuch as it constitutes a considered attempt, by an author of great philosophical sophistication, to articulate the Buddha-nature concept per se and to explain both its philosophical meaning and its soteriological function. Indeed, the author is savvy enough to have anticipated the criticisms that this concept would face, including the particular criticisms leveled in our time by Matsumoto and Hakamaya, and to have effectively countered them in the 6th century CE. In this chapter, then, I will consider some of these criticisms in turn and see how the author of the Buddha-Nature Treatise defends as Buddhist the concept of Buddha-nature and the language in which it is expressed.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000D46-QINU`"' (King, "The Doctrine of Buddha-Nature Is Impeccably Buddhist," 174–75)
In addition, she refutes the accusations that the idea of Buddha nature introduces a crypto-Atman into Buddhist thought, and that it represents a form of monism akin to the Brahmanism of the Upanisads. In doing this, King defends Buddha nature in terms of purely Buddhist philosophical principles. Finally, the author engages the Buddha nature concept in dialogue with Western philosophy by asking what it teaches us about what a human being, or person, is.
(Source: back cover)
The historical approach to Zen in Heinrich Dumoulin's major work, A History of Zen, published over twenty years ago, broke new ground in Western Zen studies. Up to that time Zen publication in the West dealt primarily with interpretive accounts of Zen and translations of Zen or Zen-related texts. I follow here an alternate approach to Zen and seek to place it in the context of one or another aspect of Mahāyāna tradition. One might read Zen in the perspective of Indian Mādhyamika or Yogācāra, or in terms of the Chinese prajñic or Hua-yen doctrinal development. But I would like to place it within the perspective of Tathāgatagarbha thought. (Kiyota, "Tathāgatagarbha Thought," 207)
Watsuji Tetsurō (1889-1960) brought Dōgen out of this long period of obscurity with his treatise Shamon Dōgen written between 1919 and 1921.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000D58-QINU`"' Watsuji's contribution, however, is not limited to his introduction of Dōgen to public attention. Instead of treating Dōgen as the founder of the Sōtō School, he presents him as a human being, a person, a man (hito):
- ...it may be justifiable to assert that I opened a gate to a new interpretation of Dōgen. He thereby becomes not the Dōgen of a sect but of mankind; not the founder Dōgen but rather our Dōgen. The reason why I claim it so daringly is due to my realization that his truth was killed by sheer sectarian treatments (Watsuji 1925，p. 160).
This realization grew out of Watsuji’s effort to solve the problem of how a layman like himself could attempt to understand Dōgen's "truth" without engaging in the rigorous training prescribed by the Zen tradition (Watsuji 1925, p , 156). A sectarian would claim that the "truth" must be experienced immediately and that any attempt to verbalize or conceptualize it constitutes falsification. If the immediate experience is the only gateway to the "truth," as the sectarian would claim, why did Dōgen himself write so much? Dōgen believed that it was through writing that his truth was to be transmitted to others. For his own religious training, he singlemindedly concentrated on sitting in meditation; yet he saw no intrinsic conflict between sitting and writing. This is why Dōgen started writing Shōbōgenzō in 1231: so that he might be able to "transmit the
Buddha’s authentic Dharma to those who are misguided by false teachers" (Watsuji 1925, p. 157). Watsuji further quotes from Dogen: "Although it (Shōbōgenzō) might appear to be a mere 'theory,' it still bears indispensable importance for the sake of Dharma" (1925，p. 157). Thus Watsuji claims that his approach, which relies on words and concepts, is a valid alternative to the monk’s subjective pursuit.
According to Dōgen, enlightenment is possible only through rigorous sitting in meditation (kufū zazen) and through the study of Dharma under a master (sanshi monpō). One can encounter Dōgen as a master through his writings, for he answers one’s questions in his works. But one still must practice sitting in meditation. Watsuji insists that meditation can be done in an office or a study as well as in a meditation hall; he even goes so far as to say that perhaps a study may be a more congenial place for this purpose than a meditation hall when many monasteries are no longer concerned with the transmission of the truth but are immersed in secular concerns (1925，p. 158). Therefore, for Watsuji, meditation does not necessarily require the act of entering a monastery.
Of the two prerequisites for the realization of the truth, sitting in meditation is left to the individual. But the other, the pursuit of Dharma under a master, is Watsuji's principle concern. Shamon Dogen is an account of Watsuji's personal encounter with the person of Dōgen as he speaks in his writings, primarily Shōbōgenzō and Shōbōgenzō zuimonki, the latter of which was compiled by Ejō, Dōgen's closest disciple. In Watsuji's treatise, we encounter not only Watsuji as he faced Dōgen but Dōgen himself.
Watsuji’s new methodology considers it central to discover and encounter the person (hito) of Dōgen in his works.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000D59-QINU`"' Many people have followed Watsuji’s methodology. Professor Tamaki Kōshirō of the University of Tokyo, for instance, remarks that not only was he first exposed to Dōgen through Watsuji, but also that he encountered the living Dōgen in Watsuji’s treatise.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000D5A-QINU`"'
This writer finds Watsuji's methodology to be particularly applicable to the study of Dōgen. Dōgen himself saw the truth fully embodied in the personhood of his Chinese master, Juching. Dōgen's encounter with this individual was the single
most decisive experience in his life, as is abundantly attested in his writings. Furthermore, Dōgen repeatedly discouraged his disciples from associating with institutionalized Zen. This paper, therefore, is the result of the writer’s attempt to encounter the personhood of Dōgen.
While this writer uses Watsuji’s methodology, the main body of literature that is examined in this paper is the chapter of Dōgen’s Shōbōgenzō devoted to the busshō or Buddha-nature. The reasons for this choice are three. The question that tormented the young monk Dōgen concerned the Buddha-nature. Dōgen's search for the answer to this question took him to the eminent monks of his time: Kōen of Mt. Hiei; Kōin of Miidera temple;
Yōsai of Kenninji temple; Myōzen, who succeeded Yōsai at this first Rinzai Zen monastery in Japan; Wu-chi Liao-pai and finally T'ien-t'ung Ju-ching in Southern Sung China. This pilgrimage spanned a period of over ten years ending in 1225 when he attained enlightenment under Ju-ching’s instruction and solved his question. Thus it is possible to look at Dōgen's formative years as a continuing struggle with the fundamental question he first raised on Mt. Hiei. Secondly, the Buddha-nature chapter is one of the longest of the ninety-two chapters, in the Shōbōgenzō which may suggest Dōgen's particular concern for the subject matter. Lastly, the original manuscript of this chapter, now preserved in Eiheiji temple, bears witness to the fact that Dōgen laboriously revised the chapter a number of times. Study of the Buddha-nature chapter, therefore, can
reasonably be taken as central to understanding Dōgen's life and thought. (Kodera, "The Buddha-nature in Dogen's
Shōbōgenzō," 267–70)
Shakya Chokden articulated his position on other-emptiness in works written during the last thirty years of his life. In those works he advocated both Alīkākāravāda Yogācāra and Niḥsvabhāvavāda Madhyamaka systems as equally valid forms of Madhyamaka, regarding the former as a system of other-emptiness and the latter as a system of self-emptiness. Instead of approaching the two systems as irreconcilable, he presented them as equally valid and effective, emphasized their respective strengths, and promoted one or the other depending on context and audience. Partly for these reasons, his own philosophical outlook does not neatly fall into the categories of other-emptiness or self-emptiness, and placing him squarely into the camp of “followers of other-emptiness” (gzhan stong pa)—as some advocates of later sectarian traditions did—does not do justice to him as a thinker. (Source: DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln)
Śākya Mchog Ldan approaches the buddha-essence inseparable from positive qualities of a buddha in two ways. In some texts, such as the Essence of Sūtras and Tantras, he argues that it has to be identified only as purity from adventitious stains, i.e., the removal of all or some negative qualities that prevent one from directly seeing the buddha-essence. In other texts, such as The Sun Unseen Before, he interprets it as the purity from adventitious stains and the natural purity as it is taught in some sūtras of the Third Wheel of Doctrine and their commentaries. That type of natural purity is understood as the state of natural freedom from all obscurations inseparable from positive qualities of a buddha. Thereby, in this second type of texts, Śākya Mchog Ldan arrives at positing two types of the buddha-essence: relative (kun rdzob, saṃvṛti) and ultimate (don dam, paramārtha). Despite different interpretations of the natural purity, the identification of the buddha-essence as the purity from adventitious stains is present in both.
In his interpretation of the buddha-essence, Śākya Mchog Ldan utilizes the categories of the three levels found in the Sublime Continuum: the impure (ma dag, aśuddha), impure-pure (ma dag dag pa, aśuddhaśuddha, i.e. partially pure) and very pure (shin tu rnam dag, suviśuddha) levels that correspond respectively to the categories of sentient beings, bodhisattvas (understood as ārya bodhisattvas in this context), and tathāgatas.
Śākya Mchog Ldan argues that one becomes a possessor of the buddha-essence free from adventitious stains only on the impure-pure level. In other words, when bodhisattvas enter the Mahāyāna Path of Seeing (mthong lam, darśanamārga) simultaneously with the attainment of the first boddhisattva [sic] ground (byang chub sems pa’i sa, bodhisattavabhūmi) of Utmost Joy (rab tu dga’ ba, pramuditā), they become āryas, i.e. ‘exalted’ or ‘superior’, bodhisattvas, directly realize the ultimate truth (don dam bden pa, paramārthasatya), and thereby for the first time generate an antidote to obscurations of knowables (shes bya’i sgrib pa, jñeyāvaraṇa). They start gradually removing them, and thereby actually see at least a partial purification of stains ‘covering’ the buddha-essence, and its inseparability from at least some positive qualities. Such is not possible for anyone below that level, even for the non-Mahāyāna arhats (i.e., śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas). Thus, only Mahāyāna āryas have the buddha-essence characterized by the purity from adventitious stains; ārya bodhisattvas have only a part of it, while buddhas have it completely.
This article contains the complete text (in English translation) of The Essence of Sūtras and Tantras: Explanation of the Buddha-essence and The Sun Unseen Before: Definitive Meaning of the “Sublime Continuum” Treatise. (Source: DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln)
Among the distinctive aspects of Shakya Chokden s oeuvre are his several contributions to the history of Buddhist thought. Historical writing in Tibet (chapter 11) was interested above all in important political or religious events, and the lives of the major actors. Doctrinal or intellectual history was generally ignored, no doubt in part be- cause the outlook fostered in the monastic colleges was one of perennialism: the truths revealed in the Buddha s teaching were eternal, and thus exempt from the process of historical change. Knowledgeable scholars were, of course, aware that commentarial and interpretive traditions did have a history of sorts, but this awareness tended to be expressed in their own commentarial notes, not in dedicated doctrinal histories. In Shakya Chokden's writings, however, we find sustained historical essays on Indian and Tibetan traditions of logic and epistemology, and of the Madhyamaka philosophy inspired by Nāgārjuna. The selections given here are drawn from his work on the latter, and may serve as an introductory guide to the philosophical writings included in the remainder of this chapter.
Shakya Chokden's discussion turns on the distinction made by Tibetan thinkers between two types of argument, termed in the present translation "autonomous reason” and "consequence.” The first refers to the method of using positive proof to demonstrate the truth or falsehood of a given proposition. The second, by contrast, only seeks to undermine the propositions advanced by a (real or presumed) opponent by drawing out their untenable consequences, and so is similar to reductio ad absurdum, or “indirect Proof,” in Western systems of logic. This distinction was often considered by Tibetans to he the basis for designating two distinct schools of Madhyamaka philosophy, Svātantrika (Autonomous Reasoning) and Prāsańgika (Consequentialist). MTK (Komarovski, Sources of Tibetan Tradition, 373)
i. The Wish-fulfilling Meru: A Discourse Explaining the Origination of Madhyamaka (dBu-ma'i byung-tshul rnam-par bshad-pa'i gtam yid-bzhin lhun-po),
ii. Drop of Nectar of Definitive Meaning: Entering the Gate to the Essential Points of the Two Truth[s] (bDen-pa gnyis-kyi gnas-la 'jug-pa nges-don bdud-rtsi thigs-pa), and
iii. Great Ship of Discrimination that Sails into the Ocean of Definitive Meaning: A Treatise Differentiating the Tenets of Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika Madhyamaka (sBu-ma thal-rang gi grub-mtha'i rnam-par dbye-ba'i bstan-bcos nges-don gyi rgya-mtshor 'jug-pa'i rnam-dpyod kyi gru-chen).
The Wish-fulfilling Meru attempts in presenting in a lucid and concise way the Madhyamaka view including the Tantrik-madhyamaka, and its spread in India and Tibet. Drop of Definitive Meaning, through its brief yet succinct explanation guides us in entering the spheres of definitive meaning by means of understanding the two truth[s]—the conventional truth and the ultimate truth. Great Ship of Discrimination that sails into the Ocean of Definitive Meaning extensively explains the divergence of Madhyamaka into Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka, their philosophical views, and their interpretation of various concepts. In all, this anthology gives a general presentation of Madhyamaka schools and their views according to the great Sakyapa master. (Source: back cover)
More specifically, this study will explore the relationship between the theory and practice of the two truths and the Buddha-nature. In these two significant components of Chi-tsang's thought, one can see the synthesis of the Prajñāpāramitā doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā) and the Buddha-nature theory of "not-empty" (aśūnya). In combining these two major doctrinal trends of Mahāyāna Buddhism, Chi-tsang's thought is innovative and constitutes an important phase in Chinese intellectual history. (Koseki, introduction, 1)
Notes
- Biographical data on Chi-tsang can be found in the Hsü Kao-seng-chuan (T5O, 513c-515a). The material selected by Tao-hsüan explains that Chi-tsang was a third generation Chinese whose ancestors originally came from Parthia {An-hsi). Passing through what is now North Vietnam, his family eventually settled in Chin-ling {Nanching), where Chi-tsang was born. According to the biography, Chi-tsang's countenance was Central Asian, but his speech was Chinese, and he apparently never forgot his ethnic background. Many of his works are often signed, "Hu Chi-tsang," again indicating his Central Asian origins. Chi-tsang came from a family of Buddhists; his father was also a monk who took the name, Tao-liang. Two points in the biography are rather hazy. First, the biography states that Chi-tsang became a novice under Fa-lang (507–581) when he was seven. Material on Fa-lang indicates that he left Mt. She, the center of San-lun studies in the south (Chiang-nan), in 558 to reside at the Hsing-huang ssu in Chien-k'ang (Nanching). At that time, Chi-tsang was ten or eleven. Second, the biography also notes contact with Paramārtha, the Tripiṭaka-master, who arrived in China in 546. According to Kanakura Enshō, Paramārtha entered Chin-ling in 548 and immediately left the following year. Chi-tsang may have received his name from Paramārtha, but during Paramārtha's brief stay in Chin-ling, Chi-tsang_probably had not made his appearance in the world. See Kanakura Enshō, Sanron Gengi (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1941), pp. 191–92. In addition to the primary material, see, also, Ōchō Enichi, "Eon to Kichizō," Bukkyō Shisō-shi Ronshū (Tokyo: Daizō Shuppansha, 1964), pp. 433–450; Hirai Shunei, Chūgoku Hannya Shisō-shi Kenkyū (Tokyo: Shunjū-sha, 1976), pp. 346–50. For a discussion of the three Mādhyamika texts (Sanlun), translated by Kumārajīva (Middle Treatise, Twelve Topic Treatise, and the Hundred Treatise by Āryadeva), see Richard Robinson, Early Mādhyamika in India and China (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), pp. 28–39.
- In addition to these six essays, two additional essays have been added, a content analysis of sūtras and śāstras. The material in these sections is taken from Chi-tsang's other work, the Sanlun-hsüan-i. The essay on the two truths is similar in content to an independent work on the two truths, the Erh-t_i-i. Material on ekayāna is also similar to his large work on the Lotus Sūtra, the Fa-hua-hsüan-lun. The essay on the "Two Knowledges" draws much of its material from a large commentary on the Vimalakīrti-sūtra, the Ching-ming~hsüan-lun. Finally, the essays on Buddha-nature and nirvāṇa are independent works and do not overlap with his other writings. The origins of the essay on the "Eight Negations" is not clear. Ui Hakuju, for example, believes that this essay was not written by Chi-tsang. Early Sanron scholars such as Chinkai also question the authenticity of this essay (cf. Daijo genron mondō, T70, 572c- 573a). Whether Chi-tsang actually wrote this essay still remains a question, and the most common answer given is that this essay was written by Chi-tsang's contemporary, Chün-cheng. Chün-cheng is the author of another Sui Sanlun work, the Ta-ch'eng-ssu-lun-hsüan-i. Despite the problem of authorship, Hirai believes that the Hsüan-lun as a whole is a work written by Chi-tsang (or compiled by a disciple). The content of the essays is consistent with Chi-tsang's other works, and all the Japanese catalogs and commentators agree that it is a work written by the "Great Master of Chia-hsiang ssu," Chi-tsang's posthumous title. Ui also noted that the text was known as the Ta-ch'eng-hsüan-i or the Ta-ch'eng-hsüan-chang; he also referred to a twenty chüan version of the text, but did not give his source. Again, the Japanese catalogs and commentators all agree that the text was written in five chüan. See Ui Hakuju, "Daijo genron kaidai," Kokuyaku Issaikyō, Shoshubu I (Tokyo: Daitō Shuppansha, 1965), pp. 67–73. See, also, Hirai Chūgoku Hannya, pp. 356; 378.
- The Sanskrit for Buddha-nature (buddha-dhātu or buddha-gotra) follows Takasaki Jikidō, Nyoraizo Shisō no Kenkyū (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1974), p. 11. See, also, his article, "Nyoraizō-Busshō shisō," Kōza Bukkyō Shisō, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Risōsha, 1975), pp. 101–133. Further, see Ogawa Ichijō, Nyoraizo-Busshō no Kenkyū (Kyoto: Buneidō, 1974), pp. 62–66.
Valley sounds are the long, broad
tongue.
Mountain colors are not other than
the unconditioned body.
Eighty-four thousand verses are
heard through the night.
What can I say about this in the
future?
This poem is almost a thousand years old. It was presented to a Chinese Zen master by a follower, Su Shi, who went on to become one of China's greatest poets. In Zen these four lines are considered to be Su's enlightenment verse. In addition to being a poet, Su Shi (1037–1101) was a statesman, an essayist, a painter, and a calligrapher. He practiced Zen as a layperson, not a monk, receiving instruction from Donglin Changcong, a leading master. In China, Su is still honored as one of "the four greats" in several fields, including cooking.
Let’s take a look at the poem, using the above translation by Kazuaki Tanahashi (Treasury of the True Dharma Eye: Zen Master Dōgen’s Shōbō Genzō [Shambhala, 2012], 86)
Valley sounds are the long, broad tongue. "Valley sounds" are the sounds of a stream.
"Long, broad tongue" refers to the Buddha and his teachings, known as the Dharma. Restated unpoetically: natural phenomena such as streams are capable of expressing the highest truth. (Read entire article here)
Second only to the famous Rin chen bzang po (958–1055) in receiving the title of a "Great Translator" (lo chen) during the period of the "Later Propagation" (phyi dar) of Buddhism in Tibet, rNgog lo tsā ba Blo ldan shes rab (or rNgog lo) was one of the most influential figures in the establishment of Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism. After having devoted seventeen years of his life to the study of Sanskrit under scholars in Kashmir, India and Nepal, he became renowned for his more than fifty painstaking translations and revisions of Buddhist scriptures. Apart from being the foremost Tibetan translator of works on Buddhist logic and epistemology (Pramāṇa), rNgog lo’s activities as a commentator and teacher are regarded as fundamental for the later development of this field of learning in Tibet, and his tradition came to be well-known in Tibetan literature as the "rNgog tradition" (rngog lugs). This book presents a detailed examination of rNgog lo's life based on the available Tibetan accounts, including his biography (rnam thar) written by Gro lung pa Blo gros 'byung gnas (fl. late 11th to 12th c.). Annotated translations of great parts from the latter work (one of the earliest surviving examples of the rnam thar genre, possibly unique regarding its complicated and elegant style) are included in the book. rNgog lo's oeuvre as a translator and writer is dealt with in detail, making the book an important source on this hitherto little studied scholar and his tradition. (Source Accessed July 24, 2020)
As for Kong-an, the subject matter employed here are all concerning Master Bodhidharma, the first Patriarch of Chinese Ch’an Buddhism and the 28th Patriarch of in India. These three Kong-ans are:
1. The Mind is Nowhere to be found
2. The Patriarch’s Quatrain for advanced practice
3. Bodhidharma’s Skin, Flesh, Bones, and Marrow
After reading these, you would have a pretty clear picture about Kong-an and how to make contemplation on it, as well as about the over-all quintessence of fountainhead of Ch’an Buddhism.
The second renowned genre of contemplation in Ch’an Buddhism is Hua-to. Hua-to is, as it were, a diminutive of Kong-an. Or to put it this way, Kong-an is a novel, a long story, while Hua-to is a novelette, a short story. But both of them are stories. By the same token, the Kong-an is a long contemplative material, containing a story with a complete plot––the beginning, the middle, and the denouement (ending)––for its body. Whereas the Hua-to would not have a plot; it consists only of a sentence, or a phrase. Therefore, in comparison with Kong-an, it is similar to a Kong-an in miniature, or a compressed Kong-an, for the general effect resulted in contemplating on Hua-to was supposed to be the same in contemplating on Kong-an. The instance of Hua-to scrutinized here is “Who is saying ‘Namo Amito-Fo’ (or 'Namo Amitabha Buddha')?”
The third genre of contemplation in Ch’an Buddhism is one based on the Text of the Sutras. And under this rubric, the one cited and examined here is just a very prestigious one, if not the most renowned; it is called “The Seven Inquiries to locate the Mind,” from The Surangama Sutra. With the knowledge and skills built up in learning to contemplate on the first two genres, the Kong-an and Hua-to, one would then be able to go on to learn and practice the contemplation of this genre. And having learned about the three genres of contemplation presented in this book, one would virtually have covered the most predominant contemplations in Ch’an Buddhism. (Source Accessed Mar 12, 2020)
The second reason for my changing the original title of my dissertation, is that I felt obliged to change its scope. The vast literature on Tibetan Buddhist epistemology, which has become available during the last few years, necessitated such a curtailment. Especially the presently available Dga'-ldan-pa contributions by Rgyal-tshab-rje and Mkhas-grubrje, in particular, need to be properly assessed, and this takes time. Moreover, much but not all of the subsequent Sa-skya-pa literature in this area by Go-ram-pa and Gser-mdog Pan-chen must be read with the particular theories of these Dga'-ldan-pa philosophers in mind. To undertake such a comparative study cannot be done in a hurried fashion. Some references to the Dga'-ldan-pa contributions have, however, been made in the course of this paper on the basis of my original access to but a limited number of their writings. Nonetheless, a significant portion of my dissertation that deals with the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, has been included in the footnotes of the present paper where I was concerned with historical or bio-bibliographical details. (van der Kuijp, preface, vii)
Consolidating the intent of Buddha Shakyamuni’s teachings into a unified body of text books, it is the philosophical backbone of the living tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. This rich source book embodies the basics of Prajnaparamita and Madhyamika as well as the Abhidharma from both the Mahayana and Hinayana perspective. Every volume in this series includes the Tibetan text and the English translation on facing pages.
The student of The Gateway to Knowledge can begin to comprehend the meaning of the major works on Buddhist philosophy and of the traditional sciences. When you want to extract their meaning you need an “expert system,” a key. The Gateway to Knowledge is like that key, a magical key – it opens up the treasury of precious gemstones in the expansive collection of Buddhist scriptures. (Source: Rangjung Yeshe Publications)
The author, Tsele Natsok Randröl, was born in the snowy land of Tibet. It was through study and reflection that he first unraveled the key points of everything that there is to know. Having brought forth realization through meditation training, he became known as a great pandita and siddha, a learned and accomplished master.
Among his various instructions, The Heart of the Matter is both concise and comprehensible. Not only does it contain all the vital points of the Buddha's words but, in particular, it lucidly and precisely covers the definitive meaning of the view, meditation, conduct and fruition, in their entirety, so that their practice can take effect and mature in our minds. (Source: The Heart of the Matter, introduction, 7–8)
I considered that this explanation of the bardos would benefit everyone interested in the dharma. The words are clear and easy to understand, and lengthy scholarly expositions are not emphasized. This text, easy to comprehend and containing all the key points and very direct instructions, results from following the oral advice of a qualified master. Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche
The author, Tsele Natsok Rangdröl, was renowned as one of the most learned and accomplished masters of seventeenth-century Tibet. His other books include Heart Lamp and Empowerment. (Source: Rangjung Yeshe Publications)
The book includes an exploration of Mahamudra fundamentals and thorough explanations of Ground, Path, and Fruition Mahamudra, including meditation techniques for investigating, experiencing, and contemplating these teachings. (Source: Shambhala Publications)
With in the history of Buddhism in East Asia the world of nature gained and retained a high position —something seen as having inherent religious value. This two-part essay reviews aspects of the history of this upward valuation of nature in Chinese and Japanese Buddhism and analyzes the interpretative shifts and changes made necessary by this impulse toward the attribution of increasingly great religious significance to nature. The development is carried as far as the twelfth century in Japan and the poetry of the Buddhist monk Saigyō (1118- 90), poetry which not only itself moved the valorization of nature beyond the point where earlier writers had brought it, but also, since as poetry it gained a position in the public mind and a place in the popular imagination of the Japanese people, historically "fixed" a lasting nexus between Buddhism and nature in the popular consciousness of the Japanese people. Saigyō, therefore, is of great significance in the history of Japanese religion, a fact that has always been implicitly recognized in the Japanese regard for him as Japan's greatest "medieval Buddhist nature poet." His poetry is important not only as literature but also as a document in the history of Japanese religion.
Although in what follows I am more interested in an analysis of Saigyō's verse—in relationship to the Buddhist view of nature—than in details of his life, it is of importance to note here that Saigyō, whose name before he became a monk was Satō Norikiyo, saw his Buddhist vocation as something to be carried out in the mountains rather than in temples and monasteries. Before becoming a monk he had been a military guard in the service of Emperor Toba and a member of an elite corps of palace guards known as the Hokumen no Bushi or "North-facing warriors." But at age twenty-three he relinquished his career in court and became a Buddhist monk . He was at first loosely attached to Shingon and Tendai temples in the vicinity of Heian-kyō or Kyoto and seems to have retained a lifelong attachment to the memory of Kūkai (774-835), the Japanese founder of the Shingon school. But Saigyō's forte lay in his composition of waka or thirty-one-syllable verse and it is in the context of his writing of these verses that we gain an understanding of his vision of nature, Buddhism, and the correlation of these two. For Saigyō the world of nature was the primary world of Buddhist values, and it is this that I wish to investigate in what follows. (LaFleur, "Saigyō and the Buddhist Value of Nature," 93–94)
towards revealing the complex historical development of Ch'an theory and practice both in China and Tibet.
The papers on China reveal Ch' an not as a single line of transmission from Bodhidharma, but as a complex of contending and even hostile factions. Furthermore, the view which sees Ch'an as the sinicization of Buddhism through Taoism is questioned through an examination of the Taoism that was actually prevalent during the establishment of Ch' an
in China.
The papers on Tibet take us to the heart of the controversies surrounding the origins of Buddhism in that country, based on exciting research into the
Tunhuang materials, the indigenous rDzogs-chen system, and the 'Sudden vs. Gradual Enlightenment' controversy.
Of particular note in this volume is the inclusion of several translations of papers by noted Japanese scholars who have led the way in this type of research,
made available to the Western reader for the first time. (Source: inside jacket)
- Hu-jan nien-ch'i, ming wei wu-mingc
- Suddenly a thought rose; this is called ignorance
This idea has baffled many modern scholars as it has traditionally charmed many a Far Eastern Buddhist. What is meant by "suddenly"? What constitutes "thought"? The most recent translator of the AFM, Yoshito Hakeda, has appended this remark to the passage:
- There has been much discussion on the meaning of hu-jan in connection with the origin of ignorance, mainly on the basis of interpretations proposed by Fa-tsang,d (1) that ignorance alone becomes the source of defiled states of being. It is the subtlest; no other state of being can be the origin of this. It is therefore said in the text that ignorance emerges suddenly. (2) Commenting on a quotation from a sūtra, he says "suddenly" means "beginninglessly," since the passage quoted makes clear that there is no other state of being prior to the state of ignorance. (3) The word "suddenly" is not used from the stand point of time, but is used to account for the emergence of ignorance without any instance of inception.
- . . . A monk of Minge China, glosses "suddenly" as pu-chüeh,f which may mean "unconsciously" or "without being aware of the reason."
- . . . If hu-jan is a translation of a Sanskrit word, the original word asasmāt may be posited. Akasmāt means "without reason" or "accidentally."'"`UNIQ--ref-00000DE3-QINU`"'
The above remark does not actually answer the question of the origin of the concept, hu-jan (suddenly) or the identity of nieng (thought). We become only more aware that hu-jan is one crucial justification for ch'anh (zen) "sudden enlightenment," itself a unique idea. Concerning the meaning of nien and wu-nieni (no-thought), I have shown in a related article that (a) Hakeda is not the first repeatedly to read nien as wang-nien,j vikalpa; Śikṣānanda's AFM was bothered by the same term; (b) but both managed to distort the original meaning; for (c) nien is rooted in a peculiar understanding in pre-Buddhist Han China.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000DE4-QINU`"' Nien is the incipient thought, associated with yink that disrupts the (otherwise passive, yang,l mind. In this present article, I will cite more evidences—this time focusing upon the concepts of shih,m consciousness, and hu-jan, suddenness—to show again why the AFM cannot be fully understood without reference to the native mode of thought. (Lai, "Hu-Jan Nien Ch'i (Suddenly a Thought Rose)," 42–43)
We will begin with a survey of modern Sanskritists' attempts at identifying nien and why such attempts have ultimately failed. Then we will look at a similar attempt by the AFMS to edit off the nien ideology and how by so doing it violated the integrity of the original AFM message. The sinitic meaning of the term nien and wu-nien will be demonstrated with precedents in Han thought, usages in the Six Dynasties and in Ch'an.k I will conclude with a word on why AFMS was produced. (Lai, "A Clue to the Authorship of the Awakening of Faith," 34–35)
"Nirvāṇa School," a group of scholars in the Southern Dynasties (420–589) that chose to specialize on the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, the Mahāyāna scripture narrating the last day and teaching of Śākyamuni on earth. The person credited with discovering this doctrine, before even the full sūtra was available to vindicate his stand, is Chu Tao-sheng (375?–434), perhaps better known for his stand on "sudden enlightenment." The school as such flourished best in the Liang dynasty (502–557); but because it was then aligned with scholarship focusing on the Ch'eng-shih-lun (Satyasiddhi?) by Harivarman, it came under criticism when the latter was denounced as Hīnayānist in the Sui dynasty. It is usually said that the T'ien-t'ai school, based on the Lotus Sūtra, superseded the Nirvāṇa school by incorporating many of its ideas, while the Ch'eng-shih school suffered irredeemably under the attack of Chi-tsang of the San-lun (Three Treatise or Mādhyamika) school at the same time. Henceforth, the Nirvāṇa school faded away while its old association with the Ch'eng-shih tradition was judged an unnecessary mistake.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000002-QINU`"' This article will introduce three moments from the history of this Nirvana school, showing the main trends of development and, somewhat contrary to traditional opinion, justifying the necessity for the detour into Harivarman's scholarship. Emphasis will also be put on the interaction between Buddhist reflections and the native traditions. (Lai, "Sinitic Speculations," 135)
One of the most popular sūtras in China is the Ta-pan nieh-pan ching, the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra translated by Dharmakṣema in 421 A.D. Its doctrine of "universal Buddha-nature" has endeared itself to the Orient so much that it became an axiom of sorts, and any challenge to this doctrine would be seen as a challenge against Mahayana itself. To this day, this sūtra, TPNPC for short, is well received by all major Buddhist schools. The Pali canon preserved its version of the teaching of the Buddha at his parinirvāṇa, great extinction, in the Dighanikaya. The Mahayana tradition's redaction is the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, of which the Chinese translations alone survive. Prior to Dharmakṣema, Fa-hsien the pilgrim and Buddhabhadra translated a shorter Ta-pan ni-yüan ching in six chapters. This version was based on an earlier Sanskrit text that corresponds now to the first ten chapters of the forty-chaptered TPNC. The texts were unknown to Kumārajīva (d. 413) the Kuchan translator who produced the authoritative Miao-fa lien-hua ching, the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka or Lotus-sūtra. When the TPNPC was known to the Chinese, it was almost immediately crowned as the final, ultimate 'positive'—that is affirming the permanence of the Buddha-nature qua Dharmakāya qua mahā-nirvāṇa—teaching of the Buddha. Even the Lotus-sūtra was placed, both in time and in content, second to it. In the Sui dynasty, however, T'ien-t'ai master Chih'i, establishing the Lotus school, reversed the judgement somewhat.[2] It is in part to uncover the glory that once belonged to the TPNPC that the present essay tries to analyze the initial reception of this sūtra. (Lai, "The Mahāparinirvāṇa-Sūtra and Its Earliest Interpreters in China," 99)
Notes
- The placement of note #1 in the text is unclear in the original. Nevertheless it reads: On the impact of the TPNPC, see Kenneth Ch'en, Buddhism in China (Princeton: Princeton University, 1964), pp. 112-129 or Fuse Kōgaku, Nehanshū no kenkyū, I, II (Tokyo, Sōbun, 1942) and Tokiwa Daijō, Busshō no kenkyū (Tokyo, Meiji, 1944).
- On Chih-i's p'an-chiao, see Leon Hurvitz, "Chih-i," Melanges chinois et Bouddhiques, XII, (Brussells, 1960-62), esp. appendix on p'an-chiao.
However, historically, China did mysteriously seem to lose her sense of proportion in what may be regarded as her "medieval", or, better, Buddhist period, roughly from the fourth to the tenth centuries A.D. At that time, China showed she was capable of all the extravagance of the spirit that one, for better or for worse, still associates with the word "religious."
By the twelveth or thirteenth century, during the Sung period (960-1279 A.D.), China regained her sense of proportion and came down to earth once more. The Sung Neo-Confucian triumph was not simply due to the institutional strength of the literati alone, as has been so often argued. The same literati only a short while earlier embraced wholeheartedly the Buddhist mysteries. The Neo-Confucian triumph was due to new spiritual insights into the nature and destiny of man and the priorities of life. It is the Neo-Confucian polemics against the Buddhist that still cloud modern Chinese views of the Buddhist tradition. The anticlerical attitude of modern Western humanism introduced into China during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries does not help much to correct these long-cherished Neo-Confucian opinions. Even the more objective Sinologist still follow
Dr. Hu Shih's interpretation that Buddhism was ultimately an alien plague or anomaly that led China astray from her "predestined" humanism.1
In many studies on Chinese Buddhism, the emphasis has been put on the so-called "Sinicization" process and on the confrontation between Chinese and Indian "essences." For example, emphasis has been placed on how "otherworldly" Indian Buddhism was transformed by the Chinese "essence" of "worldliness." The assumption that cultures may be described in terms of "essences" oversimplifies the complex human issues. Additionally, too strong a focus on the dynamics of "acculturation" can misconstrue the religious elements involved. I would prefer to look at the issue from
a slightly different perspective. The question I raise is not how China was "Indianized'", as Hu Shih would put it, but how the Chinese were converted to the Buddhist Dharma (Law) and came to recognize the truth in it.1 Nor is it a question of how an Indian religion was "Sinicized" but how the Buddhist sangha (fellowship) in China underwent self-transformation, drawing upon inspirations from within the Buddhist tradition itself. For example, the turn towards the world or the rejection of otherworldliness or, better, "othershoreliness" was already in the Mahayana tradition itself as in the dictum "Samsara is nirvana, nirvana is samsara." The Buddhist tradition is never simply "otherworldly mystical"
but contains within itself a wealth of teachings providing a whole range of orientations towards the world. As the Buddhist sangha matured in China, the Chinese Buddhists merely developed those elements in the Mahayana tradition closest to her "native" heart.
The phenomenon of "Sinitic Mahayana" should therefore be objectively analyzed as a cultural phenomenon and also sympathetically appreciated in its own religious terms. Just as Christianity is considered to be a creative synthesis of the Classical and the Hebraic tradition, Sinitic Mahayana should also be seen as a proud and independent offspring of the Indian and Chinese confluence. The Hebraic concept of the Messiah and the Greek idea of the Logos merged into the Christian notion of Christ as the Word of God. Similarly, it can be shown that the mature Chinese Buddhist concept of li (principle) as it was used by the Hua-yen school, was a union of the Buddhist Dharma and the Chinese Tao. Li synthesized the original meanings of Dharma and Tao, both symbols for "Transcendence", and articulated their structural interrelationship in a manner unknown before in India or China. The Sinitic understanding of the Mahayana Dharma is comparable to the Christian Church's proclamation (kerygma) concerning God—it is a new insight into an eternal truth.
The approach outlined above· would seem to be the natural and proper approach in the understanding of Chinese Buddhism. However, for some reasons, scholars have not yet followed such paths of investigation. I hope the thesis' attempt to combine the traditional sectarian Buddhological approach (which sees all Chinese Buddhist innovations to be solidly grounded in sacred Indian scriptures) and the modern critical historical analysis can reveal more faithfully the dynamics of the Buddhist faith in Chinese history.1 The larger issues mentioned in the preface here form the backdrop for the more specific study of one Chinese Buddhist text in the body of the thesis. I am interested in the "emergence of Sinitic Mahayana" ca. 600 A.D. in China and in the role the Awakening of Faith in Mahayana (Ta-ch'eng ch'i-hsin lun) played in bringing it about.1 (Lai, preface, i–v)
Notes:
(as numbered in the original manuscript)
1. Hu Shih, "The Indianization of China: A Case Study in Cultural Borrowings," Independence, Convergence and Borrowing in Institutions, Thought and Art (Cambridge: .
Harvard Tercentenary Publication, 1937). Kenneth Ch'en, in his book The Chinese Transformation of Buddhism (Princeton: 1973) follows explicitly Hu Shih's approach.
1 See Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (New York: 1972). The Dharma is "Truth" and it is no more Indian than the Christian God is Jewish.
1. For a review of the limitations of sectarian scholarship, see Kamata Shigeo's critical resume (in English) in his Chūgoku Bukkyō shisō shi kenkyū (Tokyo: 1969).
The earliest extant translation of part of the text into Chinese was by Guṇabhadra between A.D. 435 and 443. But, as the text was a source for Asaṅga whose works are known in Chinese in 413–421, a date second to third centuries A.D. is reasonably proposed (p. 24–5)
In his preface M. Lamotte has discussed the texts and commentaries, the title, the importance of the text by reason of its early date and position between the Prajñāpāramitā texts and those of the Vijñānavāda, and has given a detailed analysis of the contents. The author has p. 7 himself rightly recognized how little satisfactory literal renderings of Buddhish technical terms are. (H. W. Bailey, Review of Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra. L'Explication des Mystères. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 8 , no. 4 (1937): 1157.)
Humans have long grappled with the question of the nature of our Self, defined here as the ultimate reality inherent to our individual being. Religious traditions can be a great place to look when attempting to understand this aspect of our humanity. Broadly speaking, when contemplating ideas of Self in Buddhism and Hinduism, the relationship between the Buddhist notion of Buddha-nature (tathāgatagarbha) and the Hindu notion of Self (ātman), is an intriguing one: How can we understand them to be similar or different? How do the Buddhist concepts of emptiness (śūnyatā) and mind-only (cittamātra) relate to the concepts of tathāgatagarbha and ātman? Is emptiness contrary to these ideas? Are tathāgatagarbha and the Hindu teaching that ātman is equal to brahman (ultimate reality), both expressions of a non-dualistic state of mind? Although it is commonly taught that Hinduism and Buddhism differ in their understanding of Self, one thing that becomes apparent is that these are not simple questions, perhaps mainly because their answers are contextual. There are many answers that come from many different types of Hindus and Buddhists in various places. For this paper, I will be looking at commentary on the Buddhist text the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra and its use of the concept of a permanent Self and how this relates to emptiness (śūnyatā) and skillful means (upāya). This paper seeks to support my claim that, through skillful means, ātman and anātman (no-Self) are both saying something quite similar—despite the apparent paradoxical nature of this statement—and will look at Buddha-nature in the Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra as a way to understand and help articulate this thought. (Laughlin, "Tathāgatagarbha and Ātman," 57)
This dissertation seeks to locate the place of Taehyŏn 大賢(ca. 8th century CE), a Silla Korean Yogācāra monk, within the broader East Asian Buddhist tradition. My task is not confined solely to a narrow study of Taehyŏn’s thought and career, but is principally concerned with understanding the wider contours of the East Asian Yogācāra tradition itself and how these contours are reflected in Taehyŏn’s extant oeuvre. There are problems in determining Taehyŏn's doctrinal position within the traditional paradigms of East Asian Yogācāra tradition, that is, the bifurcations of Tathāgatagarbha and Yogācāra; Old and New Yogācāra; the One Vehicle and Three Vehicles; and the Dharma Nature and Dharma Characteristics schools. Taehyŏn's extant works contain doctrines drawn from across these various divides, and his doctrinal positions therefore do not precisely fit any of these traditional paradigms. In order to address this issue, this dissertation examines how these bifurcations originated and evolved over time, across the geographical expanse of the East Asian Yogācāra tradition. The chapters of the dissertation discuss in largely chronological order the theoretical problems involved in these bifurcations within Yogācāra and proposes possible resolutions to these problems, by focusing on the works of such major Buddhist exegetes as Paramārtha (499-569), Ji 基 (632-682), Wŏnhyo 元曉 (617-686), Fazang 法藏(643-712), and, finally, Taehyŏn.
first twelve fascicles of Dharmakṣema's translation completed under his collaborators' support when he had not mastered the Chinese language. It is very likely that Faxian 法顯 (337–422) translated a version of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra that featured buddhadhātu as foxing. Buddhabhadra, in the same period, translated a version of the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra, in which he favoured the term foxing over a literal translation of the Sanskrit. As another contemporary monk with these two, Dharmakṣema translated the Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra, going further than Faxian by using the term foxing regularly. These texts influenced the Dilun monastic tradition 地論宗. Among these, the term foxing and its Sinicism explanations played the most significant role, influencing the whole of the Chinese and even East Asian Buddhist thought.
There are major differences between our Sanskrit text of the Ratnagotravibhāga and its classical Chinese translation, which had an immeasurable influence on East Asian Buddhist thought and has yet to be fully explored. No commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga in Chinese Buddhism has survived, so scholars have maintained the opinion that it was not regarded too much in Chinese and East Asian Buddhism. However, the findings of my research show that the Chinese translation of the Ratnagotravibhāga had more influence than previously imagined in East Asian Buddhist intellectual history.
I explore the ideological background of the classical Chinese translation of the Ratnagotravibhāga, with reference to the Pusa dichi jing 菩薩地持經, several commentaries on the Śrīmālā-sūtra, the Da boniepan jing 大般涅槃經 and the Rulengqie jing 入楞伽經. In comparison to the surviving Sanskrit text, the Chinese version of the Ratnagotravibhāga downplays the significance of the expression gotra and instead reflects a strong interest in zhenru 真如 (Skt. tathatā) and foxing 佛性 (Buddha-nature) – for instance, 'zhenru foxing' becomes the foundation or reason for transmigration in the world. In this context, reality (Skt. tathatā) acts like a conditioned dharma, an idea that deeply influenced later understanding of Buddha-nature in East Asian Buddhism. I furthermore discuss the relationship between the Ratnagotravibhāga and other significant East Asian authors and teachings, such as Paramārtha 真諦 (499-569), the Dasheng qixin lun 大乘起信論, Fazang 法藏 (643-712), the Sanjie school 三階教, and trace the influence of the Ratnagotravibhāga beyond China into the writings of Wonhyo 元曉 (617-686) in Korea and the Japanese authors Juryō 寿霊 and Chikei 智憬 in Nara era (710-784). (Source Accessed May 25, 2021)
The present state of the discussion may in short be characterized as follows. The traditional view that (1) the Śāstra is a translation of a Sanskrit original and (2) that the translator is Paramārtha, is now generally abandoned.[3] It is also known that the lntroduction is forged.[4] It is further known that the Sanskrit text translated by Śikṣānanda was itself a translation from the extant Chinese version.[5] If so much is accepted, early doubts of Chinese Buddhists concerning the Śāstra gain weight.[6]
Hui-chün, an early seventh century witness, in the passage quoted above p. 156 note 4, speaks of "former" Dāśabhūmikas who forged the Śraddhotpāda. Chi-tsang (549-623) blames Dāśabhūmikas "of a former generation"
that they mistook the eighth vijñāna for Buddha-nature (T. vol. 34 380 b 20 f.). In another place he speaks of "old" Dāśabhūmikas (T. vol. 42 104 c 7). This implies that we have to distinguish between late Dāśabhūmikas (after the arrival of the Mahāyāna-saṁgraha) and early ones (the first and second generations after the translators of the Daśabhūmika Śāstra).[7] Among them, those who belonged to the early generation are said to have forged the Śraddhotpāda Śāstra.[8]
Tokiwa believes in a Chinese author who mainly relied on the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra both translations of which (Sung and Wei) he amalgamated. This may be correct though I could not find allusions peculiar to Guṇabhadra's (Sung) translation.
Mochizuki has proved that the Chinese author was acquainted not only with the Laṅkāvatāra but with several other texts. He proposes as author T'an-tsun, a disciple of Fa-shang who dictated the Śāstra to his disciple T'an -ch'ien. See below p. 160.
Hayashi Kemmyō, has traced material in Liang Wu-ti's writings and the Pao-tsang lun. Liang Wu-ti believed in immortal souls.[9] The Śraddhotpāda Śāstra contains nothing of that sort. Though influence from that side cannot be excluded, I do not feel this material to be significant enough to permit us to place the author in the South.
Matsunami Seiren believes in Aśvaghoṣa if not as author yet as the spiritual father of the Śraddhotpāda. I have compared his quotations from the Sauṇdarānanda Kāvya etc . which are interesting. But I think we might consider as established that the author of the Śraddhotpāda Śāstra was a Chinese and work upon that assumption.[10] Besides, the main tenets of the Śāstra have not been found in the Kāvya.
I pass by other theories of which I have only heard . Scholars are searching in all directions and undoubtedly will find material unknown to me which will throw even more light on the intricate problem of our text. Meanwhile I shall consider as established that the Śāstra was composed by an early Dāśabhūmika and limit my investigation to the question who this person was. (Liebenthal, "New Light on the Mahāyāna-Śraddhotpāda Śāstra," 155–58)
Notes
- T. 1666. I have compared the photos of manuscripts mentioned in Giles, Chinese Manuscripts from Tunhuang, nos. 4318-20, 5771-84. But I found no interesting versions. (No. 5783 seems to be a commentary of the Samyuktābhidharma-sāra!)
- Of this literature I had at my disposal : P. Demiéville: Sur l'authenlicité du Ta Tch'eng K'i Sin Louen. Bulletin de la Maison Franco-Japonaise, tome II, no. 2 , Tokyo 1929, reprint pp. 1-78 (Demiéville, Authenticité).
Mochizuki Shinkō: Bukkyo daijüen (1935} (Mochizuki, Dictionary).
Same : Daijo Kishinron no Kenkyū (1922) (Mochizuki , Study) .
Same: Kōjutsu Daijō Kishinron (1938} (Mochizuki, Kishinron).
Same : Kokuyaku Issaikyō, Ronshu-bu 5 (1953}. A translation with a detailed outline.
Same : Bukkyō kyōten. seiritsu shiron (1949}, pp. 532–624.
Ui Hakuju: Daijō Kishinron. Tokyo 1936.
Matsunami Seiren: Yugagyoha no taikei lo nendai (Nippon bukkyō gakkai nempō, No. 22) . 1957.
Same: Yugagyoha. no so lo shite no Memyō (Taishō Daigaku kenkyū kiyō, No. 39). 1954
Same: Kishinron-shisō no taikei to nendai {Nippon bukkyō gakkai nempō, No. 22) . 1957.
Same: Tensei naru Nanda (Taishō Daigaku kenkyū kiyō, No. 42). 1957.
Hayashi Kemmyō: Kishinron no shin Kenkyū. 1945.
Suzuki D. Teitarō: Awakening of Faith. Chicago 1900. - Also by Demiéville, see Le Concile de Lhasa (Bibliothèque de l'lnstitut des Hautes Études Chinoises, t. vii, Paris 1952), part 1 p. 57.
- Though old.
- Tao-hsüan's note following upon the biography of Hsüan-tsang in Hsü kao-seng chuan T. vol. 50 428 b 27.
- Cf. Mochizuki, Dictionary 3256b, also Ching-lu T. vol. 55 142a; Chinkai, Sanron gensho Mongiyō [Chinese characters not available] ch. ii (T . 2299 vol. 70 228c) quotes two passages from the Ta-ch'eng ssu-lun hsüan-i [Chinese characters not available] ch. 5 and 10 which, however, are not found in the extant fragmentary version (Hsü-tsang ching I. 74/I). It looks as if ch. 10 of that edition should more correctly be labelled ch. 12. I am translating these quotations: Ch. 5. '"The Śraddotpāda is made by a prisoner-of-war who borrowed the name of Aśvaghoṣa." Ch. 10. "Śraddotpāda. Some say that it is made by Dāśabhūmikas of the North . . . It is not by Aśvaghoṣa Bodhisattva. Former [Chinese characters not available] Dāśabhumikas made it. They borrowed the name (of Aśvaghoṣa) for the headline". The "prisoner -of-war" is perhaps imagination. The "former" Dāśabhūmikas seem to be correct.
- Cf. my "Notes on the Vajrasamādhi." T'oung Pao vol. xliv, 4-5, pp, 378-382 . I have in this paper discussed several allusions which l had found in the Vajrasamādhi and wish to add one more which I had overlooked. It is the famous half gāthā for which the rākṣasa gives away his body. Cf. T. vol. 9, 733b, c and Nirvāṇa Sūtra, Sheng -hsing p'in [Chinese not available], T. vol. 12 xiv 450a-451b.
- To say that the Śraddhotpāda Śāstra was forged is perhaps not correct. Aśvaghoṣa may appear in the title as spiritual author as he appears in the biography of T'an-yen dictating, in the shape of a horse, a commentary on the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. He and Nāgārjuna were worshipped as bodhisattvas under the Wei (Daśabhūmika, Introduction). He seems to have a function of inspirator similar to Maitreya. See Demiéville, La Yogācārabhūmi de Saṅgharakṣa, B.E.F.E.O. XLIV, 2. {1954) pp. 377-387, anti cf. T. vol. 50 334c 10 and vol. 8 530b 25 seq.
- Cf. Mon. nipponica Vlll I–2 pp. 376 seq.
- Cf. Mon. nipponica Vlll I–2 pp. 376 seq.
The texts in question are:
1. Chin-kang san-mei ching (Vajrasamādhi) T. 273 vol. 9. (Quoted in the following as Samādhi.) It has three commentaries:
a. The Chin-kang san-mei ching lun, T. 1730 vol. 37 composed by Yüan-hsiao, a Korean, in the second half of the seventh century. This is the only commentary which I have used for this paper in order to correct the original. A very good modern edition has been published by Chou Shu-chia in Peking 1936.
b. Zokuzōkyō A 55/2-3. Ming.
c. Zokuzōkyō A 55/3. Ch'ing.
2. Chin-kang shang-wei t'o-lo-ni ching, T. 1344 vol. 21. Transl. Buddhaśānta (?). Yüan Wei.
3. Chin-kang ch'ang t'o-lo-ni ching, T. 1345 vol. 21. Transl. Jinagupta (?) (527-604). A second translation of the preceding. These two texts have no relation to the Samādhi.
4. Chin-kang san-nei pen-hsing ch'ing-ching pu-huai pu-mieh ching, T. 644 vol. 15. A probably genuine text, containing 100 samādhis . . . (Liebenthal, opening remarks, 347–48)
[ . . . ]
It seems to me established that
The Samādhi is an agglomeration of several texts, of which we have distinguished:
1. A frame (Text A), probably derived from a sūtra translated in the fifth century or earlier in the North, perhaps in Liang-chou. This seems to have been a Hīnayāna text.
2. A text (B), which contains the verses and part of the prose, composed between 565 and 590 by a teacher of the North, Yeh or P'eng-ch'eng. The author might have been Ching-sung.
It is difficult to say how Text B originally looked. Was it a pamphlet or a collection of gleanings from other texts? Was it written to counteract the propaganda of Hui-ssu?
In order to further clarify these points I propose for study: (1) a careful investigation of the northern tradition from Bodhiruci and Buddhaśānta on to about 590 A.D., (2) searching the Tun-huang fragments for parts of the original Text B, (3) further search for quotations in the texts studied by the teachers of the Northern Ch'i. (Liebenthal, conclusion, 383–86).
(*Chinese characters in the original text and notes unavailable)
Notes
- Hayashi Taiun: "Bodaidaruma-den no kenkyū", Shūkyō kenkyū IX.iii, Tokyo, May 1932, pp. 62-76.
- (Chinese text unavailable) A number of versions exist. See below.
- Daruma no zen-bo to shisō oyobi sono ta, Tokyo 1936 (Suzuki II), a complement to the same author's Shōshitsu isho, Osaka 1935 (Suzuki I).
- Le Concile de Lhasa (Bibl. de l'Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises vol. VII), Paris 1952, p. 54 n. 2 (Demiéville).
- Mizuno Kōgen: "On the Relation between Bodhidharma's Two Entrances and Four Practices and the Vairasamādhi Sūtra" (Bodaidaruma no ninyū shigyō setsu to Kongōzanmai-kyō, Indogaku Bukkyōgaku kenkyū, III.2, Tokyo, March 1955, pp. 621-626 (Mizuno I). Same: same title, Komazawa daigaku kenkyū kiyō No. I3, Tokyo 1955 (Mizuno II). Cf. also Ono Hōdō: Daijō kaikyō no kenkyū, Tokyo 1954, p. I25/6.
not have been compiled before the second century A.D.[2] It is this Mahāyāna version of the MNS which we are going to examine in our present study. (Liu, introduction, 63)
Among the many concepts current among Chinese Buddhists, "Buddha-nature" is undoubtedly the most central and the most widely debated. As is well-known, the idea "Buddha-nature" first became popular in China with the translation of the Mahayana Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra (hence-forth referred to as MNS) in the early fifth century; since then, a variety of theses have been proposed on several aspects of the subject. These are worth examining not only because of the important role they play in the history and development of Chinese Buddhist thought, but also because they reflect more fundamental doctrinal differences. Once these differences have been clarified, a more comprehensive picture of the various dominant philosophical trends in the field of Chinese Buddhism will appear. This paper will unravel the diverse streams of thought which came to be associated with the Buddha-nature concept during the Northern and Southern Dynasties, i.e., in the first two centuries of the propagation of the Buddha-nature doctrine in China. (Liu, foreword, 1)
It is the orthodox belief that the MNS teaches that all sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature. Since in the MNS "Buddha-nature" refers to "the nature of the Buddha" and "to possess" the Buddha-nature in the case of sentient beings usually indicates "to have in the future,"[1] this belief amounts to the conviction that the MNS maintains that all sentient beings will achieve Buddhahood someday. This conviction is well attested by the text of the MNS. Thus, we find it clearly expressed in the MNS that "all three vehicles will eventually share the same Buddha-nature":
- Good sons! The same is true of the śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas, [all of whom will attain] the same Buddha-nature, in the like manner as [cows of different colours produce] milk [looking the same]. Why is it so? For all of them will [sooner or later] put an end to defilements. However, there are various sentient beings who maintain that Buddhas, bodhisattvas, śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are different [with respect to their final destiny. [Thus,] there are various śrāvakas and common people who doubt [the teaching] that the three vehicles are not different. These sentient beings will finally come to understand that all three vehicles [will eventually share] the same Buddha-nature. . . .[2]
Those who refuse to accept the tenet that all sentient beings without exception will possess the Buddha-nature are criticized by the MNS as wanting in faith.[3] In the sūtra, this idea of the
universal presence of the Buddha-nature is presented as one of the distinctive themes of Mahāyāna writings[4] as well as among the principal claims to excellence of the MNS itself.[5] It is so highly esteemed that it is described as representing the "essential meaning" (tzu-i) of the Buddha's teaching;[6] and, together with the doctrine of the eternal nature of the Tathāgata, it is said to be definitive (chüeh-ting) and not open to future amendments.[7]
If this thesis of the eventual enlightenment of all sentient beings does indeed constitute the central theme of the MNS, it is strongly qualified by the presence in the sutra of the concept of the icchantika. The term "icchantika" is derived from the Sanskrit root is meaning "to desire," "to wish" and "to long for." This explains the variant Chinese renderings of the term "icchantika" as "a being of many desires" (to-yü), "a being cherishing desires" (lo-yü) and "a being full of greed" (ta-t'an).[8] But in the MNS, the failings attributed to the icchantikas far exceed those which are usually associated with people of such descriptions. In the sūtra, the icchantika is described as "devoid of good roots" [9] and as "the most wicked being."[10] He is depicted as "having no capacity for the [true] Dharma"[11] such that he can never be rehabilitated by the instruction of the Buddha and so will never attain supreme enlightenment. Taken at its face value, this picture of a being condemned forever to spiritual darkness appears to contradict the proposition of the MNS that all sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature and so are destined for Buddhahood, and commentators of the MNS have been hard pressed to find a viable way out of this apparent dilemma.
The present article, which is the second of a two-part study on the problem of Buddha-nature in the MNS,[12] is an attempt to unravel the various strands of thought present in the MNS regarding the character and fate of the icchantikas. It is hoped that our discussion, brief and sketchy as it is, will be of help in throwing light on this highly intricate question. (Liu, "The Problem of the Icchantika," 57–59)
'"`UNIQ--poem-00000EAD-QINU`"' Nevertheless, given their very different theoretical upbringings and doctrinal affiliations, it is inevitable that they would carry to their explanations of the Buddha-nature concept some of the basic principles and assumptions of their respective philosophical traditions. In examining and comparing the Buddha-nature teachings of Hui-yüan and Chi-tsang our present study attempts to show how the Buddha-nature concept has come to assume divergent significances when read in the context of the two main streams of thought in Mahāyāna Buddhism: Yogācāra and Mādhyamika. (Liu, "The Yogācāra and Mādhyamika Interpretations of the Buddha-nature Concept in Chinese Buddhism," 171)
The Fundamental Potential for Enlightenment sets forth an analysis of the natural and developed potential within all of us from the perspectives of the two main schools of mahayana thought–the Mind-Only school and the Middle Way school. It explains how this potential is transformed into the state of enlightenment and gives comprehensive definitions and explanations clearly establishing the existence and nature of the various facets of enlightenment.
(Source: back cover)
Unsurprisingly, the Buddha often expressed his appreciation of trees and other plants. According to one story in the Vinaya monastic code, a tree spirit appeared to him and complained that a monk had chopped down its tree. In response, the Buddha prohibited monastics from damaging trees or bushes, including cutting off limbs, picking flowers, or even plucking green leaves. One wonders what he would say about our casual destruction of whole ecosystems today.
We may also wonder about the larger pattern: why religious founders so often experience their spiritual transformation by leaving human society and going into the wilderness by themselves. Following his baptism, Jesus went into the desert, where he fasted for forty days and nights. Mohammed's revelations occurred when he retreated into a cave, where the archangel Gabriel appeared to him. The Khaggavisana Sutta (Rhinoceros Horn Sutra), one of the earliest in the
Pali canon, encourages monks to wander alone in the forest, like a rhinoceros. Milarepa lived and practiced in a cave by himself for many years, as did many Tibetan yogis after him. Today, in contrast, most of us meditate inside buildings with screened windows, which insulate us from insects, the hot sun, and chilling winds. There are many advantages to this, of course, but is something significant also lost?
Although we normally relate to nature in a utilitarian way, the natural world is an interdependent community of living beings that invites us into a different kind of relationship. The implication is that withdrawing into it, especially by oneself, can disrupt our usual ways of seeing and open us up to an alternative experience. Does that also point to why we enjoy being in nature so much? We find it healing, even when we don't understand why or how, but clearly it has something to do with the fact that the natural world offers us a temporary escape from our instrumentalized lives. (Read the entire article here.)
Cette traduction de l’Insurpassable Continuité est le fait d’un disciple-traducteur de Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rimpoché. A ce titre elle ne prétend pas à l’orientalisme, à l’érudition du pur spécialiste, même si la fréquentation des textes tibétains depuis 20 ans, au hasard des stages avec Rimpoché a sans doute laissé quelques traces. Mais dans la mesure où Rimpoché a bien voulu en son temps en désigner le traducteur pour animer des groupes de réflexion autour de ce texte, celui-ci en tire un peu d’assurance pour présenter son travail.
S’il y a bien quelque chose que celui-ci a compris aussi -qu’il aurait dû comprendre en tous cas - grâce au Dharma, c’est que l’on est rien sans les autres, et cela est valable pour ce travail qui sans les apports de Katia et Ken Holmes, de Rosie Fuchs, de François Chenique, et d’autres contributeurs plus épisodiques (Jim et Birgit Scott, Ari Goldfield…) n’aurait jamais vu le jour.
Pour reprendre la formule classique, s'il subsiste des fautes, et elles ne manqueront pas, celles-ci sont donc bien miennes. On pourrait dire aussi, à la suite d’Auguste Comte je crois, qu’il n’y a pas de vérité première, seulement une erreur ultime. Tandis que de mon côté, je me sens soulagé en pensant qu’un site web permet de revenir à l’ouvrage, le lecteur trouvera là de son côté un travail qu’il aura toute latitude, et l’envie, je l’espère, d’améliorer.
Ceci dit, celui-ci vise un public ouvert, personnes raisonnablement cultivées mais ordinaires, qui, faute de pouvoir passer autant de temps que cela le nécessite à étudier la philosophie indo-tibétaine, ont besoin d’un accès direct et plaisant si possible à ce texte essentiel de la tradition kagyupa. En conséquence un certain nombre de choix ont été fait à partir de cette volonté d’accessibilité en terme de présentation, de style et de cheminement des idées.
Jamgœun Kongtrul Lodreu Thayé utilise souvent la particule ”etc.“ (particule, on peut s’en douter, pratique quand tous les textes étaient gravés à la main) : nous avons rétabli dans la mesure du possible la liste des mots concernés. Par exemple, si le texte tibétain dit : "Le désir, etc.,", nous avons pris sur nous de compléter : "Le désir, [la haine, l’ignorance]".
Traduire en donnant, sinon tous son sens, du moins du sens au texte racine, pour ceux qui ne voudraient lire que lui, sans l"éventer" l’apport du commentaire n’est pas la moindre difficulté. Toujours dans une recherche d’équilibre, nous avons quelquefois inséré un détail fourni dans le commentaire. Par exemple, la stance 118 traduite textuellement dit : "[..] en les êtres ordinaires sont enterrés sous les tréfonds de la tendance habituelle à l’ignorance…". "êtres ordinaires" est trompeur dans la mesure où il est question, suivant l’enseignement de KTGR (Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rimpoché), des Vainqueurs de l’ennemi (arhat), précision que nous avons donc ajoutée au texte racine. On ne saurait au passage trop rappeler la nécessité, et l’intérêt, d’aborder les textes sous la tutelle d’un lama formé, qui en donnera une explication enracinée dans une tradition précise, le style "télégraphique" du tibétain se prêtant autrement à toutes les interprétations imaginables.
De plus en plus de pratiquants ayant des notions de tibétain, nous avons inséré à l’occasion entre parenthèses certaines translittérations en wylie. autant pour renseigner, il est vrai, le lecteur que pour faire comprendre nos choix de traducteurs, question sur laquelle nous reviendrons occasionnellement.
Dans le chapitre des neuf exemples de l’élément en particulier, le lecteur pourra s’agacer des répétitions quasi au mot près d’une stance à l’autre. L’étude textuelle et historique démontre que le texte racine est constitué d’un certain nombre de stances très anciennes autour desquelles des écrivains non identifiés ont greffé au fil des siècles d’autres vers visant à commenter d’une manière analytique ces premiers écrits. On en trouvera la liste à la fin du LMDFB. Ce que l’on veut dire ici c’est que le commentaire dans cette tradition littéraire n’était pas ennemi de la simple répétition, dans la mesure où il n’y avait rien de plus à comprendre (?). Les stances primitives sont assez significatives en elles-mêmes pour qu’on en repère la plupart même sans cette information philologique.
La traduction est toujours un délicat équilibre, comme le remarque si bien Elizabeth Callahan, entre le mot à mot et le sens, peut-être plus encore dans ce genre de śāstra qui croise logique et poétique bucolique.
D’un côté nous avons le texte racine, qui est indéniablement un poème, ce que nous avons restitué avec une versification simple.
Même si celle-ci est très basique, l’extrême concision que demande une poésie, à travers en particulier l’usage de l’ellipse, rejoint quelquefois d’une manière saisissante l’expression tibétaine. Par exemple, on trouvera "le corps de réalité, mûrissement..". La prose française oblige tôt ou tard à faire savoir si le corps de réalité, dans cet exemple, est le fruit du mûrissement ou l’agent du mûrissement, problème qui n’apparaît pas en tibétain, et que selon notre expérience, la concision poétique permet d’éviter. Nous rejoignons S.Arguillère quand il revendique, dans un de ses travaux mis à disposition on line : "L’expression française que j’ai choisie me paraît […] suffisamment littérale pour n’ajouter à l’indétermination de la formule tibétaine nulle précision arbitraire." Par ailleurs, cette versification vise à permettre une lecture scandée, voir chantée, du texte suivant en cela la plaisante méthode transmise à nous par Rimpoché, pour faciliter mémorisation et pratique.
L’approche du commentaire de JKLT est, quant à elle, celle de la scolastique avec un recours aux outils de la logique. (Il est d’autant plus émouvant de constater que JKLT ne peut s’empêcher d’y déroger lorsqu’il s’agit de combattre l’obscurantisme et l’intolérance, circonstances où sa langue devient plus émotionnelle). Il a fallu là aussi procéder à un certain nombre de choix. JKLT appose, pour commenter un mot, son synonyme. Prenons l’exemple d’une phrase qui dirait : "Le chat noir est sur la table". JKLT commenterait, suivant en cela une technique très répandue chez les lettrés tibétains : "Le chat, félin, animal, noir, de couleur sombre, est sur un meuble, la table", alors que le bon usage du français semble requérir un minimum d’enrobage stylistique tel que : "le chat, ce noir félin repose sur un des meubles, la table". Nous avons donc enrobé. Il utilise aussi beaucoup la formule : “Soit le chat noir, il est sur la table. La table est un meuble, donc le chat noir est sur un meuble". Le mot phyir, "parce que", intervient 500 fois dans le texte. Nous avons donc là aussi un peu changé la syntaxe. (Au passage,je remercie ma chatte, source d’inspiration illimitée de ce genre de constats).
Si le texte racine a droit à un certain hermétisme, hermétisme, je crois, qui a permis aux différentes traditions tibétaines de faire leur ce texte de manière variée, le commentaire doit être clair.
S’adressant à un public de moines et de disciples, JKLT utilise, peut-être à titre de consigne de mémorisation, environ 85 fois la formule : "Il faut savoir (shes bya)". Nous les avons omises assez souvent. Enfin, l’auteur emploie dans la fameuse partie des neuf exemples 50 fois le mot "voile". Si cela correspond à la rigueur logique de la démonstration tibétaine, en français il n’y a guère danger d’induire une incompréhension en traduisant dgrib, utilisé dans un sens très simple, par des variantes un peu plus plaisantes : "enterré", pour voilé par la terre, "enduit" pour voilé par l’argile, "enserré" pour voilé par les pétales d’un lotus, etc. C’est là un exemple des libertés que nous avons prises. Il y aurait d’autres exemples de ce type. Pour aller au plus simple, disons que nous ne nous sommes pas montrés les partisans d’un mot à mot millimétré quand le sens n’en souffrait pas.
Il est dans un sens dommage d’avoir à rendre accessible un texte ; on sent bien le risque de le dénaturer. Non seulement le commentaire de JKLT, s’il était traduit au mot près, ressemblerait à une suite indigeste de syllogismes, mais de plus nous sommes loin, oh combien, d’avoir une exacte science du glossaire épistémologique et ontologique des penseurs tibétains. Exemple pris au hazard, le lecteur pourra se demander pourquoi la vérité ultime est, comme le dit le texte, "au délà de l’analyse étymologique",juxtaposition d’idées étrangère à nos représentations de la vie spirituelle (à l’exception peut-être de la kabbale). Dans ce cas, nous pouvons risquer l’explication suivante. Même si le bouddhisme n’est pas en lui-même "égotiste", c’est toujours dans un cadre méthodologique d’origine indienne qu’il opère pour défendre sa position vis à vis de ses détracteurs. Or une école indienne d’importance posait, à la croisée de la grammaire et de la métaphysique, que le nom des choses ayant une existence propre, accéder à l’étymologie d’un mot, c’était se rapprocher de la réalité ultime du phénomène illustré par ce mot. Cette notion d’étude étymologique, même si le bouddhisme se l'est appropriée dans un but différent, est donc restée d’importance comme moyen d’accéder à la connaissance du réel.
Les penseurs tibétains ont même enrichi et donné de nouveaux développements aux sciences logiques, épistémologiques, etc.,par rapport à leurs maîtres indiens.
Il faut donc trouver quelque consolation dans l’idée que l’on était voué dès le départ à une demi-mesure. Ajoutons au passage qu’à cet éclairage, le travail décrié (pour cause d’hermétismes fréquents) d’un chercheur comme Stéphane Arguillère, prend toute sa valeur.
Quant à nous, nous nous sommes autorisés à insérer au début de certains chapitres des remarques en quelques lignes facilitant la compréhension de concepts originaux selon notre expérience de l’enseignement de KTGR.
On s’attend à ce que le lecteur ait lu auparavant, le Précieux Ornement de la libération, ouvrage dont Rimpoché juge acquise la connaissance avant d’enseigner la Continuité, ou du moins un ouvrage d’introduction générale, un lam rim, de la voie bouddhiste. La Continuité ne revient plus sur des données telles que les trois poisons, les cinq chemins, les dix terres, etc.
Puisse ce travail bénéficier à tous, en ces temps troublés.
Etienne L. Sarlat,France, janvier 2007. (Source Accessed June 15, 2020)
In the fifth century A.D., Buddhism began to extricate itself from its quasi-Daoist pigeonhole by clarifying definitive differences between Buddhist and Daoist thought, shedding Daoist vocabulary and literary styles while developing new distinctively Buddhist terminology and genres. Curiously, despite the fact that Mahāyāna Buddhism had few adherents in Central Asia and was outnumbered by other Buddhist schools in India as well, in China Mahāyāna became the dominant form of Buddhism, so much so that few pejoratives were as stinging to a fellow Buddhist as labelling him ‘Hīnayāna’ (literally ‘Little Vehicle,’ a polemical term for non-Mahāyānic forms of Buddhism). By the sixth century, the Chinese had been introduced to a vast array of Buddhist theories and practices representing a wide range of Indian Buddhist schools. As the Chinese struggled to master these doctrines it became evident that, despite the fact that these schools were all supposed to express the One Dharma (Buddha’s Teaching), their teachings were not homogenous, and were frequently incommensurate.
By the end of the sixth century, the most pressing issue facing Chinese Buddhists was how to harmonize the disparities between the various teachings. Responses to this issue produced the Sinitic Mahāyāna schools, that is, Buddhist schools that originated in China rather than India. The four Sinitic schools are Tiantai, Huayan, Chan and Pure Land (Jingtu). Issues these schools share in common include Buddha-nature, mind, emptiness, tathāgatagarbha, expedient means (upāya), overcoming birth and death (saṃsāra), and enlightenment. (Source: Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 1)
Critical Buddhism was inevitable. That it was given voice by prominent Japanese scholars noted for their work in non-East Asian Buddhism was also inevitable. That it has provoked strong, even hostile, reactions was inevitable as well. Inevitable means that the causes and conditions that gave rise to Critical Buddhism can be analyzed and understood to show that it has a context, a history, and a necessity. Critical Buddhism is necessary. Thinking about what arises through causes and conditions, especially in terms of how that impacts on cultural and social realities, is a principal component of both Critical Buddhism and Buddhism properly practiced.
This essay will examine some—but certainly not all—of the factors that have contributed to Critical Buddhism. Some arguments and observations will be offered that, while not retellings from the writings of the Critical Buddhists, run parallel to them. These parallels, which I offer as supplements, recast some of their arguments and focus on issues and areas germane to their undertaking. After discussing the inevitability of Critical Buddhism in the context of twentieth-century Japanese Buddhist scholarship, I will turn to some of the events that took place in China during the seventh and eighth centuries that were decisive for the prevalence in East Asia of the type(s) of Buddhism they criticize. This will be followed by a critique of what has happened to the notion of enlightenment in East Asian Buddhism, particularly in the Ch’an and Zen traditions, with reference to the problem of hongaku (original enlightenment) and the authority of lineage transmission. Then, stepping back into a wider context, I will suggest that, far from being the idiosyncratic, misguided departure depicted by its detractors, Critical Buddhism is the inevitable revisiting of a theme that has been central to Buddhism since its onset. All the above points concern inevitabilities: the trajectory and accomplishments of Japanese scholarship in this century coupled with the crisis of Buddhism in the modern world; the decisive historical events that have established a pervasive ideological underpinning in East Asian Buddhism that Matsumoto and Hakamaya have labeled dhātu-vāda, combined with the exclusion of other, counteracting Buddhist tendencies found elsewhere in the Buddhist world, such as Buddhist logic; the undermining of certain foundational Buddhist notions, such as enlightenment, as a result of or in tandem with the growth of dhātu-vāda ideology; the persistent self-criticism and self-reevaluation that Buddhism has subjected itself to, often glorifying the critique and the critics (Nāgārjuna being the most famous example)—all these points have made it inevitable that Critical Buddhism appear today in Japan (and elsewhere). Finally, while examining an aspect of Matsumoto’s critique of The Record of Lin-chi, I will suggest some tactical distinctions that should be considered by those critical of Critical Buddhism (Lusthaus, "Critical Buddhism and Returning to the Sources," 30–31)
La besogne, à dire vrai, n'était pa si facile. Je ne disposais que de la copie exécutée, sous ma surveillance, par le Pandit Kulamāna, reproduction fidèle d'un original assez bon dans l'ensemble, mais parsemé de menues fautes dues principalement a la confusion de lettres analogues dans la devanāgari du Népal. Cette copie, sur papier népalais (gris au recto, jaune au verso), occupe 123 feuillets, à neuf lignes par page. L'ouvrage est complet: la seule lacune étendue se place à la suite du vers 2 de la llesection: deux feuillets avaient à cet endroit disparu de l'archétype; pour dissimuler la lacune, le copiste ancien a recouru à un procédé assez usuel ; il a copié ailleurs deux autres feuilles qu'il a insérées à la place des feuillets manquants. Je n'ai pas pu arriver à déterminer la provenance exacte de cette interpolation; mais elle vient sans aucun doute de quelque çāstra étroitement apparenté au Mahāyāna Sūtrālaṃkāra par le sujet et par le lexique. J'ai donné en Appendice à la suite du texte le contenu de ces deux feuilles: un chercheur plus heureux réussira probablement à les identifier. Les autres lacunes sont de peu d'étendue : XI, 5, une ligne; 51, deus lignes; XI, 70, deux ou trois lignes; XII, 7, un hémistiche.
La traduction chinoise, due à I'Hindou Prabhākara mitra (entre 630 et 633 J.-C.), comble heureusement toutes ces lacunes; sans elle, j'aurais dû renoncer même à éditer ce texte. C'est par une collation constante de la version chinoise que j'ai réussi—si j'y ai réussi— à dégager de mon unique manuscrit un texte acceptable et intelligible. Je n'ai pas cru devoir, sous couleur d'une « acribie ». intransigeante, étaler au bas des pages toutes les lectures vicieuses du manuscrit; Je ne les ai rapportées que dans les rares cas où ma correction affectait l'ensemble d'un mot. Je laisse à ceux qui voudront bien se référer à la copie de Kulamāna le soin de juger ce qu'a pu coûter d'efforts la constitution d'un texte présentable.
C'est de propos délibéré que je me suis refusé a faire disparaître les irrégularités d'orthographe et de sandhi de mon manuscrit. La tradition des scribes népalais a ses usages constants, par exemple la réduction du groupe ttva à ttva (bodhisatva, tatva, etc.), l'interchange des sifflantes palatale et dentale (kuçīda, kusīda, etc.); pour les textes qu'ils sont seuls à nous avoir conservés, il me paraît préférable de se conformer à leurs usages plutôt que de leur imposer les rigueurs d'un purisme théorique. le sancrit a bien assez d'uniformité pour qu'on n'aille pas effacer de parti pris les rares particularités de temps ou de lieu qui ont pu y marquer leur empreinte. Quant au sandhi, I'application mécanique des règles risque le plus souvent d'anéantir des nuances de ponctuation et de pensée exprimées justement par des infractions à ces règles.
Si j'ai préféré donner le texte en caractères devanāgarī, malgré les avantages pratiques de la transcription au point de vue occidental, c'est que nos éditions d'ouvrages bouddhiques ont chance d'atteindre une catégorie de lecteurs que nous me prévoyons pas assez peut-être tt qui mérite pourtant d'être prise en considération. Au Népal même, et par delà le Népal, dans le monde si peu accessible encore des Lamas, nous pouvons apporter ainsi à de bonnes âmes un aliment de piété qui se convertira peut-être en amorce de science: l'exemple donné par les éditeurs européens peut provoquer là-bas une imitation féconde, sauver de la destruction ou rappeler au jour des textes menacés, et activer ainsi le progrès des connaissances. L'indianisme n'est point un vain exercice de dilettantisme: derrière nos problèmes de linguistique, de philologie, d'histoire politique, religieuse ou sociale, il faut entrevoir les centaines millions d'êtres vivants que ces problèmes conditionnent à leur insu, et dont le sort est lié aux solutions qui doivent triompher.
Je manquerais à un réel devoir de gratitude si je n'exprimais pas ici mes remerciements à tous ceux qui ont collaboré à l'impression de ce livre, aux typographes de l'Imprimerie nationale, au Directeur des travaux, M. Héon, et surtout à M. Guérinot, de qui les corrections minutieuses m'ont valu des épreuves presque parfaites. Mon ami et collègue M. Finot a pris la peine de relire aussi toutes les épreuves. S'il reste encore des fautes, et je sais pertinemment qu'il en reste (un erratum sera donné à la fin de la traduction), responsabilité n'en saurait incomber qu'à moi, et à la faiblesse de la nature humaine. (Lévi, foreword, i-iii)
L'Indien Prabhâkara-mitra, auteur de la traduction chinoise (entre 630 et 633 J. C.), assigne le M. S. A. à Asaṅga, qu'il qualifie expressément de « Bodhisattva ». La préface de là traduction, due à Li Pe-yo (l'auteur du Pe-Tsin chou) répète et confirme cette attribution, sans faire allusion à une révélation surnaturelle. Mais, à cette époque même, Hiuan-tsang apprend dans les couvents de l'Inde à classer le M. S. A. parmi les textes sacrés révélés à Asaṅga par Maitreya. Jusque-là, au témoignage de Paramârtha et des traducteurs chinois du vc siècle, le Saptadaçabhûmi çâstra (ou Yogâcâryabhûmi çâstra) avait seul passé pour révélé.
Un demi-siècle après Hiuan-tsang, Yi-tsing, qui n'est pas comme Hiuan-tsang un adepte de l'école Yogâcâra, continue à classer le M. S. A. parmi « les huit branches » (pa tchi) d'Asanga, où il fait entrer pêle-mêle et de son propre aveu plusieurs traités de Vasubandhu.
Chez les Tibétains[1], le M. S. A. est unanimement rangé dans les « Cinq çâstras de Maitreya », et il en ouvre la série. Mais les vers seuls sont attribués à Maitreya ; la prose qui commente ces vers est tenue pour un ouvrage à part, sous le titre de Sûtrâlaṃkâra-bhâṣya, attribué à Vasubandhu. La traduction tibétaine est due à Çâkyasiṃha l'Indien, assisté du Lotsava grand réviseur Dpal brcogs et autres. Je n'ai pas d'informations sur ces personnages; mais, quelle que soit leur date, Prabhâkara mitra leur est certainement antérieur ; avant le milieu du VIIc siècle, le Tibet, à peine ouvert à la civilisation, n'avait ni traducteurs, ni traductions. Nous sommes donc fondés à considérer l'ouvrage entier, prose et vers, comme dû à un seul auteur, Asaṅga. Au reste, si le tibétain distingue dans l'ouvrage deux parties, texte et commentaire, avec deux auteurs différents, le Tche-yuen lou chinois (Catalogue comparé des Livres Bouddhiques compilé dans la période Tche-yuen 1264–1294) donne à l'ouvrage entier, en tant qu'oeuvre du Bodhisattva Asaṅga, le titre fan (c.-à-d. sanscrit) de : Sou-tan-lo A-leng-kia-lo ti-kia, transcription de Sûtrâlaṃkâraṭîkâ « Commentaire du Sûtrâlaṃkâra » (Tche-yuen lou, chap. IX, in°.); en fait, cette désignation de ṭîkâ ne peut s'appliquer pourtant qu'à la prose explicative qui accompagne les vers ou kârikâs.
Le texte sanscrit est divisé en adhikâras ou « chapitres » régulièrement numérotés jusqu'au quinzième ; à partir de là les chapitres ne portent plus d'indication numérique jusqu'au chapitre final ; mais celui-ci est désigné comme le vingt et unième. Les sections marquées dans l'intervalle sont seulement au nombre de quatre ; il manque donc une unité pour parfaire le chiffre de 21. Il est probable que le dernier chapitre est à partager en deux sections, entre le vers 42 et le vers 43. Les dix-neuf derniers vers, avec leur refrain uniforme, constituent une unité bien nette comme hymne de conclusion.
Le tibétain[1] reproduit exactement les divisions du manuscrit sanscrit. Le chinois[2] représente un autre partage de l'ensemble. Le texte y est divisé en treize grandes sections, découpées d'une manière assez irrégulière en vingt-quatre chapitres. (Lévi, "Le Mahâyâna Sûtrâlaṃkâra," 7–9)
Notes
1. Outre Târanâtha, v. aussi Bouston traduit par Stcherbatzkoï, La littérature Yogâcâra d'après Bouston, Muséon, 1905, II. Il est assez surprenant de voir que les Tibétains comptent comme l'oeuvre personnelle d'Àsaṅga le (Saptadaça-)bhûmi çâstra, le seul ouvrage que la tradition ancienne assigne à Maitreya. En dehors de cet ouvrage (et, naturellement, des sections détachées qui en ont été traduites à part: Nanjio 1170, 1083,1086, 1096, 1097, 1098, 1200, 1235), le Canon chinois n'attribue à Maitreya que le Madhyânta-vibhaṅga(Nj. 1245, traduit par Hiuan-tsang), également compté comme une oeuvre de Maitreya par les Tibétains [Je laisse en dehors l'insignifiant opuscule : Sarvaçiksàsthitanâmârtha çâstra (Nj. 1315) traduit par Che-houentre 980 et 1000]. Le cas du Mahâyânasaṃparigraha çâstra offre un intérêt tout particulier. Le premier en date des trois traducteurs chinois, Buddhaçânta, en 531, présente l'ouvrage comme une « oeuvre d' A-seng-kia », dans le texte de l'édition de Corée ; mais les éditions proprement chinoises ont remplacé cette mention par « composition de Wou-tcho p'ou-sa [equals] Asaṅga bodhisattva ». La préface qui accompagne la traduction de Paramârtha, en 563, déclare que « le çâstra original (pen loun) a été composé par A-seng-kia, maître de la loi (fa che). » Hiuan-tsang, enfin, qui donne une traduction en 648, traduit fidèlement un colophon qui dit : « Moi, A-seng-kia, j'ai fini d'expliquer brièvement le Mahâyâna-saṃparigraha çâstra dans les sûtras du Grand Véhicule de l'Abhidharma », mais il présente le texte comme « la composition de Wou-tcho p'ou-sa [equals] Asanga bodhisattva ».
Wassilieff (Notes sur Târanâtha, p. 315 sq.) a tort de dire que « les cinq textes de Maitreya manquent tous [sämmtlich] chez les Chinois ». J'ai déjà signalé la traduction chinoise du M. S. A. et celle du Madhyânta-vibhâga. La version chinoise de l'Uttaratantra a échappé jusqu'ici aux recherches, parce qu'elle ne porte pas de nom d'auteur. C'est le Mahâyânottaratantraçâstra (Nj. 1236; éd. Tôk. XIX, 2) des catalogues chinois, traduit par Ratnamati en 508. Restent le Dharmadharmalâ-vibhaṅga et l'Abhisamayâlaṃkâra qui n'ont pas de correspondant connu ou reconnu en chinois. A propos des oeuvres d'Asaṅga conservées en chinois, j'ajoute encore que le Choun tchong louen (Nj. 1246; Tôk. XIX, 2), dont le titre sanscrit est restitué par Nanjio sous la forme : Madhyântânugama çâstra, est en fait — comme le titre chinois l'exprime exactement — un commentaire sur le Madhyamakaçâstra de Nâgârjuna, interprété au point de vue de la doctrine Yogâcâra.
1. La traduction tibétaine se trouve dans le Tanjour, Mdo. vol. XLIV (phi), le texte en vers va de 1 à 43b; le « bhâṣya » termine le volume, de la page 135 à la fin.
2. La traduction chinoise porte le n° 1190 dans le Catalogue de Nanjio; dans l'édition du Tripiṭaka de Tôkyô, elle trouve boîte XIX, vol. 4: Elle se forme la première moitié du volume ; le Sûtrâlaṃkâra d'Açvaghoṣa forme l'autre moitié.
This paper will examine Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita’s doxography, considering the way in which he attempts to demonstrate that the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness is ultimate within the Buddhist doctrinal history originating from India. According to Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita, the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness is said to have been the intent of the Last Tuming of the Wheel of the Dharma which is of definitive meaning, teaches the Buddha-nature (tathāgatagarbha), and, as pointed out by Duckworth, "accords with the Great Perfection"'"`UNIQ--ref-00003500-QINU`"' (rdzogs chen). Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita’s gzhang stong view is explicitly taught in the following doxographical texts: the Bde gshegs snying po'i rgyan, the Grub mtha'i rnam gzhag nges don dgongs gsal, the Rton pa bzhi ldan gyi gtam, the first chapter of the Rnying ma rgyud 'bum dkar chag lha'i rnga bo che,'"`UNIQ--ref-00003501-QINU`"' and the Sangs rgyas gnyis pa'i dgongs pa'i rgyan,'"`UNIQ--ref-00003502-QINU`"' which is Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita's commentary on the Gsang sngags lam gyi rim pa sal ba'i sgron me, a gter ma of Nyang ral Nyi ma 'od zer (1124/1136-1192/1204).
This paper will also suggest that Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita should be recognized as a forerunner of the ris med movement in Khams, as supported by the following facts: his view on the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness embraces the major practice lineages (sgrub brgyud)—Jo nang pa, Bka' brgyud pa, Sa skya pa, early Dge lugs pa, Rnying ma pa, and Zhi byed—within a single overriding intent of the Buddha’s teachings;'"`UNIQ--ref-00003503-QINU`"' Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita as the teacher of Zhe chen dbon sprul ’Gyur med mthu stobs rnam rgyal, also known as Zhe chen Mahāpaṇḍita (b. 1787), who was a gzhan stong pa,'"`UNIQ--ref-00003504-QINU`"' and who in tum was the teacher of the three masters Kong sprul (1813-99), Mkhyen brtse'i dbang po (1820–2), and Dpal sprul (1808-87).'"`UNIQ--ref-00003505-QINU`"' Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita’s Legs bshad gser gyi thur ma, which is his response to the Lta ba'i gsung mgur by Lcang skya Rol pa'i rdo rje (1717-86),'"`UNIQ--ref-00003506-QINU`"' would hint at the seeds of the ris med movement which grew up among the three schools, the Sa skya, Bka' brgyud, and Rnying ma.'"`UNIQ--ref-00003507-QINU`"' With this paper, then, I hope to add to our understanding of the practice lineages of Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka. (Makidono, introduction, 77–80)
A brief summary of the content of the work in which Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita unfolds his understanding of the history of Buddhism is as follows. After the title, his homage to buddhas, and a statement of the composition’s purpose, he sets out to give an account of the Three Turnings of the Wheel of the Teaching. Doxographically, the First Turning gives rise to the doctrines of the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools of the Lesser Vehicle. The author explains the ultimate truth as conceived by the Vaibhāṣika School, but rejects its atomic theory as being deluded, since it posits the existence of subtlest particles of both matter and cognition. He likewise cannot follow the Sautrāntikas in their assertion of the true existence of external objects. From there, he jumps to the Last Turning, which he deals with until the end of the work, primarily on the basis of quoted scriptures. Among them, those concerning the Mind-Only school focus in on the Three Natures theory, which in turn he disallows, given that a truly existing perceiving subject does not comport with the essencelessness of phenomena. That school, he claims, died out, and their works did not gain entry into Tibet. From there he moves on to the next great figures to arrive on the scene: Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga. He goes on to explain the two modes of Madhyamaka, and contends that though both of them are in fact Mādhyamikas of the Middle Wheel, some biased persons claim Asaṅga for the Mind-Only school. Mādhyamikas, whose doctrine is grounded in the Two Truths, divided into two subschools, the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas. The former, represented in the Indian tradition by Bhāviveka, accepted the existence of phenomena only on the relative level. The latter, by contrast, represented by Buddhapālita, do not accept phenomena even on the relative level. That was the stage to which the Indian Mādhyamikas developed. Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita identifies his own position as that of a true successor of Indian Buddhism’s Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka. In Tibet, Tsong kha pa (1357-1419) initiated a new approach, whereby the truth was subject to confirmation by means of valid cognition, which led to a tradition of rigorous debate. Extensively citing the Ratnapradīpa of Bhavya (clearly distinguished from the Svātantrika Bhāviveka), which expounds the subtle, inner Madhyamaka of practice, he refutes the use of logic when it comes to ultimate reality. He asserts that the doctrine of mind-only as taught in such works associated with the Last Turning of the Wheels as the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra and the Ghanavyūha-sūtra is the subtle, inner Madhyamaka—and Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, and Bhavya also taught it as such. He equates it with the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness, which he also terms the Great Madhyamaka of definitive meaning. He defends Hwa shang's "abandoning mental engagement," as being the tradition of the instruction of Madhyamaka. The practitioners of Rdzogs chen, he notes, label the doctrine of the Last Turning the "king and creator of all" (kun byed rgyal po), and so he regards Rdzogs chen as the same as the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness. Thus, he places Madhyamaka at the summit of the doxographical hierarchy of Buddhist schools as it crystallized in Tibet from its roots in India. He thereby emphasizes that the two modes of emptiness, or two forms of Madhyamaka, that is, self-emptiness and other-emptiness, are in harmony. For Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita, the essence of the Buddhist doctrine, which is the Great Madhyamaka of other¬emptiness, is shared by all Tibetan Buddhist schools, be they Jo nang pas, the early Dge lugs pas, Bka' brgyud pas, Sa skya pas, or Rnying ma pas. He ends by stating that Tantric practice is fundamental to the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness, and that it is predicated on the existence of the Buddha-nature—that is, Buddhahood—in every sentient being. (Makidono, preliminary remarks, 77–79)
Notes
2. Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita. Nges don dbu ma chen po'i tshul rnam par nges pa'i gtam bde gshegs snying po'i rgyan. I have used three editions of the text for my translation; see the References. The section headings in the translation have been added.
From ancient times, the origin of "tathāgata", which has been usually translated as 如 來 (one who comes thus), is not unknown. This has been used as the title of Buddha, chiefly in Buddhism from the start.
Now, I will consider the meaning of "tathāgata" in the Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñāpāramitā-vyākhyā of Haribhadra (ed. by Wogihara) (W.). This includes the Aṣṭasāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra (As.), Maitreya's Abhisamayālaṃkāraśāstra-kārikā (A.) which is a summary of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra (P.), and Haribhadra's commentary which is based on the P. and the As. Accordingly at first, I point out sentences of "tathāgata", which I think as the etymological explanations, and then survey the character of it. (Mano, "'Tathāgata' in Haribhadra's Commentary," 22)
Accepting the possibility of enlightenment as a fundamental Buddhist axiom, one has to either explain the causal process of its production, or accept its primordial existence, for example in terms of a buddha nature (tathāgatagarbha). The latter also applies, of course, when buddhahood is not taken to be produced from scratch. The way this basic issue is addressed is an ideal touchstone for systematically comparing various masters and their philosophical hermeneutical positions in the complex landscape of Tibetan intellectual history. The diversity of views on buddha nature has its roots in the multilayered structure of the standard Indian treatise on buddha nature, the Ratnagotravibhāga. Depending on whether one follows the original intent of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtras (which can be identified in the earliest layer of the Ratnagotravibhāga), or the Yogācāra interpretation of the latter in the Ratnagotravibhāga, buddha nature can refer to either an already fully developed buddha, or the naturally present potential (prakṛtisthāgotra) or natural luminosity of mind, i.e., sentient beings’ ability to become buddhas. While some saw in such positive descriptions of the ultimate only synonyms for the emptiness of mind,[1] or simply teachings of provisional meaning,[2] the Jo nang pas, and many bKa’ brgyud pas and rNying ma pas as well, took them as statements of definitive meaning.[3] Among the latter, i.e., those for whom buddha nature is more than just emptiness, there was disagreement about the relationship between such a positively described buddha nature and its adventitious stains, which include all ordinary states of mind and the world experienced by the latter.
For my analysis of Mi bskyod rdo rje’s view on the relation between buddha nature and its adventitious stains I have chosen his Abhisamayālaṃkāra commentary, the rGan po’i rlung sman,[4] which contains a critical review of ’Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal’s (1392-1481) rGyud gsum gsang ba; the sKu gsum ngo sprod rnam bshad; the Phyag rgya chen po’i sgros ‘bum and Mi bskyod rdo rje’s independent work on gzhan stong, the dBu ma gzhan stong smra ba’i srol legs par phye ba’i sgron me. While these texts have in common that they endorse a robust distinction between buddha nature and the adventitious stains, the respective gzhan stong ("other empty") views underlying this relationship slightly differ, or are not mentioned in explicit terms. The homogeneous clear-cut distinction between impure sentient beings and a pure mind, dharmadhātu, or buddha nature is strikingly similar to what we find in the relevant works of the third Karma pa Rang byung rdo rje (1284-1339).5) Even though Rang byung rdo rje does not explicitly mention the word gzhan stong in his mainly Yogācāra-based presentation of buddha nature, Karma Phrin las pa’s[6] (1456-1539) and Kong sprul Blo gros mtha’ yas’s (1813-1899) description of Rang byung rdo rje as a gzhan stong pa[7] is at least understandable on the grounds that Mi bskyod rdo rje uses this label for a doctrine similar to Rang byung rdo rje’s.[8] In order to further contextualize Mi bskyod rdo rje’s distinction between buddha nature and adventitious stains I have also consulted relevant passages from his commentaries on the Madhyamakāvatāra and the dGongs gcig. (Mathes, introductory remarks, 65–67)
Notes
- This mainly is the position of rNgog Blo ldan shes rab (1059-1109), who claims in his Theg chen rgyud bla’i don bsdus pa, 5b3: "The mental continuum, which has emptiness as its nature, is the [buddha] element (i.e., buddha nature)." (... stong pa nyid kyi rang bzhin du gyur pa’i sems kyi rgyud ni khams yin no). A similar line of thought is followed by the dGe lugs pas, for whom emptiness is what is taught in the doctrine of tathāgatagarbha (see Seyfort Ruegg 1969, 402).
- This is, for example, the position maintained by Sa skya Paṇḍita (1182-1251) and Bu ston Rin chen ‘grub (1290-1364) (Seyfort Ruegg 1973, 29-33).
- For rNgog Blo ldan shes rab and some dGe lugs pas, too, buddha nature has definitive meaning on the grounds that it is a synonym of emptiness (see Mathes 2008:26-27; and Seyfort Ruegg 1969, 402) .
- This is how the author originally referred to his work, even though it appears in the Collected Works in the less irreverent title Sublime Fragrance of the Nectar of Analysis (Higgins and Draszczyk 2016, vol. 1, 12).
- I.e., the Zab mo nang don and its autocommentary, the sNying po bstan pa, the Dharmadhātustava commentary, and the Rang byung rdo rje’i mgur rnams. See Mathes 2008, 51-75.
- See Karma 'Phrin las pa: "Dris lan yid kyi mun sel zhes bya ba lcags mo’i dris lan bzhugs", 91, 1-4. For the Tibetan text and an English translation, see Mathes 2008, 55 & 441.
- See Kong sprul Blo gros mtha’ yas: Shes bya kun khyab mdzod, vol. 1, 460, 2-13.
- The fact that the relation between buddha nature and its adventitious stains is only occasionally labelled gzhan stong by Mi bskyod rdo rje is not very telling, since in his dBu ma gzhan stong smra ma’i srol the main topic is the said relation, and Mi bskyod rdo rje refers to it as gzhan stong merely in the title.
What makes gZhon nu dpal's DhDhV-commentary so interesting is his mahāmudrā interpretation of a central topic in the DhDhV, i.e., the abandonment of all "mentally created characteristic signs" (nimittas). The latter practice plays a crucial role in the cultivation of non-conceptual wisdom, which is taken as the cause or the foundation of āśrayaparivŗtti in the DhDhV. Based on Sahajavajra's (11th century) Tattvadaśakaţīkā gZhon nu dpal explains that the nimittas are abandoned by directly realizing their natural luminosity which amounts to a direct or non-conceptual experience of their true nature. To be sure, while the usual Mahāyāna approach involves an initial analysis of the nimittas, namely, an analytic meditation which eventually turns into non-conceptual abiding in the same way as a fire kindled from rubbing pieces of wood bums the pieces of wood themselves (gZhon nu dpal explains this on the basis of Kamalaśīla's commentary on the Nirvikalpapraveśadhāraņī), mahāmudrā pith-instructions enable a meditation of direct perceptions right from the beginning. In view of the fact that such direct perceptions of emptiness (or dharmatā in this context here) usually start from the first Bodhisattva-level onwards, gZhon nu dpal also tries to show that the four yogas of mahāmudrā are in accordance with the four prayogas of the DhDhV. It should be noted that such a mahāmudrā interpretation must have already existed in India, as can be seen from Jñānakīrti's (10th/11th-century) Tattvāvatāra, in which a not-specifically-Tantric form of mahāmudrā practice is related with the traditional fourfold Mahāyāna meditation by equating "Mahāyāna" in Lańkāvatārasūtra X.257d with mahāmudrā. The pādas X.257cd "A yogin who is established in a state without appearances sees Mahāyāna" thus mean that one finally sees or realizes mahāmudrā.
To sum up, the DhDhV plays an important role for gZhon nu dpal in that it provides a canonical basis for his mahāmudrā tradition, and by showing that the dharmatā portion of the DhDhV is a commentary on the second chapter of the RGV, gZhon nu dpal skillfully links his mahāmudrā interpretation to the standard Indian work on Buddha-nature, and thus to a concept which considerably facilitated the bridging of the Sūtras with the Tantras. (Source Accessed April 1, 2020)
The contributions to this volume were presented at the gzhan stong panel organized by Klaus-Dieter Mathes (University of Vienna) at the Twelfth Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies in Vancouver, Canada, in August 2010. Its full name was "The History of the Rang stong/Gzhan stong Distinction from its Beginning through the Ris-med Movement." The contributors were, besides the organizer, Karl Brunnhölzl (Tsadra Foundation), Anne Burchardi (The University of Copenhagen and The Royal Library of Denmark), Douglas Duckworth (Temple University), David Higgins (University of Vienna), Yaroslav Komarovski (University of Nebraska-Lincoln), and Tsering Wangchuk (University of San Francisco). It is regretted that Karl Brunnhölzl and Douglas Duckworth were unable to include their work in the present publication. (Mathes, introduction, 4–5)
Notes:
- See Brunnhölzl’s Prajñāpāramitā, Indian "gzhan stong pas," and the Beginning of Tibetan gzhan stong; and Mathes’s "Tāranātha's ‘Twenty-One Differences with Regard to the Profound Meaning’—Comparing the Views of the Two gŹan stoṅ Masters Dol po pa and Śākya mchog ldan," and "The gzhan stong Model of Reality. Some More Material on Its Origin, Transmission, and Interpretation."
appearance and emptiness in terms of valid cognition that analyzes for the ultimate abiding nature. In the context of a conventional valid cognition, however, which analyzes for the mode of appearances (i.e., perception), the two truths are defined in terms of the way things appear versus the way they truly are. When the abiding nature is perceived as it truly is, there is still awareness, albeit in a form beyond the duality of ordinary perception. For Gang shar it is only in this phenomenological sense that the rang stong of samsara and gzhan stong of nirvāṇa need to be distinguished. (Mathes, "Introduction: The History of the Rang stong/Gzhan stong Distinction," 7)
Tāranātha begins his somewhat delicate task of comparing the two masters Dol po pa and Śākya mchog ldan in a conciliating manner, by explaining that both supposedly see what is profound reality and hence should not have different thoughts about it. It is only in order to accommodate the different needs of their disciples that they enunciate variant views. Even though the essential gźan stoṅ view and meditation practices of both masters are the same, there are a lot of minor differences regarding tenets (grub mtha') that arise when formulating the view on the level of apparent truth.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000102A-QINU`"'
The first four of the twenty-one points address differences in the exegesis of the Madhyamaka and Maitreya texts which are considered to be commentaries on the Buddha's intention underlying the second and third turnings of the "Wheel of the Dharma" (dharmacakra).'"`UNIQ--ref-0000102B-QINU`"' Points 5-8 embody Śākya mchog ldan's and Dol po pa's different understanding of non-dual wisdom. In points 9-16, their views on the trisvabhāva theory are distinguished. In a related topic, Tāranātha also elaborates the different understandings of self-awareness (point 11), entities and non-entities, and conditioned and unconditioned phenonema (all in point 13). Next, our attention is drawn to different ways of relating the four noble truths with the apparent and ultimate (point 17). The last four points deal with the two masters' views on the Buddha-nature. (Mathes, "Tāranātha's 'Twenty-One Differences with Regard to the Profound Meaning'," 294–95)
There are two Chinese translations of the sūtra: the Guṇabhadra (求那跋陀羅) version translated
in A. D. 436 called the Shengman shizihou yicheng dafangbian fangguang jing 勝鬘師子吼一乘大方便方廣經, T. 353, vol. 12 <ŚSN (Ch.1)>); and the Bodhiruci (菩提流支) version of A. D. 710 called the Shengman furen hui (勝鬘夫人會, T. 310(48), vol. 11 <ŚSN(Ch.2)> ), which is the 48th sūtra of the Ratnakūṭa collection (Da bao ji jing 大寶積經) There is also a ninth century Tibetan translation called the 'Phags pa Iha mo dpal 'phren gi seṅ ge'i sgra śes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo <ŚSN(Tib.)>. The English translation by Alex and Hideko Wayman is based on the Chinese translation.'"`UNIQ--ref-00001080-QINU`"' Readers are referred to this work for more detailed information. There is also a great deal of research that has been done on this sūtra by Japanese scholars, which we will not touch upon here.
The original version of this sūtra has been lost, and there are only a few fragmentary quotations in Sanskrit in the Ratnagotravibhāga and the Śikṣāsamuccaya. In The Schøyen Collection, however, I was able to discover three virtually complete folios that cover the final portion of the sūtra as well as another two fragments related to other sections. As the sūtra ends on the recto side of folio no. 392,'"`UNIQ--ref-00001081-QINU`"' the verso side of the same folio begins another sūtra which is the subject of the next report in this volume. In the following, I will introduce the above mentioned three folios and two fragments related to the ŚSN. (Matsuda, "Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanādanirdeśa," 65)
Du III au VII siècle de notre ère, selon la chronologie la plus souvent admise, la pensée bouddhique en Inde a trouvé une expression particulièrement brillante dans l'école dite du Vijñānavāda «doctrine de la connaissance». Les premiers ouvrages ressortissant à cette école en tant que telle peuvent être datés du début du Ill siècle. Au cours de ce siècle et du suivant, elle constitue peu à peu ses thèses, notamment à travers les ouvrages de Maitreya-nātha, d'Asaṅga et de Vasubandhu l'ancien. Je désignerai les développements de cette période sous le nom de Vijñānavāda ancien. Au V siècle, Vasubandhu le jeune cherche à fixer et à synthétiser la doctrine; ses travaux ouvrent la période de ce que j'ai appelé le Vijñānavāda classique, caractérisée par une abondante littérature de commentaires qu'illustrent en particulier les noms de Sthiramati, Dharmapāla et Hiuan-tsang. Le present exposé s'attachera à retracer brièvement l'histoire du Vijñānavāda, puis à exposer la doctrine classique. (May, "La philosophie bouddhique idéaliste," 265)
English Translation:
From the third to the seventh century AD, according to the most commonly accepted chronology, Buddhist thought in India found a particularly brilliant expression in the school known as the Vijñānavāda "doctrine of knowledge". The first works coming out of this school as such can be dated to the beginning of the 11th century. During this century and the following, it gradually built up its theses, notably through the works of Maitreya-nātha, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu the Elder. I will designate the developments of this period under the name of ancient Vijñānavāda. In the fifth century, Vasubandhu the Younger sought to fix and synthesize the doctrine; his works open the period of what I have called the classical Vijñānavāda, characterized by an abundant literature of commentaries that illustrate in particular the names of Sthiramati, Dharmapāla and Hiuan-tsang. This presentation will focus on briefly recounting the history of Vijñānavāda, then explaining classical doctrine.
The field of Ch'an studies has seen some very lively disputes over the course of the twentieth century, but there has been general agreement on the proposition that the doctrine of sudden enlightenment represents the highest expression of the doctrinal mainstream of early Chinese Ch’an Buddhism. Although there is some quibbling regarding details and specific interpretations, scholars working in this field often describe the history of the doctrine of sudden enlightenment within Ch’an in terms of three subjects: (1) Hui-neng’s doctrine of sudden enlightenment as shown in his "mind verse" (hsin-chieh) in the Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch (Liu-tsu t'an-ching); (2) Shen-hui’s campaign in opposition to the gradual teaching of the Northern school and in support of the public recognition of Hui-neng as sixth patriarch; and (3) the continuation of the spirit of Hui-neng in the teachings and religious practice of Ma-tsu, Shih-t'ou, and the later Ch’an tradition
Research done in recent years has shown that the traditional interpretations of these three subjects are all substantially incorrect, although the implications of these findings have not yet been fully realized. The history of early Ch'an is in the process o f being thoroughly rewritten, but it is already clear that the doctrine of sudden enlightenment and the dispute between the sudden and gradual teachings should no longer be used as yardsticks by which the religious message of Ch'an and its widespread acceptance in T'ang dynasty China are understood. (McRae, "Shen-hui and the Teaching of Sudden Enlightenment in Early Ch'an Buddhism," 227)
Volume 48
The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch consists of a record of the teachings of Hui-neng, the Sixth Patriarch of the Chan School in China, recorded by his disciple Fahai, and is known by several abbreviated titles such as Platform Sūtra or Platform Sūtra of the Dharma Treasure. It proclaims the independence of the Southern School of Chan from the Northern School on such subjects as "sudden enlightenment" (Ch. dun-wu) and the external expression of one's real nature (Ch. jian-xing).
Source
Ch. Liuzu dashi fabao tan jing (六祖大師法寶壇經), Compiled in the Chinese by Zong-bao, as recorded by Fa-hai et al. 1 fascicle. (Source: BDK America)
Then which text does he depend on to establish his original idea? As the Ratnagotravibhāga is cited most frequently in his bDen gnyis gsal ba'i nyi ma"`UNIQ--ref-00000003-QINU`"', it seems to be the most important text in his great Madhyamaka. I consider his commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga"`UNIQ--ref-00000004-QINU`"' attributed to Maitreya here'"`UNIQ--ref-00000005-QINU`"'. (Mochizuki, introduction, 111)
1. T. = Turnour MS. (written in Siṅhalese character)* in the India Office Library.
2. Ba. = No. 2276 (in Siṅhalese writing) of the Oriental MSS. in the Library of the British Museum.
3. Bb.= No. 2412 (in Siṅhalese character) of the same collection.
4. Ph = Phayre MS. (in Burmese writing), in the India Office Library.
5. Com. (1.) Buddhaghosha's Commentary (Turnour collection), in the India Office Library.
6. ,, (2.) A manuscript of the above work in my own collection. It is of the same type as the Turnour copy.
7. Corn. (3.) Buddhaghosha's Commentary), prepared for me with great care by Subhûti Unnânsê. It is a very valuable and accurate manuscript, and contains many variations from (1.) and (2.).
8. D. = A MS. in my own collection purchased from Dr. Rhys Davids.
9. Tr. = A transcript (unpunctuated) of the Copenhagen MS. by Dr. Trenckner.
10. P = Paris MS. used only in the Uddânas.
Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 are all in Siṅhalese writing.
11. There is a ṭīka or subcommentary in the British Museum collection but it has not afforded me any help in
settling the text of the Aṅguttara. It contains the first nipâta and the beginning of the second.
There is a very close agreement between the Siṅhalese and Burmese versions of the Aṅguttara-Nikâya; but where they essentially differ, I have, in nearly every case, given the preference to the Siṅhalese readings.
The Siṅhalese manuscripts, as Professor Fausböll long ago pointed out (Ten Jātakas, p. x), often retain older
forms and expressions, which the Burmese replace by more modern, more common, and more regular ones. A few instances of this kind occur in the Aṅguttara.- Thus, for bhecchati (I. v. 1}, Ph. reads bhijjissati, and for paligheda (II. iv. 6) cleverly substitutes baligedha, in which ball gives some sense, though not the exact meaning required.
In one instance I have found in the Phayre MS. a reading borrowed from the explanation in the Commentary (See III, 65, 3, footnote 5).
In difficult or doubtful passages the Burmese manuscripts
rarely render us any trustworthy assistance. Thus, for saṅkasâyanti (III. iv. 9) the reading of all the Siṅhalese copies, and sanctioned by the Saṃyutta-Nikâya, Pk reads saṅghâmayanti. l venture to think that the Siṅhalese reading is the correct one, and that it is not a mistake for saññâyanti
In some few cases the Commentary differs from the received text as in the reading atīthâtuṃ for atīyātum (II. iv. 9), and okkâcita for ukkâcita (II. v. 7). In
other cases it has given us a better reading than that of the received text. See saṅkhepa, III. 62, 3.
The Chinese are said to have a work answering to the
Aṅguttara-Nikâya, which Professor Beal calls the "Add-0ne-Āgama."1 We have, however, no means of verifying this statement, as we have no published specimens of a Chinese Aṅguttara to compare with the Pāli version.
In Professor Beal's "Catena of Buddhist Scriptures from the Chinese," we have some quotations from a work called the "Sian-chi-Kwan," written by Chi-kai, the founder of the Tian-tai sect. The extract on p. 258, entitled "On Chiding the Evil Desires," resembles very closely the first ten suttas of the Paṭhana-vagga (pp. 1, 2) mixed up with some commentator's remarks and illustrative stories; but the Chinese stories are not the same as those told by
Buddhaghosha. The chapter on p. 261, "Casting Away Hindrances," looks much like an expansion of the Nirvāṇapahâna-vagga (I. ii. 1-10).
The Chinese may have had an Aṅguttara, but it probably bore no closer likeness to the Pāli work so called than the Dhammapada translated by Professor Beal resembles the text edited by Professor Fausböll.
In the Samacitta-vagga (II. iv. 2) of the Aṅguttara there is a very interesting little sutta on filial piety in which it is insisted that no adequate return can be made by children to their parents, even though they should perform for them the most menial offices. The sutta also points out the duty of children to look after the spiritual welfare of their parents. (see also III. 31). There seems to be some reminiscence of a northern version of this sutta in Japanese Buddhist books. The San-kai-ri quotes the Bussetsu Ko-ko-kio as the authority for the following piece of advice to dutiful children:—"Although a man should provide for his parents a hundred kinds of the choicest food suited to the palate, and though he caused their bodies to be arrayed in magnificent garments, and though he bear them on his
shoulders from place to place, and furnish them with every sort of amusement and happiness, . . . beyond all this they should ever seek to induce them to render due homage to the three precious things—Buddha, Buddhist rites, and the priests—and also realize clearly their future destination."
In regard to this subject the Fubo-on Ju-kió has a remark that I have met with somowhere in Pāli, "that if one were to estimate the value of one sho (about a quart and a half) of the mother's milk, it would be more than ten thousand eight hundred and fifty kokus of rice; and if estimated in rice stalks, it would make twenty-three thousand bundles; and if calculated in linen cloth, it would be more than three thousand three hundred and seventy steps or measure" (The Chrysanthemum, a monthly magazine for Japan and the Far East, April 1882 pp. 172, 173).
In the Pāli Text Society's Journal for 1885 I have
discussed the modern versions of the interesting story of "Death's Messengers" in the Devadûta-vagga III. 35, 1–4.
But of these and other interesting matters I shall have more to say when the Aṅguttara-Nikâya is completed ; the present installment, however, will show the necessity of publishing the whole as soon as possible.
The Siṅhalese MSS. contain, at the end of the Tika-nipâta, Uddânas for the first three nipâtas. The Phayre MS.
has an Uddânas only for the Tika-nipâta.
The text of these Uddânas is corrupt in many places, and though it has been compared with the vaggas themselves, it is still not free from error.
The Tika-nipâta Uddâna does not go beyond the Maṅgala-vagga.
The Acelaka-vagga probably included only suttas 151, 152; so that the ten suttas 153-162 made a second vagga, while No. 163 constituted a third vagga, a mere "tag", as at the end of the Atthavasa-Vagga, II. xvii, 3, 4, 5, p. 100. (Morris, preliminary remarks, vii–xii)
Notes
1. An edition of the first two nipātas was issued by the Pāli Text Society among the publications of 1883; but it was not well received on account of the numerous contractions used in the text. In the present work only a few po's or . . . . have been employed.
1. Bunyin Nanjin, in his "Catalog of the Chinese Buddhist Canon," No. 543, gives a description of a work called T(illegible)an-yi- chān-chin (Add-one-āgama-book), which he tranlates Ekottarāgama sūtra. It was translated into Chinese by Dharmanandin, A.D 385. Judging from the titles of each chapter (varga?) it is unlike the Pāli Aṅguttara-Nikâya. It is, however, worth noting that in the Milinda-Pañba (p. 352) the Aṅguttara is alluded to as the Ekuttara-Nikâya.
Composed in China around 420, the Brahmā’s Net Sutra is based on various contemporary Mahayana and Hinayana vinaya writings and includes extensive discussion of indigenous Chinese moral concepts such as filial piety, etc. The text is based in the same mainstream Mahayana thought of the Flower Ornament Sutra (Huayan jing), the Nirvana Sutra (Niepan jing), and the Sutra for Humane Kings (Renwang jing). In fact, the extent of the Brahmā's Net Sutra's agreement with the Flower Ornament Sutra is so pronounced that it is regarded as the "concluding sutra" of the latter.
Long thought to be the Skt. Brahmajāla-sūtra translated by Kumārajīva into the Chinese as Fanwang jing (梵網經), the work is now seen within modern scholarship as composed in China around 420, based on various Mahayana and Hinayana vinaya writings available at that time. 2 fascicles. (Source: BDK America)
Nevertheless, we can still ask if there might be yet another accessible vantage point from which one could regard Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō as philosophical? This paper will argue that the answer is "yes," there is such a vantage point, so long as one distinguishes what Dōgen writes from how Dōgen writes. For the claim of the paper is that while it remains ambiguous to maintain that his writings exhibit a philosophical system based on content, their form realizes what philosophy is at its core, i.e. reflexivity or philosophy’s inherent self reference.'"`UNIQ--ref-000010F1-QINU`"' (Müller, "Philosophy and the Practice of Reflexivity," 545–46)
So begins THE GREAT MEDICINE: A Remedy that Conquers Clinging to Reality, a moving text written in verse by Shechen Gyaltsap Gyurme Pema Namgyal. Shechen Rabjam Rinpoche's commentary explores the foundation of awakened mind, the inner workings of loving kindness and compassion, the view of emptiness, and the practical applications of this understanding on the path. Rinpoche's teaching style is refreshing and direct, using examples from his own experience and anecdotes about his teachers and the lineage to illustrate the importance of mingling the Buddhist teachings into ones own life.
"We need to gain real experience with these valuable instructions and integrate them into our lives. Doing so is the only reason to study them. The result of spiritual practice should be our inner transformation into a better human being. After years of practice we should gain a sense of inner peace and become less vulnerable to outer circumstances. Inner freedom, relaxed and open happiness, as well as joy will arise when negative emotions and mental confusions disappear. In contrast, we will have missed the point of the practice if our mental poisons remain all-powerful, torment us constantly, and cause us to remain preoccupied with ourselves."
Shechen Gyaltsap Gyurme Pema Namgyal, (1871-1926) was one of the most learned and accomplished practitioners of his time. His 13 volumes of writings contain many lucid and profound commentaries. He was the root teacher of Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche.
The 7th Shechen Rabjam Rinpoche, born in 1966, is the grandson and spiritual heir of Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche. He is the abbot of Shechen Monasteries and Nunnery in Nepal, India, and Bhutan and the founder of a number of on-going humanitarian projects. (Source: Back Cover)
The translator, Rev. Hubert Nearman, is a senior disciple of the late Rev. Master Jiyu-Kennett, first Abbess of Shasta Abbey in California, and founder of the Order of Buddhist Contemplatives. Prior to becoming a monk, he was a scholar and translator of medieval Japanese texts and was a recipient of a grant for his translation work from the National Endowment for the Humanities. (Source Accessed June 28, 2021)
This thesis gives an account of Yogācāra Buddhist thought as presented in the works of Sthiramati, a leading sixth-century thinker in the Yogācāra tradition, along with a translation of his commentary on the Chapter on Enlightenment of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra. The thesis introduces Sthiramati's life and times, and discusses the authorship and authenticity of works attributed to him.
Sthiramati's viewpoint is placed in the overall context of Yogācāra ontology. The thesis elucidates the fundamental categories of Yogācāra ontology, giving an analysis of the three identities (trisvabhāva) and their interrelationships, the connection between the three identities and the principle of representation-only (vijñaptimātra), and an account of basis-transformation (āśrayaparāvṛtti). This provides a philosophical foundation for interpreting the Yogācāra concept of Buddhahood, bringing out the intrinsic link between ontological realization and soteriological attainment in the Yogācāra system.
The thesis traces the Yogācāra account of Buddhahood in both its essence and its manifestation: Buddhahood is shown as both the absolute ground of being and as the locus for innumerable pure qualities and forms of mastery through which enlightenment is communicated to ordinary sentient beings. In this connection, the thesis presents the Yogācāra analysis of the Three Bodies of Buddha (Dharmakāya, the Truth-Body; Sambhogakāya, the Enjoyment-Body; Nirmāṇakāya, the Emanation-Body), which encompass both the essential being and the manifest functioning of Buddha. The three Budda-bodies are correlated with the four liberative wisdoms (jñāna) of the Buddha (the Mirror-like Wisdom, the Equality Wisdom, the Analytical Wisdom, and the All-Accomplishing Wisdom). The thesis recounts the classic Yogācāra discussion of the attributes of Buddhahood in terms of unity and multiplicity, and the nature and scope of Buddha's salvific activities.
The aims of the thesis are (1) to present Yogācāra Buddhology in its own terms; (2) to clarify the conceptual structure of Yogācāra Buddhology and the relationship in Yogācāra thought between Buddha and the phenomenal world, and between Buddha and the minds of sentient beings; and (3) to facilitate cross-cultural comparisons between Buddha and concepts of the Absolute in other religious traditions by providing a reliable presentation of the ontological, epistemological, and soteriological aspects of Yogācāra Buddhology.
It is about the fundamental intention that underlies all the Buddha’s teachings and unites all the categories of Buddhist concepts within one central principle – the “actual reality of the nature or state of all phenomena.” One of the main messages is the universal validity and unchangeable nature of virtue and non-virtue, which means that no one can bypass the foundational practices and the observance of disciplined conduct..
Each chapter is started with the Leading Case (本則, Honsoku), Background (機縁, Kien), Dharma Discourse (提拮, Nentei), and Verse (古頌, Juko). When Keizan mentioned each Patriarch he began with the most important point. First, the key tenet as Leading Case (Honsoku). Next, he indicated the background (Kien) of each Patriarch. Some backgrounds are minutely detailed while others are brief and sparse. After a discussion about background, Keizan presented a lengthy interpretation about the Patriarch as Dharma Discourse (Nentei). He followed with his own Verse (Juko) as a short conclusion.
Short stories of each Patriarch are given in this manner so it is easy to follow the accomplishment of each Patriarchs life. Honsoku as Leading Case is the area which indicates the Enlightenment and level of transmission of the Patriarch, while Kien as Background describes the process by which the Patriarch is enabled to practice the transmission. Nentei as Dharma Discourse clarifies the Enlightenment of the Patriarch. Here Keizan teaches the students various interpretations of the Dharma. Finally, Juko (Verse) expresses the spirit of the chapter. Though not necessarily connected with the surface meaning of the chapter, it does express the essence and the conclusion. By making use of the Leading case, background, and dharma discourse, Keizan demonstrates the spiritual tenets which lead to the actual stage of being a Patriarch. In other words, it portrays the Way of Enlightenment. (Nishiyama, introduction, 3–4)
exegetical literature connected with the Buddhist Scripture of the
latest and, partly, of the intermediate period is contained in the
5 treatises ascribed to the Bodhisattva Maitreya. These are:—
1) The Sūtrālaṁkāra,
2) " Madhyānta-vibhanga,
3) " Dharma-dharmatā-vibhanga
4) " Abhisamayālaṁkāra, and
5) " Uttaratantra
Of these 5 treatises the original Sanskrit text of the Sutrālaṁkāra has been edited by Prof. Sylvain Levi, who has likewise given a French translation of it. The Sanskrit text of the Abhisamayālaṁkāra and its Tibetan translation have been recently edited by Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky and by myself in the Bibliotheca Buddhica and will be followed by an analysis of the 8 subjects and the 70 topics which form its contents. The 3 other works have not, till now, met with the full appreciation of European scholars. The reason perhaps is that we possess only their Tibetan translations in the Tangyur (MDO XLIV), the original Sanskrit texts having not, up to this time, been discovered. An investigation of this branch of Buddhist literature according to the Tibetan sources enables us to ascertain the exclusive importance of the said 3 treatises as containing, in a very pregnant form, the idealistic and monistic teachings of later Buddhism. In particular the Tibetan works draw our attention to the Uttaratantra, the translation and analysis of which forms the subject-matter of the present work. It is indeed the most interesting of the three, if not of all the five, being the exposition of the most developed monistic and pantheistic teachings of the later Buddhists and of the special theory of the Essence of Buddhahood, the fundamental element of the Absolute, as existing in all living beings. (Obermiller, introduction, 81–82)
Bu-ton's History of Buddhism proper is divided into the following principal parts: —
I. The Life of the Buddha Çākyamuni, the narrative of the so-called 12 Acts of the Buddha (mdzad-pa bcu-gñis), or rather of the 12 principal events in his life. The account of the first eleven, ending with the first "Swinging of the Wheel of the Doctrine" (chos-kyi ḥkhor-lo bskor-ba = dharma-cakra-pravartana) represents a summary of the Lalita-vistara-sūtra and contains numerous verses from it. Then, after a short indication of the Second and the Third Swingings (i.e. of the Scripture of the intermediate and the later period), there follows the story of the Buddha's attainment of Nirvāṇa. It is taken from the Vinayakṣudraka (tib. Ḥdul-ba-phran-tshegs, Kangyur ḤDUL, XI), being a summary of the corresponding part of the latter.
II. The Rehearsals of the Buddhist Scripture. This part begins with the account of the first Rehearsal (Mahākāçyapa, Ānanda, Upāli), of the death of Kāçyapa and Ānanda, and of the second Rehearsal (Yaças, Kubjita, Revata, etc.). The only source here is likewise the Vinaya-kṣudraka, the corresponding text of which is rendered in an abridged form, all the verses being quoted at full length. As concerns the 3d Rehearsal and the 18 Sects, the texts referred to on this subject are: —
1. The Nikāya-bheda-upadarçana-saṁgraha of Vinītadeva (Tg.
MDO. XC.).
2. The Bhikṣu-varṣāgra-pṛcchā. of Padmākaraghoṣa (Ibid).
3. The Prabhāvati of Çākyaprabha. (Tg. MDO. LXXXIX.)
4. The Tarkajvālā of Bhāvaviveka. (Tg. MDO. XIX.)
The latter work, though not directly mentioned, represents the principal source. Some passages of it are fully contained in Bu-ton's text. —
Ill. The different theories concerning the time of duration of the Buddhist Doctrine. Here we have quotations from the Karuñā-puṇḍarīka, from Vasubandhu's Commentary on the Akṣayamati-nirdeça-sūtra (Tg. MDO. XXXV.), the Commentary on the Vajracchedikā. (Tg. MDO. XVI), the Commentary on the 3 Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtras (Tg. MDO. XIV), etc. We have likewise the chronological calculations of the Sa-skya Paṇḍita and others concerning the time that has passed since the death of the Buddha.
IV. The "prophecies" concerning the persons that have furthered the spread of Buddhism. The most important are those contained in the Lankāvatāra, the Mahākaruṇā-puṇḍarīka (Kg. MDO. VI), and the Mañjuçrī-mūlatantra. (Kg. RGYUD. XI. Narthaṅ edition, or XII. Derge edition) A separate prophecy referring to the Tantric Ācāryas, that of the Kālacakra-uttaratantra (Kg. RGYUD. I) and the Mahākāla-tantra-rāja (Kg. RGYUD. V), is given at the end of this part. It is especially the Mañjuçrī-mūla-tantra which is to be regarded as a source of the greatest importance, not only for the History of Buddhism, but for the historiography of India in general. The most interesting is that part of it which refers to the Indian kings, — Açoka, Virasena, Nanda, Candragupta, etc. Noteworthy is the passage concerning Pāṇini who is spoken of as the friend of the king Nanda. — A detailed analysis of the historically important parts of all these texts will be published by me before long. —
V. The biographies of the celebrated Buddhist teachers, viz. Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Candragomin, Candrakīrti, Āryāsanga, Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Haribhadra, Çāntideva, etc. Each of these is followed by a list of the works composed by the teacher in question. An indication of the volumes of the Tangyur (Sūtra and Tantra) in which the works are contained is always given in the notes.
VI. A short summary of the history of the grammatical literature, or rather of the legends referring to it, viz. the stories about Bṛhaspati, Pāṇini, Sarvavarman (alias Çarvavarman, Saptavarman, or lçvaravarman), etc. After that comes an enumeration of the kanonical texts (Sūtra and Tantra) which have been lost or have not been translated into Tibetan. —
VII. Prophecies of an apocalyptic character foretelling the disappearance of the Buddhist Doctrine. Among these, that of the Candragarbha-paripṛcchā is quoted at full length with a very few abbreviations. This prophecy is treated in the Kangyur as a separate work (Kg. MDO. XXXII). In this place the text of the Lhasa block-print of Bu-ton's History contains a great number of mistakes in the proper names, which are sometimes quite illegible (e.g. Akandradha instead of Agnidatta !). A correct rendering of these names has been made possible with the help of the Derge (Sde-dge) edition of the Kangyur.
VIII. The History of Buddhism in Tibet. It begins with the genealogy of the early legendary Tibetan kings, commencing with Ña-ṭhi-tsen-po. Next come the legends about Tho-tho-ri-ñen-tsen and Sroṅ-tsen-gam-po. These are followed by a more detailed account concerning the spread of Buddhism in Tibet during the reign of Ṭhi-sroṅ-de-tsen, viz. the activity of Çāntirakṣita (called the "Ācārya Bodhisattva"), the selection of the first 7 Tibetan monks [Sad-mi mi bdun], the dispute between the adherents of Kamalaçīla and of the Chinese Hva-çaṅ Mahāyāna (the Tsen-min and the Tön-mün), etc. Then we have a brief account of the reign of Ral-pa-can, of the persecution by Laṅ-dar-ma, and of the restauration of the Church by the 10 monks of Ü and Tsaṅ, an indication of the monasteries and monastic sections founded by the said monks and their pupils and, finally, a narrative of the events that followed, viz. the arrival of Dīpaṁkaraçrījñāna (Atīça) in Tibet and the subsequent propagation of Buddhism. In particular we have an enumeration of the texts translated by some of the Lotsavas from the Sanskrit. It may be noted that, with very few exceptions, the texts mentioned belong to the Tantric parts of the Kangyur and Tangyur. Here ends the history proper. It is followed by a list containing the names of all the Paṇḍits and Lotsavas who have acted in Tibet, beginning with Çāntirakṣita and Padmasaṁbhava. With it ends the 3d Chapter (leḥu) of Bu-ton's text: "The History of the Doctrine in Tibet".
The last part is a systematical Index of all the Buddhist literature which has been translated from the Sanskrit by the Lotsavas and Paṇḍits. It is divided into 1. Sūtra Scripture (including the Vinaya, Prajñāpāramitā, Avataṁsaka, Ratnakūṭa, and Sūtra sections of the Kangyur), 2. Sūtra Exegesis, 3. Tantra Scripture, and 4. Tantra Exegesis. This Index, as well as the list of the Lotsavas and Paṇḍits, arranged in the alphabetical order, will form a separate 3d part which is to contain numerous other Indices and Appendices besides.
The part now published, similar to the first, includes a great number of smaller chapters and subdivisions. The system according to which these have been designated, is the same as in the first part, and is directly connected with the latter. A full table of the contents is given at the end. — (Obermiller, introduction, 3–6)
His work has not failed to attract the attention of European scholarship. Wassilieff quotes it in the first volume of his Buddhism, Sarat Candra Das has translated some excerpts out of it. I myself have published a translation in French, in the Muséon 1905 ("Notes de littéature buoddhique. La littérature Yogācāra d'après Bou-ston"),
ston"), of the part devoted to the litterature of the Yogācāra school, and, in English, of the part dealing with the Abhidharma Iitterature of the Sarvāstivādins, included in Prof. Takakusu's work on the Abhidharma Iitterature of the Sarvāstivādins. In the years 1927 and 1928 I have interpreted the work to my pupil E. E. Obermiller making it the subject of our seminary study. He then has made an English translation which was revised by me and is now published, thanks to the kind attention accorded to it by the Heidelberg Society for the Investigation of Buddhist Lore and by its president Professor M. Walleser.
The translation of the first part, now published, was not an easy task, since it consists predominantly of quotations, many of them having the form of mnemonic verse (kārikā's). They had to be identified and their commentaries consulted. With very few exceptions all has been found out by E. E. Obermiller in the Tanjur works. The high merit of this self-denying, absorbing and difficult work will, I have no doubt, be fully appreciated by fellow scholars who have a personal experience of that kind of work.
Budon Rinpoche was a native of Central Tibet. He lived in the years 1290–1364. He consequently belongs to the old school of Tibetan learning, the school which preceded the now dominant Gelugpa sect (the yellow-caps) founded by Tsoṅkhapa. Besides the History he has written many other works. A full block-print edition of all his works in 15 volumes has recently appeared in Lhasa. No copy of it has as yet reached Leningrad. Among his works there is one on logic, Tshad-ma-rnam-ṅes-pai-bsdus-don = Pramāṇa-viniçcaya-piṇḍārtha, with his own commentary. A block-print containing his biography (rnam-thar) is in my possession. It will be analyzed by E. E. Obermiller in the Introduction also dealing with the sources of Tibetan historiography, which will be attached to the translation of the whole work. The Translation is made from the text of the old block-print edition, a copy of which is found in the Asiatic Museum of the Academy of Sciences of the U. S. S. R. (Th. Stcherbatsky, introduction, 3–4)
Notes
- These translations are in need of revision, since there are considerable mistakes in which both translations always agree.
- Bod-Chos-ḥbyuṅ.
There is, however, one subject relating to the spread of Buddhism in Ṭhi-sroṅ-deu-tsen's reign, to which the Tibetan historian devotes his special attention and on which he dwells in detail. This is the strife between two parties into which the Buddhists of Tibet were at that time split. One of these parties consisted of the pupils and followers of Ācārya Śāntirakṣita who professed that form of Mahāyāna Buddhism which was generally acknowledged in India and Nepal, viz. the teaching of the Path to Enlightenment through the practice of meditation connected with the dialectical analysis peculiar to the Mādhyamika school of the Buddhists and with the practice of the six Transcendental Virtues (pāramitā).
The leader of the other party was a Chinese teacher (hwa-śaṅ or ho-shang) known by the Sanskrit name Mahāyānadeva, who preached a doctrine of complete quietism and inactivity. According to him every kind of religious practice, the meditative exercises and all virtuous deeds as well were completely useless and even undesirable: the liberation from the bonds of phenomenal existence was to be attained merely through the complete cessation of every kind of thought and mental activity,—by abiding perpetually in a state analogous to sleep. Bu-ston'"`UNIQ--ref-00000002-QINU`"' relates how this party grew very powerful and found numerous adherents among the Tibetans, how the followers of Śāntirakṣita suffered oppression from it, and how the king who was an adherent of Śāntirakṣita's system, invited Śāntirakṣita's pupil, the teacher Kamalaśīla in order to refute the incorrect teachings of the Chinese party. The dispute between Kamalaśīla and the Chinese Ho-shang in which the latter was defeated is described by Bu-ston'"`UNIQ--ref-00000003-QINU`"' in detail. We read that the leading men of the two parties'"`UNIQ--ref-00000004-QINU`"' assembled in the presence of the king, that the Ho-shang was the first to speak in favour of his theory of quietism and inactivity and was answered by Kamalaśīla who demonstrated all the absurdity of the theses maintained by the Ho-shang and showed that the teachings of such a kind were in conflict with the main principles of Buddhism and were conducive to the depreciation and rejection of the most essential features of the Buddhist Path to Enlightenment. We read further on how the chief adherents of Kamalaśīla'"`UNIQ--ref-00000005-QINU`"' likewise refuted the theories of the Ho-shang, how the latter and his party acknowledged themselves vanquished and were expelled from Tibet by order of the king who prescribed to follow henceforth the Buddhist doctrines that were generally admitted,—the teaching of the six Virtues as regards religious practice and the Mādhvamika system of Nāgārjuna as regards the theory.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000006-QINU`"'
Thus the influence of the Chinese Ho-shang’s teachings over the minds of the Tibetans suffered a complete defeat and with it perhaps some political influence of China.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000007-QINU`"' This is certainly a most important event in the history of Tibetan Buddhism which has been duly appreciated by Bu-ston. It is therefore quite natural that we should be interested in finding out the sources of Bu-ston's historical record. But the text of Bu-ston's History which, as a rule, contains references to the works on the foundation of which it has been compiled, does not give us any information here. At the first glance the account of the controversy looks like the reproduction of an oral tradition and there is nothing that could make us conjecture the presence of a literary work upon which the record could have been founded- The following will show that it has now become possible to trace out this work, to compare with it the account given by Bu-ston and to ascertain its historical importance. (Obermiller, "A Sanskrit MS. from Tibet," 1–3)
A Philosophy of Plants
The philosopher Tomonobu Imamichi (1922–2012) pointed out that most Japanese family crests are based on plant designs, indicating that, compared with cultures that employ dragons and eagles, or lions and tigers in their heraldry, Japanese cultural patterns show a strong tendency toward adaptability and harmony. Plants survive not as individuals but by species adaptation. This means that they grow where their seed randomly falls, existing within a pattern of dramatic change as their branches and leaves grow. Imamichi wrote, "In the very workings of their life, plants are a reiteration of elegant beauty as they bud, bloom, fall, proliferate, fruit, and change color, all within an intense yet inconspicuous struggle for life" (Tōyō no bigaku [Aesthetics of the East], TBS Britannica, 1980). Plants take root in that space where their seed falls and form a community with other plants. They maintain harmony with their surroundings and continually transform themselves, adapting to changes in their environment. As Imamichi stated, the workings of their life are inconspicuous, but there is no doubt a severity of struggle to survive and flourish.
Are Plants and Trees Nonsentient?
Mahayana Buddhism in general does not consider trees and plants to be capable of sensation and, with the exception of the Lotus and Śūraṅgama sutras, does not hesitate to place them on a par with tiles and stones. For example, the Mahāratnakūṭa Sūtra (Sutra of the Great Accumulation of Treasures) says, "Plants and trees, tiles and stones, like shadows, are not sentient" (Mahāratnakūṭa Sūtra, 78, Discourse to Pūrṇa, 17.2.4). Why is this so?
The geographer Yutaka Sakaguchi reports that recent research has shown that from the middle of the third century to around the sixth or seventh century the world experienced severe climate change in the form of cooling, drier conditions (see "Kako ichiman sanzennen no kikō no henka to jinrui no rekishi" [Climate change and the history of human beings
during the past thirteen thousand years], Kōza, bunmei to kankyō, 6: Rekishi to kikō [Lecture series, 6, Civilization and the environment: History and climate] [Asakura Shoten, 1995 (revised edition, 2008)], 1–11). The Mahayana sutras, with their prohibition of meat eating, were compiled at this time. Why this prohibition was added to the small simple meals demanded by asceticism can thus be explained in ecoreligious terms. In all probability, the acceptance of ascetic behavior in relation to food and the rejection of meat by religious practitioners and the societies that supported them derived from severe and long-term food shortages. At such a time, rather than rearing pigs and other animals on plant food and then eating their meat, many more human lives could be sustained by a considerably lesser volume by eating vegetable foodstuffs directly. "Hence, in order to keep both monks and lay followers free from what was deemed unnecessary inconvenience and qualms, the sentience of plants was, by and large, ignored [in the precept against the taking of life]" (Lambert Schmithausen, Buddhism and Nature: The Lecture Delivered on the Occasion of the EXPO 1990 [International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1991], 7).
Plants and the Lotus Sutra
Chapter 5 of the Lotus Sutra, "The Parable of the Herbs," likens the teachings of the Buddha benefiting all beings equally to the rain that falls on all trees, shrubs, herbs, and grasses, enabling them to grow and blossom, producing fruits. This chapter was to have an important influence on the Chinese Tiantai and Japanese Tendai schools of Buddhism. Whereas the Chinese Huayan school held that plants are not sentient and cannot achieve enlightenment, in commentaries such as Fazang's (643–712) Huayanjing tanxuanji (Records of the search for the profundities of the Avataṃsaka Sūtra), Tiantai scholars advocated plants' capability of attaining buddhahood. This must have been because of the image presented in "The Parable of the Herbs." (Read the entire article here)
Une religion comme le bouddhisme est un tout infiniment complexe. Quelque place qu'y tiennent les idées théosophiques, soyons sûrs qu'elles ne la constituent pas tout entière. Elles s'y trouvent amalgamées à des éléments de toute provenance. Est-ce en les isolant artificiellement qu'on les étudiera le mieux dans leur nature et dans leur action ? Ce ne serait ni avantageux, ni même possible. Les contacts qu'elles subissent entraînent pour elles des déterminations dont il faut bien tenir compte : tel le cristal transparent qui se colore par le voisinage d'une fleur d'hibiscus. D'autre part, il serait excessif sous prétexte de théosophie, d'embrasser ici le bouddhisme dans toute son étendue. D'excellents ouvrages, aisément accessibles au public, me permettent de limiter ma tâche sans inconvénient.
Ce que je me propose, c'est d'étudier dans quelles conditions, externes et internes, les idées maîtresses du bouddhisme ont agi sur les esprits ; de quelle manière elles se lient les unes aux autres ; quelle influence elles ont exercée sur la conduite des individus et sur la communauté ; comment elles se sont transformées par le travail même de la pensée ; comment elles ont dévié au contact de doctrines hétérogènes ; à quels excès de théorie et de pratique elles ont parfois abouti. Je ne m'occuperai donc du Bouddha et du Sangha que dans la mesure où la personnalité du maître et l'organisation de l'église sont pour quelque chose dans la direction prise par le travail des âmes religieuses. Quant aux doctrines, je laisserai de côté celles qui n'intéressent pas du tout l'élaboration du salut, et passerai rapidement sur celles qui peuvent être considérées comme la simple application des principes essentiels. Si je ne craignais d'exposer mon livre à de redoutables comparaisons, je dirais que j'ai tenté de mettre en lumière !'« esprit » du bouddhisme, un esprit remarquable à la fois par sa continuité et par ses variations.
Malgré les restrictions que je viens d'indiquer, ce programme, je le crains, paraîtra trop ambitieux. Peutêtre même le trouvera-t-on irréalisable dans les conditions actuelles de la science. Que d'incertitudes, en effet, et que de lacunes dans l'histoire de la pensée bouddhique! Pouvons-nous seulement dater avec quelque approximation les écrits dits canoniques ? N'est-il pas puéril de vouloir expliquer les aspects successifs du bouddhisme sans tenir le plus grand compte de facteurs qui ne sont ni théosophiques, ni même hindous ? On a cherché du côté de la gnose et du manichéisme l'origine de quelques-unes des nouveautés par lesquelles se distinguent les écoles du Grand Véhicule. Si l'on a eu raison l'évolution de la doctrine cesse d'être exclusivement autochtone. Comme, d'ailleurs, l'influence des religions sectaires s'est fait sentir très vite, qu'elle s'est accentuée avec le temps, qu'elle a fini par devenir presque prépondérante, on trouvera l'explication des dernières déviations, non pas sans doute hors de l'Inde, mais hors du bouddhisme, et dans des formations religieuses dont nous savons fort mal l'histoire ancienne. Ces écueils,et d'autres encore, je savais qu'ils étaient semés sur ma route, et j'espère n'avoir jamais oublié leur présence pendant que je travaillais à cet ouvrage. Mais je n'ai pas eu non plus la prétention de résoudre tous les problèmes. Je me tiendrai pour satisfait, si j'ai quelque peu contribué à une plus entière connaissance du bouddhisme. (Oltramare, preface, xiii–xv)
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The dissertation includes four main chapters, these are: I. Zhanran's biography; II. The idea of Buddha-nature in Chinese Buddhism; III. Demonstration of the Buddha-nature of the insentient in Zhanran’s The Diamond Scalpel treatise; IV. Summary.
In the first chapter Zhanran’s life is presented through a translation, comparison and analysis
of the chapters dealing with Zhanran’s life from the biographies of monks written in the Song
Dynasty (960−1279). Biographies besides historical data also contain several miraculous elements, thus, this first chapter also provides a glimpse into the world of Buddhist biographies. This chapter also briefly introduces the reader into the history of Tiantai school before Zhanran, therefore this is placed at the beginning of the dissertation.
Because the main theme of Zhanran’s treatise is the Buddha-nature of the insentient, the translation and analysis of the text is preceded by a chapter on the idea of Buddha-nature, focusing on its apparition, evolution an interpretations in Chinese Buddhism. This chapter is divided into two major parts, the first part gives a presentation of those sūtras and treatises, which had the greatest influence on the formation of Chinese interpretations of the notion. The second part deals with those Chinese traditions and schools, thinkers and ideas, which had great impact on the formation of the Chinese Buddha-nature theory. While presenting certain writings, schools and thinkers a greater emphasis is laid on those ideas, which appear in The Diamond Scalpel, or can be proven to have influenced Zhanran’s philosophy. Thus, both the premises for Zhanran’s conclusion and the ideas to be refuted clear out. The objective of this chapter is to place Zhanran’s work in a greater context, and to determine those antecedents, that lead Zhanran towards the formulation of his ideas.
The third, most important and most extensive chapter is the translation of The Diamond Scalpel, complemented with translations from commentaries written to it, detailed analysis and interpretation of the text divided into sixty separate chapters. One of the most important objectives is to grasp the main ideas, and provide this difficult text a clear and easily understandable interpretation.
The fourth chapter consists of a summary of the main ideas presented in The Diamond Scalpel, and an overall analysis of the text. (Pap, "Theme and Objective of the Research," 1–3)
From this, we can draw the conclusions that for a Tang Dynasty (618–907) monk, trained on the teachings and traditions of a Sinitic school of Buddhism, the title of a Buddhist writing is highly important, for mainly two reasons: (1.) it can bear the very essence, the 'subtle' meaning of the whole work, and (2.) it can serve as an anchor, that bounds it to the 'original' Buddhist teachings, serving as a means of legitimatisation, at the same time. These two aims can be detected in Zhanran's'"`UNIQ--ref-0000119A-QINU`"' 湛然 (711−782) choice of the title for his Diamond Scalpel (Jin’gang bei 金剛錍; T46:1932) treatise. The Diamond Scalpel treatise, in one fascicle, written in his old age, is a relatively short work, compared to his lengthy commentaries, yet well deserves to be considered his most creative, genuine work. The main theme of the treatise is the Tiantai interpretation of the teaching of Buddha-nature, as inherently including insentient realm, as well as all sentient beings. While expounding the topic, and presenting his arguments, the main tenets of the Tiantai school emerge one after the another, offering the reader a complete picture of the self and the world, suffering and the ways to liberation, etc. – i.e. problems of utmost importance for a Buddhist practitioner –, as seen by a Tang Dynasty Buddhist monk. At a first reading, the title of the treatise does not seem to tell us a lot about its content, but taking a closer look, and applying a more careful, meticulous examination, we find that Zhanran's choice of title must have been the result of a thoughtful consideration, for it perfectly suites the above mentioned two criteria. Following Zhiyi’s legacy, Zhanran chooses a title, which 'symbolizes and summarizes' the main issues to be discussed in his treatise. More precisely, first of all, it hides an allusion to a simile from a mahāyāna sūtra (thought to render the words of the Buddha), and thus anchors, bounds the whole work to the 'original' teachings of the Buddha, and secondly, after decoding the symbols and references, and interpreting them in the light of Tiantai philosophy, we find that these three characters can truly be regarded the quintessence of the work, the very argument in support of the theory of Buddha-nature of the insentient. Zhanran, following the example of his great predecessor, Zhiyi, expounds and argues based on the most important texts and tenets of mahāyāna Buddhism, while interpreting, reinterpreting, and often furnishing these with new, ingenious meanings.
First, we are going to examine the provenance and possible interpretations of the title – i.e. the context in which the basic notions appear, before Zhanran's time –, Zhanran's own explanation of the title, i.e. the very first paragraph of his work, and further interpretations of the title (and its explanation) found in later commentaries, written to the treatise, by Tang and Song Dynasty monks. Through this one, particular example we can get a glimpse into the complex process of how Chinese monks interpreted and reinterpreted the texts inherited from India, the way in which through focusing on, and/or consciously selecting certain motifs, similes or even terms, embellished these with new meanings, which were further used as tools to prove their own ideas and theories, as if these were identical with the original teachings of Buddha Śākyamuni. Secondly, we are going to examine the most important arguments Zhanran is using to prove his theory about the Buddha-nature of the insentient. I will argue that these arguments can be grouped around two key concepts, already concealed within the title. (Pap, "Zhanran’s Arguments in Support of his Buddha-Nature Theory," 129–130)
Included is extensive material on the history of faith in Buddhism with the main attention devoted to Ch'an (Zen) and Hua-yen. There are also substantial discussions of Buddhist antecedents to these schools and of the Pure Land School.
This is the first book in English to examine the central role of faith in Mahayana Buddhism. The author's approach develops from his personal experiences as a son (Zen) monk of the Chogye order, which was heavily influenced by the integration of meditation and scriptural study established by Chinul. (Source: Suny Press)
The problem is compounded even further by the existence of one influential school of Buddhism, the Zen (Ch'an) school, not a few of whose teachers have openly insisted on the harmfulness of reading the scriptures for those intent on achieving Enlightenment. For these teachers and their followers, the scriptures might just as well be burned as read.[3]
This is not simply a modern problem; it existed in sixth century China.[4] This was the period that saw the appearance of Treatise on the Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna (hereafter referred to as AFM). Once AFM appeared, it very quickly became popular. There seem to be two reasons for this: first, it satisfied the demand of people who wanted one volume that could comprehensively embrace all Buddhist doctrines; second, it is a non-sectarian text.[5] As a matter of fact, AFM was welcomed not only by non-sectarian people but by sectarian people as well. This occasioned another problem: members of some Buddhist sects who welcomed the appearance of AFM tried to use AFM to glorify their own sects. Many of the traditional commentators betrayed such tendencies, the most famous of these being Fa-tsang (643-712 A.D.), the third patriarch of the Hua-yen school in China.[6] One of his characteristic tactics was to anticipate the attack on his sectarian attitude by his opponents, the adherents of the Fa-hsiang school,[7] by using the doctrine of AFM to justify what was specifically the Hua-yen doctrine.
Fa-tsang's commentaries on AFM exerted a strong influence on his own and succeeding generations, the result being that AFM has sometimes been considered a Hua-yen text.[8] This is certainly unfortunate. But it underscores the hermeneutical problem of how to read a text. Ui Hakuju, one of the most noted of modern Japanese Buddhologists, responded to this problem in his Daijō kishin ron by cautiously suggesting that the text be read apart from its commentaries in order that its real message be grasped.[9] This suggestion is valid only insofar as it screens out those commentaries, such as Fa-tsang's, which already bring a point of view to the text and read the text as confirming that point of view. If, however, the commentary is truly exegetical in nature, then Ui's suggestion is invalid since it cuts off a prospective medium by which one's understanding of the text may be deepened. The commentaries on AFM written by the Korean monk Wǒnhyo (617-686 A.D.) are such a medium.[10]
Wǒnhyo is regarded as one of the three great commentators on AFM; the other two are Hui-yüan (523-592 A.D.) and Fa-tsang (643-712 A.D.).[11] Wǒnhyo's commentaries are very different from Fa-tsang's: Wǒnhyo is emphatic in characterizing AFM as a text embodying a principle by which all sectarian disputes may be harmonized. According to Wǒnhyo's understanding, if one interprets AFM as a sectarian teaching, one will betray the original intent of its author.[12] Unfortunately, in East Asia, including his home country of Korea, Wǒnhyo's commentaries
are simply famous; they are not well-studied.[13] They have generally been neglected in favor of Fa-tsang's.
Wǒnhyo is, undoubtedly, one of the foremost thinkers that Korea has produced; he wrote much else besides his commentaries on AFM. Yet, although he influenced both Chinese and Japanese thinkers,[14] he is almost unknown in the West. This thesis represents a preliminary attempt at remedying this situation. (Park, preface, 2–5)
Notes
- A number of books have been written about the Buddhist canon. For the Pali canon see Maurice Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature, Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1933, especially Vol. II, Section III, pp. 1-423. For the Sanskrit texts see Yamada Ryūjō, Bongo Butten no shobunken, Kyoto: Heirakuji shoten, 1977. For the history of the formation of the original Buddhist texts in general, see Maeda Egaku's Genshi Bukkyō seiten no seiritsushi kenkyū, Tokyo: Sankibo Busshorin, 1964. This
is the most comprehensive book of its kind.
The following books on the Chinese Buddhist canon are reliable: Prabodh Chandra Bagchi, Le Canon Bouddhique en Chine; les Traducteurs et les Traductions, Vols. 1 and 4, Paris: Sino-Indica Publications de l'université de Calcutta, 1927-1938; Paul Demiéville, "Sur les Éditions Imprimées du Canon Chinois," Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient, Tome XXIV, Hanoi, 1924; Ono Gemmyō, "Bukkyō kyōten sōron," vol. 12 of Busshō kaisetsu daijiten, Tokyo: Daitō shuppansha, 1931-1936; Kenneth Ch'en, Buddhism in China {Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 365-386.
- For the schools of Buddhism in China, see Kenneth Ch'en, ibid., pp. 297-364.
- As Yanagida Seizan, one of the most energetic of contemporary Japanese Zen scholars, says in his discussion of the origin of Ch'an Buddhism in China, the early Ch'an masters such as Bodhidharma (arrived in China in 521 A.D.) and Hui-neng (638-713) did not neglect the importance of canonical instruction. The negligence shown towards the canon was a fairly late development in Ch'an Buddhism, after it had become popular and powerful. Extreme condemnation of scriptural studies began with Kung-an (Koan) Ch'an masters such as Ta-hui (1088-1163). See Yanagida Seizan, Zen shisō (Tokyo: Chuo koronsha, 1975), pp. 9-106 and Yanagida Seizan, Shoki Zenshū shisho no kenkyū (Kyoto: Hozokan, 1967), pp. 419-484.
- In the second chapter of AFM, "Reasons for Writing the Treatise," there are two pairs of questions and answers; the second one of them is a discussion of this problem. See T. 1666, vol. 32, p. 575c, lines 7-17. Wǒnhyo discusses this in his commentary also: see T. 1844, vol. 44, p. 205c, line 5 - p. 206a, line 16.
- It is undeniable that AFM became popular very quickly because of the many early records which mention AFM and comrnenbaries on it. However, I disagree with previous scholars such as Mochizuki Shinko and Ui Hakuju about the reasons for its popularity. They claimed that its popularity was due to the fame of Asvaghoa and Paramārtha. This may be true, but it can be only partially true. Many texts bear the names of Aśvaghoṣa and Paramārtha, but none have been as influential as AFM. Therefore, one may say that it was the doctrinal content of AFM which guaranteed its success; only this can explain its prominent historical role in sixth century Chinese Buddhism. Although Wǒnhyo did not doubt the authenticity of the text, he did not discuss the author and translator, whereas Hui-yuan and Fa-tsang did discuss them. See the preface to Mochizuki Shinko's Daijō kishin ron no kenkyū (hereafter referred to as DKK-M) (Tokyo: Kanao bunendo, 1922), pp. 1-5. See also the postface to Ui Hakuju's Daijō kishin ron (hereafter referred to as DK-U) (Tokyo: Iwanami bunko, 1936), pp. 131-132. See also T. 1843 vol. 44, p. 175c, line 11 - p. 176a, line 8 and T. 1846, vol. 44, p. 245c, line 25 - p. 246a, line 8.
- For the nature of Fa-tsang's commentaries, see DK-U, p. 132. An excellent overall survey of commentaries on AFM is given in Mochizuki Shinko's DKK-M, pp. 203-346. Mochizuki's survey includes detailed and annotated explanations of 176 commentaries on AFM. For the most recent
comprehensive survey see Hirakawa Akira's Daijō kishin ron (Tokyo: Daizō shuppan kabushiki kaisha, 1976), pp. 390-413.
- Murakami Senshō gives a good review of the criticism of AFM. See his Daijō kishin ron kōgi (Tokyo: Tōyō daigaku shuppanbu, 1912), pp. 19-31.
- See DK-U, pp. 138-139.
- See ibid., p. 140.
- Wǒnhyo wrote nine commentaries on AFM; only two are extant: T. 1844 and T. 1845 (see Part Two, "Introduction to Translation"). For the titles of the seven missing commentaries see the third section of Part One, "Wǒnhyo's Bibliography."
- Almost all the books and records about AFM mention the three great commentaries. The earliest attested one to do so is the preface by the Japanese monk Kakugen. It is included in T. 1844, vol. 44, p. 202a, lines 3-4. See my translation of Kakugen's preface in the Appendix.
- T. 1845, vol. 44, p. 226b, line 12.
- Many books and papers have been published about Wǒnhyo, but few of them are critical. There have been three translations of Wǒnhyo's commentaries into modern Korean, but none of the three is reliable. See Note 3 to the translation in Part Two.
- See Motoi Nobuo's paper, "Shiragi Gangyo no denki ni tsuite," Ōtani gakuhō XLI, No. 1 (1961), p. 37.
Volume 12
The Sutra of Queen Śrīmālā of the Lion's Roar
The Sutra of Queen Śrīmālā of the Lion's Roar, generally known by its abbreviated title of Śrīmālā-sūtra, was expounded by Śrīmālā, the daughter of King Prasenajit of Śrāvasti, under the inspiration of Śākyamuni. Its important subjects include the theory of the “One True Vehicle” and the dharmakāya. Distinguished from other sūtras with the leading role played by a woman, and with the guarantee given by Śākyamuni therein, the text celebrates the potential of all people to become Buddhas and provides textual authority to counteract cultural gender bias.
In Japan this sūtra is further distinguished by the commentary (Taishō 106) attributed to Prince Shōtoku, included in his “Commentaries on Three Sūtras” (Jp. San-gyō gi-sho).
Source:
Skt. Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanāda-sūtra, translated into the Chinese by Guṇabhadra as Shengman shizihou yisheng defang bianfang guang jing (勝鬘師子吼一乘大方便方廣經). 1 fascicle.
Taishō 475
Volume 14
The Vimalakīrti Sutra
In The Vimalakīrti Sutra the protagonist is a layman by the name of Vimalakīrti, well-versed in the profundities of Mahāyāna Buddhism. He happens to fall ill, and the sūtra starts from the point where Śākyamuni, hearing of his illness, asks his disciples to go to visit him. However, since each of the disciples has in the past been got the better of by Vimalakīrti in some way or other, they all refuse to go; so in the end it is Mañjuśrī who agrees to visit him in their stead. As a result a discussion on the profound teachings of the Mahāyāna unfolds between Vimalakīrti and Mañjuśrī. This sūtra is held in high regard in Japan, not least because Prince Shōtoku included a commentary on it (Taishō 107) in his Commentaries on Three Sūtras (San-gyō-gi-sho). Beyond that, the text has considerable appeal due to its dramatic contents, and is an important key to an understanding of the profound thought of Mahāyāna Buddhism.
Source:
Skt. Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra. Translated into the Chinese by Kumārajīva as Weimojie suoshuo jing (維摩詰所説經). 3 fascicles. (Source: BDK America)
Because of the number of citations and references which are retained in Sanskrit Buddhist texts, the Śrīmālādevī sūtra seems to have been widely circulated throughout India. This text is
quoted in the Ratnagotravibhāga-mahāyānottara-tantra śāstra (The Supreme Exposition of Mahāyāna: A Commentary on the Jewel Lineage)[1] and the Śikṣāsamuccaya (A Compendium on Instruction)[2] with allusions made in the Laṅkāvatāra sūtra[3] and the Mahāyāna sūtrālaṁkāra (The Ornament of the Mahāyāna sūtras).[4] The Ch'eng wei-shih lun (Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi) by Hsüan-tsang also quotes from the Śrīmālādevī sūtra but does not identify the sūtra by name.[5]
According to the Sung kao seng chuan[6] Bodhiruci used a Sanskrit text of the Śrīmālādevī sūtra for reference in translating the text into Chinese. From the above evidence, it may be concluded that a Sanskrit original of the Śrīmālādevī sūtra did exist and that this text was part of the Indian Buddhist tradition.
The classical Chinese text is extant in two recensions:
1) Sheng-man shih-tzu-hou i-ch'eng ta-fang-pien fang-kuang ching (1 ch.) (T.v.12, no. 353, pp. 217-223), translated by Guṇabhadra (394-468) in 435.
2) Sheng-man-fu-jen hui which is the forty-eighth assembly in the Ratnakūṭa anthology (Ta-pao chi ching) (T.v.11, no. 310, pp. 672-678), translated by Bodhiruci[7] (572-727) of T'ang between 706 and 713.
Because Guṇabhadra's translation is almost three hundred years older than Bodhiruci's, it has been chosen as the basic text in order to trace the development of Tathāgatagarbha thought in its original form. Bodhiruci's translation is used when Guṇabhadra's translation is ambiguous and when differences in interpretation are indicated.
The Tibetan recension, Hphags-pa lha-mo dpal-phreṅ gi seṅ-geḥi sgra shes-bya-ba theg-pa chen-poḥi mdo (Tōhoku no. 92, Bkaḥ-ḥgyur), which is part of the Ratnakūṭa anthology, will not be used. When significant differences between the Chinese and Tibetan recensions occur, the Tibetan text will be noted also.[8]
The commentaries which are extant are few and only in Chinese and Japanese. There are no Tibetan commentaries now extant, which discuss only the Śrīmālādevī sūtra.[9] According to the Kao seng chuan,[10] immediately after the translation of the Śrīmālādevī sūtra many commentaries were composed by monks who had studied and memorized the Śrīmālādevī sūtra. These texts, now lost, were dated between the fifth and sixth centuries A.D. According to Chi-tsang's Sheng-man ching pao-k'u, monks studied and composed commentaries on the Śrīmālādevī sūtra from the North-South dynastic periods through the Sui (i.e. from approximately 440-618 A.D.).
The major commentaries[11] extant in Chinese are:
1) Hsieh-chu sheng-man ching (T.v.85, no. 2763) - Although the commentator is unknown, this text was probably the composition of a noble woman of Northern Wei, attested to by the calligraphy and literary style of the Tun-huang manuscript. Completed before 500 A.D., it is the oldest extant commentary on the Śrīmālādevī sūtra.[12] Only Chapter 5, "Ekayāna" is discussed.
2) Sheng-man ching i-chi (2 ch.) (Dainihon zokuzōkyō, v.1, no. 30-1) by Hui-yüan, (523-692) of Sui - Only the first half of the text is extant, corresponding to the first four chapters of the Śrīmālādevī sūtra.
3) Sheng-man ching pao-k'u, (3 ch.) (T.v.37, no. 1744) by Chi-tsang (549-623) of Sui.
4) Sheng-man ching shu-chi, (2 ch.) (Dainihon zokuzōkyō v.1, no. 30-4) by K'uei-chi (632-682) of T'ang.
5) Sheng-man ching su-i ssu-ch'ao, (6 ch.) (Dainihon bukkyō zensho, v.4) by Ming-k'ung[13] of T'ang in 772.
The major commentaries extant in Japanese are:
1) Shōmagyō gisho (1 ch.) (T.v.56, no. 2184) attributed to Prince Shōtoku (573-621) but probably the composition of a North Chinese Buddhist scholar.[14]
2) Shōmangyō shosho genki, (18 ch.) (Dainihon bukkyō zensho, v.4) by Gyōnen (1240-1321). First five chüan are missing. The extant text begins with the chapter "The Ten Ordination Vows".
3) Shōman-shishikugyō kenshūshō (3 ch.) (Nihon daizōkyō, v. 5; Dainihon bukkyō zensho, v.4) by Fūjaku (1707-1781)
The Sheng-man ching pao k'u and the Shōmangyō gisho are the two primary commentaries upon which the present study's interpretation of the Śrīmālādevī sūtra is based. These two commentaries have been selected because the former, written by a San-lun master, interprets Tathāgatagarbha from a Mādhyamikan perspective whereas the latter is representative of the North Chinese scholars' interpretation and frequently overshadows the sūtra itself in popularity, particularly in Japan. The Sheng-man ching i-chi and the Hsieh-chu sheng-man ching are used as references in analyzing Chapters 4 and 5, "The Acceptance of the true Dharma" and the "One Vehicle" respectively of the Śrīmālādevī sūtra.
In Chapter One, a historical analysis will be attempted, suggesting the place and time of composition on the basis of external and internal evidence now available. In Chapter Two, the evolution of the Tathāgatagarbha will be outlined, based upon the first two Tathāgatagarbhan texts, the Tathāgatagarbha sūtra and the Pu tseng pu chien ching, which predate the Śrīmālādevī sūtra.[15]
In Chapter Three the characteristic format of the
Śrīmālādevī sūtra is summarized in relation to the Tathāgatagarbha sūtra and the Pu tseng pu chien. In Chapter Four the Tathāgatagarbha as presented in the Śrīmālādevī sūtra is analyzed with relation to the text as a whole, and in Chapter Five the annotated translation of the Śrīmālādevī-siṁhanāda sūtra is presented with notations of key differences between the two Chinese recensions and with references made to the two commentaries, Sheng-man ching pao-k'u and Shōmangyō gisho, and to the Sanskrit fragments noted above.
Appendix I is an attempt to lay the groundwork for a methodology of Buddhist studies which would provide a foundation for the skills needed for a critical analysis and interpretation of Buddhist phenomena. Appendix II is an annotated bibliography for studying the Śrīmālādevī-siṁhanāda sūtra. Appendix I is admittedly limited and will provide only the most general outline of the requisite methodological procedure in analyzing a Buddhist text. (Paul, introduction, 1–6)
Notes
- There are two English translations of the Ratnagotravibhāga-mahāyānottara-tantra śāstra: E. E. Obemiller, The Sublime Science of the Great Vehicle to Salvation Being a Manual of Buddhist Monism (Rome: Acta Orientalia, 1932), (Shanghai reprint: 1940) and Jikido Takasaki, A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra): Being a Treatise on the Tathāgatagarbha Theory of Mahāyāna Buddhism (Rome: Series Orientale Rome XXIII, 1966). The Sanskrit text of the Ratnagotra-vibhāga-mahāyānottara-tantra śāstra, ed., by E. R. Johnston (Patna: Bihar Society, 1950) cites the Śrīmālādevī sūtra on pp. 3, 12, 15, 19, 20, 22, 30, 33, 34, 36, 37, 45, 50, 55, 56, 59, 72, 73, 74, 76, and 79. A portion of these Sanskrit fragments have been noted below, in the translation, wherever differences or ambiguities in the Chinese recensions occur.
- Cf. Çikshāsamuccaya (A Compendium on Buddhist Teaching, ed. by Cecil Bendall (St. Petersburg: Imperial Academy of Sciences, (1897-1902), vol. I of Bibliotheca Buddhica, reprinted by Indo-Iranian Journal (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1957), pp. 42 and 43.
- Cf. Laṅkāvatāra sūtra, ed. by Bunyiu Nanjio, (Second edition, Kyoto: Otani University Press, 1956), p. 222 line 19 and p. 223 line 4.
- Cf. Mahāyāna sūtrālaṁkāra, ed. by Sylvain Lévi (Paris: 1907), (Shanghai reprint : 1940), Tome 1 (XI, 59), p. 70. The cited passage, attributed to the Śrīmālādevī sūtra, could not be found in either Chinese recension. Lévi also was unable to find the passage but does allude to the citation as being in the Çikshāsamuccaya, ed. by Cecil Bendall, op. cit., but these two citations are not of the same passage.
- The following citations are quoted in the Ch'eng wei-shih lun, translated by Hsüan-tsang (T.v.31, no. 1585, p. 1-60): (The remainder of this note is handwritten in Chinese and is unavailable.)
- (The first part of this note is handwritten in Chinese and is unavailable.) In the second year of T'ang emperor Chung-tsung in the reign of Shen-lung (706) he (Bodhiruci) returned to the capital (Loyang) to Chao ch'ung-fu temple to translate the Mahāratnakūṭa anthology. This anthology bad forty-nine old and new assemblies, totaling 120 ch., which were finished in the fourth month, eighth day of the second year of Hsun-t'ien (713). In the translation hall, the monks Ssu-chung and the Indian director Iśara (?) translated the Sanskrit: while the Indian monks Prajñāgupta (?) and Dharma were consulted concerning the Sanskrit meaning." (T.v.50, no. 2061, p. 720b)
The Sung kao seng chuan, 30 ch., was compiled by Chih-lun and Tsang-ning of the Sung dynasty during the period from the beginning of the T'ang dynasty until 967 according to Ui Hakuju, Bukkyō jiten (A Buddhist Dictionary), (Tokyo: Daitō shuppansha, 1971), p. 654 and until 988 according to Nakamura Hajime, Shin-bukkyō jiten (The New Buddhist Dictionary), (Tokyo: Seishin shobō, 1972), p. 329. - According to the Sung kao seng chuan, op. cit., (p. 720c) Bodhiruci died in the fifteenth year of K'ai-yuan (727) of T'ang at the age of 156.
- The differences noted between the Chinese and Tibetan recensions are based upon the Shōmangyō hōgatsu dōji shomongyō (Kyoto: Kōkyō shoin, 1940) by Tsukinowa Kenryū.
- Tibetan commentaries on the Ratnagotravibhāga do interpret the passages which cite the Śrīmālādevī sūtra. These are not discussed within the present study.
- Kokuyaku-issaikyō hōshaku-bu shichi, Ono Masao (gen. ed.) (Tokyo: Daitō shuppansha, 1958), p. 84 lists the monks who attempted to write commentaries now lost. The Kao seng chuan, compiled by Hui-chao of the Liang dynasty, is the record of approximately 253 eminent monks from 67 A.D. through 519 A.D. Cf. Ui, Shin-bukkyō jiten, op. cit., p. 303.
- For a complete listing of all commentaries in both Chinese and Japanese, extant and no longer extant, see below - Appendix II, Annotated Bibliography.
- Fujieda Akira, "Hokucho ni okeru Shōmangyō no tenshō" in Tōhō gakuhō, v.XL, 1973, p. 334. (Journal of the Institute of Humanities) (Jimbun Kagaku kenkyūsho) (Kyoto University).
- According to the Bussho kaisetsu daijiten, Ono Masao {gen.ed.) (Tokyo: Daitō shuppansha, 1966), vol. V, p. 350, this text was composed by both Prince Shōtoku and Ming-k'ung.
- Prince Shōtoku most probably did not compose the Shōmangyō gisho since many of the texts which the Gisho cites were not known to Prince Shōtoku but were introduced to Japan at a much later date. For the transmission of the Chinese commentaries on the Śrīmālādevī-siṁhanāda sūtra, see "Hokucho ni okeru Shōmangyō", op. cit. For the "original" Gisho, composed by a Chinese scholar of the North-South dynastic period, residing in North China, see "Shōman gisho hongi" in Shōtoku taishi kenkyū, v. 5 (Osaka: Shitennoji Joshi Daigaku, 1973) by Koizumi Enjun in which the original Chinese commentary is edited and later almost entirely copied in the Shōmangyō gisho.
The research on these commentaries at the time of this writing has been undertaken by members of the Jimbun Kagaku kenkyusho who are affiliated with Kyoto University. From analyzing the Tun-huang manuscripts, two very similar hypotheses have been developed: a) The Gisho itself was written by a Chinese scholar, or b) The original for the Shōmangyō gisho, viz. Shōman gisho hongi (or, Sheng-man i-su ben-i), was composed by a Northern Chinese scholar and later almost entirely interpolated into the Shōmangyō gisho by Prince Shōtoku or one of his followers. - The analysis of Tathāgatagarbha was undertaken in consultation with Professors Yuichi Kajiyama, Chairman of Buddhist Studies, Kyoto University, and Gadjin Nagao, Professor Emeritus in Buddhist Studies, Kyoto University.
compassion on a nearly unthinkable scale?"
This thesis explores the thought of one of Tibet's preeminent scholars, 'Jam mgon 'Ju Mi pham rnam rgyal (1846-1912), focusing on one of his most important texts, the Precious Lamp of Certainty. The critical philosophical traditions of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism inculcate a developmental or gradualist interpretation of the path towards enlightenment based on philosophical study and critical reasoning. The Precious Lamp of Certainty uses critical philosophical methods to establish the viability of the Great Perfection (rdzogs chen), a philosophical and meditative oriented towards subitism or sudden enlightenment.
For over thirty years I have been encountering a motif or set of motifs in Japanese culture that is, outside of folklore and the children's story, virtually unheard of in European literature. Japanese literature and theater are rife with stories in which the protagonists are not human but are, rather, plants, trees, animals, or supernatural beings. For many Westerners, such tales seem indicative of some kind of arrested development in the Japanese psyche, as if their culture had failed to become modern or, worse, "grow up."
When I ask my Japanese colleagues about this, most see no problem at all: both Shinto and Buddhism acknowledge that sentience can exist across a broad spectrum of life, from the simplest organic structures to supernatural entities that, though invisible, may direct our lives in ways we still don’t understand. Arguably, the Japanese themselves feel a kinship with these other entities to a degree that many people in Europe or North America do not, though such a sensibility is common among indigenous peoples around the world. As unique as they are, human beings do not occupy any God-given, privileged place in this scheme. Th e word animism is brought out to explain much of this, though the term itself is vaguely used.
I began to realize that a radically different metaphysical construct of the world gives rise to a distinctive poetics and dramaturgy, and that typical EuroAmerican critical tools fail to adequately interpret even Japanese discursive texts, to say nothing of many of their greatest works of poetry, fiction, and drama. (Poulton, "Flowers of Sentience," 20) (Read the entire article here)
The Samdhinirmochana Sutra demonstrates how our common modes of viewing reality and our habitual ways of living are fundamentally mistaken. It details how the full force of our mental and physical faculties can be harnessed for the task of clearing up the ignorance that clouds the continuum of every being who is not a Buddha, describing in detail the views, stages, and practices necessary for this transformation.
This Sutra presents the Buddha's dialogues with ten great Bodhisattvas on such topics as ultimate reality, base-consciousness, the threefold character of phenomena, the teachings of definitive meaning, the ten stages of the Bodhisattva Path and the six perfection, and the union of wisdom and compassion at the Buddha level. Read, studied, outlined, and meditated upon, this Sutra can reveal the architecture of enlightenment and open awareness to the profound and expansive vision that informs the third turning teachings. Correctly understood, it can guide the reader on a path that leads to mental balance, insight into the view of sunyata, and deep commitment to work selflessly for the benefit of others. To encourage students to investigate the text more closely, this publication contains the complete typeset Tibetan text on facing pages, extensive notes, glossary, and index. (Source: Dharma Publishing)
In the second part is reprinted the Sanskrit text of Maitreya's Uttaratantra (Ratnagotravibhāga). The third part includes corrections and emendations suggested by Jikido Takasaki in the Sanskrit text in the light of Tibetan and Chinese versions. The fourth part is an English translation of the text from its Tibetan version by E. Obermiller.
This book is a radical departure from the traditional interpretations of Buddhism and the Mādhyamika philosophy in particular. It aims at reviving
philosophy as cultural activity, a path to enlightenment and spiritual discipline. (Source: Exotic India)
Pérez-Remón's book is analytical in nature, and its immediate aim is to provide an interpretative study of the anattā doctrine as it appears in the earlier parts of the Pali canon, namely the Nikaya literature. He describes the religious views elaborated in these contexts as a soteriology, that is to say a system of moral training which considers salvation to be its prime goal. Buddhist writings on the self, he argues, are not as clear and unambiguous as is often supposed. He does not, in particular, believe that one could regard them in a purely negative light, after the manner of certain Theravada exponents. The use and the import of "self" (attā) and "non-self" (anattā) are of course central to this study. In order to facilitate his inquiry into these key terms, he introduces some important distinctions which appear for the most part to be philosophical in nature. First, there is the distinction between the self in its existential and metaphysical signification; and second, between two senses of the term non-self, one qualified and the other absolute. Previous interpretations of the anattā doctrine have not revolved around distinctions of this kind. Perez-Remon, however, is of the view that it is necessary to focus on them in order to gain a true insight into early Buddhist thinking on the nature and existence of the self.
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La question n'est pas nouvelle; plusieurs fois déjà elle a été étudiée, et diverses solutions lui ont été données. Kern, dans son Histoire du bouddhisme dans l'Inde (1), rejetant l'opinion communément admise en Extrême-Orient, plaça Vasubandhu au VIe siècle de notre ère. Buhler (2) essaya vainement de le ramener au IVe : la thèse de Kern conserva la faveur des indianistes. En 1890, M. Sylvain Lévi, dans son remarquable ouvrage sur Le théâtre indien (3), tentait d'établir que la période d'activité de Vasubandhu couvrait toute la première moitié du VIe siècle ; et dans une note sur La date de Vasubandhu (4), il la reportait même jusqu'au milieu et à la fin de ce siècle. Depuis lors à diverses reprises, notamment dans ses Donations religieuses des rois de Valabhī (5) et dans ses Notes chinoises sur l'Inde parues ici même (6), il s'est efforcé d'étayer sa thèse de nouvelles considérations. M. Takakusu Junjirō, après avoir proposé les limites de 450–550 pour l'« àge moyen » (7) dans lequel Yi-tsing range Vasubandhu et Asaṅga, essaya ensuite de les préciser davantage en ce qui concerne le premier et d'établir qu'il avait vécu de 420 à 500 environ de notre ère (8). En 1908, M. Wogihara (9) démontrait en détail ce que les anciens catalogues chinois du Tripiṭaka, Nei tien lou, K'ai-yuan lou, etc., des écrivains comme Touen-louen des T'ang dans son Yeou-kia louen ki (1), еt M. Nanjio Bunyu (2) avaient déjà dit sommairement, à savoir qu'un ouvrage d'Asaṅga, le Yogācāryabhūmi çāstra (3), avait été partiellement traduit en chinois par Dharmarakṣa entre 414 et 421, soit dès le commencement du Ve siècle (4).
Enfin dans l'introduction de sa traduction du Mahāyāna-Sutrālaṃkāra (5) parue en 1911, M. S. Lévi, abandonnant sa première opinion, écrit à propos d'Asaṅga : « Son activité couvre toute la première moitié du Ve siècle, en débordant de part et d'autre sur les deux extrémités de cette période. » C'est peutêtre un peu long, car si Asaṅga a vécu soixante-quinze ans, les documents à notre connaissance nous disent qu'il chercha sa voie un certain temps. N'oublions pas d'ailleurs que le Yogācāryabhūmi çāstra, l'œuvre maîtresse d'Asaṅga, est de dimensions considérables: la traduction chinoise compte 100 kiuan. Son importance dogmatique n'est pas moindre. Il est l'expression d'une pensée maîtresse d'elle-mème, qui a dépassé la période des incertitudes et des tàtonnements. Il est assez peu vraisemblable, mème sans tenir compte des indications données par Paramārtha dans sa vie de Vasubandhu, qu'il ait été écrit par un tout jeune homme. En tout cas, quelque différence d'àge qu'on veuille admettre entre Asaṅga et Vasubandhu, — et il faut tenir compte de l'existence d'un troisième frère, Viriñcivatsa (6) — celui-ci, bien qu'il ait vécu quatre-vingts ans, n'aurait pu, dans ces conditions, dépasser ni mème atteindre la fin du Ve siècle.
D'une manière générale, il semble que dans les études qui ont porté sur ce sujet, quelques documents aient été ignorés et que d'autres aient été délibérément écartés de la discussion comme douteux. En bonne logique, ce simple doute qui ne parait pas avoir jamais été sérieusement éclairci, suffirait à enlever toute sécurité aux conclusions que l'on a cru pouvoir formuler sans en tenir compte, ou si l'on préfère, elles ne sauraient ètre que provisoires tant que la menace qu'il laisse planer sur elles n'a pas été définitivement écartée. La question me parait donc devoir ètre reprise, les documents déclarés douteux soumis à un nouvel examen, et mis en œuvre aussi ceux qui n'ont pas encore été utilisés. Je n'ai pas d'ailleurs la prétention d'ètre complet. C'est à peu près uniquement à la première série, (missing characters), du Supplément du Tripiṭaka de Kyōto, œuvres hindoues et chinoises, que sont empruntés les textes qu'on trouvera au cours de cette étude. Les quelque 700 fascicules déjà parus de cette admirable publication, d'une importance capitale pour les études bouddhiques, en contiennent sans doute d'autres encore, qu'une recherche plus approfondie et plus complète ferait découvrir. Je n'ai pu que feuilleter les œuvres qui m'ont paru devoir ètre les plus intéressantes pour mon sujet par leur date, leur auteur ou leur genre. (Péri, preliminary remarks, 339–41)
Notes
1. T. II, p. 414; Annales du Musée Guimet, t. XI, p. 450; il parle principalement d'Asaṅga, et se basant sur la date de l'avènement de Çīladitya (610, propose les dates de 485 à 560. C'est évidemment à cet ouvrage que la Chronology of India de Mrs. Mabel Duff les emprunte, et non au Buddhismus de Vassilieff, auquel elle renvoie. Celui-ci ne dit rien de tel; si je ne me trompe, il donne seulement la date bouddhiste de 900 ans, dont je parlerai plus loin.
2. Die indischen Inschriften und das Alter der indischen Kunst-Poesie, dans Sitzungsberichte der Kais. Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien, 1890, p. 79 sqq.
3. Cf. I, 165, et II, 35.
4. Journal Asiatique, 1890, II, p. 552–553.
5. Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Hautes-Etudes. Sciences religieuses, vol. VII. Etudes de critique et d'histoire, p. 97.
6. La date de Candragomin. BEFEO, III (1903), 47-49.
7. A Record of the Buddhist religion.... by I-tsing, p. VIII.
8. La Sāṃkhyakārikā étudiée à la lumière de sa version chinoise, BEFEO, IV (1904), p. 37-56; et A study of Paramārtha's life of Vasubandhu and the date of Vasubandhu, dans Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1905.
9. Asaṅga's Bodhisattvabhūmi, ein dogmatischer Text der Nordbuddhisten, Leipzig. B. E. F. E.-O. T. XI. —22.
1. Grand ouvrage en 48 k., publié dans le supplément au Tripiṭaka de Kyoto, 1re
série, boites LXXV, fasc. 4 et 5, et LXXVI, fasc. 1 à 4. Le passage cité se trouve boite LXXV, fasc. 4, p. 308.
2. Cf. Nanjio, Catalogue, nos 1083, 1086, etc.
3. Nanjio, Catalogue. no 1170.
4. Le canon chinois contient sept ou huit traductions partielles de cet ouvrage, faites à des époques parfois très voisines les unes des autres, sous des titres différents ; encore n'avons-nous pas toutes celles qui le furent: le K'ai-yuan lou, k. 12, en cite une dizaine pour le mème texte. Le fait qu'il en existait des extraits si nombreux, assez différents pour que des contemporains les traduisissent séparément à quelques années de distance, permet de croire qu'un intervalle assez long sépare la composition de l'ouvrage des premières traductions d'extraits faites en Chine.
5. B. E. H. E. Sciences historiques et philologiques, fasc. 190, p. *2.
6. (Characters not available). Watters, On Yuan Chwang's travels, I, p. 210, propos Bilindibhava qui paraît inadmissible. Bilindi est inconnu, tandis que viriñci est employé dans la composition de plusieurs noms ; bhava ne concorde pas avec le sens de « fils, enfant », que Paramārtha attribue aux deux dernières syllabes et qu'il expose avec beaucoup de précision, représente d'ailleurs un mot à ancienne finale dentale; quant à (missing character), c'est sùrement ici une simple faute de copiste, très fréquente du reste pour (missing character).
There is no traditional rubric of tathāgatagarbha scriptures, though modem scholars (e.g. Takasaki, 1974) have treated several scriptures as belonging to a thematic class, namely the ;;Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta, the Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanādasūtra, the (Mahāyāna) Mahaaparinirvāṇamahāsūtra, the Mahāmeghasūtra, the *Mahābherīhārakasūtra, and the Mahāyāna Aṅgulimālīya (or Aṅgulimālīyasūtra). This classification is based in the first instance on the use of these and related works as proof texts in the Indian treatise Ratnagotravibhāga (Mahāyānottaratantra). The category is thus in some sense conceptually coherent even in an Indian context. Moreover, many of these texts take on a very significant role in East Asia where, again, they are often appealed to in various groupings.
The notion of tathāgatagarbha (embryo of the tathāgatas), a Mahāyāna innovation, signifies the presence in every sentient being of the innate capacity for buddhahood. Although different traditions interpret it variously, the basic idea is either that all beings are already awakened, but simply do not recognize it, or that all beings possess the capacity, and for some the certainty, of attaining buddhahood, but adventitious defilements (āgantukakleśa) for the moment prevent the realization of this potential. (Radich, "Tathāgatagarbha Sūtras," 261)
East Asian Buddhism has developed a series of concepts that
refer to the realm of the nonsentients-material objects and entities devoid of a conscious mind-which constitute and furnish the material space where both sentient beings in the Six Destinations (rokudō or rokushu) and buddhas live and operate. In particular, hijō or mujō (nonsentients) and kikai (realm of objects) refer to the milieu of buddhas and sentient beings. They are therefore related to such concepts as ujō (sentient beings), shujō (living beings), shujōkai (realm of sentient beings) and bukkai (realm of the buddhas). On the other hand, ehō, which literally means "karmic support," is the material environment (space and circumstances with the related set of objects) in which sentient beings find themselves as a consequence of karmic retribution. This notion is related to that of shōbō, "karmic retribution proper," the particular body-mind complex that forms the subjectivity of a sentient being as a result of karma.
In Japan, terms referring to materiality and the environment are considered synonymous with more concrete expressions such as sōmoku kokudo (plants and the territory), sōmoku kasen gareki (plants, rivers, bricks, and stones), or more simply sōmoku (plants). This synonymity is important to recognize because in most medieval doctrinal tracts a term such as sōmoku did not refer literally to "plants" only but rather to the entire realm of the non-sentients. Most often this extended to inanimate objects of any kind, including man-made artifacts.2 Therefore, as we will see in the course of this book, "nature" is not always an accurate rendition of the doctrinal contents of these concepts.
Japanese authors have usually studied the Buddhist philosophy of objects as a purely doctrinal matter isolated from larger social and ideological issues. Most of them consider it the manifestation in Buddhist terms of an ahistorically understood Shintō animism that is believed to permeate the Japanese cultural tradition. In some cases, this is related to a vague environmental concern supposedly generated by such animism. One of the goals of the present study is to formulate a critique of such interpretations.
I will address here the Buddhist discourse of the nonsentients from the perspective of an intellectual history open to the field of
cultural studies, which I understand as a clearinghouse of tools and approaches useful in comprehending the workings of a culture. Particular emphasis will be placed on the contexts of the source material relating to the inanimate world and the processes of signification they generated. One of the problems with received
scholarship on the relationships among Buddhism, plants, and objects is over-specialization and excessive compartmentalization, which prevents it from addressing the discourse from a multidisciplinary perspective. Most studies consist of philological and doctrinal discussions of elite texts almost completely isolated
from their shifting contexts of production and interpretation. Other scholars address ideas and practices on a "folk" level, but largely ignore their doctrinal foundations. One notable exception is Taira Masayuki, who has indicated that medieval prohibitions against cutting trees issued by religious institutions were in fact attempts to apply Buddhist ethical precepts to the fields of economy and power relations.3 However, even Taira failed to connect such prohibitions to the Buddhist discourse on nonsentients and related treatments of materiality as part of a larger cultural picture.
Ecological and environmental concerns are often mentioned
in contemporary literature on plants becoming buddhas. In this monograph, Japanese Buddhist ecology is understood as a set of discursive practices related to the definition, interpretation, and uses of the environment (kikai, ehō) of sentient beings and the objects inhabiting it. Thus, whenever I refer to "ecology" I do so with this larger meaning in mind. This meaning is closely related to economy, politics, and ideology, and is not the result of a supposed "love for nature," as most authors suggest. I will show that Buddhist doctrines on plants constitute in fact a discourse on the material environment, its status and its functions. Such a discourse was articulated with respect to three orders of significance, which I define as ecosophia, ecognosis, and ecopietas. Ecosophia refers to standard Buddhist doctrines denying the nonsentients the possibility of becoming buddhas.4 With ecognosis I indicate Tendai and Shingon initiatory doctrines on the absolute and unconditioned nature of the nonsentients. Finally, ecopietas has to do with popular, widespread beliefs and attitudes about the sacredness of the natural world and material objects in general.
The medieval Japanese discourse on the material environment addresses a number of social concerns, such as the status of the members of the initiatory lineages producing these doctrines, the ontology of social order, the control of the material world of the nonsentients, and the distribution of its wealth. As such, doctrines on the Buddha-nature of plants played an important ideological role in the creation of a vision of order and of power relations in
society. We will see that this Buddhist discourse was not a mere doctrinal curiosity or a manifestation of an animistic love for nature. Rather, it went far beyond Buddhological and soteriological issues, with important practical consequences. This was particularly the case in the arenas of social ideology and economics, and
influenced the ways in which religious institutions defined themselves and their own properties.
The three chapters that compose this book address different
but related subjects. Chapter One presents the main doctrinal and philosophical aspects of the status of nonsentients and objects in general in Japan. I begin with an excursus on Chinese treatments of the subject, which constituted the background to subsequent Japanese interventions. Then, I introduce the two main forms of Japanese ecognosis, those developed within the Tendai and Shingon traditions, through a discussion of the most significant texts on plants becoming buddhas. Chapter Two discusses "popular" discourses and practices concerning trees as instances of ecopietas. I attempt to show that ecopietas-like attitudes, rather than being a mere manifestation of primordial and Shinto animistic beliefs, were also the result of struggles and negotiations between Buddhist institutions supported by the state and local social structures or life-styles. Chapter Three deals with the ideological effects of the doctrines on plants becoming buddhas. There I criticize received ideas that such doctrines are manifestations of a typically and uniquely Japanese attitude towards nature and the environment, rooted in an essentially ahistorical vision of Shinto. In particular, I discuss a number of cases of prohibitions against cutting trees issued by religious
institutions in medieval Japan: their rhetoric as well as their historical and social contexts show that religious institutions were interested in trees not particularly out of environmental concerns (even though those were present), but in their attempt to establish their own social role and influence. In this sense, the theme of plants becoming buddhas becomes a metaphor for larger issues, such as the relations between religious institutions and the state, and ideas of social order and domination. (Rambelli, introduction, 1–4)
Notes:
1. Throughout the book, "Buddha" (capitalized) will be used as a proper noun to refer to a specific Buddha, whereas "buddha" or "buddhas" (lower case) will indicate a general condition as a result of certain soteriologic practices.
2. The role of plants as objects is particularly evident in the art form known as ikebana, in which vegetal elements are isolated from their contexts to form examples of abstract expressIonism that point to the nature of the vegetal as object. It is also seen in premodern iron sculptures representing trees and branches, known as tetsuju (iron trees).
3. Taira Masayuki, Nihon chūsei no shakai to bukkyō, 1992, pp. 247-249.
4. The term "ecosophia" was first used by Félix Guattari in his Les trois écologies, 1989. I employ it in a different way.
The concept of the Buddha's real or essential nature is referred to by (or better: rests upon) many different Sanskrit terms - e.g. (tathāgata-)dhātu, (buddha-)gotra, (tathāgata-)garbha, dharmatā, dharma-kāya, buddhatā. Other terms that are closely related are Tathatā, āśraya, prakṛti, prabhāsvara-citta, dharma-dhātu, buddha-jñāna.'"`UNIQ--ref-000011ED-QINU`"' So when we speak of the Buddha-nature (which is how I will abbreviate the more cumbersome 'the Buddha's real or essential nature' from now on), we are tacitly drawing upon some or all of these terms, which have their own ramifications and interrelations, of course. This is a very complex situation and I want to try and clarify it by approaching it from two angles. First, historically, I want to propose that Buddhism in India always had within it three strands which tended to view and understand the Dharma from their own standpoint; these strands are those of śīla, samādhi and prajñā (see p. 262 for details). Secondly, conceptually, I propose a number of what may be called conceptual nets or images (e.g. withinness, foundation, nature/being—see p. 263 for details) that can be applied to the concept of the Buddha-nature, and which (a) tend to hang together as a group, but in addition (b) each of the conceptual nets to a large extent determines the sort of terminology that is used when speaking of the Buddha-nature. Part of my argument is that works like the RGV (and to a lesser degree, the ŚMS) represent a systematization of the different terms (and hence, tacitly, the conceptual nets that give rise to these terms) that were available at the time that the Mahāyāna was growing to maturity.'"`UNIQ--ref-000011EE-QINU`"' This period of the Mahāyāna is usually referred to as the third turning of the Dharma-cakra; it involved a fundamental shift in the axis of Buddhism which led to a bhedābheda philosophy (i.e. the Absolute is both distinct and non-distinct from its attributes). Finally, we look at what the Chinese made of all this. They settled on the term fo hsing to mean 'Buddha-nature', but we find that hsing is used to translate different Sanskrit terms (e.g. prakṛti, gotra, bhāva—see p. 267 for details), and that these Sanskrit terms are themselves translated by other words than hsing (e.g. t'i, shen, chen, shih). In other words, the inherent ambiguities in the Sanskrit terminology are replaced by inherent ambiguities in the Chinese terminology. In addition, because garbha (which nearly always means 'embryo' in Sanskrit) is translated by ts'ang, ( = 'womb'; lit. 'storehouse'), a certain vacuum was created in the Chinese vocabulary which the terms fo hsing and fo hsin ( = buddha-citta) neatly filled. (Rawlinson, introductory remarks, 259–60)
It is often linked with The Heart Sutra and The Diamond Sutra to form a trio of texts that have been revered and studied for centuries. However, unlike the other sutras, which transcribe the teachings of the Buddha himself, The Platform Sutra presents the autobiography of Hui–neng, the controversial 6th Patriarch of Zen, and his understanding of the fundamentals of a spiritual and practical life. Hui–neng's instruction still matters—the 7th–century school of Sudden Awakening that he founded survives today, continuing to influence the Rinzai and Soto schools of contemporary Zen.
Red Pine, whose translations of The Heart Sutra and The Diamond Sutra have been celebrated and widely received, now provides a sensitive and assured treatment of the third and final sutra of the classic triumvirate. He adds remarkable commentary to a translation that, combined with the full Chinese text, a glossary, and notes, results in a Mahayana masterpiece sure to become the standard edition for students and seekers alike. (Source: Counterpoint Press)
This is the first translation into English of the original text used by Bodhidharma, which was the Chinese translation made by Gunabhadra in 443 and upon which all Chinese Zen masters have relied ever since. In addition to presenting one of the most difficult of all Buddhist texts in clear English, Red Pine has also added summaries, explanations, and notes, including relevant Sanskrit terms on the basis of which the Chinese translation was made. This promises to become an essential text for anyone seeking to deepen their understanding or knowledge of Zen. (Source: Counterpoint Press)
This is the title of one of the most important books in the world. A Japanese scholar has translated it The Awakening of Faith. It might also be rendered The Mahayana Faith or The Faith of the New Buddhism.
Its importance is apparent when we consider the fact that of the 26,000 Buddhist monks and nuns in Japan no less than 17,000 of them belong to the Pure Land School and the True School, which regard this book as their fountain and origin.
Its importance is still more apparent when we consider that its doctrines are the fundamental ones of the Mahayana Faith, which is by far the chief school of Buddhism, not only in Japan, but also in China, where are the great majority of the Buddhists of the world. If we estimate the value of books by the number of adherents to their doctrines, then, after the Bible, the Koran, the Confucian Classics, and the Vedas, this volume, about the size of the Gospel of Mark, ranks next, or fifth, among the sacred books of the world.
The great value of the book is also apparent when we remember that the Eastern world had been driven to general despair by the atheistic doctrines of primitive Buddhism, called the Hinayana School, and that it was by the doctrines of this book, which gave rise to the Mahayana School of New Buddhism, that a gospel of great hope was preached to the greater part of the Eastern Asiatic continent. Its new doctrines were that of the One Soul immanent for good in all the universe, that of a Divine Helper of men, of individual immortality and growth in the likeness of God, of the importance of faith in God to produce good works and that of the willingness of the best spirits to make sacrifices to save others—the very subjects which in these modern days still occupy the attention of the most thoughtful men of the world. The book is Brahministic and Buddhistic, Indian and Western in some aspects of philosophic thought. It is profoundly philosophic, reminding one strongly of Hegel, Berkeley and G. Gore in the earlier part, and is as hard to understand as Bishop Butler's famous Analogy; yet very practical in the latter part, therefore it has great importance arising from its high and extensive range of view.
If it be, as it is more and more believed that the Mahayana Faith is not Buddhism, properly so-called, but an Asiatic form of the same Gospel of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, in Buddhistic nomenclature, differing from the old Buddhism just as the new Testament differs from the old, then it commands a world-wide interest, for in it we find an adaptation of Christianity to ancient thought in Asia, and the deepest bond of union between the different races of the East and the West, viz., the bond of a common religion. Both Christianity and the New
Buddhism hold to the transcendent and the immanent forms of God; but the East emphasises more of the immanent form while the West emphasises more of the transcendent. The almost universal reception of the
doctrines contained in this book by both the East and the West constitutes to my mind its highest claim to our attention; for thereby we are brought face to face with a solution of the stupendous practical problem of uniting all races in one bond of religious charity!
The text introduces us to the preliminaries of the Buddhist practice required for higher spiritual development such as the four basic ways of concentrating one's mind on the Dharma and the Four Noble Truths.
This commentary by Khamtrul Rinpoche given in simple and lucid language unravels the gist of the Rin-chen them-skas. Appended at the end of the book is a guide to the voluminous Nyingma Lamrim (Kun-bzang bla-ma'i zhal-lung). (Source: Back Cover)
Another version of Holmes's translation of Gampopa's Ornament of Precious Liberation is found in Ornament of Precious Liberation (Holmes).
America—but also, and no less importantly, in the course of its development
within historical India itself.
One way in which Buddhism has responded to these intellectual and cultural encounters can be related to hermeneutics: that is, the modes by which a tradition explains its sources and thereby interprets (or reinterprets) itself
in a continuing process of reactivation and renewal of its heritage.[1]
In the case of Buddhism this process—perhaps comparable in part to what in another context is now frequently referred to as aggiornamento—had both endogenous and exogenous causes. It was, in other words, set in train both by internal, systemically generated requirements and tensions within the
Buddhist tradition as it evolved in geographical space and historical time, and by external impulses received from its intellectual and social environment, which could be, according to the case, either positive or negative in character.
The purpose of this paper is to explore this process with respect to the Buddhist hermeneutics of the ideas of non-self (anatman) and of a spiritual matrix or germ (gotra, tathagatagarbha or Buddha-nature) and the relationship of this pair of ideas to Vedantic notions and Brahmanical social groups in classical India. Reference will be made also to certain exegetical developments that either originated in Tibet or were at least fully realized there for the first time. Our analysis will revolve around the fact that, however historically antithetical and structurally contrasting these two ideas are in Buddhism, they in fact have not invariably been treated by Buddhist hermeneuticians as contradictory or even as systematically exclusive of each other.
Because of its philosophical and religious significance in the fields of soteriology and gnoseology, the Mahāyānist theory of the tathāgatagarbha—the Germ of Buddhahood latent in all sentient beings—occupies a crucial position in Buddhist thought, and indeed in Indian thought as a whole. In virtue of both their extent and their contents, the sūtras treating the tathāgatagarbha—and the systematically related doctrines of the natural luminosity (prakṛtiprabhāsvaratā) of mind (citta) and the spiritual germ existent by nature (prakṛtistha-gotra)[2]—are amongst the most important in the Mahāyāna. The idea that the doctrine of the tathāgatagarbha and Buddha-nature is one of the supreme teachings of the Mahāyāna is explicitly stated in
the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sutra.[3]
Mahāyānist doctrine is in large part concerned with the path (marga) of the Bodhisattva and supreme and perfect awakening (bodhi), that is, the state of a Buddha. The terms tathāgatagarbha and gotra are used to denote the base or support for practice of the path, and hence the 'cause' (hetu: dhatu) for attainment of the fruit (phala) of buddhahood. Even when the texts do not employ the term tathāgatagarbha to designate this factor as the one which makes it possible for all living beings ultimately to attain liberation and Buddhahood, the importance of the theme of the tathāgatagarbha is basic to the soteriology and gnoseology of the Mahāyāna. (Ruegg, "The Buddhist Notion of an 'Immanent Absolute'," 229–30)
In the course of his monumental work on the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras E. Conze has written: 'It is quite a problem how the Dharma-element which is common to all can be regarded as the source of a variety of "lineages" [gotra]'.[1] It has been the endeavour of the present writer in a series of publications starting in 1968 to shed light on this very fundamental and interesting question. An article in the Festschrift dedicated to the late E. Frauwallner was devoted to the interconnexion between the single, unique and undifferentiated dharmadhātu, the naturally existent spiritual element or germ (prakṛtisthaṃ gotram) and the variously conditioned psycho-spiritual categories (gotra)[2] recognized by the Buddhist texts as explained by Ārya Vimuktisena (ca. 500 ?) and his successor Bhadanta Vimuktisena in their commentaries on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra (i. 37-39), which they correlate with the topics of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā.[3] And shortly afterwards there followed a more detailed study of this question as it relates to the notion of the tathāgatagarbha or buddha-nature in La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra: Études sur ta sotériologie et la gnoséologie du bouddhisme (Paris, 1969) and Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub (Paris, 1973). In the last publications Haribhadra's commentaries on the Prajñāpāramitā were discussed, and the importance of the doctrine of the One Vehicle (ekayāna), was taken up at some length not only from the point of view of soteriology but also from that of gnoseology
Between the two Vimuktisenas and Haribhadra (fl. c. 750-800) on the one side and the Tibetan exegetes on the other there lived a number of important Indian commentators whose work could be only briefly touched on in the Théorie. Amongst the most important of these later Indian masters of the Prajñāpāramitā are Dharmamitra and Abhayākaragupta, both of whom have been reckoned by Buddhist doxographers as being, for certain systematic reasons, close to the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika school, and Ratnākaraśānti (first half of the 11th century), a Vijñānavādin (of the Alīkākāravāda branch) who appears to have undertaken a harmonization of the Vijñānavāda and the Madhyamaka in the manner of the synthesizing movements especially characteristic of later Buddhist thought in India.
One of Ratnākaraśānti's main works on the Prajñāpāramitā—the Sārottamā (or Sāratamā ?), a Pañjikā on the Aṣṭasāhasrikā, which until recently was known only by its Tibetan version in the Bstan 'gyur—has now been recovered in an incomplete Sanskrit manuscript. Since the promised publication of this text is awaited with keenest interest by students of this literature, his work must be left for another occasion.[4] The present paper will therefore consider the discussions by Dharmamitra and Abhayākaragupta of the relation between the gotra, the dharmadhātu, the ekayāna, and the tathāgatagarbha. (Ruegg, "The Gotra, Ekayāna and Tathāgatagarbha Theories of the Prajñāpāramitā," 283–284)
Notes
- E. Conze, The Large Sūtra on Perfect Wisdom (London 1961), p. 105 note 2. References hereunder to the folios of Tibetan translations of Indian texts contained in the Bstan 'gyur relate to the Peking edition as reproduced in the Japanese reprint published by the Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Institute (Tokyo and Kyoto). Prints of other editions of the Bstan 'gyur were unfortunately unavailable during the writing of the present paper.
- On the meanings of the term gotra, and in particular on the two meanings '(spiritual) element, germ, capacity' and '(spiritual) lineage, class, category' which might be described respectively as the intensional and extensional meanings of the word when the gotra as germ determines the classification of persons possessing it in a gotra as category, see the present writer's article in BSOAS 39 (1976) p. 341sq.
- "Ārya and Bhadanta Vimuktisena on the gotra-theory of the Prajñāpāramitā," Beitriige zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens (Festschrift fur Erich Frauwallner), WZKSO 12-13 (1968/1969), pp. 303–317.
4. Ratnākaraśānti's other work on the subject, a commentary on the AA entitled Śuddhimatī, (or: Śuddhamatī) will be referred to below.
The word gotra is frequently used in the literature of Mahāyāna Buddhism to denote categories of persons classified according to their psychological, intellectual, and spiritual types. The chief types usually mentioned in this kind of classification are the Auditors making up the śrāvaka-gotra, the Individual Buddhas making up the pratyehabuddha-gotra, and the Bodhisattvas making up the bodhisattva-gotra.[2] In the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra these three types constitute altogether different gotras, which thus coincide with the three separate Vehicles (yāna) as recognized by the Yogācārin/Vijñaptimātratā, school.[3] To these three some sources add the further category of the undetermined (aniyatagotra), which is made up of persons not yet definitively attached to one of the three preceding classes; and the non-gotra (agotra), that is the category made up of persons who cannot be assigned to any spiritual class.[4] Each of the first three categories is thus comprised of persons capable of achieving a particular kind of maturity and spiritual perfection in accordance with their specific type or class, the Auditor then attaining the Awakening (bodhi) characteristic of the Śrāvaka and so on.[5] Especially remarkable in this connexion, and somewhat anomalous as a gotra, is the non-gotra, i.e. that category of persons who seem to have been considered, at least by certain Yogācārin authorities, as spiritual ‘outcastes’ lacking the capacity for attaining spiritual perfection or Awakening of any kind; since they therefore achieve neither bodhi nor nirvāṇa, they represent the same type as the icchantikas to the extent that the latter also are considered to lack this capacity.[6]
The three gotras mentioned first together with the aniyatagotra and the agotra are discussed chiefly in the Śāstras of the Yogācārins[7] and in the commentaries on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra.[8]
In addition, the gotra functions so to speak as a spiritual or psychological 'gene' determining the classification of living beings into the above-mentioned categories, which may be either absolutely or temporarily different according to whether one accepts the theory that the three Vehicles (yāna) are ultimately and absolutely separate because they lead to the three quite different kinds of Awakening of the Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha, and Bodhisattva—namely the extreme triyāna doctrine-or, on the contrary, the theory that the Vehicles are ultimately one because all sentient beings are finally to attain Awakening and buddhahood which are essentially one—in other words the characterized Mādhyamika version of the ekayāna theory.[9]
Notes
- (Note 1 belongs to title): A shortened version of this paper was read before the Indological section of the twenty-ninth International Congress of Orientalists in Paris in July 1973.
The following abbreviations are used.
IBK Indogaku-Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū.
MSA Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (ed. Lévi).
RGV Ratnagotravibhāga (Sanskrit text ed. E. H. Johnston).
RGVV Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā (Sanskrit text ed. E. H. Johnston).
TGS Tathāgatagarbhasūtra (Tibetan translation in the lHa-sa ed. of the bKa'-'gyur).
Théorie D. Seyfort Ruegg, La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra (Publications de l'École Française d'Extreme-Orient, LXX, Paris, 1969). - v. Laṅkāvatārasūtra, ed. Nanjō, 2, pp. 63-6, and the other sources quoted in Ruegg, Théorie, 74 f.
- Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra 7.15, 24; cf. Théorie, 73-4.
- Laṅkāvatārasūtra 2, p. 63.
- v. Laṅkāvatārasūtra 2, pp. 63-5; MSABh. 3.2.
- Laṅkāvatārasūtra 2, pp. 65-6; MSABh. 3.11: aparinirvāṇadharmaka. There are two categories of persons not attaining nirvāṇa, those who do not attain it for a certain length of time (tatkālāparinirvāṇadharman) and those who never do so (atyantāparinirvāṇadharman). The theory that some persons are destined never to attain nirvāṇa and buddhahood is considered characteristic of the Yogācārin school, which does not admit the doctrine of universal buddhahood implied by the usual interpretation of the ekayāna theory (see Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra 7.24) and the theory of the tathāgatagarbha present in all sentient beings. (MSA 9.37 does not, it seems, refer to the fully developed tathāgatagarbha theory which is based on three factors—the irradiation of the dharmakāya, the non-differentiation of the tathatā, and the presence of the gotra [see RGV 1.27 f.]—and concerns only the non-differentiation of the tathatā, and the tathāgatatva, which all beings possess as their embryonic essence. Cf. below, n. 50.)
The agotra doctrine to the extent that it assumes a class of spiritual 'outcastes' being evidently incompatible with the tathāgatagarbha theory, the question arises as to the significance of the allusion to persons without a gotra in RGV 1.41. The reference there seems to be to a hypothetical case (opposed to the author's own view expressed before in RGV 1.40-41c), which is not, however, admitted by the author; and the revised reading of pāda 1.41d agotrāṇāṃ na tad yataḥ (cf. L. Schmithausen, WZKS, xv, 1971, 145) 'since this is not so for those without gotra ' makes this interpretation easier (see p. 346). Indeed, according to RGVV 1.41, any allusion to an icchantika who does not attain nirvāṇa is to be interpreted as referring to a certain interval of time (kālāntarābhiprāya) only, and not to a permanent incapacity. On the icchantika cf. D. S. Ruegg, Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub, Paris, 1973, p. 12, n. 1. The aparinirvāṇagotra is also mentioned in RGVV 1.32-3, 1.38, and 1.41, and the aparinirvāṇadharman in 1.41. - cf. MSA, ch. 3; Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya and ºṭīkā, 2.1, 4.15-16.
- cf. Théorie, 123 f.
- v. Théorie, 177 f.; MSA 11.53-9; Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā 3.1a, 22. On the equivalence of nirvāṇa and buddhahood, see RGV 1.87.
Section II investigates the complex, and controversial, problem of whether a (Prāsaṅgika) Mādhyamika may, within the frame of his school's philosophy, assert a thesis (pratijñā) and maintain a philosophical position (pakṣa, mata). It is a reworked and expanded version of an earlier study: 'On the thesis and assertion in the Madhyamaka/dBu ma' in E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher (ed.), Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist religion and philosophy (Proceedings of the Csoma de Korös Symposium held at Velm-Vienna, 13-19 September 1981 (Vienna, 1983), pp. 205-241).
Section III concerns the very significant place occupied in Tsoṅ kha pa's Madhyamaka philosophy by the ideas and methods of epistemological and logical system (pramāṇavidyā) of Dharmakīrti. It is an expanded version of a study first published in 1991: 'On pramāṇa theory in Tsoṅ khap pa's Madhyamaka philosophy' in E. Steinkellner (ed.), Studies in the Buddhist epistemological tradition (Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference, Vienna, 11-16 June, 1989, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophische-Historische Klasse, Denkschriften, 222. Band (Vienna, 1991), pp. 281-310).
Part II of these Studies will contain annotated translations of Candrakīrti's Sanskrit commentary on Madhyamakakārikā i.1 taken from his renowned Prasannapadā madhyamakavṛttiḥ and of rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen's Tibetan Summary-Memorandum on the Eight Crucial Points in Madhyamaka philosophy (dKya' gnad/gnas brgyad kyi zin bris). (Source: foreword in Part I)
(Source: foreword in Part I)
The Introduction chapter of this book, Rulu's seventh, explores the origin of the concept of the Tathagata store, and discusses how teachings on the Tathagata store have come to be accepted in China as the mainstream of Mahayana teachings and a distinct school of thought, standing apart from and along with the Madhyamaka School and the Yogacara School. Highlights of teachings on the Tathagata store presented in this chapter include why all sentient beings possess the Tathagata store, meanings of the dharma body and its four virtues, a comparison between the self claimed by those on non-Buddhist paths and a true self taught by the Buddha, meanings of one's Buddha nature, and how one's Tathagata store and alaya consciousness (alaya-vijnana) are unified.
This book presents the English translations of six sutras selected from the Chinese Buddhist Canon. The Mahavaipulya Sutra of the Tathagata Store gives a basic teaching and describes by nine analogies that one's Tathagata store is shrouded by one's afflictions. The Sutra of Neither Increase Nor Decrease reveals that the Tathagata store is a Tathagata's dharma body, and that the realm of sentient beings neither increases nor decreases. The Sutra of Shrimala's Lion’s Roar gives teachings on one's afflictions that shroud one's Tathagata store and inspires all sentient beings to ride the One Vehicle to attain Buddhahood. The Mahayana version of the Sutra of Angulimalika reveals that as one's Tathagata store transcends all dharmas, all dharmas are one's Tathagata store. The Sutra of the Unsurpassed Reliance teaches one to rely on one's Tathagata store in order to walk the bodhi path to Buddhahood. The Sutra of the Vajra Samadhi reveals that one's inherent awareness, the pure awareness of one's true mind, has a mass of benefits. This book will benefit readers at all levels and can serve as a basis for scholarly research. (Source: Author House)
Emulating Never Disrespectful Bodhisattva
The Quest of the Monk Sōō to Practice Revering Buddha-Nature
The "marathon monks" of Japan are one of the iconic images of Japanese Buddhism, familiar to people the world over. These monks walk excruciating mountain circuits on Mount Hiei near Kyoto and Mount Kinpu in Nara Prefecture for a summer retreat of one hundred days. A handful in the posar period have performed the insufferable thousand-day version of this retreat, and also completed additional ascetic practices to gain the title of Great Acarya. Having achieved the humanly impossible, they are sometimes referred to as living buddhas.
Hagiographic sources tell us that the founder of this practice, the Tendai monk Sōō (831-918), was motivated to seek enlightenment when as a novice monk he studied the part of the Lotus Sutra that tells the story of Never Disrespectful Bodhisattva. Sōō set his heart on emulating Never Disrespectful's way of practice, walking about making obeisances to other people as future buddhas. Unfortunately, Sōō's responsibilities to look after his teacher, and the daily task of going into the mountains to harvest anise-tree leaves for the offerings at the monastery's central hall, prevented him from dedicating himself solely to the reverence of other people's buddha-nature. According to tradition, however, Sōō's daily forays into the mountain became the origin of today's marathon-monk practice, in which ascetic monks revere the shrines of Buddhist deities and places where Japanese divinities abide in the mountains. It is often said that the marathon monk's true object of reverence is the buddha-nature of the natural world.
The Lotus Sutra's Never Disrespectful Bodhisattva is an archetype of respect for the inherent dignity of sentient beings. As told in chapter 20 of the Lotus Sutra, one time in the past there was a monk who did not practice by chanting sutras but instead went around making obeisance to every person he met, telling them, "I would never dare to disrespect you, because surely you are all to become buddhas!" As the reader can probably anticipate, the Lotus Sutra tells us that Never Disrespectful was oftentimes ridiculed, even physically attacked, but he bore it all patiently and through this practice not only purified his mind and body but also transformed the hearts and minds of the people around him. The Lotus Sutra tells us that performing this practice leads to quickly attaining the Buddha Way. (Scarangello, "Buddha-Nature (1)," 28-29) (Read entire article here)
In the last installment of this column we explored the concept of buddha-nature—its meaning, the Lotus Sutra's teaching of revering buddha-nature, and how Buddhists can reveal the buddha-nature of themselves and others by demonstrating respect for people and discovering their goodness. This time we will consider another way of realizing buddha-nature that is inspired by the stories of the Lotus Sutra. Rissho Kosei-kai members speak of awakening to buddha-nature as attaining the conviction that both oneself and others are, in the allegorical language of the Lotus Sutra, "children of the Buddha." Rev. Nikkyo Niwano, the founder of Rissho Kosei-kai, held that feelings of worthlessness thwarted people's ability to improve their own lives and brought them much suffering, and for this reason he employed the sutra's allegory of the parent-child relationship to help people see themselves as future buddhas and heirs to all the qualities that the Buddha Shakyamuni possessed. The belief that living beings are children of the Buddha also encourages the appreciation of all human life. As members of the human family, all people are our brothers and sisters, possessing the same inherent dignity and human potential as the Buddha. Today some people may not be entirely comfortable with the gendered language of the Lotus Sutra's allegory, but a close reading of the text can open pathways to an understanding appropriate to contemporary society and twenty-first century social norms. (Scarangello, "Buddha-Nature (2)," 35) (Read the entire article here)
Also included is a diplomatic edition of the Tibetan text in Wylie along with seven appendixes, including Jamgon Kongtrul's outline of Rangjung Dorje's text, a song on buddha-nature, and information from the Zab mo nang don related to the heart of Buddhahood.
Known to contemporary scholars of Tibetan literature for some time through mention in other works, Bcom ldan ral gri's survey has recently become available for the first time in two manuscripts. The present work contains a detailed historical introduction, an annotated edition of the two manuscripts, as well as concordances and appendices intended to aid the comparative study of early Tibetan collections of Indic Buddhist literature. (Source: Harvard University Press)
Both accessible and illuminating, this book explores the continuities between the ways in which Zen was practiced in ancient times, and how it is practiced today in East Asian countries such as Japan, China, Korea, and Vietnam, as well as in the emerging Western Zen tradition. (Source: Yale University Press)
Everyone who has had at least some glimpses at Buddhism knows that it contains various philosophical theories as well as various spiritual practices. The term ' philosophical theory ' should be understood here in a general sense comprising any attempt to make rational statements about the true nature or the fundamental principles of the totality or some part of the existent, or about those aspects of it of which everyday experience is not aware. In this sense, philosophical theories in Buddhism are, e.g., the doctrine that there is no substantial Self, no ātman; or the doctrine that the whole universe consists of momentary factors, of factors each of which lasts only for the time of an extremely short moment. ' Spiritual practice ', in the case of Buddhism, consists essentially of moral or ethical exercises, and of practices of meditation, deep concentration, or trance. As an example, we may adduce the so-called four 'infinitudes', or 'unlimited ones' (apramāṇa), i.e. the meditative practice of the attitudes of friendliness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and impartiality or equanimity with regard to all living beings. Another example is the 'contemplation of the impure' (aśubhabhāvanā). Here the Yogin, in order to subdue excessive covetousness, contemplates dead bodies in their different stages of decomposition. In this exercise, it is not necessary that the Yogin actually stays at a cemetery for the whole time. He may well continue the exercise at any other place, making use of a special meditative practice in which he is able to visualize those dead bodies he saw previously.
In this article I want to contribute to the solution of the problem of the historical relation of these two elements — philosophical theory and spiritual practice — in Buddhism. Did Buddhism usually start from philosophical theories and afterwards develop corresponding spiritual practices? Or is it more typical for Buddhism that first there are spiritual practices and that philosophical theories are only the result of a subsequent reflection which leads to a theoretical consolidation and generalization of those spiritual practices? (Schmithausen, "On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism," 235)
However, being a living or animate being (e.g. p(r)āṇa/p(r)āṇin, satt(v)a, jīva, bhūta) is, in India, at any rate in theoretical contexts, by and large equated with being sentient ((sa)cetana, sacittaka, cittamaṃta, etc.), with being, to a certain extent at least, capable of perception and sensation, and in doctrinally developed Buddhism it is, apart from men and mythological beings, only animals that are regarded as sentient beings. Except for certain developments
in the Far East and perhaps Tantric Buddhism (which requires special investigation), plants are not admitted in Buddhism as sentient beings, let alone crystals, stones, earth, water or other inorganic things. These are hence not, at least not directly, protected by the precept to abstain from killing/injuring animate beings.
The question is, however, whether this restriction of living, sentient beings, in the sphere of nature, to animals only was the position of Buddhism from the outset. Actually, from what we know about other Indian religions prior to or contemporary with earliest Buddhism, such a position would seem to have been anything but a matter of course.
As for Vedic religion, there is sufficient evidence that not only animals but also plants as well as seeds and even water and earth were, more or less naively, believed to be living and even sentient, and fire and wind had at least a personalized, divine aspect (viz. the gods Agni on the one hand, and Vāyu and Vāta on the other; cp. also the idea of water and fire as principles of life in late Vedic thought). Even in post-Vedic Hinduism, at least the view that plants and seeds capable of germination are sentient beings is still well documented, although some circles and authors disagree. Occasionally, even stones, water or the earth are admitted as living or sentient.
In Jainism the view that plants and seeds are sentient beings is clearly expressed and undisputed, and according to the view prevailing in Jaina sources even earth, water, wind and fire are alive, i.e., consist of minute living beings possessing, like plants, the sense of touch.
Against this background, it appears natural to raise the question whether in earliest Buddhism, too, at least plants and seeds (but perhaps even earth and water) may still have been viewed as living, sentient beings, in spite of the later rejection of such a view. To be sure, in this case it would be necessary to explain how the later view arose. But in the opposite case, too, one would have to search for a reason why the Buddhists, or the Buddha, abandoned the view, current at their time, that plants are sentient beings.
It would be easy to determine the status of plants and seeds in earliest Buddhism if the canonical Buddhist texts, and especially such layers as can be regarded as comparatively old, did contain fully explicit statements either rejecting or
asserting the sentience of plants. But there are none, as far as I can see. Hence, the matter has to be decided by induction. In view of the later doctrinal position of Buddhism that plants (etc.) are not sentient beings, the onus probandi is, of course, incumbent on him who maintains that in earliest Buddhism the situation was different. Therefore, I shall, in the following chapters (II-IV), discuss passages which may indicate that in earliest Buddhism plants were still regarded as living, sentient beings, or at least not yet definitely considered to be lifeless and insentient. (Schmithausen, The Problem of the Sentience of Plants in Earliest Buddhism, 1–4)
(*Notes of the author have been omitted.)
addition to the traditional six kinds of mind, viz. the five sense-perceptions and non-sensory cognition (manovijñāna), there are two new, more or less subliminal forms, viz. kliṣṭa-manas and ālayavijñāna. The former is a continuous, subtle notion or feeling of 'I', whereas the latter, in accordance with the frequent Chinese rendering, i.e. "store mind," "connaissance-réceptacle, may, in a preliminary way, be characterized as the container or store-house of the latent residues or Impressions of previous actions (karman) and mind processes, or, following the usual Tibetan translation kun gźi rnam par śes pa ("fundamental mind", "Grunderkennen"), as the basic layer of mind processes or even the very basic constituent of the whole living being. It should be kept in mind that (at least in the "orthodox" Yogācāra school) ālayavijñāna is strictly person-bound, each living being having its own ālayavijñāna.
The present essay, though also including a few remarks on the origin of kliṣṭa-manas ( see § 7. 1A. 2. 2), is primarily concerned with the problem of the origin and development of ālayavijñana. Yet, my treatment of this matter is not exhaustive either. I have rather confined myself to dealing with the problem of the origin of ālayavijñāna in a rather limited sense (see § 1.4), and to an attempt to deduce, from my starting-point and the data available in the oldest materials, certain crucial aspects of the early development of this concept.
In accordance with the limited scope of the present essay, I
feel it justified to confine myself, as for previous research, to a short systematic outline of the essential aspects of what it has contributed to the question of the formation of the concept of ālayavijñāna (§ 1.3). Though I admit that a full account of the history of research on ālayavijñāna would be useful, it would take much more time than I can afford, and anyway it should, in view of the fact that most pertinent works are in Japanese, be written by a Japanese scholar. Nevertheless, apart from specific references in the notes, a few
recent theories on the origin of ālayavijñāana will be discussed in detail in § 7, because they advocate solutions considerably differing from mine, and because I should scarcely be justified in setting up a theory of my own if I did not give my reasons for not adopting one or the other of those already set forth.
As for the question of the origin of the concept of ālayavijñāna, the solution presented in this essay must remain a hypothetical one. In view of the fact that
even basic problems of the literary history of the older Yogācāra texts, esp. of the Yogācārabhūmi, are still unsolved or controversial and since some early materials are known only from fragments—and there may have been others no longer extant in explicit quotations—, statements on the early history of Yogācāra thought are almost inevitably, at least for the time being, bound to be hypothetical. But I think Suguro is right in emphasizing that we have no choice but to try to reconstruct the historical development of Yogācāra thought if we want to re-enact it, as it were, as a dynamic, living process, and not merely take stock of the
petrified (and often incoherent) results. Besides, even preliminary observations in terms of a history of ideas may, if handled with caution, on their part be helpful in resolving problems of literary history. But what I consider essential is that, even if we cannot (or cannot yet?), in our hypotheses on matters of the history of ideas (as well as of the literary history) of uncertain periods like early Yogācāra, reach certainty, we are none
the less clearly called upon to proceed from mere possibility or non-committal plausibility to probability; i.e. we should try to find out criteria which permit us to single out, from among the at times considerable number of possible explanations, the one which is (or at least those few which are) probable; and it is precisely this that I intend to do in the present essay. (Schmithausen, introductory, programmatic and methodological remarks, Vol. 1, 1–3)
(*Author's notes have been omitted)
Ju Mipham Rinpoche (1846–1912) was a great master of the Nyingma lineage of Tibetan Buddhism and one of the leading figures in the Rime nonsectarian movement in Tibet. This text, along with Ju Mipham Rinpoche's commentary, is taught extensively throughout the world by Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche, who considers this text to be of pivotal importance. Jim Scott, a longtime student of Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche, translated this work at his request and under his guidance. (Source: Shambhala Publications)
Tathāgata-garbha is an important Mahāyāna principle, which explains that all living beings process essence of Buddha-hood (Sarvasattvās-tathāgata-garbhāh). Tathāgata-garbha theory is a teaching that gives great optimism for all living beings in the pursuit of Bodhi (Enlightenment) or Buddhatva (Buddhahood). This theory enshrines in it a sublime concept that all the sentient beings are potential Buddhas or all will attain Buddha-hood. Owing to the presence of Tathāgata-garbha in all, one perceives the equality of oneself with others, and works for the wellbeing of all living beings, as one's entire life motif. According to A.K. Chatterjee, an outstanding authority on Yogācāra Idealism, the author "brings out beautifully the implication of the notion of the "Tathāgatagarbha" in this volume. (Source: Exotic India}
During his scientific expeditions to India, Nepal, Tibet and Pakistan in the nineteen thirties, forties and fifties, Giuseppe Tucci (1894-1984) had the opportunity of photographing, and in many cases of having someone copy, several important Buddhist works.[1] Subsequently, most of the manuscripts that he photographed or copied entered the collections in Nepalese, Chinese and Pakistani libraries, but others were lost. At present Tucci’s reproductions of some of these manuscripts are the only documentation at our disposal.
The study and cataloguing of the photographs and manuscripts now held in Rome in the Library of the Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente (IsIAO) was begun in 1997 (officially on 12th June 1998) by Claudio Cicuzza and myself. The first results of our work have been published as an appendix to the first version of this paper published in Warsaw in 2000. At that time the scanning of the negatives was still underway, so our list was highly provisional, based mainly on the short titles written on the envelopes of the negatives and on the photographs already printed.
During the last few years, not only it has been possible to correct this list here and there, sometimes with the help of other scholars, as we shall see below, but also to find further manuscripts and photographs of Sanskrit manuscripts that belonged to the Italian scholar –in the IsIAO Library, in the Museo Nazionale d’Arte Orientale ‘Giuseppe Tucci’ (MNAOr) and in a small but important private collection near Rome–and eventually to gather more information regarding the history of Tucci’s expeditions and of the formation of his collection.[2] (Sferra, introduction, 15)
Notes
- Certainly Tucci did not photograph the MSS personally, for he declares his complete unfamiliarity with any kind of device, including the camera (“[F]ra me e quale che sia macchina, anche la macchina fotografica, resta un’assoluta incapacità di intesa”, 1996b: 17). Among his companions on the expeditions there was always a person responsible for the photographic reproductions.
- This aspect of Tucci’s work has been studied by Oscar Nalesini; see below, pp. 79-112.
A monk asked Zhaozhou: ‘‘Does a dog have buddha-nature?’’ Zhaozhou replied: ‘‘No.’’
This pithy exchange between an unidentified Buddhist monk and the Tang dynasty Chan master Zhaozhou Congshen (778–897) is perhaps the best-known example of a Chan gong’an, or ‘"public case." Although the passage occurs in a collection of Zhaozhou's sayings supposedly compiled by his disciples, its notoriety is due to a Song dynasty master, Wumen Huikai (1183–1260), who placed this exchange at the beginning of his famous gong’an collection, Gateless Barrier of the Chan Tradition (Chanzong wumen guan, 1228).[1] Wumen’s compilation, consisting of forty-four such exchanges and anecdotes accompanied by Wumen’s comments, is one of the most important works of Chan literature. And as the first case in Wumen’s collection, "Zhaozhou’s dog" became the single most influential gong’an in the Chinese Chan, Korean Son, and Japanese Zen traditions. It is often the first and sometimes the only gong’an assigned to monks, and many traditional commentators claim, following Wumen’s lead, that this single gong’an holds the key to all others.
Wumen’s work was neither the earliest nor the most comprehensive compilation of Chan cases. Indeed, the Gateless Barrier is relatively short and straightforward in comparison to two earlier collections, the Blue Cliff Record of Chan Master Foguo Yuanwu (Foguo Yuanwu Chanshi Biyan lu), published in 1128, and the Congrong Hermitage Record of the Commentaries by Old Wansong on the Case and Verse [Collection] by Reverend Jue of Tiantong [Mountain] (Wansong laoren pingzhang Tiantong Jue heshang songgu Congrongan lu), published in 1224. The cases that
make up these texts are each based on an individual anecdote, verbal exchange, or quandary known as the benze (original edict), to which has been added comments in prose and verse brushed by later masters. Whereas the Gateless Barrier contains forty-four such anecdotes accompanied by a brief comment and verse by Wumen, the Blue Cliff Record and Congrong Hermitage Record each contain one hundred cases including several layers of appended judgments, verses, and interlinear glosses. (The same "original edict" may appear in two or more collections, but the exegesis will invariably differ. More will be said about the structure of these
collections below.) Many more gong’an collections gained currency in China, and the Chan tradition would come to speak of seventeen hundred authoritative cases (although this number was probably not meant to be taken literally). By the end of the Song the gong’an had assumed a central role in the ideological, literary, and institutional identity of the Chan school.
Popular books on Chan and Zen Buddhism present gong’an as intentionally incoherent or meaningless. They are, it is claimed, illogical paradoxes or unsolvable riddles intended to frustrate and short-circuit the intellect in order to quell
thought and bring the practitioner to enlightenment. This understanding of gong’an is allied with a view of Chan as an iconoclastic and anti-intellectual tradition that rejects scripture, doctrine, philosophy, and indeed all forms of conceptual understanding in favor of unmediated or "pure" experience. Gong’an are intended, according to this view, not to communicate ideas so much as to induce a transformative experience. To grasp at the literal meaning of a Chan case is to
miss its point.
Recently scholars have begun to question the instrumental view of Chan that underlies this approach to Chan cases, arguing that it is based on a misreading of the historical and ethnographic record.[2] Chan ranks among the most ritualistic forms of Buddhist monasticism, and a master’s enlightenment is constituted within a prescribed set of institutional and ritual forms.[3] Moreover, the notion that Chan is designed to induce a nonconceptual or pure experience can be traced in part to late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Japanese intellectuals such as D. T. Suzuki and Nishida Kitarō, who were culling from Western sources, notably William James.[4] The notion that Chan is anti-intellectual and repudiates "words and letters" is belied by the fact that the Chan tradition produced the largest literary corpus of any Buddhist school in East Asia.[5] This corpus consists in large part of "recorded sayings" (yulu) and "records of the transmission of the flame" (chuandenglu) texts—texts recounting the careers and teachings of past patriarchs from which the original edicts were drawn.
Scholars now appreciate that Chan is more complex than early apologists and enthusiasts cared to admit; it is no longer possible to reduce Chan practice and Chan literature to a mere means intended to engender a singular and ineffable
spiritual experience. Accordingly, scholars of Chan gong’an have begun to attend to the institutional context and literary history of the genre,[6] and one scholar has devoted an entire monograph to the folkloric themes that appear in a single case.[7] Be that as it may, little progress has been made in deciphering the doctrinal and exegetical intent of Chan gong’an; it would appear that scholars remain reluctant to treat gong’an as a form of exegesis at all. This reluctance may be due to the enduring legacy of an earlier apologetic mystification of the gong’an literature. The primary objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that such reluctance is misguided and that it is indeed possible to recover the original meaning and doctrinal purport of at least some of the cases. The task is not easy, however, as the cases are philosophically subtle and hermeneutically sophisticated, and the authors of the collections delighted in obscure allusions, clever puns, and deft wordplay. (Sharf, "How to Think with Chan Gong’an," 205–7)
Notes
My thanks to Charlotte Furth and Elizabeth Horton Sharf for their comments and
suggestions on earlier drafts of this chapter and to Ling Hon Lam for his meticulous
editorial attention.
- T 2005:48.292c20–24. The exchange is also featured in case no. 18 of the Wansong Laoren pingzhang Tiantong Jue heshang songgu Congrongan lu, T 2004:48.238b21–39a28. Textual details concerning Zhaozhou’s recorded sayings (Zhaozhou Zhenji Chanshi yulu) will be found below.
- Faure, The Rhetoric of Immediacy and Chan Insights and Oversights; Foulk, "Myth, Ritual, and Monastic Practice"; Sharf, "The Zen of Japanese Nationalism," "Whose Zen?" and "Experience."
- Foulk and Sharf, "On the Ritual Use"; Sharf, "Ritual."
- Sharf, "Whose Zen?"
- On the sometimes controversial place of literary endeavors in the Song monastic institution, see esp. Gimello, "Mārga and Culture"; and Keyworth, "Transmitting the Lamp," 281–324.
- See esp. Heine and Wright, eds., The Kōan.
- Heine, Shifting Shape.
In this chapter I examine some medieval Buddhist doctrines that, at least on the surface, seem similarly strange and implausible. Indeed, some of the Buddhist notions to be examined below were perplexing to audiences in their own day, much as discussions of brain transplants are perplexing to us today. On the Indian side, I will begin with the notion of nirodha-samāpatti, a meditative state akin to a vegetative coma in which all consciousness has ceased. I will then turn to a class of beings known as “beings without conception” (asaṃjñika-sattvāḥ), denizens of a celestial realm who are devoid of sentience, thought, and consciousness. In both cases, an insentient state seems to be followed by (or gives rise to) a sentient state, which poses serious challenges to the classical Buddhist understanding of karma. On the Chinese side, we will consider the debate over the buddha-nature of insentient objects—can an insentient thing such as a wall or roof tile attain buddhahood and preach the dharma? This doctrine too could be (and was) seen as a threat to the coherence of Buddhist teachings.
Modern scholars tend to approach such doctrines as the products of intelligent but misguided scholastics struggling to make sense of the universe, all the while hobbled by the dictates of tradition, scripture, and a prescientific understanding of the cosmos. They are the proverbial schoolmen calculating how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. But I would suggest another perspective. Such theories, I argue, serve as frames of reference for pondering issues of personal identity, ethical responsibility, sentience, and death. Given that we ourselves are still far from clarity on these issues, and given that we too devise fanciful thought experiments to help gain a conceptual toehold, perhaps it is time to look afresh at what the Buddhists might have been up to.[11] (Sharf, preamble, 144–45)
Notes
11. For an articulate defense of Buddhist scholasticism, along different lines, see Paul John Griffiths, “Scholasticism: The Possible Recovery of an Intellectual Practice,” in Scholasticism: Cross-Cultural and Comparative Perspectives, ed. José Ignacio Cabezón (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 201–35.
The Chan tradition is renowned as the “meditation” school of East Asia. Indeed, the Chinese term chan 禪 (Jpn: zen) is an abbreviated transliteration of dhyāna, the Sanskrit term arguably closest to the modern English word “meditation.” Scholars typically date the emergence of this tradition to the early Tang dynasty (618–907), although Chan did not reach institutional maturity until the Song period (960–1279). In time, Chinese Chan spread throughout East Asia, giving birth to the various Zen, Sŏn, and Thiê`n lineages of Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, respectively. Today these traditions continue to promote, at least in theory, meditation practices, and these have been the subject of considerable scholarly interest.[1]
It may then come as a surprise to learn just how little is known about the meditation techniques associated with the “founders” of this tradition—the masters associated with the nascent (or proto-) Chan lineages of the seventh and eighth centuries. It was during this fertile period—which, following scholarly convention, I will call “early Chan”—that the lineage myths, doctrinal innovations, and distinctive rhetorical voice of the Chan, Zen, Sŏn, and Thiê`n schools first emerged. Although hundreds of books and articles have appeared on the textual and doctrinal developments associated with early Chan, relatively little has been written on the distinctive meditation practices, if any, of this movement.
This essay emerged from an attempt to answer a seemingly straightforward question: what kinds of meditation techniques were promulgated in early Chan circles? The answer, it turned out, involved historical and philosophical forays into the notion of “mindfulness”—a style of meditation practice that has become popular among Buddhists (and non-Buddhists) around the globe. Accordingly, I will digress briefly to consider the roots of the modern mindfulness movement, and will suggest possible sociological parallels between the rise of the Buddhist mindfulness movement in the twentieth century and the emergence of Chan in the medieval period. (Sharf, "Mindfulness and Mindlessness in Early Chan," 933)
Notes
- The literature is vast; on modern Japanese Zen and Korean Sŏn meditation practice in English see, for example, Buswell 1992, Hori 2000, and Hori 2003. On the history of these practices see Bielefeldt 1988, Buswell 1987, Collcutt 1981, Foulk 1993, and Schlütter 2008.
Sharf draws his argument in part from a meticulous historical, philological, and philosophical analysis of the Treasure Store Treatise (Pao-tsang lun), an eighth-century Buddho-Taoist work apocryphally attributed to the fifth-century master Seng-chao (374–414). In the process of coming to terms with this recondite text, Sharf ventures into all manner of subjects bearing on our understanding of medieval Chinese Buddhism, from the evolution of T’ang “gentry Taoism” to the pivotal role of image veneration and the problematic status of Chinese Tantra.
The volume includes a complete annotated translation of the Treasure Store Treatise, accompanied by the detailed exegesis of dozens of key terms and concepts. (Source: University of Hawai'i Press)
This article is not concerned with whether buddha-nature and tathāgatagarbha thought is actually deleterious to critical philosophical work. Rather, the concern is to demonstrate that, far from embracing buddha-nature doctrine, the eighth-century founders of Southern Chan had serious concerns with it. Evidence for this is found in: (1) the writings of Shenhui, notably in his opposition to the doctrine of the "buddha-nature of insentient objects" (wuqing foxing 無情佛性); and (2) the Platform Scripture of the Sixth Patriarch (Liuzu tanjing 六祖壇經), particularly in the variant versions of Huineng's famous "enlightenment verse." Thus the Southern School may be viewed as a forerunner of the Critical Buddhist anti-dhātuvāda polemics. The article closes with comments on the ongoing problems Chinese Buddhist exegetes had in marrying the metaphysical monism of Yogācāra and tathāgatagarbha teachings with the anti-foundationalist thrust of Madhyamaka and Prajñāpāramitā literature.
attributes to Chih-i. It is probably fair to say that the weight of contemporary historical-critical scholarship in both Japan and the West is against both this chronology and this attribution; Shih is, of course, aware of this, but judges the arguments against the traditional position to be inconclusive. The matter is complex, and the importance of Shih's paper lies not in this but rather in the substantive doctrinal analysis she provides of "inherent evil". (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to Buddha Nature, 6)
The well-known motto of Ch'an Buddhism is that "perceiving the true self, one becomes a Buddha." The "true self" signifies the Buddha nature inherent in all sentient beings. The discovering of the "true self" has become the single most important pursuit of the Buddhist, especially in Sino-Japanese Buddhism. On the contrary, early Buddhism teaches that ultimately no substantial self (i.e., 'anatman') can be found, since the self is nothing but the union of the five aggregates. Modern Buddhologists as well as the Buddhists have been intrigued by the inconsistency that one single tradition teaches both that there is no self on the one hand, and that the goal of religious life is to discover the true self, on the other hand.
The big questions concerning these two contradictory doctrines include:
- How did they develop during the course of Buddhist history?
- How can they be reconciled?
- Are these two ideas actually as contradicting as they appear to be?
- Is the concept of the Buddha nature an outcome of the influence of other Indian religious thought upon Buddhism?
It is out of the scope of this short paper to answer all these questions. Therefore, this paper will deal with the antecedent and synonymous concept of the Buddha nature, that is, 'tathagata- garbha' ('ju lai tsang'). Specifically, this paper will examine the meaning and significance of the 'tathagatagarbha' (Buddha nature) based on three 'tathagatagarbha' texts and argue that the 'tathagatagarbha'/Buddha nature does not represent a substantial self ('atman'); rather, it is a positive language and expression of 'sunyata' (emptiness) and represents the potentiality to realize Buddhahood through Buddhist practices. In other words, the intention of the teaching of 'tathagatagarbha'/Buddha nature is soteriological rather than theoretical.
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The Sutra of Liberation and Breaking the Attributes of the Mind through the Wisdom Stored in the Ocean of Buddha-nature (Foxinghai zang zhihui jietuo po xinxiang jing 佛性海藏智慧解脫破心相經; hereafter: Sutra on the Wisdom Stored in the Ocean of Buddha-nature) is a Chinese apocryphal scripture whose origin is still obscure. For a long time, the sutra was thought to be missing. Following the discovery of the Dunhuang 敦煌 manuscripts and the stone sutras in the Grove of the Reclining Buddha (Wofoyuan 臥佛院; hereafter: the Grove), an overall version of the text can now be restored.
The sutra, consisting of two scrolls, is included in the Taishō edition in the volume on the “sutras in Dunhuang manuscripts whose origins are in doubt 敦煌寫本類疑似部”. The version in the Grove is an incomplete engraving of the first scroll of the sutra. For reasons that still await clarification, the text on wall e in cave 46 reads from left to right. It is preceded on wall d by scroll 22 of the Nirvana Sutra, and followed on wall f by the Diamond Sutra. Neither the author nor the translator of this scripture is mentioned in the Dunhuang and the Grove versions. (Shih-Chung, introductory remarks, 101)
Tathāgatagarbha and Buddha nature are technical terms that indicate the existence of the true nature of the Buddha or Tathāgata who has attained enlightenment through totally unclouded insight (prajñā), within all living things, though these living things may be covered with the impurity of worldly desire and be seemingly incapable of attaining enlightenment. In essence, these terms refer to the fact that the Buddha or Tathāgata resides within the nature of all living things. The notions of Tathāgatagarbha and Buddha nature make assertions about the nature of enlightenment or salvation for living things still trapped in an unenlightened condition of suffering. They do so from the ideological position of those Tathāgatas or Buddhas who have already realized truth and been released from suffering and unenlightenment. These ideas are expressed as a kind of theodicy and soteriology, as they deal with the challenge of how super-temporal, absolute truth appears at a historical or personal level. Ideas that originate in the mature period of the history of an ideology produce higher-level notions that allow concepts born in various contexts in the previous history of the ideology to coexist. The ideas of Tathāgatagarbha and Buddha nature, which point to the Tathāgata or Buddha that dwells within all living things, encompass both all living things and Tathāgata, and so exist at a higher conceptual level than either.
There are two foundations of the ideas of Tathāgatagarbha and Buddha nature, which simultaneously problematize both unenlightenment and enlightenment: the features of soteriology in general religious thought, and the view of truth that is unique to Buddhism. Soteriology, as conceived of in general religious thought, considers the world in a dualistic fashion, as being split into the world of humanity and the world of gods, the world of suffering and the world of liberation, the endless cycle of life and death (samsara) and supreme enlightenment (nirvana). On the one hand is a relative, limited, and impermanent world, and on the other an absolute, infinite, and eternal world. The movement from the former aspect to the latter is not ceaseless but, rather, requires a change in the dimension of our existence, such as religious conversion or enlightenment. The experience of the individual transforms the aspect of the world, which formerly appeared as a single layer, thus exposing its mysterious and unseen facets. In contrast to many religions, which end their exposition at this point, Mahayana Buddhism takes the appearance of this duality itself as a subjective experience and seeks to reach the point at which both aspects ultimately become indistinguishable. The scenery of this world as seen from the world of libreration, worldly desire purified by enlightenment, Samsara illuminated by nirvana are all accepted as they are, without the necessity of any negation or denial. The duality of the world is therefore overcome, and a higher-level equality emerges that still acknowledges individual differences. (Source Accessed June 29, 2020)
Although the doctrine of tathāgatagarbha can be traced to the teaching of an innately pure luminous mind (prakṛtiś cittasya prabhāsvarā) in early Buddhist teachings, the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa-parivarta (AAN) is often considered one of the earliest Buddhist scriptures that explicitly expound the teachings of the tathāgatagarbha.
The central message of the AAN focuses upon the non-increase and non-decrease nature of the dharmadhātu. This brings out the idea of the dharmadhātu as a totality which transcends all dualistic notions. Translated into Chinese by Bodhiruci in 525 CE, the AAN is now extant only in Chinese translation (Taishō no. 668). Unfortunately, no serious studies have ever been conducted on this sūtra in Western scholarship. The precise relationship between the tathāgatagarbha and the two Mahāyāna traditions, Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, is also worth investigating in detail. The thesis will argue that the tathāgatagarbha is not a separate school in Indian Buddhism. It will then study the historical issues relating to the AAN, followed by a philosophical investigation of its teachings. The thesis will also undertake an "external" consideration of the doctrinal relationship between the AAN and a number of sūtras and śāstras. It will also incorporate a study of Bodhiruci (菩提流支), of the Northern Wei (北魏) dynasty, who translated the AAN into Chinese, as well as the first complete English translation of the AAN from its extant Chinese version.
This study may provide an alternative view on the tathāgatagarbha theory. The thesis will argue that the tathāgatagarbha is referring to be an aspect of all experiences. This means that all beings are by nature having a dimension of the mind not fully realized, and it is yogic meditative practices that enable the practitioners to develop an awareness of the enlightenment which is always implicit in our consciousness.
Although the text has hitherto drawn the attention primarily of Japanese scholars, this is the first critical edition of the sūtra, aligning its Chinese text with the available Sanskrit, offering a richly annotated English translation, a detailed introduction which places the work in its historical and doctrinal context, and a number of appendices exploring key notions, providing a reading text shorn of annotation, and enumerating the prolific quotations of the work found in Chinese Buddhist literature. This volume is thus an important contribution to studies of developing Mahāyāna Buddhism, Buddhist doctrine and the textual history of scriptures.
(Source: Hamburg University Press)
Snellgrove presents the Hevajra tantra, and tantric texts of this class, not as degenerate products of a faith at the time in terminal decline in India—as has often beeb claimed by puritanical scholars—but rather as a wholly legitimate expression of esoteric ritual and meditative practice developed as a natural evolution within the madhyamaka tradition.
While based primarily on Nepalese manuscript editions of the text, Snellgrove makes extensive reference to the Tibetan translation as well as to extant Indian commentaries. The first half of the work comprises an introduction and the actual translation with detailed annotations, while the second consists of the Romanized original Sanskrit and Tibetan texts and an extensive glossary. (Source: Back Cover)
Snodgrass explains how the Buddhism presented in Chicago was shaped by the institutional, social, and political imperatives of the Meiji Buddhist revival movement in Japan and was further determined by the Parliament itself, which, despite its rhetoric of fostering universal brotherhood and international goodwill, was thoroughly permeated with confidence in the superiority of American Protestantism. Additionally, in the context of Japan's intensive diplomatic campaign to renegotiate its treaties with Western nations, the nature of Japanese religion was not simply a religious issue, Snodgrass argues, but an integral part of Japan's bid for acceptance by the international community. (Source: University of North Carolina Press)
Early in the history of the Kagyü school, the teachings of Jikten Sumgön were condensed into 150 core formulations called vajra statements. These pithy, revelatory statements comprise the Single Intention (Dgongs gcig), which presents the thought of the Buddha and the nature of the ineffable (brjod du med pa) in concise and direct expression. The Single Intention weaves the thread of ineffable mahāmudrā through the entire fabric of Buddhism. It presents mahāmudrā as pervading disciplined conduct, meditative concentration, and discriminative knowledge; ground, path, and result; view, practice, and conduct; and the “three vows” of prātimokṣa, of the bodhisattvas, and of mantra. Jikten Sumgön teaches how the fundamental values and insights revealed by the Buddha are woven into reality and therefore accessible to all.
Jan-Ulrich Sobisch manages to convey the unity of the Buddha’s message both in its particulars and in its scope. His deep and authoritative skill makes this the definitive presentation of one of the most unique and compelling works of classical Tibetan literature. (Source: Wisdom Publications)
Showing how it is absolutely essential for—and goes hand in hand with—the achievement of insight into reality, he gives practical tips for countering sleepiness, agitation, and their more subtle counterparts. Leading us step by step toward deeper levels of concentration, volume 4 of the Steps on the Path to Enlightenment series brings readers closer to the ultimate goal of śamatha: unlimited and effortless focus. (Source: Wisdom Publications)
The primary concept underlying Dōgen's Zen practice is “oneness of practice-enlightenment”. In fact, this concept is considered so fundamental to Dōgen's variety of Zen—and, consequently, to the Sōtō school as a whole—that it formed the basis for the work Shushō-gi, which was compiled in 1890 by Takiya Takushō of Eihei-ji and Azegami Baisen of Sōji-ji as an introductory and prescriptive abstract of Dōgen's massive work, the Shōbōgenzō (“Treasury of the Eye of the True Dharma”).
Dōgen is a profoundly original and difficult 13th century Buddhist thinker whose works have begun attracting increasing attention in the West. Admittedly difficult for even the most advanced and sophisticated scholar of Eastern thought, he is bound, initially, to present an almost insurmountable barrier to the Western mind. Yet the task of penetrating that barrier must be undertaken and, in fact, is being carried out by many gifted scholars toiling in the Dōgen vineyard. (Source: University of Hawai'i Press)
Dölpopa emphasized two contrasting definitions of the Buddhist theory of emptiness. He described relative phenomena as "empty of self-nature," but absolute reality as only "empty of other," i.e., relative phenomena. He further identified absolute reality as the buddha nature, or eternal essence, present in all living beings. This view of an "emptiness of other," know in Tibetan as shentong, is Dölpopa's enduring legacy.
The Buddha from Dölpo contains the only English translation of three of Dölpopa's crucial works. A General Commentary on the Doctrine is one of the earliest texts in which he systematically presented his view of the entire Buddhist path to enlightenment. The Fourth Council and its Autocommentary (which was not in the first edition of this book) were written at the end of his life and represent a final summation of his teachings. These translations are preceded by a detailed discussion of Dölpopa's life, his revolutionary ideas, earlier precedents for the shentongview, his unique use of language, and the influence of his theories. The fate of his Jonang tradition, which was censored by the central Tibetan government in the seventeenth century but still survives, is also examined. (Source: Shambhala Publications)
[NOTE. The materials embodied in this list were received in a final form from Dr. Hoernle. early in 1918. The typed press copy prepared from them was after his death in November of that year checked with the original under the kind supervision of Dr. F. W. Thomas.
Owing to various reasons difficulty was experienced about verifying the exact reading of all extracts quoted by Dr. Hoernle from particular MSS., mainly in Khotanese language. It being thus impossible to assure in this respect the degree of accuracy which that most painstaking collaborator would have aimed at, I have thought it advisable to reduce the reproduction of such quotations within narrow limits. For convenient reference by future students the original Inventory ' slips' as received from Dr. Hoernle's hand, as well as a typed copy of them, have been deposited at the India Office Library.—A. STEIN.]
Scholars and commentators have long recognized the historical importance of original enlightenment thought but differ heatedly over how it is to be understood. Some tout it as the pinnacle of the Buddhist philosophy of absolute non-dualism. Others claim to find in it the paradigmatic expression of a timeless Japanese spirituality. According other readings, it represents a dangerous anti-nomianism that undermined observance of moral precepts, precipitated a decline in Buddhist scholarship, and denied the need for religious discipline. Still others denounce it as an authoritarian ideology that, by sacralizing the given order, has in effect legitimized hierarchy and discriminative social practices. Often the acceptance or rejection of original enlightenment thought is seen as the fault line along which traditional Buddhist institutions are to be differentiated from the new Buddhist movements (Zen, Pure Land, and Nichiren) that arose during Japan’s medieval period.
Jacqueline Stone’s groundbreaking study moves beyond the treatment of the original enlightenment doctrine as abstract philosophy to explore its historical dimension. Drawing on a wealth of medieval primary sources and modern Japanese scholarship, it places this discourse in its ritual, institutional, and social contexts, illuminating its importance to the maintenance of traditions of lineage and the secret transmission of knowledge that characterized several medieval Japanese elite culture. It sheds new light on interpretive strategies employed in pre-modern Japanese Buddhist texts, an area that hitherto has received a little attention. Through these and other lines of investigation, Stone problematizes entrenched notions of “corruption” in the medieval Buddhist establishment. Using the examples of Tendai and Nichiren Buddhism and their interactions throughout the medieval period, she calls into question both overly facile distinctions between "old" and "new" Buddhism and the long-standing scholarly assumptions that have perpetuated them. This study marks a significant contribution to ongoing debates over definitions of Buddhism in the Kamakura era (1185–1333), long regarded as a formative period in Japanese religion and culture. Stone argues that "original enlightenment thought" represents a substantial rethinking of Buddhist enlightenment that cuts across the distinction between "old" and "new" institutions and was particularly characteristic of the medieval period.
(Source: University of Hawai'i Press)
Buddhist doctrine refers to entities possessing mind (Skt., citta) as sentient beings (Skt., sattva) and considers them to undergo rebirth through the six realms of existence (hells, hungry spirits, animals, asuras, human beings, heavenly beings). It is because they possess mind that they give rise to the defilements, accumulating the negative karma that is the cause of rebirth. The purpose of Buddhism therefore is to release beings from the suffering associated with rebirth, a condition called liberation (Skt., vimokśa) and nirvana. Mahayana calls it the attainment of buddhahood (Jpn., jōbutsu). There also exist nonsentient beings (Skt., asattva). Since they do not possess mind, they do not undergo the cycle of rebirth and so cannot attain liberation, nirvana, or buddhahood. In principle, therefore, plants, like inorganic substances not possessing "mind," are not understood to undergo rebirth. It is therefore impossible to discuss their attainment of buddhahood. However, when Buddhism entered China, the potential for buddhahood of nonsentient beings became an important subject for debate. Since China had not previously had any concept of sentient beings, no strict distinction was made between sentient and nonsentient, which was why the question of nonsentient buddhahood was taken up. The Jingangbi lun (Diamond Scalpel Treatise) of the sixth Tiantai patriarch, Zhanran (711–82), confronted the issue directly and asserted that nonsentient beings could attain buddhahood. This did not, however, mean that they could aspire to enlightenment, practice, and achieve buddhahood of themselves. Rather, when a sentient being attains buddhahood, the whole environment becomes the Buddha's realm. A sentient being's subjective existence (Jpn., shōhō) arises from past karmic effects and this causes the realm of the environment (Jpn., ehō) to arise. Environment is thus dependent on subjective existence, and therefore, when a sentient being attains enlightenment, so do nonsentient beings. What is important here is that sentient beings attain enlightenment through their own practice, whereas nonsentient beings can only do so as the environment of sentient beings. This was a solution consonant with Chinese ideas that placed significance on a person's own actions, seen typically in Confucianism. The Japanese did not view human beings in any special way as did the Chinese. Furthermore, they tended to look on nature in terms of plants. The land of Japan was called the "middle land of the reed beds" (ashihara no nakatsu kuni), its landscape being described as a swamp where reeds grew. The fecundity of plants symbolized the evolution of the world. According to the Nihon shoki (Chronicle of Japan, eighth century), before Ninigi, grandson of the sun goddess Amaterasu, descended from the heavenly plain, the land of Japan was where "the standing trees, and even the single blade of grass, uttered words." This is thought to represent the disordered state of nature that existed before the land was civilized. Humankind was referred to as people grass (hitogusa); in other words, the mass of people was understood through the model of grasses and trees.
In Japan, therefore, nature was thought of in terms of plants, and people were thought to be close to them. Japan's view of nature is often described as animism, but this is not necessarily appropriate. Not all natural phenomena were regarded as spiritual entities, nor were they objects of veneration. Deities (kami) resided in the depths of nature, manifesting themselves in natural objects serving as receptacles (yorishiro). For example, at Ōmiwa Shrine in Nara Prefecture, Mount Miwa is described as the body (shintai) of its kami. Originally, though, the mountain was regarded as sacred because it was the place to which the kami descended: it was not itself the kami. The buddhahood of grasses and trees came to be a concern precisely because human beings and plants were thought of as being of the same quality. Whereas in China tiles and stones were presented as representative of nonsentient existence, in Japan it was grasses and trees. (Read the entire article here)
The central topic of the work is the notion of illusory appearance, for when one realizes deeply that all appearances are illusory, one realizes also that all appearances are in that respect equal. The realization of the equality of all phenomena is said to be the Great Perfection approach to the path, which frees one from both grasping at and rejecting appearances. However, for those unable to remain effortlessly within the natural state, in the final chapter Rongzompa also describes how paths with effort are included in the Great Perfection approach. (Source: Shambhala Publications)
The first part of the book outlines the three-fold nature of Being, as conceptualized in Buddhist metaphysics. The author uses an interpretive framework borrowed from the existentialist philosophy of Heidegger, in order to separate the transcendental Essence of Being from its Temporal manifestation as Self, and from its Spatial or Cosmic dimension. The second part clarifies the Buddhist approach to knowledge in its religious, transcendental sense and it shows that the Buddhists were actually first in making use of dialectical reasoning for the purpose of transcending the contradictory dualities imbedded in the common ways of perceiving, thinking, and arguing about reality. (Source: SUNY Press)
The main reasons for this are, in my opinion, evident. While the canonical books of the Hinayana Buddhism have been systematically preserved in the Pali language, those of the Mahayana Buddhism are scattered promiscuously all over the fields and valleys of Asia and in half a dozen different languages. Further, while most of the Sanskrit originals have been destroyed, their translations in Tibetan, Mongolian, and Chinese have never been thoroughly studied. And, lastly, the Mahayana system is so intricate, so perplexingly abstruse, that scholars not accustomed to this form of thought and expression are entirely at a loss to find their way through it
Among the false charges which have been constantly poured upon the Mahayana Buddhism, we find the following : Some say, "It is a nihilism, denying God, the soul, the world and all"; some say, "It is a polytheism: Avalokiteçvāra, Tara, Vajrapani, Mañjuçri, Amitābha, and what not, are all worshipped by its followers"; still others declare, "It is nothing but sophistry, quibbling, hair-splitting subtlety, and a mocking of the innermost yearnings of humanity" ; while those who attack it from the historical side proclaim, "It is not the genuine teaching of Buddha; it is on the contrary the pure invention of Nāgārjuna, who devised the system by ingeniously mixing up his negative philosophy with the non-atman theory of his predecessor"; or, "The Mahayana is a queer mixture of the Indian mythology that grew most freely in the Tantric period, with a degenerated form of the noble ethical teachings of primitive Buddhism." Though no one who is familiar with Mahayanistic ideas will admit these one-sided and superficial judgments, the majority of people are so credulous as to lend their ear to these falsified reports and to believe them.
The present English translation of Açvaghosha's principal work is therefore dedicated to the Western public by a Buddhist from Japan, with a view to dispelling the denunciations so ungraciously heaped upon the Mahayana Buddhism. The name of Açvaghosha is not very well known to the readers of this country, but there is no doubt that he was the first champion, promulgator, and expounder of this doctrine, so far as we can judge from all our available historical records. Besides, in this book almost all the Mahayanistic thoughts, as distinguished from the other religious systems in India, are traceable, so that we can take it as the representative text of this school. If the reader will carefully and patiently go through the entire book, unmindful of its peculiar terminology and occasional obscureness, I believe he will be amply and satisfactorily repaid for his labor, and will find that the underlying ideas are quite simple, showing occasionally a strong resemblance to the Upanishad philosophy as well as to the Samkhya system, though of course retaining its own independent thought throughout.
In conclusion let me say a word about the difficulty of translating such an abstruse religio-philosophic discourse as the present text. It is comparatively easy to translate works of travels or of historical events or to make abstracts from philosophical works. But a translator of the Mahayanistic writings, which are full of specific phraseology and highly abstruse speculations, will find himself like a wanderer in some unknown region, not knowing how to obtain any communicable means to express what be perceives and feels. To reproduce the original as faithfully as possible and at the same time to make it intelligible enough to the outside reader, who has perhaps never come in contact with this form of thought, the translator must be perfectly acquainted with the Mahayanistic doctrine as it is understood in the East, while he must not be lacking in adequate knowledge of Western philosophy and mode of thinking. The present translator has done his best to make the Mahayanistic thoughts of Açvaghosha as clear and intelligible as his limited knowledge and lack of philosophic training allow him. He is confident, however, that he has interpreted the Chinese text correctly. In spite of this, some errors may have crept into the present translation, and the translator will gladly avail himself of the criticisms of the Mahayana scholars to make corrections in case a second edition of the work is needed. (Suzuki, translator's preface, x–xiv)
The Laṅkāvatāra is a Mahayana text difficult in more than one way to understand perfectly as to its meaning and also in Its proper historical setting. But its importance as giving most of the fundamental tenets of Mahayana Buddhism has urged the author to publish whatever results he has gained so far in his study. They are no doubt short of being quite satisfactory from a strictly scholarly point of view, but the author's earnest wish is to open the way, if he could so hope, for further study and more thoroughgoing investigation of the text. Mahayana Buddhism is
just beginning to be known in the West. As to the appreciation of its full significance we have to wait patiently for some years yet to come.
The first two parts of these Studies were already published In The Eastern Buddhist, but in the present work they have been revised fully and inaccuracies corrected as far as available. The third part is entirely new. As the Studies were not planned out as a whole from the beginning but have grown progressively in the author's mind, some repetitions have become inevitable. The second part dealing with the Laṅkāvatāra containing the philosophy of Zen Buddhism was written first. As it was being revised after its publication in The Eastern Buddhist, Volume IV, Nos. 3-4, for 1928, the thought suggested itself that the sutra must be studied also textually since there are still three Chinese and one (or two) Tibetan translations. The result was the first part of the present work, which appeared as an independent article in The Eastern Buddhist, Volume V, No. 1, for 1929.
The Laṅkāvatāra does not belong exclusively to the Zen school of Buddhism, it is also the common property of the Mahayana. When it is studied apart from Zen, some of the important conceptions developed in the sutra, which do not
necessarily belong to the philosophy of Zen, are to be expounded, however briefly. Hence the third part of the present Studies, entitled "Some of the Important Theories Expounded in the Laṅkāvatāra."
The author has prepared for the benefit principally of
his Japanese and Cbinese readers a glossary of the Sanskrit technical terms found in the book. This he hopes to be of use in their perusal of Sanskrit Buddhist literature and at the same time illustrative of the methods of the Indian-Chinese translators. (Suzuki, preface, v–vi)
In Not Always So Suzuki once again voices Zen in everyday language with the vigour, sensitivity, and buoyancy of a true friend. Here is support and nourishment. Here is a mother and father lending a hand, but letting you find your own way. Here is guidance which empowers your freedom (or way–seeking mind), rather than pinning you down to directions and techniques. Here is teaching which encourages you to touch and know your true heart and to express yourself fully, teaching which is not teaching from outside, but a voice arising in your own being. (Source Accessed Nov 25, 2020)
The innocence of this first inquiry—just asking what you are—is beginner's mind. The mind of the beginner is needed throughout Zen practice. It is the open mind, the attitude that includes both doubt and possibility, the ability to see things always as fresh and new. It is needed in all aspects of life. Beginner's mind is the practice of Zen mind.
This book originated from a series of talks given by Zen Master Shunryu Suzuki to a small group is Los Altos, California. He joined their meditation periods once a week and afterwards answered their questions and tried to encourage them in their practice of Zen and help them solve the problems of life. His approach is informal, and he draws his examples from ordinary events and common sense. Zen is now and here, he is saying; it can be as meaningful for the West as for the East. But his fundamental teaching and practice and drawn from all the centuries of Zen Buddhism and especially from Dogen, one of the most important and creative of all Zen Masters.
This book is about how to practice Zen as a workable discipline and religion, about posture and breathing, about the basic attitudes and understanding that makes Zen practice possible, about non-duality, emptiness, and enlightenment. Here one begins to understand what Zen is really about. And, most important of all, every page breathes with the joy and simplicity that make a liberated life possible. (Source: inside jacket)
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The MPNS-G declares or suggests the non-emptiness of the tathāgata. This is reinterpretation of the pratītyasamutpāda and the śūnyatā idea, and follows the rule of the historical Buddhist hermeneutics. It is especially worthwhile to note that the MBhS, like the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra in the Vijñāptimātra idea, devaluates the śūnyatā idea as imperfect. This quite negative attitude toward the śūnyatā idea does not appear in any other Indian texts on the tathāgatagarbha idea including the MPNS and the AMS. Aiming at establishing the theory that every sentient being is able to perform religious efforts and become buddha on account of the nonemptiness and the eternalness of the tathāgata, the MBhS must reject any sūtra concerning the śūnyatā idea as imperfect. Though the MPNS is a pioneer in reinterpretation of the the śúnyatā idea, the MPNS cannot devaluate it perfectly because the śūnyatā idea is one of the main backgrounds to the MPNS. The MBhS's decisive attitude toward the śūnyatā idea devaluation becomes possible by having the MPNS as its basis. (Source: UTokyo Repository)
Buddhism, as a religion arose in ancient India and developed in various parts of the world, aims at the unique goal that is providing welfare and happiness for human beings. The real happiness brought to mankind by Buddhism is not a satisfaction of self-requirement, but a spiritual benefit
coming from enlightenment of the absolute truth, emancipation of the ego of things and persons, and free from the hindrances of passion and ignorance. Buddhism that is mainly based on teachings of the Buddha delivered at different places on different occasions continues to develop and adapt to the new challenges in the form of thought, different cultures, religions, customs and tradition of the people wherever it went. However, all the Buddha’s teachings originate in the enlightenment of the Buddha.
All traditions of Buddhism accept that the Buddha attained enlightenment through stages of meditation that led to the Buddhahood endowed with transcendent wisdom and compassion. According to some Mahāyāna scriptures, the Buddhahood is nothing other than the Buddhanature which is the inherent essence within all beings. The doctrine of the Buddha-nature presented in several Mahāyāna scriptures of the so-called Tathāgatagarbha literature was formed in about the third century CE. There is no evidence that the doctrine of Buddha-nature formed a school in India like the Śūnyatā (Emptiness) of the Mādhyamika or the Vijñaptimātratā (Consciousness-only) of the Yogācāra School, but the Buddha-nature plays an important role in the religious life of Mahāyāna Buddhism in the East and Southeast Asian countries because it provides a faith of the permanence and immortality due to a declaration that all sentient beings possess the innate Buddha-nature and have a potentiality of becoming the Buddhas.
Although most of the followers of Mahāyāna Buddhism believe the doctrine of the Buddha-nature and constantly try their best endeavor to attain the goal of Buddhahood, there were a lot of opinions that criticize the doctrine of the Buddha-nature by asserting that it is not Buddhist because this idea of the Buddha-nature seems to be akin to the permanent Self
(ātman/brahman) presented in the Vedānta of Brahmanism. Conversely, according to some other scholars, the Buddha nature or Tathāgatagarbha referred in some Mahāyāna Sūtras does not represent a substantial self or ego; it is rather a positive language to express the thought of śūnyatā and to represent the potentiality of realizing the Buddhahood through Buddhist
practices. Modern scholars today fall into an unending discussion about the similarity or difference between the Buddha-nature and Brahman but no one compares the date of these doctrines. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is an attempt to clarify the Buddhist orthodoxy of the doctrine of the Buddha-nature through chronological comparison of the date of Buddha-nature with that of Brahman. Based on the Laṅkāvatārasūtra and other scriptures, the work attempt to elucidate that the Buddhist thought of the Buddha-nature had existed prior the Vedāntic thought of Brahman. Indeed, the thesis shows that while the doctrine of the Buddha-nature had come into existence in the third century CE in the Tathāgatagarbha literature, the
Vedāntic doctrine of Brahman appeared for the first time in the sixth century CE. Consequently, although the Buddha-nature is closely akin to Brahman/ātman of the Vedānta, the doctrine of the Buddha-nature is originally a thought of Buddhism. For this reason, the writer chose the topic
entitled “Thought of Buddha-nature as Depicted in the LaṅkāvatāraSūtra” for the Ph.D. thesis.
Study on the Buddha-nature is a task which cannot be carried out without the important texts, teachings, practices and historical movements of Buddhism. This study is mainly based upon the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, a Buddhist text of the later period of the Tathāgatagarbha literature, in which
the thought of the Buddha-nature is depicted in relationship with most of the Mahāyāna concepts such as the Buddhatā, Tathāgatagarbha, Ālayavijñāna, Dharmakāya, Mind-only, etc. Especially, the Laṅkāvatārasūtra emphasizes the practice of self-realization and sudden enlightenment of the Buddha-nature. It is also said that the Sūtra was handed down by Bodhidharma to his heir disciple Hui-ke 慧可 as the proof of enlightenment in Chan (Zen) Buddhism.
This thesis is an attempt to investigate and criticize the philosophical and religious thought of the Buddha-nature as depicted in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra. In so doing, we have taken into consideration the following principle themes:
1. Evolution of the Buddha-nature Concept
2. The Buddha-nature in the Tathāgatagarbha Literature
3. The Laṅkāvatārasūtra and Hindu Philosophy
4. The Thought of Buddha-nature in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra
5. The Practice of Buddha-Nature in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra
6. Further Development of the Concept of Buddha-nature in
China
Structurally, therefore, excluding the introduction and conclusion, the thesis consists of six major chapters in accordance with the above six main themes respectively.
The constructed nostalgia of the later Great Perfection, or rDzogs chen, tradition gazes backward temporally and geographically toward eighth-century India, reminiscing an era in which the subcontinent is thought to have served as generous benefactor of Dharma gifts to the fledging Buddhist empire of Tibet. Insistence on the familiar Buddhist requirements for true transmission—authenticity and legitimacy founded in lineage and longevity—certainly inspired many of its textual "revelations" beginning in the eleventh century. Many of those nostalgic constructions of rNying ma history have been well documented by modern scholars.
It would be rash to assert, however, that despite all those imaginings, there were no historical primordia of the Great Perfection in the preceding centuries. The textual roots of the Mind Series (sems sde) texts are testament to these early stirrings, as are the Dunhuang manuscripts identified by Sam van Schaik as expressing a form of “Tibetan Zen.”[1] A third seed was planted via the Tibetan Mahāyoga tantra tradition, and within it, germinations of Great Perfection gnoseology, observable prominently in the ninth-century works of dPal dbyangs, who in some colophons and later histories is designated gNyan dPal dbyangs. His works include six canonical verse texts retrospectively entitled sGron ma drug, or Six Lamps,[2] and the rDo rje sems dpa’ zhus lan (Vajrasattva Questions and Answers) catechism found at Dunhuang in three manuscript copies. I have discussed these texts and their most likely Indian inspirations elsewhere. Here, I highlight a particular text within the Six Lamps, his Thugs kyi sgron ma (Lamp of the Mind), as intending to establish, quite early on, a standard set of topics we see well developed in systemizations of the early Great Perfection tradition a few centuries later, and perhaps even before that, in Mind Series texts such as those attributed to Mañjuśrīmitra like the Byang chub kyi sems rdo la gser zhun and the Byang chub sems bsgom pa.[3]
Of all dPal dbyangs’s texts, the Thugs kyi sgron ma is the ideological, linguistic, and practical hinge to his Mayājāla corpus as a whole, linking the other five of the Six Lamps texts and providing convincing evidence for accepting those Six Lamps as a collection, as well as offering insight to the later interpretations of his catechism. The Thugs kyi sgron ma displays dPal dbyangs’s full range of presentation. It includes, on the one hand, dPal dbyangs’s direct recommendations to Mahāyoga tantra, and on the other hand, his depictions of the realization of reality as utterly unstructured, unmediated, and transcendent of any dichotomization or reification, using the apophatic language sprinkled throughout the rest of the Six Lamps texts. Thus, by emphasizing these two elements—the transgressive and the transcendent—within a single text, the Thugs kyi sgron ma may have served as a valuable field guide to early Tibetan Mahāyoga and at least to some degree as a useful strategic plan for the cultivation of something more sustainable and vibrant on Tibetan soil, the Great Perfection. As I hope to show, dPal dbyangs’s very deliberate indexing of these topics appears to have been intended to standardize them as interpretive categories even while undercutting the value of reliance upon them as such, redefining Mahāyoga tantra as it found its earliest shape in Tibet. (Takahashi, introductory remarks, 159–60)
Notes
- Sam van Schaik, “The Early Days of the Great Perfection,” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 27.1: 167 and 201.
- The Six Lamps texts are as follows: The Lamp of the Mind (Thugs kyi sgron ma), The Lamp of the Correct View (lTa ba yang dag sgron ma), The Lamp Illuminating the Extremes (mTha'i mun sel sgron ma), The Lamp of Method and Wisdom (Thabs shes sgron ma), The Lamp of the Method of Meditation (bsGom thabs kyi sgron ma), and The Lamp of the Precious View (lTa ba rin chen sgron ma). These are P5918, P5919, P5920, P5921, P5922, and P5923, respectively. There are other Lamp collections in both Nyingma and Bön traditions, usually comprising four or six texts. The most prominent example of these is from the Bönpo Great Perfection lineage, the sGron ma drug gi gdams pa. See Christopher Hatchell's "Advice on the Six Lamps" in Naked Seeing: The Great Perfection, the Wheel of Time, and Visionary Buddhism in Renaissance Tibet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), and Jean-Luc Achard’s English translation in the Six Lamps: Secret Dzogchen Instructions of the Bön Tradition (Boston: Wisdom, 2017).
- See Namkhai Norbu and Kennard Lipman’s Primordial Experience: An Introduction to rDzogs-chen Meditation (Boston: Shambhala, 2001). Karen Liljenberg has discovered parallel passages to dPal dbyangs’s Lamp text the Thabs shes sgron ma in the rTse mo byung rgyal, a text she has identified as belonging to the sems sde corpus the Sems sde lung chen po bco brgyad. Karen Liljenberg, “A Critical Study of the Thirteen Later Translations of the Dzogchen Mind Series” (doctoral dissertation, SOAS, 2012), 57-60. I suspect there are further discoveries to be made of such borrowings between early Tibetan Mahāyoga texts and those of the early Mind Series. See also Liljenberg's paper elsewhere in this issue.
The point now I am going to express here is the discovery of the use of a compound noun ' tathāgata-gotra-saṃbhava ' in the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra), which seems to be the Sanskrit original for '如來性起', one of the important terms in the philosophy of the Hua-yen (華嚴) Sect of Chinese Buddhism, but is actually not found in the Avataṃsaka, the basic scripture for that sect. (Takasaki, para. 1, 48)
In part 1 he has singled out those scriptures that use the term tathāgatagarbha as their principal term and identified three scriptures—Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra, Anūnatvāpurṇatvanirdeśa, and Śrīmālādevīnirdeśa—as the basis for the formation of the tathāgatagarbha theory. Next, he has placed the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, which uses the term buddhadhātu for the first time as a synonym of tathāgatagarbha, and associated scriptures in a second group, while in the third group we have the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra and so on, in which the concept of tathāgatagarbha is identified with ālayavijñana, the basic concept of the Vijñānavāda.
In part 2, he has dealt with the prehistory of the tathāgatagarbha theory in Mahāyāna scriptures that use terms synonymous with tathāgatagarbha, such as gotra and dhātu, tathāgatagotra, tathāgatotpattisambhava, āryavaṃsa, buddhaputra, dharmadhātu and dharmakāya, cittaprakṛti, and so on. The main points made in this work are discussed in the papers that have now been brought together in the present volume.
This volume has for convenience' sake been divided into seven parts according to subject matter. Part 1 presents a textual study, namely, a critical edition of chapter 6 of the Laṅkāvatāra. Part 2 deals with subjects concerning scriptures such as the Laṅkāvatāra, part 3 with technical terms and basic concepts of the tathāgatagarbha theory, part 4 with tathāgatagarbha doctrine in general, and part 5 with Japanese Buddhism and Buddhism in East Asia (on the basis of scriptures translated into Chinese). Part 6 presents a historical survey of Japanese scholarship on Buddhism, and part 7 consists of several book reviews. (Source: Motilal Banarsidass)
The term ' ārambaṇa ' is one of the technical terms unique to Buddhism. Being equivalent to Pali ' ārammaṇa ' and Cl. Skt. ' ālambana ' it is usually used in the sense of 'basis of cognition' or 'sense-object', e.g. rūpa as ārambaṇa of cakṣurvijñāna, or dharma as that of manovijñāna. The usual equivalent to this term in Tibetan and Chinese language is ' dmigs pa ' and '所 縁', respectively.
What I am going to examine here is whether or not the same meaning mentioned above can be applied to this term used in the Ratnagotravibhāga (RGV), I, 9.
. . . We may conclude the characteristics of the TG [tathāgatagarbha] theory in this sūtra in the following way.
1) The biggest contribution of the MPS [Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra] to the history of the TG theory is the establishment of the concept of buddhadhātu as explaining the nature of tathāgatagarbha. This dhātu concept as showing the essence or nature common to sattvas and the Tathāgata seems to be introduced by the AAN [Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa], but the MPS, succeeding the AAN, utilized it in its full scope, in which are involved various other meanings of the term dhātu developed in Buddhism, such as relic of the Buddha, the 18 component elements, the 4 gross elements, sphere of the dharma, the essence of dharmas (e.g. the tathāgatakāya is not (consisting) of elements of collected materials (bsags paḥi khams), but of the essence of the dharma (chos kyi khams) (L. 110a1–2). It suggests that 'dharmakāya' is 'dharmadhātu-kāya' ), the word root, etc.
2) The most unique expression of this sūtra with respect to the TG is the ātman, which is regarded as a sort of taboo in Buddhism*. Connotation of this term in the text is completely identical with dhātu.
3) Inspite of the use of such an abstract concept, the MPS is far from systematization of the theory, in comparison with the AAN and the ŚMS [Śrītmalasūtra]. Especially the relationship between tathāgatagarbha and dharmakāya, problem of the pure mind and the defilements, etc. are not discussed explicitly as in the SMS. In this respect, I hesitate a bit to suppose the date of the MPS as coming after the ŚMS.
4) Inspite of frequent references to the icchantika, the term agotra is not used. In general, the gotra concept is lacking in the MPS. This point is common to the AAN, and the ŚMS. (Takasaki, section 6, 9–10)
4.1.1 The Nirvāṇa Sūtras. Like many other ancient cultures, the Chinese, too, have a concept of a soul or abiding entity that survives the person‘s death. The Chinese word for such an abiding entity is línghún 靈魂. One of ancient China‘s largest and wealthiest temple, built in 328 (Eastern Jin dynasty) by the Indian monk, Huìlǐ 慧理,[1] is called Língyǐn Sì 靈隐寺, the "Temple of the Soul‘s Retreat," belonging to the Chán school, located north-west of Hangzhou, Zhejiang province. In its heyday, during the kingdom of Wúyuè guó 吳越國 (907-978) [5.1.2.1], the temple boasted of 9 multi-storey buildings, 18 pavilions, 72 halls, more than 1300 dormitory rooms, inhabited by more than 3000 monks. Many of the rich Buddhist carvings in the Fēilái fēng 飛來峰 grottos and surrounding mountains also date from this era.
The Chinese word for anattā (P) or anātman (Skt) (non-self) is wúwǒ 無我, literally meaning "not-I." There is no Chinese word for not-linghun. As such, although a Chinese Buddhist would intellectually or verbally accept the notion that there is no I (that is, an agent in an action), he would probably unconsciously hold on to the idea of some sort of independent abiding entity or eternal identity, that is, the linghun, which is in effect the equivalent of the brahmanical ātman. The situation becomes more complicated with Mahāyāna discourses, such as the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, that speak of a transcendent Buddhanature as the true self.[2]
Notes
- Not to be confused with Huìlì 慧立/惠立 (615 -?), a Táng monk, who respected the works of Xuánzàng Sānzàng 玄奘三藏, and wrote a biography on him entitled Dàcíēnsì sānzàng fǎshī zhuàn 大慈恩寺三藏法師傳. When Huìlǐ 慧理 came to Hángzhōu in 326, he was drawn to the mountainous ambience as a place of "the soul‘s retreat," and founded Língyŭn monastery there. In the Liáng 梁 dynasty, Wǔdì (武帝, emperor 502-550) who generally had a positive attitude toward Buddhism endowed Língyǐn Temple with rich land properties. Emperor Jiǎnwén (簡文, r 550-552) wrote a report on this donation, one which is titled Cì língyǐnsì tián jì (賜靈隱寺田記 Report Concerning the Donation of Land to Língyǐn Temple). See http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?97.xml+id(‗b9748-96b1-5bfa‘).
- See Dictionary of Buddhism, sv ātman
This enlightening study fills a significant gap in the field of Chinese Buddhist history. Focusing on the cultural side of Buddhism, it adds breadth and balance to studies in Buddhism as a whole, appealing to professionals and academics with an interest in Buddhism and Chinese Buddhist history. (Source: Routledge)
cultivate their experience by practicing the two phases of meditation, and in this way, achieve our own enlightenment.
Today’s teachings are based on the mind treasure of His Holiness Dudjom Rinpoche, Jigdral Yeshe Dorje, one of the great masters of the Nyingma, the Ancient Ones. They are called The Dakini Heart Essence (Khandro Thuk Thik) and within this cycle, the particular text he is teaching is the foundational practices or ngondro. The text is entitled Restoring Benefit and Happiness: Liturgy of the Foundational Practices of the Profound Path of The Dakini Heart Essence. In Boise, Idaho, last year, Rinpoche taught this text up to the point of receiving the four empowerments in the guru yoga section. Now he will start from there and pick up the thread.
Naropa's songs are very important for practitioners of Mahamudra, pithy words, rich with meaning. This is why I chose to teach them during my courses. The songs and my explanations are now translated by lotsawa Erik. These teachings are about essential meditation training. I consider them very important for future students to pay attention to and study. Doing so will greatly benefit one's understanding of the key points of Mahamudra. (Thrangu Rinpoche, foreword, 7)
Khenchen Thrangu Rinpoche was one of the grateful recipients of these teachings, which he regards as among the most important he has ever been given. He transmits them here, for the benefit of all of us who strive to practice in challenging times. They include contemplations on the ephemeral nature of both joy and suffering, meditations for resting the mind, and guidance for cultivating equanimity in any situation. (Source: Shambhala Publications)
I understand the phrase 'tathagata-garbhaḥ' as the womb that gives birth to tathāgatas, the womb for tathāgatas, which is a conclusion I have arrived by taking into consideration the contents of scriptures down to the Laṅkāvatāra sūtra, as well as the latter's expression, 'garbhas-tathāgatānām' (VI k. la).
Previously I understood the phrase (t. g.) as tathāgata abiding in the womb, which now I find inappropriate because it does not cover the whole phrase, the key-point of which is that the womb is empty of the thick coverings of kleśas.
For the understanding of the phrase t. g. I went through Śākyamuni's life-stories like the Mahāvastu (MV) and the Lalitavistara (LV), the Māyā chapter of the Gaṇḍavyūha (GV), the Śūraṃgama-samādhi sūtra (sss), the Tathāgata-garbha sūtra (TG), the Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra of mahāyāna (MPN), the Śrīmālādevi-siṃhanāda sūtra (SM), and the Laṅkāvatāra sūtra (LS). Now I am certain that it constitutes the core of the philosophy of religion of Buddhism. (Tokiwa, preliminary remarks, 13)
An encyclopedic author active during the reign of King Rāmapāla (ca. 1084–1126/1077–
ca. 1119) of the Pāla Dynasty, Abhayākaragupta is renowned for his erudition in a vast range of subjects in Buddhism.[1] His expertise is especially prominent in, though not limited to, the area of Tantric Buddhism, as attested by the well-known "Garland Trilogy" (phreng ba skor gsum), i.e. his three major works on Tantric ritual (Vajrāvalī, Jyotirmañjarī, and Niṣpannayogāvalī), which exercised a great influence on the Buddhism of the later period in Nepal and Tibet.
The Peking bsTan 'gyur includes twenty-six works ascribed to Abhayākaragupta, of which twenty-three are in the domain of Tantra; the other three deal with non-Tantric Buddhism.[2] Though most of these works are only available through Tibetan translation, some important texts of Abhayākaragupta are preserved in Sanskrit. The following works in Sanskrit have hitherto been edited: Niṣpannayogāvalī; Vajrāvalī; Jyotimañjarī; Ucchuṣmajambhalasādhana; Svādhiṣṭhānakramopadeśa.[3] In addition, Sanskrit manuscripts are known to exist of the Pañcakramatātparyapañjikā Kramakaumudī, Kālacakrāvatāra, and Abhayapaddhati.[4] According to some recent information, furthermore, Sanskrit manuscripts of the Āmnāyamañjarī, Munimatālaṅkāra and Madhyamakamañjarī[5] have been discovered in Tibet [6]
The Amnāyamañjarī, which may be called the magnum opus of Abhayākaragupta, is a commentary on the Saṃpuṭodbhavatantra and an encyclopedic compendium of Indian Tantric Buddhism. According to Bühnemann, Abhayākaragupta undertook the composition of the Amnāyamañjarī before 1101 or 1108 C.E. (twenty-fifth regnal year of Rāmapāla) and completed it in 1113 or 1120 C.E (thirty-seventh year of Rāmapāla). As has been remarked,[7] the Saṃpuṭodbhavatantra, though traditionally considered to be an Explanatory Tantra (vyākhyātantra) of the Hevajra and Saṃvara cycles, integrates many doctrinal and ritual elements adopted from several heterogeneous textual traditions such as that of the Guhyasamāja. Because of this "ecumenical" character of the Saṃpuṭodbhavatantra, the Amnāyamañjarī as its commentary also encompasses a great variety of subjects relating to the doctrine and ritual of Tantric Buddhism. The Amnāyamañjarī is referred to several times by Abhayākaragupta himself in his other works, such as the Munimatālaṅkāra,
Abhayapaddhati, Pañcakramatātparyapañjikā, and Vajrāvalī.[8] In turn, the Āmnāyamañjarī
refers to his other works [9]
Though, as remarked above, the existence of a presumably complete Sanskrit manuscript of the Āmnāyamañjarī has been reported, it still remains inaccessible to us. However, a single folio fragment of this text has been recently identified in the collection of Sanskrit manuscripts in Göttingen. In this paper, we describe this manuscript fragment and present a critical edition and an annotated translation of the text contained in it. We also include as appendices an edition of the corresponding part of the Tibetan translation as well as parallel passages found in Kamalanātha's Ratnāvalī and Abhayākaragupta's Abhayapaddhati. (Tomabechi and Kano, Abhayākaragupta and the Āmnāyamañjarī, 22–23)
Notes
- For the dates and works of Abhayākaragupta, see Erb 1997: 27–29: Bühnemann and Tachikawa 1991: Bühnemann 1992.
- For bibliographical information on these works, see Bühnemann 1992: 123–125.
- The Svādhiṣṭhānakramopadeśa (or Dvibhujasaṃvaropadeśa) was edited by Okuyama (1993).
- The Centre for Tantric Studies at University of Hamburg is currently working on a joint project to the Abhayapaddhati in collaboration with CTRC (China Tibetology Research Centre). Tomabechi is preparing a critical edition of the Kramakaumudī based on the manuscript copy preserved at CTRC.
- The latter text is not included in the bsTan 'gyur, but is mentioned by Abhayākaragupta himself in the Munimatālaṅkāra, D 145v6; P 179r8: mdor bsdus pa ni kho bos dbu ma'i snye mar phul du byung bar rnam par bshad do; Āmnāyamañjarī, D 28r1; P 31r2–3: 'di'i skye ba dang 'jig pa de dag kyang dbu ma'i snye mar nges par dpyad zin pas (P: pa'i) ... ; D 76v7–77r1; P 86v2-3: thsad ma gang gis 'di rang bzhin med pa nyid du bsgrub pa de ni bdag cag gis rgyas pa dang bcas par dbu ma'i snye mar nye bar bkod cing; D 162r5–6; P 179v1: bzlog pa kho na las de kho na nyid 'di rnams so zhes dbu ma'i snye mar nges par dpyad zin to (P: te). See also Isoda 1984: 3 n. 14.
- These texts are registered in the (unpublished) catalogue of microfilms kept at the CTRC in Beijing. Tomabechi confirmed the existence of the copies of these manuscripts during his visit to Beijing in May–June 2007.
- Noguchi 1984 and Skorupski 1996: 201.
- See Munimatālaṅkāra, D 89r4; P 93v2, D 218r7; P 287r4, Kramakaumudī, fol. 22v4, 27r1, 53v4. For the Abhayapaddhati see Bühnemann and Tachikawa 1991: xiv and Bühnemann 1992:123; and for the Vajrāvalī, see Bühnemann and Tachikawa 1991: xvi and Bühnemann 1992: 125.
- Vajrāvalī (in ĀM D 72v3; P 82r2, D 97r1; P 108r7, D 188v7; P 208r5, D 24Or2; P 266v4, D 257v2; P 288r4, D 260r4; P 291r5–6), Jyotirmañjarī (in ĀM D 24Or2; P 266v3, D 260r3; P 291r4), Madhyamakamañjarī (in ĀM D 28r1; P 31r2–3, D 76v7-77r1; P 86v2–3, D 162r6; P 179v1; See note 6 above), Munimatālaṃkāra (in ĀM D 12r3; P 13v3, D 24v5; P 27v2, D 24v6; P 27v4, D 33v4; P 37v1–2, D 41v7–42r1; P 47r2, D 52r1; P 56r6, D 77r1; P 86v3, D 112v5–6); P 125r3, D 174v7; P 193r8, D 225v3; P 249r2, D 270r1–2; P 302v6), Abhayapaddhati (in ĀM D 77r1; P 86v2, D 209r2; P 229v8), Cakrasaṃvarābhisamaya (in ĀM D 172v6; P 191r6–7, D 242v3; P 269v7).
This thesis, a comparison of the concepts of buddha-nature and dao-nature in the medieval period (from the 5th to the 10th centuries) of China, presents a historical investigation of the formation of the idea that insentient things are able to possess buddha-nature in medieval Chinese Mahāyāna Buddhism. In Chinese Mahāyāna Buddhism, the concept of buddha-nature was originally defined as a potential possessed by sentient beings that enabled them to achieve buddhahood. From the 6th century, the concept was reinterpreted within the Chinese Buddhist tradition so that insentient things were also able to possess buddha-nature. Recent scholarship has pointed out that the idea of insentient things having buddha-nature is a combination of Buddhist and Daoist ideas based on the concept of the all-pervading Dao found in the Zhuangzi 莊子. In this sense, buddha-nature seems to be interpreted as equivalent with the Dao of Daoism. My project suggests that the reinterpretation of buddha-nature in association with the insentient realm should be elucidated in a more nuanced way than the idea of all-pervasiveness of the Dao. A historical, doctrinal investigation of the intellectual formation of the concept of buddha-nature in Chinese Mahāyāna Buddhism demonstrates a new interpretation of buddha-nature in the context of insentient things having buddha-nature. Further, through a historical investigation of intellectual exchange between Buddhism and Daoism, some evidence provided in this project illustrates that the idea of insentient things having dao-nature in Daoism was not inherited from Buddhism, but drawn from Daoist tradition. This new perspective is different from that of some contemporary scholars who have claimed that the idea of insentient things having dao-nature was borrowed from Chinese Buddhism. A chronological investigation of the discussion of nature in Chinese thought demonstrates that the idea of insentient things having buddha-nature incorporates earlier Daoist traditions found in Arcane Study.
In Dzogchen practice, the most important thing is the recognition of inner space or emptiness. If you can practice this, then whatever phenomena of samsara arise are dissolved into wisdom mind. For this to happen, your recognition of mind nature has to be unwaver-ing. If you can achieve this, then anything that arises in your mind-stream-any emotions, thoughts, likes, dislikes, perceptions of good and bad, and so on-is naturally released without effort.
The problem is, when phenomena arise from confusion and igno-rance, they dominate your perception and result in suffering. However, habitual negative emotions like fear can be naturally liberated by allowing them to dissolve into the inner space of mind. You can do this because the essence of these habitual emotions is actually wisdom.
The key point is to let go of the grasping within the emotion and see its true nature. When habitual emotions arise, you neither sup-press nor get caught up in them. You do not get carried away by clinging to self and other. If you just allow the emotion to dissolve, the energy trapped within it is released and blossoms as wisdom. (Read more here)
Path is a state of confusion which is not recognizing this ground, our basic state, to be as it is. Conceptual mind and time are both present during the path. But when your mind is pure, free of these, that is called fruition, and that is what is to be attained. To reiterate, confusion is called path. This confusion can be cleared up. There are three methods to clarify confusion: view, meditation and conduct. By means of the view, meditation and conduct we reveal what is already present. Slowly and gradually, we uncover more and more of the basic state. This process is what I will try to explain. (Tsoknyi Rinpoche, chapter 1, 20–21)
Prof. Hauer has started a series of studies, chiefly dedicated to the critical investigation of Indian religion.[1] We cannot help being very greateful to him for this, because we must acknowledge that the various aspects of Indian religion are not yet studied as they deserve.
I do not need to insist on proving the great importance of this research, which is likely to throw much light on many a problem; chiefly on that of the extent of the influences exercised by the aboriginal element on the evolution of Indian religious thought and Indian civilization in general. The Vedas have a great importance, no doubt,
but it is also true that Indian gods, mythology, practices, theories about sacrifice, etc., are, on the whole, very different from the religious ideas expounded in that famous book. The study of the
last phases of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and of its relation with the Hindu systems proper, will prove of the greatest importance for this kind of research; because it is just in the literature of that period that we find the most important documents of these new conceptions and meet the names of a host of gods, demons and goblins of whom we did not hear before that time.
For this reason I think that Prof. Hauer is quite justified in having started his Series with the study of such an important Mahāyāna text as the Laṅkāvatāra, which contains some very interesting allu- sions to the relation between the Buddha and the gods of Hinduism (cf. e.g., p. 192).
The first of the papers dedicated to our text is chiefly concerned with the refutation of the Sāṅkhya system contained in the Laṅk., X, 546 ff. This section has been translated by the author, as he thinks that it represents the reply of the Mahāyāna to the new claim of the Sāṅkhya to be the doctrine of salvation (p. 5.). This Sāṅkhya is, according to the A., the new exposition of the system as contained in the Sāṅkhyakārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇna. The chronology of either text seems to support this view. In fact, this refutation is contained in the tenth Chapter of the Laṅk., which is wanting in the first Chinese translation by Guṇabhadra (443 A.D.), while it is found in the second
translation, made by Bodhiruci in the year 513 A.D. On the other hand, we may suppose that the kārikā was composed about 450 A.D. That is true, but I do not think we are allowed to infer from this, that there is any interdependence of this kind between the kārikā and the Xth Chapter of the Laṅk. First of all, the history of the various redactions of this text, represents a very difficult and complex problem. I have compared the three Chinese translations with the Sanskrit original and I already had the opportunity to point out that the text of the Laṅkāvatāra underwent many changes,[1] so that we may safely assume that different redactions of the Laṅk, circulated not only at different times, but also in different places. It is true that the allusion to the Huns, which is found in X, 785, must go back to the first decade of the 7th century A.D., but the fact remains that the Sanskrit text of the Xth Chapter, as it has been handed down to us in the Nepalese manuscripts, looks like a compilation from various sources. Thus it has been enlarged by the insertion of various ślokas already quoted in the preceding chapters in prose.[2] As a rule, all these double verses cannot be found in the translation of Śikṣānanda. This I say in order to show that the problem of the various strata composing the vulgata of the Laṅk, as well as the other concerning the age to which they must be attributed is a very complex one. They can only be solved by the comparative study of the Tibetan and Chinese translations. Therefore it is evident that the chronology based upon any passage of the present text cannot be relied upon as definitive, until the history of the text has been reconstructed. On the other hand, the refutation of the Sāṅkhya system, as contained in X, 558 ff, is neither one of the earliest, nor one of the best. The refutation of the satkāryavāda (Sāṅkhya) as well as of the asatkāryavāda (Vaiśeṣika) forms one of the chief contents of the dogmatical works of Mahāyāna Buddhism. It can be found in the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-Śāstra of Nāgārjuna, in the Śataśāstra of Āryadeva, in the Buddhagotraśāstra attributed to Vasubandhu etc.[1] Nor shall we forget that Vasubandhu and
Diṅnāga refuted at length the Sāṅkhya theories in their Paramārthasaptati and Pramāṇasamuccaya respectively. Moreover, as Diṅnāga himself tells us in his commentary upon the Nyāyamukha, he wrote a book exclusively devoted to refuting the Sāṅkhya system. Shen T'ai, a disciple of Yuan Chwang, who commented upon the Nyāyamukha, tells us that this work was a very large one, as it contained six thousand ślokas.
Therefore I do not think that this criticism of the Sāṅkhya as contained in the Laṅkāvatāra can really throw much light on the history of the controversy between the two systems. In fact, we must acknowledge that the value of the Laṅkāvatāra, as a philosophical hook, is rather limited, although it is of the highest importance for the history of the evolution of the Mahāyāna Buddhologie and "Erlosungslehre."
But I can hardly believe that the passage in question is expressly directed against the Sāṅkhya system. It is only meant to assert the idealistic view which is expounded throughout the book. Kapila, it is true, is referred to by name in the verse X, 558 and in three other places; but Kaṇāda also is quoted in X, 548. . . .
But to which school did the Laṅkāvatāra originally belong? It is in general believed that it represents Yogācāra ideas. But, of course, we cannot learn very much from this mere name, because Yogācāra has certainly a very wide meaning. It is also considered as a synonym of Vijñānavāda, and therefore even the vijñaptimātratā theory of Vasubandhu is put under that same item.
In fact, according to the Chinese tradition the book is considered as one of the six sūtras of the Lakṣaṇa school. But if we read these volumes it will be easy to recognize that, though there are some fundamental notions that can be found all throughout, each text or group of texts presents its own peculiarities.
Notes
1. J. W. Hauer, Das Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra und das Sāṅkhya (eine vorläufige Skizzeo, Stuttgart, 1927.
Id, Die Dhāraṇī im nördlichen Buddhismus und ihre parallelen in der sogennannten Mithrasliturgie. Ibid.
Beitrage zur Indischen Sprachwissenschaft und Religionsgeschichte.
1. See. my Studio comparative fra le tre versioni cinesi ed il testo sanskrito del i capitolo del Laṅkāvatāra, Memorie della R. Accademia dei Lincei, serie v, vol xviii, fasc, 5; and Una nuova edizione del Laṅkāvatāra in Studi Mahāyanici, Rivista di studi Orientali, vol. X.
2. In Studi Mahāyanici, pp. 574 ff., I have given a list of the verses inserted in the text, which have been repeated in the tenth chapter. This fact makes me rather doubtful whether many of the other verses collected there are not taken from some Mahāyāna text belonging to the same current of thought. Prof. Hauer thinks that the first Chapter belongs to the most ancient redaction of the book. I can hardly believe that; in fact, it cannot be found in the translation of Gunabhadra, and it has but very little relation with the rest of the book. On the other hand, I think that the gāthās represent the most ancient nucleus of the book, as it is shown by the numerous Prakritisms that have survived and that the redactors of the present vulgata could not avoid: e.g., desemi, pp. 76, 176, 181; vibhāvento, p. 95 ; vikalpenti, pp. 185 186; nāśenti, p. 190 ; deśyante for deśyamāne, p. 201.
1. For other references see Ui’s, Vaiśeṣika philosophy.
2. See my English translation of the Nyāyamukha in "Materiailen zur Kunde des Buddhismus" edited by Prof. Walleser, Heidelberg, to be published shortly.
This book by Giuseppe Tucci, the internationally renowned Tibetologist, is a scholarly study of the religions of Tibet: Buddhism, the nameless "folk religion," and the system called Bon. The history of the spread of Buddhism in Tibet is divided in the indigenous tradition into the "early" and "later" stages. The first chapter of the book surveys the significant events of the early spread, which ended with the persecution of Buddhism in the ninth century, and the second reviews those of the later spread, beginning with the revival of Buddhism and the founding of great monasteries in the eleventh century. Chapter 3 deals with the general characteristics of "Lamaism" and the emergence of the major schools of Tibetan Buddhism, particularly the rNying ma pa, Sa skya pa, bKa' brgyud pa, and dGe lugs pa. Chapter 4 examines the doctrines held, both in common and in particular, by these schools, as well as the substantialism of the Jo nang pa and the quietism of the Zhi byed pa. The fifth chapter deals with the organization of the monastic community, the administration of the monastery and its property, and the religious calendar with its various festivals. Chapter 6 is devoted to the "folk religion," replete with its beliefs in benevolent and malevolent numina. Various apotropaic rituals intended to protect the individual, the family, the house, and other property are discussed in detail. This chapter shows clearly the contradiction between the intellectual preoccupation with Buddhist epistemology and ontology on the monastic level and the emotional concern with the existence of demonic powers and the vulnerability of the "soul" (bla) on the lay level. The final chapter deals with the Bon religion that predated Buddhism in Tibet. This chapter explores the religious milieu of the ancient monarchy and then examines the way in which Bon evolved over the centuries in competition with, and later in imitation of, Buddhism. An eight-page chronological table listing significant dates and events in Tibetan history is given at the end of the book.
This dissertation is a study of the process through which Tibetan Buddhist philosophy, by synthesizing doctrines and texts into consistent models, integrates views of reality within doctrinal and soteriological systems. It consists of an analysis of the most fundamental doctrinal tension found in the Tibetan tradition, namely the apparent inconsistency of doctrines belonging to the negative Mādhyamika and to the more affirmative Yogācāra trends of Mahāyāna Buddhism. As a case study aiming to provide a first systematic examination of that problematic, the dissertation surveys and analyzes Tibetan interpretation of the set of texts referred to as the Five Treatises of Maitreya (byams chos sde lnga), and at the way those interpretations deal with the doctrinal tensions found in that set of text. In addition to providing a recension of major interpretations of the Five Treatises developed between 1100 and 1500, a detailed account is given of the model of interpretation given by gSer mdog Paṇ chen Śākya mchog ldan, a famous teacher of the Sa skya school of Tibetan Buddhism. When confronted with the features of other interpretations, Śākya mchog ldan's interpretation of the Five Treatises, which proceeds primarily by allowing a plurality of views to be maintained even at the level of definitive meaning, provides us with a new insight in the Tibetan philosophical tradition: the most fundamental dimension of philosophical reconciliation of doctrinal views, especially of the kind found in the Five Treatises, can be described as pertaining to textual hermeneutics. Moreover, Śākya mchog ldan's contribution to that domain of Buddhist thought, by placing hermeneutics at the very centre of his system of Buddhist doctrine and practice, suggests that hermeneutics is a fundamental category of all Buddhist philosophical debates, and that it should be part of any attempt to understand the Tibetan philosophical tradition.
Modern scholarship on the Five Treatises has so far privileged studying the texts of the Five Treatises individually, not giving much importance to the concept of the Five Treatises per se and its consequences on the interpretation of the texts that form it. In the following pages I argue that, on the contrary, the notion of the Five Treatises and the idea that they form a unit is crucial enough for Tibetan interpreters that we cannot fully understand Tibetan interpretations of those texts without taking this into consideration. If we look at the way Tibetan interpreters define the category and how they form their interpretations around it, we come to the conclusion that a study of Tibetan interpretations of individual treatises cannot represent fully the influence of those texts on Tibetan Buddhist literature and thought
In order to establish that claim, having explained the concept of the Five Treatises as a unit and where that unit fits among Tibetan Buddhist scriptures, I will trace its origin and development from the recognition of Maitreya’s authorship of the Treatises to the notion that the Five Treatises form a single work. I will conclude by explaining how the study of the Five Treatises as a whole and of that concept itself allows us to understand things that the study of the texts individually cannot provide. (Turenne, introduction, 215–16)
In the tradition of Buddhism which has been transmitted to China and Japan, we can see two basically different streams of thought in the Yogācāra philosophy. Although this fact is well-known among Japanese scholars, it does not seem to be widely known among American, European, and Indian scholars. In order to understand correctly the Yogācāra philosophy, however, the clear understanding of these two streams of thought, their mutual differences, and their relation to the theories of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu is indispensable.
One of these two streams was introduced into China by Hsuang-tsang. Although the thought of this stream can be known through the works of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu as translated by Hsuang-tsang, it can be known in its most all-inclusive and systematic form in the Ch'eng wei shih lun of Dharmapāla.[1] This stream of thought continued from the time of Hsuang-tsang to the present day. Happily, it did not die out in China and Japan where its study was continued and where present-day scholars are well acquainted with it. There is no unclear point as regards the more important aspects of this stream of thought.
The other stream of thought, represented by the works of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu as translated by Buddhasānta, Bodhiruci, Paramārtha, Dharmagupta, Prabhākaramitra, and others, was introduced into China before the time of Hsuang-tsang. The translations of these masters, unlike those of the other stream, were not widely studied and the actual nature of its thought is difficult to determine. With the exception of Paramārtha, there are only one or two translated works of each of these masters. And, even in the study of their works, it is not possible to determine the differences from the other stream of Yogācāra thought.
Paramārtha, however, translated a great many of the important works of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu. And, with the discovery and publication of the Sanskrit texts, eminent scholars of Japan have done comparative studies based on the Sanskrit original and the Chinese and Tibetan translations in order to determine the extent to which the stream of thought introduced into China before the time of Hsuang-tsang differs from that stream which was introduced by Hsuang-tsang. The results of this research clearly show that there is a fundamental difference between the theory introduced by Paramārtha and that of Hsuang-tsang. The importance of this difference lies in the fact that the theories introduced by Paramārtha and Hsuang-tsang are both said to be the theories of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu. If the theories of Paramārtha and Hsuang-tsang are fundamentally different, the problem arises as to which transmission is faithful to the theories of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu; or, if they are both separate traditions, what was the theory of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu? This has been the focus of attention of present-day Japanese scholars doing research in the Yogācāra philosophy. As the studies of the Yogācāra philosophy by Western and Indian scholars have been lacking in knowledge of these two streams of thought, their interpretations of the central problems of the Yogācāra philosophy have been ambiguous and often erroneous and do not show a clear understanding of it. Their understanding of the Yogācāra philosophy is not in accord with the theory of either one of these two streams of thought. And, because the differences between their interpretations and the two streams of thought are not clear, one cannot find a clear-cut understanding of the theories of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu.
It is my aim in this paper to present the differences of interpretation of these two streams of thought relating to the theories of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu which were transmitted to China and to examine the question of which of the two streams is faithful to the thought of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu. As this paper cannot possibly deal with the whole of the Yogācāra philosophy, it will deal with only a few of the essential points. (Ueda, preparatory remarks, 155–56)
Notes
- Dharmapāla and others, Ch'eng wei shih lun,P Taishō-Daizōkyō, Vol. 31, No. 1585. French translation: "Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi," by Dharmapāla, translated from Chinese into French by La Vallée Poussin (Paris, 1928-1929).
Tulku Urgyen Rinpoche expresses what he himself has undergone, instructing us in a complete manner of training. To attain enlightenment we must experience our innate nature. The ultimate object of realization, the natural state of mind, unmistakenly and exactly as it is, need not be sought for elsewhere but is present within ourselves. Stability in this unexcelled state of unity is not achieved by separating what we know from what we do.
This book contains astute instructions that address these key points of spirituality. (Source: Rangjung Yeshe Publications)
The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra consists of ten chapters, named respectively —(1) Rāvaṇādhyeṣaṇā parivarta, (2) Sarvadharmasamuccaya parivarta, (3) Anityatā parivarta, (4) Abhisamaya parivarta, (5) Tathāgata - nityānityatva, (6) Kṣaṇika parivarta, (7) Nairmāṇika parivarta, (8) Māṃsabhakṣaṇa parivarta, (9) Dhāraṇīparivarta, and (10) the Parisamāpti parivarta, which bears no special name.
Throughout the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra the speaker is Buddha himself. The first chapter of the book is addressed to Rāvaṇa, while the person spoken to in the remaining nine chapters is Mahāmati. Rāvaṇa prayed to Buddha for the solution of two questions, viz. : (1) what is the distinction between dharma and adharma, and (2) how could one pass beyond both dharma and adharma? Buddha’s answers to these questions form the subject-matter of the first chapter. Thereafter 108 questions were asked by Mahāmati, and
Buddha’s answers to these questions form the topics of the remaining nine chapters. (Vidyābhūṣaṇa, para 10–11, 833)
"Buddha-nature" (Japanese, Bussho) has been regarded in the Sōtō sect as one of the three central fascicles of the Shōbōgenzō, together with Genjōkōan and Bendōwa. Dōgen delivered it the tenth month of 1241 to the followers gathered around him at the Kōshō-ji south of Kyoto. The work as we now have it, however, is a considerably revised form of that original text. Although neither the original or revised manuscript exists in Dōgen's holograph, a copy by his disciple Ejō (1198-1280), including Dōgen's later revisions, is preserved in the Eihei-ji. In most editions, Shōbōgenzō Buddha-nature is the third fascicle in the collection, following Genjōkōan and Makahannya-haramitsu.
The idea that sentient beings all possess the Buddha-nature and the possibility of attaining Buddhahood is central to most of the schools of the Mahayana. Yet Dōgen's treatment, reflecting his own unique Zen standpoint, can be said to be apart from all the rest. Strictly adhering to a nondualistic interpretation, he comments on passages from Zen and other Buddhist writings that have some bearing on this theme. What is most striking about this commentary is the manner in which it gives clear priority to religious meaning over normal grammatical syntax. In more than a few cases Dōgen chooses to read these passages in ways which are dubious, and sometimes even impossible, from a grammatical point of view. But he does it for a definite purpose. It focuses attention on what he feels to be inadequacies in the traditional ways the texts are read, and at the same time it clearly sets forth his own understanding and rectification of those inadequacies based on his religious awakening.
For example, at the very beginning of the work he quotes a passage from the Nirvana Sutra ("Northern" version) well-known to all Buddhists: "All sentient beings without exception have the Buddha-nature". This is the general Mahayana statement, which is emphasized in particular in the Nirvana Sutra. Dōgen goes beyond it, by reading the passage as, "All sentient beings-whole being is the Buddha-nature." This he does by reading the characters shitsuu normally "without exception have, as "whole being (he is aided by the fact that the character u means both "to be," or "being," and "to have"). This changes the traditional emphasis of sentient beings having a Buddha-nature, to stress a standpoint more in keeping with the basic nondualistic Mahayana position: whole being is the Buddha-nature, in which "whole being" means not only sentient beings but all beings. This avoids the duality of subject (sentient beings) and object (the Buddha-nature possessed by them), the duality which regards the Buddha-nature as a potentiality to be actualized in the future, and the duality of means and end, where practice is taken as a means and realization of Buddha-nature the end. Dōgen's reading "whole being is the Buddha-nature" thus indicates the nondualistic oneness of the realizer (whole being) and the realized (Buddha-nature), the simultaneity of Buddha-nature and enlightenment (Buddha), and the identity of practice and attainment. It is the key to his understanding of the Buddha-nature as it is developed in various aspects throughout the rest of the work*
Buddha-nature is the eighth fascicle to appear in this series of translations from Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō which began in May 1971 with Bendōwa. As in the past, we have provided rather extensive footnotes. Their aim is to provide the English language reader a means of better arriving at some understanding of this extremely difficult work, much of which would be incomprehensible without them. We of course do not pretend that they are in any way definitive. They could not be, given the profoundly complicated and suggestive nature of the text. We have attempted, however, to have them exemplify a consistent view of the work as a whole. The edition followed is that of Õkubo Dōshū: Shōbōgenzō (Tokyo: Chikuma, 1971), pp. 14–35. We would like to express our gratitude to Professor Nishitani Keiji for his valuable suggestions.
N.B. In the text, Dōgen quotes passages from Zen and other Buddhist writings at the heads of the various sections. In order to make clear both the way they are normally read and Dōgen's own sometimes peculiar interpretative reading, we have translated them according to the normal reading when the italicized quotation first appears en bloc at the beginning of the sections; then, when Dōgen's different reading makes it necessary, we have generally retranslated the same words as close to his meaning as the English will allow in the following phrase by phrase discussion of the quotation. When this is done the discrepancy between the two renderings is detailed in the footnotes. (Waddell and Abe, introduction, 94–96)
Notes
- See Abe Masao, "Dōgen on Buddha-nature," Eastern Buddhist, IV, I.
The thesis focuses on the relations between mind and karma and the continuity of life in saṃsāra based upon a concept of mind, the ālayavijñāna, as presented in the texts of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu of the Yogācāra school of Indian Buddhism, A.D. 4-5th centuries. It has been the topic of many sectarian disputes as well as the springboard for several far-reaching doctrinal developments, so it is desirable to examine it within its early Indian Buddhist context.
The first section presents the multivalent viññāṇa of the Pali Canon and related concepts. It demonstrates that the major characteristics later predicated of the ālayavijñāna were present in an unsystematized but implicit form in the viññāṇa of the early discourses.
The next section describes the systematic psychological analysis developed by the Abhidharma and its consequent problematics. It argues that the incongruity of Abhidharmic analysis with the older unsystematized doctrines led to major theoretical problems concerning the key concepts of kleśa and karma, to which the Sautrāntika school offered the concept of seeds (bija).
The third section, based primarily upon the texts translated herein, depicts the origination and gradual development of the ālayavijñāna within the Yogācāra school from a somatic "life principle", to an explicitly unconscious mind, to its final bifurcation into an unconscious afflicted mind (kliṣṭa-manas) and a passive respository of karmic seeds, the latent loci of kleśa and karma, respectively.
The last section compares the ālayavijñāna systematically with Freud's and Jung's concepts of the unconscious, concluding that their respective philosophical milieus led both traditions to conceptions of unconscious mental processes as necessary compensations for strictly intentional epistemological models.
In the appendix the major texts presenting the ālayavijñāna, Chaps. V and VIII.37 of the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, part of the Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi, and Ch. 1 of the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, are translated and extensively annotated in order to contextualize the minutiae of this concept of mind with its canonical precursors and its Abhidharmic contemporaries. (Source: ProQuest)
This important study reveals how the Buddhist unconscious illuminates and draws out aspects of current western thinking on the unconscious mind. One of the most intriguing connections is the idea that there is in fact no substantial 'self' underlying all mental activity; 'the thoughts themselves are the thinker'. William S. Waldron considers the implications of this radical notion, which, despite only recently gaining plausibility, was in fact first posited 2,500 years ago. (Source: Routledge)
Bernard Faure, on the other hand, touches upon the same issue of logocentric and differential trends in Chan in his comprehensive critique of the Chan tradition. Faure's study of this issue has two main problems. First, since his study is a criticism, he shows only what he thinks is the logocentric side of Chan, without providing a constructive study of deconstruction in Chan. Second, he criticizes Magliola for relating his logocentric/differential distinction to the historically well-defined distinction between Northern and Southern Chan. Faure believes that this hasty connection is "counterproductive" (Faure 1993: 225). His own approach, as opposed to Magliola's, is to suggest that it is impossible to identify one school or one figure in the Chan tradition as either logocentric or deconstructive. He asserts that there are "only combinations" of these two types in the Chan tradition (Faure 1993: 225). It appears that this position of "combination only" avoids a one-sided view and the error of jumping to a conclusion. However, by concluding that there are only combinations, Faure turns away from the necessity and possibility of analyzing and identifying individual deconstructive trends in Chan Buddhism, and from the necessity and even the possibility of a coherent reinterpretation and reconstruction of Chan thought. The coherent reinterpretation and reconstruction of Chan thought obviously demands more than a mere criticism. It is true that the thought of one school or one figure may involve elements of two trends; but this fact does not preclude the possibility of its being coherently interpreted as representative of one trend.
This paper, therefore, will attempt to investigate a major deconstructive trend in Chan Buddhism, namely, that of the Huineng 惠能 and the Hongzhou 洪州 Chan, and its target—certain reifying tendencies in Chan. (Wang, preliminary remarks, 63–64)
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS[1]
The theory of “Buddha Nature” or tathāgatagarbha (henceforth TG)[2] formed an important school of thought in Mahāyāna Buddhism and continues to enjoy popularity in some circles even today, although it has been dismissed by some scholars as non-Buddhist.[3] It has drawn the attention of several scholars. On the Tibetan front, David Seyfort Ruegg has through a series of publications greatly contributed to the understanding of the TG theory, particularly that of the dGe-lugs-pa tradition. A number of studies devoted to the TG theory from the perspective of the exponents of the gźan stoṅ (“extrinsic emptiness”)[4] theory have also appeared in recent years.[5] However, much remains to be explored in the works of various Tibetan authors of different traditions and periods.
One important Tibetan interpretation of TG that has been ignored so far is that of the rÑiṅ-ma school. The little attention it has received is in the context of studies pertaining to the Tibetan Madhyamaka and rDzogs-chen doctrines.[6] Can one, however, speak of a single rÑiṅ-ma interpretation of TG without the risk of oversimplification? Admittedly, not all rÑiṅ-ma scholars interpreted TG in the same way. They may differ in their erudition, style of interpretation and emphasis according to the particular time and place in which they lived. Even one and the same scholar may interpret it differently in different works, or even in different passages of the same work. Nevertheless, despite the differences in details within the various schools of Tibetan Buddhism, each of them, including the rÑiṅ-ma school, has, in my opinion, its own few archetypical intellectual figures who shape, lead and represent their respective traditions, and whose positions agree at least in substance if not always in every detail. And thus later rÑiṅ-ma-pas consider Roṅzom-pa (eleventh century), Kloṅ-chen-pa (1308-1363) and Mi-pham (1846-1912) as their three archetypical intellectual models, and their interpretations of a given doctrine as the “official” rÑiṅ-ma position.[7]
Before examining their views, I would like to briefly discuss how some of the leading rÑiṅ-ma scholars – whose interpretations of the TG doctrine are considered authoritative for the rÑiṅ-ma school – are portrayed in some secondary literature. Of the major rÑiṅ-ma scholars, Roṅ-zom-pa has been presented as clearly preferring Yogācāra–Madhyamaka by Georges Dreyfus,[8] apparently following John Pettit who merely states that Roṅ-zom-pa in his Grub mtha’i brjed byaṅ suggests that the Yogācāra–Madhyamaka is “more important” (don che ba).[9] What the closing phrase of the pertinent statement by Roṅ-zom-pa actually says is: “The treatise [or position] of Yogācāra–Madhyamaka appears (snaṅ) to be more significant.”[10] The statement gives Roṅ-zompa’s personal opinion about the then prevalent two Madhyamaka systems (i.e., Sautrāntika–Madhyamaka and Yogācāra–Madhyamaka) and not his doctrinal affiliation.[11] Kloṅ-chen-pa and Mi-pham have been portrayed as exponents of the gźan stoṅ theory. For example, according to Samten Karmay, Kloṅ-chen-pa’s stance on the TG theory is identical to that of Dol-po-pa’s.[12] Similarly, David Germano (apparently following S.K. Hookham) describes Kloṅ-chen-pa’s comments regarding the doctrine of emptiness and TG as “fairly typical” of the gźan stoṅ concepts in Tibet.[13] These scholars’ impressions are not altogether unjustified because Kloṅ-chen-pa’s evaluation of TG prima facie looks so positive that one might assume it to be identical with that of Dol-popa’s. Even amongst the traditional Tibetan scholars there were figures like Koṅ-sprul who preferred to place Kloṅ-chen-pa and Karma-pa Raṅ-byuṅ-rdo-rje (1284-1339) in the group of gźan stoṅ exponents.[14} This doctrinal agenda is still continued by living Tibetan exponents of the gźan stoṅ doctrine. A few modern scholars have designated Mi-pham as an exponent of the gźan stoṅ theory as well. However, a closer look reveals that in most cases, it is the terminology that has led to this determination; that is, the term gźan stoṅ has not necessarily been used by these scholars in a strict technical sense. One author who seems to consciously seek to prove Mi-pham a gźan stoṅ exponent is Paul Williams.[15] Leading rÑiṅ-ma teachers of more recent times have also been presented as proponents of the gźan stoṅ theory. Cyrus Stearns’ The Buddha from Dolpo, which greatly contributes to the understanding of Dol-po-pa’s life and thoughts, tends to oversimplify the rÑiṅ-ma explanation of the TG theory. For instance, Stearns, relying on verbal communication with sDe-gźung Rin-po-che (1906-1987), maintains that rÑiṅ-ma teachers such as bDud-’joms Rin-po-che (1904-1987) and Dilmgo mKhyen-brtse (1910-1991) were proponents of the gźan stoṅ doctrine.[16] I am not aware of any textual evidence that would suggest that these teachers were proponents of the gźan stoṅ doctrine, at least not in Dol-po-pa’s sense. Both bDud-’joms Rin-po-che and Dil-mgo mKhyenbrtse, in fact, speak about the oneness of emptiness and appearance or the compatibility of the Middle and Last Cycles of Buddha’s teachings.[17]
One notices a general tendency among modern scholars to associate, in addition to the above-mentioned rÑiṅ-ma teachers, rÑiṅ-ma doctrines with gźan stoṅ teachings.[18] These scholars can be grouped into three: (a) those who are obviously predisposed to the gźan stoṅ theory, (b) those who are opposed to the gźan stoṅ doctrine and (c) those who are too generous with the use of the term gźan stoṅ.[19] One of the reasons why the rÑiṅ-ma position on TG has remained somewhat elusive appears to be the complexity of the matter itself which forbids a simplistic expression of it in terms of raṅ stoṅ or gźan stoṅ. In the following passages, I shall present (a) the early Tibetan background of the TG theory, (b) a brief historical sketch and (c) a general profile of the rÑiṅ-ma interpretation of the TG doctrine, and (d) finally my assessment of the rÑiṅ-ma stance on the TG theory in India and Tibet,19 and thereby demonstrate how complex and distinctive the rÑiṅ-ma interpretation of TG actually is. Nonetheless, although I shall strive to describe their interpretation accurately, some of my observations will remain tentative. It is, however, not my intention to discuss here whether the rÑiṅ-ma interpretation is in keeping with the TG theory as originally conceived in India.
Notes
- This article is a revised and enlarged version of the paper presented at the Tenth Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies (6th-12th September 2003) held in Oxford. I owe my gratitude to a number of individuals who contributed in different ways to bringing this article to its present form. I am grateful to my wife Orna Almogi (University of Hamburg) for painstakingly going through this article at its various stages of writing. I also owe my thanks to Prof. Lambert Schmithausen (University of Hamburg), Prof. Karin Preisendanz (University of Vienna) and Dr. Anne MacDonald (University of Vienna) for their valuable suggestions. I would also like to thank Prof. David Jackson (University of Hamburg) for going through an earlier version of this article. My thanks also go to Kazuo Kano (University of Hamburg) for his proof-reading of the final version.I am, of course, solely responsible for the content of the article.
- See Michael Zimmermann’s recent study of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, the earliest exposition on Buddha Nature in India, where he presents a detailed discussion of the term tathāgatagarbha (Zimmermann 2002: 39-50). Note that I use Tathāgatagarbhasūtra as a proper noun referring to this particular sūtra and TG sūtra as a common noun referring to a sūtra which deals primarily with the tathāgatagarbha doctrine.
- Some modern Japanese scholars have openly dismissed the TG theory as non-Buddhist, an issue which lies outside my present topic. For some details, see Zimmermann 2002: 82-84.
- A tradition may for polemical reasons label a rival tradition as a proponent of gźan stoṅ (“extrinsic emptiness”) or raṅ stoṅ (“intrinsic emptiness”). However, as suggested in Kapstein 2000: 121, it would be, from a methodological point of view, sensible to refrain from using labels such as gźan stoṅ and raṅ stoṅ unless a given tradition prefers to use one of these terms to describe its own conception of emptiness. Furthermore, since we tend to be too generous with the use of the terms raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ, I would like to make clear from the very outset how rÑiṅma scholars understand these terms. For them, a given “x” (no matter what) is said to be raṅ stoṅ if it cannot withstand (bzod pa) the logical analysis of Madhyamaka reasoning. A given “x” that can withstand such a scrutiny, which is for them an impossibility, would imply its “true or hypostatic existence” (bden par grub pa). Please note that my translation of the technical term bden par grub pa or bden grub is based on Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 37 where it is explained as “a permanent substantial entity established ‘in truth’, i.e., hypostatically (bden par grub pa).” See also Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 320 and Seyfort Ruegg 2002: 296, Indices, s.v. bden grub. Hence, if the logical analysis of Madhyamaka reasoning is applied, for example, on a cow or TG, neither of them will be able to withstand the force of logical analysis. A single case of “hypostatic existence” would be sufficient to cause the collapse of the entire Madhyamaka system. Thus, from the perspective of such a scrutiny, a given “x” is always raṅ stoṅ. Further, if a given “x” is empty of a numerically different given “y,” then “x” is said to be gźan stoṅ. In this sense, a given “x” is always empty of “y” and hence always gźan stoṅ. For example, a cow is always empty of a bull and so is TG empty of adventitious impure phenomena of saṃsāra. Thus, from this viewpoint, a given “x” can be both raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ. On the other hand, for Dol-po-pa Śes-rab-rgyal-mtshan (1292-1361), the initiator of the gźan stoṅ theory, whether or not “x” is raṅ stoṅ or gźan stoṅ would depend on whether “x” is a conventional phenomenon or absolute reality. If “x” is a conventional phenomenon, it is raṅ stoṅ, and if it is absolute reality, it is gźan stoṅ. Hence, Dol-po-pa uses the expressions kun rdzob raṅ stoṅ or kun rdzob stoṅ ñid and don dam gźan stoṅ or don dam stoṅ ñid (Ri chos, p. 305.8) and states that the banal (tha śal) emptiness (i.e., itaretaraśūnyatā) belittled in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra is neither of the two (ibid., p. 154.15-155.15). In principle, Dol-po-pa could have described this itaretaraśūnyatā (“emptiness of reciprocity”) as kun rdzob gźan stoṅ in opposition to what he called kun rdzob raṅ stoṅ and don dam gźan stoṅ but has apparently, for strategic reasons, refrained from doing so. Designating itaretaraśūnyatā as kun rdzob gźan stoṅ would have been self-defeating because then he would have been forced to concede that there is at least one kind of gźan stoṅ which is unacceptable even by his own standard. Thus, he could consolidate his gźan stoṅ theory by insisting that only the absolute can be gźan stoṅ and only gźan stoṅ can be absolute (ibid., p. 308.12-15).
- See, e.g., Seyfort Ruegg 1963; Broido 1989; Hookham 1991 and 1992; Stearns 1999; Mathes 1998, 2000 and 2002. Note, however, that one may have to be careful not to anachronistically presuppose that one homogenous gźan stoṅ theory existed at every place and time in Tibet (e.g., see the Si tu’i raṅ rnam, p. 266.7-267.2; Smith 2001: 265). In fact, the comparing and contrasting of the various gźan stoṅ interpretations would shed important light on the history of the concept and might contribute to a better understanding of the evolution, continuation and reception of such concepts.
- Kloṅ-chen-pa’s discussion of TG occurring in the seventh chapter of his Tshig don mdzod is assessed in Germano 1992: 77-82. John Pettit published a translation of Mi-pham’s Ṅes śes sgron me and its commentary by ’Khro-chu ’Jam-dpal-rdo-rje (Pettit 1999a) and also included a translation of Mi-pham’s gŹan stoṅ seṅ ge’i ṅa ro, p. 359-378.4. See “The Lion’s Roar Proclaiming Extrinsic Emptiness,” in Pettit 1999a: 415-427. The recent doctoral dissertation by Karma Phuntsho also discusses Mi-pham’s stance on the TG theory (Phuntsho 2003).
- One might ask just how authoritative and representative Roṅ-zom-pa, Kloṅchen-pa and Mi-pham were and are for the rÑiṅ-ma school. Mi-pham himself considered Roṅ-zom-pa and Kloṅ-chen-pa as the most authoritative interpreters of the rÑiṅ-ma doctrine and he saw himself as the follower of the two. See the Dam chos dogs sel, p. 378.5-379.2, the dBu ma rgyan ’grel, p. 42.5, the Ṅes śes sgron me, p. 121.1-2. See also the colophon to his Roṅ zom bla rnal, p. 61.6: mtshuṅs med ma hā paṇḍi ta chen po’i rjes su ’jug par khas ’che ba mi pham rnam par rgyal bas zla tshe bzaṅ po la bris pa dge’o /. The fact that Mi-pham is responsible for the latest systematisation of the rÑiṅ-ma doctrine and that he did so primarily by relying on Roṅ-zom-pa and Kloṅ-chen-pa, is, in my view, sufficient for considering the three as representative and authoritative, as they are indeed perceived by the rÑiṅ-ma tradition today. See also Smith 2001: 16.
- See Dreyfus 2003: 331.
- Pettit 1999a: 90-91, 485, n. 315.
- lTa ba’i brjed byaṅ, p. 11.11-14: dbu ma rnam gñis kun rdzob kyi tshul mi mthun pa la / luṅ daṅ rigs pa gaṅ che ba ni rgyud daṅ mdo sde spyi’i gźuṅ daṅ / rigs pa spyi’i tshul daṅ / dbu ma’i mkhan po gźuṅ phyi mo mdzad pa’i slob dpon klu sgrub daṅ / ārya de ba’i gźuṅ ltar na yaṅ / rnal ’byor spyod pa’i dbu ma’i gźuṅ don che bar snaṅ ṅo /.
- If one wishes to speak about Roṅ-zom-pa’s doctrinal affiliation, then one can safely state that he was, in the first place, affiliated with rDzogs-chen doctrines, and that his method of establishing emptiness is closer to that of the Prāsaṅgika– Madhyamaka than to any other Buddhist system, regardless of whether or how much access he had to Prāsaṅgika texts. This becomes particularly evident in his Theg chen tshul ’jug and was also the impression of some traditional Tibetan scholars such as Mi-pham (see, for example, the Ṅes śes sgron me, p. 75.3-4, the dBu ma rgyan ’grel, p. 309.6-310.1 and the Dam chos dogs sel, p. 378.6) and Blobzaṅ-mdo-sṅags Chos-kyi-rgya-mtsho (1903-1957), a dGe-lugs-cum-rÑiṅ-ma scholar from Khams, who even went on to prove that Roṅ-zom-pa’s view is a Prāsaṅgika view (see the lTa ba’i dris lan, p. 70-71). Whether the Prāsaṅgika–Madhyamaka view was in some form present during the early propagation of Buddhism in Tibet may depend, among other things, on whether Śāntideva was indeed a Prāsaṅgika–Mādhyamika as the Tibetan tradition has perceived him to be.
- See Karmay 1988: 184-185; cf. Kapstein 1992: 23, n. 1.
- See Germano 1992: 78. See also Hookham 1991: 136, 150.
- Śes bya rgya mtsho, p. 567.8-10; Smith 2001: 338, n. 888.
- See Williams 1998 (particularly, p. 199-216). For reviews of Williams 1998, see Kapstein 2000, Tatz 2001: 78-79. A few words should be said here regarding Paul Williams’ study of “auto-perception” (raṅ rig: svasaṃvedana/svasaṃvitti) and his attempt to connect it with the controversial issue of gźan stoṅ. To agree with Mi-pham’s understanding or interpretation of “auto-perception” is one thing and to understand his position accurately is yet another matter. In my view, Williams seems to have missed the point regarding the controversial issue of “auto perception,” particularly in regard to Mi-pham’s stance on this issue. If he had studied Mi-pham’s interpretation of “means of valid cognition” (pramāṇa), he would have seen why the theory of “auto-perception” was crucial for Mi-pham. According to him, the whole theoretical structure of perception and inference developed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti would collapse without the theory of “auto-perception.” Mi-pham insists that as long as one accepts conventional valid cognition (tha sñad tshad ma), one must accept “auto-perception,” at least on the conventional level, just as one accepts “perception of others” (gźan rig). Thus, without a clear concept of Mi-pham’s background and his view on pramāṇa, any study of Mi-pham’s view on “auto-perception” is destined to be less than successful. A proper assessment of Mi-pham’s understanding of Madhyamaka would have revealed that for Mi-pham, there is no phenomenon that can withstand (bzod) the Madhyamaka logical analysis, and this includes “auto-perception.” The Prāsaṅgika–Mādhyamikas (such as Candrakīrti and Śāntideva) do refute the Yogācāra notion of “auto-perception” but, for Mi-pham, this is done so in the context of establishing absolute reality or “that which is free from manifoldness” (niṣprapañca). However, even Prāsaṅgika–Mādhyamikas should, according to Mi-pham, have no problem in accepting “autoperception” on the conventional level, just as they have no problem accepting “perception of others.” For Mi-pham, anything that can be attested by means of conventional valid cognition is acceptable on the conventional level. If a thing is impossible even on the conventional level, then it should be something like a “permanent sound” (sgra rtag pa) or a “rabbit’s horn” (ri boṅ gi rwa). But, for him, neither is “auto-perception” like a “permanent sound” nor did Candrakīrti and Śāntideva consider it to be so. However, Tsoṅ-kha-pa believed that Candrakīrti and Śāntideva held “auto-perception” to be impossible even on the conventional level. This is the point of departure of the actual issue and the controversy took place within the contextual framework of Pramāṇa and Madhyamaka, which were seen by Mi-pham as complementing and strengthening rather than as excluding or nullifying each other. Hence, bringing in rDzogs-chen and gźan stoṅ issues in this context is unwarranted. If Williams had studied rDzogs-chen or the rÑiṅ-ma interpretation of TG, he would have realised that for the rÑiṅ-ma-pas (including Mi-pham), there is a strict distinction between mind (sems) and gnosis (ye śes). The expression so sor raṅ gis rig par bya ba (pratyātmavedanīya) which actually means “accessible to personal experience only” or “to be known directly and introspectively,” an idea also acceptable to Candrakīrti or Śāntideva, has also been taken out of context by Williams. Unless we understand the methods of interpretation systematized by Mi-pham, we will never fully comprehend the way he conceives Pramāṇa, Madhyamaka, TG and rDzogs-chen or his conception of their intricate relationship with one another. And unless we have a clear picture of how Mi-pham understood raṅ rig in these systems, we shall only have a fragmentary and distorted idea of Mi-pham’s stance on raṅ rig.
- See Stearns 1999: 215, n. 137-138.
- bDud-’joms Rin-po-che explicitly states: “Thus, by clinging to and postulating one of the positions of appearance and emptiness, one would not be able to avert the erroneous (lit. “bad”) views that hold on to the extremes. Therefore, it is necessary to properly establish the sphere of reality (dharmadhātu), the union of appearance and emptiness [or] the ultimate [and] actual absolute truth, as the equality of [saṃsāric] existence and [nirvāṇic] calmness” (bsTan pa’i rnam gźag, fol. 109b2-4: des na snaṅ stoṅ gaṅ ruṅ re’i phyogs su źen ciṅ bzuṅ bas ni mthar ’dzin gyi lta ba ṅan pa bzlog mi nus pas / chos dbyiṅs snaṅ stoṅ zuṅ ’jug mthar thug rnam graṅs ma yin pa’i don dam srid źi mñam ñid du legs par gtan la ’bebs dgos śiṅ /). Dil-mgo mKhyen-brtse likewise considers the Middle and Last Cycles as complementary, for he explains absolute reality as “the ultimate of what is to be established in a way that the purports of the Middle and the Last Promulgations become entwined as one and is the finale of the ocean-like systems of sūtra and tantra” (bDud rtsi’i snaṅ ba, fol. 71a6: ’khor lo bar mtha’ dgoṅs pa gcig dril gyis gtan la dbab bya mthar thug pa mdo sṅags grub mtha’ rgya mtsho’i skyel so yin la). See also the Zil gnon dgoṅs gsal (fol. 178a6-b2) where Dil-mgo mKhyen-brtse speaks about the union (zuṅ ’jug) of the “primordial purity” (ka dag), which is equated with “freedom from the eight extremes of manifoldness” (spros pa’i mtha’ brgyad las ’das pa), and the “immanently present” (lhun grub) Buddha bodies (sku) and gnosis (ye śes) constituting the TG, and his ’Jam dpal dgoṅs rgyan (fol. 239a2-b5), where TG (among several other terms) is indicated as a synonym of the emptiness of the Middle Promulgation. See also his rDo rje mdud grol (fol. 136a5-b4 & 150a3-4) where he explains the view of Prāsaṅgika–Madhyamaka in the same way Mi-pham does.
- According to Karmay, who relied on the Italian edition (1973) of The Religions of Tibet, Tucci maintains that the doctrines of rDzogs-chen and of the Jonaṅ-pas were developed from the Hva-śaṅ’s doctrine of TG (see Karmay 1988: 87). This claim, however, does not appear in the later English translation of the book. S.K. Hookham describes rDzogs-chen as typically gźan stoṅ-type teachings and claims that giving it a raṅ stoṅ gloss is the attempt of the present Dalai Lama “to abate the long standing hostility” towards rDzogs-chen and to protect it “from the ravages of the ‘exclusive Rangtongpa’” (Hookham 1991: 16; see also Hookham 1992: 151-152, n. 4). For reviews of Hookham 1991, see Ehrhard 1993 and Griffiths 1993. See also Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 87.
- See, for example, Smith 2001: 231, where it is stated that “Mi pham’s open advocacy of the Gzhan stong was another red cape, and the bulls were not slow to charge,” and ibid., p. 327, n. 788 where both the sToṅ thun seṅ ge’i ṅa ro (p. 563-606.5) and the gŹan stoṅ seṅ ge’i ṅa ro (p. 359-378.4) are said to be works on the gźan stoṅ theory. It is of course true that Mi-pham wrote on the gźan stoṅ theory and even defended it and can be thus called a “gźan stoṅ sympathiser.” He, however, did not consider himself a gźan stoṅ pa (Dam chos dogs sel, p. 378.5-379.1: ñams mtshar tsam du bris pa yin na yaṅ / raṅ bzos bde gśegs dam chos bslad mi ruṅ / ’chal ṅag soṅ na rgyal ba rnams la bśags / raṅ bzos bśad na ci yaṅ zad mtha’ med / bdag la gźan stoṅ sgrub pa’i khur kyaṅ med / roṅ kloṅ rnam gñis klu sgrub gźuṅ daṅ mthun / dman pa bdag kyaṅ rtse gcig der ’dun kyaṅ / ma bris dbaṅ med pha rol tshig gis bskul /). Surprisingly, although the Ṅes śes sgron me is the locus classicus for the rÑiṅ-ma position regarding the issue of raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ, John Pettit, in his study of this work, seems to be uncertain about Mi-pham’s position (Pettit 1999a: 114-124). However, cf. Pettit 1999b.
considered the starting point of Buddhism. According to both Mahāyāna ('Greater Vehicle')
and Hīnayāna ('Lesser Vehicle') or non-Mahāyāna, the historical Buddha had sometime in
the distant past resolved to become a buddha, thereby launching out on the career of a
bodhisattva, that is, a sentient being who strives to attain the highest state of awakening. A
major distinction between non-Mahāyāna and Mahāyāna, however, is that for the former the
status of being a bodhisattva or buddha is confined to the historical Buddha (or a few others like him), while the ultimate soteriological goal of a disciple is Arhatship (that is, the final
state of a saint who has attained release from the cycle of birth and death) primarily for
oneself. For the latter, by contrast, even an ordinary sentient being is capable of undertaking
the long and arduous career of a bodhisattva by generating bodhicitta and finally becoming a buddha (just like the historical Buddha himself), primarily for the sake of many other sentient
beings. In sum, a person who possesses or has generated bodhicitta is considered to be a
bodhisattva, and the form of Buddhism concerned with the theory and practice of a bodhisattva is known as Mahāyāna. The idea of bodhicitta in the sense of the resolve to
become a buddha is hence the bedrock of Mahāyāna, and is what distinguishes a bodhisattva from a śrāvaka, Mahāyāna from non-Mahāyāna. It is presupposed by all forms of Mahāyāna Buddhism including Vajrayāna ('Diamond Vehicle'), or tantric Mahāyāna.
Multiple internal and external factors must have contributed to the formation and further development of the concept of bodhicitta. The psychological need of the Buddhists to make up in one way or another for the demise of the historical Buddha may have been one of the principal internal factors that contributed to the formation of the idea of the resolve to become a buddha. Such an idea would not have lacked the doctrinal justification or legitimisation that it needed, for the non-Mahāyāna sources seem to abound in doctrinal elements that could easily be used to underpin the concept of bodhicitta. In its early phase of development, the idea of generating bodhicitta probably meant only the initial resolve to become a buddha, a momentous decision made by an aspirant seeking Buddhahood (buddhatva). This was seen as an indispensable but not necessarily a sufficient condition for the attainment of Buddhahood. However, gradually the idea came to encompass the entire theory and practice of a bodhisattva and to be considered not only a necessary but in fact a sufficient condition for such an attainment. In the course of time, even the true reality that a bodhisattva or buddha experiences as a spiritual event, the meditative insight or gnosis by means of which the true reality is experienced, and all conceivable resources or means—be they psycho-physiological, visual, verbal, or visional impulses that could be employed for becoming a buddha—came to be regarded as bodhicitta. It is this idea as found explicated in Indian and Tibetan Mahāyāna Buddhism that the present study seeks to examine. (Wangchuk, introductory remarks, 21–22)
distinctive view of ultimate truth (don dam bden pa; paramārthasatya) and propagated this view widely and earned much scorn for it, leading to one of the most controversial doctrinal-sectarian disputes in Tibetan Buddhist history. His explication of other-emptiness, which he equates with the ultimate truth, is deemed radical and wholly unacceptable by many of his contemporaries and later Tibetan scholars because it stands in sharp contrast to the mainstream fourteenth-century and early-fifteenth-century Tibetan interpretations of self-emptiness, the notion that all phenomena including ultimate truth do not exist inherently. The
self-emptiness interpretations are based primarily on Indie sources such as the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, Nāgārjuna's (c. 200) Madhyamakakārikā, and Candrakīrti's (c. 570-640) Madhyamakāvatāra. In contrast, Dolpopa generally does not claim that middle wheel treatises (’khor lo bar pa’i gzhung) such as the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras are the fundamental sources for his presentation of an other-emptiness view. Rather, he bases his formulation of other-emptiness on tantric sources such as the Kālacakra,2 last wheel suūtras {'khor lo tha ma’i mdo) such as Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra,3 and Indic commentarial sources4 traditionally credited to figures such as Maitreya, Asaṅga (c. 300), and Vasubandhu (c. 300).
As a prominent fourteenth-century Tibetan doxographer, Dolpopa, however, does not repudiate self-emptiness per se; rather, he speaks of two types of emptiness5 that have separate referent points. For him, self-emptiness refers only to conventional phenomena such as tables, chairs,
and negative defilements that do not inherently exist6 or that are empty of their own entities. Dolpopa argues that since conventional phenomena cannot withstand analysis, in that their individual entities are essentially empty or deconstructed, as the existence of their nature is thoroughly investigated, they are empty of inherent existence. Therefore, he claims
that self-emptiness is not ultimate truth.7
On the other hand, he passionately demonstrates that other-emptiness exists inherently and ultimately. Furthermore, it is identified with the tathâgata-essence (de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po, tathdgatagarbha or buddha-nature (sangs rgyas kyi rigs; buddhagotra) endowed with enlightened qualities that exists in all beings. Dolpopa argues that this form of emptiness is not empty of its own entity, since it ultimately and permanently exists. Also, ultimate truth is empty of all conventional phenomena that are antithetical to ultimately existent other-emptiness. So, while self-emptiness, which he refers to as "empty-emptiness" (stong pa’i stong pa), is primarily taught in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras of the middle wheel teachings, it is not ultimate truth, as it is empty of its own entity and it is not free from conceptual thought. On the other hand, other-emptiness, which he dubs "non-empty-emptiness" (mi stong pa’i stong pa), while not primarily taught in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, is delineated in last wheel teachings of the Buddha, such as Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, Śrīmālādevīsūtra, and others to refer to the naturally enlightened buddha-nature that is empty of all conventional phenomena. This is Dolpopa’s position on the two types of emptiness and the hierarchy of Mahāyāna literature in a nutshell and much of the discourse that follows on other-emptiness in the history of Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism has its roots in Dolpopa’s doctrinal formulation of other-emptiness vis-à-vis self-emptiness.
While Dolpopa certainly gets the well-deserved credit for making other-emptiness "a place of fundamental importance in the expression of
his philosophy"8 in Tibet, his controversial interpretation of Mahāyāna texts and the relative early availability of his writings to international scholars has perhaps led some to assume that Dolpopa’s thought is more original than it really was. Fortunately, the recent release of dozens of Kadam (bka’ gdams) volumes of previously unknown philosophical texts that predate Dolpopa allows us to reconsider this issue. Among the new texts that might be pertinent to a reconstruction of the early history of other-emptiness discourse in Tibet is the writing of Rinchen (rin chen ye shes, 13th-14th c.) in conjunction with the previously available Buton’s (bu ston rin chen grub, 1290-1364) Precious Garland of Rebuttals (’phrin yig gi lan rin po che’i phreng ba).9 I argue that Dolpopa’s unique doctrinal views with respect to ultimate truth and their related Indie sources are found in Rinchen’s doctrinal formulation of Mahāyāna literature. Furthermore, there is a good reason to argue that Dolpopa’s unique views were directly influenced by the Kadam scholar.10 Therefore, in this article, I analyze their points of convergence and divergence on the issues of buddha-nature,
textual authority, and doxographical strategy, and suggest that Kadam influence on Dolpopa needs to be recognized more than we do in modern scholarship on Dolpopa’s works. (Wangchuk, introduction, 9–11)
It is well recognized by Buddhologists that the Mahāsāṃghika sect arose by a schism from the previously undivided Buddhist saṃgha in the second century after the Buddha's Nirvāṇa (A.N.), leaving the other part of the saṃgha to be called Sthavira. As to precisely when the schism occurred, there was a difference of opinion as to whether it happened as a result of the Second Buddhist Council (about 110 A.N.) over a laxity of Vinaya rules by some monks, or happened later in the century (137 A.N.) over the five theses about Arhats and which occasioned a 'Third Buddhist Council' sponsored by the Kings Nanda and Mahāpadma. There were some other possibilities, as summarized by Nattier and Prebish,[2] who conclude that the schism occurred 116 A.N. over Vinaya rules, while the argument over Arhat attainment provoked a further split within the already existing Mahāsāṃghika sect. It is immaterial for our purposes whether the 'five theses of Mahādeva' downgrading the Arhat occasioned the schism between the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Sthaviras, or whether this downgrading was an internal argument within the Mahāsāṃghika. What is important here is that the downgrading of the Arhat continued into a Mahāyāna scripture called the Śrīmālā-sūtra, and that the five theses are a characteristic of the Mahāsāṃghika, to wit: 1. Arhats are tempted by others, 2. they still have ignorance, 3. they still have doubt, 4. they are liberated by others; and 5. the path is accompanied by utterance. The fifth of these seems explainable by other Mahāsāṃghika tenets, in Bareau's listing:[3] No. 58 'morality is not mental'; No. 59 'morality does not follow upon thought'; No. 60 'virtue caused by a vow increases'; No. 61 'candor (vijñapti) is virtue'; No. 62 'reticence (avijñapti) is immoral.'
Part I of this paper attempts to relate the Śrīmālā-sūtra and the Tathāgatagarbha doctrine to the Mahāsaṃnghika school. Part II discusses the terms dharmatā and svabhāva so as to expose an ancient quarrel. (Wayman, introduction, 35–36)
Notes
- Akira Hirakawa, "The Rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relationship to the Worship of Stupas," Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko, No. 22, Tokyo, 1963, p. 57.
- Janice J. Nattier and Charles S. Prebish, "Mahāsaṃghika Origins: The Beginnings of Buddhist Sectarianism," History of Religions, 16:3, Feb., 1977, pp. 237, ff.
- André Bareau, Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule (École Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1955), Chapitre I 'Les Mahâsânghika', pp. 55–74.
Paul Williams’ Mahayana Buddhism is widely regarded as the standard introduction to the field, used internationally for teaching and research and has been translated into several European and Asian languages. This new edition has been fully revised throughout in the light of the wealth of new studies and focuses on the religion’s diversity and richness. It includes much more material on China and Japan, with appropriate reference to Nepal, and for students who wish to carry their study further there is a much-expanded bibliography and extensive footnotes and cross-referencing. Everyone studying this important tradition will find Williams’ book the ideal companion to their studies. (Source: Routledge)
Paul Williams places this controversy in its Indian and Tibetan context. He traces in detail Mi pham's position in his commentary on the Bodhicaryaāvatāra, the attack of one of his opponents, and his response, as well as indicating ways in which this controversy over the nature of awareness may be important within the context of Mi pham's rNyingma heritage of rDzogs chen thought and practice.
This book is the first book length study of its subject, and also includes a reprint of a previous paper by Williams on the reflexive nature of awareness, as well as the relevant Tibetan texts from Mi pham. The book will be of interest to all students of Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka, as well as associated areas of Buddhist thought such as Yogācāra and the philosophy of Dharmakīrti. It will also be of value to those concerned with the intelectual foundations of rDzogs chen. (Source: Back cover of Routledge 2013 edition)
The idea of dhātu-vāda is thus an integral part of the Critical Buddhism critique and as such merits careful examination in any evaluation of the overall standpoint. Since Matsumoto first found the dhātu-vāda structure in Indian tathāgata-garbha and Yogācāra literature, we need to begin with a look at the texts in question. My approach here will be purely philological and will limit itself to the theoretical treatises (śāstras). (Yamabe, introductory remarks, 193)
Phillip B. Yampolsky has based his translation on the Tun-huang manuscript, the earliest extant version of the work. A critical edition of the Chinese text is given at the end of the volume.
Dr. Yampolsky also furnishes a lengthy and detailed historical introduction which contains much information hitherto unavailable even to scholars, and provides the context essential to an understanding of Hui-neng's work. He gives an account of the history and legends of Ch'an Buddhism, with particular attention to the traditions associated with Hui-neng, quoting or summarizing the most important narratives. He then discusses the various texts of the Platform Sutra, and analyzes its contents. (Source: Columbia University Press)
First of all, I would like you to consider all sentient beings who are equal to limitless space and generate a sense of loving kindness towards all of them. Generate the wish that each and every one of them may know happiness in this life and never return to the lower realms in future lifetimes, and that gradually they may all establish the status of buddhahood. Consider that it is for this purpose that you wish to receive the teachings on the. nature of the mind. Please give rise to the purest motivation of which you are capable.
In the past it was always traditional for the teacher to examine disciples and for disciples to examine the teacher. From the standpoint of the spiritual teacher, this process of examination was necessary to determine whether or not the disciples were suitable vessels to receive teachings on the nature of the mind. From the standpoint of the disciples, it was necessary to determine whether or not the teacher was qualified to truly bring benefit to the disciples. In this way, much care would be taken by both teacher and disciples to examine one another, after which a relationship would be established and the teachings would be transmitted.
These days both teacher and disciple are unable to do this. If you ask whether or not I am a truly qualified teacher of dzogchen, I am not. If I were, I would be able to see into the minds of all the disciples and know exactly whether they are ready· for the teachings or not. It is only a realized being, only a buddha, who has the power to really understand the minds of others. Therefore we should consider that the teacher of dzogchen must truly be an enlightened one. In our present circumstances we can also consider, first, that the mind of all sentient beings is buddha, that all~entient beings possess the buddha nature, which is their very essence, and second, that we have all obtained the precious human rebirth. With these two things together the teachings are allowed to be transmitted and received. (Yangthang Rinpoche, Introduction to the Nature of Mind, Section One: The Prerequisites, 1–2)
The present report overviews further findings from the set of miscellaneous texts in Śāradā palm-leaves from Zha lu ri phug. The palm-leaf set was first reported by Kano Kazuo (2008), who utilized nine folios in two photographic images (Sferra Cat. MT 42 II/1& 2) preserved at the Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente (IsIAO) in Rome with the help of Francesco Sferra. We have known on the basis of catalogue descriptions that there are further folio images from the same set preserved in other institutes, viz. the China Tibetology Research Center (中国藏学研究中心, CTRC) and the China Ethnic Library (中国民族图书馆, CEL). In other words, the photographic images of the set have been scattered and separately preserved in the three institutes. Ye Shaoyong and Li Xuezhu have independently paid special attention to these materials and researched them.[1]
It was during a lunch break on 2 August 2012 on the occasion of the 5th Beijing International Seminar on Tibetan Studies at CTRC that the present authors (Ye, Li, Kano) met together and became aware of the fact that we were studying folios from one and the same collection. We quickly decided collaboration by unifying each one’s results and sharing all related materials (As for the CTRC material, we share transcription prepared by Li). After collecting the folios together, we have come to know the number of folios of the set as 87 in total, in which 46 folios are found in CTRC images (Sang De Cat. No. 100, [3], [5] = Luo Cat., 136ff., No. 44, [3], [5]) and 41 are found in CEL images (Wang Cat. No.10, 15, 16, 17). The nine leaves in IsIAO images as reported by Kano (2008) overlap with those in CEL (Wang Cat. 10, 16). These folios contain more than fifteen works, most of which are, unfortunately, incomplete, and the remaining folios are yet to be found. There are also folios yet to be identified among the available ones. In the present report, we shall provide a preliminary survey on the Śāradā folios and an update of the report of Kano (2008) by supplying further identifications. (Ye, Li, and Kano, introduction, 30–31)
Notes
1. See Ye 2012 and Li 2011.
An Overview of Buddhist Tantra is the fourteenth volume from this collection and the first in the series to focus on tantra. Whereas previous volumes presented the general exoteric teachings of Buddhism, this work outlines the esoteric practice of tantra according to the Nyingma system. The author defines the parameters of tantra by dividing the work into outer and inner tantras, and concludes with explaining the result of the tantric path—enlightenment itself. Designed to be a companion for dedicated practitioners who receive direct instructions from a qualified teacher, this work is a comprehensive manual that provides the foundation for understanding the genuine and profound teachings of Buddhist tantra. (Source: Shambhala Publications)
This book contains four Tibetan texts in translation. First, The Excellent Path to Liberation explains how to give our attention to the teachings, and how to ground our spiritual practice in harmonious relationships with others and the world at large. Second, Dudjom Lingpa’s account of his visionary journey, Enlightenment without Meditation, teaches by example that as practitioners we should ask ourselves sincere questions concerning our perception of reality, and that we should not be content with superficial answers.
In the third book, Sera Khandro’s commentary, she presents Dudjom Lingpa’s work within two frameworks. She first clarifies the view on which the spiritual path is founded, the path of meditation; the ensuing conduct that reflects and enriches meditative experience; and the path’s result—awakening and enlightenment. Next she illuminates the subtleties of the great perfection view, the four tantric bonds: nonexistence, a single nature, pervasive insubstantial evenness, and spontaneous presence.
Source: Shambhala Publications
term was coined and took shape. It will become evident that it is impossible to reduce the genesis and meaning of the term tathāgatagarbha by way of a monoexplanatory model.
Common throughout the De bźin bśegs pa’i sñiṅ po’i mdo (Tathāgatagarbha sūtra) of the Lang Kanjur are several features which are generally assumed to be archaic, such as the ya btags in all words beginning with m- followed by the vowel i or e (e.g. myi, myed, etc.), the usage of the da drag, the tsheg placed before śad, the mtha’ rten ’a (e.g. dpe’ ), occasionally a reversed gi gu, la(s) (b)stsogs pa for la sogs pa, the omission of genitive particles and, in the verses, the reading ’i instead of yi ( ’i counting as a full syllable).
The version of the sūtra represents the canonical transmission (and not the translation found in the “Kanjur from Bathang”).[85] Stemmatically, the text in the Lang Kanjur is very close to the three Phug brag versions of the sūtra, which have been shown to derive from one and the same archetype.[86] It shares mistakes with this archetype. In other instances it is, however, free of the secondary readings found in all three of the Phug brag versions. In all the cases where Phug brag shares a
mistake with the representatives of the Tshal pa-line, the Kanjur version from Dolpo also has this secondary reading. Its use for establishing the stemma of the canonical versions of the De bźin gśegs pa’i sñiṅ po’i mdo is therefore restricted primarily to evaluating the readings of the Phug brag Kanjur in the instances where Phug brag deviates from the Tshal pa-transmission. In all the cases where the Chinese translations of the sūtra could be used to decide on the originality of a reading in the Tibetan, it turned out that whenever the variant in the Lang Kanjur was identical with the one of Tshal pa as against Phug brag, the latter variant was secondary. (Zimmermann, appendix, 104–5)
Notes
85. For more details on this paracanonical translation see Zimmermann 1998.
86. See Zimmermann 2002: 173–177.
Among the Tibetan Collection of the Newark Museum in Newark (New Jersey) there is an incomplete manuscript Kanjur from Bathang in Khams (East Tibet). In spite of the fact that this
Kanjur was already donated to the museum as early as 1920 it is surprising that it has only recently become the object of a scholarly treatment of some length.[1] In his critical edition of the Mahāsūtras (cp. n. 1), Peter Skilling has used internal criteria to prove that the Bathang Kanjur is affiliated to neither the Tshal pa lineage nor to the Them spangs ma lineage of textual transmission. Its independent character can also be ascertained by external kanjurological
criteria: the collection of the texts, its grouping and its order within the volumes are unique. It becomes, therefore, very plausible that "the Newark Kanjur belongs to an old and independent textual transmission that predates the compilation of the Tshal pa and Them spangs ma collections."[2]
Contained in the ta volume of the sūtra section (mdo bsde ta) of this Kanjur is the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra (TGS).[3] In the process of editing the Tibetan text of this important Mahāyāna work, of which no Indic copies have come down to us, I used most of the available, historically relevant Kanjurs.[4] Among these 13 versions alone the TGS found in this Kanjur from Bathang represents a different, second translation (Bth). As the existence of two independent Tibetan translations of the same Indic text are of rare occurrence, this study intends to throw light on the differences between the two Tibetan texts, to describe the particular features of Bth and finally to classify it within the history of Tibetan translation activities. (Zimmermann, introductory remarks, 33–35)
Notes
- For a description of the Kanjur cp. Eleanor Olson, Catalogue of the Newark Museum Tibetan Collection, Vol. III, Newark 1971, p. 114, dating it to the 16th century; the most detailed analysis of the 23 volumes of the Kanjur can be found in Peter Skilling's unpublished article Kanjur Manuscripts in the Newark Museum: A Preliminary Report, Nandapurī 1995; the only study including some texts of this Kanjur in a textcritical edition is Peter Skilling's (ed.) Mahāsūtras: Great Discourses of the Buddha, Vol. I: Texts, Oxford 1994 (The Pali Text Society, Sacred Books of the Buddhists Vol. XLIV).
- Skilling, Kanjur Manuscripts. . . . , p. 4.
- Vol. ta, folios 245b1–258a8. The title at the beginning of the volume reads de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po zhes bya ba'i mdo' . The title at the beginning of the sūtra itself runs: de bzhin gshyes <pa'i> snying po zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo. It seems remarkable that the Tibetan equivalent for Skt. ārya, 'phags pa, does not appear in the titles of the Bathang translation whereas it is common to all the other major Kanjurs. The spelling mdo bsde can be found "consistently on all tags" (Skilling, Kanjur Manuscripts. . . , p. 6, n. 16).
- The critical edition of the TGS is part of a Ph.D. thesis to be submitted at the University of Hamburg. The collation comprises the versions of the TGS as contained in the Kanjurs from Berlin, Derge, Lithang, London, Narthang, Peking (Ōtani reprint), Phug brag (three versions), Stog, Tabo (fragmentary) and Tokyo (Toyo Bunko) compared with the two Chinese translations. Bth will be appended as a diplomatic edition.
I have been able to trace a hitherto unidentified quotation in the Ratnagotravibhāga(vrtti) (RGV(V)) to the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra (TGS). The sentence in question occurs in the RGV(V) in the context of the explanation of the three svabhāvas of the dhātu, viz., dharmakāya, tathatā and gotra, the three key terms of verses 1.27-28, which constitute the central section of the RGVV. The quotation is part of the commentary on the third aspect, i.e., gotra, and is placed after the last of the three interpretations of the compound tathāgatagarbha. In this context the dhātu of living beings, i.e., their buddha essence, has
just been declared to mean "cause" (hetu).
In his comprehensive study of the development of the tathāgatagarbha teaching, J. Takasaki also deals with the sūtra which bears the name of this Mahāyāna philosophical current.[1] The Tathāgatagarbhasūtra (TGS) has generally been referred to as the earliest expression of this doctrine and the term tathāgatagarbha itself seems to have been coined by this very sūtra. In this paper I intend to introduce the textual history and doctrinal content of the TGS and offer some speculations concerning the possible motivations lying behind its compilation. By pointing out some interesting parallels concerning the structure and formulations in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra (SP), I shall then suggest that the SP and the TGS carry a similar compositional line. Finally, I shall determine the position and role of the TGS in Mahāyāna Buddhism as a sūtra presupposing the doctrine of the SP and providing its metaphysical foundation. (Zimmermann, introductory remarks, 143–44)
Notes
- Jikidō Takasaki 高崎直道, Nyoraizō shisō no keisei (Formation of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory), Tokyo 1974 (Shunjū-sha): pp. 40–68.
Notes
- An excellent summary of the positions put forward by the proponents of the idea that buddha-nature is not Buddhist, on the one hand, and criticism of this position, on the other, is found in Hubbard and Swanson, 1997. It is my understanding that the representatives of the so-called Critical Buddhism movement (hihan bukkyō 批判仏教) started out with the aim of reforming certain deplorable states of affairs in Japanese Buddhism, but quickly turned against much of what characterizes the history of Buddhist ideas in India and beyond. Though their immediate aim was thus laudable, the normativity of their approach makes it difficult for a critical scholar of the intellectual history of Buddhism to accept their criticisms.
- The most comprehensive discussion of the scriptures on buddha-nature in India is still Takasaki, 1974.
Until now several scholars have dealt with Tibetan texts of the manuscript collection of Tabo monastery in Spiti District, Himachal Pradesh, India.[1] With this short contribution I would like to throw light on the Tabo fragments of one of the Tibetan translations of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, in Tibetan De bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po'i mdo. l shall focus on the textual characteristics and the relation of the Tabo fragments to the versions of the sūtra contained in the other main Kanjurs. It is strictly to be kept in mind that all conclusions drawn from the presentation of the material and its evaluation can only claim validity for the De bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po'i mdo. My conclusions are not meant to provide a characterization of the Tabo Kanjur in general. Though, regarding the position of the manuscript in the general, Kanjur stemma, there seem to be certain tendencies common to all the texts of the Kanjur found in Tabo and analysed until now, each work should be seen as an individual case. Only when a sufficient number of studies will have been executed and will repeatedly confirm the results shall we be able to draw conclusions of a more general nature. (Zimmermann, introductory remarks, 177)
Notes
- See the studies in East and West 44–1, 1994, and SCHERRER-SCHAUB / STEINKELLNER 1999; further PAGEL 1999: 165–210.
So far, no lifeless universe has been discovered. That is, the occurrence of matter without the occurrence of life is, judging by the available empirical evidence viewed globally, something that does not happen. In every case that matter has been there in any universe, life has occurred—eventually.
I do not mean that there has never been a time, a single snapshot moment or a billion such moments, during which there was only matter but no life. Nor do I mean that there is no part of the universe in which, considered in isolation from all other parts, there is only lifelessness. "In every case that matter has been there in any universe, life has occurred" is true even if there are immense periods of time, considered in isolation, and immense swaths of space, considered in isolation, where there is no life.
The crux of the problem, however, lies in those three words, "considered in isolation." Everything depends on how we divide things up, where our definition of "one thing" begins and ends.
For what I mean when I say that "matter without life has never existed" is that, scientifically speaking, there has never appeared even one particle of any kind of matter found in any non-life-producing universe, considering that universe as a whole. For no non-life-producing universe has yet been discovered. Likewise, there is no lifeless matter in any period of time that is not part of at least one sequence of time that produces life.
All matter that has ever been discovered has existed only in a universe that also contains life, and all lifeless times were part of this sequence of time we are now in, the total sequence of time that produced this life.
No lifeless universe has ever been discovered. Among all the universes that have been discovered so far, there is not even one that is devoid of life. I challenge you or anyone to show me even one particle of matter, or even one moment of time, from a universe without life.
At this point we have merely been speaking empirically about what has so far been discovered. There are very few things that we can know with absolute certainty without relying on empirical contingency. But in fact this is one thing we can know with absolute certainty: no universe will ever be discovered devoid of life.
We can know this for two reasons. The first is perhaps relatively trivial, although some philosophers attach great significance to it. It is that the act of "discovering" itself requires a living being. Ipso facto, wherever any discovering is done, life is also present. Therefore no universe devoid of life can ever be discovered.
The second reason has to do with how we define universe. Th is is the hidden premise of the claims I am making here: it is because we understand the idea of "universe" in a certain way that we can claim, with absolute certainty, that there is no lifeless universe. If the universe is taken in its broadest meaning, which is also its most commonsensical meaning, it means "all that exists." All that exists certainly includes this planet, this solar system, this period of time. The universe in this broadest sense is what includes any more-narrowly construed universes—for example, all alternate universes. If we call the sum total of all possible universes "the universe," then it is obvious that there is no universe but this one, and since this one contains life, no universe can be discovered that is devoid of life. Whatever might be discovered is by definition part of this totality that includes our lives.
All of the above is true even if life exists only once, for a few million years, on one small planet. Even if there was no life for billions of years—and in most of the universe there never has been and never will be life—even if the phenomenon "life" is a peculiar flash that occurs only on planet Earth between the Hadean Eon 4,500 million years ago until 2018 CE, and never arises anywhere ever again, it is still true that there is no universe devoid of life and that there can never be any universe devoid of life.
And yet people often contemplate those vast billions of years and expanses of space and speak of "lifeless matter." This makes sense only if we divide the world in a certain way. That is, it is only because we are in the habit of dividing self and other, or mind and its objects, or—to put it most generally—inside and outside, that it is possible to speak of lifeless matter. Only if any one part of the universe is thought of as an entity truly separate from all other parts can anything be lifeless. The key question is how much of the universe do we consider to be "one thing." Where do we draw the line that divides inside from outside? If "me and that rock" are one thing, that one thing has life, just as "my skin and my fingernails" has life. If me and that rock are separate, then my body has life and the rock has no life.
Mahāyāna Buddhism, particularly that developed in the Madhyamaka school and further elaborated in Tiantai Buddhism, holds that the separation of "inside and outside" is impossible to sustain in any nonambiguous way. These schools generally develop this idea logically by use of reductio ad absurdum arguments that try to demonstrate that any way of drawing common-sense dividing lines to define one object in distinction to another end up being self-contradictory. (Read the entire article here).
The Third Karmapa, Rangjung Dorje. A Collection of Important Root Texts: Gyu Lama, Zangmo Nangdon, Namshe Yeshe Chepa, and the Hevajra Tantra. Vajra Vidya Library, 2011.
The Third Karmapa, Rangjung Dorje. A Collection of Important Root Texts: Gyu Lama, Zangmo Nangdon, Namshe Yeshe Chepa, and the Hevajra Tantra. Vajra Vidya Library, 2011.;ཟབ་མོ་ནང་དོན་དང་རྒྱུད་བརྟག་གཉིས་དང་རྒྱུད་བླ་མའ་བསྟན་བཅོས།;Karmapa, 3rd;Karma Kagyu;Vajrayana;Third Karmapa Rangjung Dorje;རང་བྱུང་རྡོ་རྗེ་;rang byung rdo rje;karma pa gsum pa;ཀརྨ་པ་གསུམ་པ་;Karmapa, 3rd; nang brtag rgyud gsum: zab mo nang don;rgyud brtag gnyis;rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos
